This chapter seeks to provide a modest contribution to the understanding of terrorism. It explores, in particular, “Muslim suicide terrorism” not as a religious but as a sociological phenomenon. It locates terrorism in the context of crisis situation of the modern world and seeks to situate Muslim suicide terrorism as a religious response to the consequences of European colonialism and crisis in society. Many so-called terrorists are not passive objects of social, economic, and political forces, or puppets, but are instead educated and innovative international actors who have developed well worked-out methodologies to put their plans into action and to achieve political goals.
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (1977) offers a useful way of understanding the ways in which the environments in which Muslim suicide terrorists are raised and cultural and material influences shape their disposition to act, their means of interpreting the world, and ultimately how they express themselves politically. This chapter attempts to redefine the contours of Muslim suicide terrorism by removing it from its surrogate abode in Islam to its rightful domicile in the postcolonial situation in which many Muslims live. It presents Muslim suicide terrorism as a habitus that is responsible for structuring political comportment and action. The attempt is to understand why terrorism occurs in the Muslim context and seeks to demonstrate that what we are dealing with today is a general habitus of Muslim suicide terrorism induced by the crisis situation in society directly afflicting many Muslims. I argue that Muslim suicide terrorism is a response to the consequences of colonialism and the crisis or negative consequences of modernity; economic deprivation, social injustice, inequality, political turmoil, and so on.
The term “terrorism” has its origin in the word terror, which has a Latin origin meaning “to frighten.” It is perhaps for this reason that terrorism is often used interchangeably with the term “terror,” obscuring the possibility of a more precise, tangible, and meaningful explanatory definition of the term. Also, terrorism is a term that is politically and emotionally charged (Hoffman 2006). At the same time, it is not immutable: “Separating the tactics of terror from the concept of terrorism is necessary but difficult” (Mahan and Griset 2008: 3). These factors make the task of defining terrorism in any precise way enormously difficult (Wardlaw 1989). Yet the definition of terrorism is imperative simply because it has important ramifications. For instance, organizing global counter-terrorism operations necessitates common agreement among those involved over rules and procedures (Deflem 2006). Prosecution, surveillance, prehearing incarcerations, and imprisonment under terrorism law similarly demands properly worked out definition.
Sue Mahan and Pamala L. Griset describe terrorism as “an ideological and political concept” (2008: 3). In terms of terrorism as a political concept, Hoffman asserts that “Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term is fundamentally and inherently political” (2006: 2). Politics is about power struggle, therefore, any definition is likely to spark emotive and hostile disputation. Terrorism derives its meaning from a broader philosophy to which an individual or a group subscribes.
In light of this, if a person shares the philosophical viewpoint of terrorists, he or she is a terrorist and if a person disagrees with such a view, he or she is not a terrorist (Cooper 2001). Is terrorism simply a matter of personal viewpoint? A vast majority of people would agree that fundamental values—for example, justice and freedom—are worth protecting and fighting for, even if one must sacrifice their own life in the process. In a sense then, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” (Crenshaw 2001; Lodge 1982; Velter and Perlstein 1991). Oppressive governments describe those who resist them as terrorists. However, those who use violence to overpower the same governments consider themselves “freedom fighters.” Hoffman (2006) observes that most, if not all, terrorist organizations understand themselves as freedom fighters. If politics and ideology could be separated from the definition, it would hardly matter who is terrorizing whom. However, this is not actually the case, and as Cooper (2001) suggests, terrorism must be defined by the character of the act itself.
So why, then, is terrorism so difficult to define? Hoffman (2006) says this is because the meaning of terrorism changes so frequently that there is no way of holding onto one meaning forever or for a prolonged period of time. Cooper (2001: 881) says that it is due to the fact that “there has never been, since the topic began to command serious attention, some golden age in which terrorism was easy to define.” Additionally many violent acts such as war, riot, organized crime, or even a common assault, may easily fall under some definitions of terrorism. Even damage to property that does not jeopardize life is ordinarily perceived as a crime of nonviolent nature. However, for critics of so-called “eco-terrorists” such as the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front (Kushner 2003), property damage is viewed as an act of violence and terrorism.
Walter Laqueur claims that “more than a hundred definitions have been offered” (1999: 5), including a number of his own, and says that terrorism is difficult to define because “there is not one but many different terrorisms” (ibid.: 46). Schmid and Jongman (1988) found 109 definitions in their well-known review in the late 1980s and Andrew Silke (2004) asserts that this figure had doubled by 2004.
Any definition of terrorism must include individual motivation, social environmental factors, and political purpose. So this discussion relies on Hoffman’s definitional model, which distinguishes certain pivotal characteristics of terrorism and leads to some understanding of the concept. Terrorism is:
• ineluctably political in aims and motives;
• violent—or, equally important, threatens violence;
• designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim, or target;
• conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command, or
• conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia), or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or
• inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders, and
• perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity. (Hoffman 2006: 40)
It has been argued that terrorism began in first century Judea during the Jewish rebellion against Roman occupation (66–73 CE) (Kushner 2003; Hoffman 2006; Mahan and Griset 2008). One faction of the rebels called “Sicarii” were named for a short carved dagger (sica) which they used to slit the throats of both Romans and members of the Jewish establishment in public. They were part of a group known as Zealots (from Greek zelos, meaning strong spirit) who stood against Roman occupation of Judea.
During the French Revolution, the Jacobin Club led by Maximilien Robespierre, which rose to power in France in 1792, enforced a régime de la terreur commonly known in English as the “Reign of Terror” (June 1793–July 1794). This is a potent example of state terrorism executed to advance the objectives of a revolutionary movement. Although the Reign of Terror was enforced by the Jacobin-dominated government of the day, when the Jacobins lost power, “terrorist” became a term of abuse. The Jacobin Club’s actions were the first to be described as terrorism in the modern world by British philosopher Edmund Burke (Mahan and Griset 2008). This is apparently an early example of the term being used in its contemporary sense.
In the twentieth century, terrorism became the trademark of numerous political movements from both sides of the political spectrum. Technological advancements such as automatic, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and miniature electrically detonated explosives, provided terrorists with new modes of causing death. The development of air transportation facilitated new techniques, methods, and opportunities. Terrorism was almost an official policy in authoritarian states such Nazi Germany during the reign of Adolf Hitler, the Soviet Union when Stalin was in power, China during Mao Zedong’s leadership, and Cambodia under Pol Pot.
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, some of the most extreme groups involved in terrorism had an innovative religious ideology—for instance, HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamia or Islamic Resistance Movement), Hezbollah (Party of God), and al-Qaeda (Arabic for “The Base”) in the Middle East. Some of these groups, including the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka, espoused the method of suicide bombing or suicide terrorism, in which the bomber would try to cause destruction to an important economic, military, political, or iconic object by detonating a bomb strapped on his or her body. For Muslims, the proclivity to commit acts of terrorism originated from new religious cosmology and ideology. As we will see, ideology plays a key role.
There is a long tradition in social science generally and in political science in particular which argues that the ideological factor is an important determinant of violent mobilization (Gurr 1970; Lichbach 1989; Muller and Seligson 1987). Although there is no Islamic scriptural support for terrorism, the ideology of Muslim suicide terrorism is developed from a complex interpretation of the concept of jihad (struggle), which is complex and multidimensional, but the common understanding of it is that it is a struggle against any “evil.”
Transnational jihadist ideology asserts that western states and societies are inimical to Islam. Jihadists see Islam and the Christian West in a conflictual relationship. They often trace this as far back as the Crusades and portray their enemy as violent and call for defensive combat against them. Hence, framing the combat as a defensive reaction against evil makes those engaged in this process appear to be victims rather than aggressors and consequently gives their cause a religious tone towards which all good Muslims are persuasively ushered.
Jihadists have an articulated ideology and a definitive plan. They generally work with a keen sense of the need for change on individual and social levels. The individual, they believe, needs to be properly socialized into the Jihadists’ version of the Islamic worldview and the community should be re-molded to espouse and project Islamic values into the political, economic, and social structures of society. Islam is used, and some may say abused, to reinforce group norms and to institute moral sanctions for individual behavior. It is used to provide universal goals and values, which in turn offer a sense of community (ummah).
This makes jihadism an attempt to re-establish an Islamic order, albeit the Jihadists’ version of it. Muslims governed by the shariah (Islamic law), a society in which justice, moral purity, peace, and prosperity prevail, can be achieved through an Islamic polity (Guazzone 1995). Moral purity, therefore, is the key aspect of Jihadist ideology. Untainted morality is achievable, for the Jihadist movements, not through rationality but through serious observance of the shariah and by living in an Islamic state governed by Islamic principles (Moussalli 1999). Islam is din wa-dawlah (religion and state) precisely because morality is absolute. Thus, Jihadist ideology conceives of Islam as an all-encompassing system embodying social, economic, political, and spiritual aspects of life in one complete and holistic order (ibid.).
Founded upon this ideology, Muslim suicide terrorism is political terrorism or political in nature. If we place the Muslim experience in the context of European colonialism and in the crisis situation of the Muslim world, a much clearer picture emerges that explains some of the motives and rationales behind Muslim terrorist activities in recent years. Before we do this, however, let us examine Bourdieu’s A Theory of Practice (1977) and his pivotal concept of habitus to provide the overall discussion with some theoretical context.
Bourdieu’s theoretical project is a vital contribution to the analysis and explication of “social influences,” especially of what people do and why they do it, and how their social actions contribute to the reproduction of those very influences (Rey 2007: 40). Social influences explain how Muslim suicide terrorists come to perceive and understand their social world, how they shape their disposition to act, and how they choose to express themselves politically. Bourdieu focused on constructing a critical sociology that explained power relationships generated and regenerated out of cultural resources, processes, and institutions (Swartz 1997: 52). For Bourdieu, power is not an independent sphere but is, rather, located at the center of social life. Culture is viewed by Bourdieu as an expression of power, and not necessarily without political content. Bourdieu sees sociology as a powerful analytical tool capable of “producing awareness of those mechanisms that make life painful, even unlivable” and of “bringing contradictions to light” (Bourdieu 1999: 629). “Symbolic violence” is a key concept in A Theory of Practice, which refers to the norms and values espoused by dominant social actors in the society, “naturalized” as self-evident “truth” and accepted as such by the dominated populace. This power is both visible and invisible in the social sphere. Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice (1977) reveals a set of diverse modalities of power as they are negotiated through cultural tools at the social level and at the level of individual choice, affecting the temperament to engage in political action and assume a political identity. The practice, therefore, is the outcome of different habitual configurations and dispositions (habitus) accompanied by resources (capital) and ignited by social settings or social conditions (fields) (Crossley 2001: 96). The interaction between capital and fields and hegemonic subjects that shape individual experience often have indirect effect with which they may not consciously identify, yet which inform their insights and worldview (habitus).
The habitus may be seen as the quiescent part in the construction and expression of identity that ultimately shapes practice and action. Habitus assists the disposition to assume and practice a particular identity. For Muslim suicide terrorists, it may be suggested that identities are constructed in relation to these practices in fields of resistance.
Habitus denotes people’s ability to presuppose the mindset and actions needed within specific social settings or fields to better understand, in the present case, Muslim suicide terrorism. It is habitus and its connection with the field and the capital treasured by the field that establishes what a person is capable of doing or achieving. It is a common set of learned and embodied temperaments and knowledge of the world, built out of both objective structures and individual biography.
The term “habitus” is related to the words “habit” and “habitual.” It denotes an inclination towards a particular way of behaving—ingrained in our bodies as well as our intellects, normally at the subconscious level. Habitus is second nature:
Habitus tends to shape individual action so that existing opportunity structures are perpetuated. Chances of success or failure are internalised and then transformed into individual aspirations or expectations; these are in turn externalised in action that reproduce the objective structure of life chances. (Swartz 1997: 103).
According to Bourdieu (1977: 8 and 95), habitus refers to “generative principles of distinct and distinctive practices” that are directly connected to being immersed in different social and cultural norms which work together as a fusion of force between “the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position” and “a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, practices.” Drawing attention to his idea of the collective embodiment of processes, Bourdieu explains that the principles, norms, values, and common rituals and practices in everyday social living are embodied “beyond the grasp of consciousness,” and that the body as a vessel of memory is composed in a way that is “capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy” (ibid.: 94):
… the habitus is the product of the work of inculcation and appropriation necessary in order for those products of collective history, the objective structures, (e.g. language, economy etc.) to succeed in reproducing themselves more or less completely, in the forms of durable dispositions. (Ibid.: 85).
Bourdieu explains how practice (agency) is connected to capital and field (structure) through habitus. In Distinction (1984: 110), Bourdieu demonstrates this figuratively by the following formula: (Habitus x Capital) + Field = Practice.
Put differently, what people do in society (action) is practice, which occurs in a variety of interrelated ways in the fields—sub-spaces in society or the social world—that together make up society. What people do amounts to personal pursuit of different possessions (capital); whether these are symbolic or “real” depends on the fields in which their practice takes place. Perhaps what makes Bourdieu’s concept of habitus important for an analysis of Muslim suicide terrorism is his challenge to connect microsystem variables such as framing and cognitive schemes to macropower structures.
In the last 150 years or so, the conditions for terrorism were incubating in Muslim responses to the challenges and experiences generated by western influence and intrusion. European conquests of Muslim territories, which began in the sixteenth century, overwhelmed Muslim societies with new western technologies, methods of economic management, political systems, and ideology (Bagader 1994). The advent of colonialism broke up the established Islamic political order, particularly that of the Mughal dynasties and the Safavid and Ottoman Empires, which had remained intact for centuries, and contested traditional beliefs and norms, thus causing a major crisis of Islamic authority and Muslim identity (ibid.). Under western influence and colonial rule, modernity “found its way” into the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam), bringing sweeping changes in the Muslim world (Rahman 1982; Esposito 1983; Hunter 1988). The processes of secularization, urbanization, and modernization, undermined and challenged old myths, doctrines, institutions, social structures, and social relationships. As a result, Muslims and Muslim societies underwent radical socio-economic, cultural, and political reorganization, reshuffles, and changes (Rahman 1982).
To counter the domination of European colonial powers and secure its survival, the Islamic religion took on a political dimension in the twentieth century in the dar al-Islam, inspiring anti-colonial and nationalist movements. Many Muslim states adopted the political, economic, and educational institutions of the western states that had colonized them. They experimented with liberal nationalism, socialism, and Marxist communism but without success: “Problems of authoritarianism, legitimacy, and political participation continued to plague most Muslim countries” (Esposito 1983: 12).
Despite the majority of Muslim states embracing modernization and national development after independence, in general, social and economic conditions did not improve for ordinary Muslims (Hunter 1988). Many continued to experience poverty, social inequality, and injustice. Living standards for most ordinary Muslims barely changed. A general mood of decline and stagnation continued and the vast majority of Muslims finally realized that “the paradigm of modernisation and the political elites associated with it have failed to avert the Islamic world’s decline and end its state of political and economic dependency” (ibid.: xii). By uprooting old social and political institutions and patterns of relationships, whether based on tradition or religion, material modernity created a void. The newly created social and political forces and other new demands did not properly cater for or offer appropriate channels of expression: “The result for the majority of people has been a growing feeling of psychological, social, and political alienation and disorientation” (ibid.: xiii).
The development of Muslim terrorism as a significant political phenomenon can be understood from this perspective. That is, many Muslims felt a strong sense of being socially, economically, and politically eclipsed and deprived of the benefits of modernization. Muslim terrorism, therefore, is a struggle against the forces “hostile” to religion and aspects of traditional and religious life. Muslim terrorists who subscribe to this ideological approach see terrorism as the last hope for bringing about religiously practical and acceptable changes in their societies. For these terrorists, the recovery of Islamic glory is the solution to currently existing problems or more broadly to the crisis of modernity.
Some studies (Atran 2005; Baregu 2002) posit that there is no correlation between economic and material deprivation—that is, poverty—and terrorism, whilst others (Berman 2002; Gutierrez 2002; Richmond 2003) concede a strong link. The South Korean Nobel Peace Prize laureate Kim Dae-Jung acknowledged in 2001 that poverty breeds terrorism, and his view was echoed subsequently by other members of the exclusive group of Nobel Peace Prize winners (Jai 2001). Laura D’Andrea Tyson, former chief of the Presidential Council of Economic Advisors under the Clinton administration and dean of the Hass School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley, suggested a Marshall Plan to combat political despotism and eradication of poverty because she saw poverty and hopelessness in poor remote parts of the world were perfect breeding grounds for a network of terrorism bent on wreaking havoc and mass destruction (Tyson 2001). Hudson posits that “terrorists in much of the developing world tend to be drawn from the lower sections of society. The rank-and-file of Arab terrorist organizations include substantial numbers of poor people, many of them homeless refugees” (1999: 50). Krueger and Maleckova (2002) in their study of Hezbollah militants in Lebanon found a statistical link between poverty and terrorism, in that poverty had a strong negative effect on the possibility of some members of the Lebanese community becoming Hezbollah militants, or, more precisely, a 30 per cent increase in poverty led to a 15 percent rise in Hezbollah militant recruitment. Li and Schaub (2004: 236) posit that “a primary cause of transnational terrorism is underdevelopment and poverty … Poor economic conditions create ‘terrorist breeding’ grounds, where disaffected populations turn to transnational terrorist activities as a solution to their problems.”
The impact of limited economic opportunity has a multiplier effect, which links with the attraction to militancy and terrorism. In Muslim countries, a strong cultural expectation exists for young men. Employment for young men forms a conduit to independence enabling them to purchase their own homes, get married and raise families. With social breakdowns and economic crises, many young men and even women are unable to achieve this, and therefore are forced into long-term or even permanent “social cadetship.” This experience is not unique to young men in the Muslim world; young men in other poor countries suffer similar experiences. When the transition into adult independence seems unachievable for many young people and when they feel most vulnerable, terrorist organizations appear, offering solutions. The appeal of terrorism or terrorist organizations then is not only about economic independence or class position in the Marxist sense, but is associated with status in Weberian sense, connected to the importance of lifestyle, participation in consumer culture, and a sense of social freedom and well-being.
Though terrorism is a heterogeneous phenomenon, there is something that brings different terrorists and terrorist groups together, and that is their dissatisfaction with prevailing economic conditions, particularly poverty. The clearest evidence of the economic causes of terrorism or terrorism linked to economic issues in society, particularly poverty and socio-economic inequality, can be found in the recent work of Mutlu Koseli (2010) in Turkey. Koseli posits that it can be inferred from his study that Turkish provinces with a high percentage of poor populations have more terrorist incidents, when compared with more equal or even privileged provinces. He says that “In sum, it appears from the findings of this study that poverty and the conditions leading to such poverty are related to the support and spread of terrorism in the provinces of Turkey” (Koseli 2010: 159).
Another indicator of terrorism Koseli identifies in his study that is worth mentioning is education, which of course directly involves and affects young people who appear most prominently as terrorists. Koseli observes that when inequalities in education between provinces in Turkey rise, so do the incidents of terrorism. He notes that “It can be inferred from the results of this study that unequal distribution of education service is contributing to the support and spread of terrorism in the provinces of Turkey” (ibid.).
Poverty and lack of education among other factors, either independently or in conjunction with each other, in Turkey, and presumably elsewhere, are indicators which reveal that unequal distribution of government resources in society has a “real” connection with terrorism. One simple reason for this is that unequal distribution of government resources is seen, particularly in the underprivileged sector of society, as unfair and unjust. In this regard, Baregu (2002) and Gutierrez (2002) note that perception of injustice emanating from governmental failure is one of the prime motivations for terrorism.
There is no doubt that a correlation exists between economic and material depravation and terrorism. This can be further understood by looking at Durkheim’s (1951) concept of anomic suicide. Anomic suicide is the consequence of an unexpected and sudden change in the social standing of an individual. The change produces a new set of circumstances or a situation to which the individual is powerless to react. Take, for instance, sudden economic crises, a series of investment failures, or strings of resource busts (when the regulatory ability of the government and key institutions in society weakens and individual “feelings” are left unattended), suicide levels rise.
Consequently,
… a kind of declassement occurs, suddenly thrusting certain individuals into a situation inferior to the one they occupied hitherto. They must therefore lower their demands, restrain their wants, learn greater self-control … they are not adjusted to the condition imposed on them and find its very prospect intolerable; thus they experience sufferings which detach them from a reduced existence even before they have tried it. (Durkheim, quoted in Lukes 1975: 210)
It is critical to note, however, that individuals respond differently to crisis situations and not everyone afflicted by a reduced standard of living and poverty resorts to anomic suicide. It is, however, clear that one way in which individuals respond to their economic malaise or woes is anomic suicide or, in the Muslim context, “suicide terrorism.”
A factor other than economic that helps to explain terrorism is the crisis of modernity. It is being argued that the catalysts for Muslim terrorism are the negative consequences of the process of modernization, or the crisis of modernity. Modern political elites have been unsuccessful in preventing the Muslim world’s decline and stopping its political and economic dependency on the West. In this connection, Hunter explains:
Thus, while material modernity has tended to disintegrate old sociopolitical institutions and patterns of relationships, it has not replaced them with new ones … The result for the majority of people … psychological, social, and political alienation … These feelings … propelled … to seek some sense of stability and continuity by reverting to their traditional way of life. (Hunter 1988: xiii)
In a sense then, modernization has been largely unsuccessful in creating a just foundation for world societies and overcoming the social ills that have plagued humanity.
Similarly, Keyder argues that when Muslims failed to benefit from capitalism and modernization, they turned their backs on them and turned to “a community-building movement, seeking to keep the noxious effects of the market, which is identified with secularist immorality, out of the community of believers” (1986: 13). These real or perceived failures have provided the catalyst for many Muslims to join terrorist organizations.
Ted Gurr asserts that both small and large-scale studies on causes of terrorism reveal that it does not occur in a specific or prescribed place, but anywhere at any time. It is, however, true that terrorism has commonly been seen as occurring more “in developing societies rather than in the poorest countries or in the developed West and is especially likely to emerge in societies characterized by rapid modernization and lack of political rights” (Gurr 2006: 86). Butko argues that Islamist
… movements have arisen in reaction to attempts at rapid development and modernization which have not fulfilled the expectations of a majority of their populations. Urbanization, higher education and the perception of relative material deprivation have led to feelings of alienation, frustration, and hence, a growing sense of powerlessness. (Butko 2004: 33).
Muslim terrorism is thus viewed as a response to the prevailing conditions in the modern epoch. Muslim terrorism is undeniably the result of poor political and economic circumstances associated with the process of modernization in many Muslim countries.
Rising unemployment, the increasing divide between rich and poor, and lack of opportunities for young men and women in terms of employment and education all contribute to a crisis situation in society. Tessler asserts that Muslims “regard their problems as grounded in existing patterns of political economy, and they accordingly attribute much of the responsibility for their plight to the political regimes by which they are governed” (1997: 93).
The failure of their own governments and precarious local conditions turn Muslims towards terrorism. Sidahmed and Ehteshami argue that the constant failure of the states to meet people’s social needs in the face of rising economic problems and a “combination of … factors create[d] fertile ground for the growth of the Islamist forces” (1996: 7).
Mendelsohn argues that Islamists believe that the “disjoining” of religion and science as part of the process of secularization have effectively removed all restraints against what may be described in Islamist circles as the harmful forces of modern science and technology. Created by God to operate in perfect harmony to control nature, the Enlightenment project and subsequent secularization process have inappropriately introduced rivalry between science and religion, adversely impacting nature. Islamists have emerged as “the restorers of the lost harmony” (Mendelsohn 1993: 24).
In Rajaee’s argument, Muslim terrorism can be seen as a response “to the consequences of modernity—to its political (i.e., colonialism), educational (i.e., new school systems and modern institutions of learning), and ideological (i.e., the ideologies of nationalism, democracy, and socialism) by-products” (1993: 103, original emphasis). Like Rajaee, Roy argues that the Islamist cause is a modern phenomenon and a socio-religious response “of anti-colonialism, of anti-imperialism, which today has simply become anti-Westernism” (Roy 2001: 4).
Social conditions resulting from widespread conflicts which are characterized by oppressive policies and practices, discrimination, injustice, and inequality that cause extensive physical, economic, social, and cultural dislocations, weaken and even destroy the social ties that cement the structure of society, thus creating feelings of humiliation, uprootedness, isolation, bitterness, and vengeance, in some quarters. Such conditions constitute in part the crisis of modernity and are conducive to the rise of suicide terrorism, whereby some Muslims are willing to sacrifice their lives for a “greater good,” such as the honorable political existence of their community.
Social dissolution, particularly in contemporary Muslim societies, helps us discern that Muslim suicide terrorism is related to the disintegration of social groups where individuals feel disenfranchised and their ties to society and the stability of social relations within the society are all weakened if not destroyed. The high degree of social disintegration, normlessness, social isolation, disenfranchisement, discrimination, and repression in society leads some Muslims to suicide terrorism. Under the weight of the crisis of modernity, Muslims’ weak social integration leads them to extreme isolation or “social detachment” which precludes them from seeking support from family and the religious community to cope with difficulties. As a response, Muslims resort to suicide terrorism, not as an easy way out of a life of misery, but to make a political statement and as an act of unselfishness sacrifice where the goal is for the sake of the community. Muslim suicide terrorists believe that this is the supreme sacrifice and a cause for “greater good” and not a “suicide” for the purpose of achieving social prestige, public praise, and recognition.
Muslim suicide terrorism always manifests in public acts. What is important to note is that suicide bombers who work with each other in groups must also be motivated to achieve a collective goal, thereby engaging in or fulfilling a cause that is much larger and higher than the individual. Evidence such as video recordings and written testimonies of “Muslim martyrs” (shahids) often reveal altruistic motivation behind suicide bombing. The prevalence of joint missions or group strikes and the presence of Muslim-martyr video recordings and written testimonies, such as those left by members of the Hezbollah movement in Palestine (Dabbagh 2005), prove that a vast majority of acts of suicide terrorism are either in part or in full motivated by a shared purpose, and are not merely a reflection of personal grievance and sorrow (Pape 2005; Dabbagh 2005).
Most Muslim terrorist groups engaged in suicide missions or bombings are intimately intertwined with their respective societies because of their pursuit of political objectives which much of the society support, given the prevailing poor socio-economic and political conditions. From the perspective of Muslim terrorist groups or organizations, suicide attacks are necessary because of the existence of imbalance in military muscle between the state and themselves but, more importantly, attacks will exert greater pressure on the enemy. Put differently, suicide attacks are constructed around the idea of altruism, not as an end in themselves but as a vehicle for accomplishing the greater good of the collective.
People who have suffered hardship and crises for a prolonged period of time at the hands of a formidable enemy in the end react to perceived and real inferiority by lending support for suicide missions. Suicide attacks are a vehicle for people to vent their anger and express their feelings of disempowerment, uprootedness, dispossession, hopelessness, resentment, and injustice. Such attacks represent a confrontation between a subordinate group and the ruling authorities in which the former deliberately uses any resources at its disposal against an existing order it perceives as illegitimate.
Muslim terrorist campaigns are a form of resistance and should be seen as such. This resistance is directed toward the dominant class exercising power in the society. Thus Foucault’s concepts of power and resistance are handy for understanding Muslim suicide terrorism. For Foucault, power is the ability to bring about social change. The difference between “resistance” and “power” is linked to the “subject-position” of the subject that employs its ability to generate social change. The hegemonic subject is the dominant group that exercises power, whereas the counter-hegemonic subject is the underclass that resists.
For Foucault, behavioral options for a subject are regulated by the “subject-position” of that actor in the organization of power. A subject selects tactics from a pre-existing collection of mechanisms. In the case of Muslim suicide terrorists, it could be suggested that they select resistance from a composite of tactics available to counter-hegemonic subjects. Their agency is restricted as is their choice of tactics.
Whenever there is power, there is always resistance. This is a widely acknowledged fact. Based on this understanding of the power-resistance dynamic, resistance is a natural response to those in power, for example HAMAS’s resistance to Israel and Fateh, and the resistance of Fateh and Israel to HAMAS. Each subject in this network of power sees itself as a counter-hegemonic subject resisting the hegemonic subject. Resistance is an altruistic mechanism that seeks to change the power balance in the social world and bring about positive social change.
When aggrieved Muslim communities collectively share a sense of inequality, the situation quickly generates a sense of moral outrage, and consequently provides the motivation and justification for violence. How this violence is learnt then becomes critical in understanding Muslim suicide terrorist campaigns. Habitus enables us to understand that Muslim suicide terrorists have entered a new national and global situation produced by modernization and development. In these new settings, they are not only acquiring new knowledge and a new habitus, but are also attempting to revive parts of the old habitus.
Members of a social group (in this case, the in-group constituted by terrorists) place great emphasis on their socially shared standards—norms and values that distinguish them from the out-group—and they develop a unique habitus. In-groups such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda have their own rituals, practices, and ideologies. Members not only need to learn them but also practice them. Practices such as combat training in the context of suicide missions become critical. Potential bombers undergo training, for instance, to act normal in a crowd whilst having a bomb strapped to their bodies. They undergo intensive training and programming through attending lectures delivered by senior members, reviewing videos and written testimonies of past bombers, examining infrastructures and buildings for potential targets, body conditioning and disciplining, and target practice. Most importantly, they undergo intense psychological conditioning/indoctrination—which is the most critical part of developing a “terrorist habitus.” Undergoing these processes enables terrorists to acquire a particular outlook on the world and develop a unique disposition. These rituals of terrorism training separate the members from others and from other groups. They have their own categories, assumptions, and criteria to use to make sense of their own activities and the world as well as to measure others. Once the rituals and practices become internalized, they form the habitus, a second nature. Hence, blowing up oneself takes place “naturally,” as part of their acquired habitus.
Habitus can thus be seen making sense of the emergence of terrorist organizations and the practice of suicide violence. Muslims join terrorist organizations to become part of a solid group with distinct identity and undertake certain rituals, practices, and training within it to develop a habitus of self-destruction. The concept of “habitus” and its links with other important concepts of “field” and “capital” provides a powerful theoretical structure. The terrorist habitus shapes political action and infuses it with meaning as part of the development of identity. Muslim suicide terrorism is a collective Muslim experiential response to the consequences of colonialism and the crisis of modernity. The terrorist subculture is a habitus that develops over a period of time as part of the pursuit of capital in the field and eventually embodies the agency that becomes the practice.
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