Report made by Flight Lieutenant Gerald Le Blount Kidd RAFVR, close support controller aboard HMS Calpe Dated 24 August 1942
Communications worked excellently throughout and great credit is due to Flight Lieutenant Hall for his work in this connection. He also rendered invaluable assistance throughout the day as liaison officer between Air Commodore Cole and me and in other capacities.
No signals were received by me from Uxbridge so that it was not known what targets had been accepted and what squadrons were on their way.
The view enjoyed by the controller from the bridge was excellent and was invaluable in exercising control over aircraft. HQ ships 1 and 2 were often a good distance apart — as there were no fighters under the direct control of HQ 1 interceptions could not be made in several instances. Difficulty was experienced in locating the fighters actually under ship control. It was noted that aircraft in loose pairs and fours had a much better chance of making interceptions than aircraft in Squadron formation, — (This was seen only once). Fighters rarely, if ever, saw enemy aircraft before they were warned by the controller. Too often they were down sun of the convoy and too low and the attacks would be made from up sun and above.
Fighters were often too low and got fired at by the convoy gunners who were naturally very light on the trigger.
There was a lot of RT chatter between aircraft. As things turned out this did not matter but if closer control of close support squadrons or control of fighters had been required, intercom would have to be cut to a minimum.
Close support at Dieppe had little apparent effect on the houses which were evidently reinforced.
My aircraft recognition was very weak indeed, it is essential that controllers doing this type of work should be adept at this.
It was observed that enemy aircraft were often chased home by large numbers of our fighters, many of whom could have had very little hope of catching up. Cover over the convoy was left very thin on these occasions.
Excellent co-operation and assistance was at all time received from Squadron Leader Sprott on HQ 2. Apart from the fact that owing to the unforeseen strength and preparedness of enemy resistance the objectives were not gained and casualties were high. Nevertheless viewed as a combined operation the raid was a success of timing and close-co-operation between the services. The next combined attack will have a much better chance of success as a result of the great deal of experience gained by all who took part.
Much gratitude is felt for the pilots who looked after the convoy with such tireless resolve from the moment of first light until after the weather had closed down and for the organisation and preplanning that made that possible.
The Navy's efficiency and courtesy was much appreciated and the calm and cheerful courage of the Canadian Officers and men was an inspiration.
(Public Record File Air 16/765)