NOTES

INTRODUCTION

x Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: Technically “ISIS” no longer exists. The official name for the organization is now the Islamic State. We have stuck with “ISIS” purely for the sake of convenience, realizing that there’s an intense debate on nomenclature. Daesh, which many of our interviewees use, is the Arabic acronym for “Dawla al-Islamiya fil Eraq wa Sham,” or the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. Although the acronym doesn’t have a specific meaning, it is considered pejorative because of the hard sound of its pronunciation. The combination of letters in Arabic connotes thuggishness, harshness, and obtuseness. 

CHAPTER 1

 2 Zarqa was the biblical staging ground: Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al-Zarqawi and the New Generation (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005) 29–30.

 2 Zarqawi was an unpromising student: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 260.

 2 He drank and bootlegged alcohol: Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic, July 1, 2006, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/4983.

 2 His first stint in prison: Loretta Napoleoni, “Profile of a Killer,” Foreign Policy, October 20, 2009, foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/profile-of-a-killer.

 2 Worried that her son was descending: Weaver, 2006.

 3 It was a city of perpetual waiting: Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda (New York: Other Press, 2005) 16.

 4 If Azzam was the Marx: Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 135.

 4 Untold millions of dollars passed through: Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Vintage, 2007); Gerges, The Far Enemy, 134.

 4 Some of the world’s most notorious: Gerges, The Far Enemy, 76.

 5 By the end of the decade: Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006), 64–65.

 5 He had been the emir: Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 63, 66–67.

 5 In late November 1989: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 52–53.

 5 Theories as to the likely culprits: Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 93.

 5 One of the arrivals: Weaver, 2006.

 5 In the spring of 1989: Brisard, Zarqawi, 17.

6 Rather than return to Jordan: Ibid.

 6 Among those were the brother of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: Brisard, Zarqawi, 21.

 6 Despite his remedial Arabic: Ibid.

 6 He also met his future brother-in-law: Brisard, Zarqawi, 21; Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 32.

 6 Al-Hami had lost a leg to a land mine: Weaver, 2006.

 6 She traveled to Peshawar for the wedding: “,يواقرزلا بعصم وبأ ـ سانلل نايب اذه,” YouTube video, 34:05, posted by ةا ansaralshari3a, March 25, 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUrLMFautCI.

 6 According to al-Hami: Brisard, Zarqawi, 22.

 6 Al-Hami returned to Jordan: Brisard, Zarqawi, 23–24.

 6 He cast his lot with the Pashtun warlord: Brisard, Zarqawi, 24.

 7 It graduated the masterminds: “KSM trains at Sada camp,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified January 11, 2006, www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/ksm_trains_at_sada_camp.htm; “Hambali trains at Sada camp,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified January 11, 2006, www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/hambali_trains_at_sada_camp.htm.

 7 As recounted by Loretta Napoleoni: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 55.

 7 The first was “the days of experimentation,”: Ibid.

 7 The second was the “military preparation period,”: Ibid.

 7 Clausewitz for terrorists: Ibid.

 7 Al-Zarqawi returned to Jordan in 1992: Brisard, Zarqawi, 28.

 7 Their fears were proven out in 1993: Brisard, Zarqawi, 29.

 8 Together, in a Levantine shadow play: Brisard, Zarqawi, 36.

 8 Al-Maqdisi was a pedantic scholar: Brisard, Zarqawi, 37.

 8 “He never struck me as intelligent”: Jeffrey Gettleman, “Zarqawi’s Journey: From Droupout to Prisoner to Insurgent Leader,” New York Times, July 13, 2004, www.nytimes.com/2004/07/13/international/middleeast/13zarq.html

 8 Al-Maqdisi first gave al-Zarqawi: Brisard, Zarqawi, 226–27.

 8 Aware that the GID was tracking: Brisard, Zarqawi, 39.

 8 He was charged and convicted: Weaver, 2006.

 9 Amin was further instructed: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 64–65.

 9 Both were sentenced in 1994: Brisard, Zarqawi, 43.

 9 Time in prison made al-Zarqawi more focused: Weaver, 2006.

 9 He got his underlings: Brisard, Zarqawi, 48.

 9 “He could order his followers”: Gettleman, 2004.

 9 By means of coercion or persuasion: Brisard, Zarqawi, 48.

 9 He beat up those he didn’t like: Ibid.

 10 “The note was full of bad Arabic, like a child wrote it”: Gettleman, 2004.

 10 Unable to develop arguments: Ibid.

 10 At one point, he was thrown into: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 70.

 10 It was in prison that al-Zarqawi: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 75–76.

 10 The mentor-scholar helped: Weaver, 2006.

 10 A few of these even caught the attention of bin Laden: Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 93–94.

 10 According to “Richard,” a former top-ranking counterterrorism official: Interview with former top-ranking counterterrorism official, December 2014.

 11 Many Islamists who hadn’t actually committed terrorism: Brisard, Zarqawi, 57.

 11 Al-Zarqawi left Jordan in the summer of 1999: Brisard, Zarqawi, 59.

 11 Al-Zarqawi was arrested briefly in Peshawar: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 97.

 11 Told that he would only receive his passport back: Brisard, Zarqawi, 67.

 11 Al-Zawahiri was present at the meeting: Bryan Price, Dan Milton, Muhammad al-Ubaydi, and Nelly Lahoud, “The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 16, 2014, www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state.

 12 In the early 1990s al-Qaeda had targeted: Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 197.

 12 One of these contacts was Abu Muhammad al-Adnani: Price et al., 2014.

 13 The camp was built with al-Qaeda start-up money: Brisard, Zarqawi, 71–72.

 13 According to former CIA analyst Nada Bakos: “Tracking Al Qaeda in Iraq’s Zarqawi Interview With Ex-CIA Analyst Nada Bakos,” Musings on Iraq blog, June 30, 2014, musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/tracking-al-qaeda-in-iraqs-zarqawi.html.

 13 The physical activity at Heart: Interview with former top-ranking counterterrorism official, December 2014.

 13 Al-Zarqawi fielded mainly Palestinian and Jordanian recruits: Brisard, Zarqawi, 72.

 13 As the name implied, the Soldiers of the Levant were: Weaver, 2006.

 13 Some of the camp’s graduates: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 125–26; Brisard, Zarqawi, 88.

 13 The Jordanian authorities claimed: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 125–26; Weaver, 2006.

 13 Jund al-Sham grew exponentially: Weaver, 2006.

 14 Repeatedly between 2000 and 2001: Ibid.

 14 Repeatedly al-Zarqawi refused: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 98–99; Weaver, 2006.

 14 “I never heard him praise anyone apart from the Prophet”: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 98–99.

 14 Whether owing to his arrogance: Weaver, 2006.

 14 One of al-Zarqawi’s lieutenants at Heart: Brisard, Zarqawi, 77.

 14 After the September 11 attacks: Brisard, Zarqawi, 115.

 14 The targets of this conglomerate were two: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 106–07; Brisard, Zarqawi, 115–16, 122.

 14 On February 3, 2003: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 116–17.

 15 “We first knew of Zarqawi . . .Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 15 “Jihadists gain more from friendships . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 16 Al-Zarqawi and his convoy: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 109.

 16 According to a member of al-Zarqawi’s entourage: Ibid.

 16 Saif al-Adel, the al-Qaeda security chief: Price et al., 2014.

 17 He visited a Palestinian refugee camp: Brisard, Zarqawi, 96, 99–100.

 17 Shadi Abdalla, bin Laden’s former bodyguard: Brisard, Zarqawi, 95.

 17 Al-Zarqawi also went to Syria: Brisard, Zarqawi, 96.

 17 A high-level GID source told: Weaver, 2006.

 18 It was in deference to al-Zawahiri: Bill Roggio, Threat Matrix: A Blog of the Long War Journal, May 12, 2014, www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/05/iran_owes_al_qaeda_invaluably.php

 19 As early as October 2002: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 87–88; Gerges, The Far Enemy, 252.

 19 A year later, bin Laden wrote a letter: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 88.

 19 In opposition bin Laden advocated: Ibid.

 19 He put out a global casting call: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 10–11, 87–89, 132.

 19 To hurt the “far enemy,”: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 88.

CHAPTER 2

 20 Bin Laden’s injunction was fully realized: Kevin Woods, James Lacy, and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61701/kevin-woods-james-lacey-and-williamson-murray/saddams-delusions.

 21 But he had very much prepared: Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Vintage Books, 2013) 20–21.

 21 He beefed up one of his praetorian divisions: Ibid.

 21 In their magisterial history of the Second Gulf War: Ibid.

 21 The man who anatomized this strategy: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 18–20.

 22 Added to their ranks were more disaffected Iraqis: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 14; “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” The Coalition Provisional Authority, May 16, 2003, www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf; Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: Debaathification,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2005, www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-debaathification/p7853#p9.

 23 To distinguish the latter from disfigured veterans: Brian Owsley, “Iraq’s Brutal Decrees Amputation, Branding and the Death Penalty,” Human Rights Watch/Middle East, June 1995, www.hrw.org/reports/1995/IRAQ955.htm.

 23 The regime thus introduced a proscription: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 146.

 23 Some of Iraq’s new-minted faithful: Joel Rayburn, Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2014) 101.

 23 Most of the officers who were sent to the mosques: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 102.

 24 Many graduates of the program, Rayburn notes: Ibid.

 24 One such person was Khalaf al-Olayan: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 113.

 24 Mahmoud al-Mashhadani showed the folly: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 114.

 25 “If you talk to the Shiites, they understand . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 25 It was for this reason that George H. W. Bush: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 5.

 26 The elder Bush had hoped: Ibid.

 26 The violent implementation of democracy: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 105.

 26 It was carried out by a twenty-siex-year-old Moroccan man: Carolina Larriera, “Remembering Sergio Vieria de Mello Ten Years After the Attack on the UN in Baghdad,” The Huffington Post, October 19, 2013, www.huffingtonpost.com/carolina-larriera/remembering-sergio-vieira_b_3779106.html.

 27 This “embellishment” evidently included the diplomat’s role: Christopher Hitchens, “Why Ask Why?: Terrorists Attacks Aren’t Caused by Any Policy Except That of the Bombers Themselves,” Slate, October 3, 2005, www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2005/10/why_ask_why.html.

 27 “According to Harvey, it provided Zarqawi’s men the cars SSO provided the vehicles . . .”: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 22; “Iraq’s Security Services: Regime Strategic Intent—Annex C,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 23, 2007, www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1_annxC.html; “Special Security Organisation—SSO: Al Amn al-Khas,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified July 28, 2011, www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/khas.htm.

 27 The idea was, if you understood who the terrorists were: Derek Harvey interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 28 According to a study conducted by the Jamestown Foundation: Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Al-Zarqawi’s Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets,” Terrorism Monitor Vol. 3 No. 22, The Jamestown Foundation, November 18, 2005, www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=610&no_cache=1#.VIk1cDHF8ei.

 28 The same month Tawhid wal-Jihad bombed the Jordanian embassy: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 100, 105; Lawrence Joffe, “Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim,” obituary, The Guardian, August 29, 2003, www.theguardian.com/news/2003/aug/30/guardianobituaries.iraq.

 28 In fact, it was al-Zarqawi’s father-in-law, Yassin Jarrad: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 108, 160–161; “Imam Ali Mosque,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified July 9, 2011, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/an-najaf-imam-ali.htm; Bassem Mroue, “Alleged Al Qaeda Militant Is Hanged,” The New York Sun via The Associated Press, July 6, 2007, www.nysun.com/foreign/alleged-al-qaeda-militant-is-hanged/57989; Ben Wedemean, “FBI to Join Mosque Bombing Probe,” CNN.com, September 1, 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/31/sprj.irq.main.

 29 It went on to state, “The unhurried observer . . .”: Musab Al-Zarqawi, “Letter from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 1, 2004, www.cfr.org/iraq/letter-abu-musab-al-zarqawi-osama-bin-laden/p9863.

 29 nemeses was the Badr Corps: For the sake of consistency, we have chosen to use Badr Corps throughout, however, it was eventually renamed the Badr Organization.

 29 “[T]he Badr Brigade . . . has shed its Shi’a garb . . .”: Ibid.

 29 If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war: Ibid.

 30 That figure may have been exaggerated: “Iraq: Islamic State Executions in Tikrit,” Human Rights Watch, September 2, 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/02/iraq-islamic-state-executions-tikrit.

 30 Members of the first two categories were then carted away elsewhere: “Iraq: ISIS Executed Hundreds of Prison Inmates,” Human Rights Watch, October 30, 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/30/iraq-isis-executed-hundreds-prison-inmates.

 30 Al-Zarqawi proved a dire pioneer: Brisard, Zarqawi, 142–43.

 30 An imprecation was then recited by his captors: Brisard, Zarqawi, 131.

 31 Though Al-Zarqawi retained an audiovisual squad: Brisard, Zarqawi, 143.

 31 Writing to his former protégé: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 103.

 31 However, as former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel has observed: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 102–03.

 32 As scholar Michael W. S. Ryan has noted: Michael W. S. Ryan, “Dabiq: What Islamic State’s New Maga www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42702&cHash=0efbd71af77fb92c064b9403dc8ea838#.VLGK7caJnzL

 32 Before Blackwater attained international notoriety: “Four Blackwater Agents Hung in Fallujah Iraq March 31, 2004,” YouTube video of ABC broadcast, 2:41, posted by WARLORDSMEDIUM, December 11, 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=bln0q8E5onE.

 32 The failure of foresight seems staggering: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 23, 56–57.

 33 According to Wael Essam, a Palestinian journalist: Interview with the authors, November 2014.

 33 The beheading of Nicholas Berg: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 113.

 33 The main American weapon against Zarqawists: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 114.

 33 McChrystal assessed that the threat posed: Ibid.

 34 By then adept at the uses of psychological warfare: Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 364.

 34 It would be the Saudi billionaire’s enterprise: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 105.

 34 It was also accompanied by F/A-18 Hornet jets: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 117–18.

 34 In total, three “torture houses” were uncovered in the city: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 119.

 35 Roughly a quarter of all insurgents killed: Lt. Colonel Kenneth Estes, US Marine Corps Operations in Iraq, 203-2006 (Marine Corps History Divistion), 66; CQ Researcher, Global Issues: Selections from CQ Researcher (CQ Press, 2014), ebook.

 35 America was waging a “total war against Islam,”: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 183.

 36 In December 2004 bin Laden answered al-Zarqawi’s bayat: Ibid.

 36 The title was somewhat deceptive: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 105.

 36 As Bruce Riedel recounts, some al-Qaeda ideologues: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 12–13.

 36 Here the thirteenth-century Islamic theologian: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 100.

 36 Al-Zarqawi was thus seen as upholding: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 105; Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 150–53.

 36 As Riedel puts it: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 106.

 36 He had the United States and its European allies: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 106.; “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” PewResearch, October 7, 2009, www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population.

 37 He had, according to his Saudi admirer: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 105.

 37 One insurgent stronghold was Haifa Street: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 123; “Haifa St, Baghdad, Iraq,” Google Maps, accessed January 17, 2015, www.google.com/maps/place/Haifa+St,+Baghdad,+Iraq/@33.3263295,44.3705687,12z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x15577f4a7ecb0a21:0x808bf83e3e9c97e9.

 37 Haifa Street in particular was a totem: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 123.

 38 In Dora [yet another district of Baghdad infiltrated by insurgents]: Ibid.

 39 The ease with which Mosul collapsed: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 124.

 39 They were especially brutal to any Iraqi soldier: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 126.

CHAPTER 3

 40 Al-Zarqawi’s sinister strategy hewed closely: Translation of The Management of Savagery by William McCants. Abu Bakr Najri, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, May 23, 2006, azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf.

 42 On February 28, 2005, a suicide bomb killed: Warzer Jaff and Robert E. Worth, “Deadliest Single Attack Since Fall of Hussein Kills More Than 120,” New York Times, February 28, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/02/28/international/middleeast/28cnd-iraq.html.

 42 In one horrifying instance: “Interview Col. H.R. McMaster,” Frontline End Game, June 19, 2007, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/endgame/interviews/mcmaster.html.

 43 “If they perceive failure, they may take other actions . . .”: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 36.

 43 “[Al-]Zarqawi, or the Iraqis he had working for him . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 44 It also contains the largest phosphate mines in the Middle East: Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 190.

 44 Building on Adam Such’s experience in Hit: “Anbar Before and After The Awakening Pt. IX: Sheik Sabah Aziz of the Albu Mahal,” Musings on Iraq blog, January 23, 2014, musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/01/anbar-before-and-after-awakening-pt-ix.html.

 45 In the Albu Mahal’s Hamza Battalion: Hannah Allam and Mohammed al Dulaimy, “Marine-led Campaign Kill Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,” McClatchy DC via Knight Ridder Newspapers, May 16, 2005, www.mcclatchydc.com/2005/05/16/11656_marine-led-campaign-killed-friends.html.

 45 The graduates of the Qa’im program: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 172; Rayburn, Iraq After America, 110–11.

 45 A third of the Desert Protectors’ members quit: Ibid.

 45 Appalled by how the Sunni boycott: Col. Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams, eds., Al-Anbar Awakening: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009, Vol. 2, Marine Corps University Press, 2009, www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Al-Anbar%20Awakening%20Vol%20II_Iraqi%20Perspectives%20%20PCN%2010600001200_1.pdf.

 46 Its first initiative was to encourage Sunnis: Monte Morin, “Officer Killed by Suicide Bomb Had High Hopes for Ramadi,” Stars and Stripes, January 9, 2006, www.stripes.com/news/officer-killed-by-suicide-bomb-had-high-hopes-for-ramadi-1.43384.

 46 On the fourth day of the glass factory drive: Monte Morin, “Suicide Bomb Kills Dozens of Iraqi Police Recruits, Two Americans,” Stars and Stripes, January 6, 2006, www.stripes.com/news/suicide-bomb-kills-dozens-of-iraqi-police-recruits-two-americans-1.43269.

 46 Still too vulnerable to al-Zarqawi’s strong-arm tactics: Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, Summer 2012, 20.

CHAPTER 4

 48 Sunni voter turnout was around 80 percent: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 119.

 49 Additionally, less moderate non-AQI insurgents: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 191–92.

 49 Kanan Makiya, a scholar of Baathist Iraq: Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York: Jonathan Cape, 1993).

 50 He founded his own paramilitary organization: Nada Bakri, “In Lebanon, New Cabinet Is Influenced by Hezbollah,” New York Times, June 13, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/world/middleeast/14lebanon.html.

 50 The Battle of Najaf in August 2004: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 101.

 51 Ansari worked for the Quds Force’s Department 1000: Ibid.

 51 The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI): Rayburn, Iraq After America, 15–17.

 51 SCIRI’s armed wing: “Iraqi Miniser’s Son Misses Flight, Forces Plane Back: Airline,” Reuters, March 6, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/06/us-lebanon-iraq-plane-idUSBREA2519B20140306; Rayburn, Iraq After America, 73–75.

 51 “The mullahs ran a very subversive campaign”: Interview with one of the authors, June 2014.

 51 A former CIA officer not long ago described Suleimani: Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” The New Yorker, September 30, 2013, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander.

 52 For Petraeus, Iran had: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 423.

 52 Not only had the Quds Force officer: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 313, 351–52.

 52 Al-Muhandis was selected to oversee: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 151, 159; Filkins, 2013.

 52 When detonated, the heat from the EFP: David Axe, “Real E.F.P.: Pocket-Sized Tank Killer,” Defense Tech, February 14, 2007, defensetech.org/2007/02/14/real-e-f-p-pocket-sized-tank-killer.

 53 Another JSOC raid in Erbil: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 324–25.

 53 “By exposing Iran’s secret deal”: “Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Fuding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point,” US Department of the Treasury, July 28, 2011, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1261.aspx.

 54 “They were there, under Iranian protection, planning operations,”: Filkins, 2013.

 54 After December 2005 SCIRI was placed: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 140.

 55 “We either stop them or give Iraq to Iran”: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 141.

 55 But, by way of trying to limit the damage: Ibid.

 55 The counterpart brigade in charge of West Baghdad: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 146.

 55 According to a State Department cable: “Islamic Human Rights Organization Alleges Iraqi Forces Detainee Abuse in Ninewa,” Wikileaks, June 16, 2005, wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BAGHDAD2547_a.html.

 55 Other Iraqi government institutions: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 222.

 56 Hospitals, meanwhile, were refashioned: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 221–222.

 56 It also had ready access: Ibid.

 56 When US soldiers finally opened the door: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 185–86.

 57 Only the “most criminal terrorists” were detained: Ibid.

 57 Testifying to the grim cooperation: Edward Wong and John F. Burns, “Iraqi Rift Grows After Discover of Prison, New York Times, November 17, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/11/17/international/middleeast/17iraq.html.

 57 In 2006 the US government found: “Testimony of Dr. Matthew Levitt, Fromer-Wexler fellow and director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” US House Financial Services Committee, November 13, 2014, financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba00-wstate-mlevitt-20141113.pdf.

 57 According to Laith Alkhouri: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 58 From 2005 to 2010 subsidies from Gulf Arab donors: US House Financial Services Committee, 2014.

 58 Oil smuggling from the Bayji Oil Refinery: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 231; Benjamin Bahney, Howard J. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, Renny McPherson, and Barbara Sude, An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (National Defense Research Institute, 2010) e-book.

 58 A Defense Intelligence Agency assessment: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 231.

 58 AQI’s resources had by then eclipsed: US House Financial Services Committee, 2014.

 58 In July 2005 al-Zawahiri sent him a letter: “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation),” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2013, www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2.

 58 Al-Zawahiri counseled al-Zarqawi to avoid the “mistakes of the Taliban,”: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 104.

 58 There was one enemy: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2013.

 59 Fearing that the Islamic Republic’s response: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 104.

 59 The CIA leaked the critical missive: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 103.

 59 The day of the bombing: Ellen Knickmeyer and K.I. Ibrahim, “Bombing Shatters Mosque in Iraq,” Washington Post, February 23, 2006, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/22/AR2006022200454.html.

 59 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for peaceful protests: Ibid.

 59 One of Iraq’s NGOs found: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 194.

 59 The al-Askari Mosque bombing accomplished: Ellen Knickmeyer and Muhanned Saif Aldin, “Tense Calm Prevails as Iraqi Forces Seal Off River Town,” Washington Post, October 18, 2006, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/17/AR2006101700254.html; Rayburn, Iraq After America, 120.

 60 Bodies were dumped in the Tigris River: Joshua Partlow and Saad al-Izzi, “Scores of Sunnis Killed in Baghdad,” Washington Post, July 10, 2006, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/09/AR2006070900139.html; Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 214.

 60 The Mahdi Army also set up checkpoints: Jon Lee Anderson, “Inside the Surge,” The New Yorker, November 19, 2007, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/11/19/inside-the-surge; “Ghazaliya, Baghdad, Iraq,” Google Maps, accessed January 17, 2015, www.google.com/maps/place/Ghazaliyah,+Baghdad,+Iraq/@34.0092759,43.8541015,9z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x15577d6b25af61b3:0x1c37973c4265e31e; Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 213–14.

 60 Uniformed Iraqi policemen were enlisted: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 213–14.

 60 Sunni insurgents paid the Shia back: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 87–88.

 60 AQI and other Islamist insurgent groups: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 213–14.

 60 This was the issue put forth in a classified memo: “Text of U.S. Security Adviser’s Iraq Memo,” New York Times, November 29, 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29mtext.html.

 60 “Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas”: Ibid.

 61 He may even have once escaped: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 106.

 61 To find al-Zarqawi through his underlings: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 206.

 61 US forces discovered that their target: Ibid.

 61 Iraqi soldiers found al-Zarqawi first: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 207.

 61 Jordanian intelligence, which had claimed: Dexter Filkins, Mark Mazzetti and Richard A. Oppel Jr., “How Surveillance and Betrayal Led to a Hunt’s End,” New York Times, June 9, 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/06/09/world/middleeast/09raid.html.

 61 All foregoing words of caution to the contrary: Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, 106.

 62 The Mujahidin Advisory Council he installed: Eben Kaplan, “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Zarqawi’s Mysterious Successor (aka Abu Ayub al-Masri),” Council on Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006, www.cfr.org/iraq/abu-hamza-al-muhajir-zarqawis-mysterious-successor-aka-abu-ayub-al-masri/p10894.

 62 Al-Masri had belonged to: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 230.

 62 For one thing, he took the Iraqization program further: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 121; Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy Council, Vol. 21, No. 4, Winter 2014, www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/islamic-state-al-qaeda-affiliate-caliphate.

 62 Its demesne was Ninewah, Anbar, and Salah ad Din provinces: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 121, 136.

 62 ISI’s appointed leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 230; Rayburn, Iraq After America, 128.

 63 After his succession became public, US forces captured: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 230.

 63 Al-Zarqawi, he said, saw himself in messianic terms: Ibid.

 63 “He came from outside . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 63 Both men wanted to establish: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 230; Hashim, 2014.

 63 Most of the Sunni groups that joined ISI protested: Hashim, 2014.

 63 Ultimately, they resorted to killing jihadists: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 64 In May 2014 he issued a statement: Price et al., 2014.

 65 Digital intelligence on ISI: Bill Roggio, “Iraqi Troops Kill Senior al Qaeda in Iraq Leader,” The Long War Journal, November 7, 2008 www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/iraqi_troops_kill_se.php.

 65 The Wall Street Journal reported: Greg Jaffe, “At Lonely Iraq Outpost, GIs Stay as Hope Fades,” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2007, www.wsj.com/articles/SB117813340417889827.

 66 Abu Ghazwan’s overview: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 233.

 66 He had once been a detainee of the coalition: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 233; “Fire Marshal Ronald P. Bucca,” Officer Down Memorial Page, accessed January 17, 2015, www.odmp.org/officer/16195-fire-marshal-ronald-p-bucca.

 66 In Bucca, al-Rahman not only learned: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 32–33, 233–34.

 66 As Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor recount: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 234.

CHAPTER 5

 68 “The history of the Anbar Awakening is very bitter . . .”a former high-ranking official: Interview with the authors, August 2014.

 69 Barrels of purloined crude were imported: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 244.

 69 Two sheikhs from the Albu Aetha and Albu Dhiyab tribes: Myriam Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall,” Middle East Policy Council, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2011, www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-its-rise-and-fall.

 69 Nighttime vigilantism gained: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 244.

 70 What made Ramadi different: Kirk Semple, “Uneasy Alliance Is Taming One Insurgent Bastion,” New York Times, April 29, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/world/middleeast/29ramadi.html.

 70 al-Rishawi was ready to cut a new deal: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 250.

 70  “People with ties to the insurgents . . .”a US lieutenant had told the journalist George Packer: George Packer, “The Lesson of Tal Afar,” The New Yorker, April 10, 2006, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10/the-lesson-of-tal-afar.

 70 The council quickly expanded: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 252.

 71 Just before New Year 2007: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 253.

 71 Abdul al-Rishawi’s general success: Ibid.

 71 “I swear to God . . .” the sheikh told the New York Times: Edward Wong, “An Iraqi Tribal Chief Opposes the Jihadists, and Prays,” New York Times, March 3, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/world/middleeast/03sheik.html.

 71 He was assassinated by the jihadists: Alissa J. Rubin and Graham Bowley, “Bomb Kills Sunni Sheik Working With US in Iraq,” New York Times, September 13, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/09/13/world/middleeast/13cnd-iraq.html.

 72 The emir told him that while foreign occupiers: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 263.

 72 The new strategy demanded confronting: Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (New York: Penguin, 2012), 267.

 72 Petraeus and Marine Lieutenant General James Mattis: Burke, The 9/11 Wars, 265.

 73 A mixture of soldiering and policing: Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-24, The Patraeus Doctrine: The Field Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations, US Army, 2009.

 73 In 2007 the US Government Accountability Office: Glenn Kessler, “Weapons Given to Iraq Are Missing,” Washington Post, August 6, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/05/AR2007080501299.html.

 73 The US military’s solution was a partition: Burke, The 9/11 Wars, 271.

 74 A military intelligence analysis: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 209.

 74 Furthermore, the overwhelming cluster of attacks: Ibid.

 75 If a detonated IED turned out to be a dud: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 210.

 75 As they had done the prior year in Ramadi: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 370.

 75 The group’s fallback base was in nearby Buhriz: Ibid.

 75 Sergeant 1st Class Benjamin Hanner told the Washington Post: Joshua Partlow, “Troops in Diyala Face A Skilled, Flexible Foe,” Washington Post, April 22, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/21/AR2007042101467_pf.html.

 76 Shawn McGuire, a staff sergeant recalled to Gordon and Trainor: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 375.

 77 In an interview with the Washington Post: Jackie Spinner, “Marines Widen Their Net South of Baghdad,” Washington Post, November 28, 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16794-2004Nov27.html.

 77 After being handed a list of the top-ten AQI operatives: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 381.

 77 In Ameriya, a neighborhood: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 384.

 78 No doubt leery of seeing a replay: Ibid.

 78 In a June 2010 Pentagon news briefing: Gen. Raymond Odierno, “DOD News Briefing with Gen. Odierno from the Pentagon,” US Department of Defense, June 4, 2010, www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4632.

 79 In Iraq After America, Joel Rayburn recounts: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 124.

 80 Several months before his death, he had conducted a Skype call: Interview with one of Jibouri’s interlocutors, November 2014.

 81 Dr. Jaber al-Jabberi . . . told us: Interview with one of the author, August 2014.

CHAPTER 6

 83 Not only had the internationally publicized and condemned torture: Alissa J. Rubin, “US Military Reforms Its Prisons in Iraq,” New York Times, June 1, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/world/africa/01iht-detain.4.13375130.html.

 83 According to one US military estimate: Interview with Joel Rayburn, October 2014.

 83 Owing to the spike in military operations: Craig Whiteside, “Catch And Release in the Land of Two Rivers,” War on the Rocks, December 18, 2014, warontherocks.com/2014/12/catch-and-release-in-the-land-of-two-rivers.

 84 In a PowerPoint presentation he prepared for CENTCOM: Major General D.M Stone, “Detainee Operations,” United States Marine Corps, PowerPoint presentation, November 2014.

 86 A former ISIS member interviewed by the Guardian: Martin Chulov, “Isis: The Inside Story,” The Guardian, December 11, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story.

 86 Abu Ahmed recounted: Ibid.

 87 Craig Whiteside, a professor at the Naval War College: Whiteside, 2014.

 88 Anthony Shadid, then a foreign correspondent for the Washington Post: Anthony Shadid, “In Iraq, Chaos Feared as US Closes Prison,” Washington Post, March 22, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/21/AR2009032102255_pf.html.

 89 “It was easy to capture al-Qaeda people,” Rayburn told us.: Interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 90 No longer useful to al-Maliki: Burke, The 9/11 Wars, 430.

 90 Conditions were especially grim in Diyala: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 591.

 90 Such prejudicial justice didn’t apply to Shia prisoners: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 592.

 90 Shadid interviewed Colonel Saad Abbas Mahmoud: Shadid, 2009.

 91 The original plan for the Awakening: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 591.

 91 The Iraqi agency tasked: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 593.

 91 Moreover, al-Maliki showed little interest: Ibid.

 91 Mullah Nadim Jibouri . . . claimed: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 91 The US assessment of his dictatorial tendencies: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 614.

 92 Odierno, with good reason, saw: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 609.

 92 He would need to form a government: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 617.

 93 The following day, Iraq’s president: Rayburn, Iraq After America, 213–14.

 93 Al-Maliki formed a government in 2010: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 620.

 93 Odierno, for one, saw how flagrant manipulation: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 619.

 93 Vice President Joseph Biden . . . is recorded: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 615.

 93 “I know one guy . . .” Khedery told us.: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014; Ali Khedery, “Why We Stuck With Maliki—and Lost Iraq,” Washington Post, July 3, 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki--and-lost-iraq/2014/07/03/0dd6a8a4-f7ec-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html.

 94 As much of the consequences of the surge: “Blowback Against Glenn Greenwald #1,” Anonymous Mugwump blog, May 25, 2013, anonymousmugwump.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/blowback-against-glenn-greenwald-1.html

 94 There was actually little debate: “Five Myths About ISIS,” Anonymous Mugwump blog, October 5, 2014, anonymousmugwump.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/five-myths-about-isis.html.

 94 But al-Maliki didn’t: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 673–674.

 96 Al-Hashimi was allowed to fly off: Adrian Blomfield and Damien McElroy, “Iraq in Fresh Turmoil as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki Orders Arrest of Vice President,” The Telegraph, December 19, 2011, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/8966587/Iraq-in-fresh-turmoil-as-Prime-Minister-Nuri-al-Maliki-orders-arrest-of-vice-president.html.

 96 He remained in exile He later fled to Turkey: Associated Press in Baghdad, “Iraq Vice President Sentenced to Death Amid Deadly Wave of Insurgent Attacks,” The Guardian, September 9, 2012, www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/09/iraq-vice-president-hashemi-death-sentence.

 96 They claimed to be searching for the killer: Joel Rayburn, “Iraq Is Back on the Brink of Civil War,” New Republic, May 8, 2013, www.newrepublic.com/article/113148/iraqs-civil-war-breaking-out-again.

 98 According to the Obama administration: Jessica D. Lewis, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent,” Middle East Security Report 14, Institute for the Study of War, September 2013, www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI-Resurgent-10Sept_0.pdf.

 98 ISIS then sacked Fallujah: Sinan Adnan and Aaron Reese, “Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency,” Middle East Security Report 24, Institute for the Study of War, October 2014, www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Sunni%20Insurgency%20in%20Iraq.pdf

CHAPTER 7

 99 Abed al-Sattar, the Anbar Awakening leader: Edward Wong, “An Iraqi Tribal Chief Opposes the Jihadists, and Prays,” New York Times, March 3, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/world/middleeast/03sheik.html.

 100 As scholar Eyal Zisser has noted: Eyal Zisser, “Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1999, www.meforum.org/465/hafiz-al-asad-discovers-islam.

 100 Up until recently, for example, despite a national Syrian law: Fares Akram, “Hamas Leader Abandons Longtime Base in Damascus,” New York Times, January 27, 2012. www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/middleeast/khaled-meshal-the-leader-of-hamas-vacates-damascus.html.

 100 Today, the regime relies overwhelming on the paramilitary assets: David Axe, “Iran Transformed Syria’s Army into a Militia that Will Help Assad Survive Another Year,” Reuters, December 17, 2014, blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/16/iran-transformed-syrias-army-into-a-militia-that-will-help-assad-survive-another-year; Amos Harel, “Iran, Hezbollah Significantly Increases Aid to Syria’s Assad,” Haaretz, April 6, 2012, www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/iran-hezbollah-significantly-increase-aid-to-syria-s-assad-1.422954.

 101 In 2007 CENTCOM announced: “Three Major Terror Busts in Iraq—Iran, Syria Connections Exposed, Say US Officials,” ABC News, March 22, 2007, abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2007/03/three_major_ter; Burke, The 9/11 Wars, 171.

 101 According to Major General Kevin Bergner: Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda in Iraq Operative Killed Near Syrian Border Sheds Light on Foreign Influence,” The Long War Journal, October 3, 2007, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/al_qaeda_in_iraq_ope.php.

 101 A study published in 2008: Peter Bergen, Joseph Felter, Vahid Brown, and Jacob Shapiro, Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout: Al-Qa’ida’s Road In and out of Iraq, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Sinjar_2_FINAL.pdf.

 102 “In border villages and cities,” the CTC study stated: Ibid.

 102 Al-Assad, of course, has always denied: Ibid.

 102 as Jason Burke’s The 9/11 Wars shows: Burke, The 9/11 Wars, 171.

 103 Bassam Barabandi, a former diplomat: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 103 The former diplomat described for us: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 103 Tony Badran, an expert on Syria: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 104 Badran mentioned . . . the curious case: “Death of a Cleric,” NOW Lebanon, October 5, 2007, now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/death_of_a_cleric.

 104 As recounted by journalist Nicholas Blanford: Ibid.

 104 Blanford argued that al-Qaqa: Ibid.

 105 Habash told us that he first met al-Qaqa in 2006: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 106 “According to reports in the Arabic press”: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 106 Fatah al-Islam later posted: Graham Bowley and Souad Makhennet, “Fugitive Sunni Leader Thought to Have Been Captured or Killed in Syria,” New York Times, November 10, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/12/10/world/africa/10iht-syria.4.18569673.html.

 107 Most of the insurgents Syria funneled: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 231.

 107 “crisis management cell”: Ian Black and Martin Chulov, “Leading Syrian Regime Figures Killed in Damascus Bomb Attack,” The Guardian, July 18, 2012, www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/18/syrian-regime-figures-bomb-attack; Michael Weiss, “What the Assault on the Assad Regime Means,” The Telegraph, July 20, 2012, blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/michaelweiss/100171767/what-the-assault-on-the-assad-regime-means.

 107 Abu Ghadiyah, the Treasury Department alleged: Bill Roggio, “US Strike in Syria ‘Decapitated’ al Qaeda’s Facilitation Network,” The Long War Journal, October 27, 2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/10/us_strike_in_syria_d.php.

 107 According to a State Department cable: “Gen. Patraeus’s Meeting with P.M. Maliki,” Wikileaks, January 7, 2009, www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BAGHDAD31_a.html.

 108 He was an al-Qaeda financier: “Treasury Designates Members of Abu Ghadiyah’s Network Facilitates Flow of Terrorists, Weapons, and Money from Syra to al Qaida in Iraq,” US Department of the Treasury, February 28, 2008, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp845.aspx.

 108 Abu Ghadiyah’s predecessor: James Joyner, “Zarqawi Financial Network Independent,” Outside the Beltway, January 25, 2005, www.outsidethebeltway.com/zarqawi_financial_network_independent.

 108 Petraeus had even sought permission: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 461.

 108 Stanley’s McChrystal’s JSOC: Roggio, October 2008.

 109 He asked al-Assad to end: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 577.

 109 Maura Connelly, the charge d’affaires: “UK Foreign Secretary Miliband’s Nov. 17–18 Trip to Damascus,” Wikileaks, November 19, 2008, www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08DAMASCUS821_a.html.

 109 Perhaps it was with the foregoing episode: “Cable 09DAMASCUS384, Re-engaging Syria: Dealing with Sarg Diplomacy,” Wikileaks, June3, 2009, wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09DAMASCUS384.html.

 110 In December 2014 Martin Chulov: Chulov, December 2014.

 110 More than one hundred people: Ibid.

 111 In November 2009 his government aired: Steven Lee Myers, “Iraq Military Broadcasts Confession on Bombing,” New York Times, August 23, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/world/middleeast/24iraq.html.

 111 But it recalled its ambassador from Damascus: “Iraq and Syria Recall Envoys,” Al Jazeera, August 25, 2009, www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/08/20098251602328210.html.

 111 One of the men he refused to turn over: Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “US Security Team to Visit Syria, Focus on Iraq,” Reuters, August 11, 2009, www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/11/us-syria-usa-sb-idUSTRE57A5Y120090811.

 111 For a short time, al-Assad had tried: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 610; Hugh Naylor, “Syria is Said to Be Strengthening Ties to Opponents,” New York Times, October 7, 2007. www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/world/middleeast/07syria.html.

 111 Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told: Tony Badran, “The ‘Lebonization’ of Iraq,” NOW Lebanon, December 22, 2009, now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/the_lebanonization_of_iraq.

 112 The Iraqi general struggled: Chulov, December 2014.

 112 As relayed in a State Department cable: “Syrian Intelligence Chief Attends CT Dialogue With S/CT Benjamin,” Wikileaks, February 24, 2010, wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10DAMASCUS159_a.html.

 113 He explained his own peculiar method: Ibid.

 113 The answer to that question lay in Mamlouk’s follow-up: Ibid.

CHAPTER 8

 114 ISIS’s history, according to Dabiq’s reconstruction: “The Return of Khilafah,” Dabiq, Issue 1, July, 2014, media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf.

 115 The first was the killing of Abu Khalaf: Bill Roggio, “US Kills Senior Syrian-based al Qaeda Facilitator in Mosul,” The Long War Journal, January 28, 2010, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/us_kills_senior_syri.php.

 115 A US official later said: Ibid.

 115 Al-Rawi named two couriers: Gordon & Trainor, The Endgame, 623.

 116 Laith Alkhouri, the counterterrorism expert, said.: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 117 “No one thought he wanted competition . . .”: Ibid.

 117 He’s said to have lived in modest quarters: Ruth Sherlock, “How a Talented Footballer Became World’s Most Wanted Man, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” The Telegraph, November 11, 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948846/How-a-talented-footballer-became-worlds-most-wanted-man-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi.html.

 117 Al-Baghdadi wore glasses: Ibid.

 117 Dr. Hisham al-Hashimi, an expert on ISIS: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 117 According to one of his neighbors: Sherlock, November 2014.

 118 by late 2003 he had founded his own Islamist faction: Hashim, 2014.

 118 a year after that, he was enrolled: Chulov, December 2014.

 119 Abu Ahmed, the former high-ranking ISIS member: Ibid.

 119 according to Abu Ahmed, he started causing problems: Ibid.

 119 When al-Baghdadi was released: Ibid.

 119 In 2007 he joined the Mujahideen Shura Council: Hashim, 2014.

 123 “The brutality, the tradecraft . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 124 Harvey’s insight is all the more compelling: Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, “Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS,” New York Times, August 27, 2014, mobile.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html.

 124 The first is Abu Abdul-Rahman al-Bilawi: Ruth Sherlock, “Inside the Leadership of Islamic State: How the New ‘Caliphate’ Is Run,” The Telegraph, July 9, 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956280/Inside-the-leadership-of-Islamic-State-how-the-new-caliphate-is-run.html.

 124 Originally from al-Khalidiya in Anbar: Hisham al-Hashimi,”Revealed: The Islamic State ‘Cabinet,’ From Finance Minister to Suicide Bomb Deployer,”The Telegraph, July 9, 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956193/Revealed-the-Islamic-State-cabinet-from-finance-minister-to-suicide-bomb-deployer.html.

 124 The second influencer, according to al-Hashimi: Ibid.

 124 Somewhere in between, according to the Wall Street Journal: Siobhan Gorman, Nour Malas, and Matt Bradley, “Brutal Efficiency: The Secret to Islamic State’s Success,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-to-the-success-of-islamic-state-1409709762.

 124 Iraqi and Syrian militants think al-Anbari: Siobahn Gorman, Nour Malas, and Matt Bradley, “Disciplined Cadre Runs Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/SB20001424052970204545604580127823357609374.

 125 according to a cache of internal documents: “Exclusive: Top ISIS Leaders Revealed,” Al Arabiya News, February 13, 2014, english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/02/13/Exclusive-Top-ISIS-leaders-revealed.html.

 125 Another former US detainee: Hubbard & Schmitt, 2014.

 125 Another graduate of both Bucca: “3 Senior ISIS Leaders Killed in US Airstrikes,” CBS News, December 18, 2014, www.cbsnews.com/news/3-senior-isis-leaders-killed-in-u-s-airstrikes.

 125 A former lieutenant colonel: Sherlock, July 2014.

 125 Baghdad is said to have “handpicked”: Hubbard & Schmitt, 2014.

 125 The New York Times reported: Ibid.

 126 Michael Pregent, a former US military: Interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 126 Known internationally as the “red-bearded jihadist”: “Red-Bearded Chechen Fighter Is Face of ISIS,” Sky News, July 3, 2014, news.sky.com/story/1293797/red-bearded-chechen-fighter-is-face-of-isis.

 126 Abu Omar al-Shishani, or Tarkhan Batirashvili: Gorman et al. “Disciplined Cadre,” 2014.

 126 He fought in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Nina Akhmeteli, “The Georgian Roots of Isis Commander Omar al-Shishani,” BBC News, July 8, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28217590.

 126 Al-Shishani even hung up the phone: Ibid.

 126 Released in 2010: Bassem Mroue, “Chechen in Syria a Rising Star in Extremist Group,” Associated Press, July 2, 2014, bigstory.ap.org/article/chechen-syria-rising-star-extremist-group.

 126 Teimuraz told the BBC: Akhmeteli, 2014.

 127 The Chechen first emerged in Syria: Mroue, 2014.

 127 In November 2014 Kadyrov announced: Joanna Paraszczuk, “The Chechen Leader With a Grudge and the IS Commander with Nine Lives,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, November 14, 2014, www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-why-kadyrov-claims-shishani-killed/26692100.html.

 128 Some of them even made impressive incursions: Mroue, 2014.

 128 Menagh finally fell: Nour Malas and Rima Abushakra, “Islamists Seize Airbase Near Aleppo,” Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2013, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323420604578652250872942058.

 128 Largely a morale boost: Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Rebels Gain Control of Government Air Base in Syria,” New York Times, August 5, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/world/middleeast/rebels-gain-control-of-government-air-base-in-syria.html; Michael Weiss, “Col. Oqaidi on al-Qaeda, UN Inspectors, and Kurdish Militias,” NOW Lebanon, August 18, 2013, now.mmedia.me/lb/en/interviews/col-oqaidi-on-al-qaeda-un-inspectors-and-kurdish-militias.

 128 Khalid wrote in a statement: Joanna Paraszczuk, “Military Prowess of IS Commander Umar Shishani Called Into Question,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, November 6, 2014, www.rferl.org/content/umar-shishani-military-prowess-islamic-state/26677545.html.

 129 Stories about pretty, middle-class teenage: Allan Hall, “One of the Teenage Austrian ‘Poster Girls’ Who Ran Away to Join ISIS Has Been Killed in the Conflict, UN Says,” Daily Mail, December 18, 2014, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2879272/One-teenage-Austrian-poster-girls-ran-away-join-ISIS-killed-conflict-says.html.

 129 copycats who are stopped: “Austria Detains Teenage Girls Who Wanted to Marry ISIS Fighters,” NBC News, January 11, 2015, www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/austria-detains-teenage-girls-who-wanted-marry-isis-fighters-n284096.

 130 In 1940 George Orwell wrote an essay: “George Orwell Reviews Mein Kampf (1940),” Open Culture, August 19, 2014, www.openculture.com/2014/08/george-orwell-reviews-mein-kampf-1940.html.

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 131 Bashar al-Assad gave an interview: “Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894.

 131 Just three days before his interview: “Syria: Gang Attacks Peaceful Demonstrators; Police Look On,” Human Rights Watch, February 3, 2011, www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/03/syria-gang-attacks-peaceful-demonstrators-police-look; Lauren Williams, “Syria Clamps Down on Dissent with Beatings and Arrests,” The Guaridian, February 24, 2011, www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/24/syria-crackdown-protest-arrests-beatings.

 131 on February 17, a spontaneous protest erupted: Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “Syria: Activists Protest Police Beating, Call for Investigation,” Los Angeles Times, February 17, 2014, latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/02/syria-activists-protest-police-beating-call-for-investigation.html.

 131 Although the protest was carefully directed: Ibid.

 131 That demonstration came to an end: Rania Abouzeid, “The Syrian Style of Repression: Thugs and Lectures,” TIME, February 27, 2011, content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2055713,00.html.

 132 Similar protests soon broke out in Damascus: Dane Vallejo and Michael Weiss, “Syria Media Briefing: A Chronology of Protest and Repression,” The Henry Jackston Society, May 2011, henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/Syria+Media+Briefing.pdf.

 132 One woman held at the Palestine Branch: Fergal Keane, “Syria Ex-Detainees Allege Ordeals of Rape and Sex Abuse,” BBC News, September 25, 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19718075.

 133 Caesar testified before US Congress: Josh Rogin, “Syrian Defector: Assad Poised to Torture and Murder 150,000 More,” The Daily Beast, July 31, 2014, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/31/syrian-defector-assad-poised-to-torture-and-murder-150-000-more.html.

 133 Stephen Rapp, the State Department’s ambassador-at-large: Josh Rogin, “US: Assad’s ‘Machinery of Death’ Worst Since the Nazis,” The Daily Beast, July 7, 2014, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/07/u-s-assad-s-machinery-of-death-worst-since-the-nazis.html.

 134 one of the favored slogans: “The Syrian regime says, ‘Al Assad or we’ll burn the country down,’” YouTube video, 7:24, posted by Tehelka TV, October 30, 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNBGHaTkgW8.

 135 What Zakarya meant: James Reynolds, “Syria Torture Accounts Reinforce Human Rights Concerns,” BBC News, July 3, 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18687422.

 135 said Shiraz Maher, an expert on radicalization: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 135 In 2010 Nibras Kazimi published: Nibras Kazimi, Syria Through Jihadist Eyes: A Perfect Enemy (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 2010), 63.

 136 “The sectarianism was carefully manufactured . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 136 According to one who was detained: Ruth Sherlock, “Confessions of an Assad ‘Shabiha’ Loyalist: How I Raped and Killed for £300 a Month,” The Telegraph, July 14, 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9400570/Confessions-of-an-Assad-Shabiha-loyalist-how-I-raped-and-killed-for-300-a-month.html.

 137 Most of them were women and children: Stephanie Nebehay, “Most Houla Victims Killed n Summary Executions: UN,” Reuters, May 29, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/29/us-syria-un-idUSBRE84S10020120529.

 137 The shabiha were readily identifiable: Harriet Alexander and Ruth Sherlock, “The Shabiha: Inside Assad’s Death Squads,” The Telegraph, June 2, 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9307411/The-Shabiha-Inside-Assads-death-squads.html.

 137 an investigation by the United Nations: “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council, 21st Session, August 15, 2012, www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-50.doc.

 137 Victoria Nuland accused Iran: Chris McGreal, “Houla Massacre: US Accuses Iran of ‘Bragging’ about Its Military Aid to Syria,” The Guardian, May 29, 2012, www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/29/houla-massacre-us-accuses-iran.

 137 With as many as one hundred thousand recruits: Sam Dagher, “Syria’s Alawite Force Turned Tide for Assad,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2013, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323997004578639903412487708.

 138 IRGC operative Sayyed Hassan Entezari said: Axe, 2014.

 138 Each brigade of the National Defense Force: Ibid.

 138 Reuters conducted interviews: “Insight: Syrian Government Guerrilla Fighters Being Sent to Iran for Training,” Reuters, April 4, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/04/us-syria-iran-training-insight-idUSBRE9330DW20130404.

 138 The camp at which Samer: Farnaz Fassihi, Jay Solomon, and Sam Dagher, “Iranians Dial Up Presence in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2013, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323864604579067382861808984.

 138 According to an Iranian military officer: Ibid.

 139 the National Defense Force has already: Michael Weiss, “Rise of the Militias,” NOW Lebanon, May 21, 2013 now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/rise-of-the-militias.

 139 Christian witnesses who spoke to the NGO: “No One’s Left,” Human Rights Watch, September 13, 2013, www.hrw.org/reports/2013/09/13/no-one-s-left-0.

 139 This has resulted in high-profile Iranian fatalities: Filkins, 2013.

 139 Tehran has relied only on operatives: Farnaz Fassihi and Jay Solomon, “Top Iranian Official Acknowledges Syria Role,” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2012, online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578000482831419570.

 139 Several members of IRGC Ground Forces: Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, AEI’s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study of War, May 2013, www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf.

 140 A report published by the Institute for the Study of War: Ibid.

 140 former Syrian prime minister Riyad Hijab declared: Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran: Syria’s Lone Regional Ally,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 9, 2014 carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/09/syria-s-lone-regional-ally-iran.

 140 As early as May 2011: “Administration Takes Additional Steps to Hold the Government of Syria Accountable for Violent Repression Against the Syrian People,” US Department of the Treasury, May 18, 2011, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1181.aspx.

 140 Such support, as later came to light, included: Michael R. Gordon, “US Presses Iraq on Iranian Planes Thought to Carry Arms to Syria,” New York Times, September 5, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/world/middleeast/us-presses-iraq-on-iranian-planes-thought-to-carry-arms-to-syria.html.

 140 In 2012, when the Iraqis stopped denying: Ibid.

 140 According to US intelligence: Arash Karami, “Iran News Site Profiles Head of Iraq’s Badr Organization,” Al-Monitor, November 13, 2014, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/iran-news-site-profiles-badr-org.html.

 141 In January 2014 the Meir Amit Intelligence: William Booth, “Israeli Study of Foreign Fighters in Syria Suggests Shiites May Outnumber Sunnis,” Washington Post, January 2, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/02/israeli-study-of-foreign-fighters-in-syria-suggests-shiites-may-outnumber-sunnis.

 141 Kata’ib Hezbollah has also lost: Phillip Smyth, “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 27, 2013, www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/from-karbala-to-sayyida-zaynab-iraqi-fighters-in-syrias-shia-militias.

 141 Ditto Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army: Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Fight for Syria’s Assad,” Reuters, October 16, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/16/us-syria-crisis-iraq-militias-idUSBRE89F0PX20121016.

 141 Phillip Smyth, an expert on the Special Groups: Phillip Smyth, “Breaking Badr, The New Season: Confirmation of the Badr Organization’s Involvement in Syria,” Jihadology blog, August 12, 2013, jihadology.net/2013/08/12/hizballah-cavalcade-breaking-badr-the-new-season-confirmation-of-the-badr-organizations-involvement-in-syria.

 141 Iran has even sent “thousands”: Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Pays Afghans to Fight for Assad,” Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579564161508613846.

 141 Others are allegedly ex-Taliban fighters: Nick Paton Walsh, “‘Afghan’ in Syria: Iranians Pay Us to Fight for Assad,” CNN, October 31, 2014, www.cnn.com/2014/10/31/world/meast/syria-afghan-fighter.

 142 No IRGC-run subsidiary has been: Martin Chulov, “Syrian Town of Qusair Falls to Hezbollah in Breakthrough for Assad,” The Guardian, June 5, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/05/syria-army-seizes-qusair.

 142 one Party of God paramilitary confessed: Mona Alami, “Hezbollah Fighter Details Opsin Qusayr,” NOW Lebanon, June 4, 2013, now.mmedia.me/lb/en/interviews/hezbollah-fighter-details-ops-in-qusayr.

 142 Abu Rami told the Guardian in July 2013: Martin Chulov and Mona Mahmood, “Syrian Sunnies Fear Assad Regime Wants to ‘Ethnically Cleanse’ Alawite Heartland,” The Guardian, July 22, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/syria-sunnis-fear-alawite-ethnic-cleansing.

 142 al-Assad’s first post-uprising interview: Andrew Gilligan, “Assad: Challenge Syria at Your Peril,” The Telegraph, October 29, 2011, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8857898/Assad-challenge-Syria-at-your-peril.html.

 143 But in February 2012: Wyatt Andrews, “Clinton: Arming Syrian Rebels Could Help al Qaeda,” CBS News, February 27, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-arming-syrian-rebels-could-help-al-qaeda.

 143 As the Violations Documentation Center: Glenn Kessler, “Are Syrian Opposition Fighters, ‘Former Farmers or Teachers or Pharmacists’?” Washington Post, June 26, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/06/26/are-syrian-opposition-fighters-former-farmers-or-teachers-or-pharmacists.

 144 As Ambassador Frederic Hof: Frederic Hof, “Saving Syria is No ‘Fantasy,’” Politico, August 11, 2014, www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/mr-president-saving-syria-is-no-fantasy-109923.html.

 145 he issued a general amnesty: “Assad Orders New Syrian Amnesty,” Al Jazeera, June 21, 2011, www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/06/2011621944198405.html.

 145 Muhammad Habash, the former Syrian: Mohammed Habash, “Radicals Are Assad’s Best Friends,” The National, January 1, 2014, www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/radicals-are-assads-best-friends.

 145 There’s a famous photograph: Joshua Landis, “Syria’s Top Five Insurgent Leaders,” Syria Comment blog, October 1, 2013 www.joshualandis.com/blog/biggest-powerful-militia-leaders-syria.

 145 Future ISIS members were also amnestied: Ahmad al-Bahri, “ISIS Restructures Raqqa Under its New Ruling System,” Syria Deeply, November 17, 2014, www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/11/6388/isis-restructures-raqqa-ruling-system.

 145 according to the US State Department: “Designations of Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” US Department of State, September 24, 2014, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232067.htm.

 147 in January 2014, Major General Fayez Dwairi: Phil Sands, Justin Vela, and Suha Maayeh, “Assad Regime Set Free Extremists from Prison to Fire Up Trouble during Peaceful Uprising,” The National, January 21, 2014, www.thenational.ae/world/syria/assad-regime-set-free-extremists-from-prison-to-fire-up-trouble-during-peaceful-uprising.

 147 a twelve-year veteran of Syria’s own Military: Ibid.

 148 More intriguingly, Fares claimed: Ruth Sherlock, “Exclusive Interview: Why I Defected from Bashar al-Assad’s Regime, by Former Diplomat Nawaf Fares,” The Telegraph, July 14, 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9400537/Exclusive-interview-why-I-defected-from-Bashar-al-Assads-regime-by-former-diplomat-Nawaf-Fares.html.

 149 According to journalist Rania Abouzeid: Rania Abouzeid, “The Jihad Next Door,” Politico, June 23, 2014. www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214.html.

 149 Among those making the journey: Ibid.

 149 Major General Dwairi told the National: Sands et al., 2014.

 149 Though his first point of contact in Hasaka: Abouzeid, 2014.

 149 What has been established: Ibid.

 149 Al-Jolani’s cell allegedly waged: “Extremism Hits Home Stopping the Spread of Terrorism,” Per Concordian, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2014, www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_V5N3_en.pdf.

 150 Laith Alkhouri said.: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 151 Al-Jolani later explained to Al Jazeera: “Full Interview with Abu Mohammad al-Jolani,” Internet Archive, posted by Abe Khabbaab (رجاهملا بابخ ىبا), archive.org/details/golan2.

 151 Al-Zawahiri issued two communiqués: Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “Move Forward, O Lions of Sham,” The Global Islamic Media Front, 2012, azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/dr-ayman-al-e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22onward-oh-lions-of-syria22-en.pdf.

 151 Al-Zawahiri excoriated the al-Assad regime: Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “Move Forward, O Lions of Sham,” The Global Islamic Media Front, April 26, 2012, worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2125.

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 157 The idea that a Kurd would join ISIS: Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 244.

 158 ISIS’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani: “Abu Speech: Jihadist Kurds of Halabja Attack Lead ‘Islamic State’ Kobani,” (درك يداهج »باطخ وبأ« ةلودلا« موجه دوقي ةجبلح نم ي ينابوك ىلع»ةيمالسالا) Al-Quds Al-Arabi, October 10, 2014, www.alquds.co.uk/?p=233274.

 158 Charities that were started: “Kuwaiti Charity Designated for Bankrolling al Qaida Network,” US Department of the Treasury, June 13, 2008, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1023.aspx.

 158 after decades of proselytization: Salem al-Haj, “Issue: Islamic Tide in Iraq’s Kurdistan File Historical Reading,” (فلم ددعلا: دملا يمالسالا يف ناتسدرك قارع لا ةءارق ةيخيرات ) Al Hiwar. February 7, 2014, alhiwarmagazine.blogspot.ae/2014/02/blog-post_5030.html.

 158 In Syria the Kurdish turn to ISIS: Jordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics, and Society (New York: Routledge, 2009), 90, 102.

 159 Al-Baghdadi’s deputy: “Abu Muslim al-Turkmani: From Iraqi Officer to Slain ISIS Deputy,” Al Arabiya News, December 19, 2014, english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2014/12/19/Abu-Muslim-al-Turkmani-From-Iraqi-officer-to-slain-ISIS-deputy.html.

 159 Abu al-Athir al-Absi: Radwan Mortada, “Al-Qaeda Leaks II: Baghdadi Loses His Shadow,” Al-Akhbar, January 14, 2014, english.al-akhbar.com/node/18219/18219.

 159 Al-Absi formed a group: Suhaib Anjarini, “The War in Syria: ISIS’s most Succesful Investment Yet,” Al-Akhbar, June 11, 2014, english.al-akhbar.com/node/20133/20133.

 159 Al-Absi took a hard line: Mortada, 2014.

 159 According to Wael Essam: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 160 Al-Absi was one of his staunchest defenders: Anjarini, 2014.

 161 others fell out with their original insurgencies: Mitchell Prother, “ISIS’s Victories May Win It Recruits from Rival Syrian Rebel Groups,” McClatchy DC, June 23, 2014, www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/06/23/231236_isiss-victories-may-win-it-recruits.html.

 161 issued a joint statement disavowing: “Syria Rebel Factions, Including al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, Reject Authority of US-Backed Opposition SNC,” CBS News, Septembe 25, 2013,www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-rebel-factions-including-al-qaeda-linked-nusra-front-reject-authority-of-us-backed-opposition-snc.

 161 In October seven Islamist groups: “Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 21, 2013, carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=50831.

 161 Some Islamic Front commanders: Joanna Paraszczuk, “Syria: Truce Between ISIS’s Abu Umar al-Shishani & Ahrar ash-Sham on Eastern Front in Aleppo Province, EA Worldview, January 8, 2014, eaworldview.com/2014/01/syria-claimed-truce-abu-umar-al-shishani-ahrar-ash-sham-eastern-front.

 161 Liwa Dawud, once the most powerful: “1,000-strong Syrian Rebel Brigade Defects to Islamic State,” RT, July 11, 2014, rt.com/news/171952-thousand-strong-defect-islamic-state.

 162 fighters from the Islamic Front: Yusra Ahmed, “Nusra Front Suffers Defections to Join Rival ISIS,” Zaman Al Wasl, October 24, 2014, www.zamanalwsl.net/en/news/7205.html.

 162 ISIS benefits from the absence: Ahmed Abazid, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Confused Position,” Zaman Al Wasl, March 28, 2014, www.zamanalwsl.net/news/48054.html.

 164 In areas fully controlled by ISIS: Liz Sly, “The Islamic State is Failing at Being a State,” Washington Post, December 25, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-islamic-state-is-failing-at-being-a-state/2014/12/24/bfbf8962-8092-11e4-b936-f3afab0155a7_story.html.

 165 had a reputation as a drug dealer: Ruth Sherlock, “Bodyguard of Syrian Rebel Who Defected to Isil Reveals Secrets of the Jihadist Leadership,” The Telegraph, November 10, 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11221995/Bodyguard-of-Syrian-rebel-who-defected-to-Isil-reveals-secrets-of-the-jihadist-leadership.html.

 165 Aamer al-Rafdan joined ISIS: Anjarini, 2014.

 166 In an article for the New Statesman: Shiraz Maher, “From Portsmouth to Kobane: The British Jihadis Fighting for Isis,” NewStatesman, November 6, 2014, www.newstatesman.com/2014/10/portsmouth-kobane.

 167 by September 2014 the CIA calculated: “CIA Says IS Numbers Underestimated,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2014, www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/cia-triples-number-islamic-state-fighters-201491232912623733.html.

 167 Missionary jihadists who were driven: interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 167 ISIS benefited from the Assadist massacres: Interviews with Syrian activists and rebels, 2013–2014.

 168 Armed with knives and light weapons: Kyle Orton, “What to do About Syria: Sectarianism and the Minorities,” The Syrian Intifada blog, December 24, 2014, kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2014/12/24/what-to-do-about-syria-sectarianism-and-the-minorities.

 168 Videos of torture also showed: Rafida and Nusayris are derogatory terms for Shia and Alawites respectively.

 168 Saudi nationals often point to: “Kawalis al-Thawra Program, 7th episode with Mousa al-Ghannami,” (سيلاوك ةروث لا- ةقلحلا ةعب اسلا-قيبطت دودحلا نيب ةمكح عرشلا لهجو شعاد) YouTube video, 36:13, posted by ىسوم يمانغلا , December 20, 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYtJ0XNMoKI.

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 170 Slightly overstating the power of social media: “Head to Head—Will ISIL Put an End to Iraq?” YouTube video, 47:27, posted by Al Jazeera English, November 21, 2014, http://youtu.be/XkJl9UbG2lo.

 170 Two weeks before the fall of the city: Nico Prucha, “Is This the Most Successful Release of a Jihadist Video Ever?” Jihadica blog, May 19, 2014, www.jihadica.com/is-this-the-most-successful-release-of-a-jihadist-video-ever. Video can be found at ihadology.net/2014/05/17/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-clanging-of-the-swords-part-4.

 173 This not only maximized its viewership: J.M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter,” The Atlantic, June 16, 2014, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856.

 175 In the videos, this hadith is recited: “The Failed Crusade,” Dabiq, Issue 4, October 2014, media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue-4-the-failed-crusade.pdf.

 175 Al-Baghdadi claimed to be a descendent: Hashim, 2014.

 177 One of ISIS’s governors, Hussam Naji Allami: “Mufti ‘Daash’ Legitimate: Hedma Shrines of Mosul, on the Basis of the ‘Modern Prophetic,’” Al-Ghad, November 17, 2014, www.alghad.com/articles/836900.

 177 the US State Department created a Twitter: Think AgainTurn Away, Twitter post, January 15, 2015, 11:04 a.m., twitter.com/ThinkAgain_DOS/status/555802610083852289.

 177 Three days earlier, as the world was recovering: Dan Lamothe, “US Military Social Media Accounts Apparently Hacked by Islamic State Sympathizers,” Washington Post, January 12, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/01/12/centcom-twitter-account-apparently-hacked-by-islamic-state-sympathizer.

 178 Though the White House downplayed: Eli Lake and Josh Rogin, “Islamic State’s Psychological War on US Troops,” Bloomberg View, January 15, 2015, www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-15/islamic-states-psychological-war-on-us-troops; “ISIS Supporters Just Hacked the US Military’s CENTCOM Twitter Account.” Vox, posted by Zack Beauchamp, January 12, 2015, www.vox.com/2015/1/12/7532363/centcom-hack-isis.

CHAPTER 12

 180 as the Associated Press reported: Bradley Klapper and Kimberly Dozier, “Al-Qaeda Building Well-Organized Network in Syria: US Intelligence Officials,” National Post, August 10, 2015, news.nationalpost.com/2012/08/10/al-qaeda-building-well-organized-network-in-syria.

 180 And al-Zawahiri’s exhortation had paid off: Bradley Klapper and Kimberly Dozier, “US Officials: al-Qaeda Gaining Foothold in Syria,” Yahoo! News, August 10, 2012, news.yahoo.com/us-officials-al-qaida-gaining-foothold-syria-201207990.html.

 180 The rebels were also growing: Julian Borger, “Syria Crisis: West Loses Faith in SNC to Unite Opposition Groups,” The Guardian, August 14, 2012, www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/13/syria-opposition-groups-national-council.

 181 In a survey of the opposition: “Syrian Opposition Survey: June 1– July 2, 2012,” The International Republican Institute and Pechter Polls, iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20August%2017%20Survey%20of%20Syrian%20Opposition,%20June%201-July%202,%202012.pdf.

 181 On December 11, 2012, the US Treasury Department: “Treasury Sanctions Al-Nusrah Front Leadership in Syria and Militias Supporting the Asad Regime,” US Department of the Treasury, December 11, 2012, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1797.aspx.

 182 In December 2012, Syrians held: Ruth Sherlock, “Syrian Rebels Defy US and Pledge Allegiance to Jihadi Group,” The Telegraph, December 10, 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9735988/Syrian-rebels-defy-US-and-pledge-allegiance-to-jihadi-group.html.

 182 the first al-Qaeda agent to confirm: Rania Abouzedi, “How Islamist Rebels in Syria Are Ruling a Fallen Provincial Capital,” TIME, March 23, 2013, world.time.com/2013/03/23/how-islamist-rebels-in-syria-are-ruling-a-fallen-provincial-capital.

 183 US Marines had famously helped: Paul Wood, “The Day Saddam’s Statue Fell,” BBC News, April 9, 2004, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3611869.stm.

 183 Suddenly Islamists had just toppled: Rania Abouzeid, “A Black Flag in Raqqa,” New Yorker, April 2, 2013, www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-black-flag-in-raqqa.

 183 Pamphlets were distributed: Abouzeid, March 2013.

 183 In the New Yorker, Rania Abouzeid reconstructed: Abouzeid, April 2013.

 184 Al-Baghdadi didn’t just confine his message: Rita Katz and Adam Raisman, “Special Report on the Power Struggle Between al-Qaeda Branches and Leadership,” INSITE on Terrorism blog, June 25, 2013, news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/3195-special-report-on-the-power-struggle-between-al-qaeda-branches-and-leadership-al-qaeda-in-iraq-vs-al-nusra-front-and-zawahiri.

 184 al-Jolani left absolutely no doubt: Ibid.

 184 What followed was a brief media intermission: Ibid.

 185 Al-Zawhiri thereby “dissolved” ISIS: “Translation of al-Qaeda Chief Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Letter to the Leaders of the Two Jihadi Groups,” accessed January 18, 2015, s3.documentcloud.org/documents/710588/translation-of-ayman-al-zawahiris-letter.pdf.

 185 Al-Suri, who was killed: Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda’s Chief Representative in Syria Killed in Suicide Attack,” The Long War Journal, February 23, 2014, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/zawahiris_chief_repr.php.

 185 was a veteran al-Qaeda agent: “Sources in Aleppo, Syrian Net: Syrian Regime Released from Abu Musab al-Suri and his Assistant Abu Khaled, Observers See a Threat to Washington,” Aleppo Syrian Net, December 23, 2011, Accessed January 3, 2015, www.sooryoon.net/archives/41907.

 185 He had helped found: Caleb Weiss, “Caucasus Emirate Eulogizes Slain Ahrar al Sham Leaders,” The Long War Journal, September 15, 2014, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/caucasus_emirate_eul.php.

 186 The brainchild of Sir Mark Sykes: James Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle That Shaped the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), p. 12.

 186 The agreement was, and still is, a synecdoche: Ian Black, “Isis Breach of Iraq-Syria Border Merges Two Wars into One ‘Nightmarish Reality,’” The Guardian, June 18, 2014 www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/18/isis-iraq-syria-two-wars-one-nightmare.

 186 Al-Baghdadi had earnestly taken up: Constanze Letsch, “Foreign Jihadis Change Face of Syrian Civil War,” The Guardian, December 25, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/25/foreign-jihadis-syrian-civil-war-assad.

 190 On July 11 2013, Kamal Hamami: Paul Wood, “Key Free Syria Army Rebel ‘Killed by Islamist Group,’” BBC News, July 12, 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23283079.

 190 “We are going to wipe the floor with them,”: “New Front Opens in Syria as Rebels Say al Qaeda Attack Means War,” Reuters UK, July 13, 2013, uk.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/uk-syria-crisis-idUKBRE96B08C20130713.

 190 Similarly, when ISIS “accidentally” beheaded: Richard Spencer, “Al-Qaeda–Linked Rebels Apologise After Cutting Off Head of Wrong Person,” The Telegraph, November 14, 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10449815/Al-Qaeda-linked-rebels-apologise-after-cutting-off-head-of-wrong-person.html.

 191 It kidnapped revered opposition activists: “Rule of Terror: Living Under ISIS in Syria,” Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations, November 14, 2014, www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/HRC_CRP_ISIS_14Nov2014.pdf.

 191 it established monopolistic checkpoints: Tareq al-Abed, “The Impending Battle Between FSA, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” Al-Monitor, July 31, 2013, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/07/syria-possible-battle-fsa-islamic-state-iraq-syria.html.

 191 ISIS sent a car bomb to the base: Lauren Williams, “Islamist Militants Drive Free Syrian Army Out of Raqqa,” The Daily Star Lebanon, August 15, 2013 www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Aug-15/227444-islamist-militants-drive-free-syrian-army-out-of-raqqa.ashx.

 191 ISIS then expelled the brigade: Ibid.

 191 In late December 2013: Michael Weiss, “Has Sahwa Hit the Fan in Syria?” NOW Lebanon, January 8, 2014, now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/529244-has-sahwa-hit-the-fan-in-syria.

 191 Among the buildings targeted: Ibid.

 192 Fares had taken to comparing: Ibid.

 192 “The reason Kafranbel became . . .”: Ibid.

 192 On New Year’s Day 2014: Ibid.

 193 the brigade accused it of exceeding: Ibid.

 193 the Islamic Front stated in a press release: Ibid.

 193 This new mainstream front, Saoud told us: Interview with one of the authors, January 2015,

 193 The last group to join this budding Sahwa: Ibid.

 194 If these demands were not met: Ibid.

 194 On January 5 the Islamic Front announced: Ibid.

 195 A quaky truce brokered: Ibid.

 195 Al-Jolani blamed ISIS for the week: Ibid.

 195 ISIS had raised a defiant slogan: Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State,” The Soufan Group, November 2014, soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf.

 196 Abu Omar al-Shishani . . . signed: Yossef Bodansky, “The Sochi Olympics Terror Threat has Links to Camps in Syria that are Supported by the US,” World Tribune, January 24, 2014, www.worldtribune.com/2014/01/24/the-sochi-olympics-terror-threat-has-links-to-camps-in-syria-that-are-supported-by-the-u-s.

 196 On February 2, 2014, global al-Qaeda: Liz Sly, “Al-Qaeda Disavows Any Ties with Radical Islamist ISIS Group in Syria, Iraq,” Washington Post, February 3, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html.

 196 His real name is Maysara al-Juburi: Abu Bakr al Haj Ali, “Abu Maria: The Nusra Leader Behind the Split with IS in Syria?,” Middle East Eye, November 14, 2014, www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/changes-jabhat-al-nusra-indicate-changes-entire-battlefield-1875666927.

 197 ISIS further claims: Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted,” Hudson Institute, July 1, 2008, www.hudson.org/research/9854-the-caliphate-attempted-zarqawi-s-ideological-heirs-their-choice-for-a-caliph-and-the-collapse-of-their-self-styled-islamic-state-of-iraq.

 198 A recent study conducted by the Carter Center: “Syria: Countrywide Conflict Report #4,” The Carter Center, September 11, 2014, www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/NationwideUpdate-Sept-18-2014.pdf.

 198 By Damascus’s own admission: Kyle Orton, “The Assad Regime’s Collusion with ISIS and al-Qaeda: Assessing the Evidence,” The Syrian Intifada blog, March 24, 2014, kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2014/03/24/assessing-the-evidence-of-collusion-between-the-assad-regime-and-the-wahhabi-jihadists-part-1.

 198 One advisor to the regime told the New York Times: Michael Weiss, “Trust Iran Only as Far as You Can Throw It,” Foreign Policy, June 23, 2014, foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/23/trust-iran-only-as-far-as-you-can-throw-it.

 198 Some of this may owe to ISIS’s financial: Ibid.

 198 As a Western intelligence source told the Daily Telegraph: Ruth Sherlock. “Syria’s Assad Accused of Boosting al-Qaeda with Secret Oil Deals,” The Telegraph, January 20, 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10585391/Syrias-Assad-accused-of-boosting-al-Qaeda-with-secret-oil-deals.html.

 198 Frederic Hof . . . wrote: Frederic C. Hof, “Syria: Should the West Work with Assad?” Atlantic Council, July 10, 2014, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-should-the-west-work-with-assad.

CHAPTER 13

 201 It was this established patronage system: William D. Wunderle, A Manual for American Servicemen in the Arab Middle East: Using Cultural Understanding to Defeat Adversaries and Win the Peace (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013).

 201 the Baath Party regarded: Carole A. O’Leary and Nicholas A. Heras, “Syrian Tribal Networks and their Implications for the Syrian Uprising,” The Jamestown Foundation, June 1, 2012, www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39452.

 201 Protestors called for “fazaat houran,”: “ شام - فزعة حوران - إهداء للثورة من شباب سوريا بالسعودية” YouTube video, 7:28, posted by Shaam Network S.N.N., April 1, 2011, www.youtube.com/watchv=Y4ww1xUrHMs.

 202 Overall, tribes account for 30 percent: Nasser Al-Ayed, “Jihadists and Syrian Tribes,” Global Arab Network, November 6, 2014, www.globalarabnetwork.com/studies/13181-2014-11-06-11-53-28.

 202 Because Deir Ezzor connects Syria: Peter Neumann, “Suspects into Collaborators,” London Review of Books, Vol. 36, No.7, Apil 3, 2014, www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n07/peter-neumann/suspects-into-collaborators.

 203 Sometime in the summer of 2012: Karen Leigh, “In Deir Ezzor, ISIS Divides and Conquers Rebel Groups,” Syria Deeply, August 11, 2014, www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/08/5930/deir-ezzor-isis-divides-conquers-rebel-groups.

 206 Members of the Karbala joined: Interview with Wael Essam, November 2014.

CHAPTER 14

 220 They did not bomb the [ISIS] headquarters until June: Martin Chulov, “Isis Fighters Surround Syrian Airbase in Rapid Drive to Recapture Lost Territory,” The Guardian, August 22, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/isis-syria-airbase-tabqa.

 220 “There is a clear shift in the ISIS strategy . . .”: “ISIS Take over Syria Army Base, Behead Soldiers: Activists,” The Daily Star Lebanon, July 26, 2014, www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jul-26/265226-85-syria-troops-killed-in-jihadist-advance-activists.ashx.

 220 Assad’s own cousin, Douraid al-Assad, is quoted as saying: YouTube video, 7:29, posted by Syria.truth, September 15, 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsA7FQywurU#t=11.

 221 When the Syrian Air Force finally escalated: Anne Barnard, “Blamed for Rise of ISIS, Syrian Leader is Pushed to Escalate Fight,” International New York Times, August 22, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/middleeast/assad-supporters-weigh-benefits-of-us-strikes-in-syria.html.

 221 “[I]t’s imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement . . .”: Price et al., 2014.

 224 “What they do is attack the weaker units . . .”: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “’Syria is Not a Revolution Any more—This is Civil War,’” The Guardian, November 18, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/syria-revolution-civil-war-conflict-rivalry.

 224 In an obituary for Jazra, journalist Orwa Moqdad wrote: Orwa Moqdad, “A Rebel Killed by Rebels,” NOW Lebanon, December 19, 2013, now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/526509-the-enemy-of-the-enemy.

 230 One military commander: Hassan Abu Haniya, “Structural Construction of the ‘Islamic State,’” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, November 23, 2014, studies.aljazeera.net/files/isil/2014/11/2014112363816513973.htm

 233 Before that, ISIS was thought to have earned millions: Scott Bronstein and Drew Griffin, “Self-Funded and Deep-Rooted: How ISIS Makes Its Millions,” CNN, October 7, 2014, edition.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-funding.

 234 Germany’s foreign intelligence agency: “German Spies Say Isis Oil Isn’t Money Gusher,” The Local, November 7, 2014, www.thelocal.de/20141107/spies-say-isis-oil-isnt-money-gusher.

 235 Zakat is extracted from annual savings:”Zakat FAQs,” Islamic Relief UK, accessed January 18, 2015, www.islamic-relief.org.uk/about-us/what-we-do/zakat/zakat-faqs/#trade.

 235 ISIS also imposes taxes on non-Muslims: The Islamic State blog, the-islamic-state.blogspot.ae/2014/02/blog-post_26.html.

 235 While donations from foreign sponsors: US House Financial Services Committee, 2014.

 235 ISIS seized millions of dollars: Bronstein & Griffin, 2014.

 235 It has also seized large stockpiles: “Dispatch from the Field: Islamic State Weapons in Iraq and Syria,” Conflict Armament Research Ltd, September 2014, conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Dispatch_IS_Iraq_Syria_Weapons.pdf.

EPILOGUE

 236 in one of his first press conferences: Jay Solomon, “Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi Pledges to Unify Iraq in Fight Against Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/prime-minister-haider-al-abadi-pledges-to-unify-iraq-in-fight-against-islamic-state-1411688702.

 236 “The Americans approach us to leave . . .”: Phillip Smyth, “All the Ayatollah’s Men,” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2014, foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/18/all-the-ayatollahs-men.

 237 According to Human Rights Watch: “Iraq Forces Executed 255 Prisoners in Revenge for Islamic State Killings—HRW,” Reuters, July 12, 2014, news.yahoo.com/iraq-forces-executed-255-prisoners-revenge-islamic-state-133400715.html.

 237 On August 22, 2014, the Musab Bin Omair mosque: “Iraq: Survivors Describe Mosque Massacre,” Human Rights Watch, November 2, 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/01/iraq-survivors-describe-mosque-massacre.

 237 The Badr has lately been accused of: Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014, foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/breaking-badr.

 237 “The [United States] is basically paving the way . . .”: Ibid.

 238 Indirectly supported by US warplanes: “US Military Conducts Air Strikes Against ISIL, Airdrops Humanitarian Aid Near Amirli,” United States Central Command, August 30, 2014, www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/us-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-airdrops-humanitarian-aid-iraq.

 238 US Abrams tanks have been photographed: Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, “Iran-Backed Militias Are Getting US Weapons,” BloombergView, January 8, 2015, www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-08/iranbacked-militias-are-getting-us-weapons-in-iraq.

 238 The Pentagon announced: Maggie Ybarra, “Pentagon: Most of Islamic State’s Oil Refineries in Syria Have Been Destroyed,” Washington Times, September 30, 2014, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/30/pentagon-most-of-isis-oil-refineries-in-syria-have.

 238 Al-Abadi has claimed: “Iraq: ISIS Leader Baghdadi Injured, Stays in Syria,” Al Arabiya News, January 20, 2015, english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/01/20/ISIS-leader-wounded-and-stays-mostly-in-Syria-says-Iraqi-PM.html.

 240 Even in the most fiercely contested battle for Kobane: Dan Lamothe, “US Air Strikes in Syria Are Now Dwarfing Those in Iraq, Thanks to the Fight for One Town,” Washington Post, October 16, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/10/16/u-s-airstrikes-in-syria-are-now-dwarfing-those-in-iraq-thanks-to-the-fight-for-one-town.

 240 In October 2014 Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel: Phil Stewart and Steve Holland, “Hagel, Under Pressure, Resigns as US Defense Secretary,” Reuters, November 24, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/24/us-usa-military-hagel-idUSKCN0J81AK20141124.

 240 in part because he cautioned: Justin Sink, “Hagel Memo Criticized WH Syria Strategy,” The Hill, October 30, 2014, thehill.com/policy/defense/222354-hagel-memo-criticized-wh-syria-strategy.

 241 Harakat Hazm (the Movement of Steadfastness) posted: “US-Backed Rebel Group Criticizes Syria Strikes,” AFP, September 23, 2014, news.yahoo.com/us-backed-rebel-group-criticises-syria-strikes-192612603.html.

 241 wrote Robert Ford, the former US ambassador: Robert S. Ford, “Remember Our Syrian Allies,” New York Times, October 3, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/opinion/remember-our-syrian-allies.html.

 241 In one strike, in the town of Kafr Daryan, Idlib: Josh Levs, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister, “Source: Al Qaeda Group in Syria Plotted Attack Against US with Explosive Clothes,” CNN, September 23, 2014, www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/world/meast/al-qaeda-syria-khorasan.

 241 as one rebel media activist put it: Fidaa Itani, “Opposition Fighters Are Rejecting US-Led Strikes in Syria,” NOW Lebanon, September 9, 2014, now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/564118-opposition-fighters-are-rejecting-us-led-strikes-in-syria.

 241 ISIS has pledged rhetorical solidarity: Tim Lister and Raja Razek, “Islamist Rivals in Syria Find a Common Enemy in ‘Crusaders’ Coalition,” October 6, 2014, www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-al-nusra-syria.

 242 Chérif was arrested before he could join: Rukmini Callimachi and Jim Yardley, “From Amateur to Ruthless Jihadist in France,” New York Times, January 17, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/world/europe/paris-terrorism-brothers-said-cherif-kouachi-charlie-hebdo.html.