On 20 February 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu sat next to Shimon Peres in the presidential residence in Jerusalem. He looked slightly nervous. He was focused on trying his best not to smirk, or look smug, or triumphant. He understood why he had been invited to the residence, and waited to hear the President utter the words that he had longed to hear for a decade.
After the banks of cameras and reporters fell quiet, Peres came straight to the point.
The Basic Law: The Government obliges me to bestow the task of forming the government on one of the Knesset members within seven days of my receiving the official election results.
At the conclusion of the consultations, delegates representing 65 incoming Knesset members – a majority of the Knesset – recommended that I task MK Benjamin Netanyahu with forming the next government.
Therefore, in accordance with the authority vested in me by the Basic Law: The Government, I have decided to bestow the task of forming the next government on MK Benjamin Netanyahu, while noting that a majority of the delegations expressed their wish that the government formed will be a broad government, and requesting that this desire be taken into account in the forming of the government.
MK Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed to me his willingness to take this task upon himself.
I hope that the process will be completed quickly. The people of Israel need governmental and political stability so that we will be able to cope with the challenges standing before us.1
Netanyahu’s appointment was made despite the fact that the party he led had not emerged from the Knesset elections, held ten days earlier on 10 February, as the largest party. This aside, the election represented a triumph for Netanyahu, who rejuvenated the fortunes of the party and had more than doubled the number of seats it had won in the previous election.
The meeting represented a hugely decisive moment in the career of Benjamin Netanyahu. During the days that had followed the election, the media had been full of speculation as to which party leader Peres would nominate for Prime Minister.
The centre-left argued they had the largest party and would be able to put together a coalition. Tzipi Livni, the leader of the largest party in the Knesset, argued that she should be offered the first chance to form the government from her fellow party member, President Peres.
The reality of the electoral maths slowly dawned on Peres, as he carefully studied the results, and concluded that the centre-left would not be as able to form a government. Peres understood that Netanyahu, as head of the right-wing block, clearly enjoyed a majority at coalition level. Faced with little choice, Peres had summoned Netanyahu to his residence to give him the good news.
The meeting was awkward and stiff: a reminder of their political rivalry from the 1996 elections in which Netanyahu had defeated Peres in Israel’s first direct election for Prime Minister. Peres, who had assumed the Presidency in July 2007, had hoped for a centre-left victory in Israel’s elections.
Such a victory, Peres hoped, would have reinvigorated the peace process with the Palestinians. Netanyahu, he sensed, would defer it, avoiding concluding any agreement with the Palestinians.
Peres wished Netanyahu success, but feared the worst. The two parted in the knowledge that they would have to find ways of working together over the subsequent four years on the peace process and a range of other issues. Both men appeared statesman-like as they shuffled around one more time for the cameras.
The Israeli centre-left would take some time to forgive Peres for designating Netanyahu as Prime Minister, but Peres hoped that there was still a prospect of establishing a government of national unity that would include the parties of the centre-left. There wasn’t.
As Netanyahu departed the residence, he addressed the press as the Prime Minister designate. After just over a decade away, he was returning to the Prime Minister’s office to lead Israel for a second time. He promised to put together a governing coalition as soon as possible. In reality, he had already put much of the coalition in place, and had been endorsed by key parties that would come to join his government.
His invitation to form a government came exactly one month after Barack Obama had been inaugurated as President of the United States on 20 January 2009. The two new leaders were seen as being at opposite ends of the political spectrum.
After Netanyahu became Prime Minister designate, the New York Times recalled a story that Netanyahu was fond of telling about his first meeting with Barack Obama, which had taken place in Jerusalem in the summer of 2008. At the time, Obama was the Democratic nominee for President and was visiting Israel as part of his campaign for the presidency.
As they moved to the side of the room, Obama said:
You and I have a lot in common. I started on the left and moved to the centre. You started on the right and moved to the centre. We are both pragmatists who like to get things done.2
Whatever the merits of this assessment, the Obama–Netanyahu relationship became central to not only Israel–US ties since, but to the Middle East peace process. When Netanyahu told the story in 2009, he did so with much delight and viewed Obama’s comments as a type of endorsement. It was also a reminder that, while much of Israel and the outside world viewed Netanyahu as hawkish, he considered himself to be a pragmatist.3
On 31 March 2009, Netanyahu presented his government to the Knesset. The foreign policy section of his speech set out one of the clearest articulations of his beliefs and mindset. The address was vintage Netanyahu, linking the present difficulties to the past and the future.
For President Obama, the speech served as a wake-up call as to the potential difficulties that lay ahead. For all the apparent mutual warm feelings during their first encounter in Jerusalem, the content of the speech outlined a divergent path in terms of the priorities of Netanyahu and Obama.
Netanyahu started off the speech with his usual phoney reticence about being chosen to form the government. ‘It is not with the elation of the victorious that I stand before you today, but rather with a feeling of heavy responsibility,’ he said. He then moved on to express his regret that he was not standing before the Knesset as leader of a national unity government. Here his sentiments were more genuine, but his finely tuned political antenna told him that this had been a non-starter.
Having done with the political small talk, he moved on to the substantive section on security and the peace process. Here his message was direct, sobering and angry. He first set out the problems:
The security crisis we are facing originates from the rise and spread of radical Islam in our region and in other parts of the world. The greatest threat to humanity, and to the State of Israel, stems from the possibility that a radical regime will be armed with nuclear weapons or that nuclear weapons will find a home in a radical regime.
Netanyahu then moved to the specific threat and the issue that would dominate US–Israeli relations for the rest of the era of Obama and Netanyahu. In delivering his words, which he knew would be translated into English for the international press, he made sure that his intonation and stress transmitted the right tone of anger that built to a crescendo, before he reminded the Knesset that Israel could take care of itself in this dangerous world. As he put it:
It is a mark of disgrace for humanity that several decades after the Holocaust the world’s response to the calls by Iran’s leader to destroy the State of Israel is weak, there is no firm condemnation and decisive measures – almost as if dismissed as routine.
However, the Jewish people have learnt their lesson. We cannot afford to take lightly megalomaniac tyrants who threaten to annihilate us. Contrary to the terrible trauma we experienced during the last century when we stood helpless and stateless: today we are not defenceless. We have a state, and we know how to defend it.4
He then turned his attention to Hezbollah and Hamas and delivered the standard Israeli line:
Terrorists from radical Islam now threaten us from both the north and the south. We are determined to curb terrorism from all directions and fight against it with all our might.5
It was in the Palestinian negotiations that Netanyahu tried to offer something of a new policy. His focus on economic development was viewed by his political foes as a means of delaying having to offer major political concessions. It was seen in the White House as another worrying development and as confirmation that Israel had moved to the right.
Netanyahu made his case to the Knesset:
My Government will act vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority to achieve peace on three parallel tracks: economic, security and political. We strive to assist with the accelerated development of the Palestinian economy and in developing its economic ties with Israel.
We will support a Palestinian security mechanism that will fight terror, and we will conduct on-going peace negotiations with the PA, with the aim of reaching a final status arrangement. We have no desire to control another people; we have no wish to rule over the Palestinians.
In the final status arrangement, the Palestinians will have all the authority needed to govern themselves, except those that threaten the existence and security of the State of Israel. This track – combining the economic, security and political – is the right way to achieve peace.
All previous attempts to make shortcuts have achieved the opposite outcome and resulted in increased terror and greater bloodshed. We choose a realistic path, positive in approach and with a genuine desire to bring an end to the conflict between our neighbours and us.6
The final paragraph was arguably the most revealing, in that Netanyahu was telling the world that he did not expect there to be a final status deal with the Palestinians in the immediate future. Indeed, he was saying that any attempt to try to reach a comprehensive settlement with the Palestinians could make matters worse as, he claimed, it had in the past.
In academic language this reeked of Netanyahu opting for a strategy of conflict management over conflict resolution. This choice also did not bode well for US–Israeli relations, as the Obama administration was still locked into trying to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and not to manage it.
Netanyahu concluded his presentation of the government with a reminder to the Knesset, and the rest of the world, of his brother Yonatan, and the importance of the Netanyahu family narrative in the character of the new Prime Minister.
Citizens of Israel, I asked myself how best to express the depth of my feelings at this event, on the eve of Passover 2009. I chose to read an excerpt from one of the final letters written by my late brother, Yoni, approximately one year before he fell during the operation to rescue the hostages in Entebbe:
‘Tomorrow is Passover,’ wrote Yoni. ‘I always saw it as our most wonderful holiday; it is an age-old holiday celebrating freedom. As I sail backwards on the wings of history, I travel through long years of suffering, of oppression, of slaughter, of ghettos, of ostracism, of humiliation; many years that, from an historic perspective, do not contain one ray of light; but that is not the case because of the fact that the core remained, hope existed, the idea of freedom continued to burn through the fulfilment of the tradition of the ancient holiday.
This, in my opinion, is a testament to the eternalness of the aspiration for freedom in Israel, the continuity of the idea of freedom. The Passover holiday,’ he wrote, ‘awakens in me an emotional affinity, also because of the Seder which, like it does for all of us, reminds me of forgotten moments from our personal pasts, my past. I clearly remember the Seder we held in Talpiot, Jerusalem when I was six.
Among the participants were a number of elders like Rabbi Binyamin and Professor Klausner, and my father was also there. There was a large table and there was light. I find myself in my past, but I do not only mean my own personal past, but also the way I see myself as an inseparable link in the chain of our existence and independence in Israel.’7
The impression that Netanyahu wanted to convey in his address was of a determined, pragmatic leader, who was more at ease with himself and his personal history than he had been during his first term as Prime Minister. A one-line summary of the speech would read simply: this time, things will be different.
In a nod to the other important member of his family, his historian father, Benzion, the new Prime Minister included a selective history of the Jewish people:
The State of Israel was established during its most difficult hour, an hour during which the words of the Declaration of Independence echoed in our ears: ‘The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.
After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to its land and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.’
There is no more wondrous a journey in history than that of the Jewish people. There is no struggle more just than its struggle to return to its homeland and build a life here as a free and sovereign nation. There is no question mark, not about the right, not about the justice and not about the existence of the people of Israel and its country. There is no question mark, and we will not allow anyone or any country to raise a question mark over our existence.
The 20th century proved that the future of the Jewish people is dependent on the future of the State of Israel, and therefore it is our duty to do all that is necessary to ensure the security, strength and prosperity of our country.8
All of this seemed to confirm Natan Sharansky’s point, that Netanyahu was fond of attempting to put the present day into a historic context. Throughout his speech he was trying to reassure Israelis that he understood where they came from, who they were and where he was going to lead them in the future. He wasn’t totally successful in reassuring all Israelis, but it was a better effort than anything from his first premiership.
On the political front, he had stated his position on Iran and the Palestinians, in the belief that he was articulating the views of most mainstream Israeli voters on the two issues that defined the era and Israel’s relations with the Obama administration. This was not the speech of an ideologue, but, rather, a pragmatist, who believed that Israel was facing an unprecedented threat to its existence.
With its dramatic tones, emotive language and focus on economic improvement for the Palestinians, it was a speech that might have been given by the late Moshe Dayan, from the Labour Party. Netanyahu looked and sounded more statesmanlike, but the potential divisions with President Obama reminded everyone of his difficult relationship with President Clinton.
Netanyahu believed that he could convince President Obama, and the world, of the merits of his positions towards Iran and the Palestinians. In his eyes, Israel had turned to him in its hour of need. The onset of the global financial crisis, and the continued threats posed by Hezbollah and Hamas to Israel, appeared greater than ever. On top of this, the Iranian nuclear programme presented a new challenge to Israel’s military hegemony in the Middle East, and potentially to the very existence of the state.
During the presentation of his government to the Knesset, Netanyahu had been careful not to adopt a ‘told you so’ message. Instead, he portrayed himself as a Churchill-style leader, who would guide the country through the real and perceived dangers that Israel faced. His credentials, as both a successful manager of Israel’s economy and guardian of the country’s diplomatic position with the outside world, were important reasons in his political return.
The mistakes he made during the 2001 election campaign had consigned him to a position of having to accept the leadership of his rival, Ariel Sharon of the Likud and of Israel. It looked as if Netanyahu had missed his opportunity to lead Israel for a second time, as Sharon continually strengthened his leadership of the centre-right in Israel. Internationally, Sharon rapidly went from pariah figure to international statesman, who was warmly welcomed in the White House, Downing Street and the Élysée Palace.
To his credit, Netanyahu had not sulked on the political sidelines from 2001 until his return to the premiership in 2009. Rather, he had joined the Sharon government and worked to rehabilitate himself as a minister and political heavyweight in Israel.
At the same time he never abandoned the ambition to lead Israel again, or the belief that the country would one day turn to him for leadership. In the meantime, he concentrated his energies on trying to resolve, or manage, the difficult issues that were brought before him as a minister.
His speech to the Knesset, on 31 March 2009, marked the end of a long road of political redemption for Netanyahu that had started in 2002. But his rise back to power had proven to be full of obstacles and false starts. In the end, he had been able to position himself as the politician that Israelis turned to when they felt most fearful, in both their present day lives and about their future prospects.
Back in November 2002, this triumphant return appeared a long way off, when the Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon had – a little reluctantly – asked Netanyahu to serve in his new government as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The month of November 2002, however, would come to be one that Netanyahu would want to forget.
Two months prior to his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the king of the politics of fear returned to the international stage in Washington as a ‘private citizen’ to offer the Americans key advice, which would have a far reaching impact for the United States and the whole of the Middle East.