The nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus the European Union, was agreed in Vienna on 14 July 2015. The deal represented the total rejection by the international community of the central pillar of Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign policy since his return to power in 2009.
American, European and Iranian leaders rushed to herald the deal as the product of painstaking diplomacy that had averted a potential military clash between Iran and the rest of the world. In Israel the agreement was viewed with suspicion and fear. There was also a sense across the political spectrum that Netanyahu’s confrontational tactics towards the Americans and the rest of the world over the Iranian nuclear programme had backfired spectacularly.
For Netanyahu 14 July 2015 was his D-Day, during which much of the world and Israel turned its attention to criticising his approach to the nuclear issue. It removed the prospect of any Israeli unilateral military action against the Iranian programme. Netanyahu had long prepared for this D-Day, believing that the Obama administration would lead the world into seeking an agreement of sorts with Iran. He was ready, as a result, to vent his frustration and opposition to the deal for the world to hear.
The headlines across the globe on 14 July were not dominated by the agreement, the contents of which most laymen failed to understand, but, rather, by the fierce reaction of Netanyahu to it, and his fears for the future of Israel and the Middle East. The king of fear-mongering went to task on the JCPOA, trying to rally support to prevent it from becoming law.
With much of Israel and the outside world watching, Netanyahu’s statement was dramatic and full of rhetoric that made for good headlines:
The world is a much more dangerous place today than it was yesterday.
The leading international powers have bet our collective future on a deal with the foremost sponsor of international terrorism. They’ve gambled that in ten years’ time, Iran’s terrorist regime will change while removing any incentive for it to do so. In fact, the deal gives Iran every incentive not to change.
In the coming decade, the deal will reward Iran, the terrorist regime in Tehran, with hundreds of billions of dollars. This cash bonanza will fuel Iran’s terrorism worldwide, its aggression in the region and its efforts to destroy Israel, which are on-going.
Amazingly, this bad deal does not require Iran to cease its aggressive behaviour in any way. And just last Friday, that aggression was on display for all to see.
While the negotiators were closing the deal in Vienna, Iran’s supposedly moderate President chose to go to a rally in Tehran and at this rally, a frenzied mob burned American and Israeli flags and chanted ‘Death to America, Death to Israel!’ Now, this didn’t happen four years ago. It happened four days ago.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, said on March 21 that the deal does not limit Iran’s aggression in any way. He said: ‘Negotiations with the United States are on the nuclear issue and on nothing else.’ And three days ago he made that clear again. ‘The United States’, he said, ‘embodies global arrogance, and the battle against it will continue unabated even after the nuclear agreement is concluded.’
Here’s what Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Iran’s terrorist proxy Hezbollah, said about sanctions relief, which is a key component of the deal. He said: ‘A rich and strong Iran will be able to stand by its allies and friends in the region more than at any time in the past.’
Translation: Iran’s support for terrorism and subversion will actually increase after the deal. In addition to filling Iran’s terror war chest, this deal repeats the mistakes made with North Korea. There too we were assured that inspections and verifications would prevent a rogue regime from developing nuclear weapons. And we all know how that ended.
The bottom line of this very bad deal is exactly what Iran’s President Rouhani said today: ‘The international community is removing the sanctions and Iran is keeping its nuclear program.’ By not dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, in a decade this deal will give an unreformed, unrepentant and far richer terrorist regime the capacity to produce many nuclear bombs, in fact an entire nuclear arsenal with the means to deliver it.
What a stunning historic mistake!
Israel is not bound by this deal with Iran because Iran continues to seek our destruction. We will always defend ourselves.1
It was a defiant statement that attempted to transmit the message that, as far as he was concerned, the battle over the Iranian nuclear programme was far from over. Central to his argument was that Iran must be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons as the result of its programme.
In Israel, centre-left opposition politicians agreed with Netanyahu that the deal was bad for Israel, but blamed him for creating the conditions that encouraged the United States to sign the deal with Iran. A less confrontational stance would have produced better results for Israel and not damaged relations with Washington as much as Netanyahu’s approach had done.
On the right, Avigdor Lieberman was predictably vocal in his opposition to the agreement, comparing it to Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement with the Nazis. He said, ‘It is an agreement of total capitulation to unrestrained terrorism and violence in the international arena.’2
President Obama telephoned Netanyahu on 14 July to try to reassure the Prime Minister that the agreement served American and Israeli interests, and that it would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Obama reminded him of America’s commitment to Israel’s security. As the White House phone read-out recorded:
The President also underscored his Administration’s stalwart commitment to Israel’s security and noted that the JCPOA will remove the spectre of a nuclear-armed Iran, an outcome in the national security interest of the United States and Israel. The President told the Prime Minister that today’s agreement on the nuclear issue will not diminish our concerns regarding Iran’s support for terrorism and threats toward Israel.
The President noted that Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s visit next week to Israel is a reflection of the unprecedented level of security cooperation between the United States and Israel, and that the visit offers a further opportunity to continue our close consultation on security issues with Israeli counterparts as we remain vigilant in countering the Iranian regime’s destabilizing activities in the region.3
Obama’s conversation illustrated his well-placed caution in dealing with Netanyahu. He understood that the Prime Minister would attempt to rally support in Congress to try to prevent the agreement becoming law. Netanyahu did exactly that, but his strategy failed as Congress was not able to prevent the implementation of the agreement.
For those Israelis who bothered to read the details of the JCPOA, the major problem that arose from it was over the question of verification. Inspectors would have limited access and the site visits were to be at registered plants. Inspectors would not be able to show up and conduct searches at previously unknown facilities.4
All of this sounded rather familiar to many nuclear experts in Israel. Its own nuclear weapons programme, devised in the late 1950s, had followed a similar path. First, the establishment of a nuclear programme for alleged peaceful purposes, which was then transformed into one that produced nuclear weapons by the start of the 1960s. Verification of Israel’s nuclear facilities by American and British inspectors had been very poor, which allowed the Israelis to proceed towards the development of nuclear weapons with relative ease.
The most annoying aspect of the JCPOA for Netanyahu personally was that he understood perfectly well that he had not lost the argument on the merits (or not) of the agreement with Iran. He was correct in assuming that the world was not embracing a newly reformed despot regime, but, rather, had cut a deal with a dangerous regionally expansionist regime that wished to wipe Israel off the map.
Being right was one thing, but getting the agreement changed – or better still dropped altogether – appeared impossible. The world was not looking for a fight with Iran, and moved on to new, more pressing issues such as the rise of the Islamic State.
Netanyahu understood that he was beaten, and his pragmatic nature led him towards a reconciliation of sorts with President Obama. Part of his thinking was governed by his hope of extracting additional help from the administration towards protecting Israel in its, post-JCPOA, more dangerous neighbourhood.
On 9 November 2015, the two leaders met at the White House for the first time since the deal on Iran. For Netanyahu the meeting was about being seen to be mending fences with the Obama administration and securing a commitment from the President to bolster Israel’s security. On Iran, the agenda shifted towards the implementation of the deal, and specifically making sure that the Iranians complied with its terms and conditions.
After the two and a half hour meeting, both Netanyahu and Obama were keen to emphasize that it was a return to business as usual. Obama argued that the time had come to set aside their differences over Iran, and to look towards negotiating a new ten-year package of military aid to Israel and to find ways to try to manage and calm the ongoing wave of violence between Israelis and Palestinians.5
Netanyahu described it as one of his best meetings with Obama, and during the course of his statement to the press offered the Americans a reminder of his apparently rediscovered acceptance of the two-state solution. As he put it:
Equally, I want to make it clear that we have not given up our hope for peace. We’ll never give up the hope for peace. And I remain committed to a vision of peace of two states for two peoples, a demilitarized Palestinian state that recognizes the Jewish state.6
Obama officials were quick to point out that despite Netanyahu’s comments, they did not think it possible that there would be any Israeli–Palestinian agreement during the remaining time of the Obama administration. They also considered it pointless to try to start what they considered would be meaningless negotiations between the two sides. This was music to Netanyahu’s ears.7
The meeting was important for both men, who understood the need to calm US–Israeli relations before any lasting damage was done to the relationship. Agreeing to differ over Iran was the best means to putting the row behind them, but, as Netanyahu quipped to the press, he remained convinced that he would be proved right. He said:
It’ll be left to history to see if Iran will modernize and reform under this clique. I have my doubts. I hope I’m wrong; I suspect I’ll be proved right.8
The basic difference between him and Obama was that Netanyahu argued the deal would empower Iran, while the President thought it the best way to contain it. Netanyahu had never been a big fan of containment as a means to controlling troublesome regimes.
Not wanting to labour the point (again) Netanyahu was keen to move on from the subject area of his biggest political defeat and to focus on other aspects of Israeli security.
Reports from Israel indicated that Israel had been serious about attacking the Iranian nuclear programme in the past. Ehud Barak was said to have favoured a military strike along with the Prime Minister. In the period between 2010 and 2012, Israel came close to launching such a strike on three occasions.9
Alleged opposition from some other cabinet members and key figures in the IDF acted as a restraint on the Netanyahu–Barak axis and prevented any strike taking place. Once negotiations started between the Obama administration and Iran the potential for such a strike receded.10
Many leaders would have been crushed if the cornerstone of their foreign policy had failed, but not Netanyahu. He simply tried to move the political agenda on to something that he also felt passionate about, Israel’s large resources of natural gas, that in his eyes needed to be tapped. A controversial issue with lots of opposition, it was perfect for Netanyahu to get his claws into.
In December 2015, and only after months of wrangling, he signed the deal that would lead to the start of the extraction of the gas from off the Israeli coast. Netanyahu labelled the discovery of the huge gas field as ‘a gift from God’. It was one that had the potential to transform the energy map of the Middle East and bring great benefits to Israel.
This plan is important to our economy because it gives us a much cheaper source of energy . . . It makes us, if not an energy superpower, then definitely an important international force.
. . . There is no way to open up these additional gas fields without this plan. This is the only option . . . Unfortunately, this issue has become a political and populist discussion. This plan is vital to our security, because we don’t want to be left with one power plant that’s under fire; we need multiple gas fields.
This is essential for our foreign relations. Many countries have expressed interest [in buying the natural gas]. Not just Greece and Cyprus, whose leaders I am meeting in a few weeks. Jordan, and of course the Palestinian Authority as well, have shown interest. Turkey and Egypt are also interested, and we are in discussion with them.11
The development of Israel as an energy superpower was hugely attractive to Netanyahu and his vision of the future success of the Israeli economy. He continued to view the economy as both Israel’s greatest strength, but also its major weakness. The strength lay in its high-tech boom and in other parts of the private sector. The weakness was prevalent in the public sector and its ties to the Zionist Labour movement.
Iran, by the end of 2015, while not forgotten, was no longer the hot topic of debate in the Netanyahu-led government. This revealing point indicates the notion of self-reinvention that Netanyahu had pulled off time and again in Israeli politics. Just when he looked cornered, with no exit possible, he discovered a way out and was able to enjoy a new lease of life.
The outside world, and much of Israel, continued to wait for the moment when the rise of Benjamin Netanyahu would come to an end and the start of his decline begin. As the British politician Enoch Powell had once said, ‘All political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in failure, because that is the nature of politics and of human affairs.’12 To date, despite his many setbacks and defeats, Netanyahu’s own career has not yet ended in failure.
At the start of 2016, despite a formal investigation of his wife by the Attorney General in Israel, and a growing belief that his coalition would not last beyond the halfway point of the current Knesset, Netanyahu remained at the helm. Talk was of his chances of surpassing David Ben-Gurion as Israel’s longest serving leader.13
Arguably, the most intriguing part of Netanyahu’s rise was his ability to bridge (and at times divide) Israel with the United States. He viewed the dispute over the Iranian nuclear programme with President Obama as a one-off, and not as part of a weakening of ties between Jerusalem and Washington. That said, he would very much like still to be in power when the United States inaugurates President Obama’s successor in January 2017.