2
The Original Team of Rivals
WASHINGTON FIRST CONVENED the cabinet meeting on November 26, 1791. Just as he had surrounded himself with talented subordinates as commander in chief of the Continental Army, Washington selected department secretaries that brought extensive experience and knowledge to their positions. They were well-educated, opinionated, prideful men accustomed to sharing their beliefs openly, and they expected to be treated with respect. Washington depended on their advice in private consultations and invited them to cabinet meetings to share their expertise. Which was just as well, because they probably would have offered their opinions either way.
Much like Washington, they had been forged by the war. They had experienced administrative inefficiency that shaped their thinking about the executive: they had endured Congress’s ineptitude in the face of danger; they had witnessed the obstacles to executive power imposed by the state legislatures; and their communities had suffered when the state militias could not offer sufficient protection. Their military and government experiences prior to serving in the federal government influenced their understanding of executive power, forged their shared commitment to expanding presidential authority, and informed their advice once in the cabinet.
In recent years, some cabinet secretaries have received more scholarly and popular attention than others. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to Alexander Hamilton’s efforts to create a strong federal government, and for good reason—he created the nation’s financial system, which yielded the funds that the government needed to keep its doors open.1 But Hamilton was one of many trusted advisors. Thomas Jefferson has long been a scholarly favorite as well. Even Jefferson, who later protested the expansion of presidential power, supported increased executive authority after his tenure as the governor of Virginia. But the cabinet was not just Hamilton and Jefferson. Each of the secretaries played a critical role shaped by their war experience. Here I will offer a glimpse into the extraordinary lives of five of Washington’s secretaries—Henry Knox, Edmund Randolph, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and William Bradford. The first four served as the original cabinet and the core of Washington’s administration. After Jefferson’s retirement and Randolph’s promotion to the State Department, Bradford became the second attorney general and played a central role in the cabinet during his year in office.
History has largely forgotten or dismissed Secretary of War Henry Knox’s central role in the Washington administration. Perhaps this oversight occurs because Knox almost always supported Hamilton’s agenda in the cabinet. But Knox endured his own hardships that convinced him of the need for a powerful, active president, and he made substantive contributions in the cabinet to achieve those goals. During the Revolutionary War, he witnessed firsthand the Continental Congress’s inability to provide for the army. As general of artillery, Knox was responsible for maintaining the army’s field pieces, securing replacements for damaged or lost cannons, acquiring ammunition, and deploying artillery in battle. But he found these efforts continuously frustrated by congressional action. On February 11, 1778, Congress passed new regulations creating one commissary general in charge of all military stores. The commissary general would be responsible for acquiring and delivering all arms and ammunition, from rifles to cannons and everything in between.2 In order to procure supplies for battle, Knox would have to request materials from the commissary general.
From the very beginning, he protested this new arrangement. In June 1778, he wrote to Washington, miserable about the new regulations. He pointed to several European armies as a more sensible model. All other successful models had the general of artillery overseeing his own “ordnance,” meaning supplies and ammunitions. This chain of command ensured that the general of artillery could remedy any deficiencies in his supply. Knox could not suppress his outrage that Congress had adopted such an untested plan of action: “There cannot be an instance pointed out in any service where the Commissaries or Clerks are made independent, and unamenable to the Commanding Officer of Artillery, as in the Regulations of the Ordnance Department, Feby 12th.”3
By the end of the 1778 campaign season, matters had not improved. As the army prepared to enter winter quarters in Middlebrook, New Jersey, Knox again wrote to Washington describing the problem: “During the course of the past Campaign I have repeatedly, on an emergency, found myself at a loss to know where to send for Stores, by reason of not having the Returns of all the Departments; the Commissaries not conceiving themselves obligated to send me Returns, even on my sending for them.” Knox made clear that the deficiencies of the organizational structure were not just some new kinks that needed to be worked out: “I have a request for a Return to the principal Commissary uncomplied with at this moment, although I sent the Letter above two months ago; and at present I am totally ignorant of what is doing in the Ordnance Department in Pennsylvania.”4 Sympathetic to these concerns, Washington forwarded Knox’s original letter to Henry Laurens, president of the Continental Congress. Yet Knox’s continuing complaints indicate how slowly Congress moved to centralize the war administration or fix the problems with the command structure. In February 1779, Congress invited Knox to come to Philadelphia and brief them on the artillery. Based on Knox’s testimony, it finally passed legislation to regulate the ordnance departments later that month.5
FIGURE 2.1 Henry Knox, Charles Peale Polk, 1783. National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution
After the American victory at Yorktown in October 1781, the bulk of the Continental Army spent the next two years waiting for the results of peace negotiations between the United States and Great Britain. While Hamilton was gone from the army between April and October 1781, and again after the siege of Yorktown, Knox remained in the military until the very end of the war and served in many prestigious positions. In March 1782, Congress appointed Knox and Gouverneur Morris, the assistant superintendent of finance, to negotiate prisoner-of-war exchanges with the British.6 Knox served as a major general of artillery until August 1782, when Washington honored him with command of West Point, a valuable defensive position.
In the meantime, the lull in action gave Knox and many other officers ample opportunity to consider the new American nation. Frustrated with limited central government during the war, Knox advocated for greater power for the Confederation government. On February 21, 1783, he wrote to Financier of the Treasury Robert Morris, “As the present Constitution is so defective, why do not you great men call the people together and tell them so; that is, to have a convention of the States to form a better Constitution. This appears to us, who have a superficial view only, to be the more efficacious remedy.”7
With no plan to revise the Confederation government in sight, Knox and many other officers feared the nation would be left leaderless. Determined that their sacrifices during the war not go to waste, they created a new fraternal organization to fill the leadership vacuum.8 On May 13, 1783, a meeting of officers adopted the first constitution of the Society of the Cincinnati at Verplanck House, near Fishkill, New York.9 The society was founded to perpetuate wartime friendships between American, French, and German officers and would protect the virtues and republican morality of the fledgling nation. The society was also intended to step in when Congress failed to care for the widows and children of indigent veteran officers. If the civilian government would not offer strong leadership, the officers would. Knox carried this ethos with him into the federal government, always convinced that a corps of officers was best suited to lead the country.
On March 17, 1785, Knox accepted the appointment of secretary of war. He entered the office hopeful that the Confederation Congress, and his position under its authority, wielded enough power to address its responsibilities. Shortly after accepting his appointment, Knox explained to Washington that he agreed to hold the position because “Congress have rendered the powers, and duties of the Office respectable.”10 As the first secretary of war under the Continental Congress, Knox’s responsibilities included overseeing the tiny Continental Army and Indian affairs. He also held an expansive view of his powers. As all troops were under his oversight, Knox considered himself commander in chief. He also believed all military issues should be under the purview of the national government. He repeatedly rejected Virginia’s efforts to establish a military store in the Ohio territory. He was not trying to sabotage Virginia’s self-defense; rather, he argued that national defense was a responsibility of Congress rather than of the states.11 During the Whiskey Rebellion, an insurrection in western Pennsylvania over the whiskey excise tax, we will see Knox again argue that defense was a national responsibility, although this time he believed the responsibility lay with the executive, and he urged the president to put down the insurrection rather than leaving the issue to Pennsylvania.
Despite Knox’s high hopes upon entering office, he quickly discovered that Congress and his position did not meet his expectations. Knox attempted to secure peace with Indian tribes both through negotiations and by deploying troops to protect western settlers. Both efforts were hamstrung by state interference, limited federal authority, and Congress’s inability to raise adequate funds.
First, Congress had no real authority to restrict state action, and often pursued goals that conflicted with those of the states. For example, in December 1785, Congress granted Cherokee Indians exclusive rights to land west of North Carolina. Congress hoped that by granting Cherokees sovereignty over specific territory, the federal government could stop white settlers from encroaching on Native land and limit Native attacks on white families and settlements. However, after signing an agreement with the Cherokees, Congress learned that North Carolina had already parceled out the same land to its own settlers.12 The next year, Kentucky and Virginia threatened Congress’s Indian policy. In late summer 1786, Knox worked to keep various native nations from banding together in one united confederacy against the United States. He believed he could keep individual Indian tribes at peace if the states would temporarily ignore attacks by radical fringe groups. Much to Knox’s frustration, General George Rogers Clark led an excursion that destroyed several Shawnee towns. The violence committed by Virginian troops undermined the federal policy of containment and diplomacy, but Congress had no authority to penalize the states for pursuing conflicting policies.13
Second, Congress commanded insufficient military forces to limit white settlement in western territories. In June 1786, Knox requested that Congress raise an additional 800 troops to establish posts in the western territories. Congress did not respond to his proposal.14 Later that fall, Knox again encouraged Congress to raise more troops. This time Congress heeded his recommendations under the guise of protecting western settlements against Indian warfare. Shays’ Rebellion, an insurrection in western Massachusetts over harsh tax policies led by army veteran Daniel Shays, struck closer to home and inspired congressional action. Despite Congress’s best intentions, few states responded to the request for troops and only two companies of artillery were raised.15 Recognizing that Congress was not able to supply the much-needed federal army, Knox also submitted a proposal to Congress titled “A Plan for the General Arrangement of the Militia of the United States.” He proposed the creation of three corps based on age ranges, with the number of mandatory days of service to be determined by age. In his report, Knox argued in favor of compulsory militia service because “military education shall be an indispensable qualification of a free citizen.” Congress could not even consider the proposal because not enough members showed up in New York City to reach a quorum.16
Third, Congress could raise no money to fund military action or to conduct effective negotiations with Native Americans. Most of Congress’s problems could be attributed to lack of money. Congress established annual quotas for state taxation, but it depended on the states voluntarily complying with these requests. There was no enforcement mechanism. Compounding its lack of tax revenue, the nation owed significant debts to the French and Dutch, with looming due dates. One example of the states’ power over Congress’s finances took place in November 1785. Congressionally appointed peace commissioners signed a treaty with Cherokee representatives at Hopewell, on the Keowee River.17 However, the peace commissioners had to clear the terms of the treaty with state governors before signing the final document. Additionally, Congress mandated that the states affected by the proposed treaty raise funds to cover the cost of the negotiations. When Georgia threw “every obstruction in the way to prevent the Commissioners from treating with the Creek Nation,” there was nothing Congress could do except hope that the negotiations would continue.18
Knox witnessed Congress’s fiscal limitations firsthand. No matter how compelling the reason, most of his requests for funding were turned down. On June 14, 1786, the Board of Treasury confessed that they wished to supply Knox with the support he requested, but “there are not sufficient sums in the treasury to defray the salaries of the public officers whose services are indispensably necessary for the support of the mere form of the civil government.”19 Put another way, Congress did not have money to pay federal officials, much less supply an army out west. In late October 1786, Knox wrote to Washington of the depressing state of the Confederation Congress: “The powers of Congress are utterly inadequate to preserve the balance between the respective States, and oblige them to do those things which are essential to their own welfare, and for the general good.”20
Perhaps the most disheartening moment for Knox came in January 1787 during Shays’ Rebellion. Knox, in his capacity as secretary of war, was responsible for overseeing Congress’s response to the rebellion. Knox quickly traveled to Springfield, Massachusetts, to visit the federal arsenal and assess for himself the situation on the ground. His visit gave him little confidence that the Massachusetts militia would turn up to defend the arsenal against their friends and neighbors. He was devastated to see the change in his home state.21 A decade earlier, he had pored over military texts in his Boston bookstore to teach himself the art of artillery. He had protested the British taxation policies in the streets of Boston and had enthusiastically joined the militia after the Battles of Lexington and Concord in April 1775.22 Now Knox could not trust the militia to uphold the laws of the new government he had fought eight years to protect.
On October 18, 1787, Knox submitted a full report to Congress, sharing his “firm conviction, unless the present commotions are checked with a strong hand, that an armed tyranny may be established on the ruins of the present constitution.”23 Two days later, Congress resolved unanimously to raise 2,040 troops to prepare for future wars with Native Americans. But Congress secretly intended to send these troops to quell the domestic rebellion gaining steam in Massachusetts.24 Yet when Knox returned to New York City to organize the troops, there was no money to pay the soldiers or buy supplies. Only Virginia had responded to Congress’s plea for funds.25 Knox was forced to tell Massachusetts officials that he had no ability to intervene—he had no armed force to send to protect the federal arsenal in Springfield.26
Knox took some comfort that his beloved Society of the Cincinnati contributed to the resolution of Shays’ Rebellion. After Congress failed to provide resources for federal forces, the officers of the Society of the Cincinnati stepped forward. In early 1787, the network of officers gathered troops, and Benjamin Lincoln, the president of the Massachusetts chapter, established a subscription to pay for the army. Within twenty-four hours, wealthy merchants, government officials, and elites in Boston had raised the money to outfit the new army. Lincoln’s army marched to Springfield and confronted the rebels. The rebellion crumbled and the leaders were captured and arrested. As a native Bostonian, an active member of the Society of the Cincinnati, and the secretary of war, Knox served as an important conduit for information and resources.27
Knox brought these experiences to his tenure as secretary of war for Washington’s administration. Only a few months after starting his role in Washington’s administration, Knox returned to his plan to reorganize the militia that he had first proposed almost four years earlier. Knox and Washington reviewed the proposal and made a few revisions. In January 1790, Washington submitted the plan to Congress. On May 8, 1792, Congress finally passed a bill creating a uniform militia system. Under the Confederation system, Knox had also observed Congress’s inability to respond to a domestic crisis, and he brought this experience to the cabinet. Although the new federal Congress finally adopted Knox’s militia plan, it took the legislature more than two years to pass the bill. Given this glacial pace, he had little faith that Congress could muster decisive military action in the face of a crisis.
Knox’s entire career, from brigadier general of the artillery to secretary of war under President Washington, convinced him that the nation required a strong president. During the Revolutionary War, Knox significantly outranked Hamilton. He created the artillery corps in the Continental Army, developed the first school for artillery, and oversaw the expansion of the first military school at West Point. He then served as the secretary of war for several years under Congress’s supervision before the Department of War was placed under executive control in 1789, and Knox continued in the office in the new federal government. While these experiences taught Knox lessons similar to the ones Hamilton learned during the war, his experiences were entirely his own. It is no surprise that he feared the anarchy of the French Revolution—a mob response was antithetical to the values that he and his beloved Society of the Cincinnati espoused. He also advocated for a decisive presidential response to other important events in the 1790s, such as the Neutrality Crisis in 1793 and the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, based on these past experiences.28
On the evening of August 8, 1794, Knox departed Philadelphia to investigate the state of his farm, then on the brink of bankruptcy in Maine. Washington undoubtedly resented Knox’s absence over the next two months, and their relationship cooled upon Knox’s return to Philadelphia on October 6. Unfortunately, Washington’s frustrations have colored history’s assessment of Knox’s contributions to the cabinet.29 Washington himself wrote to Knox that “it would have given me pleasure to have had you with me & advantages might have resulted from it on my present tour [to Western Pennsylvania].”30 Washington may have been angry with his secretary of war, but he valued Knox’s abilities, input, and experience. Knox had been at Washington’s side for every major battle of the Revolutionary War and had been a trusted confidant during the Confederation period. Once in office, he helped smooth the transition between the old and new governments by serving as secretary of war under both constitutions. During the first few years of the presidency, Knox and Washington worked closely to navigate tensions between the United States and many Native American nations.31 Although Knox did not march out with Washington and troops to meet the rebels in western Pennsylvania during the Whiskey Rebellion, he was actively involved in the cabinet until his departure on August 8, and he helped define the administration’s strategy. Based on his own experiences, Knox supported a strong executive led by a powerful president and supported by the cabinet.
Although largely forgotten by the history books, Edmund Randolph served as Washington’s personal lawyer and one of his trusted advisors for over twenty years. As the first attorney general and second secretary of state, he was a central member of the first cabinet. His storied career led to an ignominious end, however: in 1795, Randolph resigned in disgrace after the other members of the cabinet accused him of selling state secrets to the French. His resignation has overshadowed his very real contributions during his lengthy tenure in Washington’s cabinet, both in the minds of his contemporaries and in the eyes of history. In Washington’s administration, Randolph served as a valued advisor and confidant while Washington established countless legal precedents in his early years in office. After Jefferson’s retirement, Randolph took over the Department of State and played a significant role in the administration’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion and the Jay Treaty negotiations, two pivotal moments during Washington’s second term. Based on his previous governing experience, he championed federal power over the states and ensured that the cabinet supported a strong, active president.
Randolph’s tenure as governor of Virginia from 1786 to 1788 was plagued by violence between Native Americans and settlers on the western border and by the fiscal aftermath of the Revolutionary War. These experiences led Randolph to see significant flaws in the 1776 Virginia Constitution. That constitution obligated the governor to consult with the eight-man Council of State before making numerous decisions, including calling out the militia, making appointments to office, or granting pardons. Under this constitutional arrangement, the Virginia governor essentially shared military authority with the council. Even worse, the governor did not control who would serve as his “advisors”; the House of Delegates in the Virginia Assembly, the legislative branch, determined the reelection, salary, and appointment of Council of State members.32 Randolph objected to the control that the Virginia Assembly wielded over the executive through the council. He also believed the Virginia governor should initiate policy and enforce legislation. Randolph recognized the importance of both executive independence from the legislative branch and the executive’s ability to drive a policy agenda. He advocated for their adoption in the first federal administration.
FIGURE 2.2 Edmund Randolph, Constantino Brumidi, 1904. Library of Congress
Two military issues plagued Virginia during Randolph’s tenure as governor: improving the condition of Virginia’s forts and providing adequate militia defense for the western counties. A few months after taking office, he investigated the western posts on the Virginia-Kentucky border.33 In particular, Randolph devoted considerable attention to the Point of Fork fort, located at the intersection of the Rivanna and upper James Rivers. Because of the fort’s central location and access to waterways for transportation, it stored most of the state’s military supplies. After traveling fifty miles west from Richmond, Randolph arrived at the fort. He was aghast at its condition: “In every instance disorder prevails.… Some of the salted beef so offensive that the men complained, and it was thrown away … The match is in the same room with the powder. Iron ball in there also. Not a lock upon any door fit for use.”34 These were unacceptable conditions for the most important fort in the state, especially if western communities faced imminent threats of Native American attacks. Randolph issued orders to improve the conditions at the fort and planned a follow-up visit one year later.
Upon Randolph’s second visit to the fort, the troops had made significant progress on a new arsenal and powder magazine. Randolph noted that the houses still needed paint and the troops lacked new flints, and he advised that a second arsenal building should be constructed. Randolph’s report ended on a somber note:
A military establishment never existed with so feeble a power of defence. It is exposed to destruction, not only from the successful attack of a few determined and well-prepared men, but even from the negligence or corruption of a single Centinel. I verily believe that without better defence the military stores will fall a sacrifice to some daring attempt or other.
When he returned to Richmond in June 1788, Randolph submitted a plan for new fortifications to the Virginia Assembly, but the assembly took no action on the report.35 Randolph discovered that the Virginia executive’s inability to create and implement new policies significantly limited his ability to improve border security.
As governor, Randolph was technically the commander in chief of the state, but the Virginia Constitution drastically curtailed the power of the governor over the state militia. He could issue proclamations and executive orders, and he could call up the militia in an emergency. In March 1787, Randolph issued his first proclamation, exhorting all militia officers to “punctually and faithfully discharge their respective duties,” and threatened prosecution for those who failed to heed their responsibilities. Yet the law gave Randolph no authority to enforce the terms of his proclamation—they were empty words.36 Less than a decade later, Randolph encouraged Washington to issue proclamations, because he knew the president had the authority to back up his words with action.
In response to the Indian raids out west, Randolph also called up the militia to defend settler communities. Under the 1785 militia law, however, the counties retained control over most aspects of the militia, leaving Randolph powerless to reform it into an effective fighting force. The law required the governor to fill officer vacancies based on recommendations of the county courts or with the advice of the Council of State. Each local commander trained and directed his own troops with little oversight. In return, the law required each county to submit annual militia returns and financial accounts to the governor for executive review, but the counties rarely complied with this regulation within the appointed time.37 In theory, the militia law gave local communities the authority to select their own leaders under the assumption that they would know the best military and leadership talent. In practice, communities often selected popular individuals with little regard for their military expertise, as long as they made few demands of local male citizens. The law provided no recourse for Randolph to enforce county compliance, remove incompetent officers, or enforce military policy.
Meanwhile, reports of ongoing hostilities arrived daily. Many citizens, including militia officers, begged Randolph to send help. Lieutenant Colonel John Evans urgently requested “a return of the officers and militia,” as the local communities were in a “defenceless situation … lying exposed to the ravages of cruel and savage enemy. Expecting an Indian war the ensuing season, prays for assistance, as they have neither arms nor ammunition for defence.”38 Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Barnett pleaded for Randolph’s help as well. Barnett said he needed scouts, but the militia law did not provide for them and no other legislation gave Randolph the authority to hire them. Randolph’s hands were tied unless he took extraconstitutional action and risked censure from the legislature.
Randolph also understood that no additional assistance would be forthcoming from Congress in New York City. He had witnessed his predecessor struggle with the same problems. On May 16, 1786, Governor Patrick Henry had written to John Hancock, the president of the Confederation Congress, “anxious … for the peace & safety of the people” of Virginia in light of recent intelligence that settlers had been “attacked by the Indians on the Eastern, Southern & Western Borders of the District.” Furthermore, Henry shared his concerns that the Department of Indian Affairs had neglected or mismanaged treaties with Native Americans just outside of Virginia’s borders. Eager to provide “against future Evils of a similar nature,” Henry urged Hancock to send an agent to negotiate with the Wabash Indians.39 Nothing came of Henry’s pleas. As the attorney general of Virginia during Henry’s tenure, Randolph was aware that previous attempts to secure congressional help had failed, so he knew better than to expect a resolution spearheaded by congressional agents. Limited by the state constitution and Congress’s unwillingness or inability to assist, the best Randolph could do was offer condolences.40
Randolph also learned the importance of an active executive as he worked to settle Virginia’s Revolutionary War accounts with the Confederation Congress. The Articles of Confederation required each state to submit a complete report of expenses incurred during the war. Congress would then determine the proper share for each state and issue a credit or debit based on how much the state had already paid. Virginia suffered greater wartime expenses and losses than most of the twelve other states. Yet despite the damage, Virginia was able to use its considerable resources to pay off most of its wartime debts by 1787. The Virginia Assembly confidently believed it would receive a large credit from the Confederation Congress in return. In January 1787, the assembly directed Randolph to appoint an agent to organize, categorize, and compile the state’s expenses into a report. With the advice of the executive council, he appointed Andrew Dunscomb to complete the job.41
The task quickly became much more daunting than the Virginia Assembly, the council, or Dunscomb expected. Most state papers—including all the vouchers for payments made by Virginia to the Confederation—had been destroyed during the British invasion in 1781. Dunscomb deposited the remaining papers into large bags and labeled them “not arranged.”42 Dunscomb sought to recreate proof of these payments through other sources, such as paperwork documenting bounties, payments to soldiers, advances of supplies, and advances to the militia. Eight clerks toiled away under Dunscomb’s supervision, while he peppered Randolph with letters requesting advice, pleading for assistance, and detailing the difficulties of the project.43 Randolph sympathized with Dunscomb’s plight, but the assembly had not granted him power to assist Dunscomb or oversee the project.
In 1788, the assembly finally authorized the governor and council to intervene. Randolph went to work, simultaneously overseeing Dunscomb’s work and lobbying the Continental Congress for an extension to fully provide the necessary proof. He instituted a complex system for categorizing the documents and expenses. He created four categories of accounts: money, specifics, miscellanies, and the executive departments (hospital, marine, and clothing). Next, Randolph outlined seven different types of acceptable proof if the original documents were unavailable. He also listed ten subcategories under the “money” account and eleven subcategories under the “specifics” account. Finally, to guide Dunscomb and his aides, Randolph provided test cases and advised how they should be handled.44
Randolph also secured legal counsel to represent the state’s claims. On September 27, 1788, after months of correspondence, Colonel William Davies agreed to oversee the project. As a former commissioner of Virginia’s Board of War, Davies understood army accounts. He knew where to look for proof of payment, having been privy to the initial transactions. In May 1791, Davies submitted Virginia’s final expense report to Congress. Although the Federal Board reduced Davies’s claims, it granted Virginia a credit for $19,085,981—the largest of any state.45 With his brilliant legal mind, Randolph provided the necessary analytical and organizational skills to oversee the project and used his increased authority to hire talented subordinates. But the Virginia Assembly came frighteningly close to failing to grant Randolph enough power to manage the state’s claims.
As secretary of state, Randolph brought these past experiences and frustrations with him to the cabinet. He encouraged Washington to exert the full power of the presidency over both domestic and diplomatic issues. Randolph insisted on the president’s right to assert executive privilege, defended executive authority over foreign policy, and encouraged Washington to lead a federal response to the Whiskey Rebellion. He did not trust the states, especially those with weak governors, to exercise control over their militias, and he knew how slowly Congress could move on military issues. Randolph’s experience with Virginia’s war debts also taught him the value of a powerful president who could assert control over the administration’s agenda. But his cabinet experience was also unique. He didn’t always agree with Hamilton, Knox, and Jefferson, and he was not afraid to say so. He was also the first cabinet member to hold two different positions, first as attorney general and then secretary of state, and served as Washington’s trusted advisor for twenty years.46
Thomas Jefferson served as governor of Virginia from 1779 to 1781, which were some of the darkest days of the Revolutionary War. The British invaded Virginia during Jefferson’s tenure, and he struggled in vain to piece together a military response. During moments of military emergency, Jefferson chafed against the constitutional limitations of his office and pursued more extreme measures to execute the war effort in Virginia. In February 1779, Lieutenant Colonel George Rogers Clark of Virginia had captured several high-ranking British officials. Typically, captured officers were kept under parole, meaning they were expected to stay in town, but they were treated like gentlemen and given access to most luxuries until they could be swapped in prisoner-of-war exchanges. In this case, Jefferson and the Council of State believed exaggerated accounts that Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton, the British commander of Fort Detroit and one of the captured British officials, had incited local Indians to attack Americans, offered bounties for the scalps of white settlers, and mistreated American prisoners of war.47
Jefferson had previously taken pains to offer kind and generous treatment to British officers captured in Virginia, so he bristled at these reports. On June 16, 1779, Jefferson learned of Hamilton’s capture and ordered, in agreement with his Council of State, that the prisoners be “put into irons, confined in the dungeon of the publick jail, debarred the use of pen, ink, and paper, and excluded all converse except with their keeper.”48 He welcomed the opportunity to inflict vengeance, even if his orders violated established prisoner-of-war protocol.49
British officers protested the new conditions and threatened to discontinue further prisoner-of-war exchanges until Hamilton’s conditions improved. Major General William Phillips, a British officer who had grown close to Jefferson during his own parole, appealed to Jefferson’s “lively sentiments and those liberal principles.” Phillips insisted that the terms of Hamilton’s surrender amounted to a sacred contract that Jefferson must observe. Under this contract, Jefferson should treat Hamilton as a typical prisoner of war and allow him a parole.50 Jefferson responded that Hamilton’s surrender failed to include any stipulations about his treatment as a prisoner of war. Jefferson admitted, however, that he had “the highest idea of the sacredness of those Contracts which take place between Nation and Nation at war, and would be among the last on earth who should do any thing in violation of them.”51
FIGURE 2.3 Thomas Jefferson, Charles Willson Peale, 1791. Courtesy of Independence National Historical Park
In July 1779, he requested Commander in Chief George Washington’s advice on the matter. Washington replied that he “had no doubt of the propriety of the treatment decreed against Mr. Hamilton, as being founded in principles of a just retaliation.”52 A few months later, Washington appeared to change his mind after reading a letter from Joshua Loring, the British commissary of prisoners. In the letter, Loring announced his intention to retaliate for Hamilton’s poor treatment by refusing to release any Virginia soldiers. Washington passed the letter along to Jefferson. Out of respect for Jefferson’s authority as governor, Washington refrained from demanding that Jefferson release Hamilton, but added that the Virginia officers held by the British requested Jefferson’s leniency.53 Based on Washington’s advice, Jefferson and the Council amended their orders and allowed Hamilton to be released on parole in September.54 Jefferson’s temporary enforcement of harsher penalties—throwing a prisoner into a dungeon in shackles, without access to pen or paper—without a court-martial demonstrated his willingness to stretch the powers of the Virginia executive branch.
Sometimes Jefferson also acted without the approval of his council or the legislature, even though his actions were strictly prohibited by the Virginia Constitution. In May 1779, British forces under the command of Sir George Collier burned Norfolk, the city of Portsmouth, and the shipyard of Gosport, and destroyed a valuable supply depot at Kemp’s Landing. At the Gosport shipyard alone, the British destroyed 137 vessels and “five thousand loads of fine seasoned oak-knees for shipbuilding, and infinite quantity of masts, cordage, and numbers of beautiful ships of war on the stocks.”55 In June 1779, news slowly trickled into Williamsburg, the capital at the time, describing the extent of the damage done by the recent British invasion. Jefferson didn’t wait for input from the legislature before taking action—he immediately moved to acquire accurate intelligence about the destruction. A few days later, the Virginia Assembly passed a resolution instructing him to do what he had already begun: investigate the situation and report back to Congress.56
In early January 1781, as a British force commanded by Benedict Arnold approached the capital in Richmond, the council members and delegates fled to avoid capture. The council lacked a quorum to meet again until January 19. In the meantime, Jefferson continued to govern, exercising powers beyond those outlined in the Virginia constitution.57 He oversaw the relocation of state papers, issued orders, and raised troops in response to Arnold’s invasion.58 On January 16 and January 18, he wrote to Colonel George Weedon and Lieutenant Richard Claiborne, authorizing the temporary seizure of all boats on the James and Chickahominy Rivers to transport horses and troops.59
Other times, Jefferson defied council orders directly. On February 16, 1781, the council met to discuss the state’s need for additional naval armaments to shore up the meager defenses. He proposed authorizing temporary impressment measures. The council disagreed and only authorized Jefferson and the officers in Virginia to “engage the willing.”60 Over the next few weeks, it became clear that few owners had volunteered their boats. On March 4, he overrode the council’s decision and authorized Captain William Lewis to “impress all the armed vessels of private property which can be had immediately, together with their crews, arms, etc., and the crews of other vessels as far as necessary to man these.”61
Despite his expansion of executive power in Virginia, Jefferson received widespread criticism for not doing enough to protect the state of Virginia from British forces.62 Edmund Pendleton, the former president of Virginia’s Committee of Safety, wrote a letter to Washington slamming Jefferson as “incredulous and not sufficiently attentive.” Pendleton reported that state troops felt “disgrace in having Our Metropolis, at 100 miles distance from the Sea Coast, Surprized and taken without resistance by a handful of Banditti.”63 Jefferson also received criticism for his flight from Charlottesville in June 1781 in the face of the approaching British troops. When Jefferson’s term ended a few weeks after his retreat, most assemblymen were still scattered about the state and could not assemble to elect his replacement. Rather than staying in office until the House selected the next governor, he returned to his home at Monticello, relieved to have completed his term. Many of his critics, including his most vocal opponent—Patrick Henry—believed that Jefferson abandoned Virginia in its hour of need. Henry convinced the House of Delegates to introduce a resolution requiring that “an inquiry be made into the conduct of the Executive of this State for the last twelve months.”64
When the assembly gathered to consider the charges six months later, the threat of invasion had passed and the members viewed Jefferson’s actions in a more reasoned mood. The assembly acquitted Jefferson of all wrongdoing, dismissed the charges as overly partisan, and unanimously passed a declaration declaring “the high opinion which they entertain of Mr. Jefferson’s Ability, Rectitude, and Integrity as [Chief] Magistrate of this Commonwealth.”65 Although he was cleared, the charge of cowardice lingered and forced Jefferson to address the charges in the 1796, 1800, and 1804 elections.
Jefferson later defended his deployment of executive power in his Notes on the State of Virginia. He analyzed the Virginia constitution and contended that the executive and judiciary branches were subordinate and dependent on the legislature, even though they shouldn’t be. He suggested that this imbalance stymied government efficiency, and he proposed a new constitution to remedy the defects of the 1776 government by providing greater separation between the branches of government, as well as more power for the executive.66 He believed the governor should act independently of the council and the legislature. In the event of another war, Jefferson’s constitution would allow the governor to protect the state without requiring a grant of dictatorial powers by the assembly.67
Jefferson shared these ideas with both Washington and Randolph. On May 28, 1781, Jefferson had confided to Washington his relief at his imminent retirement from the governorship: “A few days will bring to me that period of relief which the Constitution has prepared for those oppressed with the labours of my office.”68 In February 1783, as Jefferson sailed to Paris to accept a new position as minister to France, he wrote to Randolph and confessed his low opinion of politics in their home state: “I have seen with depression of spirit the very low state to which that body has been reduced. I am satisfied there is in it much good intention, but little knowle[d]ge of the science to which they are called.” Jefferson was thrilled that Randolph planned to stand for a seat in the legislature but warned his friend about the burdens of office: “I only fear you will find the unremitting drudgery, to which any one man must be exposed who undertakes to stem the torrent, will be too much for any degree of perseverance.”69
As a member of Washington’s cabinet, Jefferson pursued his goals for an independent, active executive. Although his opinions about executive power differed from Hamilton’s and eventually from Washington’s, Jefferson initially worked in the cabinet to shape a powerful president based on his own governing experiences. He promoted presidential authority over the diplomatic process, supported executive privilege, and defended Washington’s authority against attacks from the French minister. His ideas about executive power continued to influence the administration after he retired as secretary of state. In 1794, Washington purchased a published copy of Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia for $1.50.70
While Alexander Hamilton’s importance is sometimes overstated, no chapter on the central figures of Washington’s cabinet would be complete without an introduction to Hamilton’s wartime experiences. During the Revolutionary War, Hamilton observed Congress’s failure to prosecute the war effort and began a long career of advocacy on behalf of a powerful, independent executive. While the army shivered at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777–1778, Hamilton corresponded with George Clinton, the rebel Governor of New York. He did not mince words when he shared his concern that Congress and the state governments would undermine the army’s sacrifices: “The weakness of our [legislative] councils will, in all probability, ruin us. Arrangements on which, the existence of the army depends, and almost the possibility of another campaign, are delayed in a most astonishing manner; and I doubt whether they will be adopted at all.”71
Hamilton’s letter to Clinton was just one of many he sent to state and congressional leaders imploring them to reform the government to adequately supply the army. In 1781, Hamilton and Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance, proposed an amendment to the Articles of Confederation giving Congress the power to raise revenue through taxes. In particular, he worried about the back pay due to the officers. Congress had just passed a resolution granting half pay to retired soldiers, yet could not scrounge up the funds to pay the troops. Alas, nothing came of Hamilton’s proposed amendment.72 While the army survived, Hamilton resigned in 1781, disgusted with Congress and its inability to support the troops. He spent the rest of his career promoting a federal government, and an executive, that avoided the Continental Congress’s weaknesses.
FIGURE 2.4 Alexander Hamilton, John Trumbull, 1792. National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution
After the war, the Nevis-born Hamilton returned to New York, his adopted home state. He practiced law while dabbling in public service, but he quickly became disillusioned with the postwar government. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress did not levy taxes; it passed requisitions—essentially requests for funds from the states—but had no enforcement mechanism to ensure that the states contributed. Hamilton served as the national government’s requisition collector for New York, but he struggled in vain to collect taxes with no power to secure payment. New York treasurer Comfort Sands and the state legislature offered only empty promises that they would raise money in the future. After a short term of service, Hamilton offered his resignation in August 1782.73 He would later confess to Robert Livingston his fears about the future of the state of New York: “The situation of the state at this time is so critical that it is become a serious object of attention to those who are concerned for the security of property or the prosperity of government.… The spirit of the present Legislature is truly alarming, and appears evidently directed to the confusion of all property and principle.”74 Hamilton saw flaws in the other states’ constitutions as well. In 1787, the Massachusetts legislature repealed tax laws in response to Shays’ Rebellion. Somewhat ironically, as he was a former revolutionary himself, Hamilton was disgusted that the government wavered in the face of populist resistance.
These experiences shaped Hamilton’s understanding of credit, taxes, and the government’s role in monetary policy. He was convinced that if the states retained authority over fiscal policy and taxation, they would devastate the new nation’s credit.75 Less than a decade later, he again witnessed populist resistance during the Whiskey Rebellion. As we will see, Hamilton campaigned vigorously in the cabinet for a strong government-led military response against the rebels.
To rectify the weaknesses of the state and Confederation governments, Hamilton supported early efforts to reform the Articles of Confederation. In September 1786, he arrived in Annapolis, Maryland, with high hopes that the delegates would draft meaningful reform proposals for the Confederation Congress. When only representatives from five states arrived, Hamilton drafted an address to the states from the Annapolis Convention. The address stated that the delegates were “deeply impressed … with the magnitude and importance of the object confided to them on this occasion” and wished to make the most of the opportunity. They regretted the absence of delegates from the other eight states, especially since the “defects in the system of the Fœderal Government … may be found greater and more numerous, than even these acts imply.” The address closed by inviting all thirteen states to send delegates to “Philadelphia on the second Monday in May [1787]” with the goal of considering “the situation of the United States” and “devising such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the Fœderal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”76 That gathering would become known as the Constitutional Convention
In 1787, Governor George Clinton appointed Hamilton to serve as a New York delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. On June 18, Hamilton proposed the creation of an executive with magisterial powers that many of his colleagues shunned as suspiciously monarchical. His suggestion was essentially ignored.77 Once the convention approved the Constitution, Hamilton devoted himself to securing ratification even though he had argued in favor of a much stronger federal government. He famously spearheaded an essay project with James Madison and John Jay to influence undecided delegates in the Virginia and New York State Ratification Conventions. Hamilton himself wrote fifty-one of the eighty-five essays published under the pseudonym “Publius” in defense of the new Constitution, which became known as the Federalist Papers.78
After his appointment as the first secretary of the treasury, Hamilton finally had the opportunity to help shape a strong executive and powerful federal government. He wasted no time making the most of this moment and crafted an ambitious legislative agenda that transformed the nation’s credit from nonexistent to robust, and that required extensive federal powers exercised by an energetic executive branch. First, he drafted a bill authorizing the federal government to assume the states’ debts remaining from the Revolutionary War. By assuming the debt, the federal government could ensure that the states’ creditors would be repaid and thus would be willing to extend future loans to the new government.79 Next, Hamilton proposed an excise tax that would provide necessary income for the federal government to discharge its debt.80 Finally, Hamilton favored the creation of the first national bank to support tax collection and cultivate safe borrowing of money.81
After the creation of his financial system, Hamilton continued to promote a strong, independent executive. As we’ll discuss in more detail later, in 1793 he asserted the president’s right to declare neutrality in the face of foreign war. When Edmond Charles Genêt, the French minister, challenged Washington’s authority over foreign policy, Hamilton pushed for Genêt’s recall and masterminded a public relations campaign to discredit Genêt. When the Whiskey Rebellion broke out in 1794, he supported federal enforcement of the excise tax he had proposed and convinced Congress to pass. His advocacy for a military suppression of the insurrection was consistent with the goals he pursued during the entirety of his public service career.82
Yet while Hamilton reveled in utilizing the power of the federal government, he did not seek to bolster the power of the secretary of the treasury in relation to the president. Based on his military and early governing experience, Hamilton believed that the government needed one strong executive that could actively pursue an agenda. The cabinet needed to encourage and buttress the president, but never undermine or steal his authority, as Hamilton as witnessed in the states.
William Bradford served as the second attorney general of the United States. While he served in the cabinet for only nineteen months before his death on August 23, 1795, he was Washington’s trusted advisor and played an important role in the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794. As with the other secretaries, Bradford’s background shaped his advice to the president and his cabinet participation. Like Hamilton and Knox, Bradford served in the Continental Army before transitioning to government service. These experiences convinced him of the value of a strong president, which he promoted as attorney general.
In the 1770s, Bradford was an early supporter of the independence movement. After completing his schooling at Princeton, he regularly sent letters to his Princeton classmate James Madison on the proceedings of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia: “I have but little to tell you of the Congress; they keep their proceeding so secret that scarce any thing transpires but what they think proper to publish in the papers. They meet every day & continue long in debate but it is said are very unanimous.”83 While struggling to decide whether to enter the ministry, study law, or become a doctor, Bradford joined the local militia. He boasted to Madison that the Philadelphia militia could soon meet the British army without fear: “We are equally industrious in Philada. and propose having a General review next monday: & I hope in a month or two we shall be able to meet without dread the most disciplined troops.”84 In the fall of 1775, Bradford traveled to Cambridge to witness the siege of Boston.85
FIGURE 2.5 William Bradford, William E. Winner, 1872. Department of Justice
Bradford’s militia term expired one year later, at which point he joined the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment as a company commander. As a part of Washington’s Continental Army, Bradford participated in major battles over the next couple of years. In late December 1776, Bradford and the rest of the Pennsylvania 11th were assigned to Thomas Mifflin’s brigade. Mifflin’s troops succeeded in their own dangerous crossing of the Delaware River on December 28. On the night of January 1, 1778, Mifflin’s troops covered the final leg of their journey and met up with Washington’s forces as the sun rose on January 2. They arrived in time to participate in the Second Battle of Trenton and helped fight off three British attacks across Assunpink Creek.86 That night, General Mifflin attended Washington’s council of war before leading his troops on a night march to Princeton. Bradford and the other soldiers in the Pennsylvania 11th fought at the Battle of Princeton and forced the surrender of British troops holed up in Nassau Hall.87 After two night marches and two battles in two days (with no break for sleep), Bradford and the other soldiers collapsed in a tired heap. The experience was one he did not soon forget.
Perhaps more important, Bradford endured the harsh and unforgiving winter at Valley Forge. In the fall of 1777, Congress expressed its wish that the Continental Army establish winter quarters in Pennsylvania to protect the countryside from the British forces cozily quartered in Philadelphia. While Washington worried that supplying his troops would be difficult if they all stayed in once place, he acquiesced to Congress’s request and selected Valley Forge as the best defensible location. Washington’s fears proved prescient, as the troops struggled to find wood to build shelter and the residents resisted selling food or supplies to the army. Most days, the troops received meager rations of beef, bread, and alcohol. At one point the troops went six days without a ration of beef, their main food staple, and on three separate days received no rations at all.88 Unwilling to see his troops starve, Washington reluctantly issued orders to confiscate food and clothing from local farms. Sensitive to the importance of public opinion, he ordered that civilians be paid “a reasonable Rate” for the items the army seized.89
As a junior officer, Bradford suffered slightly less than the rank-and-file soldiers. Bradford established his headquarters a local home owned by David Havard near Valley Forge. The dwelling was fairly small, and Bradford shared the space with his father, William Bradford Sr., his older brother, Thomas Bradford, and his brother-in-law, Elias Boudinot—all Continental Army soldiers. But it was a solid house and warm in the winter—a large step up from the drafty huts available to average soldiers in Valley Forge.90
Although he had a warm place to sleep, Bradford witnessed the pain and hunger of the men under his command. While there are no records showing that Bradford met with congressional representatives who visited camp, reports of Washington’s meetings with them certainly circulated among the officer corps.91 Bradford shared the other officers’ frustrations that Congress and locals appeared indifferent at times or moved too slowly to alleviate the suffering of the army. Bradford brought these observations with him to his state and federal governing positions and worked to increase executive authority.
By 1779, two years of fighting had taken its toll on Bradford. He was worn down, suffering from chronic illness, and injured, so he resigned his commission as a lieutenant colonel and returned home to Philadelphia. Over the next few months, Bradford finished his legal studies and joined the bar before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The very next year, Pennsylvania named Bradford the state attorney general, a position he held for the next eleven years.
During his tenure as a Pennsylvania state official, Bradford’s military experience was never far from his mind. In November 1780, Bradford represented Pennsylvania in the Hartford Convention and served as president of the proceedings. The Hartford Convention was a gathering of representatives from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York to discuss a more effective way to support the Continental Army and “[draw] forth the necessary Supplies from the States.”92 The Convention passed several resolutions urging the states to call up their militias and immediately comply with the army and congressional requisitions. The resolutions stressed that the failure to supply the materials requested by Congress led “the Army [to] greatly suffer and been frequently brought into a very Critical and dangerous situation.”93 At the conclusion of the Convention, Bradford forwarded the resolutions to the governors of states not present—including Governor Thomas Jefferson of Virginia.
In late 1793, Thomas Jefferson retired as secretary of state and returned to his home at Monticello. Washington selected Attorney General Edmund Randolph to be the next secretary of state. To fill the opening, Washington nominated Bradford as the second attorney general of the United States.94 Bradford was a solid political choice. In 1791, Governor Thomas Mifflin, Bradford’s old military commander, had appointed Bradford to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Bradford’s tenure on the court, combined with his eleven years as the Pennsylvania attorney general, made him one of the premier legal minds in the country. In addition, no other secretaries in the cabinet represented the middle states of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and Rhode Island, so Bradford offered important geographic diversity. Perhaps most important, Washington knew Bradford personally from their time together in the Continental Army and trusted that he would be a firm advocate for a strong executive based on their shared military experience. This trust proved well founded. During his nineteen months in office, Bradford regularly encouraged Washington to assert presidential authority over both domestic and diplomatic issues.
These five men—Hamilton, Knox, Randolph, Jefferson, and Bradford—brought extensive military and leadership experience with them to the president’s cabinet. Some of their experiences taught similar lessons. Hamilton, Knox, and Bradford all came away from the Revolutionary War with a deep distrust of Congress’s ability to act decisively; Jefferson and Randolph left the Virginia governorship convinced that executive power must be free from legislative limitations. When they entered Washington’s private study to gather as a cabinet, they eagerly participated in a new institution and shared a commitment to expanding presidential authority.