ON FEBRUARY 1, 1793, France declared war on Great Britain and the Netherlands. The fighting spread to Italy, Germany, and Spain before expanding to the West Indies and engulfing British, French, and Spanish colonial holdings. Two months later, news of the European war reached Washington at his home at Mount Vernon. He immediately sent word to Hamilton and Jefferson that he would end his vacation early and join them shortly in Philadelphia. Washington and his secretaries believed that fighting another war would be nothing short of catastrophic. The Revolutionary War had wreaked havoc on the American economy, which was finally recovering after the economic downturn of the 1780s. Farms had slowly improved their harvests, American credit had gradually been restored, and currency had stabilized. Another conflict would likely paralyze the Atlantic trade so vital to the vulnerable new nation and threaten its fragile economic recovery. American farmers, sailors, and merchants would also be caught in the crossfire as they tried to transport and sell American goods in foreign ports and preserve the small economic advances of the past few years. Those were just the potential economic repercussions, let alone the death and physical destruction of war. Worst-case scenario, if the United States fought another war with Britain and lost so soon after gaining independence, there was a real possibility that the nation would be forced back into colonial status. While Washington wrapped up his visit and made his way back to Philadelphia with these potential consequences in mind, he instructed Hamilton and Jefferson to prepare strategies to maintain neutrality in the European war.
Once Washington returned to Philadelphia, he entered a new phase in his relationship with the cabinet. In late 1791 and 1792, he utilized the practices he had perfected in councils of war as commander in chief. He occasionally convened cabinet meetings, three times in 1791 and six times in 1792. He almost always submitted questions for consideration ahead of time, asked for written opinions in the event of disagreement, and then decided on a course of action after the meeting. But most of the interactions still took place in writing or in individual consultations. In 1793, Washington continued these practices, but he also began calling regular cabinet meetings to debate ongoing diplomatic and domestic issues. Given the intensity of the situation, he preferred to discuss issues multiple times before making decisions, rather than just relying on written opinions. The year 1793 served as the high-water mark for cabinet meetings. Fifty-one gatherings took place in 1793—over half of all the meetings that Washington organized as president. Rather than meeting once every couple of months, in 1793, the cabinet usually met once or twice each week at the President’s House. In times of extreme stress, they gathered up to five times per week. Washington had convened a handful of cabinet meetings before April 1793, but never with the frequency required to resolve the issues surrounding the Neutrality Crisis. Given the potential consequences of each decision, he called these meetings to request advice and support as he carefully established diplomatic precedent for the new nation.
In addition to creating new internal practices, Washington and the cabinet established critical executive precedents. They crafted the first major foreign policy and forged rules of neutrality that regulated periods of peace over the next five decades. They also asserted American independence on an international stage, demonstrating that the administration would not be pushed around by European powers.
By establishing these precedents, the cabinet worked to reinforce the president’s authority over diplomatic affairs. As Washington and the secretaries implemented neutrality, they actively sidelined Congress and state authorities in favor of executive-led enforcement of foreign policy. The secretaries’ defense of presidential power and rejection of congressional participation reflected their shared experience with the inefficiencies of the state legislatures and the Confederation Congress.
At several points during the Neutrality Crisis, Washington adopted a strong position that could have provoked public reaction. As he navigated these difficult choices, he followed the model he had established with his officers in councils of war before retreats or controversial decisions. Washington convened the cabinet before each major decision, ensuring he had the secretaries’ approval before announcing his policy and crafting executive precedent. He often requested written opinions after cabinet meetings to be sure he had evidence of their support. While he never published cabinet deliberations or the secretaries’ written opinions regarding the Neutrality Crisis, he had evidence of their support if he needed it and he could have made their correspondence public.
By the end of 1793, Congress and the American public had accepted how the administration handled the Neutrality Crisis, effectively ceding all authority over diplomacy to the executive branch. Additionally, the frequent cabinet meetings exacerbated the Hamilton-Jefferson feud and accelerated the rise of the first two-party system. Finally, the cabinet became a visible institution within the executive branch, and Washington experienced pointed criticism for his relationship with the cabinet for the first time.
Eight days after receiving news of the European war, Washington left Mount Vernon to return to Philadelphia. Anxious to return as quickly as possible, he collected reports on the road conditions to determine the best route. After leaving home, Washington rode down to Alexandria before crossing the Potomac River and landing in Georgetown. Although Washington left no records of this trip or his thoughts along the way, his route can be pieced together based on similar journeys he completed in May 1787, April 1789, November 1790, and July 1795. Washington completed each journey in five days and structured the trip around stops in Alexandria, Georgetown, Baltimore, Havre de Grace, Wilmington, and Chester.1 Given the urgency of Washington’s return to Philadelphia, he preferred to dine and sleep at familiar accommodations. He could not risk poor provisions, faulty care for his horses, or delays caused by unfamiliar innkeepers making a scene when meeting him. Perhaps he enjoyed breakfast at Vanhorn’s Tavern in Prince George County before spending the night at Spurrier’s Tavern. In the past, Washington had complained of the service at Spurrier’s but he continued to stop at the hostelry because there was “no other” along the route.2 The next day, Washington likely arrived in Baltimore. He may have asked for any news of the foreign conflict, since he could not receive mail while on the road. As he had done on previous visits, Washington may have dined with Dr. James McHenry, his former aide-de-camp and future secretary of war. On April 15, he might have dined at Skerrett’s Tavern (also called Cheyns’s or Webster’s) before he crossed the Susquehanna River on the public ferry at Havre de Grace. The next day, Washington made his way to Wilmington. To complete his journey, Washington probably enjoyed breakfast in Chester before arriving in Philadelphia on the evening of April 17, anxious to receive updates on the state of the war.
When Washington woke in Philadelphia, he drafted a letter to the department secretaries summoning them to a meeting at nine o’clock the next morning. He also sent them thirteen questions about the European conflict to consider in advance of their meeting.3 On April 19, the cabinet gathered at the President’s House, meeting in Washington’s private study on the second floor.4 Washington’s study was fifteen by twenty-one feet—not a particularly large room for five large adult men. The space was further restricted by Washington’s ornate desk (which measured more than five feet long), his dressing table, a wood-burning stove, a large globe, bookshelves along the walls, and the temporary table and chairs brought in for the meeting. When Washington and the four secretaries gathered in the room, it would have been rather cozy at best, claustrophobic at worst.
Washington’s pre-circulated questions and the April 19 cabinet meeting set the agenda for the rest of the year. The European war posed four main issues that dominated the cabinet’s attention: Should the administration issue a neutrality proclamation, and if so, with what wording? Should the administration receive a minister from France, and if so, under what terms? How would the crisis affect treaty relations with France and Great Britain? What role would Congress play in resolving the crisis?
From the moment Washington sent his questions, political tensions rippled under the surface. Jefferson and Hamilton had spent the previous year and a half battling over financial legislation and jockeying for influence in the executive branch. By 1793, they hated each other and were predisposed to assume the worst. Although Washington penned the letter with the thirteen questions to the department secretaries, Jefferson was convinced Hamilton had drafted the questions: “Though those sent me were in [the president’s] own hand writing, yet it was palpable from the style … that they were not the President’s … in short that the language was Hamilton’s, and the doubts his alone.” After receiving the letter, Jefferson conferred with Randolph, who shared the same suspicions. A few days earlier, Randolph and Hamilton had discussed similar questions. When Randolph received Washington’s letter, he immediately recognized the same questions Hamilton had raised.5
Although Washington adopted the questions proposed by Hamilton, Jefferson was wrong to assume that the president had passed along the questions without editing them. These issues had been on Washington’s mind for weeks. On April 12, before departing for Philadelphia, he wrote to Jefferson and Hamilton that the administration needed “to use every means in its power to prevent [American] citizens from embroiling us with either [France and Great Britain], by endeavouring to maintain a strict neutrality.”6 He considered neutrality essential long before Hamilton shared his thoughts. Furthermore, Washington had added several significant questions to Hamilton’s draft. Hamilton’s original list no longer exists, but we can likely tell what he shared with Washington based on a similar letter he sent to John Jay the week before. In Washington’s April 18 letter to the secretaries, he voiced concerns about a neutrality proclamation, transmitting information to Congress, and how to interpret the French-American treaty—all of which are absent in Hamilton’s letter to Jay.7
Despite apparent tension between Hamilton and Jefferson, the cabinet initially made progress in addressing Washington’s questions when they gathered on April 19. Washington understood that the administration needed to formally declare its position in the war so that other European nations knew whether to treat the United States as an ally or an enemy, but he wasn’t sure how that would affect American citizens. The first question asked if the administration should take steps to keep Americans out of the European conflict: “Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of preventing interferences of the Citizens of the United States in the War between France & Great Britain &ca? Shall it contain a declaration of Neutrality or not? What shall it contain?” The cabinet agreed that the administration would issue a proclamation forbidding American citizens from “all acts and proceedings” that would give the appearance of assisting any of the belligerent powers, including fighting or carrying contraband or items related to war such as weapons and ammunition.8
Washington and the secretaries agreed to leave the word “neutrality” out of the proclamation. Under international law, that term would require strict enforcement and might interfere with other American treaties. Jay had similarly advised Hamilton that “it [is] better at present that too little shd. be said, than too much.”9 The Neutrality Crisis presented an entirely new set of circumstances for the members of the administration. The cabinet had no experience trying to keep citizens out of an international conflict—during the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress and the Continental Army had barely scraped together enough men, financial support, and war matériel to keep the war effort afloat. Overexuberance was unfamiliar. Given these uncertainties, Washington and the secretaries agreed that avoiding the word “neutrality” left the administration with room to enforce the proclamation flexibly. They recognized that they were setting important precedent—the Neutrality Crisis was the first time the nation was forced to choose sides between European belligerents—and Washington preferred to move slowly when establishing decisions that would mold the executive branch for his successors.
Jefferson encouraged the vague language in the proclamation as the best course of action for the administration, but he also harbored ulterior motives. A strict American neutrality would have favored Britain. Jefferson knew that France needed supplies for its war against Britain and the Netherlands. Furthermore, Jefferson suspected that France desperately depended on American funds, repaid from Revolutionary War debts, to purchase those supplies. He hoped that he could negotiate a neutrality that would subtly favor the French.10 He planned to try to secure faster repayment of American debts to France, to allow French ships to purchase supplies, and to permit France to sell captured British goods in US ports. To achieve these goals, Jefferson needed the proclamation to avoid the word “neutral.”
At the April 19 cabinet meeting, Washington instructed Randolph to draft the proclamation. The cabinet had agreed to issue a proclamation forbidding American citizens from engaging with hostile powers. Much to Jefferson’s chagrin, Randolph managed to slip “impartial” into the statement at the last minute without Jefferson noticing. The key clause now read that the United States would “adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers.” Although “impartial” did not make as bold a statement, the message was clear, and the announcement became known as the Neutrality Proclamation.11
After resolving the first question, the cabinet turned to the imminent arrival of the new French minister. Citizen Edmond Charles Genêt was on a ship headed toward Philadelphia to replace his predecessor, Jean Baptiste Ternant. All the secretaries concluded that the government should receive a minister from France, but they disagreed over how friendly that reception should be. Eighteenth-century diplomatic customs dictated how countries would treat emissaries from other nations. If two nations signed an alliance, then their ministers would be welcomed “absolutely,” and the ministers would enjoy more privileges and access to the home government. On the other hand, if two nations did not have a treaty that defined their relationship, ministers might be received “with qualifications,” and they would operate under limited diplomatic privileges until the two nations established a more formal diplomatic relationship.12
While France and the United States had signed treaties of alliance during the Revolutionary War, the political situation in France had changed significantly since 1783.13 The French Revolution had begun on May 5, 1789, when King Louis XVI convened the Estates-General for the first time since 1614. Most Americans had initially applauded the constitutional reforms of the French Revolution, which promised to bring more rights to the French people. However, by late 1792, the revolution had taken a radical turn. On January 17, 1793, the National Convention convicted King Louis XVI of high treason. While the king had driven the nation into enormous debt, his true crime was ruling a society that had lost patience with the monarchy. On the morning of January 21, the king was led from the Temple prison to the Place de la Revolution (now the Place de la Concorde), where he was executed by guillotine. At 10:22 A.M., the king’s head fell into a basket while the crowds roared “Vive la Nation! Vive la République!”14
Despite the conditions on the ground in France, Jefferson argued that the Franco-American diplomatic relationship remained the same, while Hamilton insisted that France’s unstable political climate posed a danger to the United States. He suggested that the French Revolution could produce military despotism, so the treaties should be “suspended till their government shall be settled in the form it is ultimately to take.”15 Hamilton advised Washington to limit his interactions with the new French minister until that time. Recognizing that Hamilton and Jefferson were unlikely to agree, Washington called a time-out to allow cooler heads to prevail.
A few days later, the cabinet returned to Washington’s house.16 When the secretaries reassembled, Hamilton and Jefferson remained deadlocked over the French minister and whether the Neutrality Proclamation affected the United States’ diplomatic relationships with France and Britain.
The Federalists, represented in the cabinet by Hamilton and Knox, abhorred the violence and the anarchy of the French Revolution. While Hamilton and Knox appreciated French support during the Revolutionary War, the French Revolution had devolved into senseless violence. The Committee of Safety, led by the radical Jacobins, ordered the execution of 17,000 people and the arrest of 300,000. There was also a real fear that the violence that had consumed the French Revolution would make its way across the Atlantic. Abigail Adams wrote to her husband, John, the Vice President, that she hoped Republicans would “not follow the French example & Lop of[f] Heads, even of departments.”17 After their experience with Shays’ Rebellion during the Confederation, Hamilton and Knox were unwilling to risk further uprisings. They argued that the administration had a responsibility to secure the nation’s safety.
The tumultuous political scene in Paris caused Federalists to question France’s value as an ally. They argued that the French leadership could shift at any moment, making an alliance uneasy at best. Lastly, Hamilton and Knox claimed that the execution of King Louis XVI abrogated the Franco-American Treaty. Because the diplomatic relationship had been severed, the administration should accept the minister with qualifications until the administration established a new diplomatic relationship with France.18 The administration could not afford to favor France, risk alienating the country’s largest trading partner, Britain, and derail the economic system Hamilton had recently engineered.
Republicans, represented in the cabinet by Jefferson and Randolph, held deep emotional attachments to France. At the very least, they insisted that Americans owed France for its support during the Revolutionary War on principle. Republicans also pointed to the two Franco-American treaties signed in February 1778. The treaties had outlined France’s military, economic, and diplomatic commitment to the United States during the Revolutionary War. In the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, France had effectively recognized American independence and the two countries had established a mutually beneficial trade relationship. In the Treaty of Alliance, both countries pledged to come to each other’s defense if Britain attacked them or interfered with their trade. Most Republicans argued that these treaties obligated the United States to assist France in its current war against Britain. They asserted that “the real alliance is affixed to the body of the [French] state,” not the monarch. Finally, many Americans believed they should support the French Revolution as the republican ideological successor to the American Revolution. They also nursed a lasting distrust of the British and feared that an Anglo-American alliance would foster the growth of a monarchy within the United States. Based on all these factors, Jefferson and Randolph argued that the Franco-American relationship remained intact and that a French minister ought to be received without qualification.19
The personal spat between Hamilton and Jefferson belied a much larger conflict over the future of the United States. Hamilton and the Federalists envisioned a nation that prioritized manufacturing, trade, financial institutions, and industrialization. The growing American population would naturally flock to urban centers to pursue employment and education. A close relationship with Britain facilitated these goals. On the other side, Jefferson and the Republicans promoted a future of yeoman farmers, each with a farm and livelihood enough to feed a family. Supported by their own labor (and that of their slaves), farmers remained independent from the influence of employers or landlords, and thus could serve as virtuous republican citizens. Additionally, family farms kept citizens out of cities, which many Republicans viewed as dens of sin and corruption. They did not shun trade—farmers needed to sell their products, after all—but they believed the government should not prioritize merchant interests. Hamilton and Jefferson’s cabinet debates took on additional seriousness in the context of this fight for the future character of their new nation.20
Washington recognized that no amount of cabinet debate would resolve these issues, so he requested written opinions from the department secretaries, just as he had often done when his officers reached an impasse in councils of war. All the secretaries submitted their opinions by May 6. After receiving the written opinions, Washington decided to accept Genêt and confessed to Jefferson that “he had never had a doubt about the validity of the treaty: but since a question had been suggested he thought it ought to be considered.”21 His decision amounted to a wait-and-see approach. He would accept the French minister and he would not suspend the Treaty of Alliance for fear that a strong position might provoke war with France. Yet, he also took the secretaries’ advice to exploit the wiggle room inherent in the treaties. Article XI of the Treaty of Alliance required both countries to protect each other’s possessions if attacked by Great Britain. Jefferson suggested that because France had declared war on Britain, the conflict was offensive, not defensive, and therefore did not require the United States to provide aid—a convenient interpretation given that the United States did not have a navy and could offer little support anyway.
Washington also accepted Jefferson’s interpretation of Article XXIV of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. This article stipulated that enemies of France could not “fit their Ships” or “sell what they have taken” in American ports. Put another way, because France was at war with Britain, the United States must prohibit Britain from arming its warships or selling war booty in American ports. But the treaty did not require the administration to grant these privileges to France either. Technically, a neutral policy did not invalidate the treaties. According to Jefferson’s interpretation, Washington could abide by the Franco-American treaties in good faith and enforce neutrality.22
Unbeknownst to Washington and the secretaries, Genêt had arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, on April 8, 1793. After spending two months tossed about at sea during a particularly stormy spring, the Embuscade finally spotted land and limped into Charleston harbor. Although Philadelphia was his intended destination, a large storm had driven Genêt’s ship off course and he landed 680 miles to the south. Battered by the Atlantic crossing, the Embuscade nevertheless offered an enthusiastic salutation. Genêt had designed the ship to speak to Americans’ revolutionary spirit. The figurehead was a liberty cap, the foremast had been carved into a liberty pole, and the sails had large messages printed in English. The rear sail (mizzen-top) declared: “FREEMEN, WE ARE YOUR BROTHERS AND FRIENDS.” The front sail (foretop) warned: “Enemies of Equality, relinquish your principles or tremble!”23 Charleston warmly received Genêt’s unsubtle message and offered an equally effusive welcome. The new French minister was treated to fêtes, dinners, balls, and receptions. French merchants residing in Charleston outfitted their private vessels to fight the British navy and offered them to Genêt free of charge.24
Genêt’s mission was to secure three key concessions from the American government. First, Genêt assumed that French ships—both warships and privateers—would be granted access to American ports for repairs and provisioning. He also expected French privateers would be permitted to sell their captured British goods in American ports. Privateers were ships outfitted and operated by private citizens during wartime under licenses from a national government, authorizing them to attack and plunder enemy ships on the high seas. Privateers towed their captured prizes back into port to sell off the goods and supplies, often making a fortune. During wartime, each nation relied on its own band of privateers to wreak havoc on enemy nations and their trade. Second, Genêt intended to oversee the landing of French troops in American ports, purchase supplies, and then launch attacks on British and Spanish territories from US territory. Genêt planned to coordinate with the French fleet to attack British fisheries in Canadian waters and burn Halifax to the ground. The fleet would then sail to New Orleans to rendezvous with his new army (filled with American citizens) to liberate all of Louisiana.25 Finally, Genêt demanded immediate and full payment of Revolutionary War debts to fund the new French war. He insisted immediate payment would benefit the American economy because France was generously prepared to purchase all its war supplies from American farmers and merchants. Unsurprisingly, Genêt’s agenda received a mixed reception from Washington’s administration.26
Overcome by the joyous welcome he received in Charleston, Genêt abandoned all diplomatic protocol. He should have quickly made his way to Philadelphia to present his credentials to the administration. Instead, he commissioned four private vessels and hired American soldiers to man the ships. He also instructed the local French consul to adjudicate any prizes (foreign ships captured by French vessels) that privateers brought into Charleston. Essentially, Genêt established French law in an American port.27 He then made his way to Philadelphia, not quickly by sea but slowly over land. Over the course of the twenty-eight-day journey, he relished the affection shown to him by the American people. Upon arriving in Philadelphia, Genêt was greeted by a committee and a throng of ebullient citizens. The crowd marched to the French minister’s house and delivered an address from local citizens’ organizations, which were followed by cheers and applause.28 Later that evening, he sent a missive back to the French government in Paris gleefully reporting on his first few weeks in the United States: “My journey [between Charleston and Philadelphia] has been a succession of uninterrupted civic festivals and my entering Philadelphia has been a triumph for liberty. Real Americans have reached the climax of happiness.”29 This reception blinded Genêt to the complicated diplomatic realities facing Washington and the new nation.
While Genêt was indulging in festivals and balls, Washington and the secretaries learned of his actions in Charleston. On May 2, 1793, Washington and the secretaries received a report from George Hammond, the British minister to the United States. Hammond revealed that Genêt’s ship, the Embuscade, had been lurking within US sovereign waters in the Bay of Delaware. On April 25, the Embuscade had captured a British ship, the Grange, and imprisoned its crew. Hammond asserted that the capture violated American neutrality and expressed his certainty that the United States would “adopt such measures … [to] procure the immediate restoration … of the British Ship Grange and the liberation of her crew.”30
The British complaints and Genêt’s reckless behavior forced the cabinet to establish a privateer policy. Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation prohibited foreign ship captains from anchoring in American ports to acquire supplies and weapons or to recruit crew members. Yet the proclamation contained many legal gaps. The proclamation did not outline which branch of the federal or state governments would enforce the administration’s neutrality policy. Neither Congress nor any state government had passed laws regarding the proclamation, so if American citizens violated the terms, it was not clear which court should hear the case, under which statute they would be prosecuted, what would happen to the ships in the interim, or who would enforce the judgment.31 Put another way, it was not clear what specific crime they had committed or how they should be punished. These were just a few of the questions raised by the Neutrality Proclamation.
Over the course of the summer, Washington and the secretaries formulated foreign policy through a process of trial and error. On May 16, Genêt finally arrived to present his credentials to the administration. When he reached Philadelphia, Jefferson immediately warned him to cease licensing American vessels as French privateers. Perhaps blinded by his sympathy for the French cause, Jefferson believed that Genêt took the warning to heart and would henceforth comply with the administration’s neutrality policy.
After Genêt’s arrival, Washington gathered the cabinet to discuss a new privateer case. On May 3, the Citoyen Genêt had captured the British ship William, and a few days later, it had captured the Active. The Citoyen Genêt was one of the privateers Genêt had outfitted while he was in Charleston, and in a fantastic display of ego, he had named the ship after himself. On May 14, the Citoyen Genêt had arrived in Philadelphia with its two prizes in tow, meaning that Genêt defied the administration’s neutral policy right under Washington’s nose. Despite his behavior, Jefferson encouraged the rest of the cabinet to view Genêt’s conduct in Charleston as a “slight offense.” Jefferson argued that Washington had not yet issued the Neutrality Proclamation when Genêt first landed. Jefferson argued that the administration had little power over the legality of the privateers and their prizes. The president could not force restitution of prizes—that power belonged to Congress.
On the other side, Hamilton and Knox feared that overlooking Genêt’s conduct and ignoring French seizures of British ships would provoke reprisals from Britain. Furthermore, they viewed the power dynamic between the president and Congress very differently. Based on their own experiences with Congress, they did not trust the legislature to act forcefully. They argued that the administration must compel France to give up the prize ship and free the captured crew, or the French vessels should be sent away immediately.
Randolph suggested a more moderate approach. He agreed with Jefferson’s view that Washington could not force the restitution of the prizes, but he argued that the president should banish French privateers from American ports.32 At this point, Washington had yet to fully articulate the president’s power to enforce diplomatic policy, so he adopted a restrained approach. He followed Randolph’s advice and Jefferson conveyed the administration’s decision to Genêt a few days later. Washington also instructed Jefferson to apologize to Britain for not restoring their ships. Washington hoped the apology would suffice to ward off any future conflict.33 At this early stage in the Neutrality Crisis, his decision reflected his cautious approach to establishing precedent and the cabinet’s uncertainty about the executive’s powers to enforce diplomatic policy.
Genêt was not content to keep his prizes and continued to push his luck. Over the next several weeks, he peppered Jefferson with numerous letters protesting American neutrality and asserting French rights. He also offered several foreign policy suggestions—each more outlandish than the last. On May 22, Genêt suggested the administration reorganize its debt payment plan so that it could immediately pay off the French loans remaining from the Revolutionary War. On May 27, Genêt sent two letters. First, he demanded the release of Gideon Henfield. Henfield was an American captain born in Massachusetts whom Genêt had hired to sail the Citoyen Genêt. Pennsylvania authorities had arrested Henfield for violating American neutrality when the Citoyen Genêt arrived in Philadelphia. In his letter to Jefferson, Genêt insisted that Henfield should be released because he was under the protection of the French government as a captain of a privateer. Essentially, he denied that the US government had any right to control its own citizens. Genêt then sent his second letter, this time proclaiming the French consul’s right to adjudicate cases of French prizes brought into American ports.34
Jefferson carefully crafted replies to Genêt’s letters to explain the administration’s position and defend the powers of the executive branch. In response to the May 22 letter, Jefferson informed Genêt that full payment of French debt was impossible. Repaying such a large sum in one payment would cripple the American economy.35 No matter how much the administration might wish to aid France (or not), that solution was not possible.
Jefferson next turned to Genêt’s May 27 letters. Jefferson denied Henfield’s release. He explained that each government had power over its citizens. By “granting military commissions within the United States,” Genêt had “infringe[d] on [American] Sovereignty” and led American citizens “to commit acts contrary to the duties they owe their own country.”36 Jefferson also denied Genêt’s claim that the French consul had jurisdiction over French prize cases. He asserted “the right of every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other within its limits.” In other words, French consuls in American ports could not rule on the status of French privateers and their prizes. Jefferson defended “the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the warring powers.” Lastly, Jefferson tried to show Genêt that American neutrality did not intend to be cruel. The proclamation permitted privateers to enter American harbors for defensive repairs but prohibited offensive arming. Genêt did not appreciate the nuance or simply chose to ignore it.
At the end of June, Washington received word that his plantation manager was dying. He left Philadelphia for a quick visit to Mount Vernon, planning to return less than two weeks later. While he was out of town, Thomas Mifflin, the governor of Pennsylvania, received word of Genêt’s latest antics. Agents in the Philadelphia port reported that Genêt was arming a new privateer, the Petite Democrate. The Petite Democrate was a British ship formerly named the Little Sarah, which had been captured by the Embuscade. Not only was Genêt flagrantly violating the administration’s Neutrality Proclamation, but by converting a British ship into a privateer just a few blocks from the President’s House, he publicly flaunted his disregard for Washington’s orders. Mifflin forwarded the news to Washington, who asked to be kept apprised if Genêt began arming any additional vessels.
Mifflin, a devout Republican and no friend of the president, gladly let the matter drop. Mifflin and Washington had a historically sour relationship dating back to his brief tenure as one of Washington’s first aides-de-camp in the Revolutionary War. In August 1775, the position of quartermaster general had become available. Mifflin had requested the promotion, which Washington had granted. By March 1776, however, rumors swirled around Congress accusing Mifflin of mismanagement and corruption in the administration of the quartermaster department. While Mifflin had initially approached his new duties with enthusiasm, by the summer of 1777 he felt overwhelmed by the burdens of the department. On October 8, 1777, Mifflin sent his resignation to Congress, but congressmen pleaded with him to continue in the position until they found a replacement.37 Although Mifflin agreed to stay on as acting quartermaster general, he ignored his duties for the next several months, leaving the critical department at a standstill. Washington blamed many of the hardships suffered by the army at Valley Forge on Mifflin’s misconduct and never forgave his former aide.38
Mifflin also harbored ill will toward Washington. In the summer of 1777, as the British army circled Philadelphia, he requested that the Continental Army defend Philadelphia at all costs. Conveniently, Mifflin also lobbied for a line command. He asserted that as a native Pennsylvanian, he deserved a promotion. Washington disagreed and insisted he remain in the quartermaster department. Washington also excluded the quartermaster general from his inner circle of advisors, which further injured Mifflin’s pride.
Mifflin sought revenge against Washington for the perceived slights to his honor. After he resigned from the quartermaster department, Congress appointed him to the Board of War. The Board of War oversaw Washington’s operations, which Washington and his aides interpreted as a slight against his capabilities as commander in chief. As a member of the board, Mifflin voted to promote General Thomas Conway despite Washington’s protests. Mifflin also vocally criticized Washington’s command and played a role in the plot to replace Washington with General Horatio Gates during the winter of 1777. But by March 1778, any congressional resistance to Washington’s command disintegrated and Washington could not help but gloat: “Genl Mifflin it is commonly supposed, bore the second part in the Cabal; and General Conway, I know, was a very active, and malignant partizan but I have good reasons to believe that their machinations have recoiled most sensibly upon themselves.”39 Given their decades-long dislike of each other, Mifflin was in no rush to help Washington enforce his neutral policy in 1793.
On July 6, the Petite Democrate prepared to set sail. Alexander Dallas, the Pennsylvania secretary of state and a Republican himself, hoped that he could convince Genêt to pause his operations. The meeting went badly. Genêt failed to sense that Mifflin and Dallas were allies, and “he flew into a great passion, talked extravagantly & concluded by refusing to order the vessel to stay.”40 He denounced the administration’s neutral policy and threatened to take his appeal directly to the American people. While Mifflin hated to assist the administration, he could not aid a foreigner in breaking the law. He called out the militia and sent word to Knox and Jefferson.41 Dallas also relayed his conversation with Genêt to Jefferson and Knox—including the French minister’s threat to take his appeal directly to the people.
Envisioning a bloody battle on the docks of Philadelphia, Jefferson rushed to Genêt and urged caution. According to Jefferson’s report compiled later that day, he asked Genêt to “detain” the Petite Democrate until they could lay the issue “before the President who would [return] Wednesday.” Genêt “went into an immense field of declamation &complaint.” He took the opportunity to further challenge the administration and Washington in particular. He insisted, “in a very high tone,” that the president had overstepped his authority in denying French privateers access to American ports, and he shared his plans to appeal to Congress. According to Jefferson’s account of the meeting, he interrupted Genêt and explained that the Constitution divided the “functions of government among three different authorities” and that all foreign affairs responsibilities “belonged to the executive department.” When Genêt insisted that Congress was the sovereign, Jefferson countered that Congress was sovereign “in making laws only,” but that the executive was responsible for enforcing them.42 Although he disagreed with many of Washington’s policies by this point, Jefferson still defended the power of the executive and rejected Genêt’s attempts to increase congressional oversight.
After some convincing on Jefferson’s part, Genêt said “that he could not make any promise [to retain the ship], it would be out of his duty, but that he was very happy in being able to inform [Jefferson] that the vessel was not in readiness.” Jefferson again pressed Genêt to promise that the ship would not depart before the president’s return. He “gave the same answer that [the Petite Democrate] would not be ready for some time, but with the look & gesture which shewed he meant I should understand she would not be gone before that.”43 Still blinded by his fierce Anglophobia, Jefferson interpreted these words as a promise that the ship would not depart until Washington’s return. Despite Genêt’s evasiveness and threats to appeal to the American people, Jefferson left the meeting believing the French minister would honor his word. He reassured Dallas and Mifflin that the Petite Democrate would not leave Philadelphia until Washington got back and that they could safely disband the militia.44 Eager to avoid conflict, Mifflin followed Jefferson’s recommendation and sent the troops home.
Two days later, Hamilton, Knox, and Jefferson gathered to discuss Genêt’s latest actions. Hamilton argued that the administration must stop Genêt’s departure. He proposed installing cannons on Mud Island, a small island at the mouth of the Philadelphia harbor, and recommended that they issue orders to stop the Petite Democrate if she tried to leave American waters. Reluctant to start a violent confrontation and confident that Genêt would act prudently, Jefferson suggested that they await Washington’s arrival in Philadelphia before deciding.45 Unwilling to act without unanimous cabinet support, Hamilton and Knox reluctantly agreed to wait for Washington.
The next day Washington returned to Philadelphia and discovered that Genêt had moved the Petite Democrate down the river and out of reach of the proposed cannons on Mud Island. Eager to get to the bottom of the situation, Washington reviewed Jefferson’s accounts of his negotiations with Genêt. He also read reports from Dallas, Mifflin, Hamilton, and Knox, which revealed Genêt’s threat to go above the president’s head and to appeal to the American people for support. Jefferson also had this information and he knew that Genêt’s threat challenged the president’s authority over diplomacy—yet he had conveniently left this portion of the story out of his dispatch. Irate, Washington wrote to Jefferson. His anger was palpable: “Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at defiance—with impunity?” Washington then challenged Jefferson to offer a solution: “Circumstances press for decision—and as you have had time to consider them (upon me they have come unexpected) I wish to receive your opinion upon them—even before tomorrow.” Jefferson was on the road to his summer home outside of Philadelphia, but Washington did not care. He demanded immediate answers.46 Flustered, Jefferson wrote back and reiterated that “he [had] received assurance from mister Genet to-day that she will not be gone before the President’s decision.” Should Washington wish to discuss how to further proceed, Jefferson said it would be his honor to “confer with the President, or any others, whenever [Washington] pleases.”47
The next morning, Jefferson ominously noted that the secretaries gathered “on summons” from the president. Tired from his rushed journey back from Mount Vernon, annoyed with the above-average summer heat, and faced with an impending showdown with France and Britain, Washington must have been in quite a dark mood. The cabinet meeting notes, or rather the lack of documentation, reflect the somber feeling in the president’s private study that morning. In his private notes on cabinet meetings, Jefferson typically described the back and forth between the secretaries and offered his own editorializing on each position. But on the morning of July 12, Jefferson only transcribed the final decisions of the cabinet with brisk, efficient language. The cabinet agreed to order all French ships and prizes to remain in harbor until further notice. Mifflin would be instructed to keep the ships under close surveillance and forcibly stop the ships if necessary. The cabinet also planned to consult the Supreme Court justices for advice on how to proceed.48
A few weeks later, Washington gathered Hamilton, Jefferson, and Knox to discuss Genêt’s conduct. They agreed to request Genêt’s recall from France, but Washington wanted to maintain cordial relations with France. He wished to “express our friendship to [France]” but would make clear that administration “insist[ed] on the recall of Genet.”49 Hamilton also urged Washington to place all Genêt’s correspondence before Congress. He perceived that Genêt’s outrageous behavior presented a unique opportunity to score political points at the expense of his political rivals who were more closely aligned with France. Jefferson balked at this suggestion. He recognized that Genêt’s unpredictable behavior discredited the Republicans who had ardently cheered his arrival. Genêt’s letters would only highlight his fundamental misunderstanding of the US Constitution, challenges to the administration, and violations of Washington’s neutrality policy. When these indiscretions were made public, Jefferson knew that Genêt’s behavior would turn public opinion against France. Genêt’s letters would also harm Jefferson’s personal reputation as the unofficial leader of the Republican Party, for they revealed Jefferson’s efforts to enforce the administration’s neutrality policy. Although many Republicans had turned against Genêt, they still wanted to support France in the European war. They would not look favorably on Jefferson’s efforts to enforce neutrality.50
On August 1, Washington summoned cabinet members to a meeting to get Randolph’s opinion. Randolph had left the city briefly, but upon his return to Philadelphia, he quickly approved the cabinet’s decision to request Genêt’s recall. Washington knew this step was a bold move and might incur the wrath of some radical Republicans. He obtained the unanimous agreement of all his secretaries before taking this momentous step, just in case he needed political cover down the road. This cabinet meeting proved to have lasting influence on the development of the executive branch and American diplomacy. By requesting Genêt’s recall, the administration sent the message that it would defend American sovereignty against foreign influence and diplomatic machinations. When the French government granted Washington’s request, it tacitly acknowledged the United States’ right to dictate rules of neutrality on domestic soil and to demand that foreign nations abide by those rules. Genêt still had some supporters, but the American public largely acquiesced to his removal.51
The cabinet may have decided how to resolve their Genêt problem, but events soon made clear that the administration needed to legally define the rules of neutrality. At the end of July, a Pennsylvania jury issued a verdict in United States v. Henfield, acquitting Henfield of all privateering charges.52 The case posed a major problem for the administration. Washington and the cabinet had instructed William Rawle, the United States district attorney in Pennsylvania, to prosecute the case.53 Edmund Randolph had written the indictment himself and Supreme Court justice James Wilson delivered the grand jury charge, proclaiming, “That a Citizen, who, in our State of Neutrality … takes an hostile Part with either of the belligerent Powers, violates … his Duty and the laws of his Country.”54 Republican presses gleefully reported the verdict, praising the “independent jury” that had “firmly withstood the violence of an aristocratic torrent, whose sluices were opened upon them.”55 The verdict embarrassed the administration and highlighted the legal vulnerabilities present in the Neutrality Proclamation. Although the proclamation prohibited citizens from engaging in privateering, there was no legal code under which a district attorney could prosecute the case.
To prevent that embarrassment from happening again, Washington instructed the secretaries to meet and craft more formal rules of neutrality. In early August, the secretaries met and drafted eight rules to govern American interactions with foreign nations going forward, which they sent to Washington for his review. After considering the secretaries’ draft, Washington convened another meeting a few weeks later and the cabinet finalized the rules of American neutrality.56
These rules emphasized that foreign nations must take “efficacious measures to prevent the future fitting out of Privateers in the Ports of The UStates.” The administration did not care if France and Britain outfitted privateers, but they could not do so in American ports. The cabinet also took a harsher stance against privateers than it had earlier in the summer. No longer would the administration turn a blind eye to prizes. Now, if France brought captured British ships into American harbors, the president intended to “indemnify the Owners of those prizes” and expected “to be reimbursed by the French Nation.”57 These new rules represented a development in the cabinet’s interpretation of the president’s power to enforce diplomatic policy. Congress had been out of session since March 4 and could offer no solution to curb privateering while adjourned. Perhaps Congress’s inability to take action while out of session reminded the secretaries of their previous frustrating experiences with the state legislatures and the Confederation Congress. By the end of August, they were convinced that the legislature was too inefficient to provide forceful implementation of the administration’s policy and they claimed the power for the executive to enforce domestic policy, effectively sidelining Congress from this process. On June 4, 1794, Congress passed legislation confirming Washington’s rules of neutrality and affirming the president’s new powers.58
In 1793, Washington’s cabinet established important executive and diplomatic precedents, but that year also witnessed the crystallization of the first two-party political system, helmed by Hamilton on one side and Jefferson on the other. The previous fall, Jefferson had warned Washington this breach was coming. On September 27, 1792, Jefferson had left his home in Charlottesville, Virginia, to return to his office in Philadelphia. Along the way, Jefferson made a minor detour from his route to visit Mount Vernon. Washington and Jefferson enjoyed breakfast together before turning to politics. During their conversation, Washington confessed his disappointment at “the difference which he found to subsist between the Sec. of the Treasury and [Jefferson].” He acknowledged the disagreement in their political positions, but “he had never suspected it had gone so far in producing a personal difference.”59 Washington’s efforts to serve as a mediator over the next several months failed, and by 1793, Hamilton and Jefferson loathed each other. The increasing animosity between the two festered during periods of crisis. Washington’s small private study exacerbated the existing tensions between Hamilton and Jefferson by confining them together in a small space. Furthermore, the summer that year was so hot and muggy that a severe yellow fever epidemic broke out in October. Washington’s second-story study would have been stifling in the Philadelphia heat, even on the coolest of summer days. Almost twenty years later, Jefferson described his interactions with Hamilton as “daily pitted in the cabinet like two cocks.”60 His word choice conveyed a violent, bloody spectacle and reveals a great deal about the nature of cabinet debates.
Jefferson and the Republicans believed that Hamilton and the Federalists sought to turn the government into a monarchy modeled after Britain. While Jefferson did not think the president agreed with this plan, he thought Washington oblivious to Hamilton’s machinations. On the other side, the Federalists were convinced Jefferson and the Republicans were blinded by their rabid love of all things French to the dangers of anarchy and the violence of the French Revolution.
Washington did his best to manage the conflict. He hosted the secretaries at regular family dinners, invited them to the theater, and included them at other social events. He hoped that social interactions would foster an esprit de corps and diminish political divisions, just as social occasions had cultivated bonds among his officers during the war. Washington invited the secretaries to dine with him after many cabinet meetings to smooth hurt feelings that developed during the debates. For example, on July 31, 1793, he welcomed the secretaries to one such dinner. The day before, he had written to Jefferson: “As the consideration of this business may require some time, I should be glad if you & the other Gentlemen would take a family dinner with me at 4 ’Oclock. No other company is, or will be envited.”61
Similarly, on November 18, 1793, Washington hoped that a family dinner would encourage the cabinet to reach a consensus. Earlier that month, the cabinet had met four times in five days, on each occasion gathering for several hours in Washington’s office. On November 18, the cabinet members paused their deliberations halfway through the meeting to sit for dinner. During this gathering, Jefferson and Hamilton clashed over whether the administration should banish Genêt from American soil. Although the cabinet had agreed to request Genêt’s recall in late July, the administration had yet to receive a reply from France because of the slow transportation time across the Atlantic Ocean. While the administration waited for France to respond, Genêt proceeded with his outlandish plans to launch invasions into British and Spanish territories from the United States. Washington had tired of Genêt’s continuously offensive conduct and wanted to act. Hamilton argued in favor of Genêt’s immediate banishment. He suggested that the dignity of the nation was at stake and “that our conduct now would tempt or deter other foreign ministers from treating us in the same manner.” Jefferson protested that expelling the French minister would provoke war: “The measure [would be] so harsh a one that no precedent is produced where it has not been followed by war.” Counseling patience, Jefferson urged Washington to wait for an official reply from the French government.62 After the meal ended and the debates resumed, Jefferson and Hamilton still did not agree. Washington “lamented there was not an unanimity among [them], that as it was [they] had left him exactly where [they] found him.” At the bottom of his meeting minutes Jefferson noted ominously, “And so it ended.”63
Washington also employed flattery to keep Jefferson in the administration. Appealing to Jefferson’s sense of duty to encourage good behavior, he emphasized the importance of hearing both sides of each debate in cabinet meetings. During their breakfast in September 1792, Jefferson had first mentioned his wish to retire. Washington tried to convince him of his value, and of the value of the Republican perspective, in the cabinet. He assured Jefferson that his opinions were important and that having both perspectives in the cabinet kept the administration on a moderate course: “[Washington] thought it important to preserve the check of my opinions in the administration in order to keep things in their proper channel and prevent them from going too far.”64 The president implored him to stay and confessed “that he could not see where he should find another character to fill [the] office.” He had benefited from hearing multiple opinions in his councils of war and sought to maintain a similar situation in the cabinet.
Whenever possible, Washington also tried to balance his decisions between the two sides. If he could not force these powerful secretaries to get along, he could at least make them feel important. In a private conversation with Jefferson prior to the outbreak of the Neutrality Crisis, Washington evidently said, “There was no nation on whom we could rely at all times but France, and that if we did not prepare in time some support in the event of rupture with Spain & England we might be charged with a criminal negligence.” In his notes on the meeting, Jefferson confessed, “I was much pleased with the tone of these observations. it was the very doctrine which had been my polar star.”65
While Washington’s opinions on France shifted during the course of 1793, he continued his efforts to make Jefferson feel valued. In late November 1793, Washington sided very conspicuously with Jefferson during a cabinet meeting. The cabinet had gathered to discuss Washington’s upcoming annual address to Congress. Washington often provided Congress with an update on the state of diplomatic relations with foreign nations in his addresses, and 1793 was no different. Over the last year, Jefferson had been in negotiations with George Hammond, the British ambassador, to resolve lingering issues from the end of the Revolutionary War. The British insisted that Americans repay prewar debts and restore loyalist property. Americans promised that they would pay their debts once Britain evacuated western forts and indemnified slave owners for the enslaved people who had escaped with the British army.
A few days before the cabinet meeting, British ambassador George Hammond acknowledged that the British had suspended their negotiations with the Americans until the end of the war with France. Both Jefferson and Washington were outraged at Hammond’s letter. Jefferson had been waiting months for a reply from London and had sent several reminders to Hammond inquiring when he might receive an answer. After learning that London had arbitrarily decided to pause negotiations without their input, Washington and Jefferson concluded that Britain did not take the United States seriously. Recognizing an opportunity to score a few political points of his own, Jefferson urged Washington to lay his recent communications with Hammond before Congress.66 Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph all favored withholding the communications from Congress and preserving secrecy to protect the possibility of future negotiations. Much to Jefferson’s surprise, Washington lost his usual composure and vented his frustrations with Britain and Hammond. Jefferson described Washington’s decision: “The Presidt. Took up the subject with more vehemence than I have seen him shew, and decided without reserve … (wherein H. K. and R. had been against me). This was the first instance I had seen of his deciding on the opinion of one against that of three others, which proved his own to have been very strong.”67 While it is likely that Washington went against the cabinet majority because he simply lost his temper, it is also possible that he expressed his opinion in such strong terms to assure Jefferson he still had an important role in the cabinet.
Washington may have also used cabinet meetings for a political purpose as the partisan tensions between Hamilton and Jefferson intensified and his other efforts to mediate failed. Although the extent of Jefferson’s connections with the nascent Republican Party remained obscure in 1793, Hamilton did his very best to paint Jefferson in the worst possible light when he wrote to Washington,
I have long seen a formed party in the Legislature, under his auspices, bent upon my subversion. I cannot doubt, from the evidence I possess, that the National Gazette was instituted by him for political purposes and that one leading object of it has been to render me and all the measures connect with my department as odious as possible.68
Hamilton knew these charges would bother Washington, who considered attacks on the Department of the Treasury’s policies to be attacks on his administration. In 1793, the National Gazette expanded its criticism and hounded Washington with stories that extolled Genêt’s virtues and denounced the administration for its neutrality policy. The evidence against Jefferson was convincing. He had hired Philip Freneau, the publisher of the National Gazette, as a translator in the Department of State. However, the only other language Freneau spoke was French. As the longtime minister to France and an avowed Francophile, Jefferson needed little assistance with that particular language.
Washington raised the issue with Jefferson and said that while “he despised all their attacks on him personally,” he was more upset that the paper criticized every “act of the government.” Washington may have complained about Freneau’s attacks and made it clear that he saw Freneau’s hiring as a partisan act, but he never accused Jefferson outright. Jefferson interpreted this conversation as a suggestion that he should fire Freneau from the State Department, which he refused to do.69
Washington did not force Jefferson to fire Freneau, but he ensured that Jefferson took part in administrative decisions. As commander in chief, he had learned the value of covering his bases, and he applied those lessons to the cabinet. If Jefferson was present at cabinet meetings, he could not later claim ignorance or protest that he had been excluded from the decision-making process. Furthermore, Jefferson would look rather foolish if he tried to distance himself from the administration’s position while still serving as secretary of state. Jefferson discovered this conundrum when he tried to defend his role in the Neutrality Crisis to fellow Republicans, who accused the administration of adopting pro-British policies. When Madison and other Republicans criticized the Neutrality Proclamation, Jefferson quickly distanced himself from the document, making sure that his allies knew he had not written the statement: “I dare say you will have judged from the pusillanimity of the proclamation, from whose pen it came.”70As early as May 1793, Jefferson acknowledged that this tactic had limited success, and he lamented his situation: “A proclamation is to be issued, and another instance of my being forced to appear to approve what I have condemned uniformly from its first conception.”71
The year 1793 also proved to be a major turning point for the cabinet’s visibility as an executive institution. For the first time, the press and the public used the word “cabinet” to describe Washington’s meetings with his department secretaries. On June 13, Madison wrote to Jefferson criticizing the Neutrality Proclamation. Madison argued that the proclamation usurped Congress’s power. According to Madison, the Constitution granted Congress the power to declare war, and therefore only Congress could declare peace. He asked Jefferson, “Did no such view of the subject present itself in the discussions of the Cabinet?”72 Significantly, the secretaries also described their interactions as cabinet meetings, suggesting that they recognized that their actions created a new institution. In 1793, Jefferson and Hamilton described their gatherings as “cabinet meetings” and their decisions as “cabinet opinions” in their private notes.73
Increased public awareness of the cabinet’s existence raised new objections to the administration. Members of the federal government had received ample criticism before 1793. In 1789, the public denounced Adams for his role in the Title Controversy, and Hamilton dealt with his fair share of critiques for his financial legislation in 1791 and 1792. But 1793 marked the first time the public targeted Washington and the presidency. One anonymous letter to the president, printed in the National Gazette, lamented the government’s “shamefully pusillanimous” conduct toward Britain. The author warned Washington to “shut his ears against the whispers of servile adulation, and to listen to solemn admonitions of patriotic truth.” If the president did not follow this advice, “the people … [would take] the law into their own hands … and wipe off the disgrace of the nation.”74 Madison and other Republicans shared similar sentiments behind closed doors.75 Jefferson exonerated Washington from willfully complying with Hamilton’s monarchical plans by suggesting that he had simply become senile: “His memory was already sensibly impaired by age, the firm tone of mind for which he had been remarkable was beginning to relax, its energy was abated; a listlessness of labor, a desire for tranquility had crept on him, and a willingness to let others act and even think for him.”76
While Washington felt he could not respond publicly to these attacks, he used the cabinet as a hierarchy of communication and channeled responses through his secretaries and other supporters. He never personally authored replies to newspaper attacks, but he supported efforts by Hamilton and others to defend the administration.77 He encouraged his subordinates to publish replies to the attacks, he responded to private letters, and he worked to prevent further critiques of the administration. On June 29, 1793, Hamilton published an article under the name “Pacificus” to defend the Neutrality Proclamation. He asserted the president’s power in diplomatic matters: “The President is the constitutional Executor of the laws. Our Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part of the law of the land.” Hamilton argued that as part of Washington’s constitutional duties, “it was necessary for the President to judge for himself whether there was any thing in our treaties incompatible with an adherence to neutrality.” Washington had determined that neutrality was compatible with the Franco-American treaties. Accordingly, it was the president’s duty, he argued, to enforce laws and treaties domestically: “As Executor of the laws, to proclaim the neutrality of the Nation, to exhort all persons to observe it, and to warn them of the penalties which would attend its non-observance.”78 While no evidence exists that Washington approved the editorial before publication, Jefferson confided to Madison that the author behind the “Pacificus” letter was “universally known.”79 Given that Hamilton and Washington saw each other almost every day, they likely spoke about Hamilton’s writing plans.
Other leading Federalists joined in the fray. Chief Justice John Jay and Senator Rufus King worked to turn public opinion against Genêt and the French cause. During one of the cabinet meetings in July, Hamilton had learned of Genêt’s threat to appeal to the American people. He quickly wrote a series of anonymous articles attacking Genêt under the collective title “No Jacobin.”80 The very first line of the series stated: “It is publicly rumoured in this City that the Minister of the French Republic has threatened to appeal from The President of The United States to the People.”81 Early the next month, Jay concluded the Supreme Court’s regular session in Philadelphia and left to return to New York. Before departing Philadelphia, Jay likely consulted with Hamilton and learned of Genêt’s threats. They were close friends and frequently discussed legal matters and diplomacy. On August 13, Hamilton also passed along this damaging information to King, another Federalist ally. The very next day, Jay and King published Genêt’s remarks in a New York newspaper, which was then reprinted widely.82 Unlike most editorials at the time, they published this article under their own names, lending credence to the report. Their article confirming Genêt’s threats was the first publication backed by two well-respected public officials, rather than cloaked in anonymity.
Early Republic political culture included unwritten rules for published materials. There were four categories of documents: newspaper editorials, broadsides, pamphlets, and letters. Newspaper editorials were usually anonymous, intended for a lower-class audience, and carried less weight. Broadsides were short, hastily written, anonymous documents. They were cheap to print, intended to incite emotions in the crowd, and were tacked to a pole, tree, or side of a building. Pamphlets were usually published by wealthier men or those with connections to printers. They were intended for the “first and second” classes, articulated detailed arguments, and the author usually signed his name. Private letters, often intended to be shared among select circles, were the most powerful weapon because the audience assumed the author spoke freely.83 Readers understood that not all documents were the same—an anonymous newspaper editorial was much less credible and serious than a private letter. When Jay and King published a letter in the newspaper with their names attached, readers grasped the severity of the allegations.
Washington probably approved Jay’s and King’s article. They were two high-ranking Federalists and federal officials with extensive diplomatic experience and many overlapping ties to the president and the cabinet—they understood the political and diplomatic ramifications of their publication. They likely would not have issued such a public statement without Washington’s tacit blessing. Furthermore, Jay “seldom visited [Philadelphia] without a long conference with the President.”84 After conversing with Hamilton, Jay may have visited Washington to get his blessing to publish the article.
The Federalists’ collective efforts paid off. Genêt’s insolence toward the president outraged the American public. In the late eighteenth century, the American flag had not yet taken on its symbolic importance. Instead, as the most famous American, Washington embodied the nation.85 An attack on Washington by a foreigner inspired many Americans to rally behind the president and defend neutrality, even if they did not necessarily support the policy itself. Neutrality, and the president’s authority over diplomacy, became a matter of national pride.
By the end of 1793, Genêt’s behavior and the ongoing violence of the French Revolution vindicated the administration’s strict adherence to neutrality. That December, Washington delivered his annual address to Congress in which he included a separate message notifying Congress that he had requested Genêt’s recall as French minister and expected France’s reply imminently: “From a sense of their friendship towards us, from a conviction that they would not suffer us to remain long exposed to the action of a person who has so little respected our mutual dispositions.” Along with his announcement, Washington submitted Genêt’s correspondence with Jefferson: “The papers now communicated will more particularly apprize you of these transactions.”86 Genêt’s letters convinced many of the most ardent Francophiles that Washington was justified in requesting the removal of the French minister.
In February 1794, Genêt’s replacement, Jean Antoine Fauchet, arrived from France. Fauchet brought a warrant for Genêt’s arrest and a warning that if he continued his rabble-rousing, his family in France would be held hostage.87 Aware that banishing Genêt to France would result in his near-certain execution, Washington agreed to allow the disgraced French minister to remain in the United States. King, one of the former French minister’s harshest critics, encouraged Washington to grant Genêt asylum. He suggested that because Genêt no longer posed a threat to the nation, he should be treated with compassion and perhaps pity.88 Washington was not a forgiving man, but he sensed the public’s lingering affection for France and the harsh criticism that would await him if he permitted Genêt’s execution.
Although the public approved the administration’s neutrality policy by the end of the year, the uproar had caused significant damage. Washington was deeply hurt by the criticism of his leadership and sometimes vented his frustration to the cabinet. For example, in August, as the cabinet discussed Genêt’s behavior, Washington shared his fears that Genêt would incite violence by encouraging public resistance to the administration. Perhaps goading him a bit, Knox brought up a recent political cartoon that depicted the president’s execution by guillotine in the National Gazette. Jefferson noted that Washington lost his temper and railed against the criticism. He vented “on the personal abuse which had been bestowed on him.” What he said next revealed the origins of his hurt feelings: Washington “defied any man on earth to produce one single act of his since he had been in the government which was not done on the purest motives.”
Washington was notoriously thin-skinned and resented the increase in public criticism. He had accepted the presidency out of a sense of duty, rather than an inherent interest in wielding power. He would have much rather spent his final years at Mount Vernon, and the presidency made him cranky.89 Keenly aware of what he was sacrificing, Washington felt entitled to a certain amount of gratitude from the public and lost his temper when Freneau, the editor of the National Gazette, did not show the appropriate appreciation. Washington had initially subscribed to the National Gazette but canceled his subscription once the newspaper increased its criticism of the administration. To irritate the president, Freneau continued to send three copies of the daily newspaper to the President’s House on Market Street. Washington was unaccustomed to outright impertinence, and it galled him: “The rascal Freneau sent [me] three of his papers every day, as if he thought [I] would become the distributor of his papers, [I] could see in this nothing but an impudent design to insult [me].”90
Perhaps the shift in public opinion offended Washington the most. When Washington had first taken office, the public had greeted him with overwhelming adoration.91 Although a small minority criticized his levees and expensive coach and horses, most citizens approved of Washington’s early decisions as president. Opposition grew in response to Hamilton’s financial measures and the administration’s decision to declare neutrality in 1793, which many Republicans viewed as a betrayal of their French allies.92 In Washington’s second term, the rise of partisan strife and a Republican press provided numerous public outlets for this increasingly ferocious criticism. When Bache first published the General Advertiser and Aurora in October 1790, Washington was an early subscriber. He loved newspapers and eagerly perused their pages for news and reports on the state of the nation. However, by 1793, Bache had assumed Freneau’s mantle. The Aurora emerged as the leading Republican newspaper and dominated the anti-Washington press. In 1792, Washington canceled his subscription. Not to be deterred, or perhaps to get under the president’s skin, Bache followed Freneau’s example and continued to deliver several copies of his newspaper six days a week to the front door of the President’s House on the corner of Sixth and Market Streets.93 Washington could not escape the critiques, despite his best efforts.
Washington believed that as president, he had to hold himself to a higher standard of propriety and discretion. He could not write editorials or share public letters, but he did selectively respond to private letters of criticism. On September 11, 1793, Washington replied to a private letter sent by Edmund Pendleton. Pendleton had shared his concerns about Hamilton and Treasury Department policies. Washington replied with typical non-committal politeness: “With respect to the fiscal conduct of the S—t—y of the Tr—s—y I will say nothing; because an enquiry … will be instituted next Session of Congress into some of the Alligations against him.… A fair opportunity will then be given to the impartial world to form a just estimate of his Acts, and probably of his motives.”94 He made exceptions to his tight-lipped policy when he received letters from old acquaintances, if they were respectable men of substance and wisdom.
Washington also used his annual addresses to Congress to respond to his critics and to promote the administration’s agenda. In his October 1791 address, he could barely contain his glee over the success of the new United States Bank: “The rapid subscriptions to the Bank of the United States … is among the striking and pleasing evidences which present themselves, not only of confidence in the government, but of resource in the community.”95 In his address on November 6, 1792, he defended the new fiscal system and its taxes. He stated that the revenue was in a “prosperous state,” but lamented the “impediments, which in some places continue to embarrass the collection of duties on spirits distilled within the United States.” Washington threatened the offenders with prosecution, for “nothing within constitutional and legal limits … shall be wanting to assert and maintain the just authority of the laws.”96
In 1793, Washington delivered several dispatches to Congress in addition to his annual address. He included all the administration’s correspondence with Genêt. He also provided a brief explanation of their tumultuous relationship. He expected this information to counter Republican criticism of the administration for declaring neutrality and refusing aid to France in its war against Britain:
It is with extreme concern I have to inform you that the proceedings of the person [France has] unfortunately appointed their Minister Plenipy here, have breathed nothing of the friendly spirit of the Nation which sent him. Their tendency on the contrary has been to involve us in war abroad, & discord & anarchy at home. So far as his Acts, or those of his agents, have threatned our immediate commitment in the war, or flagrant insult to the authority of the laws, their effect has been counteracted by the ordinary cognisance of the laws, and by an exertion of the powers confided to me.97
Congress largely met his expectations. They approved his decision to request the recall of Genêt and supported his efforts to establish American neutrality.
Washington’s pride was not the only casualty of the Neutrality Crisis. On December 31, 1793, Jefferson retired as secretary of state. He could stomach the conflict with Hamilton no longer; furthermore, he increasingly felt himself at odds with the administration’s position and wanted to be freed from his responsibilities as secretary of state, which required him to defend (at least publicly) and execute the president’s policies. Jefferson’s retirement marked the first major departure from Washington’s administration, and firmly drew the lines between the two nascent political parties and their international loyalties. It also began an exodus of cabinet retirements over the next year.
After Jefferson’s retirement, Washington adopted a new policy for his cabinet appointments in light of rising political conflict. Starting in 1794, Washington required demonstrated loyalty to the administration as a precondition for nomination to his cabinet. In October 1795, he discussed possible candidates for open positions with Hamilton and approved of those individuals who had “been a steady friend to the general government since it has been in operation.”98 He refused to have his cabinet torn apart again by political divisions during his final years in office.
As we have seen, the cabinet supervised several key developments during the Neutrality Crisis that solidified executive power and confirmed the president’s prerogative over foreign affairs. Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation claimed for the president the authority to shape domestic policy relating to treaties. The rules of neutrality crafted by the cabinet affirmed the president’s right to enforce administrative policy. Washington’s call for Genêt’s removal demonstrated the president’s power to request a recall and the government’s right to have its policies respected by foreign nations. When Congress and the public supported the Washington administration’s handling of the Neutrality Crisis, Congress ceded these powers to Washington and the president. Furthermore, when France recalled Genêt, it tacitly accepted the United States’ authority to establish its own foreign policy as an independent nation. Washington relied on the cabinet when determining every one of these administrative decisions and policies, and the secretaries willingly participated in this process. The resolution of the Neutrality Crisis was a product of the cabinet’s participation—the secretaries brought their previous frustrations with the Confederation Congress, weak governors, and state legislatures to the cabinet. They worked to sideline Congress and promoted the president’s power over the diplomatic process.
The unique composition of the cabinet, with both French and British interests represented by the Republicans and the Federalists, respectively, produced a neutrality that preserved trade relationships with Britain and avoided an outright break with France. The absence of Hamilton or Jefferson from the cabinet likely would have produced a significantly different outcome. Jefferson may have disagreed with Washington’s decisions, but he routinely defended Washington and the presidency against Genêt’s attacks. The secretaries’ participation ensured that the cabinet, as an institution, facilitated and supported a strong presidency in diplomatic affairs. After Jefferson’s departure, the administration faced another significant challenge to its authority. This time, the threat came not from a mighty European power across the Atlantic but from a band of rebels in western Pennsylvania.