ON JULY 15, 1794, a group of about thirty militiamen surrounded Bower Hill, the home of General John Neville. Bower Hill, the largest and most ornate mansion in western Pennsylvania, sat atop a hill overlooking the Pittsburgh region. Neville served as the federal tax inspector for western Pennsylvania and was charged with inspecting local whiskey stills and collecting an excise tax. When he refused to surrender to the militia on July 15, the rebels returned the next day with more than 500 additional reinforcements, forcing Neville to flee to a local ravine, while a small handful of US Army soldiers tried to defend the home. In the fighting, Major James McFarlane, a Revolutionary War veteran and leader of the rebel force, was killed. Outraged, the rebels burned Bower Hill to the ground.
While the Washington administration had faced resistance to its tax measures before and had grappled with diplomatic challenges the previous year during the Neutrality Crisis, this rebellion posed the first major domestic threat to the presidency, the Constitution, and the rule of law. The rebellion was a moment of reckoning that raised significant questions for the new government. Did the Constitution grant the federal government power to levy an excise tax? If so, could the federal government enforce the law, or would the states lead the enforcement effort? If the federal government took responsibility, would the president craft a federal response or would Congress? Finally, how would the public respond to these enforcement measures?
If the government failed to repress the rebellion, the consequences would have been unthinkable. The federal government would have set a precedent that citizens could evade taxes, while forfeiting its ability to raise money and its credibility on the foreign stage. The location of the insurrection further compounded the pressure of the situation. Western Pennsylvania offered a direct connection to the Great Lakes and Canada. Since the Revolutionary War had ended in 1783, the United States and Britain had squabbled over borders and the possession of western forts. Washington and the secretaries suspected that Britain or other European empires might exploit any sign of weakness and encourage western communities to break off from the United States and join a foreign empire. The cabinet concluded that the survival of the federal government, the future of its fiscal system, and the nation’s capacity to internationally project its military strength depended on the administration’s ability to collect taxes and enforce compliance with federal laws.1
Over the next several months, Washington and the secretaries crafted a response to the insurrection that defended federal power to levy taxes, asserted the president’s right to establish domestic policy, sidelined Congress, and forced the state governments to comply with the president’s orders—much as they had done during the Neutrality Crisis, but this time the cabinet focused on asserting executive authority over domestic issues. When creating policy, they drew on their previous governing and leadership experiences. Washington followed his council-of-war practices by convening cabinet meetings to build consensus among his advisors and requesting written opinions to provide political cover before making a controversial decision. In cabinet deliberations, the secretaries drew on their own frustrating experiences with the Confederation Congress and state governments. They encouraged Washington to oversee a federal response to the rebellion, rather than relying on Congress or state authorities. When the secretaries advocated decisive action, their advice encouraged Washington’s predilection to adopt forceful measures.
Public opinion also played a crucial role in shaping cabinet deliberations in 1794. At each stage of the decision-making process, Washington and the secretaries considered popular responses to their actions. Rather than immediately resorting to force, they elected to send a peace delegation to negotiate with the rebels. In late August, reports trickled back to Philadelphia that the peace commission would fail. Despite their dwindling hopes, Washington and the secretaries waited to call up the militia until they received official notice that the rebels had rejected peace. They adopted this cautious approach to shore up public support for the administration’s eventual military action. On September 9, 1794, Washington finally issued orders for the Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania militias to meet in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.2 Yet Washington did not leave Philadelphia until September 30. He lingered for three weeks to make sure public opinion supported this step. Once the prominent Republican newspapers endorsed the administration’s policy, Washington confidently rode out to meet the militia in Carlisle.3
In January 1791, Congress had passed an excise tax on domestic liquors to help pay off the national debt. An excise tax made good political sense. The government desperately needed funds to pay its debts and to pay for government services, including employee salaries and basic defense measures. An excise tax would not offend foreign trade partners because it did not apply to exports or imports. It avoided the potential backlash sparked by direct taxes, which applied to all citizens in the nation. Direct taxes also weighed more heavily on the poor because they were applied based on the number of individuals per household, rather than scaled based on income. Additionally, direct taxes required government officials to go door-to-door collecting taxes from families. The administration also favored excise taxes to avoid the pitfalls of land taxes, which infuriated the landowning elite, and property taxes, which outraged the slave-owning elite who would have paid taxes based on the number of enslaved persons they owned. The administration depended on the support of these interest groups and so it avoided taxation measures that would alienate these constituencies. Finally, the excise tax would be paid by whiskey distillers. Distillers would pass the costs on to consumers, but the consumers would not interact directly with tax officials, which would preserve the popularity of the administration.4
Almost immediately, however, the tax faced backlash and exacerbated existing regional tensions. Farmers in western regions of Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania cultivated fertile lands and produced sizable harvests to sell on the market. But wheat and corn are heavy and were expensive to transport on wagons over long distances to distant port cities. Furthermore, roads in North Carolina and Kentucky were nearly impassable several months of the year. Nor was river transport an option, as Spain barred Americans from accessing the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans. Whiskey was the one commodity that brought farmers enough profit to cover the exorbitant shipping costs. Furthermore, cash-poor farmers often distilled whiskey from their leftover corn to use as a trading commodity in lieu of currency. These farmers protested the excise tax as unfairly burdensome on the poor communities in western counties of the states.
In North Carolina, farmers evaded and violently resisted the tax. In June 1792, Daniel Huger, a Federalist from South Carolina, reported to Hamilton that many North Carolinian farmers found ingenious methods to avoid the tax. They shipped their whiskey to Virginia, where they sold their spirits for lower prices, thus undercutting Virginian competitors and avoiding the excise tax. Distillers also threatened violence to avoid taxation. When Joseph McDowell Jr. tried to inspect a still in North Carolina’s Fifth District, he discovered how creative distillers could be with their threats. Inspired by the materials at hand, the owner of one distillery threatened to grind off McDowell’s nose on the mill’s grindstone. In August 1792, McDowell reported this treatment to Hamilton and Washington.5
The administration found even less success enforcing the excise tax in Kentucky. Kentuckians resented the federal government for failing to force Spain to grant access to the Mississippi River. They also felt abandoned by the federal government when the administration did not provide a more robust defense against Native American attacks on their farms. As a result, Kentuckians were not especially eager to support an administration that appeared to have ignored their interests. When the tax went into effect on July 1, 1791, Kentucky simply disregarded it.6 Kentucky chief revenue officer Colonel Thomas Marshall could not find candidates willing to serve as tax collectors, even with the promise of extra financial incentives. Distillers in compliance with the tax refused to report their neighbors who rejected the excise, even for financial rewards. Most distillers would not even fill out the paperwork necessary for collectors to inspect stills.
The state legal system also refused to cooperate. Kentucky grand juries refused to charge individuals with crimes, and the first federal attorney declined to bring a single case before the courts. When the federal attorney retired, Washington offered the position to several prominent lawyers, but all turned him down. Desperate to bring the state into compliance, Hamilton offered to forgive the first year of taxes if Kentucky’s distillers promised to pay after 1793. The distillers ignored this offer. By 1795, Hamilton offered three years of tax forgiveness. They also ignored this offer.7
For the time being, the administration was willing to overlook Kentucky’s insubordination. The secretaries feared that too harsh a response would push western communities into the arms of the Spanish, British, or French. Kentucky did not become a state until June 1792, and even then, the state’s bonds to the new nation were tenuous. In May 1794, hundreds of people gathered in Lexington, Kentucky, to pass a series of resolutions condemning the government for abandoning them to Indian attacks and forsaking their economic needs by not prioritizing Americans’ access to the Mississippi River. Attorney General William Bradford encouraged Washington to ignore the resistance efforts in Kentucky for the moment. He suggested that the administration give them “no formal notice … at present, unless for the purpose of directing a prosecution. They are clearly libellous in some parts of them, tending to excite sedition & disaffection to the Government; and therefore are indictable. But, generally speaking, publications of this nature are best counteracted by silence and contempt.”8
In August 1792, discontent in Pennsylvania also bubbled to the surface. Local leaders passed resolutions that called for “legal action to obstruct the operation of the Law,” as well as the formation of committees of correspondence and intimidation of collectors and any distillers who were in compliance with the law.9 Although Hamilton immediately advocated a military response, Washington and Randolph recognized that military suppression would be wildly unpopular at that moment. Instead, the administration offered leniency. At Washington’s request, Hamilton drafted a proclamation, but Randolph edited out some of the most inflammatory language. Randolph insisted that Hamilton remove the phrase “criminality” and any reference to the military. He recognized that “the charge to the military would inflame the Country.”10 The final proclamation denounced the protests and urged citizens to abide by the law, but it did not threaten military action.
In July 1794, the rebellion accelerated when the armed rebels attacked Neville’s home.11 Washington’s hands may have been tied with North Carolina and Kentucky—North Carolina was far from the seat of government, and Kentucky appeared to be on the brink of secession, so one wrong move might send it into the arms of the Spanish or British—but western Pennsylvania was a different story. The protests were at the administration’s back door, and Washington was disinclined to extend mercy more than once.
In late July, Washington learned of the rebels’ attack on Bower Hill. He called an emergency cabinet meeting to discuss the crisis.12 Each secretary brought with him years of experience with state governments; this familiarity colored their advice to Washington and their participation in the cabinet over the following two months. The crisis forced Washington to decide if his administration would spearhead a military response, allow Congress to take the lead, or leave containment to Pennsylvania.
On July 25, 1794, the secretaries piled into Washington’s study and gathered around the small table set up for the meeting. The cabinet expressed a unanimous “indignation … at the outrages committed” by the rebels.13 Hamilton and Knox advocated immediate military action against the rebels in western Pennsylvania. Some contemporaries, including Jefferson, and many historians have accused Knox of blindly following Hamilton’s lead. Yet his prior experience in the Revolutionary War and during the Confederation period instilled in him a firm commitment to a powerful, active executive—independent of Hamilton’s agenda. Knox distrusted Congress as well as the states’ ability to pull together a coordinated approach to the insurrection. He believed the president was the natural person to craft and enforce a federal response to the rebellion.
As the new secretary of state, Randolph brought with him the same analytical, methodical approach that he had utilized as governor of Virginia. He appreciated that the time for leniency had passed, but he was mindful of clashing opinions on the tax and sympathy for the farmers.14 He suggested that Washington negotiate with the alleged rebels before turning to a military response. The new attorney general, William Bradford, also counseled Washington to engage the rebels in negotiations—but only as political cover while the president readied troops for action.15 The cabinet also agreed that the president should not request congressional approval to direct the federal army under the command of General Anthony Wayne to crush the rebellion. A multi-state militia force would be much more palatable to the American public, which already nursed a distrust of a standing army. The army was busy in the Ohio Territory, anyway; it was marching west to the Ohio River Valley, and later that summer it would win a decisive victory against a confederation of the Shawnee, Miami, and Delaware Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers.16
The secretaries also dismissed congressional action. After receiving the news of the continuing violence in western Pennsylvania, Washington and the cabinet could have waited for Congress to reassemble in the fall. But the stakes of the rebellion were too high, and they could not risk the possibility that the rebellion would escalate. They all remembered how Shays’ Rebellion had spread across western Massachusetts in 1786, shut down the court system, and prevented tax collection while Congress struggled to raise money and troops. Alternatively, Washington could have cited the pressing circumstances and convened an emergency session of Congress. Because of the secretaries’ previous experiences with Congress, these options were never seriously considered. The tax had never enjoyed bipartisan support, and the secretaries knew that the Republicans in Congress would stall a military response. Instead, the secretaries made the unanimous decision to seek authorization for the president to call up the militia. It was an extraordinary moment—almost right away the secretaries elected to immediately sideline Congress in the nation’s first major domestic crisis.
The cabinet agreed that the president should spearhead the federal response to the rebellion, but Washington needed legal authority to call up state troops. On May 2, 1792, Congress had passed a new law that provided for “calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.” The law recognized that a foreign country might invade the nation, or a domestic rebellion might crop up during congressional recess. In the case of a domestic crisis, the president could present the facts to an associate justice of the Supreme Court or a district judge. If the justice or judge approved military action, the president could then call forth the militia in the necessary states.17
The secretaries mapped out their strategy during the July 25 cabinet meeting. Eager to secure approval and move forward with military preparations, Washington and the cabinet took no chances. They decided to share their materials with Supreme Court Justice James Wilson. Wilson was a safe choice. He was a longtime Federalist, a Washington supporter, and an advocate of executive authority.18 The secretaries also advised Bradford on how to make his approach to Wilson. Bradford should avoid revealing the president’s wish “that the certificate should be granted.” If events forced Washington to order military action, the cabinet wanted undisputed legal authorization.19 There could be no hint that he had coerced or influenced Wilson’s decision. After the cabinet meeting ended, Randolph gathered the appropriate materials and Bradford submitted them to Justice Wilson.
The following week, Washington convened a cabinet meeting, which several Pennsylvania officials joined, including Governor Thomas Mifflin, Secretary of the Commonwealth Alexander James Dallas, Chief Justice Thomas McKean, and Attorney General Jared Ingersoll.20 According to Hamilton’s records of the meeting, Washington opened by declaring that
the circumstances which accompanied it were such as to strike at the root of all law & order; That he was clearly of opinion that the most spirited & firm measures were necessary to rescue the State as well as the General Government from the impending danger; for if such proceedings were tolerated there was an end to our Constitutions & laws.
Washington explained that he hoped a peaceful outcome would be possible. If not, the administration would move forward with a military response. Anticipating that he would soon receive the necessary approval from Justice Wilson to convene and deploy federal forces, Washington asked Governor Mifflin to call out the Pennsylvania militia.
The Pennsylvania officers in attendance were shocked. They completely disagreed with Washington’s assertion of federal control. From their perspective, the insurrection was a Pennsylvania problem. The rebels were Pennsylvanians, the victims were Pennsylvanians, and the alleged crimes had taken place in Pennsylvania. Any federal government action would be massive overreach. They insisted the state judiciary alone could punish the rioters.21
The Whiskey Rebellion raised several questions about whether the rebels committed crimes under state or federal jurisdiction, and thus whether the state or federal government should drive the response. The rebels’ defiance of the excise law was a federal crime. The rebels’ attack on the Bower Hill home of General Neville appeared to be the only state crime. Governor Mifflin suggested that while federal enforcement had failed, the state had not explored its enforcement options. Mifflin argued that “the employment of a military force, at this period, would be as bad as anything that the Rioters had done—equally unconstitutional and illegal.” Others warned that the use of force might provoke further resistance.22 The Pennsylvania delegation urged Washington to allow the state judiciary time to prosecute the insurgents.
Mifflin’s suggestion that they ignore the rioters’ federal crimes appalled Washington and his secretaries. Outraged, Hamilton suggested that perhaps Pennsylvania officials didn’t want to enforce the laws because they supported the rebels. Additionally, he argued that if the use of federal force would increase local resistance, then state justice had already failed in the western counties and federal forces needed to take over.23
After the meeting, Washington asked each cabinet member—Randolph, Hamilton, Knox, and Bradford—to draft a written opinion recommending a course of action. While he genuinely desired their opinions, he also followed his previous military experience and ensured that he had written proof for the secretaries’ agreement on controversial action. Washington never published their correspondence, but he had it if he needed it. In their written opinions, the secretaries unanimously rejected the argument that Pennsylvania could quell the insurrection and instead advocated a federal response. The secretaries, however, split over how to shape the administration’s strategy and submitted opinions consistent with the positions they had articulated during the July 25 cabinet meeting. Hamilton and Knox again advocated immediate military action. Randolph recognized that military action might be necessary but preferred to pursue diplomacy first. Bradford again recommended that Washington send a peace commission for political cover even as he prepared a military strategy. Washington selected this last approach—it appealed to his desire to demonstrate strength while also cultivating public opinion in his favor.24
On August 4, 1794, Justice Wilson granted Washington the necessary authority to call out the militia and initiate a three-phase plan.25 First, on August 7, 1794, the administration issued a proclamation denouncing the rebellion, outlining the legal violations, instructing the rebels to disperse, and warning that military action would follow if peaceful negotiation failed.26 Hamilton and Knox drafted the proclamation and Randolph and Washington approved the text. This proclamation, unlike the 1792 version, pulled no punches, accusing “persons in the said western parts of Pennsylvania” of “perpetrat[ing] acts which … amount to treason.” The proclamation directed all insurgents to “disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes.” Should the resistance continue, Washington announced his intention to call up the militia to protect “the very existence of Government and the fundamental principles of social order.”27
The strong language reflected the ongoing resistance to the excise tax, but also the cabinet’s prior experience with rebellions. Knox never forgot the chaos of Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts, nor did he overlook Congress’s inability to organize the militia or raise money to curb the insurrection. Furthermore, Knox had his own personal history with Mifflin, including the contentious debates between the cabinet and Mifflin over Genêt and the Neutrality Crisis. Hamilton shared Knox’s enthusiasm. He had urged military action in 1792 and was convinced that if a proclamation had failed to stymie resistance to the excise tax two years earlier, it would fail again. The cabinet was determined to respond more forcefully this time.
As the second step, Washington sent commissioners to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Washington carefully selected all three commissioners: Bradford, the attorney general; Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judge Jasper Yeates; and Senator James Ross. All three were native Pennsylvanians, government officials, and loyal Federalists.28 Ross also resided in one of the most rebellious counties, but as one of Washington’s closest friends, he could be trusted to enforce the federal government’s power. Randolph drafted instructions and sent them to the peace commissioners with Washington’s approval. The instructions urged the commissioners to stress how painful it would be for the president to use military force against American citizens and his “earnest wish” for “peace and tranquility” to prevail. The commissioners were to state explicitly that only Congress could repeal the excise legislation, and so the Pennsylvanians needed to address their concerns to their elected officials. They should also share that the president was prepared to “grant an amnesty and perpetual oblivion for every thing which has past” if the insurgents agreed to certain unequivocal conditions: the insurgents must not obstruct the enforcement of the laws and distilleries must pay the duties moving forward.29
As the final step, Washington would summon the militia. On August 7, he announced his intention to call up the militia, to gauge the reaction and to prepare the public for future military engagement. Critically, Washington did not actually summon troops in early August. Instead, he allowed the public several weeks to get comfortable with the idea and slowly built support for military action only if negotiations failed. In the meantime, Washington planned to secretly gather the militia in Pennsylvania and nearby states if the commissioners failed to reach an agreement with the rebels. If necessary, the militia would march west.30
The next night, Knox left Philadelphia to sort out the finances for his farm in Maine. His estate was on the brink of bankruptcy and he could put off his visit no longer. He wrote to Washington pleading for a temporary release of duties. He could barely contain his anxiety and fear for his family’s future: “Accustomed to consider even your desires, much less your orders, as paramount to every other consideration, I shall certainly defer my journey, or even renounce it altogether, if your view of the subject should render my continuance here of public importance although permanent pecuniary ruin or something very like it attends either one or the other.”31 Significantly, Knox was willing to risk his reputation, his fortune, and his family to stay by the president’s side. Washington hated to see his secretary of war leave in the middle of the crisis and generally disapproved of “the absence of the Officers of the government … Under these circumstances.” He reluctantly approved Knox’s departure, however, while encouraging “a safe & speedy return.”32 Knox traveled first to Boston and then to Maine to visit his new home in Thomaston. He dispatched with his estate business in a few weeks, but then inexplicably lingered, enjoying the site of his future estate rather than returning to Philadelphia.33
In Knox’s absence, Hamilton gleefully took over the administration of the Department of War. Because he had been pushing for military action for years to protect and expand his fiscal system, he eagerly oversaw the organization of the state militias and the supplies needed to support the troops. Hamilton’s role in the administration’s response in the fall of 1794 and his subsequent command of the state militias have caused history to remember his role in the Whiskey Rebellion as larger than it was in reality. He certainly served as an essential figure, but Knox’s role cannot be discredited. Knox participated in the formation of the administration’s strategy and encouraged Washington to lead a federal response to the rebellion. Of all the secretaries, Knox had the most experience with Congress and the challenges of organizing state militias. The president trusted his advice. Furthermore, prior to his departure, Knox issued the initial orders to militias in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and New York to prepare them for future advances.34 He was not just Hamilton’s lackey, and Washington sorely missed his presence after August 8.
Knox’s absence was especially notable as the cabinet grappled with the state militias. The cooperation of the states’ governors would be needed to call up the militia in each state. After the August 2 meeting, it appeared that cooperation would not be widely forthcoming. After their meeting, Governor Mifflin sent his own written opinion to Washington. He argued that the Pennsylvania judiciary should have the opportunity to prove whether it could adequately handle the insurrection. Washington assigned Randolph—with Hamilton’s assistance—to correspond with Mifflin. In his capacity as acting secretary of war, Hamilton drew up the first draft of the administration’s response each time Mifflin objected to federal policy. At Washington’s instruction, however, Randolph reviewed these letters and sent the responses under his name and from the office of the secretary of state. Prior to this moment, Washington never assigned one secretary to deal with the states’ governors. Instead, he usually directed a secretary to correspond with the governors when the issue fell under his department’s jurisdiction.35 Hamilton certainly could have sent the responses in his capacity as acting secretary of war, or Bradford could have replied to the numerous legal questions in Mifflin’s letter.
Washington intentionally arranged for Hamilton and Randolph to work together on this task. He understood Hamilton’s personality and his tendency to antagonize opponents. By filtering Hamilton through Randolph, he created an important institutional check. He would use Randolph’s moderation to limit Hamilton’s aggressive nature. Washington also had political motivates for ordering Randolph to send the letters. Recognizing the political tensions in the August 2 meeting, he selected Randolph as the most palatable option: Mifflin ardently supported Jefferson and the emerging Republican Party, and Randolph remained the most Republican-leaning of Washington’s department secretaries. Additionally, Randolph favored pursuing peaceful options before involving troops. The administration’s response to Mifflin would appear more conciliatory if it came from him.36 Finally, although Randolph personally disagreed with a military response in the beginning, Washington trusted his legal expertise to defend the administration’s position.
As we have seen, Mifflin and Washington had long detested each other. Their animosity dated back to the Revolutionary War, when Mifflin criticized Washington’s command and tried to have him replaced with General Horatio Gates. Mifflin and Washington had clashed over enforcement of the administration’s neutrality policy in the summer of 1793. Mifflin and Washington had also battled over state and federal power just a few months before the outbreak of the Whiskey Rebellion. In April 1793, the Pennsylvania legislature empowered Mifflin to survey the Presque Isle area, near Erie, Pennsylvania, and lay out a town for settlement. Mifflin’s first attempt to send surveyors failed due to threats of Native American violence. On March 1, 1794, Mifflin issued orders to raise a militia company to accompany surveyors to the Presque Isle region. Further reports of Native American unrest reached Knox as the militia prepared to march west. Given the threat of hostilities, Knox advised Mifflin to postpone the venture. At the end of May, Mifflin wrote to Washington declaring his intentions to proceed with the survey. Washington, in no uncertain terms, instructed him to “suspend for the present the establishment at Presque-isle.”37 As he had done so many times during the Revolutionary War, Washington obtained the unanimous support of his cabinet before taking the bold step of asserting his federal authority over state officials.38 Mifflin reluctantly agreed to postpone the mission. But by mid-June, he felt he had waited long enough, and he impatiently wrote to Washington about the delay. When Washington against instructed him to postpone the surveys, Mifflin denounced Washington’s actions as unconstitutional:
Can the requisition or advice of the Executive Authority of the United States justify the Act which suspends the operation of a positive law of Pennsylvania? The Constitutional supremacy of the Laws of the Union will not be disputed: but may it not be Asked, what law of the Union … furnish[es] an Executive Magistrate with an authority to Substitute his opinions for Legislative institutions.39
Finally, on July 21, after several heated letters had been exchanged, Washington assured Mifflin that he had never intended to infringe on the governor’s constitutional duties. He also acknowledged that he would accept full responsibility for the consequences of the delay in the surveying mission.40
Given their complicated history, Washington perceived Governor Mifflin’s behavior in August 1794 as a further challenge to the president’s authority. After the outbreak of the insurrection in western Pennsylvania, Washington and the secretaries believed Mifflin sought to thwart Randolph’s efforts to coordinate the federal response to reserve power for the states; perhaps he even harbored secret sympathies for the rebels.41 Unstintingly loyal to Washington, Knox had resented Mifflin’s criticism of his commander in chief during the war. As secretary of war, he had overseen the correspondence between Washington and Mifflin over the Presque Isle squabble. He doubted Mifflin would willingly fulfill his national obligations and call up the state militia to crush the rebellion.42 The cabinet’s response to Mifflin reflected its determination to carve out space for the president to determine domestic policy, free from limitations placed by state governors. The cabinet ensured that the state governments would answer to the federal government—led by the president.
In his August 5 written opinion, Mifflin reiterated that Washington had not provided the Pennsylvania judicial system the time and opportunity to bring the rebels to justice. He argued that “the Military power of the Government ought not be employed until its Judiciary authority, after a fair experiment, has proved incompetent to enforce obedience.43 Washington and the secretaries were incredulous; resistance had erupted two years earlier, and since then Pennsylvania officials had made little effort to enforce the law. Hamilton drafted a reply to Mifflin’s letter and forwarded it to Randolph for review. Randolph made a few small adjustments and sent the letter to Mifflin. The Hamilton-Randolph letter trumpeted the administration’s goal to assert the power of the federal government and an independent executive. They acknowledged that Mifflin’s suggestion to rely on state enforcement would be a good one—“if there were no Fœderal Government, Fœderal laws, Fœderal Judiciary, or Fœderal Officers.” Furthermore, the administration might be willing to trust Mifflin to enforce the laws if they, “by a series of violent, as well as of artful expedients, had not been frustrated in their execution for more than three years.”44
When editing and approving Hamilton’s drafts, Randolph probably recalled his frustrated attempts as Virginia governor to control the militia. As governor of Virginia from 1787 to 1788, Randolph had been able to do little other than urge county militia officers to act when Indian attacks threatened the safety of the western counties. In 1794, the Constitution granted the president the authority to call up, deploy, and lead the militia, and Randolph encouraged and helped Washington to utilize this power. Additionally, the inability or unwillingness of Pennsylvania officials to subdue the insurrection echoed the incompetency of Virginia county officials during the 1780s. Randolph spoke from personal experience when he asserted that the excise laws could not be effectively enforced in the western Pennsylvanian counties without federal assistance.45
Although Mifflin grudgingly agreed to follow Washington’s command and prepare the Pennsylvania militia, he wrote additional letters challenging the administration. One week later, he assured Washington that he would comply with the administration’s orders and tried to assure the president of his personal fidelity. He argued, however, that the law required him to pursue a judicial resolution to the rebellion before turning to the militia. Additionally, he insinuated that Washington entered their August 2 conference determined to use force against the insurgents.46
Meanwhile, the cabinet received an update on the state of the rebellion. On August 15, Hamilton forwarded Washington a letter from Hugh H. Brackenridge, a prominent figure in western Pennsylvania politics. Brackenridge warned that the insurgents were gaining strength and would march on Philadelphia to demand a repeal of the whiskey excise laws.47 Bradford also sent Washington a letter a few days later. While Bradford supplied Randolph with official reports in his capacity as commissioner, he also gave his private opinion that “the people cannot be induced by conciliatory offers to relinquish their opposition to the excise laws.” Based on conversations and rumors, Bradford had come to this conclusion before his official meeting with the rebel leaders. He shared this opinion to encourage Washington to move forward with “those preparatory measures which are not inconsistent with the mission.” He also reminded Washington of the value of time: “The more artful men among the insurgents will endeavor to gain time to prepare themselves—& the moderate party will join them in hopes of putting off the evil day.”48 Washington understood Bradford’s message—the administration should not delay military preparations and risk the rebels gaining strength.
On August 24, Washington met with Hamilton and Randolph as the commissioners, led by Bradford, demanded unconditional surrender from the rebels. Fearing the peace commissioners would have little success, Washington, Hamilton, and Randolph readied the militia in nearby states, but they conducted these preparations under the strictest secrecy. They determined that to maintain full public support, the administration could deploy the militia only after the peace commission had failed.49 They did not expect news of the commissioners’ meeting with the rebels to reach Philadelphia until September. The next day, Hamilton wrote two letters to Virginia governor Henry Lee. The first letter issued the president’s official instructions to gather the militia. The second letter contained private instructions to summon the militia after September 1: “Your orders for assembling the Militia cannot well issue before the first of September. For particular reasons, it is wished they may be dated on that day.”50
By August 22, 1794, it had become clear that the peace negotiations had failed and that Washington would send out the militia. That day Mifflin sent a letter taking issue with a particular phrase in Washington’s August 7 proclamation against the insurrection. Washington had asserted that local officers of Pennsylvania failed to enforce the laws of the Union and that the officers expressed friendly sentiments toward the rebels.51 Mifflin replied that he hoped to “manifest in every way a zealous co-operation in the views of the General Government.” To comply with Washington’s requests, he needed to see “the evidence, on which the above charge is founded,” so that he “may take the proper steps to vindicate the honor of the State Government, and to remove the delinquent officers.” The request was heavily laden with sarcasm. At the end of the letter Mifflin challenged Washington and his administration to support these charges: “In its present form, however, the charge is so indiscriminate, that those Citizens who may be involved in its obloquy do not enjoy a fair opportunity for defence, nor does the Government possess the means to discover the proper objects for its indignation and censure.”52
Washington asked Hamilton to prepare a report of the alleged violations. In his capacity as secretary of the treasury, Hamilton had long seethed over the western counties’ resistance to the whiskey excise tax and kept extensive records of potential crimes. He drew up an eight-page letter, naming thirty-three officials and military leaders who unequivocally “opposed” and “discounted” the whiskey excise laws or sympathized with the rebels. He also offered a detailed report of their alleged crimes and the evidence offered against them.53 Washington then forwarded the report to Randolph. Although Randolph usually edited Hamilton’s drafts, in this instance he forwarded Hamilton’s report directly to Mifflin without making any alterations. Randolph had abandoned hope that a peaceful solution would end the rebellion, and he expressed his full support for a federal military response. More important, he fought back against Mifflin’s attacks on presidential power, regardless of his own opinions on the administration’s policy.
In the meantime, the cabinet worked to ensure that public opinion backed military action. Although Hamilton authored most of the materials, Washington approved the publications as part of a broader strategy to build public consensus.54 On August 21, Hamilton submitted a detailed report of the rebels’ actions in Dunlap and Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser.55 Shortly thereafter, Hamilton published a series of letters under the name “Tully.” The series of essays warned readers to ignore the emotional pleas employed by the rebels in western Pennsylvania: “Shun the artful snare which may be laid to entangle your feelings and your judgment.” Hamilton positioned the crisis as one between a duly elected government and insurgents committed to turning the populace against the people’s representatives. The second essay outlined how the excise bill had been passed and emphasized the constitutional process followed by all branches of government. The third essay worked to undermine support for the rebels by emphasizing “a sacred respect for the constitutional law is the vital principle, the sustaining energy of a free government.” Without respect for the Constitution and “authority of the laws,” society would devolve from freedom to slavery. Hamilton concluded by sharing his confidence that the public “will not fail to do what your rights, your best interests, your character as a people, your security as members of society conspire to demand of you.”56
These propaganda efforts had the intended effect. On September 10, the Philadelphia militia turned out in full force. The next day, the General Adviser, the Republican-backed newspaper in Philadelphia, lauded the federal government’s military response to the crisis.57 Later that month, Randolph wrote to the peace commissioners and thanked them for trying to secure a peaceful resolution. He passed along the cabinet’s belief that their efforts helped secure a positive public response to military action:
Altho’ the insurrection was not absolutely extinguished, [the president] is persuaded, that everything which could have been done under the existing circumstances has been accomplished by your labours. Indeed he ascribes to your conduct the prospect of finding but a feeble opposition.… [Y]ou have … amply prepared the public mind for the support of any measures, which may be necessary.58
The public response also helped bring Mifflin in line with the administration’s position. In early September, the administration had received the peace commissioners’ reports from their negotiations with the rebels. The report confirmed the cabinet’s suspicions that diplomacy would fail. The leaders of the rebellion had voted 34 to 23 in favor of accepting the government’s terms for peace, but Bradford, Yeates, and Ross knew that enforcing the law in western Pennsylvania would be impossible if twenty-three leaders failed to cooperate.59 Washington and the cabinet came to the same conclusion and passed on the news to Mifflin. After the militia enthusiastically responded to the call for service and the Republican press sided with the administration, Mifflin followed the tide of public opinion. He could not risk charges of disloyalty while the rest of his party supported the president. On September 12, 1794, he wrote again and assured Washington that he would comply with the president’s orders with “the utmost dispatch and alacrity.”60
As Randolph grappled with these interpersonal and constitutional complications, he consistently asserted the power of the presidency. When replying to Mifflin’s letters from August 5, August 12, and August 22, Randolph adopted most of Hamilton’s drafts. Each letter dismantled or refuted Mifflin’s claims, including his proposal that the administration leave enforcement to the judiciary. All three letters also asserted the power and independence of the president. Randolph responded that if Washington adopted the plan Mifflin recommended, it would require a complete “abdication of the undoubted rights and authorities of the United States and of his Duty,” and would force the president to “postpone the measures for which the laws of the United States provide.”61 Essentially, Randolph asserted that the Constitution required the president to lead a firm federal response to the rebellion.
These letters reveal an important dynamic within the cabinet, especially after Jefferson’s retirement at the end of 1793. When he was in the cabinet, Jefferson thought little of Randolph’s contributions. He frequently lamented to his close confidants that the cabinet often split 2½ votes to 1½ because of Randolph’s indecisiveness.62 In fact, Jefferson complained to Madison that Randolph was “the most indecisive one I ever had to do business with.”63 Jefferson’s frustrations grew out of his expectations that he would always have Randolph’s support for his positions. When Randolph articulated a middle ground between the two sides, Jefferson attributed the disagreement to splitting hairs, but he begrudgingly admitted that Washington frequently adopted Randolph’s middle-ground policies.64 Despite Jefferson’s venting, Randolph was the most accomplished legal mind in the cabinet, and Washington and the other secretaries depended on his expertise. Hamilton, himself a lawyer, frequently requested Randolph’s legal assessment before advocating new policies.65 Hamilton was unquestionably the loudest, most forceful personality in cabinet meetings, but as the new secretary of state, Randolph frequently challenged Hamilton’s interpretations. Randolph’s review of Hamilton’s letters meant far more than a simple rubber stamp of approval.
On September 9, Washington ordered all militia units to meet in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.66 Then he waited a few weeks longer to ensure that public opinion would back the administration’s military response.67 He had also secured unanimous cabinet support for military action. The Constitution did not require him to secure the approval of the secretary of state in order to undertake this military expedition against the rebels. But Washington wanted Randolph’s endorsement anyway. He recognized that crushing a domestic insurrection established a significant executive precedent, and he worked within the cabinet to build consensus before taking this important step, just as he had often built consensus within his councils of war during the Revolution.
By the end of September, Knox had been absent two weeks longer than he had originally promised, and Washington had received no communication from him in months. He was worried and annoyed. He had hoped that Knox would return in time to lead the militia west against the rebels. He sent Knox a letter expressing his displeasure and concern: “Under the circumstances which exist to exceed your proposed time of absence so long, is to be regretted—but hearing nothing from you for a considerable time has given alarm, lest some untoward accident may have been the cause of it.”68 Washington also shared that he was departing for western Pennsylvania and regretted that his trusted secretary of war was not at his side. Traveling back from Maine at the same moment and delayed by weather, Knox did not receive the letter. He would arrive in Philadelphia on October 6, only to discover the president had already left. By the time Washington returned to Philadelphia, their relationship had cooled significantly. Washington believed the good of the nation should always trump individual needs, and he resented Knox’s absence during a moment of crisis. Although he was grateful for Knox’s many years of service, he never fully forgave the misstep.69
At the end of September, Washington finally left Philadelphia to meet the Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and New Jersey militias at the predetermined rendezvous point.70 Over the next five days, he rode west with Hamilton and his private secretary, Bartholomew Dandridge Jr. During their travels, the small group met up with infantry detachments in Reading, a New Jersey regiment in Harrisburg, and Mifflin and Richard Howell, governor of New Jersey, two miles short of Carlisle. A detachment of Philadelphia troops greeted Washington just after he crossed the Susquehanna River and escorted him to Carlisle for the final leg of his journey.71
At 12:00 P.M. on October 4, a hush fell over the camp as the president’s imminent arrival was announced. Upon entering camp, Washington carefully surveyed the parade of troops, cavalry, and artillery.72 On October 9, 1794, the army began its march west through the Cumberland Valley and over the Allegheny Mountains, while Washington headed back to Philadelphia.73 By the time the troops reached Pittsburgh, the rebel leaders had fled, and the insurrection crumbled in the face of the federal forces. Troops led by Hamilton and General Henry Lee rounded up any rebels they could find. In the end, only twelve cases went to trial and only two were convicted; most cases were dismissed due to lack of evidence.74 But the arrests were not intended to imprison hundreds of rebels; rather, the point was to drive home the message that the federal government had the authority to tax its people and enforce the collection of the tax.75
As with so many other aspects of his presidency—his journeys to visit the states, his transportation, his social engagements—Washington carefully managed the details of public opinion and his reputation. He was perfectly happy for Hamilton to conduct widespread arrests while he traveled back to Philadelphia with his reputation unsullied.76
The military response ended the rebellion and asserted federal authority, but it also served as a visible embodiment of Hamilton’s new financial system. In order to pay the militiamen’s salaries and buy food, clothing, and matériel, the administration requested a large loan of up to $1 million from the new Bank of the United States.77 Commanders of each state militia then received blank drafts to withdraw up to $15,000 to pay for provisions, including the daily whiskey rations for each soldier.78 Ironically, the army’s incursion into western Pennsylvania infused much-needed specie into the region. The army purchased clothing, food, supplies, and whiskey for its troops and their horses.79 Many local farmers used this specie to purchase land or pay off their tax debts.
Most Americans approved of Washington’s handling of the Whiskey Rebellion, and historians have largely shared the public’s assessment.80 In mid-October, Bradford sent a letter to Washington as he traveled to New Jersey. He had talked with local gentlemen and was pleased to share that “attachment to the general government” had increased “in every part of the state in a wonderful degree.” Furthermore, Bradford’s acquaintances had expressed “great indignation against the insurgents.” They had heard rumors that the militia would not march to confront the rebels and had expressed their fears that “the wound should not be thoroughly probed.”81 Washington did not write a reply to this letter, but he must have been gratified to hear that so many Americans approved of his actions.
Not everyone applauded the administration’s response. Farmers out west did not change their mind about the tax and continued to request tax relief.82 When Washington insisted on regional atonement, many westerners felt betrayed. William Findley, one of Hamilton’s political rivals from western Pennsylvania, resented the concept of regional atonement instead of individual atonement, but he blamed Hamilton, not the president.83 Other Republican leaders, including Jefferson and Madison, criticized the administration behind closed doors for launching “an armament against people at their ploughs.”84 They grew more vocal in their opposition after Washington delivered his annual speech to Congress in November. In his speech, Washington accused Democratic-Republican societies of fomenting the rebellion. Jefferson was outraged. He could not believe Washington had “permitted himself to be the organ of such an attack on the freedom of discussion, the freedom of writing, printing & publishing.” He blamed Hamilton and “the faction of Monocrats” for brainwashing the president.85 Once again, Washington had escaped most of the blame.
In 1794, the Washington administration adopted a strong federal reaction to the Whiskey Rebellion. While Washington favored sending a powerful message to the insurrection, he preferred to act with the agreement of his cabinet, based on his previous council-of-war interactions. He relied on his cabinet secretaries to provide advice and shape administration policy. He also convened cabinet meetings to build consensus and provide political cover for his controversial and precedent-setting decisions. The cabinet worked to sideline Congress and to bring the state governments under federal oversight during this process. The secretaries all brought previous governing experience to the cabinet, and this expertise colored their response to the rebellion. As a result, Washington and the cabinet worked toward a shared goal—they asserted the president’s authority over domestic issues at the expense of congressional and state power. Through their participation in cabinet deliberations, Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph helped ensure that the cabinet supported and promoted presidential leadership. The Whiskey Rebellion served as the culmination of the cabinet’s prior experiences and the fulfillment of their goals for the presidency. But after suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion, the cabinet again underwent a huge change and faced yet another new challenge.