The morality chapter (Śīla-patala] of the Bodhisattvabhūmi(The bodhisattva stages) is the locus classicus for an explanation of bodhisattva morality and vows. Asa
ga (fourth century C.E.), who is credited with founding the Cittamātra, or Mind Only school, is regarded as the probable author of the Bodhisattvabhūmi. Here, he discusses morality under nine headings, of which two—“What Morality Is” and “Morality in Its Entirety”—are the most important.
Śīla, translated here as “morality,” denotes much of what is understood as morality in the Western sense, and more besides. It includes all activity brought in under words like śik
ā or śikdpāda(a bodhisattva’s training) and caryā(a bodhisattva’s deeds or activities). Personal propriety is at the core of śīla and, particularly in Buddhist Tantra, the observance of one’s commitments (samaya). This notion of propriety is central to Buddhist ethics, in both non-Mahāyāna and Mahayana schools. For the maintenance of propriety conduces to liberation, and makes one a respectable guide for others to follow; failure of propriety leads to further attachment and aversion, and makes one unsuitable as a teacher. Asaga uses the compound svabhāvśĪla to convey the idea of what bodhisattva morality actually is. His explanation emphasizes that morality is a positive contribution the agent makes to society.
Propriety requires a psychologically efficacious moral standard. This standard derives from taking others one admires as ideals. It involves the restraining or activating mental force (caiita) of vyapatrāpya(Tib. khrel yod) that operates when one experiences something like embarrassment or “dread of blame.” The social ritual of ordination, according to Asanga (paratah samādāna), is the necessary condition for cultivating such a mental force. This is because ordination and the attendant vows one takes involve being accepted by, and entering into association with, those whose ideals one admires, and a public commitment to emulating them. The restraining or activating mental force called hrī(Tib. ngo tshar) is in operation when one experiences shame. Shame requires that the moral standard is taken as one’s own. Together with embarrassment, it prevents bodhisattvas from failing to live up to their purest aspiration (suviśudhāśaya). For Asanga, and anyone committed to the bodhisattva path, this is the altruistic aspiration that is bodhicitta(“the thought of enlightenment” or “the awakened mind”).
The operation of these moral emotions does not by itself explain all aspects of a morality grounded in taking a vow. Maintaining moral propriety requires not only the possibility of shame or embarrassment but also the constant impulse to “make correction” (pratyāpatti) after failure. Additionally, it requires an admiration (ādara) for the moral self to which one aspires, accompanied by mindfulness (sm
ti) of one’s actions and vows that enables one to avoid transgression. Both admiration and mindfulness are equally conceived as restraining or activating mental forces and the complex of these mental forces enables moral propriety.
Having defined morality, Asaṅga seeks to explain it in its entirety (sarvaśīla) under three categories: saṁvaraśīla, kuśaladharmasamgrdhakaṁh īla, and sattvārthakriyāśīla, which Tatz (1986) renders “ethics of the vow,” “ethics of collecting wholesome factors,” and “ethics of benefiting sentient beings.”
Within the larger context of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the morality chapter details the second of six “perfections” (pāramitā) that characterize the bodhisattva—along with the perfections of generosity, patience, effort, meditation, and wisdom. śīila and the other perfections are not independent of one another, but together constitute interdependent facets of a bodhisat-tva’s way of life (caryā). Each is not a separate field or discipline, but taken together they are the threads that make up a Bodhisattva’s armor (saṁnāha). The Bodhisattvabhūmi’s presentation of the six perfections in general, and of the perfection of morality in particular, makes it clear that the altruistic moral project is pursued, in the first instance, mainly by attending to personal discipline and cultivation, not directly through “social engagement.” Furthermore, “social engagement” is not separate from attending to personal discipline, but is integrated with it. Altruistic, socially responsible, and beneficial behavior, in this system, is the necessary consequence of—but not the direct object of—efforts to discipline and to cultivate oneself, in contrast to an extreme, outward-looking social morality of engaging with others that devalues the cultivation of personal well-being as irrelevant to the moral project.
The Mahāyāna sūtras articulate the new altruistic principle (bodhicitta) in long, nonsystematic narratives. Asaṅga privileges these sūtras as statements of the Buddha (buddha-vacana). For Asaṅga, the historically later Mahayana sutras complement and legitimize the earlier core Buddhist literature, including the codifications of morality in the Vinaya. Asaga’s emphasis on continuity from the early monastic code to the Mahāyāna sutras makes sense of the first subcategory under which the morality chapter presents morality in its entirety—samvaraśila, Tatz’s “ethics of the vow.” It is, essentially, an unchanged presentation of the morality contained in the earlier codifications of conduct for the community (sangha) (the monks and nuns, and the male and female householders).
Tsong kha pa (1356–1419), in his Byang chub gzhung lam (Basic path to awakening) (Ka. 9a5–6), a commentary on the morality chapter, explains that Asanga sets forth the “ethics of the vow” first because practitioners must first govern or restrain themselves (hence saṁvara, Tib. sdom pa, “vow, code, restraint”) before they can engage in the behavior codified in the other two moralities. The “ethics of the vow,” then, is a vowed morality codified in a set of rules or laws that govern personal behavior, particularly restraint of the senses, the inner discipline restraining the noble person from unbridled, shameless gratification of the senses in the world of sense desire (kāmadhātu). In theory, at least, community members join the community, follow the rules, and develop restraint because of the personal and social benefit they see in it. There are strictures placed on individuals in the community by the larger community itself, but the recurring theme is the theme of personal restraint. In this sense, the morality is a yogic morality of self-cultivation in contrast to a social morality of engaging with others.
For this reason, Asaṅga begins the morality chapter with a definition of morality as “received from others” (paropādā); he has in mind an actual vow-taking ceremony that turns a noble intention into a formal commitment. This formal commitment is then given muscle by the “sense of shame” and “embarrassment.” When these are present, an unbroken line of vowed commitment—a morality—comes into being. Hence, all three moralities are equally vowed moralities, not just pious aspirations.
In the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the moral codes that earlier Buddhism first formulated as personal disciplines to govern unbridled passions and lead practitioners from mental affliction to balanced composure are reenvisioned as part of a larger, altruistic moral project necessitated by the aspiration to attain awakening for the benefit of all sentient beings. In practice, this project depends on the particular context and practitioner.
According to Khedrupjey (mKhas grub rje, 1385–1438), monks not keeping Mahāyāna morality do not break a vow, that is, are not immoral when they eat meat, even though the same monks, keeping Mahāyāna morality, would be. Non-Mahāyāna monks who eat meat are no more or less pure keepers of their moral code than monks who eat the vegetables put in their begging bowl. Were they to eat food after noon, however, contrary to their vow, they would break a rule. On the other hand, a Mahāyāna monk who refuses food given in the afternoon by a faithful donor, because it is a Prātimoka rule,1breaks the Mahāyāna code, even though a non-Mahāyāna monk does not do so.2 The point here is that propriety is particular to individual roles, institutional requirements, and context.
This presentation of morality presupposes a hierarchy of religious persons. Those with a higher “status” must maintain a higher standard of personal propriety. They incur a greater fault for moral shortcomings than do ordinary people, in part because they have committed themselves to more, and in part because they are models. Propriety is not universal in this system.
The “ethics of collecting wholesome factors” consists in the development of wholesome factors or qualities (dharmas) that make up a perfect Buddha. These Buddhadharmas include both physical (primarily, but not only, speech) and mental qualities. The physical qualities are those that enable one to benefit others, especially through teaching. The mental qualities are, similarly, infinite knowledge, kindness, and skill in means. All are a means to achieve the welfare of beings, to liberate sentient beings from suffering.
One might think that there is a value in cultivating patience, one of the wholesome qualities of a Buddha, even if it is impossible to attain a Buddha’s perfection of patience.3 Though this is plausible, it avoids a deeper problem—the vanity of the endeavor to become a better person—that troubled Indian thinkers who sought to give a central role to altruism in their philosophy.
Asaṅga directly addresses this problem at the very start of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (Dutt 1966: 2).
Question: What is lineage (gotra)?[Response]: In brief, it is twofold: naturally abiding (praktistha) and fully developed (samudānīta). Of these, the naturally abiding lineage is the specialness of the six sense fields (āyatana) of bodhisattvas. It is obtained through the true nature of dharmas (dharmatā) and comes down, one from the other, from time without
beginning in an unbroken succession. [Bodhisattvas] obtain the fully developed lineage from having earlier cultivated wholesome roots.
As a continuum of psychophysical processes, each person, according to Asaynga, is the locus for the development of wholesome qualities through cultivation. The final nature of the altruistic person as a location for the development of Buddhadharmas, though empty of a soul, is a reality. The nature of this reality is conveyed by terms such as dharmatā(“true nature of the qualities”) or pratītya-samutpāda(“dependent origination”), words that convey the power and activity in the buildup of chains of events that validates the attempt to cultivate mental qualities that cannot be achieved in one single life. For this reason, the mere aspiration to remain an ordinary person who is just a bit more patient lacks sufficient efficacy. Bodhicitta, the basis of morality, requires the aspiration for Buddhahood.
The third category of morality is the “ethics of benefiting sentient beings”: giving to the poor, feeding the hungry, protecting the helpless, seeking social justice through political activity, and so on. Asaga claims this social morality is for the purpose of “maturing beings.” It codifies ordinary altruism, and reflects the insight that altruistic behavior is not restricted to endeavors of altruistic persons to cultivate themselves, but necessarily includes simply doing for others what they want, just because they want it, with the thought that at the least they may thereby become receptive to considering basic morality that will effect lasting transformation. “The ethics of benefiting sentient beings,” though most directly engaged with singular others, is only one category of altruistic morality, and should not be conceived as the exclusive codification of altruistic acts. For Asaṅga, the three categories of ethics together describe an altruistic morality in its entirety.
During the spread of Buddhist Tantra under the late Pāla Dynasty (flourished c. 800–1150) in northeastern India, the morality chapter’s three categories for describing Mahāyāna morality in its entirety give way to three different, but overlapping categories—Prātimoksṃa, Bodhisattva, and Tantric morality. The first is the basic Buddhist morality shared by non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna Buddhists, the second the morality codified in the morality chapter, and the third a morality codified as the pledges of the five Buddha families.4 The Sdom gsum(Three Codes) genre of Tibetan polemical philosophical writing (Rhoton 2002; Sobisch 2002) is based on an exposition of these three moral codes.5
[The definition of morality.] What is the morality of bodhisattvas? You should know this has nine aspects: what morality essentially is, morality in its entirety, morality that is difficult, morality from all perspectives, morality of a holy person, morality in all its aspects, morality that brings well-being here and there [in the future], and pure morality.6
What essentially is [a bodhisattva’s] morality? In brief, you should know that bodhisattvas are moral when they have four qualities. What four? [They are moral] when they correctly receive [the ordination] from others, when they have a pure aspiration, when they make corrections after transgressing, and when, in order not to transgress, they have a feeling of admiration and remain mindful.
Among these, because a bodhisattva has received the morality from somebody else, he feels a sense of other-oriented embarrassment when he fails in training. Because the bodhisattva has a pure aspiration to be moral, he feels a sense of self-oriented shame when he fails in training. By making corrections after transgressing, and because he has a feeling of admiration that stops failure from happening in the first place, the bodhisattva becomes free from regrets in two ways. Thus, because of correctly receiving [the morality] and because of having a pure aspiration this bodhisattva feels a sense of embarrassment and shame; with a sense of embarrassment and shame he keeps the morality he has received; and by keeping it is free from regret.
Among these, two dharmas, namely, receiving [the ordination] correctly and pure aspiration, cause these two dharmas—correction after transgression and admiration that avoids transgression. You should know that these three dharmas—namely, receiving the ordination correctly, pure aspiration, and the admiration that avoids transgression—stop a bodhisattva from being immoral. You should know that correction after transgression rectifies and sets up again [morality] that has been broken. You should also know that the actual morality of bodhisattvas who have these four qualities is wholesome because it is personally beneficial, is beneficial to others, gives benefit to many people, gives pleasure to many people, brings about compassion for the world, and is for the welfare, benefit, and pleasure of gods and humans. You should know it is immeasurable [morality] because it incorporates the immeasurable bases on which bodhisattvas have to train. You should know it is altruism because it is set up for the good and pleasure of all beings. And you should know it has a great result and benefit because it assists and bestows the result of highest enlightenment.
[Morality in its entirety.] Among these, what is a Bodhisattva’s morality in its entirety? In brief, they say the morality of a bodhisattva in its entirety is systematized as the morality of the householder and the morality of one gone forth to homelessness. Furthermore, that morality based on the householder and one gone forth to homelessness is, in brief, threefold: it is vowed morality, morality that gathers the wholesome dharmas, and morality that accomplishes the welfare of beings.
Among these, what is a Bodhisattva’s vowed morality? It is the morality of any one of the seven sets of Prātimoka vows that a monk, nun, nun in training, male novice, female novice, layman, and laywoman take. You should understand this [morality] from the perspective of the householder and the one gone forth to homelessness as appropriate.
In brief, they say the morality that gathers the wholesome dharmas is whatever wholesome thing a bodhisattva accumulates for great enlightenment with his body, speech, and mind after he has received the vowed morality. And what is that? Here the bodhisattva who has resorted to morality and maintains morality applies himself to listening, to thinking, to the calm abiding and insight meditation, and similarly, from time to time addresses his gurus with respect, bows, and stands before them with the palms of his hands pressed together in supplication.…
Among these, what is a bodhisattva’s morality as it pertains to looking after beings? In brief, you should know it in eleven ways. What are the eleven? He befriends beings to look after their needs; he befriends beings when they have fallen sick and suffer from any illness; similarly, he demonstrates Dharma for ordinary and extraordinary goals, and with skillful means and advice about practice, gives appropriate advice; he shows gratitude to beings who have looked after him and gives fitting assistance in return; he protects beings from sundry fearful things such as lions and tigers, kings and robbers, water and fire, and so on; he assuages sorrow when calamities happen to belongings and relatives; he provides to those in need all that they need.…
These three heaps of bodhisattva morality—the heap of merit systematized in vowed morality, the heap of merit systematized in the morality that gathers wholesome dharmas, and the heap of merit systematized in the morality that accomplishes the welfare of beings—are immeasurable heaps of merit.
[The ordination ritual.] A bodhisattva who prays for complete enlightenment, whether a householder or one who has gone forth to homelessness, who wants to train in the bodhisattva training that is this threefold heap of merit, should bow at the feet of a bodhisattva who shares the same Dharma. This is one who prays for enlightenment and is the sort who, having understood the meaning of the verbal ordination ceremony [from having taken it earlier], knows and is able to keep the vows. Having done so, he should make the following request: “I want to receive in your presence, son of a good family, the code of a bodhisattva’s morality. If you are agreeable to this and it does not inconvenience you, please grant this out of pity, and listen to me for a moment.” Having made the proper request, and [in the presence of] the single member of the highest sangha who constitutes [the necessary quorum], he brings in the past, future, and present Lord Buddhas in all the ten directions, as well as bodhisattvas who have entered into the great levels and have obtained great knowledge and dignity. He brings to mind their great qualities and produces a heartfelt, confident faith in his mind, a faith in what his ability and causal power make possible.
A bodhisattva who knows [the ritual] sets up an image of the Tathāgata, worships properly, and in front of it, either kneeling down or squatting, [the supplicant] should say: “Son of good family,” or “Venerable,” or “Sir, please bestow on me the code of the Bodhisattva’s morality.” Then he should bring awareness to a single-pointed focus and should cultivate a feeling of complete confident faith in his mind, thinking: Now I will soon get the inexhaustible, immeasurable, incomparable [moral code that is] a treasury of great merit. Thinking thus he should remain silent.
The bodhisattva who already knows [the ritual], either standing or sitting and with an unwavering mind, should say to the bodhisattva candidate: “Listen, son of a good family,” or “Dharma brother called so-and-so, do you pray for enlightenment?” He should say “Yes.” After that he should say to him: “Son of a good family called so-and-so, do you want to take from me all the bodhisattva grounds of training and all the bodhisattva morality—the vowed morality, the morality that gathers wholesome dharmas, and the morality that accomplishes the welfare of beings?” … He should reply that he wants to take them. The bodhisattva who already knows [the ritual] should say this a second and a third time, and the bodhisattva who is taking the ordination should reply in the affirmative all three times.
… All of the morality I have described in these nine ways, beginning with what morality essentially is, you should know to be systematized in the three moralities of vowed morality, morality that gathers the wholesome dharmas, and morality that accomplishes the welfare of beings. Furthermore, in brief, this threefold morality effects the three things that are necessary for a bodhisattva: vowed morality keeps the mind stable, morality that gathers the wholesome dharmas brings [the bodhisattva’s] own Buddhadharmas to maturity, and morality that accomplishes the welfare of beings brings beings to maturity. Just these are all that a bodhisattva has to do to have a stable mind in order to live at ease in the here and now, and without physical or mental fatigue to bring the Buddhadharmas and beings to maturity. Just this is the morality of a bodhisattva. Just this is the benefit of the morality of a bodhisattva. Just this is what a bodhisattva has to do to be moral, there is nothing beyond or more than this. Past bodhisattvas who wanted great enlightenment trained in this, those in the future will also train in this, and now those on the bodhisattva path in the endless and infinite world spheres in the ten directions are training in it as well.
Dutt, Nalinaksha, ed. (1966) Bodhisattvabhūmi. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 7. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
Gombrich, R. F. (1998) “Organized Bodhisattvas: A Blind Alley in Buddhist Historiography.” In Paul Harrison and Gregory Schopen, eds., Sūryacandrāya: Essays in Honour of Akira Yuyama on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday. Swisttal-Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, pp. 45–56.
Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltshen. (2002) A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes: Essential Distinctions among the Individual Liberation, Great Vehicle, and Tantric Systems. Translated by Jared Rhoton. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Sobisch, Jan-Ulrich. (2002) Three-Vow Theories in Tibetan Buddhism. Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert.
Sparham, Gareth. (2005) Tantric Ethics. Boston: Wisdom.
Tatz, Mark. (1982) Candragomin’s Twenty Verses on the Bodhisattva Vow and its Commentary. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.
Tatz, Mark. (1985) Difficult Beginnings: Three Works on the Bodhisattva Path [by] Candragomin. Boston: Shambhala Press.
Tatz, Mark. (1986) Asaga’s Chapter on Ethics, with the Commentary of Tsong-Kha-pa: The Basic Path to Awakening, the Complete Bodhisattva. Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen Press.
Wogihara, Unrai, ed. (1973) Bodhisattvabhūmi. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1932; Reprint, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store.