Part of the material for this preliminary section is derived from the official action reports of the carrier Franklin , October 1944. A large part came from Daizo Kusanayagi’s biography of Admiral Onishi. The Divine Wind volumes were also helpful.
The extent of the damage done to the Franklin was minuscule, but the enthusiasm generated within the Japanese naval air force by this attack was enormous. Rear Admiral Masafumi Arima was very close to the pilots of the 26th Air Flotilla, and his insistence that the suicide operation was the only way to stop the Americans represented a view held widely among his pilots. In that sense Admiral Onishi’s view was not unique. What Onishi had done, however, was to transmit the view to the highest levels.
Chapter 1: Desperation
The material about the early period of the war comes from several volumes of the Boei (Japanese Self-Defense Agency) series that I have consulted in the past in preparation of other books. General Tojo’s trip to Rabaul in 1944 was unprecedented and extremely dangerous. It was as if President Roosevelt had chosen to travel
Notes
to the war front. The reason was to impress the Japanese commanders with the absolute necessity of holding the line.
General Ushiroku’s demand that Japanese soldiers use themselves as “human bullets” was shocking at the time. Yet it was the forerunner of the Kamikaze spirit as it deteriorated from voluntarism to death on demand. The fall of the Marianas provided the extremists of the army and navy with the support they needed to advance the suicide philosophy.
The statement by the “military authorities” that never again would a human bullet be employed is from Kusanayaga. The author was a correspondent for Domei, the Japanese news agency.
The Japanese revulsion at the concept of “unconditional surrender” stemmed primarily from the fear that the Emperor system would be abolished if the allies won. Secondarily, that issue gave the militarists the personal ammunition they needed; if the war was lost, the military would be disbanded, and they would be out of power.
The quotations from Admiral Onishi are from the Kusanayagi book, as are the statistics on Japanese aircraft and pilots.
The material about the Sho Plan comes largely from the Boei volumes.
Chapter 2: Organizing For Death
The accounts of the Japanese army air force military training program come from the Makoto history of the army air forces, and from the Boei series on army air operations in the Philippines. The fact that the army had the program in preparation and under wraps indicated the determination of the militarists to continue the war. That is not to say that there were not important army officers who responded to the call for volunteers. If there had been no volunteers, the army still would have gone ahead with the suicide program.
The navy program was voluntary in the beginning, although the
The Kamikazes
pressures were enormous on those who were asked to serve as suicide pilots.
The failures of the Japanese army air forces in dealing with naval targets were well known by the beginning of 1943. The Burma campaign was strictly a Japanese army show. The navy maintained a naval yard at Rangoon, and a few ships came in now and then. Submarines cruised off the coast, but that was about the extent of naval activity in that theater after the attack on the British fleet off Trincomalee at the beginning of the war. The army failed totally to develop any successful tactics for use against enemy naval vessels.
Chapter 3: Organizing
The figures of Japanese navy pilot loss and the other statistics at the beginning of the chapter are from the Kusanayagi book and from the Boei volume on the naval general staff s role in the Sho Operation.
The account of Admiral Onishi’s encounter with Admiral Ter- aoka is from Kusanayagi.
Chapter 4: The Decision to Die
The account of the American invasion of the Philippines is from the first volume of the Sho operation in the Boei series, and from Samuel Eliot Morison’s volume on Leyte in the U.S. navy history series.
The account of Onishi’s reaction comes from the Kusanayagi biography and from The Divine Wind.
The material about the 201st Air Group is from the history of Japanese navy fighter squadrons. Onishi’s discussions of the technology of the suicide attack are from the biography and from the Boei series.
Chapter 5: The Special Attack Force
The account of Admiral Onishi’s activities at Mabalacat is from the Onishi biography with an assist from The Divine Wind.
The material about the 263rd Air Group is from the Tanekawa navy fighter squadron history, as is the material about Lieutenant Kanno.
Lieutenant Seki’s letter was taken from the Kusanayagi biography, as was Onishi’s haiku, written for his First Air Fleet staff.
Chapter 6: Warming Up
The account of the activities of October 20 comes from a number of sources: the Onishi biography, the Boei volumes on army and navy operations in the Sho Operation, The Divine Wind and the army air history. The American side is told in Morison’s Leyte volume.
The song Umi Yukaba was known to all Japanese naval personnel.
Chapter 7: A-Operation Day
The general discussion of Japanese military planning for the Philippines comes from the Boei volumes on General Staff operations, and from the biography of General Yamashita.
The material about the Second Air Fleet’s movements is from the Boei series volume on naval operations in the Sho Operation.
The account of the naval surface disaster suffered by the Japanese in the Sho Operation is from the Boei series and Morison; some notes are from Admiral Ugaki’s war diary.
The account of Lieutenant Seki’s death comes from The Divine Wind and from the biography of Admiral Onishi. Seki became an
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overnight hero in Japan, and his last words, his letters to his wife and family were often quoted by suicide pilots.
The accounts of the attacks on the American and Australian ships off Leyte come from Morison and from research done for my own The Men of the Gambier Bay , including the action reports of Admiral Sprague’s escort carrier force.
The material about the Japanese army air forces’ operations is from the Boei series and from the Makoto history.
Chapter 8: Extending the Force
The story of the Onishi-Fukudome meetings is from the biography of Admiral Onishi. Also, the Boei series on the Sho Operation mentions them.
The story of the raid of October 27 is from the Boei series volume on the Sho Operation and from the Onishi biography, as well as The Divine Wind (original Japanese version).
The story of Onishi’s move of the suicide operations is from the biography.
Chapter 9: “We Must Redouble Our Efforts ”
The material about the various air units comes from Onishi and the Boei naval volume. The facts and figures about Japanese operations in the first days of the Sho Operation are from the army air history, the naval operations volume and Onishi. The notes about General Yamashita are from the Army Sho volume and the Yamashita biography. The reaction of the Imperial Headquarters is from the Imperial Headquarters (Navy) volume of the Boei series recording the Sho Operation. The stories of the Manda and Fuji squadrons are from the Makoto army air history.
Notes
Chapter 10: New Times, New Means
The study of the Akatsuki and Hitachi units is from Makoto and the Boei official history. So is the tale of the troubles of General Tominaga. The study of Admiral Fukudome’s operations is from the Boei , as is the study of Onishi’s operations. The discussion of Admiral Onishi’s study of tactics is from the Onishi biography.
The material about the American side in the Kamikaze attacks comes from Morison and the action reports of the ships involved.
The discussion of the final air operations to save Leyte is from the army air operations history and the Makoto book.
General Tominaga’s set speech comes from the Yamashita biography. The tale of Yamamoto and the other army air heroes comes from the Boei and from Makoto.
Chapter 11: To the Death
The discussion of Admiral Onishi’s motivations in pressing for the suicide program persisted in Japan after his death. Obviously he was responding to the highest form of patriotism he knew, the code of Bushido that had permeated the navy for many years.
The troubles of the Imperial General Staff are to be found in the Boei series. As with all bureaucracies, the Imperial General Staff made a fetish of planning. But as can be seen, the plans all too often came to nothing.
The tales of the fighting on Leyte are from the Yamashita biography and the Boei army volume. The anecdotes about Admiral Onishi are from the Onishi biography and from Inoguchi’s account in The Divine Wind.
The operations of the Fourth Air Army are described in the Boei army volume. The tales of the young army fliers are from the Makoto book.
The song of the Kamikazes is from the Makoto book. The material
The Kamikazes
about the organization of army Kamikaze units is from the Boei volume.
The reactions of the Americans come from Morison and the war diary of the U.S. Third Fleet.
The material about the fighting of October 25 is from many sources, including U.S. naval operations reports, combat narratives, Japanese army and navy histories.
Chapter 12: And Not Only in the Air ...
The material about the submarine service’s development of suicide weapons comes largely from the Boei volume Sensuikanshi , The Submarine History. I also used material from Kamikaze Submarine and I-Boat Captain here.
The Boei naval volume concerned with homeland operations also has some material on this subject. The story of training comes from various sources. Kamikaze Submarine was an excellent source for understanding the training of the Kaiten pilots.
The account of the Gun Operation comes from Sensuikanshi , from the Boei naval IGHQ volume on the Sho Operation and from 1-Boat Captain.
The tales of the American reaction were gleaned from the war diaries of the Third Fleet. Morison has virtually nothing about the Gun Operation, since in terms of American naval operations it was a minor episode. Most of the sailors at Ulithi and elsewhere were unaware of the Kaiten.
Chapter 13: Comets Ascending...
The army tales are from the Makoto book and the Boei army air volume. The American reactions come from the action reports of the Third and Seventh Fleets and from Morison.
Chapter 14: Philippines Fadeout
The concern of the American commanders over the Kamikaze threat is shown in correspondence within the Third Fleet and the Halsey- Nimitz exchanges. As far as Halsey was concerned the move was long overdue. He had been expecting a vigorous riposte from the Japanese for months and was surprised that it had taken so long.
The activities of Admiral Onishi and Commander Inoguchi are detailed in the Onishi biography and in The Divine Wind.
The figures about conditions in the Japanese army are from the army volume of the Boei. The accounts of the meetings of Admiral Onishi and Admiral Fukudome with the Tokyo representatives are from the Boei naval volume.
The account of American preparations for the invasion of Luzon is from Morison and from Halsey’s reports. The tales of attacks on the allied vessels come from the action reports.
Chapter 15: New Lease on Life
The tale of Admiral Onishi and the sword comes from the Onishi biography. The story of the change in command of the Japanese naval striking force is from Onishi and the Boei naval volume.
The defense of Manila is described fully in the U.S. Army’s history of the Philippines campaign and in the Boei volume on the Japanese army. The Lingayen Gulf episode is from all the above sources, as well as from the Yamashita biography.
The Americans were under some misapprehension about the use of small craft in the Philippines. They were not designed as suicide craft at first, nor were they used thus in the Philippines. But after the Philippines battle was lost, the suicide idea was projected to the motor boat corps as well, and the shinyu were then difinitely used in Kamikaze fashion.
The Tominaga-Yamashita dispute is described in the Makoto book and in the Yamashita biography. The Boei army volume is
The Kamikazes
much more restrained in its treatment, but the facts remain: Tom- inaga deserted his command and got away with it.
The story of the foot soldiers who observed and congratulated the airmen is from the Boei volume. Colonel Harada’s assessment of the Kamikaze operations is from Makoto.
Chapter 16: New Lease on Death
The figures on the ships attacked come from the U.S. Naval historical division. The continued Yamashita-Tominaga dispute is detailed in Makoto, the Yamashita biography and the Boei history. Actually Tominaga was in Manchuria at the end of the war. He was captured by the Soviets and held until the late 1950s.
Admiral Onishi’s move to Taiwan is described in The Divine Wind , in the Onishi biography and the Boei naval volume. Apparently he and Tokyo expected the next strike to come at Taiwan, but they were wrong. Onishi sat and withered on the vine for months.
Chapter 17: The Coming of B-San
The Japanese were well aware of the new long-range bomber which was destined to be used against them. The official history of the war shows how they tracked the progress of the building of the B-29 at the Boeing factory in Seattle. But while Japanese intelligence was excellent, the Imperial General Staff did not seem to understand the real meaning of the weapon or its capabilities. They did nothing to increase the range of their anti-aircraft guns or to increase the altitude capability of their fighters. Consequently, when the B-29s appeared, they flew so high that they were virtually safe from attack.
Admiral Ugaki’s comments on the early B-29 raids come from his secret war diary. The material about General Yoshita’s plans and operations is from Makoto and the Boei study.
Chapter 18: No Quarter at Iwo Jima
General Kuribayashi’s famous field order to the troops on Iwo Jima comes from the Japanese official army record. The material about Admiral Ugaki’s appointment as commander of the Fifth Air Fleet comes from his secret war diary and from the Ebina biography of Ugaki. The quotations from Ugaki are from his diary.
The story of the Tan Operation is from the Boei volume on naval operations in the homeland defense, and from Ugaki’s diary.
The story of the Japanese Ulithi raid is from Ugaki and from the Boei volume.
Chapter 19: The Hope that Failed
A study of the Boei Imperial Headquarters volumes for the period indicates the enormous importance the Japanese placed on the Ulithi raid. Admiral Toyoda and other staff officers believed that a handful of aircraft could turn the course of the war. The raid was felt so slightly by the Americans that Morison virtually ignores it in his naval history.
The order from Admiral Toyoda is from the Boei naval volume. The story of Admiral Ugaki’s activity is from his war diary. The Tan Operation is described fully in the Boei volume.
Chapter 20: The Kyushu Air Bases
The fact that Admiral Ugaki felt impelled to make a voluminous report on the failure of the Tan Operation shows the direction of Japanese thinking. Since they could no longer rely on conventional weapons, they were looking for miracles, and not finding them.
The clash between army and navy airmen was to be a problem for the rest of the war. They were never able to centralize their air activity against the allies. The army agreed in principle to accept a naval commander for the Ten Go operation, but in fact the army
The Kamikazes
ran its own show and the navy never had information about army air operations except after the fact. Thus what might have been a series of concentrated attacks fizzled into small raids.
The story of Yasuo Kawahara comes from Kamikaze. It was repeated frequently as the army hurried to build up its suicide force for the coming battle of Japan. As the pressure on the young men increased, they became visibly more reluctant to fly and the number of operational failures increased remarkably. The army’s answer was a new aircraft designed specifically for suicide operations, the Nakajima Tsurugi, a cranky but cheap plane designed for a one-way mission. The all-metal single-spar wing was attached to the fuselage by three bolts. The undercarriage was made of steel piping and was designed so that with a slight adjustment it would drop off after takeoff. In the interim it could be used with wheels for training.
The problem with the Tsurugi was that it took a skilled pilot to manage it, but the flight training schools were turning out men who had only a rudimentary knowledge of flying. Most of them were incapable of handling the plane and the training casualties were enormous. Consequently, although the Japanese were ready to build thousands of the Tsurugis no unit ever reached combat.
The story of the beginning of the Okinawa operations relies largely on Admiral Ugaki’s diary.
Chapter 21: The Kyushu Air Strikes
Admiral Ugaki’s diary is again the principal source. I used Morison and the ship action reports for the American version.
Chapter 22: Oka, the Suicide Brigade
Admiral Ugaki was surprised when he took command of the Fifth Air Fleet at the extent of Imperial Headquarters’ suicide planning. The Oka flying bomb was the first aircraft specially designed for
suicide operations. Once the pilot was committed there was no turning back. Always, even with the first Kamikazes, there had been the possibility of a rerun if weather or mechanical conditions indicated that the pilot must turn back. Lieutenant Seki, the hero of Mabalacat, had turned back no fewer than four times before he found a suitable target and plunged to his death. But not with the Oka.
As the weapon assumed its ultimate characteristics, the sensibilities of the air commanders grew dulled. So many men were being asked to accept the supreme sacrifice that the sheer numbers were too much to digest.
The story of the failed Oka raid is from The Divine Wind and Ugaki’s diary.
Chapter 23: Preparations
The Imperial General Staffs plan for the defense of Okinawa is from the Boei history. The material about the new submarine suicide command is from the Japanese official submarine history, and from I-Boat Captain and Kamikaze Submarine. The intelligence reports are from the Boei series.
Once again, Imperial Headquarters held high hopes for the multiple submarine attack on American bases in the Pacific. And once again the attacks produced virtually nothing. Yet the attacks had to succeed because there was nothing else at hand—and so the generals and admirals at Imperial Headquarters convinced themselves that they had succeeded although there wasn’t a shred of evidence to back up their claims. Here indeed was a fool’s paradise.
Chapter 24: The Spectre of Okinawa
The Boei official history volumes are the primary source for this chapter. Admiral Ugaki’s diary was also useful. I relied on the
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official history of the U.S. 77th Infantry Division for an account of the division’s activities at Kerma Retto.
Chapter 25: Operation Ten Go
The account of Japanese tactics on Okinawa is from the Boei official history. The study of the coordination of attacks comes from the history of the Imperial General Staff. The material regarding the Sixth Air Army is from Makoto. Statistics concerning American losses are from the U.S. naval records. The stories of various ships are from the action reports, as well as from Morison. Lieutenant Griffin’s story comes from his own account in the files of the navy’s operational archives.
Chapter 26: Operation Ten Go—II
Admiral Ugaki’s diary was the primary source for this chapter. I also used the Spurr book and the Boei official account of the last voyage of the Yamato. The discussion of Admiral Turner’s views is from the Dyer biography.
Chapter 27: The Flight of the Sacred Crane
The Onishi biography was the primary source here. Cadet Yasui’s story is from the Naemura book. Captain Orita’s story is from /- Boat Captain and the Boei official history. The statistics on Japanese submarine production are from the Boei history. The statistics on the Japanese army are from the army official history. The use of Admiral Ugaki’s war diary is obvious here. The story of the abortive coup d’etat is from the Boei , as well as from Kogan.