At the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15, delegates recognized a Kingdom of the Netherlands, encompassing what is today the Netherlands and Belgium. However, the union between the two was not a happy one, with the northern part of the country Dutch speaking and Protestant and the southern part French speaking and Catholic. In 1830 the Belgians revolted and quickly secured support from neighboring France. An international conference was held in 1838 that recognized Belgian independence, and in 1839 Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia concluded the Treaty of London, in which Belgium was declared “perpetually neutral.”
In 1870, when war broke out between Prussia and its allies (the North German Confederation) and France, both sides signed treaties with Great Britain reaffirming their pledges to respect the territorial integrity of Belgium.
Any violation of Belgian neutrality that may occur in the game would represent a violation of these treaties.
Quintuple Treaty Signed by the European Powers At London, 1839
In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, having taken into consideration their Treaty concluded with His Majesty the King of the Belgians, on the 15th of November 1831; and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, being disposed to conclude a definite arrangement on the basis of the 24 Articles agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia on the 14th of October, 1831 …
Who, after having communicated to each other their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:
ARTICLE 1
His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, engages to cause to be immediately converted into a Treaty with His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Articles annexed to the present Act, and agreed upon by common consent, under the auspices of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia.…
ARTICLE 3
The union which has existed between Holland and Belgium, in virtue of the Treaty of Vienna, of the 31st of May, 1815, is acknowledged by His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, to be dissolved.…
Done at London, the nineteenth day of April, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine.
Annex to the Treaty signed at London, on the 19th of April, 1839, between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, on the one part, and the Netherlands, on the Other.…
ARTICLE 7
Belgium … shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward all other States.
Treaty Signed Between Great Britain and Prussia, 1870
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn Act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided in Article 7 of the Treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually inserted in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it.…
Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:
ARTICLE 1
His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defense of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.
It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.
ARTICLE 2
His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.
ARTICLE 3
This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article 1 of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839.
ARTICLE 4
The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.
In witness wherof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.
Done at London, the 9th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1870.
Treaty Signed Between Great Britain and France, 1870
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn Act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided by Article 7 of the Treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it.…
Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:
ARTICLE 1
His Majesty the Emperor of the French having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which France is now engaged with the North German Confederation and its Allies, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by the North German Confederation and its Allies, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of the North German Confederation and its Allies should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Imperial Majesty for the defense of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Imperial Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.
It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between France and the North German Confederation and its Allies, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.
ARTICLE 2
His Majesty the Emperor of the French agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.
ARTICLE 3
This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between France and the North German Confederation and its Allies, and for twelve months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality Of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest, as heretofore, on Article 1 of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839.
ARTICLE 4
The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.
In witness whereof the respect[ive] Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.
Done at London, the 11th day of August, in the year of our Lord, 1870.
(L. S.) GRANVILLE
[British Foreign Secretary],
(L. S.) LA VALETTE
[French Minister of Foreign Affairs].
Source: Treaties and Documents Relative to the Neutrality of the Netherlands and Belgium, World War I Document Archive, https://
After bringing about the unification of Germany, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck steered a conservative course in foreign policy. He worried that other states, fearful of German power on the continent, might form a coalition against Germany if the Reich behaved too forcefully on the world stage. However, Bismarck resigned in 1890 over a difference of opinion with Kaiser Wilhelm II, and thereafter the German government pursued a policy of Weltpolitik—“world policy”—aimed at building a large overseas empire and a modern navy. Bernhard von Bülow, who served as minister of state for foreign affairs from 1897 until 1900, and then as chancellor from 1900 to 1909, argues forcefully in this speech before the Reichstag that Germany must take its place among the colonial powers. His claim that Germany in the twentieth century would become “a hammer or an anvil” would prove eerily prophetic. Anyone seeking evidence of Germany’s aggressive approach to foreign affairs will find plenty in this speech.
In our nineteenth century, England has increased its colonial empire—the largest the world has seen since the days of the Romans—further and further; the French have put down roots in North Africa and East Africa and created for themselves a new empire in the Far East; Russia has begun its mighty course of victory in Asia, leading it to the high plateau of the Pamir and to the coasts of the Pacific Ocean. Four years ago the Sino-Japanese war, [and] scarcely one and a half years ago the Spanish-American War have put things further in motion; they’ve led to great, momentous, far-reaching decisions, shaken old empires, and added new and serious ferment.… The English prime minister said a long time ago that the strong states were getting stronger and stronger and the weak ones weaker and weaker.… We don’t want to step on the toes of any foreign power, but at the same time we don’t want our own feet tramped by any foreign power (Bravo!) and we don’t intend to be shoved aside by any foreign power, not in political nor in economic terms. (Lively applause.) It is time, high time, that we … make it clear in our own minds what stance we have to take and how we need to prepare ourselves in the face of the processes taking place around us which carry the seeds within them for the restructuring of power relationships for the unforeseeable future. To stand inactively to one side, as we have done so often in the past, either from native modesty (Laughter) or because we were completely absorbed in our own internal arguments or for doctrinaire reasons—to stand dreamily to one side while other people split up the pie, we cannot and we will not do that. (Applause.) We cannot for the simple reason that we now have interests in all parts of the world.… The rapid growth of our population, the unprecedented blossoming of our industries, the hard work of our merchants, in short the mighty vitality of the German people have woven us into the world economy and pulled us into international politics. If the English speak of a “Greater Britain”; if the French speak of a “Nouvelle France”; if the Russians open up Asia; then we, too, have the right to a greater Germany (Bravo! from the right, laughter from the left), not in the sense of conquest, but indeed in the sense of peaceful extension of our trade and its infrastructures.… We cannot and will not permit that the order of the day passes over the German people.… There is a lot of envy present in the world against us (calls from the left), political envy and economic envy. There are individuals and there are interest groups, and there are movements, and there are perhaps even peoples that believe that the German was easier to have around and that the German was more pleasant for his neighbors in those earlier days, when, in spite of our education and in spite of our culture, foreigners looked down on us in political and economic matters like cavaliers with their noses in the air looking down on the humble tutor. (Very true!—Laughter.) These times of political faintness and economic and political humility should never return. (Lively Bravo.) We don’t ever again want to become, as Friedrich List put it, the “slaves of humanity.” But we’ll only be able to keep ourselves at the fore if we realize that there is no welfare for us without power, without a strong army and a strong fleet. (Very true! from the right; objections from the left.) The means, gentlemen, for a people of almost 60 million—dwelling in the middle of Europe and, at the same time, stretching its economic antennae out to all sides—to battle its way through in the struggle for existence without strong armaments on land and at sea, have not yet been found. (Very true! from the right.) In the coming century the German people will be a hammer or an anvil.
Source: Bülow’s ‘Hammer and Anvil’ Speech before the Reichstag, World War I Document Archive, https://
[The following article appeared in the British journal National Review in November 1901. It was published at a time when, thanks to the government’s nineteenth-century policy of “splendid isolation,” Great Britain had no friends on the European continent. The realignment of strategy proposed here led directly to the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. The authors of this article remained anonymous at the time, although it was later revealed that one of them was Sir Edward Grey. The article is a fine illustration of Grey’s worries that Germany was becoming a threat to the European balance of power.]
The events which have occurred in South Africa during the last few years cannot fail to produce consequences deeper and more far-reaching than the most penetrating observer of contemporary politics could have contemplated at the moment a too famous Raid provoked a no less famous telegram.… Great Britain does not require an immense army of the approved Continental type, but she does require a splendidly equipped and highly trained force, ready for transportation at short notice to any part of her over-sea Empire which may be menaced. The British Navy should be increased so as to enable us to meet any three Powers at sea in superior numbers. The naval policy and avowed hostility of Germany, to which even the British official world can no longer remain blind, will force us to keep on a war-footing in the North Sea a fleet as powerful and efficient as the Mediterranean or Channel Squadrons.…
The lesson which foreign countries may learn from our war in South Africa is one that in their own interest each of them would do well to take to heart. We desire to avoid swagger, which is said to be a British characteristic, and is probably in varying forms a characteristic of every great nation which believes in itself and its future; but to all interested in understanding the real strength of this nation the Boer War should serve as a useful warning. The prolonged and exasperating struggle has once more exhibited in an impressive manner the political stability of British institutions and the steadfast character of the British race. Reflecting men can see that the living generation of Englishmen have in no way degenerated from their forbears of a hundred years ago. In the earlier period there were two men who appreciated the inherent strength of this country: one was William Pitt,1 while the other was Napoleon Bonaparte. Pitt knew the meaning of Trafalgar. The conversation which he had in his last days with the young general who was rapidly rising to fame and who was destined to become the great Duke of Wellington, shows that his prescient intellect grasped the fact that, in spite of Austerlitz, if England were only true to herself, Nelson’s victory must inevitably drive Napoleon to a policy which would so exasperate other nations that they would ultimately turn upon him—Spain giving the signal. His vision was fulfilled; England remained true to herself, and the steadfastness of her people extorted a remarkable tribute from Napoleon to his victorious enemies before the close of his life at St. Helena: “Had I been in 1815 the choice of the English as I was of the French, I might have lost the battle of Waterloo without losing a vote in the Legislature or a soldier from my ranks.” During the last two years it has been abundantly demonstrated that the Englishmen of to-day have the same grit as their grandfathers, and the quiet, self-possessed manner in which they have faced the ignorant execration, and the political animosity of the civilized world is calculated to cause unfriendly communities to pause. They have with quiet resolution supported the Ministry—whose half-hearted measures have not always made support easy—simply because it was carrying on a war, and thousands and tens of thousands of men in England who have all their lives been bitter opponents of the political party now in power, have acted with the single object of strengthening the hands of the Government. There have been hours of difficulty, and even of danger, when more than one foreign Power desired, and tentatively sought, to form a coalition against this country. It was the temper of the people of the British Empire backed by the Navy that stunned into sobriety the zealous malignity of those who were willing to wound, but afraid to strike. The details of these sinister intrigues are not only familiar to the British Foreign Office, but their existence is known to the intelligent public; and we must admit at the outset that such shortsighted and fatuous cabals have not rendered easier the task of those who believe that the interests of England lie in the direction of improved relations with certain foreign Powers with whom at present British relations are only “friendly” in the strictly diplomatic sense.…
Closely connected with the subject of inter-imperial relations is the policy which the British Empire should pursue as regards other nations and empires. We shall have to re-consider our position with regard to them one by one; for it must be owned that some of our Ministers seem to be living under the spell of a diplomacy which the wisest of them has declared to be “antiquated.” We wish to see this wisdom translated into action. We believe it to be the desire of the nation that these old-time prejudices and superstitions should be abandoned. The condition of the world has greatly changed during the past century. At the time when the “pilot who weathered the storm”2 was laid in his grave at the foot of his father’s statue in Westminster Abbey, France was ahead of all European countries as regards population, for she numbered twenty-five million souls. When England entered upon her titanic struggle with Napoleon, the whole European population of the British Empire did not exceed fifteen millions, while the population of the United States was not much larger than that of Australia at the present moment. To-day we are living in an entirely new world, the development and progress of which is the topic of almost every leading article, so we need not descant upon it here. Perhaps the main fact which should impress itself upon Englishmen in considering the actual international outlook is not merely the extraordinary growth of Germany—who has achieved greatness by trampling on her neighbors—but the fact that this formidable community is becoming increasingly dependent on a foreign food supply, as well as on foreign supplies of raw and partially manufactured articles. This necessarily involves the development of Germany as a Sea Power, and it is a matter for every European State to ponder over. She is already stronger at sea than either France or Russia. It therefore affects them as well as England, though up to a certain point they may welcome it, because it is the cause of German hostility to England. No one has brought this hostility so graphically before the British nation as the present Chancellor of the German Empire, Count von Bülow. He loses few opportunities in his highly flavored discourses in the Reichstag of displaying his contempt for Great Britain, though both before and after more than one of these public demonstrations, private assurances have been conveyed to the British Government that the speaker need not be taken seriously as he was merely “conciliating” German Anglophobes—usually of the Agrarian class to which he belongs. One of these utterances, however, stands by itself, and as it is quite incapable of being explained away, Count von Bülow has not attempted any explanation. In reply to an interpellation, he informed the Reichstag that the telegram sent by Kaiser Wilhelm to President Kruger in 1896 was not, as had been represented in this country, the offspring of an unpremeditated impulse of resentment against the Jameson Raid, but it was a deliberate effort to ascertain how far Germany could reckon on the support of France and Russia in forming an anti-British combination. The Chancellor owned that the effort had failed, presumably because our supposed enemies were unwilling to play into the hands of Germany; he explained that, in consequence, German foreign policy had necessarily to take another tack, since “isolation” had been demonstrated. We doubt whether history records in the relations between great Powers a more impudent avowal of a more unfriendly act. It is galling to Englishmen to reflect that Germany was rewarded for failing to raise Europe against us by an Anglo-German agreement securing to her the reversion to spacious territories to which she has no sort of claim, though they may have been in the Kaiser’s capacious mind when he dispatched his telegram.
The official advocates of the Naval Bills which have been introduced into the Reichstag during the last three years have made no concealment as to the objective of the modern German navy, and that portion of the German press which takes its cue from the Government has told us in language impossible to misunderstand that Germany aspires to deprive us of our position on the ocean. “Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser”;3 such is the swelling phrase of the Kaiser; but, like all his rhetoric, there is serious purpose behind it. At the present time it is estimated that a substantial proportion of the food of the entire population of Germany is sea-borne. She is becoming transformed from an agricultural into an industrial community, and if the process continues for another quarter of a century, while remaining secured against actual starvation by her land frontiers, she will become no less dependent on the ocean highways for her prosperity than we are. Great Britain is therefore confronted with the development of a new sea power founded on the same economic basis as herself, and impelled by a desire to be supreme. But l’ocean ne comporte qu’un seul maître.4 We have secured in the past the sovereignty of the seas, and our sceptre cannot be wrested from us without a desperate and bloody struggle. Germany will not be so insane as to attempt this task single-handed, at any rate for many years to come; and it is for other Powers to consider in the interval whether it is for their advantage to support her in a joint attack on England, in which, as is evident from recent revelations, President Faure clearly foresaw that the brunt of battle would fall upon others, while the lion’s share of any plunder would fall to Germany. It is by no means improbable that such a coalition might be worsted. We have before now successfully faced the world in arms on the ocean; but on the unlikely hypothesis of our fleet being crushed, it may be as well for other nations to make up their minds what they might expect to gain if the German eagle replaced the Union Jack as the symbol of sea power.
We approach the delicate question of our relations with Russia with considerable diffidence, as the omniscient German press has declared at any time during the last twenty years that the interests of England and Russia are as irreconcilable as their hatred is hereditary. It can hardly be denied that the “honest broker” in Berlin has exploited this assumed antagonism with much skill and no little profit to himself, but it has yet to be pointed out what benefit has accrued to either of the traditional antagonists. There are grounds for asserting that this question has lately been asked in responsible quarters in Russia, and that to-day the Russian Government is less ready “to pull the chestnuts out of the fire,” to use a favorite Teutonic metaphor, for Count von Bülow than she used to be for his illustrious predecessor, Prince Bismarck. On the other hand, the failure of the Russian Emperor to act on the amiable exhortations of the leading German journals by taking advantage of our preoccupations in South Africa has made an unmistakable impression on the public opinion of this country. The National Zeitung, one of Prince Bismarck’s favored organs, kindly informed us on October 1, 1899: “If England gets into military difficulties in South Africa, if the war is protracted, or if it takes an unfavorable turn, Russia would not remain idle. The opportunity for Russian aggrandizement in Asia would be too tempting.” Of all countries in the world the Power which would have most reason to rue the substitution of Germany for Great Britain as the mistress of the seas would be Russia. When Kaiser Wilhelm came on his fruitful visit to England in the autumn of 1899, which produced the “graceful concession” on our part of Samoa, prominent Englishmen, who were inquisitive as to the significance of the great naval movement then under way in Germany, received the comforting assurance that German naval armaments were exclusively directed against Russia, being intended for co-operation with England in the Far East and for the maintenance of German interests in the Near East. In a sense, the latter suggestion expresses a substantially accurate fact. If once the sea power of England were overthrown, Germany would be free to execute her hostile policy towards Russia, who is not less in her way than we are. There is an idea growing steadily amongst Germans that Germany should expand into an empire branching from the Bosporus to the Persian Gulf; thus would territories be secured enjoying an excellent climate, to which the surplus stream of German population, which now flows to the United States and to the British Empire, might be diverted, without being lost to the German flag. This is by no means a new idea; it is the revival of an old idea, and it means of course the supremacy of Germany in the Near East and the supersession of the Slav by the Teuton. Such is the objective of those ambitious dreamers known as the Pan-Germanic League, a body most tenderly regarded by the German Government, and it embodies a policy as antagonistic to Russia as the German naval program is hostile to England.
Whatever the effect of recent developments may have been upon Russia, the attitude of the German nation and the suspicious policy of the German Government has led a continually increasing number of Englishmen to inquire whether it would not be worthwhile for England and Russia to discuss their differences with the object of arriving at a working understanding, and, if possible, a comprehensive settlement? Very distinguished Russians have frequently expressed an earnest desire that their country should seek an entente with England. The late Emperor Alexander openly avowed his desire for such a settlement …, but after his death [he] became convinced that it was hopeless to try and do business with this country, owing to the influence of a certain school of English politicians whose unreasoning antagonism to Russia almost amounts to a monomania. We hasten to say, however, that the fault does not lie exclusively with England. A main difficulty which confronts us whenever the subject is broached is that the central Government of St. Petersburg appears to be unable or unwilling to control the action of its more distant agents. We have had several conspicuous examples recently in China, e.g., where Russian officers have treated the property of, or pledged to, British subjects in a most high-handed and intolerable manner, in defiance of repeated assurances given to our Ambassador at St. Petersburg. In fact, these cases were so bad that we do not care to dwell upon them.… At the same time, we in England must remember, when we complain of such conduct on the part of Russian agents, that, bad as it is, it is not more perfidious than actions which our Government appears willing to tolerate when Germany is the culprit.…
The chief political obstacle to an Anglo-Russian understanding is, no doubt, due to the desire of Russia to come down to the Persian Gulf. If we are able to recognize and tolerate her ambition in that quarter our antagonism would come to an end, at least for a generation. This admittedly is a subject of great difficulty, and one not to be settled off-hand; but that is no reason, as the Times has lately pointed out, why statesmen should not be prepared to face it. It is clearly our interest, as it is our intention, to preserve intact the status quo in the Gulf unless we can come to an arrangement with Russia by which we get a quid pro quo. That status has been lately threatened by the Sultan of Turkey at Kuwait, the port at the head of the Gulf which the Germans are believed to have marked as their future naval base, and which is to be the southern terminus of the great trunk line which will cross Constantinople. The Sultan of Turkey lately made use of certain local disturbances between Mubarak, the Sheikh of Kuwait and the Emir of Najd in order to assert his sovereignty over the independent sheikhs of the coast, and he counted on vindicating his pretensions over the ruler of Kuwait, after that personage had been defeated by his enemies. Accordingly, the Sultan sent a corvette-full of troops to Kuwait. Mubarak immediately applied for British protection, and when the Turks appeared they found one of our gunboats in the port, and the British officer informed the Turkish commander of the expedition that his troops would not be allowed to land. There the matter stands for the present, but the whole incident is illustrative of the handiwork of Germany, who was undoubtedly egging on the Sultan. The attempt was mainly directed against the British policy of upholding the present situation in the Persian Gulf, but, if successful, it might have a very considerable bearing on the future interests of Russia. Is it not idle to argue that Germany has “claims” to a port on the Persian Gulf, while we are to regard the appearance of Russia in that part of the world as a casus belli? Some acknowledged authorities have held that the manifest anxiety of Russia to penetrate into Southern Persia and to secure a seaport is a subject to be carefully considered by England.…
Russian statesmen have to make up their minds whether, in the present condition of Russian industries, Russian agriculture, and Russian finance, a friendly understanding with England, which would relieve her anxieties in the Far East, and which might result in her being able to continue her Trans-Caucasian and Siberian railways to the shores of the Persian Gulf, and which, last but not least, might enable her to carry out her historic mission in the Balkans, is not worth a high price.
Whether our readers agree with the view propounded in this paper or not we do not think that those who adopt a purely negative attitude by denying the existence of any basis for an entente between the Russian and British Empires are entitled to be heard. If others have a positive policy opposed to that which we are setting forth, by all means let them produce it, and induce or compel the British Government to adopt it and execute it. But in the interval we venture to sketch in outline some suggestions for a comprehensive settlement between the two Powers with the object of demonstrating to the sceptics that at any rate the raw material for an Anglo-Russian agreement abounds—whatever may be the case as regards the goodwill and statesmanship requisite to evolve the finished article. We would invite the reader to note that these suggestions are calculated to compromise neither the relations between Russia and France nor those between Great Britain and Japan.
Proposed Anglo-Russian Understanding
The understanding would naturally fall under three different heads:
I. The Near East
With regard to the Near East the basis would be that whilst Russia abstained from any attempt to interfere with the status quo in Egypt, we should frankly recognize that the fulfillment of what Russia regards as her historic mission in the Balkan peninsula conflicts with no vital British interests, and that in Asiatic Turkey we should abstain from favoring the development of German schemes of expansion.
II. Persia And Central Asia
With regard to Persia and Central Asia, we might offer Russia our cooperation in the development of railway communication between the Caspian and the Persian Gulf; and in securing for her a commercial outlet on the Gulf in return for an undertaking on the part of Russia to respect the political status quo along the shores of the Gulf.…
The fact of Russia being a party to such an agreement would give France a guarantee that her interests would be taken into due consideration, while our participation would afford a natural safeguard to the commercial interests of the United States.
The effect of such an agreement, accompanied by the customary demonstrations in such cases, public declarations by the Sovereigns and their official representatives, and an exchange of visits by their respective fleets, would at once remove the danger of a sudden explosion, which must continue to hang over the whole world so long as the Far East remains the powder-magazine of international rivalries and conflicting interests which it is at present.
The natural consequence of this understanding would be that in the event of war between Germany and Russia, Great Britain would remain neutral, and in the event of war between Great Britain and Germany, Russia would remain neutral. Russia would no longer give cause for suspicion that she was instigating France to make war against us …, and Great Britain would cease to be suspected in St. Petersburg of encouraging Japanese hostility to Russia. Japan, on her side, would be relieved of the menace of a possible rival against her of the Triple Alliance of 1895.…
If we are to revert, as some of us desire, to the policy of Canning and Palmerston, and energetically support the cause of civil and religious liberty and popular rights in Europe, the time may not be remote when we should lift up our voices on behalf of the Czechs of Bohemia. In so doing we shall be promoting the real interests of the Austrian Empire; the question has been so persistently misrepresented that Englishmen are only beginning to realize that the Slavs of Austria are not the disintegrating force within that country. But it is the German element enrolled under the banner of the Pan-Germanic League which threatens the existence of an empire which a great Czech writer has told us would have to be created if it did not exist.
To sum up, then, the general conclusions of this paper: … We are the only great European Power which covets no European territory, and it ought not to be beyond the resources of our statesmanship to profit by this unique feature in our position.… It is our earnest desire to meet, if possible, the wishes of Russia, particularly on the Persian Gulf; but this policy is only practicable if Russia realizes that our cooperation is at least as valuable to her as hers is to us. We may, perhaps, be allowed to interject in passing that the different methods and systems of government and political institutions in the two empires need not interfere with their cordial relations, as some Russians seem inclined to apprehend.… Englishmen are beginning to realize that their institutions, however suitable to this country, are quite unsuitable even to nations whose historical development is much more similar to that of England than is the history of Russia. The Empire of the Tsars, on its side, possesses interesting and characteristic institutions which it would be disastrous to impair, but which could not be transferred to other soils.
In seeking to close our prolonged contest with Russia, we are desirous of doing something which would be for the advantage of civilization, and, should it be effected, it would not be less welcome because it brought us back into friendly relations with France—a country whose history is closely interwoven with our own, and with which we share so many political sentiments. The French are perhaps the only nation which will make sacrifices and run risks for the sake of those who enjoy their friendship. They are capable of sentimental attachment as well as sentimental hatred.…
But earnestly as we advocate a particular policy there should be no misunderstanding as to our motives. We are not touting for alliances. We are prepared to entertain friendly overtures, and to enter alliances on suitable terms and for practical purposes; and for the realization of ideals beneficial to the world at large we think Great Britain should be prepared to make considerable though reasonable sacrifices. But the people of this country will no longer tolerate a policy of “graceful concessions,” and will not permit any Ministry or any personage however exalted to adopt towards any Power the attitude which has been too long followed as regards Germany. If Russia wishes to come to us, we shall meet her cordially and at least half way. If, on the other hand, Russia and France, one or both of them, elect to combine with Germany in an attempt to wrest from us the sceptre of the seas and to replace our sovereignty by that of Germany, England will know how to meet them. The Navy Bill in Germany was carried through with the avowed object of creating a navy which “would be able to keep the North Sea clear.” We have no intention of clearing out of the North Sea or out of any other sea. We seek no quarrel with any Power but if Germany thinks it her interest to force one upon us, we shall not shrink from the ordeal, even should she appear in the lists with France and Russia as her allies. Germans would however, do well to realize that if England is driven to it, England will strike home. Close to the foundations of the German Empire, which has hardly emerged from its artificial stage, there exists a powder magazine such as is to be found in no other country viz., Social Democracy. In the case of a conflict with Great Britain, misery would be caused to large classes of the German population, produced by the total collapse of subsidized industries; far-reaching commercial depression, financial collapse, and a defective food-supply might easily make that magazine explode.
Source: “The ABC Proposal for British Foreign Policy,” The World War I Document Archive, http://
The British government’s decision to abandon “splendid isolation” after the Boer War led directly to the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale in 1904. This was not an alliance, but merely a settlement of differences between the countries regarding Egypt and Morocco. Nevertheless, it was regarded in Berlin as a serious threat—a sign that the two countries would now cooperate to threaten Germany’s own interests in Africa.
ARTICLE 1
His Britannic Majesty’s Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.
The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country.…
It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French savant.
The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past.
ARTICLE 2
The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.
His Britannic Majesty’s Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.
They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.
ARTICLE 3
His Britannic Majesty’s Government for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.
ARTICLE 4
The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges. The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.
This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.
Nevertheless the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty’s Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.
ARTICLE 5
His Britannic Majesty’s Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the service.
The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.
ARTICLE 6
In order to ensure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty’s Government declare that they adhere to the treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of that treaty will remain in abeyance.
ARTICLE 7
In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.
This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.
ARTICLE 8
The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government. The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
ARTICLE 9
The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.
In witness whereof his Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, duly authorised for that purpose, have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.
(L.S.) LANSDOWNE
[British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]
(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON
[French Ambassador to Great Britain]
SECRET ARTICLES
ARTICLE 1
In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by Articles 4, 6, and 7 of the Declaration of today’s date would remain intact.
ARTICLE 2
His Britannic Majesty’s Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organisation of Egypt.
In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilised Countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty’s Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.
ARTICLE 3
The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other presides should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.
Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles 4 and 7 of the Declaration of today’s date, and undertake to carry them out.
She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.
ARTICLE 4
If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of today’s date, would be none the less at once applicable.
ARTICLE 5
Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in Article 1 of the Declaration of today’s date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged, and Unified Debts after the 15th July, 1910.
Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.
(L.S.) LANSDOWNE
(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON
Source: The Entente Cordiale Between England and France—April 8, 1904, The Avalon Project, https://
Having settled its outstanding differences with France in the Entente Cordiale of 1904, the British government did the same with Russia three years later. The two countries had almost gone to war on several occasions in the nineteenth century, as British policymakers regarded Russian expansion in Central Asia as a threat to India. The Anglo-Russian Entente dealt entirely with Persia, which was divided into spheres of influence. Although this agreement was no more a formal alliance than was the Entente Cordiale, the kaiser’s government interpreted the agreement as further evidence of a plot to “encircle” Germany and prevent it from becoming a world power.
Agreement Concerning Persia
The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;
Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain Provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned Provinces of Persia;
Have agreed on the following terms:
I. Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.
II. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.
III. Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles 1 and 2.
Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.…
Source: The Anglo-Russian Entente—1907, The Avalon Project, https://
Wilhelm II became kaiser of Germany in 1888. His grandmother had been the much-beloved Queen Victoria of Great Britain, and Wilhelm was a great admirer of the British Navy and the British Empire—so much so that he desired a similar navy and empire for his own country. The British government, however, regarded Germany’s aggressive Weltpolitik of the 1890s and 1900s as a threat, and the kaiser himself as dangerously unstable. In 1908 a popular London newspaper, the Daily Telegraph, ran an “interview” that was actually a set of notes made by a British army officer of conversations he had with Wilhelm in the previous year. The result was a major embarrassment for Germany, even leading to calls for the kaiser’s abdication. This is a useful source for players seeking evidence of Germany’s hostile attitude toward Great Britain.
… “You English,” he said, “are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are so completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command, in my speech at Guildhall, that my heart is set upon peace, and that it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best of terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak for themselves, but you listen not to them but to those who misinterpret and distort them. That is a personal insult which I feel and resent. To be forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, mistrustful eyes, taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your press—, at least, a considerable section of it—bids the people of England refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will?
“I repeat,” continued His Majesty, “that I am a friend of England, but you make things difficult for me. My task is not of the easiest. The prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best elements as it is in England with respect to Germany. That is another reason why I resent your refusal to accept my pledged word that I am the friend of England. I strive without ceasing to improve relations, and you retort that I am your archenemy. You make it hard for me. Why is it?” …
His Majesty then reverted to the subject uppermost in his mind—his proved friendship for England. “I have referred,” he said, “to the speeches in which I have done all that a sovereign can do to proclaim my good-will. But, as actions speak louder than words, let me also refer to my acts. It is commonly believed in England that throughout the South African War Germany was hostile to her. German opinion undoubtedly was hostile—bitterly hostile. But what of official Germany? Let my critics ask themselves what brought to a sudden stop, and, indeed, to absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates, who were striving to obtain European intervention? They were feted in Holland, France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have crowned them with flowers. But when they asked me to receive them—I refused. The agitation immediately died away, and the delegation returned empty-handed. Was that, I ask, the action of a secret enemy?
“Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German government was invited by the governments of France and Russia to join with them in calling upon England to put an end to the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer Republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I said that so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to put pressure upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England. Posterity will one day read the exact terms of the telegram—now in the archives of Windsor Castle—in which I informed the sovereign of England of the answer I had returned to the Powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what were my actions in the hour of their adversity.
“Nor was that all. Just at the time of your Black Week, in the December of 1899, when disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction, and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. Nay, I did more. I bade one of my officers procure for me as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants in South Africa on both sides and of the actual position of the opposing forces. With the figures before me, I worked out what I considered the best plan of campaign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my General Staff for their criticism. Then, I dispatched it to England, and that document, likewise, is among the state papers at Windsor Castle, awaiting the severely impartial verdict of history. And, as a matter of curious coincidence, let me add that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts, and carried by him into successful operation. Was that, I repeat, an act of one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say!
“But, you will say, what of the German navy? Surely, that is a menace to England! Against whom but England are my squadrons being prepared? If England is not in the minds of those Germans who are bent on creating a powerful fleet, why is Germany asked to consent to such new and heavy burdens of taxation? My answer is clear. Germany is a young and growing empire. She has a worldwide commerce which is rapidly expanding, and to which the legitimate ambition of patriotic Germans refuses to assign any bounds. Germany must have a powerful fleet to protect that commerce and her manifold interests in even the most distant seas. She expects those interests to go on growing, and she must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Her horizons stretch far away.” …
Source: Daily Telegraph. London, October 28, 1908. Reprinted in Louis L. Snyder, ed., Documents of German History (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1958), 296–300.
An international crisis erupted in July 1911 when, in protest against French attempts to establish control over Morocco, the German government chose to make a show of force by sending a gunboat to the Moroccan port of Agadir. Apparently, Berlin assumed that Great Britain would express disinterest and France would be forced to back down, thus driving a wedge between the powers of the newly concluded Triple Entente. However, the Germans were to be disappointed. In a speech at Mansion House, the official residence of the Lord Mayor of London, British chancellor of the exchequer David Lloyd George warned that Britain would fight for its “national honour.” The address had special force, given that Lloyd George had a reputation for pacifism and hostility to imperialism, and soon afterward the German government backed down.
Personally I am a sincere advocate of all means which would lead to the settlement of international disputes by methods such as those which civilization has so successfully set up for the adjustment of differences between individuals, and I rejoice in my heart at the prospect of a happy issue to Sir Edward Grey’s negotiations with the United States of America for the settlement of disputes which may occur in future between ourselves and our kinsmen across the Atlantic by some more merciful, more rational, and by a more just arbitrament than that of the sword.
But I am also bound to say this—that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past redeemed Continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster and even from national extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international good will except questions of the greatest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation in tolerable for a great country like ours to endure. National honour is no party question. The security of our great international trade is no party question; the peace of the world is much more likely to be secured if all nations realize fairly what the conditions of peace must be.…
Source: Lloyd George’s Mansion House Speech, 21 July 1911, World War I Document Archive, https://
The Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 caused outrage among Serbian nationalists, who had expected that the province—mainly inhabited by Serbs—would become part of Serbia. The annexation led directly to the creation of the Narodna Odbrana (Defence of the People), a secret patriotic society dedicated to rallying the Serbian people—both inside and outside Serbia—for an eventual fight against Austria-Hungary. This document, a pamphlet issued by the organization in 1911, should be of use to any player who seeks to demonstrate Serbian hostility toward Austria-Hungary.
The annexation [of Bosnia and Herzegovina] was only one of the blows which the enemies of Serbia have aimed at this land. Many blows preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are necessary so that a new attack may not find Serbia equally unprepared.
The object assigned to the work to be done by the people of every class is the preparation for war in all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the present day. This is to be effected through strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvements, etc. A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new Serbia, in which every Serbian, from child to greybeard, is a rifleman.
The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more fearful and dangerous than the old; stronger in civilization and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come against us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which approaches in that quarter. The Serbian people are faced by the question “to be or not to be?”
The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight against the enemies with whom we stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called peaceful present-day conditions as war, and demands heroes, too, for this struggle of today which we are carrying on in Serbia and beyond the frontier.
In using the word “people” the Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Serbia. It is hoped that the work done by it in Serbia will spur the brothers outside Serbia to take a more energetic share in the work of private initiative, so that the new present-day movement for the creation of a powerful Serbian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all Serbian territories.
The Narodna Odbrana proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy. Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria attacks us today from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our national position.
For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Serbian territories and their union with Serbia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants alike.
While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connections made at the time of the annexation; today therefore it is the same as it was at the time of the annexation. Today, too, it is Odbrana (defense); today, too, Narodna (of the people); today, too, it gathers under its standard the citizens of Serbia as it gathered them at the time of the annexation. Then the cry was for war, now the cry is for work. Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary clubs, weapons, and bombs were asked for; today steady, fanatical, tireless work and again work is required to fulfil the tasks and duties to which we have drawn attention by way of present preparation for the fight with gun and cannon which will come.
Source: The Narodna Odbrana, 1911, World War I Document Archive, https://
In this excerpt from Germany and the Next War, von Bernhardi considers Germany’s position in the world. Players in the German faction will find this useful for explaining the threats Germany faces from England, France, and Russia. Members of other factions may point to this as more evidence that Germany bears aggressive intentions toward its neighbors.
V. World Power or Downfall
In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its history and its general as well as particular endowments, we attempted to prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among the Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, must be the basis of our future development.
The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us.…
The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by the hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity, examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces which concern us are weighed one against the other.
These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly to the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of the States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must try to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of the day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion. We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and therefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad lines of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or timidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does not seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense clear, so far as it concerns Germany’s power and ambitions.
We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps.
On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensive alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In this alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probably unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical national and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder to shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred battlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, the bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of Slavism, since numerous Slavonic [Slavic] races are comprised in her territories. There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime and commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react detrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel between Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining its political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck’s policy to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered such an alliance possible.
The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of Slavonic [Slavic] elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show many signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough to influence the political position of the Empire.
Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power. That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by Italians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. We should have considerably strengthened Italy’s position on the Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance.
The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive character. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential interests. It is based on a status quo, which was fully justified in its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events. Prince Bismarck, in his “Thoughts and Reminiscences,” pointed out that this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance. The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the encroachment of Italy into those regions.
The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria’s position in the Balkans, and Italy’s interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then will Bismarck’s great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with sterility. On the surface, Italy’s Mediterranean interests do not concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian entente, would probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria. Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France.
England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy’s justifiable efforts to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England’s Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would—especially in combination with the French Mediterranean squadron—seriously menace the coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against England and France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It is our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can.
France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central European Triple Alliance. France’s European policy is overshadowed by the idea of revanche.5 For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that she has forgotten the hundred years’ enmity against England and the humiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the defeats of 1870–71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and, if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her entente with England, are inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, and with good reason, for more active help from England’s hostility to Germany than from Russia.
The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. The establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible illusion as to its extent and meaning.
Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable that she will maintain honourably and with no arrière-pensée6 the obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco. The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The French policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on the hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can be negotiated before the question between them has been once more decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others.
The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and of the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, is following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the status quo. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be overestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any aggressive policy on Russia’s part. The ministry of Kokowzew7 seems likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin8 with its accompanying events showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture of internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable, therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose, meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions of Germany in North Persia.
It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the Baltic.
Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself, also, the leading power of the Slavonic [Slavic] races, and has for many years been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into Central Europe.
Pan-Slavism is still hard at work.
It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement and again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Her present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Government has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed expectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under the stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad. Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China, must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly, Turkey.
Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not identical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed. Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with Germany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of the German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths.
England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms.
The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So, also, no natural community of interests exists between England and France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an Anglo-French entente. This union is cemented by the common hostility to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might mask the real objects.
This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in order to understand the line of thought which guides the English politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the world.…
Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; it clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement. She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine the growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support, and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre in opposition to the Caliphate.
The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England, so far, in accordance with the principle of divide et impera,9 has attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism, thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of Bengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very grave danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England’s high position in the world.…
All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of England’s Empire, and these dangers largely influence England’s attitude towards Germany.
England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must not be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be destroyed.
A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great English colonial war, which would engage England’s fleets in far distant parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France’s capability of expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered.
The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from the German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer a prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without any excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet, contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other contingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicable means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years to come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importance of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia.
The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters. It has always been England’s object to maintain a certain balance of power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world’s stage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposes undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This policy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each other’s hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directly from this that England’s aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England’s most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and self-evident.
The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English point of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war. England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and to some extent a great benefit, to English industries.
After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is building, and attack the objectionable neighbour.
English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance—Germany, England, and America—has been suggested.10 But for such a union with Germany to be possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial and industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the Great Powers in the world.
It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent to that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacit approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements of English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy. The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every expansion of Germany’s power were openly shown in the very recent Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp.
A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o’-the-wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and Utopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alter the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists,11 with their greater fixity of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire.…
While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present directly influence our policy, Turkey—the predominant Power of the Near East—is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against Russia and against England—the two States, that is, with whose hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can threaten England’s position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England or Russia. Turkey’s interests are ours. It is also to the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong to Russia or England.
If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters. Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position, while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her. From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of Italy at the cost of France.…
If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we take into calculation the imponderabilia,12 whose weight can only be guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France, and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior forces will be united against Germany and Austria.
Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an extended political basis, but … we are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets for our growing industries. But at every step which we take in this direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further expansion of German international influence and of German maritime power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion barred.
Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where their interests clash.
With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, but none the less formidable, crisis—perhaps the most momentous crisis in the history of the German nation.
We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our position among the Powers of Europe; we now must decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a World Empire, and procure for German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been hitherto withheld from them.
Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is involved in our decision.
“To be, or not to be,” is the question which is put to us to-day, disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region of realities.
There is no standing still in the world’s history. All is growth and development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the status quo, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the powers of a continuous development.
We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams—spiritual and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German thought—would for long ages be lost to mankind.
If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at the risk of a war with numerically superior foes.
Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish population.
Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our political power in other ways.
In the first place, our political position would be considerably consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.
Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and the Triple Alliance has already been discussed.
Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence, in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of the political community based on it.
We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our population. It is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa by pacific negotiations.…. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of a successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our overflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generally speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our industrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for the growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This represents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release us from the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization.…
The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely disregarded.
The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays the foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory of balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power, and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a close community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a State-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five Great Powers—England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866 Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power.
“Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among the nations.” “All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a real equilibrium—an actual equality of power—is postulated.”13 This condition does not exist between the European nations. England by herself rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of French. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium by special alliances. One result only has been obtained—the hindrance of the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power can no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existing state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers which stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England’s policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and to keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in order herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and the sovereignty of the world.
We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just basis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of one embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase our own power.
A further question, suggested by the present political position, is whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning of the last century under quite other conditions—in fact, under a different conception of what constitutes a State—can, or ought to be, permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not ipso facto a breach of neutrality, for a State from which—theoretically at least—all danger of war has been removed, has no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the neutrality of the Congo State14 must be termed more than problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development presupposes such competition.
Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference in the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances of such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in the private affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, but none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international intercourse that between the States of one and the same political system a strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to political intercourse under all conditions involves serious difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord Palmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false is the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for international politics can be laid down.
After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals; and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat to the existence of a State. “It can only be asserted that every State acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an interference may become.” On the other hand, it must be remembered that the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international right, but simply and solely on power and expediency.
I have gone closely into these questions of international policy because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and may give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential that we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions possible. “No man,” so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3, 1761, “if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position.…”
Source: Friedrich von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, http://
As it became increasingly likely that Parliament would pass home rule for Ireland, the following was circulated in Northern Ireland in September 1912. Nearly 250,000 men signed the Covenant, while a similar number of women signed the Declaration. In early 1913 the Ulster Volunteers, a militia unit formed to fight against home rule, recruited some 100,000 men from among the signers of the Covenant.
The Covenant (for men)
Being convinced in our consciences that Home Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as of the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship and perilous to the unity of the Empire, we, whose names are underwritten, men of Ulster, loyal subjects of his Gracious Majesty King George V, humbly relying on the God whom our fathers in days of stress and trial confidently trusted, do hereby pledge ourselves in solemn Covenant throughout this our time of threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom and in using all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland. And in the event of such a Parliament being forced upon us we further solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves to refuse to recognise its authority. In sure confidence that God will defend the right we hereto subscribe our names. And further, we individually declare that we have not already signed this Covenant.
The Declaration (for women)
We, whose names are underwritten, women of Ulster, and loyal subjects of our gracious King, being firmly persuaded that Home Rule would be disastrous to our Country, desire to associate ourselves with the men of Ulster in their uncompromising opposition to the Home Rule Bill now before Parliament, whereby it is proposed to drive Ulster out of her cherished place in the Constitution of the United Kingdom, and to place her under the domination and control of a Parliament in Ireland.
Praying that from this calamity God will save Ireland, we here to subscribe our names.
Ulster Day, Saturday 28th, September, 1912.
God Save the King
Source: The 1912 Ulster Covenant, History Ireland, https://
Originally concluded in 1882, the Triple Alliance was renewed four times before 1914. The treaty lay at the heart of Bismarck’s strategy to keep France isolated. The Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary dated back to 1879; Italy, embroiled in a dispute with France over North Africa, adhered to the agreement three years later. In the early twentieth century, growing tensions between Austria-Hungary and Italy raised questions of whether Rome would actually go to war on Vienna’s behalf. Nevertheless, the three powers reaffirmed the agreement in December 1912. Members of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian factions should be familiar with the terms of this treaty and know what their responsibilities are in the event of war.
Treaty of Alliance between Austria-Hungary, the German Empire, and Italy. Vienna, December 5, 1912.
Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary, the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, and the King of Italy, firmly resolved to assure to Their States the continuation of the benefits which the maintenance of the Triple Alliance guarantees to them, from the political point of view as well as from the monarchical and social point of view, and wishing with this object to prolong the duration of this Alliance, concluded on May 20, 1882, renewed a first time by the Treaties of February 20, 1887, a second time by the Treaty of May 6, 1891, and a third time by the Treaty of June 28, 1902, have, for this purpose, appointed as Their Plenipotentiaries, to wit:
His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary: Count Leopold Berchtold von und zu Ungarschitz, His Minister of the Imperial and Royal Household and of Foreign Affairs, President of the Common Council of Ministers; His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia: the Sieur Heinrich von Tschirschky und Bogendorff, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary; and His Majesty the King of Italy: Duke Giuseppe d’Avarna, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary, who, after exchange of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and will enter into no alliance or engagement directed against any one of their States.
They engage to proceed to an exchange of ideas on political and economic questions of a general nature which may arise, and they further promise one another mutual support within the limits of their own interests.
ARTICLE 2
In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the Party attacked.
This same obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of any aggression without direct provocation by France against Germany.
ARTICLE 3
If one, or two, of the High Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on their part, should chance to be attacked and to be engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers nonsignatory to the present Treaty, the casus foederis will arise simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 4
In case a Great Power nonsignatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its Ally.
ARTICLE 5
If the peace of one of the High Contracting Parties should chance to be threatened under the circumstances foreseen by the preceding Articles, the High Contracting Parties shall take counsel together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual cooperation.
They engage, henceforth, in all cases of common participation in a war, to conclude neither armistice, nor peace, nor treaty, except by common agreement among themselves.
ARTICLE 6
Germany and Italy, having in mind only the maintenance, so far as possible, of the territorial status quo in the Orient, engage to use their influence to forestall on the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and the Aegean Seas any territorial modification which might be injurious to one or the other of the Powers signatory to the present Treaty. To this end, they will communicate to one another all information of a nature to enlighten each other mutually concerning their own dispositions, as well as those of other Powers.
ARTICLE 7
Austria-Hungary and Italy, having in mind only the maintenance, so far as possible, of the territorial status quo in the Orient, engage to use their influence to forestall any territorial modification which might be injurious to one or the other of the Powers signatory to the present Treaty. To this end, they shall communicate to one another all information of a nature to enlighten each other mutually concerning their own dispositions, as well as those of other Powers. However, if, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea should become impossible, and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two Powers, based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the present status quo, and giving satisfaction to the interests and well founded claims of the two Parties.
ARTICLE 8
The stipulations of Articles 6 and 7 shall apply in no way to the Egyptian question, with regard to which the High Contracting Parties preserve respectively their freedom of action, regard being always paid to the principles upon which the present Treaty rests.
ARTICLE 9
Germany and Italy engage to exert themselves for the maintenance of the territorial status quo in the North African regions on the Mediterranean, to wit, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Tunisia. The Representatives of the two Powers in these regions shall be instructed to put themselves into the closest intimacy of mutual communication and assistance.
If unfortunately, as a result of a mature examination of the situation, Germany and Italy should both recognize that the maintenance of the status quo has become impossible, Germany engages, after a formal and previous agreement, to support Italy in any action in the form of occupation or other taking of guaranty which the latter should undertake in these same regions with a view to an interest of equilibrium and of legitimate compensation.
It is understood that in such an eventuality the two Powers would seek to place themselves likewise in agreement with England.
ARTICLE 10
If it were to happen that France should make a move to extend her occupation, or even her protectorate or her sovereignty, under any form whatsoever, in the North African territories, and that in consequence thereof Italy, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel that she must herself undertake action in the said North African territories, or even have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war which would thereby ensue between Italy and France would constitute ipso facto, on the demand of Italy, and at the common charge of Germany and Italy, the casus foederis foreseen by Articles 2 and 5 of the present Treaty, as if such an eventuality were expressly contemplated therein.
ARTICLE 11
If the fortunes of any war undertaken in common against France by the two Powers should lead Italy to seek for territorial guaranties with respect to France for the security of the frontiers of the Kingdom and of her maritime position, as well as with a view to stability and to peace, Germany will present no obstacle thereto, and, if need be, and in a measure compatible with circumstances, will apply herself to facilitating the means of attaining such a purpose.
ARTICLE 12
The High Contracting Parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents of the present Treaty.
ARTICLE 13
The Signatory Powers reserve the right of subsequently introducing, in the form of a Protocol and of a common agreement, the modifications of which the utility should be demonstrated by circumstances.
ARTICLE 14
The present Treaty shall remain in force for the space of six years, dating from the expiration of the Treaty now in force; but if it has not been denounced one year in advance by one or another of the High Contracting Parties, it shall remain in force for the same duration of six more years.
ARTICLE 15
The ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged at Vienna within a period of a fortnight, or sooner if may be.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.
Done at Vienna, in triplicate, the fifth day of the month of December, one thousand nine hundred and twelve.
L. S. Berchtold
[Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary].
L. S. von Tschirschky
[German Ambassador to Austria-Hungary].
L. S. Avarna
[Italian Ambassador to Austria-Hungary].
Source: Alfred Francis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914, Volume 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920), 245–59.
The First Balkan War, which pitted Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria against the Ottoman Empire, resulted in quick defeat for Turkish forces, but serious disputes arose over how the spoils would be divided. The Bulgarian government claimed the lion’s share, arguing that its troops had done the bulk of the fighting. Greece and Serbia rejected this claim, and concluded this alliance.
Signed, May 19/ June 1, 1913; ratifications exchanged at Athens, June 8/21, 1913.
His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of Serbia, considering that it is their duty to look after the security of their people and the tranquillity of their kingdoms; considering furthermore, in their firm desire to preserve a durable peace in the Balkan Peninsula, that the most effective means to attain it is to be united by a close defensive alliance;
Have resolved to conclude an alliance of peace, of friendship, and of mutual protection, promising to each other never to give to their purely defensive agreement an offensive character, and for that purpose they have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:
His Majesty the King of the Hellenes; Mr. John Alexandropoulos, his Minister at Belgrade, Commander of the Royal Order of the Savior, Grand Commander of the Royal Order of Takovo; His Majesty the King of Serbia; Mr. Mathias Boschkovitch, his Minister at Athens, Grand Commander of the Royal Order of Saint Sava, Commander of the Royal Order of the Savior, who, after having exchanged their full powers found in good and due form, have today agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The two high contracting parties covenant expressly the mutual guarantee of their possessions and bind themselves, in case, contrary to their hopes, one of the two kingdoms should be attacked without any provocation on its part, to afford to each other assistance with all their armed forces and not to conclude peace subsequently except jointly and together.
ARTICLE 2
At the division of the territories of European Turkey, which will be ceded to the Balkan States after the termination of the present war by the treaty of peace with the Ottoman Empire, the two high contracting parties bind themselves not to come to any separate understanding with Bulgaria, to afford each other constant assistance, and to proceed always together, upholding mutually their territorial claims and the boundary lines hereafter to be indicated.
ARTICLE 3
The two high contracting parties, considering that it is to the vital interest of their kingdoms that no other state should interpose between their respective possessions to the west of the Axios (Vardar) river, declare that they will mutually assist one another in order that Greece and Serbia may have a common boundary line. This boundary line, based on the principle of effective occupation, shall start from the highest summit of the mountain range of Kamna, delimiting the basin of the Upper Schkoumbi, it shall pass round the lake Achris (Ochrida), shall reach the western shore of the Prespa lake in the Kousko village and the eastern shore to the Lower Dupliani (Dolni Dupliani), shall run near Rahmanli, shall follow the line of separation of the waters between the Erigon (Tserna) river and Moglenica and shall reach the Axios (Vardar) river at a distance of nearly three kilometers to the south of Ghevgheh, according to the line drawn in detail in Annex I of the present treaty.
ARTICLE 4
The two high contracting parties agree that the Greco-Bulgarian and Serbo-Bulgarian boundary lines shall be established on the principle of actual possession and the equilibrium between the three states, as follows:
The eastern frontier of Serbia from Ghevgheli shall follow the course of the Axios (Vardar) river up to the confluence of Bojimia-Dere, shall ascend that river, and, passing by the altitudes 120, 350, 754, 895, 571, and the rivers Kriva, Lakavitza, Bregalnica and Zletovska shall proceed towards a point of the old Turkish-Bulgarian frontier on the Osogovska Planina, altitude 2225, according to the line drawn in detail in the Annex II of the present treaty.
The Greek frontier on the side of Bulgaria shall leave to Greece on the left shore of Axios (Vardar) the territories occupied by the Greek and Serbian troops opposite Ghevgheli and Davidovo as far as the mountain Beles and the Doiran lake; then, passing to the south of Kilkitch it shall run through the Strymon river by the north of the Orliako bridge and shall proceed through the Achinos (Tachinos) lake and the Angitis (Anghista) river to the sea, a little to the east of the Gulf of Eleutherai according to the line drawn in detail in the Annex III of the present treaty.
ARTICLE 5
Should a dissension arise with Bulgaria in regard to the frontiers as indicated above, and if every friendly settlement becomes impossible, the two high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to propose by common agreement, to Bulgaria, that the dispute be submitted to the mediation or arbitration of the sovereigns of the Entente Powers or the chiefs of other states. In case Bulgaria shall refuse to accept this manner of peaceful settlement and assume a menacing attitude against either of the two kingdoms, or attempt to impose her claims by force, the two high contracting parties bind themselves solemnly to afford assistance to each other with all their armed forces and not to conclude peace subsequently except jointly and together.
ARTICLE 6
In order to prepare and to secure the means of military defense, a military convention shall be concluded with the least possible delay from the signature of the present treaty.
ARTICLE 7
His Majesty the King of the Hellenes covenants that his government shall grant all the necessary facilities and guarantees for a period of fifty years for the complete freedom of the export and import trade of Serbia through the port of Salonika and the railway lines from Salonika to Uskup and Monastir. This freedom shall be as large as possible, provided only it is compatible with the full and entire exercise of the Hellenic sovereignty.
A special convention shall be concluded between the two high contracting parties within one year from this day in order to regulate in detail the carrying out of this article.
ARTICLE 8
The two high contracting parties agree that upon the final settlement of all the questions resulting from the present war, the General Staffs of the two armies shall come to an understanding with the view of regulating in a parallel manner the increase of the military forces of each state.
ARTICLE 9
The two high contracting parties agree furthermore that, upon the final settlement of all the questions resulting from the present war, they will proceed by common agreement to the study of a plan of a custom convention, in order to draw closer the commercial and economic relations of the two countries.
ARTICLE 10
The present treaty shall be put in force after its signature. It can not be denounced before the expiration of ten years. The intention for the cessation of its force shall be notified by one of the two high contracting parties to the other six months in advance, in the absence of which the agreement shall continue to be binding upon the two states until the expiration of one year from the date of the denunciation.
ARTICLE 11
The present treaty shall be kept strictly secret. It can not be communicated to another Power either totally or partially, except with the consent of the two high contracting parties.
It shall be ratified as soon as possible. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Athens.
In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty and affixed their seals.
Executed in Salonika, in duplicate, the nineteenth day of May in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirteen.
John Alexandropoulos [Greek Minister to Serbia].
M. Boschkovitch [Serbian Minister to Greece].
Source: “Diplomatic Documents, 1913–1917, Issued by the Greek Government Concerning the Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance and the Germano-Bulgarian Invasion in Macedonia: Part First,” American Journal of International Law, 12:2 (April 1918), 89–92.
Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, were killed by Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip while on a formal visit to Sarajevo. Princip shot Ferdinand at point blank range while the latter was traveling in his car from a town hall reception, having earlier that day already survived one assassination attempt. Standing on the car’s sideboard was Ferdinand’s bodyguard, Count Franz von Harrach. A witness to Ferdinand’s assassination, he subsequently recounted the events of the day. A portion of his translated memoir is reproduced below.
As the car quickly reversed, a thin stream of blood spurted from His Highness’s mouth onto my right check. As I was pulling out my handkerchief to wipe the blood away from his mouth, the Duchess cried out to him, “For God’s sake! What has happened to you?”
At that she slid off the seat and lay on the floor of the car, with her face between his knees.
I had no idea that she too was hit and thought she had simply fainted with fright. Then I heard His Imperial Highness say, “Sophie, Sophie, don’t die. Stay alive for the children!”
At that, I seized the Archduke by the collar of his uniform, to stop his head dropping forward and asked him if he was in great pain. He answered me quite distinctly, “It is nothing!”
His face began to twist somewhat but he went on repeating, six or seven times, ever more faintly as he gradually lost consciousness, “It’s nothing!”
Then came a brief pause followed by a convulsive rattle in his throat, caused by a loss of blood. This ceased on arrival at the governor’s residence.
The two unconscious bodies were carried into the building where their death was soon established.
Source: Assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, 1914, Eyewitness to History, http://
The Communist Manifesto presented the basic outline of Marxist ideology. It traces the historical development of capitalism, which concentrated wealth and power in the hands of the bourgeoisie (who owned the “means of production”—that is, the factories) and inflicted misery on the proletariat, who were forced to sell their labor (for they owned nothing else) in order to survive. Marx and Engels predicted that the bourgeoisie would continue to shrink in number as more and more would be pushed into the proletariat. Eventually the proletarians would become so numerous and miserable that they would rise up to overthrow capitalism. Under the new “dictatorship of the proletariat” all private property would be abolished, and the oppressive class system would be destroyed once and for all.
The manifesto paid very little attention to international affairs, but the following passage provided the touchstone for most Marxist thinking on the subject. It was also commonly cited by opponents of Marxism as evidence of the movement’s dangerous radicalism.
The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality.
The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.
National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.
The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.
In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.
Source: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party: II. Proletarians and Communists, The Avalon Project, https://
At a mass party meeting at Erfurt in 1891, the German Social Democratic Party endorsed the following program. Note that while it continues to call for Marxist revolution, it also provides evidence of a new practical orientation within the party—one that encouraged its members to work through existing political institutions. The resignation of Bismarck a year earlier and the expiration of the ban on socialist organizations had ended a state-sanctioned policy of persecution against the party.
In the elections of 1912, the Social Democratic Party received more votes than any other political party, and therefore had a plurality (although far from a majority) of seats in the Reichstag in 1914.
The economic development of bourgeois society invariably leads to the ruin of small business, which is based on the private ownership by the worker of his means of production. It separates the worker from his means of production and turns him into a propertyless proletarian, while the means of production become the monopoly of a relatively small number of capitalists and large landowners.
Hand in hand with this monopolization of the means of production goes the displacement of these fractured small businesses by colossal large enterprises, the development of the tool into a machine, the gigantic growth in the productivity of human labor. But all the benefits of this transformation are monopolized by the capitalists and large landowners. For the proletariat and the sinking middle classes—petty bourgeoisie and farmers—it means an increase in the insecurity of their existence, of misery, of pressure, of oppression, of degradation, of exploitation.
Ever greater becomes the number of proletarians, ever more massive the army of excess workers, ever more stark the opposition between exploiters and the exploited, ever more bitter the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which divides modern society into two hostile camps and constitutes the common characteristic of all industrialized countries.
The gulf between the propertied and the propertyless is further widened by crises that are grounded in the nature of the capitalist mode of production, crises that are becoming more extensive and more devastating, that elevate this general uncertainty into the normal state of society and furnish proof that the powers of productivity have grown beyond society’s control, that the private ownership of the means of production has become incompatible with their appropriate application and full development.
The private ownership of the means of production, once the means for securing for the producer the ownership of his product, has today become the means for expropriating farmers, artisans, and small merchants, and for putting the non-workers—capitalists, large landowners—into possession of the product of the workers. Only the transformation of the capitalist private ownership of the means of production—land and soil, pits and mines, raw materials, tools, machines, means of transportation—into social property and the transformation of the production of goods into socialist production carried on by and for society can cause the large enterprise and the constantly growing productivity of social labor to change for the hitherto exploited classes from a source of misery and oppression into a source of the greatest welfare and universal, harmonious perfection.
This social transformation amounts to the emancipation not only of the proletariat, but of the entire human race, which is suffering from current conditions. But it can only be the work of the working class, because all other classes, notwithstanding the conflicts of interest between them, stand on the ground of the private ownership of the means of production and have as their common goal the preservation of the foundations of contemporary society.
The struggle of the working class against capitalist exploitation is necessarily a political struggle. Without political rights, the working class cannot carry on its economic struggles and develop its economic organization. It cannot bring about the transfer of the means of production into the possession of the community without first having obtained political power.
It is the task of the Social Democratic Party to shape the struggle of the working class into a conscious and unified one and to point out the inherent necessity of its goals.
The interests of the working class are the same in all countries with a capitalist mode of production. With the expansion of global commerce, and of production for the world market, the position of the worker in every country becomes increasingly dependent on the position of workers in other countries. The emancipation of the working class is thus a task in which the workers of all civilized countries are equally involved. Recognizing this, the German Social Democratic Party feels and declares itself to be one with the class-conscious workers of all other countries.
The German Social Democratic Party therefore does not fight for new class privileges and class rights, but for the abolition of class rule and of classes themselves, for equal rights and equal obligations for all, without distinction of sex or birth. Starting from these views, it fights not only the exploitation and oppression of wage earners in society today, but every manner of exploitation and oppression, whether directed against a class, party, sex, or race.
Proceeding from these principles, the German Social Democratic Party demands, first of all:
For the protection of the working classes, the German Social Democratic Party demands, first of all:
(a) Fixing of a normal working day not to exceed eight hours.
(b) Prohibition of gainful employment for children under the age of fourteen.
(c) Prohibition of night work, except in those industries that require night work for inherent technical reasons or for reasons of public welfare.
(d) An uninterrupted rest period of at least thirty-six hours every week for every worker.
(e) Prohibition of the truck system.
Source: The Erfurt Program (1891), German History in Documents and Images, http://www.germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=766.
The final decades of the nineteenth century in France saw the rise of a number of radical organizations dedicated to Marxian socialism. The most significant difference among them involved their willingness to participate in the politics of the French Republic. The French Socialist Party, founded in 1902 by Jean Jaurés, believed that socialists could achieve at least some of their objectives through participation in “bourgeois” governments. The Socialist Party of France, on the other hand, preferred to stay aloof from politics and instead focus on revolutionary agitation. Under pressure from the Second International, the various parties merged in 1905 to form the French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO), committed to the following program.
The delegates of the French organizations—the Revolutionary Socialist Workers’ Party, the Socialist Party of France, the French Socialist Party, the Independent Federations, etc.—declare that the action of the Unified Socialist Party must be based on the principles which have been established by the international congresses, especially the most recent ones at Paris in 1900 and at Amsterdam in 1904.
They state that the divergences of views and different interpretations of tactics, which have so far been able to appear, are due above all to circumstances peculiar to France and to the absence of a general organization.
They affirm their common desire to found a party of the class war which, even while it takes advantage for the workers of minor conflicts among the rich, or is by chance able to concert its action with that of a political party for the defense of the rights or interests of the proletariat, remains always a party of fundamental and unyielding opposition to the whole of the bourgeois class and to the State which is its instrument.
Consequently, the delegates declare that their organizations are ready to collaborate forthwith in this work of unifying the socialist forces on the following bases:
Articles 3 to 7 assert the authority of the party over all its elected representatives and over the party press, exacting from deputies a portion of their parliamentary salaries and obedience to a mandat impératif—that is, to prior instructions given to deputies by the party organization. The statement also proposes a Congress of Unity to be held as soon as possible.
Source: David Thomson, ed., France: Empire and Republic, 1850–1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 283–84.
Nearly 900 delegates from around the world attended the International Socialist Congress held at Stuttgart in August 1907. The delegates passed resolutions on women’s rights, colonialism, and immigration, but the main item on the agenda was militarism. There were increasing fears that a European war was imminent, and the congress sought to clarify the appropriate position for socialists around the world to adopt toward foreign affairs. Among those who approved the following resolution were leading figures of the German Social Democratic Party and the French SFIO. Players who seek to establish that socialists are likely to sabotage their countries’ war efforts may look to this document for support.
Wars between capitalist states, generally, result from their competitive struggle for world markets, for each state strives not only to assure for itself the markets it already possesses, but also to conquer new ones; in this the subjugation of foreign peoples and countries comes to play a leading role. Furthermore, these wars are caused by the incessant competition in armaments that characterizes militarism, the chief instrument of bourgeois class rule and of the economic and political subjugation of the working class.
Wars are promoted by national prejudices which are systematically cultivated among civilized peoples in the interest of the ruling classes for the purpose of diverting the proletarian masses from their own class problems as well as from their duties of international class solidarity.
Hence, wars are part of the very nature of capitalism; they will cease only when the capitalist economic order is abolished or when the number of sacrifices in men and money, required by the advance in military technique, and the indignation provoked by armaments drive the peoples to abolish this order.
For this reason, the working class, which provides most of the soldiers and makes most of the material sacrifices, is a natural opponent of war, for war contradicts its aim—the creation of an economic order on a socialist basis for the purpose of bringing about the solidarity of all peoples.…
If a war threatens to break out, it is the duty of the working class and of its parliamentary representatives in the countries involved, supported by the consolidating activity of the International [Socialist] Bureau, to exert every effort to prevent the outbreak of war by means they consider most effective, which naturally vary according to the accentuation of the class struggle and of the general political situation.
Should war break out none the less, it is their duty to intervene in favor of its speedy termination and to do all in their power to utilize the economic and political crisis caused by the war to rouse the peoples and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule.
Source: Olga Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher, eds., The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origin of the Third International (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1940), 57–59.
This editorial appeared in Le Bonnet Rouge, an anarchist newspaper published in Paris. Although it did not use Marxist rhetoric—appealing to “Republicans” as opposed to members of the working class—it certainly heightened the fears of nationalists that there might be public unrest in the event of a war against Germany.
To Republicans:
A poisoned atmosphere hangs over the country. The French people have lost confidence even in themselves. Reaction again takes the offensive and the Republic knows anew the attack of the Calottes.15
The reason?
The powerlessness of the Republic to make good its promises.
The Republic has an excuse: if it has not realized all the hopes that the people have placed in it and met all its engagements, it is because since its birth a terrible evil has depressed the world: the folly of armaments. Caught in the whirlwind, France has had to follow, and it can be said that the Republican regime has certainly prevented us going further into madness, but the hour has come to put an end to it.
All, or nearly all, of the national wealth falls into the bottomless pit of the budget for war. Money for social reforms, money to insure internal development and prosperity is lacking. No progress is made. France suffers and is exhausted. A general uneasiness obstructs commercial and industrial activity. A crisis is near. A collapse is probable.
The solution to avoid catastrophe?
Peace, peace solidly and definitively established.
The means to assure the peace of the world?
Franco-German Understanding
For fear of Germany, France made the Triple-Entente.
For fear of the Triple Entente, Germany arms herself ceaselessly.
To establish equilibrium France, Russia and England increase their armaments in proportion.
Menaced by these formidable forces, all the other countries enter the infernal round of armaments.
Thus is being prepared the most horrible slaughter the world has ever known.
Wisdom demands, then, the Franco-German understanding which will stop the nations in their race to death and will permit the redirecting toward productive ends a part of the sums absorbed in the preparation of war.
What is it that Opposes This Understanding? Economic Antagonism? The Desire for Revenge?
It is proved that the economic interests of France and Germany are more and more closely bound together. It is equally proved that the idea of revenge is repellent to the French people as a whole, and that the Alsatians and Lorrainers themselves regard it as a monstrosity.
We have made the entente with England and only a dozen years ago. England was for the French the “hereditary enemy,” “perfidious Albion,” which it was necessary to attack and subjugate. Remember the cry of “Aoh Yes!” cast as a slur on the democrats suspected of dreaming of an understanding with England … Canada … Fashoda … Fashoda was a more serious injury for us than Agadir!
We have forgotten; in a few months opinion has been reversed, the entente-cordiale is made, and no one would dare maintain that it was not a great benefit.
Why should not forgetfulness develop in connection with our differences with the Germans?
It is not possible that the remembrance of the war of ’70–’71 should hang eternally over the policy of France. Those who by their incitements feed the discord between the two countries are either fools or miserable fishers in troubled water.
Peace is the essential condition of human development.
Nothing in the order of social reforms and of great industrial and commercial achievements will be made unless the peace of the world is assured.
World peace will be assured only by a Franco-German understanding.
The next French Chamber ought to have a majority favorable to a Franco-German rapprochement.
Republicans who are zealous for a great and noble Republic; Democrats who dream of giving to the workers greater well-being; merchants who hope to work in calm and security tomorrow; voters, all powerful by virtue of the ballot, force the candidates to show their position on the question, and vote only for those who will agree to bring about this great work of public safety.
Source: “To Republicans,” Le Bonnet Rouge, 1913.
1. Pitt was prime minister during the Napoleonic Wars.
2. That is, William Pitt.
3. “Our future lies on the water,” that is, the world’s oceans.
4. “The ocean has only one master.”
5. A policy of revenge, specifically aimed at recovering lost territories (in this case, Alsace-Lorraine).
6. Mental reservation.
7. Count Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov (1853–1943) was chairman of Russia’s council of ministers from 1911 until his retirement at the end of January 1914. As prime minister he was the leading advocate of a cautious foreign policy, and he was thus despised by the pan-Slav activists at the tsar’s court.
8. Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin (1862–1911) was Kokovtsov’s predecessor as chairman of the council of ministers. He was assassinated in September 1911.
9. “Divide and rule.”
10. Thomas Schiemann, “The United States and the War Cloud in Europe,” McClure’s Magazine, June 1910.
11. That is, the Conservatives and their allies, the Liberal Unionists, who broke with the rest of the Liberal Party over home rule for Ireland.
12. The unknown factors.
13. The quotes are from Treitschke.
14. The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.
15. Calottes were skullcaps worn by certain members of the clergy; the word is being used here as a term of abuse against the Catholic Church, whom the French Left always associated with reaction.