Gloucester ablaze and out of control.
T he objectives of the British Fleet and the Luftwaffe were both clear and unequivocal. For the navy the objective was to prevent a seaborne invasion on Crete whilst the Luftwaffe’s aim was to clear the British Fleet from around the seas of Crete.
The lack of air support for the Royal Navy was now a crucial factor since the fleet was operating in the waters north of Crete, dangerously close to enemy airfields. Cunningham’s pleas and arguments for more air support in the preceding months had been unanswered in London. For the first time in history the might of a sea force was about to be pitted against the strength of an air force.
While the German convoy was being decimated by Glennie’s Force D Captain Rowley, aboard Gloucester and in command of Force B, consisting of Fiji and the destroyers Greyhound and Griffin, had spent a watchful but uneventful night in the Aegean. As daylight broke on 22 May 1941, the small force was sailing west to rejoin Rawlings’ A1 Force and the morning sun rose to reveal a beautiful clear sky.
At 0630, two waves of enemy aircraft, each consisting of twentyfive Stukas, attacked the cruisers. Gloucester and Fiji were the first British ships to come under attack from the pilots of Fliegerkorps Vlll. For an hour and a half countless attacks took place and both
Gloucester and Fiji were damaged by near misses. The superstructure of Gloucester was peppered by fragmentation bombs and more serious damage was avoided through a combination of Captain Rowley’s skill in manoeuvring the ship, the untiring work of her gun crews and a certain amount of good fortune. At about 0800 the last of the enemy planes left and Force B reached the relative safety of Rawlings’ battle fleet half an hour later.
Glennie had already taken his ships west to rejoin Rawlings’ A1 force following the destruction of the German invasion force from Milos. The encounters with the Luftwaffe and the destruction of the convoy during the previous day had once again raised the problem of ammunition shortages on Glennie’s ships.
Gloucester and the other three ships in Force B rejoined Rawlings’ A1 force south-west of Kythira. Force B had been under attack from 0630, apart from a brief respite between 0800 and 0900. Admiral Rawlings’ A1 Force, which now included Gloucester, came under attack at varying intervals from 0900 and throughout the morning. Rawlings said that the expenditure of high angle ammunition; ‘gave cause for anxiety’.1
The ammunition returns provided good reason for his concern. At 0931, battleships Warspite and Valiant had 66% and 80% respectively but it was the cruiser deficiencies that caused most concern. Ajax had 40%, Orion 38%, Fiji 30%, Dido 25%, but alarmingly, Gloucester reported that she had only 18% of her ammunition left.
At 1045, Admiral Glennie’s Force D, which included Ajax, Orion and Dido, departed to Alexandria to reammunition. Why Gloucester didn’t leave with them is a mystery. Bearing in mind that her ammunition returns at 0931 showed that she had only 18% of her high angle ammunition left, and with the air attacks continuing, it was clear that this meagre supply would soon be used up, no matter how prudent her gun crews were.
Force D’s return to Alexandria had been ordered by Cunningham, who at the time was unaware of Gloucester’s depleted ammunition. Nevertheless it is difficult to understand why Rawlings, who did know, did not detach Gloucester to Alexandria with Glennie’s force, all of whom had more ammunition than Gloucester.
Admiral King’s Force C meanwhile, was steaming north towards the island of Milos, in an attempt to intercept any further Cretebound invasion convoys. From 0700 the force came under attack from the air but at 0830 a caique was sighted, with German troops aboard. The Australian cruiser, Perth, was detached from Force C, to sink the luckless caique, which was a survivor from the flotilla that Glennie’s force had routed in the early hours of the previous night.
J K E Nelson was a sailor aboard Perth who recalled seeing the caique flying a swastika but then they ran up a white flag. He said that after some Germans had abandoned the caique, Perth opened up with her pom-poms and more German troops came up onto the deck and dived over the side. Perth finished off the caique with a salvo from her 4-inch guns, while a German soldier was still desperately clinging to the rigging.2
King’s force then sank a small merchant ship and at 1000, saw an enemy torpedo boat escorting some caiques about twenty-five miles south of Milos. The convoy which they came across was a second invasion flotilla bound for Crete and larger than the one that had been devastated during the previous night. King deployed his destroyers to give chase to the enemy convoy. The cruisers Perth and Naiad engaged the Italian destroyer Sagittario, the principal escort ship of the convoy, which by now was making smoke to hide the caiques.
King’s force had become divided during this action and was therefore vulnerable. With mounting air attacks from Stukas and JU88 bombers, King now had to make a crucial decision: whether to pursue and destroy the enemy convoy or turn about and head west to link up with Admiral Rawlings’ force, to the west of Kythira.
In King’s force, Carlisle’s speed had been reduced to twenty-one knots, and because of the continuous air attacks, Force C’s high angle ammunition was being used up at an alarming rate. King decided to call off the chase. With his ships now regrouped, he had to fight his way west to meet up with Rawlings A1 Force.
For over three hours, after turning about, King’s force repulsed attacks by Stukas and bombers during which Naiad and Carlisle were both hit. Captain L T C Hampton, the commanding officer on Carlisle, was killed.
Rawlings, meanwhile, was aware of Admiral King’s plight and signalled to him that Force A1 would be situated between twenty and thirty miles west of the Anti Kythira channel during the morning, awaiting King’s force.
At 1225, Rawlings received a signal from King saying that Naiad was badly damaged and in need of support. Rawlings then made the decision to go east into the Aegean and ordered his force to increase their speed to twenty-three knots. Gloucester was ordered to prepare to take Naiad in tow. The air attacks were now at their most intense and King’s ships were fighting for survival. At 1241, Rawlings received a further signal from King that Carlisle had been hit. Fiji was ordered to make preparations to take her in tow.
As Rawlings’ force raced towards King’s beleaguered ships it was apparent that they would again attract the attention of the Luftwaffe. At 1312, anti-aircraft shells were seen bursting in the sky above King’s force and Fiji was ordered ahead at full speed to take Carlisle in tow. However, at 1330, King signalled to Rawlings that Carlisle was not badly damaged, so Fiji was hastily recalled.
Cunningham later made adverse comments about some of King’s decisions. Although little has been said regarding the misunderstanding of the extent to which Carlisle was damaged, it is apparent that Fiji was unnecessary exposed for some time because of the mix up.
At 1332, Rawlings’ force had reached the middle of the Kythira channel when his flagship, Warspite, was dive bombed by three Bf109s coming directly down the fore and aft line of the great ship. The leading plane dropped its bombs, hitting the starboard 4-inch guns. The starboard 4-inch and 6-inch batteries were put out of action and damage caused to the No 3 boiler room intakes reduced the ship’s speed.
King’s westbound force had, by now, joined with Rawlings’ ships, which had been steaming east to support them. Rawlings turned his ships about and the fleet made their escape to the west. Dense smoke from Warspite’s boiler meant that the turn about had to be carried out away from King’s force and as a consequence, a distance of four miles opened up between the two forces.
Rear Admiral King, who was senior to Rawlings, took overall command and from then on he had the responsibility of ensuring the safety of both forces.
Almost immediately he had to deal with an attack on the destroyer Greyhound.
Greyhound had been despatched at 1320, to sink a large caique that was travelling south between the islands of Pori and Anti Kythira. Having succeeded in sinking the caique, Greyhound rejoined the wing of King’s force but was immediately attacked by dive-bombers and hit twice. At 1358, King signalled Rawlings to take his force to Greyhound to give her support. Incredibly however, only two minutes later at 1400, King changed his mind and ordered Rawlings to give close support to his own force, instead of to Greyhound. King then ordered Gloucester and Fiji to give cover to the destroyers Kingston and Kandahar, who were already on their way to Greyhound.
Gloucester ablaze and out of control.
Gloucester’s final moments. Photographs taken by a German Pilot.
At 1413, with air attacks continuing, King repeated his call to Rawlings for close support, adding that his ships had practically no high angle ammunition left. Rawlings, by now, was extremely anxious about King’s orders to Gloucester and Fiji. He signalled his anxiety to King informing him of the desperate shortage of ammunition on both ships, especially Gloucester. King then changed his orders again and instructed Gloucester and Fiji to withdraw, at Captain Rowley’s discretion.
At 1530, Rawlings’ A1 Force and King’s Force C, could see Gloucester and Fiji steaming at full speed in a desperate attempt to rejoin the safety of the battle fleet. However, the two cruisers were by then engaging enemy dive-bombers and because Gloucester had used up her few remaining rounds of high angle ammunition, the attacks came in lower and lower.
At 1530, the inevitable happened and Gloucester was hit. Fiji, herself out of 4-inch ammunition, signalled that Gloucester was out of control. Rawlings received the signals from Fiji and relayed them to King. King replied that he would order Gloucester to be sunk.
King then became uncertain about his decision and at 1555, signalled to Rawlings, saying that if the battle fleet went back to support Gloucester, they ran the risk of more ships being damaged or even lost. He then asked for Rawlings’ views.
King’s signal to Rawlings clearly indicates that he was finding it impossible to decide on the best course of action. In the end, it was left to Rawlings to advise King that in view of the state of Force C, Gloucester would have to be left. King then ordered Fiji to sink Gloucester and withdraw.
Notes
1. Letter of Proceedings PRO ADM 199/810 110319
2. Crete 1941 Eyewitnessed p.l35.