Michele Alessandrelli

Aspects and Problems of Chrysippus’ Conception of Space

In this paper I will be examining three important concepts in Chrysippus’ physics of space: those of τόπος, κενόν, and χώρα. Based on the evidence from the most relevant texts for this topic,89 I shall argue that Chrysippus had a counter-intuitive conception of place and that he introduced the concept of χώρα (on the basis of two controversial definitions)90 in order to compensate for one inconvenience of this conception of τόπος. It was a matter for him of accounting for human beings’ everyday experience of intra-cosmic spaces as permanent extensions that may be accessed: for his counter-intuitive conception of place fell short in this respect. I shall then argue that in the most important source for Chrysippus’ conception of space, fr. 25 of Arius Didymus, evidence is also provided for a problematical and quasi-dialectical stage of Chrysippus’ reflection on void.

Chrysippus’ definitions of χώρα were accepted in essence yet formally rejected by most Stoics. As a result, a definition of χώρα was developed that is very similar, in its formulation,⁹¹ to the way in which Chrysippus – in the passage from Stobaeus⁹² – describes the οὐκ ὠνομασμένον ὅλον stemming from the co-presence of occupied and unoccupied space. With regard to this matter, I will be suggesting that later Stoics, however, did not take this concept of χώρα to denote a genuine co-presence of full (place) and void. Rather, a distinction was drawn between a rigorous notion of occupied space (place) and unoccupied space (void) on the one hand, and a weaker and more informal one on the other. According to the latter, occupied space is simply that which cannot be accessed, whereas unoccupied space is that which can be accessed. Chrysippus’ second definition of χώρα⁹³ was possibly taken up and partly misinterpreted by a minority faction within the Stoic school.⁹⁴ I will also suggest that starting from a reflection on the nameless entity stemming from the co-presence of full (place) and void, either Chrysippus or his disciples ultimately came to draw a distinction between the whole (ὅλον) and the all (πᾶν).⁹⁵

 

I will now be examining the testimony recording Chrysippus’ conception of and χώρα and κενόν.96 I shall attempt to construct a conceptual framework as consistent as possible by examining this passage and comparing it with two other important accounts, those of Aëtius and Sextus Empiricus.⁹⁷ What these most probably present is the official and orthodox position of the Stoa.⁹⁸ Sextus’ testimony also provides evidence for what would appear to have been a minority position within the school⁹⁹ (as concerns the concept of χώρα). The issue will be to understand what Chrysippus’ contribution consisted in and how it was met within the school.

Chrysippus may be credited with the content of fr. 25 of Arius Didymus. This source provides a few definitions (of place and χώρα), raises a problem (regarding the possible co-presence of full and void in the universe), and presents a series of considerations concerning void. The first spatial entity it tells us about is place:

Chrysippus argued that place (τόπος) is what is entirely occupied by what exists ( ), or what can be occupied by what exists and is entirely occupied by one thing or by several things ( κατεχόμενον εἴτε ).

Let us ask ourselves if what we have here is a single definition, formulated in two different ways, or rather two distinct definitions of the concept of topos. A comparison with the other two passages in question, from Aëtius and Sextus, might offer, perhaps, a few clues on the matter. Aëtius and Sextus Empiricus, however, provide a definitional statement that only matches the first of Chrysippus’ two statements.¹⁰⁰ These texts, therefore, would all appear to be presenting the same problem: if what we have is a single definition, formulated in two distinct ways, then it would seem that the orthodox Stoics simply chose the most simple formula; if, by contrast, what we have are two distinct definitions, then these philosophers must have chosen the first definition, leaving the second one aside. What we ought to do, then, is examine the content of these two definitional statements to see whether they lead to two different conceptions of place.

In lexical terms, the second definitional statement is richer than the first. We find two elements in it that are missing from the first statement. The first of these is the locution τὸ οἷόν . The second element is the expression ὑπὸ τινὸς

Let us start from the latter. Does the locution ὑπὸ τινὸς possess the same meaning and value as ὑπὸ ὄντος? On the one hand, since both expressions occur in the same definitional statement and are connected by the use of καί rather than ἤ, they must indeed have the same meaning. On the other hand, the plural form τινῶν poses a problem. How are we to interpret it? One possible interpretation is that Chrysippus here may be considering an existent from the point of view of its constitutive elements, which, despite their mutual interpenetration, preserve all their individual characteristics, thus remaining distinct from one another.¹⁰¹ Another possibility would be to argue that Chrysippus is here considering an existent from the perspective of the relation between the whole and its parts. As a whole, the existent is a ti, but as a sum or collection of parts it is instead a multiplicity, hence the use of tina. Both interpretations are possible; indeed, we cannot rule out that Chrysippus had both meanings in mind, regarding them as mutually compatible. By contrast, we should rule out a third possible interpretation: that by the use of τινῶν Chrysippus is suggesting that the same place can be occupied in different times by different existents. For we shall see that each place is the place of a body, and one only. If any multiplicity exists, it must be intrinsic to the occupying body.

One conclusion that may immediately be inferred from this is the following: one of the two lexical differences we have noted would appear to merely consist in a conceptual specification rather than any real change in terms of content.

Let us now turn to consider the expression .¹⁰² This occurs at three different points in Arius Didymus’ fragment: in its definition of place¹⁰³, in its description of the nameless compound stemming from the co-presence of place and void,¹⁰⁴ and in the first definition of χώρα.¹⁰⁵ In Sextus’ account the expression only occurs in relation to the definition of void,¹⁰⁶ whereas Aëtius makes no mention of it at all.¹⁰⁷

Given the importance of this expression, let me also make a few preliminary observations about it.

In order to be “capable of being occupied by an existing body”, a portion of space must be conceived of as being free and unoccupied. With regard to this matter, I wish to propose the following hypothesis. The expression “unoccupied” may be understood in two different ways: either as a complete absence of body, which is to say as void;¹⁰⁸ or as the absence of any impenetrable bodies which, by putting up resistance, might make the occupied portion of space inaccessible and out of bounds. In this case, what we would have is not void, but merely the presence of diffused and penetrable bodies, such as air for instance.

Vice versa, the expression “occupied by” may also be understood in two different ways: either in the rigorous sense of a space that is utterly full, or in the more informal sense of a space that is not free, since it is occupied for the most part by bodies that put up a resistance and hence is out of bounds.

What I would suggest is that the uses of the expression τὸ οἷόν - σθαι in the fragment from Arius Didymus and in the passage from Sextus are all to be understood in the former sense, except in relation to Chrysippus’ first definition of χώρα. In the case of Chrysippus’ definition of place, as we shall soon see, the locution is used to express a particular possibility. The participles τὸ κατεχόμενον (definiens of place in Aëtius and Sextus) and - χόμενον (scil. : definiens of void in Sextus) are also to be understood in the former sense. By contrast, the use of this expression in the first of Chrysip pus’ two definitions of χώρα poses some problems. If we understand the expression according to the first of the two meanings I have outlined, we are forced to credit Chrysippus with the idea of χώρα as a co-presence of full and void. Yet from the same Arius Didymus fragment we learn that Chrysippus did not at all conceive of this ὅλον as χώρα, for he regarded it as a mere cosmic possibility, which as such has no name yet. His use of the expression, then, only becomes intelligible when it is understood in the latter sense. Chrysippus may have realised this and – in order not to jeopardise the rigour of the expression, referring to highly formal concepts such as those of void and place – may have used a different one in his second definition. These arguments all rest on the hypothesis that Chrysippus regarded χώρα as an intra-cosmic spatial reality in which there can be no void. I believe that the participles τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχόμενον (definiens of χώρα in the passage from Aëtius), (the positive definiens of χώρα in the passage from Sextus), and κατὰ δέ τι ἀκαθεκτούμενον (scil. : the negative definiens of χώρα in the passage from Sextus) are also to be understood in the latter sense.

Let us now return to the passage from Stobaeus. As previously mentioned, in the second definitional statement the expression in question is used to evoke a possibility of a certain kind. To be more precise, in the case of place it evokes a counter-factual possibility that stands in contrast to the actual condition of place: the fact that place is always full, i. e. always wholly occupied, which is its actual situation, is counterbalanced by the possibility of conceiving place as a portion of space that is merely ‘occupiable’, i. e. without the body occupying it. This interpretation is based on the fact that place is an incorporeal, whereas the existent occupying it is a body. This ontological difference enables one to conceptualise or imagine the former without the latter.

In this case too we are to rule out the possibility that Chrysippus may be using the expression to suggest that the same place can be occupied by a body other than the one currently occupying it: for place is not pre-existent to the body occupying it, but by subsisting in connection to it, receives its configuration from it.¹⁰⁹

We may therefore conclude that even the second lexical difference does not introduce any conceptual innovations so relevant as to make the statement in which it occurs a separate definition of place. Rather, this difference may be regarded as an integration, an improvement upon the first definitional statement. Its aim would appear to be that of stressing – if only counter-factually – the incorporeal nature of each place, which appeared to be jeopardised by the strong dependence of each place upon the body occupying it. If I envisage a place as being occupable, this is because I am thinking of it without the body that actually occupies it. But if I can think of a place without the body occupying it, this is because place is not itself a body, but rather an incorporeal. To return to Sto baeus’ text, we might even consider translating the ἤ connecting Chrysippus’ two statements as ‘or rather’.

Place would seem to be the incorporeal¹¹⁰ manifesting the highest degree of dependence upon the corporeal. Place is always the place of a body.¹¹¹ If there were no body occupying a given place, there would be no place as the place of that body. Each body, therefore, has a place, and one only. Place is described as finite by Chrysippus since every body is finite.¹¹² Each place is also said to be the same size as the body occupying it.¹¹³ This means that a place will be wholly delimited and defined by the body occupying it. If the latter is removed, its place is also removed. If this is the case, we are to imagine that when a body moves, its place also moves with it. This means that wherever a body may find itself or go, it will always be occupying the same place, its own – that delimited by its height, width, and depth. Let us ask ourselves: can a place be occupied by a body other than that which presently occupies it? No, it cannot. For in order to be occupied by another body, it would have to exhibit a degree of ontological independence from the body currently occupying it. But this is not the case. A place does not exist prior to the body occupying it, but only comes about with it, and is removed with it. What does the incorporeality of place consist in? No Stoic answer to this question has reached us. What we do know, however, is that incorporeality coincides with an incapability to do or suffer anything.¹¹⁴ In what way does place neither act nor suffer anything? To answer this question, let us imagine what would happen if place were a body. If place were a body, it would either put up resistance to the body trying to occupy it, thus leaving it without a place, or would endure the action of the body attempting to oust it. If it were ousted, the place too would be removed, since according to our hypothesis the body in question is the place. Hence in this latter case too the body would have no place. Only by conceiving place as something that neither acts nor suffers anything, can each body have its own place. To claim that every discrete body has its own place – and this must also somehow apply to extended bodies or corporeal masses – is tantamount to claiming that for each body at least a portion of space in the cosmos is set aside, delimited by the body’s height, width and depth. If this portion were not incorporeal, this minimum requirement would not be met. If this requirement were not met, there would be no bodies in the cosmos, since a body cannot find itself in the cosmos if it is not even allowed to occupy the portion of space delimited by its own height, width and depth.

Let us further examine Stobaeus’ text:

If what can be occupied by an existent is partly occupied and partly unoccupied, the (resulting) whole will be neither void nor place, but another nameless thing (ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ οἵου ). For void is thus called by analogy to empty containers, whereas place is thus called by analogy to full containers (τὸ μὲν γὰρ κενὸν τοῖς κενοῖς ers, whereas place is thus called by analogy to full containers ( ).

It is worth pointing out right from the start that the hypothetical sentence in the text is a third class condition, used to consider an eventuality. In the protasis, Chrysippus hypothesises the eventuality of a co-presence of void and full in a shared space; in the apodosis, he states what will happen, should the eventuality considered occur. The consequence of this would be a spatial ὅλον that differs from both place and void, and hence has no name.

What follows is intended to explain why the ὅλον stemming from the co-presence of void and full has no name. Let us call this ὅλον ‘void’, specifying that we are speaking of void by analogy to an empty container: we will find that the term ‘void’ cannot apply to this ὅλον, since the latter is similar not to an empty container, but rather to a container that is only partly empty. Let us then call it a ‘place’, specifying that we are speaking of place by analogy to a full container: we will find that the term ‘place’ cannot apply to this ὅλον, since the latter is similar not to a full container, but rather to a container that is only partially full. In other words, to claim that this ὅλον has no name is to say that it cannot be designated by the name of one of its parts.

In the light of the fact that Chrysippus referred to the ὅλον stemming from the co-presence of place and void as an eventuality, we can reassess the reason why he claimed this ὅλον to be a nameless thing. Since the latter was simply an eventuality for Chrysippus, by claiming it is nameless he sought not to banish it from his ontology outright, but simply to point out – on the basis of the primacy of the whole over its parts – that if we were to admit such a ὅλον or something of the sort, we could never call it – or rather christen it – with the name of one of its parts. Finally, it is important to note that when thinking of the co-presence of place and void, Chrysippus situated it as an eventuality at the cosmic level.

The following section in the passage under scrutiny concerns Chrysippus’ concept of χώρα. This is the most controversial section of the entire passage. It reads:

χώρα is what is bigger or more extensive and may be occupied by an existent, as a more extensive container for a body or what can contain a more extensive body ( ).

Let me start by saying that the use of the particles … ἤ115 in the text indeed suggests that Chrysippus had two alternative definitions of χώρα in mind. This does not necessarily entail two distinct concepts of χώρα, for it might simply be a sign of uncertainty on Chrysippus’ part as to which of the two definitions he should choose. As already mentioned, we cannot rule out the possibility that Chrysippus was reluctant to use the expression ὄντος as the definiens of χώρα. Indeed, in the latter definition it is replaced by the expression τὸ χωροῦν.

The claim, made in the first definition of χώρα, that the containing space is more extensive than the contained body reflects the way in which perceivers constantly experience the space they access and inhabit in their everyday lives. These portions of intra-cosmic space are perceived as extensions that are never entirely occupied and filled by bodies, which is to say as extensions that are at least partly or predominantly accessible. If this were not the case, the world would simply be inaccessible.

The expression is rather enigmatic. I have opted for the most common reading of its ordo verborum.¹¹⁶ According to this reading, τὸ χωροῦν is a participle noun serving as a nominal predicate and as the predicative complement of the subject (χώρα), whereas is the object of τὸ χωροῦν. Μεῖζον is ‘bigger’ and χωρέω, when used transitively, means precisely ‘contain’.¹¹⁷ From a syntactic point of view, a different reading of the above definition is also possible.¹¹⁸ However, since my interpretation of the Stoic concept of χώρα is compatible with both, simply as a matter of philological prudence, I prefer to stick to the first reading.

The claim that χώρα is what contains a ‘bigger’ body, by contrast, immediately raises the question: compared to what is this contained body ‘bigger’? This cannot be χώρα itself, which is the portion of space containing the body in question. By definition, χώρα will be ‘more extensive’ than this body, and in general any body it might be containing. Hence, the only thing compared to which a body might be called ‘bigger’ is another body. If this is the case, it remains to be determined what Chrysippus was seeking to emphasise by describing χώρα as a portion of space that contains a body bigger than another body.

With this aim in view, I wish to make the following remarks.

Only by taking account of Chrysippus’ counter-intuitive conception of place can we understand why he felt the need to introduce an apparently bizarre spatial reality such as χώρα, as it emerges in the definitions we are examining. What I would suggest is that Chrysippus did so in order to make up for the fact that by simply drawing upon his concept of place he could not speak of a portion of space that endures while being occupied by different bodies. As I just mentioned, the existence of portions of space occupied by several bodies is something that meets our gaze at every moment. This explains why, by definition, each χώρα will be bigger than the body it contains. If a were the same size as the body it contains, it would be identical to the topos. The concept of χώρα had to entail the idea of an intra-cosmic portion of space that is always more extensive than the body it contains.119 This portion will endure and preserve its configuration even if the bodies it contains are removed; for this very reason, it is capable of receiving several bodies. The spatial boundaries of this portion of space are defined by its contiguity with other portions or areas, serving other functions. The notion of such portion of space also entails that of a body –the contained body – that is never the same (as in the case of place), and that may be larger or smaller than the one before or after it, yet never more extensive than the aforementioned portion of space (this distinction is elliptically expressed through the quantitative language of Chrysippus’ second formulation: “bigger”).

It is possible that Chrysippus believed his two definitions of χώρα to capture both these characteristics. Where he had some doubts, perhaps, was as to which definition most perspicuously expressed these characteristics.

The first definition was possibly the clearest one. Still, it presented the locution , which strictly speaking referred to space as conceived without a body and thus was quite inappropriate to describe an intra-cosmic spatial reality. As previously mentioned, when predicated of an intra-cosmic reality, this expression would have to be understood in a more informal sense, as describing free, unoccupied space: space that is accessible, yet certainly not empty. Chrysippus may have found this informal use of the expression in relation to χώρα inappropriate and misleading. This would help explain why he used the substantival participle τὸ χωροῦν in his second definition. Still, this definition is so elliptical it is baffling. Chrysippus may have liked it because it refers the participle τὸ χωροῦν to an intra-cosmic spatial reality that is only partly accessible. For the reasons just noted, the mention of a μεῖζον body was possibly enough for Chrysippus to distinguish χώρα from place and thus ensure its function as a portion of space that endures despite the incessant movement of bodies coming, stopping, and going.

The final section in Stobaeus’ testimony concerns Chrysippus’ concept of void:

Void is thus said to be infinite: for such is what lies outside the cosmos (τὸ μὲν οὖν κενὸν ); place is finite on account of the fact that no body is infinite. Just as the corporeal is finite, so the incorporeal is infinite. Time and void are infinite ( . ). Just as nothingness is no limit, so there is no limit of nothing-as is no so is no ness, as in the case of void ( νός, οἷον ἐστι τὸ κενόν). On the basis of its subsistence, it is infinite, but it becomes limited when it is filled. When what fills it is removed, it is not possible to conceive of a limit for it ( ).

The first striking thing in this section is the lack of any definition of void. We also find three conceptual anomalies. The first is the claim that the incorporeal is infinite. This is no doubt true of void and time, but not of place and lekta. The claim thus attributes to the whole (the genus of the incorporeal) the characteristic of a part of it (infinity, which is only a prerogative of void and time). The second anomaly consists in the way in which place is described. On the one hand, the passage confirms the close dependence of place upon the corporeal element, but on the other, by pushing this dependence almost to the point of identity, Chrysippus appears to be almost conceiving of place as a body, by contrast to the infinite incorporeal void. The closing part of the section should not be interpreted to mean that according to Chrysippus void becomes place once it is filled. For this to be possible, it would have to be occupied by an infinite body. But no body is infinite. Chrysippus is merely speaking of the delimitation of infinite void caused by the presence of the cosmos within it. This leads us to the third anomaly. The language Chrysippus uses would appear to suggest that void suffers something from the body that fills it and thereby delimits it. The closing statement, moreover, would appear to be setting forth the idea of the ontological independence of the infinite void from the cosmos, and hence, more generally, from the corporeal element.

What I wish to present, however, is a hypothesis that may adequately account at least for the three anomalies just mentioned. As concerns the absence from Arius’ fragment of Chrysippus’ definition of void, it is difficult to determine whether this is a lacuna or an omission, and in the latter case, whether it is an omission due to Arius or to his Chrysippean-Stoic source. In either case, however, these difficulties will not prevent us from embracing the second hypothesis.120

A likely explanation for the first anomaly, namely Chrysippus’ claim that what is incorporeal is infinite, is that what he has in mind is a contrast between the sub-group of the incorporeals consisting of time and void and that particular body represented by the cosmos. Indeed, if there is any body that it would make sense to set in contrast with infinite time and space, this is precisely the body of the cosmos. The place that is being discussed here, then, might well be the place of the cosmos, the incorporeality of which is pushed into the background in order to emphasise the finiteness determined by the body delimiting it. In turn, this would help explain the second anomaly, namely the fact that Chrysippus here appears to be treating place like a body. The causal language which Chrysippus uses to describe the process whereby void is filled by the cosmos would seem to betray a degree of conceptual uncertainty. Still, we should not rule out the possibility that Chrysippus here was merely counter-factually and dialectically playing around – so to speak – with the concepts of void and cosmos (understood as the body filling and delimiting void), in order to find out whether the former might be conceived of as being independent of the latter. Actually, we know that the Stoics described void not as something that is filled and delimited by the cosmos, but rather as something that surrounds the cosmos.¹²¹ Claiming that void surrounds the cosmos is tantamount to saying that void is not pre-existing compared to the cosmos and its ousia, but rather subsists with them. This means that it only makes sense to speak of void in relation to something full (the cosmos and its ousia). For if the latter is removed, what remains is not void but nothingness. In the light of what has been argued, the lack of any definition of void can also be accounted for by the hypothesis that what the passage from Stobaeus illustrates is precisely the outset of Chrysippus’ reflection on this concept – an open-minded and quasi-dialectical reflection that was not yet ready to be developed and encapsulated into a definition.

The fragment from Arius Didymus has preserved and passed down an important part of Chrysippus’ contribution to the Stoic physics of space. At the beginning of the present section I claimed that the two other passages, those from Aëtius and Sextus, illustrate the official position of the orthodox Stoa on the matter. This position may largely be traced back to that of Chrysippus, yet cannot be identified with it. Why? Algra has provided a satisfying answer to this question.¹²² Since the definition of χώρα provided in both passages not only differs, in terms of its formulation, from that of Chrysippus, but is also very similar to the way in which in Arius Didymus’ fragment Chrysippus describes the “nameless” ὅλον formed by the co-presence of place and void, the labels (Sextus) and (Aëtius)³⁵ must refer not only to Chrysippus, but also to a considerable and authoritative portion of the Stoic school. What’s more, according to Sextus,³⁶ some people () – possibly a minority within the Stoa – took up Chrysippus’ second definition of χώρα again, not without a few misunderstandings. While I will attempt to explain how a situation of this kind might have come about, I should also note that it seems very strange that a thesis developed by the founder of Stoic orthodoxy may have been put aside by orthodox Stoics only to be taken up again by a minority of heterodox Stoics.³⁷

As concerns the definition of place, a substantial degree of continuity may be observed between the content of Stobaeus’ testimony and that of the passages from Sextus and Aëtius. Here I shall limit myself to a couple of observations: 1) both passages provide a definition of place in which no mention is made of the expression τὸ οἷόν , 2) in the definition of place provided by Sextus we find the expression “[place] is the same as that which occupies it ()” and it is further specified that the latter is a body.

The definition provided for void probably represents the official position of the school, which in all likelihood may be traced back to Chrysippus. When it comes to this definition, we should ask ourselves why void was conceived as something that can be occupied and yet de facto remains unoccupied. Is it correct to say that by expanding at the end of a cosmic cycle the cosmos will ultimately occupy void? The answer must be a negative one. During the cosmos may expand and expand, yet because it is still limited in its extension it cannot alter the existing conditions, according to which it is surrounded by unlimited void both at the beginning of the cosmic cycle, when it is smaller in size, and at the end of the cycle, when it is huge in size. The Stoic answer to the question may be found in two passages, and agrees with what has just been stated. The first passage is none other than fragment 25 from Arius Didymus.123 The second is a passage from Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories.¹²⁴ The reason invoked by the Stoics is that there is no infinite body capable of occupying infinite void. Hence, the definition of void draws a contrast between a possibility intrinsic to the reality of void as an infinite subsisting incorporeal and an impossibility intrinsic to the cosmos as a finite existing corporeal entity.

As already mentioned, both in the passage from Aëtius and in that from Sextus, the definition of χώρα not only differs from the one Arius ascribes to Chrysippus, but would also appear to be based on the letter of Chrysippus’ οὐκ ὠνομασμένον. To this we should add the fact that in Sextus’ passage mention is made of ἔνιοι who adopted a concept of χώρα very similar in its formulation to the second definition of χώρα ascribed to Chrysippus by Arius.

The process leading to this state of affairs might have been as follows. Most Stoics possibly reacted to Chrysippus’ two definitions of χώρα by reasoning: “we have understood what Chrysippus meant to say, but find the way in which he has expressed the concept in the first case clear yet problematic (because of his use of a technical spatial expression such as ) and in the second case informal – as one would expect the definition of a pre-theoretical spatial notion to be – but too obscure. Chrysippus ought to have combined the clarity of the first expression with the informal character of the second one. Would it not be better to redefine the notions of occupied and unoccupied space so as to claim that χώρα is only partially occupied space?” The redefinition in question is the one I have already mentioned. It consists in drawing a distinction between occupied and unoccupied space in the rigorous sense of full and empty space on the one hand, and occupied and unoccupied space in the more informal sense of space that cannot be accessed and space that can on the other. The official position of the Stoic school with regard to χώρα may therefore be interpreted as a return to Chrysippus’ notion of οὐκ ὠνομασμένον, based however on a reinterpretation of the expressions “occupied” and “unoccupied”. The concept of χώρα that stemmed from this process did not, then, coincide with the idea of a genuine co-presence of full (place) and void.

Even for the majority of Stoics, the concept of χώρα was intended to account for the way in which perceivers in their everyday lives constantly experience intra-cosmic spaces as extensions that are never entirely occupied and filled by bodies. The interpretation I have put forward enables one to explain the process that took place without having to confine Chrysippus’ position to the margins of doctrinal heterodoxy.

As for the ἔνιοι mentioned in the text, we cannot be sure they were Stoics: for we cannot rule out the possibility that they might have been people with a different philosophical orientation. What we can say is that although they sought to remain faithful to the letter of Chrysippus’ second formulation, they made the mistake of taking χώρα to be a kind of place, thus misinterpreting the value of the predicate μεῖζον. This may be inferred from the use they made of the predicate ἀξιόλογον to describe the size (μέγεθος) of a body that is contained. The point is not the absolute size of this body, but rather its relative size. For we have seen that a contained body is only said to be “bigger” in relation to other bodies, since it cannot be bigger than the space containing it. Those referred to as ἔνιοι are right in claiming that place is no different in size than the body occupying it, since it is perfectly coextensive with it, whatever its size may be. Yet by erroneously regarding χώρα as sub-species of place, they have been forced to introduce a kind of specific difference, so to speak, namely the ἀξιόλογον μέγεθος of the body that is contained. This is probably where they went wrong.

Before bringing this paper to a close, I wish to briefly return to the “nameless” ὅλον stemming from the co-presence of place and void. According to fragment 25 of Arius Didymus, Chrysippus only regarded this ὅλον as an eventuality. To be more precise, he regarded it as an eventuality inherent in the cosmic order, not the intra-cosmic. If this is the case, the very formulation that the orthodox current of the school drew upon for its definition of χώρα may have provided a clue for Chrysippus himself or one of his disciples to develop a distinction between the whole (ὅλον) and the all (πᾶν).125 The term ὅλον, which in the Arius Didymus fragment is used to mean “whole” in a pre-philosophical sense, here becomes a predicate of kosmos. The union of kosmos and void is instead described as τὸ πᾶν. Since the kosmos, surrounded by infinite void, is a body, it must certainly also have a place. Hence, what we have is a sort of coexistence of place and void which according to fr. 25 of Arius Didymus Chrysippus merely regarded as a possibility. This coexistence, in agreement with Chrysippus’ semantic instructions, came to be very generically referred to as τὸ πᾶν.