For the nature and the structure of the P.E. see J. Sirinelli 1974 and Frede 1999, 240f.
As Frede 1999, 247 rightly suggests, the verb 
is ambiguous, as it can mean both “come after chronologically” and “follow someone’s views.” Eusebius’ claim is right if the former is meant, but he clearly wants to suggest also the latter.
The most frequently cited Platonic dialogues are the Timaeus, the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Laws.
Earlier on, Philodemus (first c. BCE), follows the same strategy.
On the method of quotations in the Praeparatio, see Berkhof 1939, 52–53.
On the issue of philosophical works available to Eusebius in the library of Caesarea, see Grafton-Williams 2006, and concerning Platonist works, also Kalligas 2001, 584–598.
See Rist 1981, 159–163. Eusebius preserves a part of Plotinus’ Enneads that is missing from all manuscripts of the Enneads, namely Enn. 4.7.8.28–4.7.85.49, that is quoted in P.E. 15.10.
As we know, Plato’s works attracted much attention in late antiquity specifically for his literary merits, and indeed some of the students in Platonist schools were motivated by their desire to imitate Plato’s style. See Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 19.20.4.
On the dominance of the dogmatic interpretation of Plato in late antiquity, see Karamanolis 2006, Introduction, 6–36.
Platonist works with titles like Didaskalikos tōn Platōnos dogmatōn, of Alcinous, or De Platone et eius dogmate, of Apuleius, reflect this attitude.
φιλοσοφία; Against Hierocles 45.4, τὸν δὴ μóνον 
ἀληθείας προθύρων 
; P.E. 13.14.3.
Ὅτι μὴ 
Πλάτωνι, διὸ οὐκ ἀλóγως 
κατ᾽ αὐτὸν παρῄτημεθα φιλοσοφίαν; P.E. 13.14
On this theme see Ridings 1995 and Boys-Stones 2001, 176–202. The use of this theme by Eusebius is extensively discussed by Johnson 2006, 55–93
See Clement, Stromata 5.41.5–44.1, cf. 1.12.57.6, 1.17.87.1–2. Justin’s point of view on this issue has been long debated. See Andersen 1952–3, 157–198; Holte 1958, 110–168; and Edwards 1995, 262–280.
Celsus, for instance, criticized Christianity for being a novelty (καινοτομία, Origen, C. Celsum 3.15). Similarly speaks also Plotinus, Enn. 2.9.7.11.
On this passage see Frede 1999, 247–8.
Origen noticeably claims that Celsus cannot accuse Christians of relying on faith when he treats Plato’s texts as sacred (C. Celsum 6.1, 17).
Clement, Strom. 1.16.80.5–6, 1.17.87.2.
On Plutarch’s argument against the Stoics in that work, see Boys-Stones 1997, 41–58.
Origen himself takes the qualified view of Hellenic philosophy that we find in Clement and later in Eusebius, according to which Hellenic philosophy is a manifestation of Logos, whose perfection is Christianity, and that has as a result an agreement between Christianity and most Hellenic schools of philosophy on topics like the divine providence (C. Celsum 1.10). See further Karamanolis, 2013 ch. 1, esp. 34–48.
See Origen, C. Celsum. 4.39.47–51; 6.1, 17.
On Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato, the standard work is that of Cherniss 1944, but he greatly overstates Aristotle’s criticism of Plato compared to his debt to him. On Antiochus and later Platonists who treat Aristotle as a means of understanding Plato, see Karamanolis 2006.
On Numenius see Karamanolis 2006, ch. 3, 127–149 and idem, “Numenius,” Karamanolis, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online.
On Antiochus see Cicero, Academica 1.33–4, De finibus 5.13, on Plutarch, see for instance his Against Colotes 1114f–1115c, and his On moral virtue (esp. 442b-c, 450f).
For a long time Aristocles was thought to be the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the basis of a conjecture according to which the name “Aristotle” preserved in four ancient testimonies, including Ps.-Alexander’s De intellect needs to be changed to “Aristocles” (thus Zeller 19235, 814 n.1). Moraux was the first to argue against this conjecture, pointing out that there is a Peripatetic with the name “Aristotle” other than the founder of the Peripatos, namely Aristotle of Mytilene. See Moraux 1967, 169–182 and Moraux 1984, 82f., 399 f. Yet there is no solid basis for dating Aristocles. There is a new collection of his fragments by Chiesara 2001, which I reviewed in Karamanolis 2004, 57–59. 39 Proclus, in Timaeum 1.20.2 (vestigium V Heiland). There is disagreement among scholars as to whether this is Aristocles of Messene or Aristocles of Rhodes, who is mentioned earlier by Proclus. The discussion is reviewed by Chiesara 2001, 52–3.
On the nature of Aristocles’ work On Philosophy see Chiesara 2001, xxiv–xxxviii and Karamanolis 2006, 37–41. The testimony to the effect that Aristocles discussed the development of Greek philosophy comes not by Eusebius but by Philoponus in his On Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic 1a, test. 5 Chiesara (Test. 7 and vestigium 1 Heiland). On this topic see below.
On Clement’s argument in Stromata 8, see Havrda 2011, 343–375 and Karamanolis 2013, 125–128.
In P.E. 15.3.14 (fr. 3 Chiesara and Heiland.)
On Antiochus’ attitude to the Stoics, see Karamanolis 2006, ch. 1, esp. 64–80.
This becomes clear especially in Aristocles’ criticism of the Pyrrhoneans and the Epicureans (frr. 4 and 8 Chiesara/frr. 6, 8 Heiland).
φιλονικῶν, 
P.E. 15.7.2; Atticus fr. 5.15–30, 15.8.11; fr. 6.72–73, 15.9.7; fr. 7.37–39 Des Places.
P.E. 15.8.6.10–12; Atticus fr. 6.45–48, 72–73, 83–85, 15.9.14; fr. 7.87–89 Des Places.
On the excerption of Porphyry’s work in the P.E. see Grant (1973), 184–187.
Porphyry wrote two commentaries on the Categories, a commentary on the On Interpretation, and one on the Physics (i.e. the first five books; fragments in Smith 1993). Several other commentaries are attributed to him (i. e. on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, the Sophistical Refutations, the Metaphysics, and the Nicomachean Ethics) but with much less certainty.
I examine this issue in some detail in Karamanolis 2006, ch. 7.
Eusebius cites from the following works of Porphyry: On the Philosophy from Oracles, Literary Discourse, On the cult of idols, On Abstinence, Epistle to Anebo, Against Christians, Against Boethus.
See Karamanolis 2006, 290–298.
For more detail see Karamanolis 2006, 296–298. See also Sharples 2007 and Sharples 2010, 244–251.
Des Places prints a question mark next to the number of the fragment.
The heading is “Πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν [sc. Aristotle] διενεχθέντα τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς 
” (Against him [Aristotle] who disagrees with Plato also on the world soul).”
On that passage see Karamanolis 2006, 294–296 and Sharples 2010, 241.
Cf. also Paed. 2.1.16.4, Strom. 2.13.59.6. See Clark 1977.
The debate extends from Antiochus of Ascalon to Porphyry and goes on even afterwards. For a study of this Platonist debate, see Karamanolis 2006.
Numenius frr. 11, 16, 17, 20 Des Places.
For a brief survey of Christian positions on this issue, see Karamanolis 2013, 107–116.
Later in the Republic the Good is described as “the brightest part of being” though (Rep. 518c9). Ancient Platonists, including Origen (C. Celsum 6.64.14–28) were puzzled as to whether the Good is beyond or part of being.
In Joh 1.19.114, Princ. 1.2.2, 2.2.2, C. Celsum 5.37. See also Kritikos 2007, 403–417.
Origen maintained that God’s wisdom, the Son, was created by God (creata esse; Princ. 1.2.3; 
C. Celsum 5.39). The term “created” is not to be taken literally here, since, as Origen says, this is an eternal and everlasting generation (Princ. 1.2.4). A similar view can be detected already in Clement, who claims that God is invisible and ineffable, the highest of intelligibles (Strom. 5.12.78.2–3, 81.3–6). See further Karamanolis 2013, 87–97.
On Eusebius’ conception of Logos, see especially Ricken 1967, 341–359, and Ricken 1978, 318–352.
On this point see the discussion in Ehrhard 1979, 42–43.
On the understanding of creation among early Christian thinkers, see Karamanolis 2013, 60–107.
On Xenocrates’ interpretation of the Timaeus and his views on principles, see Dillon 2003, 98–136.
The fragments are collected by Sodano 1964. For a discussion, see Karamanolis 2006, 277–284.
On this issue, see Lyman 1993, 91f., who makes some interesting remarks about Eusebius.
For details of their education see Rousseau 1994, 27–60 (Basil), McGuckin 2001, 35–83 (Gregory Nazianzen), and Silvas 2007, 1–15 (Gregory of Nyssa). We know little about the educational curriculum in Athens at this period, although it undoubtedly included wide reading in Plato; cf. Ruether 1969, 18–28 and Rist 1981, 182–85.
Gregory of Nyssa, Life of Moses 2.116; trans. Malherbe and Ferguson 1978, 81.
Basil, To the Youth 6.5 and 9.12. Both passages cite Plato approvingly for his teaching on the pursuit of virtue.
Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 27.10, ed. Gallay 1978, 94; trans. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 2 (= NPNF) vol. 7, 288. Citations from NPNF have been modified for the sake of accuracy and stylistic consistency.
Basil, Hexaemeron 3.3, 8.2; Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man 28.
See Gronau 1908, Pinault 1925, Cherniss 1930, Courtonne 1934, and Daniélou 1953. Much can also be gleaned from the annotations to the Sources Chrétiennes editions of their works.
Translations of Plato are from Cooper 1997.
Although this is more obvious in the Republic than the Symposium, even in the latter the “leader”— that is, Eros himself—has to lead aright (210a). The necessity that the soul love in the right way in order to “regrow its wings” is a major theme of the Charioteer speech in the Phaedrus.
Alexander Mourelatos has observed (in a lecture I attended) how such a view appears to be reflected within ordinary language. We speak of an especially good beer as a real beer, an especially good catch as a real catch, and so on. Such statements suggest that our recognition of things as belonging to kinds is intrinsically evaluative. Since for Plato, to be is always to be a member of a kind (Kahn 1982), it is not hard to see why Plato regards being as in a sense deriving from the Good.
See Phaed. 97b–99d; Soph. 265b–266c; Stat. 268e–275a; Phil. 26e–31a; Tim. 27d–30c, 39e, 41a–d, 47e–48a. For a comprehensive study of this theme in Plato see Menn 1995.
For the development of this theology in antiquity see Dillon 1996 24–29, 91–96, 126–29, 137–39, 157–61, etc. and Kenney 1991 passim, and for a contemporary defense of this way of reading the Timaeus see Perl 1998.
See, e.g., Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 5–6 and Irenaeus, Against Heresies 2.34, with further references and discussion in Wolfson 1956. (However, in Tim. 41a–b, Plato speaks of the continued existence of even the gods as due to the divine will, so the difference here should not be exaggerated.)
For example, Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.4.3, 37.4, 38.4; Clement, Stromata 5.14; Origen, On First Principles 3.6.1, 4.4.10, Commentary on John 2.3; Athanasius, Against the Heathen 2; Orations against the Arians 2.78. Although Plato does not call the soul an “image” of God, the First Alcibiades (which was assumed in antiquity to be by Plato) does say that the rational part of the soul “resembles” (ἔοικεν) God (133c).
For example, Phaed. 66b–67a, 80d–84b; Rep. 9.588b–590c; Phaedr. 253d–256e.
See Apology 40e–41d; Phaedo 81a; Symp. 212a; Republic 6.500c–d; Theat. 176a–c; Tim. 47b–c, 90a–d, and Laws 4.715e–717a, with discussion in Sedley 1999 and Annas 1999, 52–71.
Major studies on this subject include Gross 1938, Merki 1952, and Russell 2004.
This work in its current form may reflect hands other than Basil’s, although it is undoubtedly based on his teaching; see Rousseau 1994, 354–59.
Basil, Long Rules, Q. 2, PG 31 908b; trans. Wagner 1962, 233.
Ibid., 908b–c.
Ibid. 912a; trans. Wagner, 235.
The desire of at least all living things for the good is prominent in the Symposium, where it is seen as expressed through the impulse for reproduction (207a–d), a passage echoed in Aristotle, De Anima 2.4.415b3–7. For discussion of the place of God in Aristotle’s teleology see Kahn 1985, Menn 1992, and Bradshaw 2004, 26–27, 38–39, and for some examples of the persistence of a theocentric teleology within later philosophy see Bradshaw 2004, 64–67 (Numenius and Alcinous), 71–72 (Alexander of Aphrodisias), 81–84 (Plotinus).
Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity 10.1, ed. Aubineau 1966, 370; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 354.
See Gregory’s Homilies on the Beatitudes 6, discussed below.
Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity 11.1, ed. Aubineau, 380; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 355.
See Plotinus, Enneads 1.6, particularly 1.6.8. The annotations to the Aubineau edition of Gregory’s On Virginity note numerous verbal parallels to both Plato and Plotinus.
Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity 11.3, ed. Aubineau, 384; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 356.
Ibid., 18.3, ed. Aubineau, 470; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 363. See also the more elaborate treatment of this subject in On the Soul and Resurrection PG 46.48c–68a, 88c–93c (= NPNF vol. 5, 438–43, 449–50), with discussion in Williams 1993 and Sorabji 2000, 391–93
Ibid., 12.1, ed. Aubineau, 398; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 357.
Ibid., 11.1, ed. Aubineau, 383; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 355.
“That which does not have its being beautiful from another, nor is such only at some time or in some respect, but is beautiful from and through and in itself, always being and never becoming beautiful, nor is there any time when it will not be beautiful, but always the same, above all addition and augmentation, unreceptive of any change or alteration,” ibid., 11.5, ed. Aubineau, 394–96; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 356.
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 5.12 (PG 9 121b); Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 1.360–69, 2.69–70; Homilies on Ecclesiastes 7 (ed. McDonough and Alexander 1962, 411–14); Homilies on the Song of Songs 5 (ed. Langerbeck 1960, 157–58).
One exception is Life of Moses 2.25, where Gregory speaks of the participation (μετουσία) of all things in God, the real Being (τὸ 
ὄν). See discussion in Balas 1966, 100–120, and for the development of the terminology of energeia see Bradshaw 2004 passim.
“Who has known the mind (νοῦς) of the Lord?” (Isaiah 40:13, LXX), quoted twice by St. Paul (Rom. 11:34, 1 Cor. 2:16). Admittedly this presents God as possessing mind rather than simply being mind, but given divine simplicity the latter also follows.
Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 28.13, ed. Gallay 1978, 127–28; trans. NPNF vol. 7, 293.
Ibid., 28.17, ed. Gallay 134–36; trans. NPNF vol. 7, 294.
Despite the reference in this passage to knowing God’s “essence or nature,” Gregory very probably has in mind not something like the knowledge of an Aristotelian definition, but the intimate personal knowledge spoken of in Scripture as face to face vision. Elsewhere he denies that the divine nature can be known to any creature, including the angels and the blessed, although he recognizes that the full extent of the knowledge possessed by these groups is unknown to us (Orations 2.76, 6.22, 28.3–4, 38.7).
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and Resurrection PG 46.29b; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 433.
Ibid., 57c; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 441.
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man 15.2 PG 44.176d–177a; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 403; cf. ibid., 14.2.
Ibid., 2.2, 16.8–9, 17.2–5, 22.4, 30.30. Gregory’s precise views on this subject are far from clear and have provoked considerable discussion; see Ladner 1958 and Behr 1999, with the works there cited.
See Plato, Rep. 10.611b–612a, Tim. 41c–42e, 69c–e; cf. the simplicity of the soul at Phaedo 79b–80b.
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man 8.8, 12.6–8, 15.3; cf. (Ps.–?) Plato, Alc. Ι 129b–130c. This is not to say, however, that Gregory would agree with the author of Alcibiades Ι that “the soul is the man” (130c), for Gregory sees the body as integral to human identity.
See Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and Resurrection PG 46.41a–c, 57a.
Ibid., 41c; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 436–37.
See Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man 5.2, 12.9–10, 16.2–3.
Ibid., 16.10; cf. Great Catechism 5. In yet another sense, Gregory holds that the image of God is not manifest in any single human being alone, but in “the whole plenitude (πλήρωμα) of humanity” (On the Making of Man 16.17). By this he would seem to mean the totality of the human race taken collectively, rather than something like the Form of Man; cf. discussion in Zachhuber 2000, 155–160.
Gregory of Nyssa, Great Catechism 1, ed. Winling 2000, 144; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 474–75.
Ibid., ed. Winling, 150–52; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 476.
Gregory is careful not to say “by which that 
is uttered,” since in the case of the deity there is no physical process accompanying speech; cf. Great Catechism 2.
Ibid., 2, ed. Winling, 152; trans. NPNF vol. 5, 476–477.
Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 23.11, PG 35 1161c–1164a (my trans.).
See Alcinous, A Handbook of Platonism 4.7 (and cf. 8 on the Receptacle); Plotinus, Enneads 2.4.11–12, 6.3.8–10; Porphyry, Isagoge 2 (ed. Busse 1887, 7.19–27). The use of the term 
in this context is probably drawn from Theaetetus 157b–c.
See Origen, On First Principles 4.4.7–8.
Basil, Hexaemeron 1.8, ed. Giet 1968, 120–122; trans. NPNF vol. 8, 56. (Admittedly, this passage is also reminiscent of Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.3, but there is little reason to think that the Cappadocians read the Metaphysics.)
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and Resurrection PG 46.124b–d (reading 
for τῶν νοητῶν); trans. NPNF vol. 5, 458. See also Hexaemeron (ed. Drobner 2009, 15–16) and On the Making of Man 24, with a convenient translation of all three passages in Sorabji 1983, 290–291.
See Sorabji 1983, 290–294, with further discussion in Hibbs 2005 and Hill 2009.
Creation occurs by “the impulse of divine choice,” 
θείας 
(On the Soul and Resurrection 46.124b; NPNF vol. 5, 458); cf. further texts and discussion in Bradshaw 2011.
Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 38.7, ed. Moreschini and Gallay 1990, 114–16; trans. NPNF, vol. 7, 346–47.
Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on the Beatitudes 6, ed. Callahan 1992, 138; trans. Graef 1954, 144.
Ibid., ed. Callahan, 142–143; trans. Graef, 148–149.
Ibid., ed. Callahan, 146–147; trans. Graef, 151–152.
See further Bradshaw 2004, 172–177.
I have discussed further aspects of the Cappadocians’ adaptation of Plato in Bradshaw 2006a and 2006b.
Aurum verum in illis quae incorporea sunt et invisibilia ac spiritalia intelligatur; similitudo vero auri, inquo, non est ipsa veritas, sed umbra veritatis, ista corporea et visibilia accipiantur.
See Ramelli 2004; 2006; 2011a.
Drama, fabula (in Cant. prol. 1.3); libellus hic in modum dramatis texitur (in Cant. 3.11.1); ordo dramatis (3.11.9); dramatis speciem libellus hic continet (3.11.15); drama, historiae species (1.1.1–3). In his refusal to allow for a literal meaning in the Song of Songs Origen agrees with Rabbinic exegetes, who allegorised it. Origen knew contemporary Rabbinic exegesis: e. g. audivi quondam a quodam Hebraeo hunc [sc. Biblicum] locum exponente atque dicente… (Hom. in Ez. 4.8). On exegetical convergences between Origen and the Rabbis see e. g. Tzvetkova 2010; Grypeou/Spurling 2009.
See at least Ramelli 2008a, 55–99.
Origen was profoundly familiar with it, like the Middle Platonists. See, e. g., Boys-Stones 2011, 319–337; Ramelli 2011b.
Parvan 2012, 77, thinks that Origen interpreted the skin tunics as the body tout court. But see Dechow 1988, 318–326, and Ramelli 2013a.
“Thus, we must remove these many garments, both this visible garment of flesh and those inside, which are close to those of skin” (Abst. 1.31); “In the Father’s temple, i. e. this world, is it not prudent to keep pure our last garment, the skin tunic? And thus, with this tunic made pure, to live in the Father’s temple?” (2.46).
He defined Plato “the philosopher taught by the Hebrews” in Strom. 1.1.10.2; then in ch. 21 he offered a chronological explanation of this assertion, similar to Tatian’s in his Oratio ad Graecos, and in chs. 22–29 showed the indebtedness of Greek philosophy, and above all of Plato, to Moses.
Guinot 2009, 179–193 suspects that Origen “reduced” the Genesis account to a myth.
Sometimes this interpretation entailed a spiritual but not eschatological understanding, e. g. in Rev 3:20, which Origen cited several times and interpreted in reference to Christ’s entrance into the soul of each one. See Maraval 1999, 57–64.
Ed. Dyobouniotes / von Harnack 1911, 21–44, also with discussion of the paternity; Skard 1936, 204–208; Robinson 1911, 295–297. Origen’s paternity is partially confirmed by Wojciechowski 2005, with an introduction, a Polish translation, and notes. He proposes that the scholia come from three commentaries, A (7, 11?, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22b, 23?, 25, 27, 28, 31b+32, 33, 34?, 35?, 36b?), probably by Origen, or Hippolytus; B (1, 10, 16?, 19?, 29, 31a, 37), non-Alexandrian; C (3, 6, 11?, 12, 13, 16?, 23?, 35?), by Dionysius of Alexandria or Hippolytus; plus other works, D (9, 24b, 30a, 36a) perhaps by Didymus; E (20, 22a, 26), from the fourth century; F (4, 8, 24a); others are single (a gloss in 2; 30b; 5 [Clement], 38 with 39 [Irenaeus]). Some scholia seem to me of Origenian paternity or inspiration, for their close correspondence with Origen’s thought. Precise parallels with Origen’s works can indeed be indicated. Tzamalikos 2013 suggests that these scholia were compiled by sixth-century Cassian the Sabaite on the basis of a commentary on Revelation by Didymus. Even in this case, the ideas would mostly go back to Origen, on whose exegesis Didymus drew. Moreover, an early Medieval prologue to an anonymous Irish commentary on the Apocalypse, preserved in a ninth-century ms. (Bamberg, Staatliche Bibliothek Patr. 102 [B.V. 18] fols. 101–110), attests to the existence of twelve homilies on Revelation by Origen, preserved at that time. According to Kelly 1985, they may have been authentic.
For a translation and commentary of Didymus’ commentary on this Psalm (but with no reference to Revelation or Origen’s interpretation) see Geljon 2011, 50–73.
See Ramelli 2011c, 649–670; and 2013b, chapter on Origen.
And yet he was accused of supporting it e.g. by Justinian and Photius, Bibl. Cod. 8.3b–4a Bekker: 
τε γὰρ ληρῳδεῖ. See also Bianchi 1986, 33–50; Lies 1999.
One must investigate this because Scripture and the apostolic teaching have left the origin of souls in darkness (Princ. 1 pref. 5).
In his exegesis of Titus preserved by Barsanuphius (C. opin. Orig. PG 86.891–3) Origen expressly said that “the doctrine that souls exist before bodies is justified neither by the apostles nor by the ecclesiastical tradition”; Origen “characterised whoever maintains this doctrine as a heretic.”
Sane qualis fuerit unius cuiusque praeparatio in hac uita, talis erit et resurrectio eius: qui beatius hic uixerit, corpus eius in resurrectione diuiniore splendore fulgebit, et apta ei mansio beatorum tribuetur locorum; hic uero qui in malitia consumpsit tempus sibi uitae praesentis indultum, tale dabitur corpus quod sufferre et perdurare tantum modo possit in poenis (De res. ap. Pamph. Apol. 134).
Comm. Cant. 3.5.16: Sed et Iob omnem hominum vitam umbram dicit esse super terram [Job 8:9] credo pro eo quod omnis anima in hac vita velamento crassi huius corporis obumbratur.
On Origen’s exegesis of Genesis: Köckert 2009 and my review 2012b, 550–552; Tzvetkova 2010 and my review 2011d.
See, also with further literature, Ramelli 2009a.
Cf. Ramelli 2009b.
Origen opposed radical allegorists such as Gnostics (Heracleon), who annihilated the historical plane of Scripture. Philo had already polemicised in the very same sense, especially in Migr. Abr. 89: εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ τοὺς 
νóμους σύμβολα 
ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὰ μὲν ἄγαν ἠκρίβωσαν, τῶν δὲ 
ὠλιγώρησαν. οὓς 
ἂν ἔγωγε 
εὐχερείας. ἔδει γὰρ ἀμφο 
ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ζητήσεώς τε τῶν 
ἀκριβεστέρας καὶ ταμιείας τῶν φανερῶν ἀνεπιλήπτου.
Ramelli 2007b with the reviews of Tzamalikos 2008 and Edwards 2009.
See Ramelli 2013b, the section on Gregory Nyssen.
“God’s will became matter and the substance of creatures.” See also Apol. Hex. 69a–c; Hibbs 2005; Hill 2009; Köckert 2009, 400–526; Arruzza 2007, 215–223; Karamanolis 2013, Ch. 2; Marmodoro forthcoming.
The distinction between αἰσθητóν/σωματικóν and νοητóν/νοερóν is presented by Gregory as “the supreme partition of all beings” (C. Eun. 1.105.9; in Cant. 6.173.7–8); “it is impossible to conceive of anything outside this division in the nature of beings” (Or. cat. 21.9–10). This division is clear in in Cant. 6.174, where the material substance is said to be finite, diastematic, and sense-perceptible, while the intellectual substance is described as infinite and unlimited, and is further divided into God and the intellects.
Analysis of Origen’s theory in Ramelli 2008b, 59–78.
Gregory brings forth this question also in An. 141 exactly in the discussion of the resurrection.
See An. 153c, 156.
This doctrine was misrepresented by Barsanuphius (C. opin. Orig. PG 86.891–902), who ascribes the theory of the preexistence of souls to both Nazianzen and Nyssen.
Plotinus in Enn. 1.2.5 speaks of “separating from the body insofar as possible,” and in 1.4.14 hopes for the “separation from the body.” In 3.6.6.71–72, true resurrection is “from the body, and not with the body,” being a κάθαρσις from the sense-perceptible. Both Gregory and Origen insist that the risen body will be, not sense-perceptible, but spiritual.
“The soul can adhere to the intellectual and immaterial only when it gets rid of the weight of matter that surrounds it … when, thanks to death, we attain incorporeality, we get close to that nature which is free from every physical heaviness” (De mort. 50–52 Lozza).
See in Illud 27: Christ will unite all beings, τὰ πάντα, to himself.
See Ramelli 2013c.
On this point see Ludlow 2007 and Ramelli 2013b, also with demonstration of the Christological foundation of 
in Gregory and precise dependences on Origen, and refutation of recent claims that Gregory did not support universal salvation.
Although he does not avail himself of either this or the following argument, Parmentier 2002, 556–557 also seems to think that both the pre-lapsarian and the post-lapsarian states of humans are corporeal; only, that of the former was an asexual and immortal corporeality, and that of the latter a gendered and mortal one.
Passions arose in humans after these assumed the irrational life of beasts after the fall (Op. 18), which in Op. 20 is described as choosing good and evil rather than good alone, as in An. 81.
Gregory is among the last Fathers who kept Origen’s philosophical “zetetic” method alive. On this a specific study is in preparation.
The intellect cannot dwell in a body unless joined with sense-perception (An. 60b). This holds true if the body at stake is a mortal body, but not if it is spiritual. This is why the intellectual soul will no longer need its inferior parts to be united to the spiritual body in the end, as Gregory argues in De anima and his first Homily on the Song of Songs. Therefore, this should be the case for the beginning as well.
Here Macrina also emphasises the identity between the mortal and the risen body: “For our part, we maintain that around the soul there comes to be constituted the same body as before, formed by the harmonic union of the same elements; those people [sc. certainly not Origen], on the contrary, think that the soul passes on to other bodies, of both rational and irrational beings, and even beings deprived of sense-perception.”
Pamphilus Apol. 159 attests that Origen in his day was accused of maintaining the preexistence of souls to their own bodies: ei de anima obiciunt quod ante corpus eam factam dicat exsistere. This charge dies hard (just an example: Origen imposed “a mind-body dualism upon the human organism in which the intellectual part of the soul both preexisted and was severed from the body in which it was provisionally contained” [Wessel 2009, 25]). But it is ungrounded: see Ramelli 2013a.
So in Just. Apol. 2.7.8 on the Stoics; Dial. 7.2 on Thales; Clem. Strom. 4.1.2.1; 5.14.140.3; Div. 26.8: a mystery concerning the Saviour is concealed in the Greeks’ exposition 
ἀρχῶν καὶ θεολογίας, “in metaphysics and theology.”
See Ramelli 2009c.
See Ramelli 2012a.
Smith 1984; Eusebius D.E. 1.10.7 ascribes to Porphyry the view that there is no difference between the souls of irrational beings and human rational souls.
Hi quidem qui alieni sunt a catholica fide transferri animas ex humanis corporibus in corpora animalium putant … nos uero dicimus quia per multam uitae neglegentiam humana prudentia cum fuerit inculta atque neglecta efficitur uelut irrationabile pecus, per imperitiam uel per neglegentiam, non per naturam.
Dogma alienum ab ecclesia Dei de transmutatione animarum, quod nec ab apostolis traditum est nec usquam in Scripturis cautum est … quod utique superfluus fiet si finis nullus emendationis occurrat, nec erit umquam quando non anima transferatur. Et si semper pro delictis animabus ad corpora diuersa redeundum est, qui umquam mundo dabitur finis?
The same was maintained by Origen in his Commentary on Proverbs, reported by Pamphilus Apol. 188.
Si quidem secundum auctoritatem Scripturarum consummatio immineat mundi et corruptibilis status hic in incorruptibilem commutabitur, ambiguum non videri quod in praesentis vitae statum secundo aut tertio in corpus venire non possit. Nam si recipiatur hoc, necessario sequitur ut huiusmodi successionibus conse-quentibus finem nesciat mundus.
Uidetur autem mihi et illa adsertio quae transferri animas de corporibus in alia corpora adseuerat peruenisse etiam in aliquos eorum qui Christo credere uidentur … putauerunt transmutari humanam animam in pecudum corpora.
was used by Plato in Tim. 28bc–well known to Gregory–, in order to indicate the cosmos, created by the Demiurge.
Alcin. Didasc. 117 H. = 49 Whittaker; Plot. Enn. 4.7, on the soul, which is described as generated and of intellectual nature; the authentic human being, αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, coincides with the (rational) soul; Iambl. An. ap. Stob. Anth. 1.362 Wachsmuth.
Philoponus (Aet. mund. 17) refers to Plato Resp. 546a and Phaedr. 245d.
See Krausmüller 2009, 48.
Pamphilus means “intellectual soul” here, as is clear from 171: Origen fatetur unius substantiae omnes esse animas et immortales et rationabiles … factas a Deo. Quando autem factae sint, olim simul aut nunc per singulos nascentium, quid periculi est alterum e duobus opinari?
Compare the closing sentence of Gregory’s De anima, which is taken over by him after many years almost ad verbum.
I wrote this paper during the three months I spent as a visiting researcher at the Department of Latin and Greek, University of Gent, Belgium (March-May 2012), thanks to a BOF-Bijzonderzoeks-fonds–Special Research Fund scholarship. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Kristoffel Demoen and to my Belgian colleagues for their friendly support in that stimulating scholarly environment.
Cf., e. g., Richtsteig 1918; Trapp 1990.
Cf. Ciccolella 2006, 94, on the primarily literary and pedagogical, rather than philosophical, interests of John of Gaza throughout the Anacreontea.
In this study in order to differentiate between the two Dialexeis, Choricius’ work is cited as Dialexeis (Dial.), and Maximus of Tyre’s work is cited as Dissertationes (Diss.).
The numbering for Choricius follows that of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
E.g., Pl. Ion 533d ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο 
μὲν οὐκ ὂν παρὰ σοὶ 
εὖ λέγειν, ὃ 
ἔλεγον, θεία δὲ δύναμις 
κινεῖ. On the distinction between 
and ἐπιστήμη, cf. Capuccino 2005, 172–4 and 186–8. The fundamental problem of the difference between technical knowledge and divine inspiration also appears in Phdr. 244b – d with reference to prophecy, on which cf. Murray 1998, 105, regarding Ion 531b.
Cf. Murray 1998, 1–32; Capuccino 2005, 234–49, for bibliographical references as well.
See Hes. Th. 22 αἵ νύ 
ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν. Cf. Capuccino 2005, 221, on the compatibility of inspiration and knowledge.
On Hesiod suddenly transformed from shepherd to poet, cf., e. g., Himer. Or. 66.5, in which Helicon personified transforms shepherds into poets, and Penella 2007, 101, n.89.
Hesiod also inspires an exhortation to work in Himer. Or. 74.1, where Hes. Op. 412 is cited (μελέτη δέ τοι ἔργον ὀφέλλει): only with continuous practice does one reach excellence in oratorical practice (3–4). Cf. Penella 2007, 105, n.99, for parallels and bibliography.
Plato’s interest in Hesiod has recently been re-evaluated: cf. Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010.
Koning 2010, 326.
These verbs occur often in Choricius’ prose, not only with reference to the delight and enchantment caused by poetry and declamation, but in all their usages: cf. Greco 2011, 104–5.
Thus in Isoc. Nic. 42 and 48–9, cited by Koning 2010, 329–32.
Phdr. 278c. Vicaire 1960, 103–11, notes Plato’s special interest in the moral teaching of Hesiod, especially in Op.
A survey of the debate on the skill of discernment of the true from the false in Hesiod in Arrighetti 1996.
Diss. 4.6, 33.104–6 Trapp, καὶ χειραγωγοῦντας 
ψυχὴν 
τὸ 
τὰ ὄντα, καὶ διερευνᾶσθαι περαιτέρω.
Diss. 4.3, 31.51–5 Trapp. Cf. Buffière 2010, 41–4: philosophers speak of the gods openly, poets figuratively.
Choricius cites Hesiod as a model of moral values also in 5.1.14 and 36.1.3.
Cf. Koning 2010, 333–41.
Cf. Koning 2010, 347–9.
There is a sarcastic reference to the ancient poets, inspired by the Muses, in Greg. Naz. Carm. 2.1.41.15–20 Adversus Maximum (PG 37.1340a) 
Elsewhere, too, Choricius insists on maintaining that peace and harmony must be the starting points and ideal conditions for literary inspiration: for Justinian’s Brumalia he keeps his distance from Homer, who began his poem with Achilles’ wrath, and he looks to the festival that is going on for a pleasing topic that may serve to launch his oration, 13.1.3: 
.A person who has a bellicose mentality does not practice rhetoric, cf. 41.1.3: 
With regard to the Spartans’ mode of celebrating a feast with the flute rather than with declamations, Choricius observes in 1.1.4: λóγοις γὰρ οὐ 
ἴσασιν ἑορτάζειν 
ἐν 
ὁ βίος. On the other hand, in Laudatio Summi Or. 4.1.25, Choricius mentions the relations between the general Summus and his own school, whether to underscore his acquaintance with the laudandus or to add cultural interests to his praise of the military man: cf. Greco 2011, 115–6. On the differences in Orr. 3 and 4 with regard to the traditional values of peace and war, cf. Westberg 2010, 71–6. In a word, peace is the necessary condition for Λóγοι.
Cf., e.g., Pl. Phdr. 249d; Grg. 525c (νουθέτημα); Lg. 740e. The substantive νουθεσία is attested in Porph. Abst. 38.23.
On which, see Penella 2007, 63 n.71, with reference to Himer. 41.10 (To Constantinople) on the Muse of the Carian Herodotus, superior to poetry.
On Choricius’ free use of Herodotus as a source, see Lupi 2010, 53–67.
Choricius cites Herodotus in Laudatio Marciani 2 (Or. 2 with 2.1.1): 
, with an obvious reference to Hom. Od. 1.3; a little later, 2.1.2, he describes him as 
with reference to the description of the Temple of Babylon in Hdt. 1.181. Choricius, too, has to describe sacred edifices, whose construction was seen to by Marcianus, so he wishes to specify that the style, but not the contents, of Herodotus’ tales is useful: 2.1.2 …
δὲ 
δεóμεθα, οὔ τι 
γε εἵνεκα…, τοῦ δὲ 
ἀξίαν ᾆσαι τὸν ἱερέα αὐτóν τε ἅμα καὶ ὅσα δημιουργεῖ. Choricius refers to Herodotean accounts in Laudatio Aratii et Stephani 20 (Or. 3.2): Ἁλικαρνασέως τινὸς μῦθοί φασι, citing Hdt. 1.84. Herodotus (8.3) and Homer are in agreement in maintaining that war against foreigners is less distressful than an internal conflict in Laudatio Summi Or. 4.1.18: 
διάλυσιν 
εἶναί 
τροπαίου 
χρώμενος δικαστῇ· ὅσῳ γὰρ εἰρήνη, φησί, 
. In Miltiades (17.1.2–3), Homer and Herodotus are associated, even though by way of contrast. Choricius draws on the myths of Herodotus in 27.1.4: εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ μυθολογεῖν, Ἡροδóτου 
λóγον: he introduces the myth of Arion, translated into Attic, from Hdt. 1.24, but adds, 27.1.5: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εὖ μάλα 
ᾷδει, 
δὲ ἐκεῖνο ὑμῖν ἔρχομαι φράσων. Herodotus “sings,” like the poets. The relationship between Herodotus and the Muses, to each of whom is dedicated one of his books, is underlined in Apologia Mimorum 32.2.148: ὥς πού 
. Ibid., 156, reports on Hdt. 1.71.
On the presence of poetry in school, Litsas 1980, 23–4. The production of poetry at Gaza and the social role ascribed to it are discussed by Ciccolella 2000, 118–26; Renaut 2005; Gigli 2005.
21.1.3: 
, ἐμοὶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾿Aθηνᾶ τε 
καὶ 
θεοῦ ῥάβδος, 
ἰδέαν τρέπει 
ἐκείνη. Cf. Buffière 2010, 279–89, on the figure of Athena, whom Neoplatonic exegesis of the Odyssey associates with φρóνησις; and also 353, Odysseus is 
like Demosthenes, who is compared to Proteus by D.H. Dem. 8.
Cf. Hermann 2011, 29.
Cf. Oratio funebris in Mariam 7.1.35, and Greco 2010, 133–4.
Cf. Aristotle Poetics 51b.1–3 
ἱστορία 
μετὰ 
ἢ 
μέτρων, on the difference between the poet and the historian.
Cf. Gigli 2005, 186–7; and Greco 2010, 97–8.
On the Chorician love of personifications, and for the personification of Λóγοι in particular, cf. Greco 2010, 136.
Anacr. 1.12–14 
κρίσιν 
τóλμῃ, and Ciccolella 2000, 130–1, who notes the allusions to the prooemium of the Hesiodic Theogony and raises the possibility that this poem was the prooemium of a collection.
Cf. Pl. Phdr. 237a; Pl. Grg. 482a.
Oratio funebris in Procopium 8.1.17.
Oratio funebris in Procopium 8.1.20 
ουσαν νάμασιν 
τε καὶ 
συγκεκραμένοις. Cf. Greco 2010, 166.
Cf. Penella 2009, 55 n.66, in reference to an analogous discourse of Libanius Or. 3.9.32.
Cf. Koning 2010, 338–41.
Cf. Oratio funebris in Procopium 8.1.15 and Aen. Gaz. Ep. 15 Massa Positano. The innundations of the Nile are an object of Herodotus’ observations (2.19), cf. Penella 2009, 54 n.63, along with other suggestive phenomena to which its waters are subjected: cf. Gigli 1998.
On the metaphor, cf. Litsas 1980, 30; furthermore, the comparison of the rhetor with the κακὸς μάγειρος in Pl. Phdr. 265e, and Vicaire 1960, 399.
The desire for knowledge can also be represented as a “thirst” to know: cf. Aristid. Or. Fun. Eteon. 8: 
τοίνυν οὕτω 
τῶν 
ὥστ’οὐκ ἐσχóλαζεν ἐπαινεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ διψῶντες 
πίνουσιν, οὕτως 
ἤρκει 
τὰ λεγóμενα. Cf. Berardi 2006, ad loc.
On the linking of Λóγοι and medicine, cf. Viansino 1967, 28–9, in which the poetic precedents are collected.
On the occasion of a public festival, declamation is a collective banquet in 1.1.5: εἰ 
ὑμᾶς 
. Choricius’ position on ability in 
as an exclusively Greek characteristic does not absolutely shut out the barbarians: they, too, if they study, can achieve excellence. See on this Lupi 2010, 139. To these references, one should add that, as a teacher of rhetoric, Choricius must have had non-Greek students; for example, in Laudatio Summi 4.1.24–25, he mentions an Arab pupil. Barbarians’ success in acquiring 
must have been an object of his daily reflection. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan character of late ancient cultural centers is well known: consider the school of Alexandria, familiar to the learned men of Gaza, and the school of Berytus, on which cf. Jones Hall 2004. Finally, Oratio funebris in Procopium 8.1.42 narrates a display of wisdom on the part of a barbarian.
On the meanings of the word and its application to the arts, cf. Murray 1996, 3–6.
The same word in Tim. Soph. Lex. Pl. η 989.10, and in Schol. in Pl. ad Lys. 207b.
The metaphorical use of 
is of Homeric origin (Il. 5.127, 15.668, 20.341). See Agosti 2004,780, on Nonn. Dion. 38.87–8 and Caprara 2006, 190–92, on Nonn. Par. 4.61.
Cf., e. g., 3.1.6, 5.1.2, 32.2.17, 18, 25, 88, 94, 34.1.5, 42.2.117.
Corcella 2008, 450, reads the text as follows: ἐνταῦθα δέ, ὦ φιλóτης, ἔστι μὲν τὰ τῆς Σπάρτης ἡδέα, ἔστι δὲ τῆς ᾿Aττικῆς τὰ σεμνóτερα· ἀτὰρ ἐκεῖνó γε οὐ 
τοὺς ᾿Aθήνησι ῥήτορας· οὐ 
καὶ 
τὰ θέατρα λέγειν, ἀλλ’ᾗ ἂν 
ἄγῃ, ταύτῃ 
.
Cf. Greco 2007, 97–9, for the bibliography.
Cf. Greco 2010, 153–4. The correspondence between 
and 
as a foundation of 
is discussed by Westberg 2010, 121–3.
Cf. Webb 2006, 114–5, who cites 34, in which the work of the orator is compared to that of Lysippus, and also gives a bibliography on the theme rhetor-πλαστής. Note especially 114: “The theme of artistic representation serves as a figure for the art of declamation itself. It draws attention to Chorikios’ own project, to the way in which he creates imaginary worlds and their inhabitants.”
An example of this is the description that closes Laudatio Aratii et Stephani (Or. 3.2.79–83), in which the emperor is depicted between his representatives at Gaza, and the image sums up the values of virtue and authority, courage and justice, that are celebrated in the encomium. On this passage, cf. Greco 2011, 112–4. On the grades of artistic imitation in painting and oratory according to Choricius, cf. Greco 2007, 99–103.
Cf. Greco 2011, for a study of the individuals celebrated in the encomiastic orations.
Information on the two individuals in Greco 2010, 23–5.
Cf. Vicaire 1960, 399.
A comment in Greco 2010, 184–5.
On the consolatory function of rhetoric, cf. Westberg 2010, 111–4.
Cf. on this passage Buffière 2010, 353, n.50, who also notes Bas. Adol., in which the same definition recurs.
In Apologia Mimorum 32.2.36–40, 65, 102, 113, myths are regarded by Choricius as simple jokes, cf. Greco 2011, 102. On the insistence upon the verb 
in John of Gaza’s Anacreontea, especially with reference to 6.86–90, and to the interpretation of these lines through Pl. Phdr. 277e–278a, cf. Ciccolella 2000, 173.
For the use of myth in Choricius and its defence through allegory, cf. Westberg 2010, 87–92. For rhetoric, myths are essential instruments of knowledge in Synesius, too; cf. Roques 2006, 269.
On this part of instruction, cf. Berardi 2006, 260, with reference to Alexander of Cotiaeum, lauded by Aristides. “Hermes” is associated with ἡρμενεύς in Pl. Crat. 407e–408b, cf. Buffière 2010, 289–96.
Cf. Vicaire 1960, 398.
So in Max. Tyr. Diss. 4.5, 33.94–98 Trapp θρασεῖα γὰρ οὖσα ἡ 
ψυχὴ τὰ μὲν ἐν ποσὶν 
ταῦτα τοῖς λογισμοῖς, 
μὲν 
ἀνευρεῖν, τυχοῦσα δὲ ἀγαπᾷ ὡς 
ἔργον.
On the vision of the philosophical mysteries through rhetoric and poetry in Synesius, cf. Roques 2006, 265. The theme in Fronto is studied by Fleury 2011, 65–75, and, with respect to Aristides, by Downie 2006, 77–78, in which she notes that in the second century the image of the mysteries becomes specialized and applied to the various τέχναι (anatomy, mathematics, rhetoric).
The image of Procopius convincing, through his eloquence, the sick who do not want to be healed (8.1.22) recalls Max. Tyr. Diss. 4.6, 34.115–21 Trapp: 
δὲ οἱ ἰατροὶ τοῖς κακοσίτοις τῶν 
ἀηδίαν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ παλαιὰ 
εἰς 
καὶ μέτρα καὶ σχῆμα 
.The effect of the sweetness of Nestor’s eloquence is like that of honey, very sweet for the healthy, but very bitter for the ill and suffering: Dio Chrys. Nestor 57.8, and Buffière 2010, 349–54.
Cf. Greco 2010, 186–93.
Cf. Boyancé 1937, 2–3.
παρ’ 
καὶ τὸ Λύκειον εἶναι νομίζοντες (Ep. 18.9).
Minniti-Colonna 1958. For some textual emendations to this edition, see Gallicet 1978, Part I, 117–35. For modern analyses of Aeneas’ dating, see Wacht 1969, 18 note 17. See also Aujoulat 1986; Segonds 1989, 83. For Aeneas’ life, see ibid; Seitz 1892; Sikorski 1909; Wacht 1969.
Minniti-Colonna 1973. For dating and life, see Honigmann 1953, 194f.
There is no critical edition of the Commentary. The text is found in Migne’s Patrologia Graeca 87.1.
Tarrant 2007; Festugiére 1966; Lang/Marco/McGinnis 2001.
For Philoponus and Simplicius, see relevant volumes of the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 1980. For Cosmas, see Wolska-Conus 1968; Wolska 1962.
For a more general study of these debates, and attention to the place of Aeneas and Zacharias within the Platonic tradition, see Champion 2014; Wear 2013.
Van Hoof 2010.
Wolska-Conus 1962.
References to the Ammonius are to line number in Minniti-Colonna’s edition. Page and line numbers are given for Aeneas’ Theophrastus. Column numbers in PG 87.1 are given for Procopius’ Commentary on Genesis.
For questions of dating of this work, see Bardy 1950, col. 3677; Segonds 1989, 89; Wacht 1969, 18 n.17. Watts has argued that Zacharias came back to the dialogue to update it in the 520s in Watts 2005.
For the anti-Manichean works, see Lieu 1983.
For Zacharias’ Monophysite biographies and church histories, see Watts 2007; Brooks 1919–21; 1977.
For Procopius and his works, see Amato (ed.) 2010.
See Amato 2010 and Garzya/Loenertz 1963; Leanza 1983; Matino 2005; Leanza 1978. On Procopius and his sources, see Ter Haar Romeny 2007.
For possible philosophical works, see Des Places (ed.) 1971, 46–7; Westerink 1942. For controversy over authorship, see Mai (ed.) 1831, 274; Russos 1893, 52–69; Dräseke 1897, 55–91; Stiglmayer 1899. Westerink 1942, challenged Stiglmayer’s negative assessment. Others follow Westerink’s lead: Emrich 1994, 993–4; Ter Haar Romeny 2007, 178; Watts 2007, 156 n.13. For the twelfth-century work, see Angelou 1984.
The line numbering of the dialogue in Minniti-Colonna’s edition begins from the title. These are the first words of the dialogue proper.
For the reception of Socrates, see Trapp 2007.
This passage is rich in allusions which demonstrate the diverse cultures which helped to generate Zacharias’ text: Theodoret’s Cure for Greek Maladies (Graecarum affectionum curatio) (pref. 1.5: τῷ 
εὐεπείας; 1.52.2: 
); Homer’s Od. and Plato’s Ap. 
.
Fragments of On Animals are collected by Haupt 1869.
On this tradition, see Sorabji 1990; 2005; 2010.
Theophrastus reports the views of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Boethus, Numenius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus. Hierocles’ version of the history of philosophy privileges the same figures.
Hadot 1978, 20.
I pursue this line of inquiry further in Champion 2013.
This generic change was perceptively analysed by Papadoyannakis 2006. On this genre, see Volgers/Zamagni 2005. The genre of “Sayings of the Desert Fathers” (apophthegmata) may also be an associated genre.
Share 2005, viii.
If we take Alcinous’ second-century handbook Did. 14.3 to represent the mainstream of Platonic interpretation, the Atticus-Plutarch position had been demoted in favour of Taurus’ interpretation early in the history of middle Platonism.
For discussion, see Phillips 1997.
Lang/Macro/McGinnis 2001.
Saffrey 1975.
On the history of the shadow analogy, see Baltes 1976, 166 – 69.
Aeneas has a shorter version of the same set of arguments: “How much better was he, and how much more truly was he the creator, he who made and harmonised as he willed, than [the creator] of the shadow which accompanies by necessity? Who could will to order (κοσμεῖν) or destroy his own shadow? Therefore this reasoning of senseless men would also destroy Providence, since care for a shadow would be impossible. Further, a shadow appears alongside the body simultaneously [with it]. But it is impossible for the creator to produce (παραλαμβάνειν) matter simultaneously [with himself].”
He shows knowledge of this psychology, at least as mediated by Gregory, at Commentary on Genesis 117cd, which is modelled on De op. hom. 145.36 f.
Lucretius De rerum Natura 1.73; Diogenes Laertius 2.1.2; 9.44; cf. Ti. 30d – 31b.
Is 65:17, 66:22; 2 Pet 3:13.
For relevant texts, see Blank/Kretzmann 1998; Iamblichus, ap. Ammonium in Int. 135.14ff. (Busse); Proclus, in Tim. 1.352.11–16 (Diehl). Courcelle has shown the currency of these debates in Ammonius’ school in his study of Boethius. See Courcelle 1967, 216–229.
See Sorabji’s discussion in Wilberding 2006, 2, 11.
In this respect they anticipate Cosmas Indicopleustes’ arguments in the sixth century.
For Philoponus on this question, and the Aristotelian background, see Haas 1997, 4f., 281–83; Sorabji 1983, 247–49, who uses the “whiteness” example.
Cf. Maximus in Eusebius PE 7.22. See also Philoponus Contra Proclum 340, 347, 365.3.
See Haas 1997, 4f. for discussion and further texts from the history of Platonism to support the widespread acceptance of this distinction. Aubry 2008, has recently discussed the concept of ἐπιτηδειότης in the context of the question of whether matter has an active ability to receive form or whether it should be conceptualised as purely passive.