15

9.00 AM, WEDNESDAY 17 September 2003. Finally, a criminal investigation was unleashed by the SIB, although ‘unleashed’ might be an exaggeration. Whilst the top brass were engaged in their furious examination of the world of written ordinances, the SIB began to organise itself. SSgt Sherrie Cooper was sent back to Battle Group Main. They needed statements from witnesses. Simultaneously, SSgt Daren Jay was sent to Camp Bucca. News of the allegations by Lt Cdr Crabbe had reached the SIB too. These had to be checked. The detainees held there had to be questioned about Baha Mousa’s death. Jay took five other RMP officers with him. It was going to be a long job.

When Cooper arrived back at Battle Group Main she sought out the adjutant, Captain Moutarde. There shouldn’t have been that much to discuss. She had already been briefed by him and Lt Col Mendonça the day before. But now he suggested that she should speak specifically to Corporal Donald Payne. At least, that’s how the conversation between them was recorded in the SIB investigation log. This was odd. Captain Moutarde had already compiled his report about the death in custody on the night of the 15th. It had been labelled for distribution to his commanding officer and the SIB. Moutarde wrote that it would be handed over to the investigating officer, whoever that might be, on their arrival at Battle Group Main the next day. And in that report Payne was clearly identified as one of the four men with Baha Mousa at the time he stopped breathing. Corporal Payne, privates Cooper and Reader, and LCpl Redfearn; all of them had been mentioned as there or thereabouts when there had been a struggle and Mousa had collapsed. It was Payne who Captain Moutarde described as restraining Mousa.

But if this report had been given to SSgt Cooper on the 16th when she first came to the base, then why hadn’t an interview with this key figure – as well as the other three soldiers mentioned – already been requested? They had to be primary witnesses.

The SIB log entry suggests Captain Moutarde’s report either couldn’t have been handed over on the 16th or hadn’t been read. It stated that only following Moutarde’s request did SSgt Cooper then see Corporal Payne. And Payne told her that although he had no particular dealings with the detainees, he did ‘brief the guard’ and had ‘periodically checked’ the prisoners. He also told her that he was involved in restraining ‘the deceased when he attempted to escape’ and then died.

These words provoked an instant reaction. SSgt Cooper explained that she could no longer speak to him. He was a material witness, perhaps even a suspect. Anything he was asked and anything he said would have to be recorded under caution to preserve the integrity of any information revealed.

Clearly, if SSgt Cooper had already been told or read of Payne’s involvement in Mousa’s death, she must have known not to speak to him in the first place, except, of course, in accordance with proper police practice. Cooper was experienced enough in criminal investigations to know this basic evidential requirement. That was her job.

Cooper dismissed Payne and turned her attention to other less crucial sources of information. She went to the Regimental Aid Post to take statements from Dr Keilloh and his medical crew. There were six of them in all. They told her how they had tried to save Baha Mousa’s life.

Next, she met with Sergeant Colley, the senior RMP officer at Battle Group Main, and was given a copy of his notebook entries from the night of the 15th. This recorded the details of the fourteen soldiers he’d found hanging about the detention facility soon after Baha Mousa had died. All would have to be questioned. But Cooper didn’t even attempt to talk to these men. Instead, she went back to the detention block to make a sketch plan. It was very rough, more to help her colleagues understand the layout than to use as some kind of scientific piece of evidence. In the same vein she went to ask Captain Seeds for an aerial photograph of the whole base. Again, a matter of framing the investigative picture, not filling in its specific subject. (There was no record of Seeds saying anything about the night of the 15th when he had entered the detention facility after Baha Mousa’s death and been disgusted by the condition of the remaining detainees.)

Before winding up her inquiries for the day and heading back to SIB HQ, SSgt Cooper reported to Lt Col Mendonça, to brief him on the progress of her investigations. He had demanded this. It was his base, after all. He had the right to be kept informed, though Cooper can’t have had much to say. There were so many unresolved questions, so few leads pursued.

When Cooper finally headed back to Shaibah to discuss the case with Captain Nugent and her SIB colleagues, she must have made the short but dangerous journey conscious that the investigation was veering in multiple directions. Its strands were spreading like ivy, fingering a host of names with possible stories attached. All would have to be tracked. The fact that she now knew that a struggle had preceded the detainee’s death altered the case’s composition entirely. It allowed for a tangle of permutations, all of which would require scrutiny. She wouldn’t be able to do that on her own.