After an exceedingly brief reorganization, on 27 December XLVII Panzer Korps ordered Panzer Lehr Division 130 to the Mirwart–Rondu sector, Mirwart being a little less than five miles northwest of St. Hubert, Rondu about seven miles southeast of St. Hubert. The Division thus defended approximately twelve miles of front. Under constant enemy pressure, both on the ground and from the air, the Division held this sector defending the southwest flank of the German salient with no more than minor losses of terrain until the start of the general retreat on 10 January. Comprehension of the Panzer Lehr role requires understanding of the initial stages of the southern arm of the American attempt to cut off the German salient and of the German attempt to renew the ring around and eliminate the American forces at Bastogne.
Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 collected its forces near Wavreille, then blocked the Lesse River sector, destroying bridges, felling trees across the road and laying mines, before falling back behind the l’Homme River, with strongpoints in Mirwart and Arville. Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 established its command post in Arville.
Adjoining to the left, division pioneers obstructed Arville, Hatrival and Vesqueville and mined the river-bed in front of Kampfgruppe von Poschinger’s sector. At this point Kampfgruppe von Poschinger, with its command post in St. Hubert, consisted of the II./Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 (Bataillon Böhm), Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 130 and schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559. Remember, in reading the names of these units that all had been reduced to mere shadows of their full establishments.
On the Division’s extreme left, Kampfgruppe Neumann, consisting of the I./ Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 and two Panther companies, defended the Moircy–Remagne sector. Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 supported the sector with two of its own Abteilungen (battalions), a Volks-Artillerie-Korps, a 21 cm Mörser (heavy howitzer) battery and Heeres-Flak-Abteilung 311. Generalleutnant Bayerlein set up his headquarters in a château near Lavacherie, about seven miles northwest of St. Hubert.
Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 faced no more than local reconnaissance by the British 6th Airborne Division, reinforced with the 29th Armoured Brigade of the British 11th Armoured Division.
Kampfgruppe von Poschinger resolutely held its sector against constant attacks by the American 87th Infantry Division from 28 December until the general retreat on 11 January.
The only enemy penetration came in Kampfgruppe Neumann’s sector, where, on 28 December, the American 28th Cavalry Squadron forced the advance outposts from Freux and Rondu back to Moircy and Remagne in the start of an attempt to cut the St. Hubert–Morhet road in the opening move of the American offensive described below.
In the evening of 28 December General Eisenhower released the 87th Infantry Division and 11th Armored Division from SHAEF reserve to Bradley’s 12th Army Group. Bradley, in turn, then released them to Patton’s Third Army, with the reservation that they must be attached to the American VIII Corps.
The Allied plans now called for Middleton’s VIII Corps, which was facing Panzer Lehr Division 130, the remnants of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division and the battered Kampfgruppe of the 15th Panzergrenadier-Division and the 3rd Panzergrenadier-Division, to open the attack northward from the Bastogne area, its first objective the high ground and road hub south of Houffalize. Milliken’s III Corps would then join the action from its positions east of Bastogne on 31 December, driving toward St. Vith. From the northern side of the German salient, Collins VII Corps and the Ridgeway’s XVIII Airborne Corps were to attack south on 3 January toward Houffalize and St. Vith, respectively, thus linking up with the drive from the south.
This attack coincided with an attack ordered by von Manteuffel. Manteuffel’s plan called for an attack in three phases: first, to re-establish the ring around Bastogne; second to force the American forces back to the south; and, third, with the help of reinforcements then en route, to annihilate the American force in Bastogne.
The new XXXIX Panzer Korps under Generalleutnant Karl Decker was brought in from OKW reserve to handle the attack on Bastogne. Over General von Lüttwitz’z protests, XXXIX Panzer Korps was attached to von Lüttwitz’s own XLVII Panzer Korps. Von Lüttwitz now commanded Armeeabteilung von Lüttwitz, consisting of those two corps.3 XXXIX Panzer Korps would attack from east to west via Lutrebois toward Assenois with the remnants of the 1st SS-Panzer Division ‘Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’, now reduced to a Kampfgruppe, the 167th Volksgrenadier Division and the 14th Fallschirmjäger Regiment. The Führer-Begleit-Brigade would spearhead XLVII Panzer Korps’s attack from the west via Sibret to meet the XXXIX Panzer Korps thrust at Assenois.
In the XLVII Panzer Korps attack the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division would advance south through the Bois de Fragotte, between Chenogne and Senonchamps, echeloned to the right of the Führer-Begleit-Brigade, and swing southeast to take Villeroux. Attached to the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division the Führer-Begleit-Brigade would capture Sibret and the combined force then move against Assenois and Hompré, linking up with the XXXIX Panzer Korps force and closing the ring again around Bastogne.
The remnants of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division and a Kampfgruppe from the 15th Panzergrenadier Division were to screen to the north and west of Bastogne while what was left of Panzer Lehr Division 130 firmly defended its sector on the Korps far right. The 26th Volksgrenadier and 15th Panzergrenadier Divisions had both lost heavily in their unsuccessful Christmas Day attack on the northwest part of the American 101st Airborne Division sector at Bastogne.
Before the opening of the two opposed offensives, on 29 December, CCA of the American 9th Armored Division was continuing the attack it had launched on 27 December north toward Sibret along the left flank of the 4th Armored Division to open the Neufchâteau–Bastogne highway and establish a line of departure for the new offensive. Its Task Force Karsteter unwittingly approached and endangered the assembly position of the Führer-Begleit-Brigade. Later Task Force Karsteter came under heavy fire and suffered heavy losses when it ran into the main body of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division.
Then, on 30 December, the two opposing attacks were launched. Aside from a few minor meeting engagements (minor, that is, from the American viewpoint) between the margins of the American 11th Armored Division’s CCB and the Führer-Begleit-Brigade, most of the American attack by the 87th Infantry and 11th Armored Division, advancing north to the left of the 9th Armored Division, struck the German sector held by Panzer Lehr Division 130 and the 26th Volksgrenadier Divison. With the exception of the penetration described below, Panzer Lehr’s staunchly defended line held with no significant changes, as did the positions of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division and 15th Panzergrenadier Kampfgruppe.
Shelled heavily in its assembly position in the Bois de Fragotte by 4th Armored Division artillery and facing severe cross-fire from the 9th Armored Division’s CCA tanks in Villeroux, the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division took little action on 30 December.
The Führer-Begleit-Brigade formed two forces, one consisting of a battalion of Panzergrenadiere, which was to force an opening into Sibret, the other consisting of its armour with another battalion of Panzergrenadiere riding the tanks. The armoured force would wait in Chenogne and then advance on a parallel route through Flohimont and enter Sibret from the west.
Starting out in dense ground fog the Führer-Begleit Panzergrenadier Bataillon made initial progress, pushing back the American Task Force Collins of CCA of the 9th Armored Division toward Sibret. However, the German battalion commander was killed, the advance slowed down and the fog lifted to reveal about 30 American tanks of CCB of the 11th Armored Division.
Though Oberst Remer, commanding the Führer-Begleit-Brigade, chose not to engage the American armour to his west, since his mission was to attack to the east, his outpost line to the west became involved and, as the action developed, more of his force was sucked in. The day passed and, by evening of 30 December, the Führer-Begleit-Brigade had accomplished little of note.
On 30 December CCA of the American 11th Armored Division and the 87th Infantry Division advanced via Rondu toward Remagne and via Freux toward Moircy. As the 11th Armored Division CCA’s 63rd Armored Infantry Battalion reached the crest of the Ridge north of Rondu Kampfgruppe Neumann’s fire swept them from the ridge. Despite extremely heavy American artillery fire, Kampfgruppe Neumann held resolutely. The American infantry lost heavily.
On the left wing of the American VIII Corps advance, the 87th Infantry Division committed two regiments, the 345th Infantry Regiment on the right to capture Pironpré, the 346th Infantry Regiment on the left to block the roads leading south from St. Hubert.
The American 345th Infantry Regiment on the right had an easy start, Panzer Lehr’s former roadblock detachments on its route apparently having been called in. However, the regiment ran into the first outpost within sight of Moircy. Heavy fire came in about 500 yards short of Moircy. By 1400 hours, after a series of costly, short rushes, the two companies reached the edge of Moircy after losing most of their officers and many enlisted men. The battalion’s reserve company was sent to circle west of the village and take the adjoining hamlet of Jenneville. A hot reception claimed heavy casualties, but the company reached the edge of Jenneville. By then, however, Moircy was in American hands and the reserve company was recalled. Kampfgruppe Neumann’s counterattack came in at about 0300 hours on 31 December. After a night of hard fighting that was costly to both sides Kampfgruppe Neumann received permission on 31 December to evacuate Moircy, but continued to hold the St. Hubert–Morhet road. Kampfgruppe Neumann suffered heavy losses.
The Americans shifted unit boundaries to leave Panzer Lehr’s position to the 87th Infantry Division and allow the 11th Armored Division’s CCA to join with its CCB east of the Bois de Haies.
In the afternoon of 31 December the American 87th Infantry Division’s 345th Infantry Regiment captured Remagne. Lack of adequate German forces precluded counterattack. By that point the 345th Regiment had sustained many casualties and was replaced by the newly-arrived 347th Infantry Regiment.
The XXXIX Panzer Korps assault to cut the Bastogne corridor failed in the east, with the capture of just two villages, Lutrebois and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, which, with the total failure of the XLVII Panzer Korps attack from the west, put ‘paid’ to the German hopes of eliminating Bastogne.
Hitler, however, still insisted on another attempt, which would take place on 4 January. That attack, however, which would be conducted by the 1st SS-Panzer Korps would come in astride the Bastogne–Houffalize highway and would not involve Panzer Lehr Division 130. XLVII Panzer Korps was simply expected to hold in place.
The new year came in with snow, sleet and bitter cold. The 87th Infantry Division’s 347th Infantry Regiment advanced through drifted snow from Remagne and Moircy to cut the Bastogne–St. Hubert highway and capture Amberloup.
During the day the American 1st Battalion with armoured support fought its way through deep snow into the woods. While daylight held enemy reaction was limited to small arms and occasional bursts of artillery fire. When night fell, however, German tanks struck and drove the American 1st Battalion back toward Remagne.
In the meanwhile 347th Infantry’s 3rd Battalion advanced north from Moircy toward Pironpré, taking the village of Jenneville that had cost its sister battalion so heavily two days earlier. However, as the battalion continued north from Jenneville heavy fire from a few German tanks that were carefully concealed in lumber piles around the local sawmill halted the American attack for the night.
On 2 January the two American battalions renewed their attack, steering well clear of the Pironpré hornet’s nest. Despite repeated American attacks, Pironpré remained in German hands until the general retreat on 11 January. The American’s took Gerimont, to the east and Bonnerue, to the west, cutting the St. Hubert–Morhet road. Gerimont remained American, but a German counterattack reclaimed Bonnerue. The American 87th Infantry Division committed its third Battalion to clean up and close the dangerous gap that had developed between its two attacking forces. Concerned, Generalleutnant Bayerlein committed Kampfgruppe von Poschinger in a counterattack that regained Bonnerue, as noted above. Lengthy and intense forest fighting against the skillfully infiltrating American troops held them to a line generally about one kilometre north of the St. Hubert–Bastogne road until the 11 January general retreat.
In a curious find, the Germans discovered a cache of artillery ammunition left over either from the 1940 advance or the 1944 retreat. Some rounds had suffered moisture damage, but many were still usable. The find of usable German propellant cartridges allowed the German artillery to fire captured American 105 mm shells back at the Americans from German pieces..
On 3 January the great American offensive of the First Army from the north and northwest and the Third Army from the south opened in a heavy snowstorm with falling temperatures. Panzer Lehr Division 130 was spared the initial assaults, but became involved in the general retreat.
Hotly contested, Bonnerue changed hands several times on 8 and 9 January. What was left of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 finally returned from east of Bastogne to its parent division on 9 January and launched a carefully prepared and well supported counterattack, retaking Bonnerue and capturing 80 prisoners.
To the west Allied attacks forced the German front back. Rochefort was lost. After the loss of Rochefort and under tremendous Allied pressure on the entire salient, Hitler agreed to a phased withdrawal. He also withdrew the 6th SS-Panzer Armee, as the former 6th Panzer Armee was now designated for commitment in Hungary to protect Germany’s last available source of petroleum.
The German front was pulled back to the line Mirwart–Bure–Wavreille–Hargimont–Charneux. Savage winter weather with bone-chilling cold, heavy snowstorms and ice-bound roads grounded Allied air and hindered pursuit. As the German phased withdrawal developed, Panzer Lehr Division 130’s position holding the line west of Bastogne was transformed into Panzer Lehr serving as rear-guard.
For the time being,, Panzer Lehr Division 130, now rear-guard, had to hold at what had become the western apex of the German salient. On 8 January Hitler authorized withdrawal to the Dochamps (15 kilometres east of Hotton)–Longchamps (6 kilometres north of Bastogne) line. ‘Unternehmen Veilchen’ (‘Operation Violet’) was to start with withdrawal of the units adjoining the Division to the right, the remnants of the 2nd Panzer Division and the 9th Panzer Division. The evacuation of St. Hubert, originally planned for the following night was postponed 24 hours, presumably due to fuel shortages and/or traffic conditions. St. Hubert was, in the event, evacuated during the night of 11/12 January.
The German perception was that the Allies were hesitant in following their withdrawal, due, in part, to mining and obstruction by German pioneers, the snow and ice conditions delaying removal of the blocks, to some extent due to the grounding of all air support, and, in part to lack of flexibility and initiative on the allied side,, what the Germans called ‘schematisch’ tactics. However, Allied artillery harassing fire on villages, intersections and other sensitive points was considered extremely unpleasant.
The withdrawal continued according to plan.
On 13 January Panzer Lehr Division 130 constituted the right flank rear-guard of the XLVII Panzer Korps, adjoined on the right by the badly battered 116th Panzer Division. In the evening of 13 January Panzer Lehr was ordered to dispatch a Kampfgruppe to link up with the 116th Panzer Division on its right. Kampfgruppe von Poschinger accordingly moved to Nadrin, approximately eight kilometres east of la Roche, but was unable to make contact with the 116th Panzer Division in the dark. South of the Ourthe River, Kampfgruppe von Hauser fell back to the line Thimont–Cens.
On 14 January superior enemy forces attacked the Panzergrenadiers north of the Ourthe both from the north and northeast. By afternoon both Nadrin and Filly were lost. The fords over the Ourthe were effectively blocked by crippled vehicles. The Panzergrenadiers were able to mine the streets and, at the last moment, blow the bridges across the Ourthe River, thereby blocking immediate pursuit. However, many of their own men were trapped on the north side of the icy river and captured. South of the Ourthe River, Warempage and Nisramont fell to the Allies.
Throughout the retreat, highways were jammed with unbroken streams of vehicles, all types and units mixed in a desperate attempt to reach the crossings over the Our to Germany. Special detachments spread sand on the icy roads. All available officers worked at traffic control, attempting to get damaged or disabled vehicles out of the road.
During the night of 14/15 January the new German front line was set at Achouffe–Bonnerue–Mabompré, almost directly north and a trifle east of Bastogne. As American forces forced back the fought-out remnants of the 116th Panzer Division, Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 prepared to backstop the 116th Panzer Division by defending the northern approach to Houffalize in Mont, which had to be evacuated in the afternoon.
Panzer Lehr Division 130 had contact with the 26th Volksgrenadier Division in Mabompré, to the south. When a combat-group of the American 11th Armored Division advanced straddling the Bertogne–Houffalize road to Mabompré Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 was able to destroy the bridge so that the American tanks could not cross, but was forced to fall back to the north. When American forces occupied the woods northeast of Mabompré, Kampfgruppe von Hauser was forced to fall back to the hills south of Houffalize. A counterattack by the 26th Volksgrenadier-Division recaptured Mabompré but resulted in the loss of the remaining six Jagdpanther of schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559. The newly-employed proximity fuses gave devastating air-bursts as American artillery harassing fire mounted throughout the sector.
The situation had deteriorated to the point where Houffalize had to be evacuated. Panzer Lehr Division 130 fell back to a position behind Houffalize during the night of 15/16 January and held that position through 16 January. That night the Division prepared a fall-back position in the in Cetturu–Tavigny, which it fell back to on 18 January.
Under cover of a blinding snowstorm on 19 January withdrawal continued without enemy interference to the railroad line west of the Luxembourg border. During the night of 19/20 January 1945 Panzer Lehr’s rear-guards passed through the new Biwisch–Asselborn defensive line that was held by the 26th Volksgrenadier Division and 15th Panzergrenadier-Division.
Panzer Lehr Division 130 had acquitted itself admirably as a fighting rear-guard during the German retreat from the Ardennes, but received no rest. General Patton had, from the very start of the German Ardennes Offensive, pushed for bold thrusts to slash through the German salient at the very base. The sparse road network south of the strong American defensive position on the Elsenborn Ridge, which had provided a firm shoulder against the northern flank of the German thrust, precluded a northern thrust from there. For a variety of reasons, the Allies chose what General von Rundstedt termed the ‘small solution’, paired thrusts aimed at Houffalize and St. Vith, approximately half-way up the German salient. No significant German forces were cut off. Now, after those two arms of the pincers had linked up at Houffalize, Patton finally launched an attack where he would have chosen to do so much earlier.
On 18 January two American infantry divisions crossed the Sûre (Sauer) River by surprise, a regiment of the 4th Infantry Division close to the German border at the junction of the Sauer and Our Rivers, two regiments of the 5th Infantry Division on either side of Diekirch. The 5th Infantry Division advanced north up ‘Skyline Drive’, seriously endangering the vital German crossings of the Our River at Vianden and Gemünd, threatening to cut off the three divisions of the LIII Armee Korps.
The German 7th Armee committed a Volksgrenadier Division on the ridge road. On 19 January Generalfeldmarschall Model immediately ordered to the 7th Armee, first a Kampfgruppe, then the entire remnants of Panzer Lehr Division 130 along with the XLVII Panzer Korps command and the 2nd Panzer Division remnants to establish a blocking position athwart the ridge west of Vianden to secure the retreat of the LIII Koprs from the Ardennes.
Heavy snow on 19 January intervened in all planned movements, but by the morning of 20 January Kampfgruppe von Poschinger was in position south and southwest of Hoscheid with the 9th Volksgrenadier Division on its right. Hoscheid was on Skyline Drive where the secondary road from Wiltz via the Wiltz River crossing at Kautenbach to the Vianden and Gemünd crossings over the Our to Germany crossed the ridge road.. If the American forces continued north on the highway through Hoscheid they could completely cut off the remaining German forces from the Our crossings.
American artillery was now within range and pounded the retreating LIII Korps as its crowded columns wound their tortuous way down ice-bound roads into the deep Our valley, across the bridges and up the German side of the valley.
On 21 January, after a heavy artillery preparation, the American 5th Infantry Division attacked Hoscheid. The initial assault was repulsed, but skies cleared the next day and American air and artillery joined the fray. Kampfgruppe von Hauser was shifted to the right to assist, but on 25 January Hoscheid fell. Panzer Lehr Division 130 was forced back to Walhausen as the last of the LIII Korps flowed back over the Clerf and Our Rivers. On 26 January 1945 Panzer Lehr’s rear-guard received permission to fall back across the Our, ending the Division’s involvement in the Ardennes offensive.
[Following (MS#A–941) translated by Frederick Steinhardt, except for the covering letter by Kenneth W. Hechler]
PANZER LEHR DIVISION (1 DECEMBER 1944–26 JANUARY 1945) (ARDENNES)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HISTORICAL DIVISION WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
| 12 July 1949 | ||||
| Note to: | MS #A–941 | |||
| By: | Kenneth W. Hechler Major, Infantry (Res) | |||
This is one of the many reports which was prepared by General Bayerlein while he was assisting the Historical Section. This particular report was written while General Bayerlein was confined to the hospital in Bad Nauheim with heart trouble. He was allowed to get up and to write at a table in order to prepare this report. I urged him to include as many illustrative sketches as possible in order to support the text of his report.
Although General Bayerlein was very eager to supply a complete account of his operations, along with a critical analysis of the tactics of the Panzer Lehr Div, I have a feeling from talking with him and from reading his reports that often he would include material which he felt the Americans would like to read. This was part and parcel of General Bayerlein’s general philosophy that after the war the best way to get ahead in life was to ingratiate himself with the Americans. It was this attitude which caused General Bayerlein to be held in considerable contempt by some of his German general associates.
Aside from General Bayerlein’s specific comments on American units and American fighting power, however, I believe that he was accurate in his discussion of the general tactics, plans, and movements of his division. He was extremely enthusiastic about preparing the answers to the questions which we presented to him, and I know from reports I received from the hospital that he worked long and hard in order to complete the details of his manuscript and to prepare the necessary supporting sketches.
| Alfred Zerbel | Koenigstein, 15 June 1950 |
INDEX FOR MS # A 941 (PANZER LEHR DIV, 1 DEC 44–26 JAN 45)
[Translated by Frederick Steinhardt]
(signed)
(Alfred Zerbel)
| Air force | |||
| American Air Force, action against Ardennes Offensive | 229–31 | ||
| American | |||
| Rapid countermeasures against attack | 224–5, 229 | ||
| Aerial attacks against attack operation | 229–31 | ||
| Losses | 247 | ||
| Armour | |||
| Combat tactics in attack | 245, 247 | ||
| Combat tactics in defense | 245, 247 | ||
| Artillery | |||
| Effects of preparatory fire for an attack wasted | 223 | ||
| Effects and strength of American artillery fire with aerial observation | 229–31 | ||
| Attack | |||
| Countermeasures against attack, rapid | 244–5 | ||
| Night - | 245 | ||
| Armoured attacks, conduct of | 245, 247 | ||
| Failure of an attack, grounds for | 222, 223 | ||
| Delaying an attack by stubbornly held strongpoints | 225, 227 | ||
| Preparations, measures for keeping them secret | 216 | ||
| Captured materiel | |||
| Materiel captured in surprise attack | 219–21, 233, 235 | ||
| Defense | |||
| Combat tactics of armour in defense | 245, 247 | ||
| Fighting in built up areas | |||
| Effectiveness of Panzerfaust in fighting in built up areas | 247 | ||
| Fuel | |||
| Captured fuel | 218 | ||
| Fuel consumption in difficult terrain | 218 | ||
| Intelligence | |||
| How intelligence was obtained regarding the enemy | 227–29 | ||
| Losses | |||
| American | 247 | ||
| Heavy German losses in the attack | 238 | ||
| Night | |||
| Night attack with armour on roads | 245, 247 | ||
| Panzerfaust | |||
| Effectiveness in forest fighting and in built up areas | 247 | ||
| Reconnaissance | |||
| Enemy situation | 227, 228 | ||
| Secrecy | |||
| Measures for secrecy in attack preparations | 216 | ||
| Surprise | |||
| Surprise successfully achieved in attack | 217 | ||
| Terrain | |||
| Fuel consumption in difficult terrain | 218 | ||
| Forested terrain, good effects of the Panzerfaust in | 247 | ||
| BAYERLEIN | Bad Nauheim. 2. XX. 454 | ||
PANZER LEHR DIVISION
1 Dec 44–25 Jan 45
translated by Frederick Steinhardt
MS # A–941
(Panzer Lehr Division, 1 Dec 44–26 Jan 45)
[Note- this section was translated from the original German by Frederick Steinhardt who was also responsible for the bracketed editorial notes.]
Questions 1–18
| 1. | When did you first hear of the planned Ardennes Offensive? | |
| I first learned of the planned offensive and the participation of the Panzer Lehr [Division] on 8 (or 10) December 1944 in conjunction with a map exercise in the headquarters of the 47th Panzer Korps in Kyllburg (Eifel). The first part of the attack (to the Maas [as the Meuse is called in Holland] between Namur and Dinant) was worked over in this map exercise. | ||
| Attending were: General von Manteuffel, General Krueger of the 58th Panzer Korps, the commanders of the Panzer Lehr, 2nd Panzer [Oberst Meinrad von Lauchert] and 26th Volksgrenadier Divisionen [Oberst Heinz Kokott]. | ||
| It was already evident that something special was planned in the West, without knowing exactly what it would be. In November the Panzer Lehr Division was being reconstituted in Westphalia under control of the 6th SS-Panzer Armee. [Although often referred to as 6th SS Panzer Armee, the official designation at that time was 6th Panzer Armee. The ‘SS’ was not added until the spring of 1945. After Panzer Lehr Division’s nearly complete destruction under the carpet-bombing accompanying Operation Cobra in the American breakthrough in Normandy, as noted earlier, the division’s remnants became part of a composite division, with all of six tanks, that halted the American advance in the Eifel in September, suffering additional painful losses. It was then in the process of reconstitution in preparation for the Führer’s Ardennes Offensive, which meant that it could not be committed in action before that offensive without express permission from the Führer. Despite that express order, von Rundstedt alerted the Division for action against Patton’s army in the Lorraine, official release of the Division following a day later. Yet again, the division was badly battered, requiring a near miracle of last-minute re-reconstitution to put it sufficiently in shape in a two-week period to participate in the Ardennes Offensive (after Elstob, Hitler’s Last Offensive.)]. On 9 November all of the divisions of that army were shifted ‘by surprise’ to the west bank of the Rhine, indeed, to approximately the area from which they later launched the attack. There were rumours of an intended attack in and south of the Aachen area. Sepp Dietrich’s Army was supposed to play the leading role in that [operation]. | ||
| The Panzer Lehr Division was withdrawn from the 6th SS-[Panzer] Armee and was assigned to the 58th Panzer Korps. The billeting area was east of Castellaun, in Hunsrück. The division was, however, ‘by surprise’, committed in the Saar area. [see note following interview MS # A-901 on ‘Panzer Lehr Division 130 in Lorraine’, regarding Saar action.] | ||
| On 1 December, after heavy fighting and substantial losses–again ‘by surprise’–[the division] was withdrawn for ‘rapid refitting’ in the Cochem area (on the Mosel [Moselle] River). A ‘Special Commission’ of OB West supervised the rapid withdrawal from the fighting and quick transport away. Therefore there must have been something special planned for the division, since the pressure for extreme haste was suspicious. Nobody could imagine that it had to do with imminent action, since the division was scarcely fit for action. Thus it was all the more surprising when the division received orders to take part in an offensive. | ||
| 2. | Measures to insure secrecy: | |
| The regimental commanders were not informed of the intention to attack and the plan of attack until just three days before the start of the attack (thus on 12 or 13 December.) Until then, all (orders and measures taken) had to be camouflaged as, for example, a ‘map exercise’ for a counterattack or as orders in the event of a counterattack against an enemy attack or penetration. | ||
| There was no concealing the numerous rail transports (of troops and materiel) in the Mosel River Valley and in the Eifel, which clearly indicated intentions to concentrate troops and attack. Maps could only be issued just before the start of the attack. |
| 3. | Date of orientation. | |||
| a. | The Chief of Staff or Operations Officer (Ia) participated in a Korps map exercise on 8 or 10 December, whereby he was orientated. In addition, the division’s commander of artillery and the combat engineers [Pioniere] [received orientation] because they had to make vital preparations (concentration of the artillery at the West Wall and preparation for constructing bridges near Gemünd and Eisenbach). | |||
| The Ib (logistics) had already been briefed before 10 December by his logistics authorities (corps, army [Armee]) since major, time-consuming work was necessary in the logistical area. | ||||
| b. | The other staff officers of the Division were briefed, according to need, between 10 and 13 December. | |||
| c. | Commanders of regiments and commanders of independent battalions (Abteilungen) [were briefed] on 12 December. | |||
| d. | Commanders of battalions were briefed on 13 and 14 December, prior to the advance, in the assembly areas (some company commanders likewise, as required). | |||
| e. & f. | Noncommissioned officers and enlisted men: [were briefed] in the evening of 15 December or in the morning of 16 December with the announcement of the appeals by Model and Rundstedt. [‘Soldiers of the Western Front! Your hour of greatness has arrived! Powerful assault armies are today attacking the Anglo-Americans. I need say no more. You all feel it: We are staking everything on this! Bear within you the holy obligation to give your all and achieve the superhuman for our Fatherland and our Führer! The Commander in Chief, West, signed von Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall.’. MacDonald, quotes endorsements to von Rundstedt’s order by Field Marshal Model and General von Manteufel: ‘Model: We will not disappoint the Führer and the Fatherland who created the sword of retribution. Forward in the spirit of Leuthen! Von Manteuffel: Forward, march, march! In remembrance of our dead comrades, and therefore on their order, and in remembrance of the tradition of our proud Wehrmacht!’] | |||
| 4. | a. | How did lack of instruction interfere with the preparations? | ||
| That did not cause problems. All preparations of the Division, regiments and battalions went smoothly. The troops were always prepared in advance for anything (practiced by the many ‘surprise’ commitments) and came directly from the fighting in the Saar region. The command personnel were always particularly well trained and prepared for anything. | ||||
| b. | Effect of the moment of surprise and maintenance of secrecy? | |||
| The enemy in Panzer Lehr’s sector seemed locally surprised, or he would have shifted his defense to the Our [River]-sector and would have been able to cause extreme difficulty and heavy losses to the Germans crossing there. Thus, [in the event], the crossing and bridge-construction were not interfered with at all. The enemy reserves were not yet there for a counterattack on the first and second days of the attack, so that the attack was able to rapidly advance over the Clerf [Clerve River] and into the Bastogne area. | ||||
| 5. | Where was Panzer Lehr reconstituted? | |||
| In the Cochem (Mosel) Lutzerath–Mayen (Eifel) starting 8 December. Thus the Division had only six days to refit and re-equip itself. |
| 6. | Reserves (allocations) in manpower, armour, guns and special weapons? | |||
| The following replacements were assigned by 15 December: | ||||
| a. | Manpower: 600, but almost all without weapons (more men arrived later during the offensive), about 250 returning convalescents. | |||
| b. | Tanks and tank destroyers [Panzerjäger]: 40 from the armour support facility at Mayen (later another 15 tank destroyers). | |||
| c. | Guns: 18 (8.8, 10.5 and 15 cm)–Almost all, however, lacking prime movers. | |||
| d. | Special weapons: (Mortars, machine guns and machine pistols) only isolated allocations, so that one entire battalion had no mortars and only a few machine guns. | |||
The Division had only one Panzer-Abteilung [tank battalion] with three companies, each with 14 tanks. The other Panzer Abteilung of the Panzer Regiment was being activated anew in Fallingbostel (Luneburger Heide) and being equipped with ‘Sperber Gerät’ [infra-red aiming devices, sights and IR illumination devices].
| 7. | Actual strength as a percent of authorized strength. | |||||
| Manpower: | 60% fighting strength. | |||||
| Tanks and tank destroyers: | 40% (one Abteilung missing). | |||||
| Guns: | 60%. | |||||
| Other weapons: | 40%. | |||||
| 8. | What special weapons were received? | |||
| In place of the missing Panzer Abteilung the Division received: | ||||
| a. | Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 539 (Jagdpanther). 30% equipped at the start of the attack (additional allotments of tank destroyers later). | |||
| b. | Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 243, 70% equipped. | |||
| c. | Nebelwerfer and heavy artillery were not received by the Division. Those were attached directly to the corps and primarily supported the first attack over the Our [River]. | |||
| 9. | Fuel? | |||
| a. | Promised: 5 units [Verbrauchssätze]. (at one Verbrauchssätz per 100 km) = 500 km. | |||
| Received: 2–1/2 units = 250 km. | ||||
| However, in the difficult terrain of the Eifel and northern Luxembourg, with the miserable roads and unfavorable weather conditions, one could only count on 2½ units = 100 km. | ||||
| b. | Road priority for fuel vehicles: Basic right-of-way and right to pass (special permit on the windshield.). | |||
| Rotary-traffic or one-way traffic. One way traffic for specified time periods. | ||||
| c. | Fuel supply for armour. | |||
| Special columns or vehicles with particularly effective column- and vehicle commanders. | ||||
| d. | Captured fuel and other captured matériel. | |||
| I did not allow myself to rely on captured fuel, though I did hope for it, particularly in Bastogne, St. Hubert and Rochefort. | ||||
Booty was, however, vanishingly scant during the entire offensive: only a few fuel lorries. [There was] some captured by draining the tanks of captured or damaged (or destroyed) enemy tanks and motor vehicles, for example: approximately 15 cubic meters [ = 3962 US gal or 3300 Imperial gal] east of Bastogne near Longwilly [Longvilly].
| Other booty: | ||||
| a) | Near Magret and Longwilly [Longvilly]: 14 armoured cars, 23 tanks (Sherman), 15 guns (self-propelled), 30 jeeps, 25 lorries (all undamaged!). | |||
| b) | Near Carimont and Tillet (east of St. Hubert) 53 lorries, 15 jeeps (all undamaged!). | |||
| c) | In Rochefort. 15 jeeps, 18 lorries. (All undamaged!) | |||
| d) | North of St. Hubert. American and German ammunition (particularly 10.5 cm) in large quantities. A great deal of ammunition had been expended near St. Hubert and Rochefort and, given the miserable logistics situation, [the captured ammunition] was a great help. | |||
| e) | In all the Division captured and placed in service approximately 120 undamaged jeeps and over 150 intact lorries. | |||
| 10. | Discussions and conferences before and during the offensive. | |||
| a. | Map exercise and first discussion of the operation on 8 (or 10) December at 47th Panzer Korps in Kyllburg. | |||
| Main question: Preparation of the attack on the first day of the attack: artillery support; fire plan, artillery preparation or not. Missions of the 26th V.G.D. [Volksgrenadier-Division] in building bridgeheads over the Our and Clerf. Mission of the Panzer-Divisions. | ||||
| Advance detachment. | ||||
| Question of Bastogne: Coup de main? Or, in the event of strong opposition–should it be taken or bypassed and only observed or guarded. Later capture by rear elements. | ||||
| b. | Discussion in Führerhauptquartier [Führer headquarters] in Ziegenberg near Bad Nauheim. | |||
| Present: Commanders of the Heeresgruppe, the armies, corps and divisions. Hitler presented the plan of the offensive, its significance for the future conduct of the war and its political significance (Canada and the U.S. A.). | ||||
| Plan of Operations in detail: Advance via Liège–Namur on Antwerp. Schwerpunkt [point of main effort] with the 6th SS-Panzer-Armee. | ||||
| Encirclement of the 21st Army Group and its destruction. For this purpose the 5th Panzer-Armee: via Bastogne–Laroche to Namur–Dinant (later Antwerp), 6th Armee to Liège. | ||||
| Extreme demands on officers and troops, since success of the offensive is decisive to the outcome of the war. | ||||
| c. | Discussion at Panzer Lehr by division commander on 13 December at Maeden east of Cochem (Mosel) regarding the Division’s plan of attack in detail. | |||
| d. | Discussion at 47th Panzer Korps on 15 December, 1600 hours, in Rickuscheid (north of Neuerburg). Brief final instructions and encouragement (all commanders of divisions, regiments and independent battalions present.) | |||
| e. | Second discussion at Panzer Lehr on 15 December, 1900 hours, at Seffern command post (north of Bittburg [Bitburg]. Commanders of regiments and independent battalions present. Course of the attack (ultimate) and individual or special instructions (pioneers, the Ala [Aufklärungs-Lehr Abteilung, Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130–the Division’s reconnaissance battalion] advance-detachment, sequence in crossing the Our near Gemünd and elements [crossing at] Dasburg–(in 2nd Panzer [Division] sector)). | |||
| f. | 19 December. Discussion with the Commander in Chief of the 47th Panzer Korps von Lüttwitz at the Division command post at Nieder Wampach. Question whether Bastogne is to be taken in the event that the coup de main fails and a second attack is also repulsed. I had the impression ‘ that Bastogne would have to be attacked employing all the available forces of the 47th [Panzer] Korps (Panzer Lehr [Division], 2nd Panzer [Division] and 26th Volksgrenadier-Division.) One cannot dare to bypass it and, judging from my experiences on 18 and 19 December, employment of weak Korps forces will prove unsuccessful, since Bastogne appears to be held by extremely good troops. In any case, however, Bastogne has to be taken by us soon, before our attack can be resumed past it to the west. Bastogne is vital for us as a transportation hub. Without Bastogne, the base for our continued attack is to narrow and that is a serious danger. | |||
| After lengthy discussion in the course of which Lüttwitz endorsed my views my proposal–to attack with the concentrated forces of the entire 47th [Panzer] Korps–was rejected, probably under instructions from higher levels. There–as I heard–people were convinced that Bastogne was a “trivial problem”, which should not be permitted to interfere with the rapid progress of the offensive. | ||||
| g. | Renewed discussion with General von Lüttwitz in the morning of 20 December along the same lines as that of 19 December and subsequent orders that elements of the Division (Aufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung [130]) and Pionier-Bataillon [130]) be sent ahead toward St. Hubert. Discussion regarding the” Surrender Demand to the garrison of Bastogne” that had been conceived by von Manteuffel and Lüttwitz. [tr. Note-General von Manteuffel emphatically denied knowledge of or complicity in the transmission of what he considered to be a ridiculous and counter-productive surrender demand, since he knew that the German forces could not in any way carry out the threats contained therein.] The [Surrender Demand] was transmitted by a parliamentary (Adjutant of the Panzer Lehr [Division] on 12 December. | |||
| h. | Discussion with General von Manteuffel on 22 December regarding the marche from Bastogne to St. Hubert near Morhet. | |||
| The advance of Panzer Lehr was too slow. Sepp Dietrich was making very good progress. He was already before Liège. What it came down to was that Panzer Lehr was to take St. Hubert as quickly as possible and then advance via Rochefort to Dinant. | ||||
| Sufficient fuel arrived. | ||||
| i. | Discussion with General von Lüttwitz on 24 December, in the evening, by telephone. | |||
| ‘The–‘courageous’-2nd Panzer-Division is facing destruction east of Dinant. It has been cut off. | ||||
| Immediate help from Panzer Lehr is necessary. Mission: Thrust forward this very night on Humain | ||||
| and Buisonville [Buissonville](north of Rochefort) to fight free the supply road of the division’. | ||||
| I proposed to advance along the Lesse [River] via Ciergnon to Custinne, since this area (Ciergnon) was already held by my armoured patrols and [that way] we would get to the encircled elements of the [2nd Panzer] division more rapidly. [My proposal] was turned down. | ||||
| k. | [German practice does not include ‘j’ in such lists] On 27 December consultation with General von Lüttwitz at the Division command post in St. Hubert. The attack to the north across the Maas was, for the time being, to be discontinued. What it came down to was holding at the limit of the present advance and, first, to attack and capture Bastogne with all means. For this purpose strong elements of Sepp Dietrich’s army [6th Panzer Armee] would be committed there. Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 901 of the Panzer Lehr [Division] (reinforced with additional armour and one artillery Abteilung) would have to remain at Bastogne and take part in the attack. It would be attached to the 39th Panzer Korps. | |||
| l. | Between 27 December and 5 January only trivial discussions took place, since the Division had only defensive assignments in the St. Hubert area and the [47th Panzer] Korps (and the [5th Panzer] Armee) were primarily concerned with the Bastogne area. | |||
| m. | Discussion with General von Lüttwitz at the Panzer Lehr command post north of Lawacherie [Lavacherie] on 7 January 1945: The St. Hubert area was to be held to the last. Therefore ‘Kampfkommandanten’ were to be appointed and made responsible for | |||
| 1. | St. Hubert, | ||||
| 2. | Champlon (highway intersection), | ||||
| 3. | Pirompre [Pirompré, Pironpré] (southeast of St. Hubert). | ||||
[note-The Kampfkommandant was responsible for the defense of the stipulated locality and was given special powers, and responsibilities. One of his special powers was that he could commandeer any troops coming within the boundaries of his jurisdiction.]
| n. | Since I, myself always commanded in the very front line, my discussions within the division were limited to individual instructions and orders on the spot with the commanders of those particular assault or defense groups. |
| 11. | Reasons for the initial success of the offensive. | |||||
| a. | Surprise of the enemy with respect to area and time of the attack. | |||||
| b. | Good training and spirit of attack of the Panzer troops, despite inadequate equipment and constant, nearly unbroken commitment in combat and despite the many failures and the miserable command at the top in recent years. | |||||
| The German troops preferred attack over defense, so long as the attack received some sort of support from heavy weapons. | ||||||
| c. | Absence of the enemy airforce in the first days. | |||||
| Reasons for the failure of the offensive. | ||||||
| a. | Incorrect initial commitment of the forces. The left (enveloping) wing should have been stronger than the right. The strength of the enemy was on the [German] right (at and south of Aachen) and that was where he also had mobile reserves available for a counter-stroke. One needs, however, to put one’s strength where the enemy is weak, therefore on the German left wing. | |||||
| The German command did not keep out any reserves to be committed during the course of the battle where the advance was going well. | ||||||
| b. | Insufficient forces for the wide-ranging operation (Maas [River] and then Antwerp). | |||||
| c. | Lack of any adequate forces to protect the long southern flank (west flank)! The worst division in the entire Heeresgruppe, the 5th Fallschirm Division was employed for that purpose. | |||||
| d. | Employment of fought-out and miserably equipped divisions. | |||||
| e. | Amateurish [dilettantenhafte] preparation, particularly with respect to logistical support, which was totally inadequate and was, in part, based on the hope of capturing matériel. [The reason I included the bracketed dilettantenhafte is that, in the literature written by former German officers, the term Dilettante, and its adjective, is frequently employed specifically in reference to Hitler’s personal intervention in matters requiring professional military training and experience, so that its use here is a pointed, if barely veiled, reference to the Führer’s baneful influence.] | |||||
| f. | Miserable terrain for concentration and assembly areas. Miserably difficult road conditions were equally unfavorable for fighting troops and logistical support. During periods of favorable flying weather the bottlenecks in the Eifel and northern Luxembourg were catastrophic. Therefore little armour got into action and the attacks and defense could not be supported with sufficient ammunition. | |||||
| g. | The artillery preparation of the first attack across the Our [River] was wasted because the troops were too far away and were unable to take advantage of it. That led to delays resulting from the opposition on the St. Vieth [St. Vith]–Diekirch road and at the Clerf [River] sector. The result of these delays was failure to get to Bastogne in time to be able to take it by a coup de main. | |||||
| h. | Bastogne. One of the greatest mistakes was that, after the failure of the ‘coup de main’, Bastogne was not captured by concentration of all [available] forces. If that had been done then the attack would have succeeded. | |||||
| Leaving that transportation center to the enemy made the basis for the advance to the Maas too narrow. Bastogne absorbed and later tied down so many forces that the offensive could no longer really be carried out. It posed a continual threat to the flank with the danger of being cut off if Bastogne was relieved and the enemy utilized this base for his attack to cut off the German salient. | ||||||
| 12. | Plans to advance to the south to roll up the U.S. 3rd Army. | |||||
| I never heard of any such. | ||||||
| 13. | When was it clear that attaining the original objectives was impossible? | |||||
| a. | In general: I was skeptical from the beginning and felt that this offensive with its far-reaching objectives could not succeed. I do not say this just with the benefit of hindsight. I expressed this opinion at the time to my chief of staff and others who were quite close to me and whom I trusted absolutely; not, however, before my subordinate commanders, since I did not want to cripple their aggressive spirit. I persuaded myself that the attack would succeed in order to give my measures and orders the requisite conviction, even though I was convinced the offensive would fail. I viewed the offensive as the final convulsions (‘dernier cri’) of the collapsing Wehrmacht and its supreme command before its end, which had been clear to me since December 1942 (after the U.S. landing in North Africa). If, therefore, something could still be attempted, then it was this offensive. | |||||
| b. | When was it clear to me that the objective of the offensive was unattainable? | |||||
| Within the context of the offensive in my own thinking (without regard to the general [answer] to ‘a.’ [above]), it was totally clear to me on 25 December that this was over, after the 6th SS Panzer Army, despite its outstanding [level of] equipment, could no longer advance; as the attacks of the 116th and 9th Panzer [Divisionen] failed; the main body of the 2nd Panzer [Division] was cut off and destroyed; and, finally, my own attack near Buisonville [Buissonville] and Humain failed, Bastogne could not be taken and the strong threat to the German southern flank by the U.S. 3rd Army became evident. | ||||||
| c. | When did it become clear that the retreat was necessary? | |||||
| Actually it was already clear on 25 December, since no additional German forces followed. | ||||||
| Quite definitely, however, on 2 January 1945. It seemed to me that the only correct [course] would be an immediate and rapid withdrawal to the Westwall out of the sack that was developing toward the west. After the attack on Bastogne everything continued to go wrong and the linkup of the garrison with the U.S. 3rd Army was complete. With that, the basis for the 5th and 6th German Armies was too narrow and the corridor to the elements that were fighting far to the west was too tight. The danger of being cut off became ever greater and it was only a question of time. The continued holding of the salient was insanity. In addition then came the effect of the enemy airforce on the narrow corridor and the exposure of the logistic support on the few, narrow roads. Any waiting and holding the salient meant daily additional losses to the troops in men and matériel that bore no relationship to the operational significance for the German command. This significance (utility) consisted in tying up strong enemy forces to prevent them from attacking at another location on the Western Front. (Anyhow, this was [what was] later given out by O. K. W. as the sense and purpose of the Ardennes Offensive.) As then stated, apparently, O. K. W. had never intended Antwerp [as an objective], but merely wanted to bind enemy forces and prevent them from attacking in the Saar region and near Aachen. | ||||||
| d. | Discussions with higher levels of command in this situation. | |||||
| On about 6 or 7 January with General von Lüttwitz in this regard (as described above under c.) This discussion, however, was senseless and pointless, since all orders came ‘from above’ and the viewpoint of the troops was never listened to or heeded, for we were always pessimists and ‘negative’ in our attitude. | ||||||
| 14. | Did the U.S. forces react more rapidly than expected and how? | |||||
| Yes, they reacted essentially more rapidly that expected. Specifically: | ||||||
| 1. | The first surprise for the Germans was the rapid occupation and strong defense of Bastogne and the courageous steadfastness of the 101st Airborne. The rapid bringing up of armoured forces in the area east of Bastogne to offensive defense against the German attack (U.S. 9th Armoured Division). | |||||
| 2. | The second surprise was the rapid reorientation of the U.S. 3rd Army against the German southern flank. By 21 December the situation on the flank was already such that the route of advance to St. Hubert near Remichampagne and Moircy could only be used under fire from enemy tanks or armoured cars. | |||||
| 15. | Importance of the capture of Bastogne and orders to that effect? | |||||
| Already in the preparatory discussions and the map exercise one of the primary questions was whether Bastogne really would have to be captured or not, [and, if so,] whether by coup de main or, if that failed, in a systematic attack (at that time general preference was for the coup de main). When the coup de main miscarried on 17/18 December, the question arose anew as to whether there should be a systematic attack or whether it should be bypassed and kept ‘under observation’. My opinion at that time was that it should be attacked by concentrating all the available forces of the 47th [Panzer] Korps. That, however, did not take place. Isolated attacks were ordered that dissipated [the available forces]. One part of the troops had to attack, another portion hurried on to the west. These measures resulted in no attack in sufficient strength. Then it was attempted with the demand for surrender, whose text was written by von Manteuffel and Lüttwitz. [Von Manteuffel, however, states that: ‘This was done without my approval. I regarded it as a pointless action, since in the event of the enemy’s refusal to surrender, there was nothing we could do to enforce our wishes. Our artillery did not even have sufficient ammunition for a heavy bombardment of the town.’(Von Manteuffel, ‘The Ardennes’, in The Fatal Decisions: Six Decisive Battle of the Second World War from the Viewpoint of the Vanquished, Michael Joseph, London 1956. According to C. B. MacDonald, ‘When General von Manteuffel learned of it he was furious, for, quite clearly he lacked sufficient artillery to make good on the threat.’] Finally the half of Panzer Lehr [Division that had been left at Bastogne] was taken away and the already-weakened 26th Volksgrenadier-Di vision was supposed to capture the fortress alone. Hence all local attacks failed. Thus precious time was lost. Bastogne was constantly reinforced and the relief army (U.S. 3rd Army) kept drawing nearer. | ||||||
| The rapid conquest of Bastogne was particularly vital for the following reasons: | ||||||