Small reserves for immediate counterattacks against enemy penetrations.
Utilization of the superior range of the tank-main-guns.
(Special:)
Manifold employment of the ‘Panzerfaust’ in forest fighting and fighting in built up areas against nests, bunkers, cellars and houses. Very good effect (also against dug-in enemy).
Estimation of U.S. losses.
Noteworthy losses: East of Bastogne, material destruction of an entire combat command of the U.S. 9th Armored Division.
(Captured or destroyed 50–60 tanks (Sherman), 40 half-tracks, 25 self-propelled guns, 22 armored cars. 40 lorries and 30 automobiles (jeeps)).
Other major losses near Neffe and Marvie resulting from German artillery fire and in house-to-house fighting in Rochefort. Particularly heavy losses in the attack on Moircy and Piromprè [Pironpré] (southeast of St. Hubert) from German artillery and tank fire. (U.S. 87th or 78th Infantry Division). [Actually, it was the U.S. 84th Infantry Division that had built up a garrison in Rochefort. Despite the intense fighting in Rochefort, Cole, in the U.S. Army Official History of the battle, (The Ardennes, Battle of the Bulge) states, ‘The defense of Rochefort had not been too costly: fifteen wounded men, under the care of a volunteer medic, were left in the town and another twenty-five were killed or captured. But the Panzer Lehr commander, who had fought in both engagements, would later rate the American defense in Rochefort as comparable in courage and in significance to that at Bastogne.’] Otherwise [American] losses cannot be estimated in anything approaching detail. I believe, however, that they were not particularly high.
Evaluation of the performance of the Panzer Lehr Division:
In general and in summary it can be stated that the Panzer Lehr [Division] performed very well in the Ardennes offensive, despite its deficient outfitting with equipment, its fought out condition, the logistical difficulties and the fragmented commitment that was ordered by higher command with:
| a. | one Kampfgruppe [Kampfgruppe Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment] 901 at Bastogne, | ||
| b. | one Kampfgruppe (pioneers and Flak) defending 40 kilometres of flanks, | ||
| c. | one Kampfgruppe [Kampfgruppe Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment] 902 attacking vie St. Hubert, Rochefort, Humain and Ciergnon. |
Signed BAYERLEIN
formerly Generalleutnant
PANZER LEHR DIVISION, 15–22 DECEMBER 1944
INDEX FOR
MS # A 942
PANZER LEHR DIVISION, 15–22 DECEMBER 1944
Translated by Frederick Steinhardt. Notes in square brackets also by Frederick Steinhardt.
(Signed) Alfred Zerbel (Alfred Zerbel)
Index for MS # A 942
| American | |||
| armoured losses during German breakthrough | 258 | ||
| organization of the defense against tanks that had broken through | 254, 258 | ||
| Rapid countermeasures against the attack operation | 252 | ||
| stubborn defense | 249, 252 | ||
| supply column, capture of | 261 | ||
| Armour | |||
| advance after breakthrough | 252–3 | ||
| losses, American, during German breakthrough | 258 | ||
| stopping the forward thrust after a breakthrough | 258 | ||
| Attack | |||
| delay due to stubborn resistance | 249 | ||
| scuttling an attack by commitment of forces in multiple small elements | 252, 254 | ||
| stopping armoured formations that had broken through | 258 | ||
| Breakthrough | |||
| armoured advance after successful breakthrough | 252–4 | ||
| organization of defense after breakthrough | 254, 258 | ||
| Defense | |||
| rapid American organization of– | 254, 258 | ||
| Losses | |||
| matériel losses, American, during the German breakthrough | 258 | ||
| Reconnaissance battalion | |||
| Incorrect employment | 252 | ||
| Roads | |||
| delay of armoured advance due to muddy roads | 253 | ||
| Weather | |||
| delay of armoured advance due to rain | 253 | ||
| Woods | |||
| infiltration through woods during attack | 249 | ||
Fritz BAYERLEIN
Oberursal, 1 March 1946
former Commander, Panzer Lehr Division
PANZER LEHR DIVISION, 15–22 DECEMBER, 1944 MS # A–942
1. Employment of the Panzer Lehr [Division] during the first days of the Ardennes Offensive.
During the night of 15/16 December the Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon [130] of the Panzer Lehr Division prepared bridges for the Irsen Stream (one kilometre northwest of Gemünd) and the Our River and built them in the morning of the 16th. These bridges could be used during the morning of 16 [December] by the 26th V.G.D. [Volksgrenadier-Division].
The entire artillery of the Panzer Lehr Division was already committed on 14 December for the battle for the Our and Clerf [Clerve River] crossings by the 26th Volksgrenadier-Division
The reconnaissance battalion of the Panzer Lehr Division (ALA) [Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130] was attached to the 26th Volksgrenadier-Division on 16 December and initially received the following mission from the [47th Panzer] Korps: After building the bridgeheads over the Our near Gemünd and the Clerf near Drauffeld [Drauffelt], to immediately advance to Bastogne to capture the town in a coup de main and then immediately resume the advance to Dinant. Route of march via Eschweiler–Derenbach and then either via Nieder Wampach or Doncols–Bras to Bastogne. For this Panzeraufklrungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130, consisting of one armoured car company, two Panzergrenadier companies and one heavy company, was reinforced with one Panzer company (15 Panzer IV), one Pionier company and one battery of artillery (10.5 cm).
The main body of the Panzer Lehr Division, likewise, after building the bridgehead of the 26th Volksgrenadier-Division near Drauffeld and the 2nd Pz. Div. [Panzer Division] near Clervaux [both bridgeheads over the Clerf River. The town of Clervaux is also referred to as Clerf in Cole’s official U.S. Army history of the battle and various German accounts.], was to advance via Bastogne to Dinant. Accordingly
Panzergrenadier-[Lehr] Regiment 901 with one Panzer Abteilung [battalion] and one artillery Abteilung [battalion] was to [cross] over the bridge at Gemünd behind the 26th Volksgrenadier-Division.
Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 with one Panzer Abteilung and one artillery Abteilung [was to advance] via Dasburg–Marnach behind the 2nd Pz. Div. [2nd Panzer-Division], then also via Eschweiler.
Events, however, proved otherwise: The stubborn resistance put up by the U.S. troops in Hosingen and in Holzthum against the 26th Volksgrenadier-Division caused the 47th Panzer Korps to commit Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 in the fighting around Holzthum. With that, the original basic principle (no premature employment of the motorized elements] was already violated. On 17 December, too, the U.S. garrison still held out in Hosingen. In the meantime strong elements of the 26th Volksgrenadier-Division infiltrated through the woods southwest of Hosingen toward Drauffeld. At this point the 47th Panzer Korps ordered the withdrawal of Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 near Holzthum in order to be able to commit it immediately to the west in accord with the original intention after the capture of Drauffeld. Accordingly, by order of the [47th Panzer] Korps, Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 was employed for the capture of Consthum.