The context in which the Panzer-Lehr-Division was committed on the lower Rhine, as described in MS # B–768, was in defence against the Canadian Army’s participation in Operation ‘Veritable’, aimed at destroying the German forces between the Maas and the Rhine. After the failure of the counterattack there described, the division was hastily moved to the Schiefbahn area to take part in the frantic efforts to halt Simpson’s American Ninth Army’s northeastward drive from the area northeast of Aachen in Operation ‘Grenade’, the southern arm of the 21st Army Group’s pincers. This action is described below in MS # B–830.
After the conclusion of the German Ardennes Offensive, Eisenhower’s plan, as Supreme Commander in Europe, for the final western offensive against Germany was to close up to the Rhine so as to be able to hold the west bank with minimal forces. Then a consecutive series of drives would unfold, from north to south, the Schwerpunkt with Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in the north. In that main effort by the 21st Army Group the British Second Army would maintain pressure while the Canadian First Army would attack, no later than 8 February, in Operation ‘Veritable’, advancing southeast down the left (west) bank of the Rhine River. By 10 February Simpson’s American Ninth Army (under British control, with Montgomery’s 21st Army Group) would attack to the northeast as the right arm of a pincer, in Operation ‘Grenade’to link up with the Canadians along the Rhine. The 21st Army Group’s British Second Army and American Ninth Army would then cross the Rhine in Operation ‘Plunder’, which would cut off the Ruhr industrial region from the rest of Germany. The Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups would later make secondary crossings of the Rhine. Thus there would be two main thrusts into the heart of Germany, the northern one across the North German Plain, the southern through the Frankfurt–Kassel corridor, converging to cut the great Ruhr industrial region off from the rest of Germany.
When the 21st Army Group’s Operations ‘Veritable’ and ‘Grenade’ had reached the Rhine, Bradley’s 12th Army Group was to launch Operation ‘Lumberjack’, in which Hodges’ American First Army would cover the south flank of the Ninth Army, clearing the triangle of land between the Erft and the Rhine Rivers extending north from Cologne, take Cologne, and then turn south along the west bank of the Rhine. Other contingents of Hodges’ First Army were to launch a narrow thrust from near the road center of Euskirchen southeast to the Ahr River, converging with a thrust by Patton’s Third Army through the Eifel, thereby cutting off more German forces west of the Rhine. Subsequently Devers’ Sixth Army Group would launch Operation ‘Undertone’
In Operation ‘Veritable’ the Canadian forces crossed the Dutch–German border south of Nijmegen, which they had captured in Operation ‘Marketgarden’, the failed attempt to gain the Arnhem bridge. They advanced southeast, just inside of and parallel to the German border with the Netherlands, through good terrain for armoured operations between the two rivers, hemmed in by flooded terrain. As part of Crerar’s Canadian First Army, General Horrocks’ British 30th Corps opened the attack, the 2nd Canadian Corps then being committed on the left.
Just inside the German frontier was the Reichswald forest, with only two north-south paved roads and, for east-west travel, no more than cleared rides, a few marginally paved for logging operations. A dozen miles to the east, two more forests, the Hochwald and the Balberger Wald formed another barrier on the approach to Xanten.
Marienbaum, where the Panzer Lehr units mentioned below detrained, is at the northern limit of the Hochwald. Goch, at the southwest end of the Goch–Kalkar road, lay on the edge of flooded ground of the River Niers, which flows into the Maas near Gennep. The Goch–Kalkar (Calcar) road, so important in the action described below, extended almost due northeast to Kalkar, which was on the margin of the extensive flooded area adjacent to the Rhine. Uedem was approximately two miles southeast of the straight line of the Goch–Kalkar road. The Uedem–Weeze road, mentioned below, paralleled the Goch–Kalkar road, extending southwest from Uedem to Weeze, Weeze being situated on the margin of the flooded land adjacent to the Maas River.
On 14 February Oberbefelshaber West released Panzer Lehr Division to Heeresgruppe H for commitment on the Maas front in the area west of Xanten. Panzer Lehr was attached to the XLVII Panzerkorps to join in a counterattack along with the 116th Panzer Division, in the action described below After the failure of the counterattack the Panzer Lehr Division was transferred to Erkelenz in the Mönchen-Gladbach sector during the night of 24–25 February.
PANZER LEHR DIVISION (15–25 FEBRUARY 1945)
PART ONE
By
Major a.D. Helmut Hudel
See MS # B–830 for Part II
Historical Division
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
MS # B–768
[tr. note–This document was only available as the English copy. Spelling and grammar, including the dubious punctuation, are left as in the original.]
PART ONE
PANZER LEHR DIVISION
(15–25 Feb 1945)
INTRODUCTION
There is little data available regarding the operations of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division west of the Rhine in the Uedem Rheindalen–Muenchen-Gladbach–Krefeld–Wesel area 15–25 February 1945. It was one of the few mobile reserve units of the High Command West and as there was a general shortage of troops on the entire Western front at that time, the division was constantly moved. The uninterrupted activity of the enemy air forces, lack of fuel, destruction of signal communications, traffic difficulties often necessitated splitting up the division units. Because of the above reasons it is very difficult to write an accurate report on the division as a whole. There are bound to be certain inaccuracies. Figures given must be considered as only approximate.
At the beginning of February 1945 I was transferred west and appointed commander of the Panzer Lehr Regiment of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division.
As ordered, I first reported to the Commander in Chief, Panzer Troops West, General Stumpf, at Daumenau near Bad Ems. As nothing accurate was known there regarding the where-abouts of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division I was ordered to report to Headquarters Army Group B.
The newly appointed operations officer (Ia) of the 130th Division, Major GS [i.G., im Generalstab=trained for General Staff], Koch-Erpach, happened to be at General Stumpf’s Headquarters at the time and I drove north with him. We met the division marching from the area of Euskirchen to the area west of Xanten. [tr.(FPS) note–Shortage of fuel and danger of air attack delayed the march, which was carried out in separated march serials.]
On 15 February 1945 we both reported to the division commander, Colonel Niemack, at Schiefbahn, who was in command of the division during the march.
Since the end of January there had been important command changes in the Panzer Lehr Division. On 25 January the former division commander, Lt Gen Fritz Bayerlein [sic.-lack of comma] had turned over his command to Colonel Niemack. At the same time the chief of operations (Ia) was transferred and at first Major, GS [i.G.] Fuhrmann was appointed chief of operations and later, after 15 February, Major, GS [i.G.] Koch-Erpach was assigned the duty. At the same time Major Hudel was appointed commander of the Panzer Lehr Regiment.
These changes naturally caused some initial difficulties which later showed up rather disturbingly in the various critical situations.
After the Battle of the Bulge, where the division had suffered very great losses, the division had been moved to the Neuerburg–Bitburg (Eifel) area and there it had been briefly reorganized. The various units had been filled out numerically almost to the authorized T/O strength, however, the combat value of the replacements was bad, as was usually the case during the last years of the war. The new leaders [officers] had no combat experience, the non-commissioned officers and the men had not had sufficient training. This was particularly noticeable in the transmission of orders and the inadequate execution of tactical orders. However, it must be emphasized that the readiness and willingness to fight were there and that up to the very end there was no lack of discipline. Because of this the division could keep on going and was able to carry out its missions.
Compared with other divisions, the materiel of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division, was still good. We had an adequate supply of weapons but the general lack of vehicles was clearly noticeable. We had no spare parts with which to repair vehicles heavily damaged during preceding actions.
The independent battalions of the division–reconnaissance, engineer, signal, antitank–were on the whole in a pretty good condition as far as personnel and materiel. The transmission of orders, however, was often handicapped by lack of signal equipment.
The 901st Panzer Grenadier Lehr Regiment had sufficient weapons and vehicles and its great number of armored personnel carriers was a particularly favorable factor.
The 903d Panzer Grenadier Lehr Regiment had about half of the vehicles required but its other equipment and weapons were sufficient.
The condition of the Panzer Artillery Regiment was very bad. It consisted for a time of only regimental headquarters and a very weak and light battalion of panzer IV. [tr.(FPS) note-Although this paragraph says it refers to the Panzer Artillery Regiment, the comments appear to apply to the Panzer Regiment, since a later paragraph describes the Panzer Artillery Regiment in quite different terms.]
Most of our tanks were either being repaired or were laying out on the roads somewhere. Because of lack of fuel and spare parte [sic.] towing and repair work took a very long time. A sufficient number of tank crews with combat experience were available.
A panzer battalion, organized by special orders, was entrained, enroute to join the division.
One battalion of the Panzer Artillery Regiment, which had originally consisted of three battalions, had been disbanded. Therefore the division had only two battalions equipped with [a] satisfactory amount of guns. It lacked vehicles to the same extent as the Panzer Grenadier Regiments.
There were far from enough supply trains and the striking power of the division was often badly handicapped by this factor.
(For the 130th Panzer Lehr Division’s order of battle see appendix 1.)
ACTION IN THE UEDEM–XANTEN AREA
On 18 February 1945 the 130th Panzer Lehr Division moved into the concentration area assigned it for the intended counter-offensive in the Xanten Forest. The hazy and rainy weather was favorable for the movement of the units but because of the expected strong enemy air activity they were widely dispersed. After the commanding officers had been briefed on the situation they were ordered to start reconnaissance.
Fighting methodically, and fully exploiting the superiority of their weapons and ammunition, the Canadian First Army advanced into the area southeast of the Reichswald Forest as far as, and beyond, the road Kalkar–Goch. From the direction of their attack it could be seen that they intended advancing in a southeastern direction and gaining the left bank of the Rhine. They were going to try in cooperation with the American forces advancing from the area of Aachen to roll up the German front to the south in order to encircle and destroy the German forces.
At the beginning of February the 130th Panzer Lehr Division had been moved into the area of Euskirchen to be employed as mobile reserve of Army Group B facing the expected major American attack. As the situation toward the north became more and more critical the division was attached to Army Group H for a short operation within the First Parachute Army. It was to be used only for counterattack and not to be inserted into the defense front and was to be returned as soon as possible to Army Group B.
During 18 February the 1st Battalion of the Panzer Grenadier Lehr Regiment [part of Kampfgruppe v. Hauser, consisting of Panzergrenadier-Lehr Regiment 901, Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130 and an artillery Abteilung.] arrived and was unloaded without enemy air interference at various railroad stations in the Marinebaum [Marienbaum] area. The battalion’s equipment was very good–two companies with 14 V tanks [Panzer V, Panther][tr. (FPS) Note–Ritgen remarks that inadequate training of the tank-drivers resulted in inordinately high losses of the factory-new inadequately inspected and tested equipment. Despite reinforcement by the 8th Kompanie of Panzer-Lehr Regiment 130, which, consisting of mixed Panzer IV and Panzer V, was the only combat-ready company of the II Abteilung, only 22 combat-ready tanks, along with 10–12 Panzerjäger of Panzerjäger Lehr Abteilung 130] supported the attack of Kampfgruppe v. Hauser on 19 February. (Ritgen, Die Geschichte der Panzer Lehr Division, p. 273.] Because of lack of fuel the new tanks had not been broken in and there had been no time to give them the final check up and overhauling. On account of this tank losses were high from the beginning. These losses were all the more serious because the enemy always attacked with masses of tanks and tanks can only be repelled by tanks and assault guns.
On 19 February the 1st Battalion was reinforced by one company (panzer IV) and four antiaircraft tanks which had arrived from the direction of the Eifel. There were in all 22 tanks ready for action that day. (Appendix 2)
Since early morning very strong artillery firing could be heard at the front. Unlike American artillery fire this fire was concentrated on the front and the area close behind. The expenditure of ammunition was extraordinary; no one had ever heard anything like it before.
The division was organized in the following manner for the mission ahead of it:
Kampfgruppe Hauser under Colonel Baron von Hauser, commanding officer of the 901st Panzer Grenadier Lehr Regiment;
901st Panzer Grenadier Lehr Regiment;
1st Reinforced Battalion of the 901st Panzer Grenadier Lehr Regiment;
Antitank Battalion;
Artillery Lehr Regiment.
The 902d Panzer Grenadier Lehr Regiment [Kampfgruppe v. Poschinger] was concentrated around about and at Uedemerbruch as mobile reserve. The regimental commander, Lt Col von Pochinger was the local commander at Uedemerbruch.[tr. note–Ritgen, in Die Geschichte der Panzer Lehr Division... and von Seemen, in Ritterkreuzträger list him as von Poschinger.]
On orders from LVII Panzer Corps, the division command post was established at the forester’s house, at Nachtigall, with that of the 116th Panzer Division.
The terrain was reconnoitered during the morning of 19 February and early in the afternoon the Kampfgruppe Hauser was alerted. The Division was attached to the LVII Panzer Corps. The division commander at the command post of the 116th Panzer Division received the following combat mission by telephone from the commanding general:
| 1) | The enemy has gained deep penetrations into the sector of the 116th Panzer Division and has advanced as far as the farm buildings about 3 kilometres southwest of Kalkar at the Kalkar–Goch road. | |
| 2) | The Panzer Lehr Division will attack the enemy today, pushing them back to the northwest and gain the road running in a northwestern direction parallel to the Kalkar–Goch road as first objective. |
[tr. note–The Kalkar–Goch road runs northeast-southwest. The sketchmap in Ritgen does show a road running northwest at right angles to the Goch–Kalkar road. The Schwanenhof farmstead is located on this road about half a kilometre southeast of the junction with the Goch–Kalkar road. The Totenhügel is a bit over one kilometre due south of this road. According to Ritgen (p.224), after assembling in the area south of the Totenhügel [hillock, burial mound?], Kampfgruppe v. Hauser was to attack and regain the road located about 1 kilometre northwest of and running parallel to the Kalkar–Goch road at Luisenhof, restoring the former defensive front.
Stacey’s history of the Canadian Army in World War II, The Victory Campaign, vol. 3, also has a detailed sketchmap of this action, his Sketch 37, showing Battle Group Hauser’s attack on the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry on 19 February, accompanied by an intense, detailed account of the fierce fighting. His Sketch 37 clearly shows Kampfgruppe von Hauser’s objective, though his map labels it as Louisendorf, rather than Louisenhof and indicates a built-up area surrounding a large square at the crossroads. The road parallel to the Kalkar–Goch road, which passes through Louisendorf, is approximately two kilometres northwest of the Schwanenhof, where Kampfgruppe von Hauser’s attack bogged down.]
The plan is for the division to advance further to the northwest after the first objective has been reached.
The 116th Panzer Division with all available artillery and tanks will support the attack of the Panzer Lehr Division.
It will be reported when it is planned to begin the attack.
Because of the difficulties in circulating orders and because not all commanders had returned from their reconnaissance missions, the departure to the concentration area was delayed. It was after 1900 before the Kampfgruppe Hauser had concentrated south of Todtenhuegel. [Totenhügel].
The attack was begun at 2000 in a western direction. Combat reconnaissance patrols went ahead. According to what some parachutists holding positions northwest of Todtenhuegel reported the Kalkar–Goch road was strongly occupied by the enemy with tanks and infantry.
When Kampfgruppe Hauser turned northward it was delayed several times by strong harassing fire. Reconnaissance patrols reported that they had almost reached the farm at Schwanenhof. By 2400 Kampfgruppe Hauser approached the farm buildings and the road about 1 kilometre south of the Kalkar–Goch road. Suddenly it ran into concentrated defense fire and a fire duel developed during which some enemy tanks were disabled. The attack, however, did not progress. It was impossible to break into the farm buildings of Schwanenhof. The enemy defense fire became stronger and stronger.
At dawn 20 February the Kampfgruppe resumed its attack and fought desperately to take the farm buildings, however, the enemy defense fire from tanks and artillery, which responded immediately, again proved too strong forcing the attack to come to a halt. Tanks of both sides were disabled by the artillery duel.
Since the terrain was flat and exposed and one had an uninterrupted view over the whole of it major operations, of any kind, during the day time were out of the question. The enemy would immediately resume strong artillery fire.
The positions reached were improved and the division was temporarily attached to the 116th Panzer Division with the Kampfgruppe Hauser incorporated into the line of defense.
During the day the reconnaissance patrols from Panzer Lehr Regiment and the 902d Panzer Grenadier Lehr Regiment combed the area north of Uedem and north of the Uedem–Weeze road. We anticipated an enemy attack from Goch southward and southwest.
One tank company took positions on both sides of the road at the fork 1 kilometre north of Uedem to act as a mobile reserve for antitank defense.
On 21 February Kampfgruppe Hauser remained in its positions. Strong harassing fire from the enemy artillery was laid down on the front and rear areas and twice the enemy tried to advance. Their weak attacks were repulsed. Heavy artillery drum fire was heard in the west. During the night the Kampfgruppe Hauser was relieved by elements of the 6th Parachute Division. The relief was considerably disturbed and delayed by an enemy attack which could not be repulsed. The division was assigned to the II Parachute Corps. The division command post remained at its former location south of the forester’s hut at Nachtigall.