Panzer Lehr’s next mission was as part of the response to Operation ‘Grenade’. Simpson’s American Ninth Army’s drive across the Roer River in Operation ‘Grenade’ to link up with the Canadian forces driving down the west bank of the Rhine in Operation ‘Veritable’ was delayed by the floodwaters released by the Germans from the Schwammenauel Dam. However, despite serious problems caused by the swift current or the swollen Roer and enemy artillery fire, Simpson’s 23 February crossing of the last major water barrier before the Rhine was an outstanding success. The Ninth Army then swept forward irresistibly, reaching the Rhine north of Neuss on 2 March and linking up with the British on 3 March.
On 24 February Oberbefehlshaber West ordered the Panzer Lehr Division back to Heeresgruppe B, to the Schiefbahn area where it would be attached to the 15th Armee. Shortage of fuel caused considerable delays and made it necessary to entrain the tracked elements. After a strenuous night march the division had barely reached Schiefbahn when it received orders to proceed as rapidly as possible, bypassing Rheydt on both sides, to the Erkelenz area. Ritgen remarks (p. 281) that it was ‘in light of the situation, a difficult task.’
Heavy pressure from the Allied air forces forced the road march to be made in small groups of vehicles hastening from cover to cover. It was 28 February before the division reached the Rheydt area.
PANZER LEHR DIVISION (25 FEBRUARY–7 MARCH 1945)
Hudel
Frankfurt, 21 May 48
Employment of Panzer Lehr Division 130 in the Areas of Uedem–Rehindahlen–Muenchen [München]-Gladbach–Wesel from 15 February–7 March 45
Part II
25 February–7 March
Translated by Frederick P Steinhardt
MS # B–830
25 February 45
The elements of the division that had been relieved during the night by Fallschirmjäger [parachute] units were ordered to concentrate and proceed to the Schiefbahn area. This was partially completed by morning, at which point strong enemy air activity prevented further movement by road. It was impossible to refuel the armour until darkness fell.
The division command post was moved to Schiefbahn. No final order was received for the division to move to the Erkelenz area.
The elements of the division were widely dispersed as a result of the long march to the Xanten–Uedem area and commitment there. What had, by now, become the usual shortage of fuel seriously delayed its reassembly. The same [lack of fuel] prevented the tanks of the II./Panzer Lehr Regiment that had been repaired in Neroth (Eifel) from rejoining [the regiment]. The I Abteilung of the Panzer Regiment had suffered relatively heavy losses due to mechanical problems. On 25 February about 15 tanks were available.
In other respects, the Division’s losses had not been too bad, so, all in all, the Division was fully ready for action.
26 February
During the night additional elements assembled near Schiefbahn.
In the morning the Division received orders from the 1st Fallschirmjäger Armee to move to the Erkelenz area.
Two march groups were formed. One march group was to advance past Rheidt [Rheydt] on the west, the other to its east. Intense enemy aerial activity made it impossible for either group to move as a whole. Individual vehicles had to move independently, dashing from cover to cover. A liaison officer was sent to XII SS-Armee Korps. That evening he reported to the command post in Beeck and was briefed on the situation. The Panzer Lehr Division was urgently awaited, especially the armour as mobile antitank defense against the feared American armoured advance on Rheydt–München-Gladbach. In addition, elements of the Division were to launch an attack to the south to close the gap that had developed between the left wing of XII SS-Armee Korps and Korpsgruppe Bayerlein.
However, the first elements of the Panzer Lehr Division could not be expected to arrive before 27 February. The exact time of arrival depended on the enemy’s air activity.
27 February 45
Due to problems with fuel supply and unforeseen difficulties in transmitting orders the leading elements of the Division did not move out until 0300 hrs.
As soon as it was light, enemy aircraft again patrolled the highways, producing further delays. Panzeraufklärungs Lehr Abteilung 130, reinforced with elements of Panzer Pionier Batailllon 130 and several Panzerjäger [tank destroyers] did not reach Rheidt until evening.
By noon the division staff arrived at XII SS-Armee Korps command post. The Division command post was to be established near the corps command post during the night. In the afternoon the Division was attached to XII SS-Armee Korps.
Assuming that the main body [of the Division] would arrive during the night of 27/28 [February] the Division received the following orders for the coming day:
| 1) | Assemble and attack enemy forces advancing to the north and northeast from Erkelenz. |
| 2) | Establish a security line: Hardt–southern edge of Odenkirchen–Juchen. |
| 3) | Additional strong forces supported by armour were to be assembled to attack via Hochneukirch toward Garzweiler to close the gap between the left wing of XII SS-Armee Korps and Korpsgruppe Bayerlein. Since the first two tasks already involved division of forces, any attempt to carry out the third would involve such dispersal of forces that practically nothing could be accomplished. The Division Commander expressed this opinion emphatically. |
[tr. note-Ritgen (pp. 281 ff.) remarks that the third task was typical of Hitler’s wishful thinking and unreality at that point, since it envisioned the Panzer Lehr Division attacking toward the southwest in conjunction with a matching attack by the 11th Panzer Division to close the yawning gap in the front line north of Erkelenz, a task that, in itself, would have strained the abilities of a full-strength Panzer division in the best of times, and which was clearly unimaginable for what was left of Panzer Lehr. The Division Commander did his best to protest the fragmentation of his division and point to the urgent necessity of building a firm defensive front south of Rheydt in the face of the two enemy corps that were turning north, threatening the southern flank of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Armee, but to no avail.]
28 February
Additional elements of the Division arrived in Rheydt during the night. In the morning the Division was organized for the assigned mission as follows:
[Kampfgruppe von Hauser:] Two battalions of Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 901, one battalion Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 902. Ten tank destroyers [of one Panzerjäger company] and one Panzer company with 12 tanks were ready at the southwest edge of Rheydt to attack toward Erkelenz. Its immediate objective was Hilderath.
Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 130 held the security line from Hardt to the München-Gladbach–Erkelenz road; elements of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 held from the road to the southeast edge of Odenkirchen; Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 held the line from north of Sasserath to Juchen. Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 adjoined to the southeast, ordered to secure and reconnoiter to the southwest and south.
Enemy air activity was extremely intense from daybreak on. Nevertheless, assembly of the attack forces at the southwest edge of Rheydt was not significantly hampered, merely somewhat delayed. The group moved out at about noon and attained the Mennrath–Wickrath line. As it advanced further the leading elements ran into with strong enemy armoured forces attacking toward Rheydt [the American 5th Armored Division]. The enemy already held Hilderath and Wickrathhahn. Heavy fighting ensued, during which 15 enemy tanks were knocked out. The German assault group, however, was too weak in tanks and tank destroyers. It was forced back under enemy pressure. Wickrath was burning and was evacuated late in the afternoon. After an artillery preparation American tanks took Mennerath. Thanks to vast superiority in armour, the enemy could have advanced to Rheydt and München-Gladbach, but did not. The German forces went into position at the Rheindahlen–Rheydt railroad line and repulsed weak attacks until darkness fell.
In the Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 130 sector several enemy attacks toward München-Gladbach were repulsed during the day.
Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 identified strong enemy armoured forces in the area west and southwest of Juchen.
Since there was a gap between XII SS-Armee Korps and Korpsgruppe Bayerlein and, given the existing force ratio, there was no prospect of closing it, there was danger of envelopment.
Late in the evening the forces west, southwest and southeast of Rheydt were pulled back to the southwest edge of the city.
The Division command post was in the northeast part of München-Gladbach.
1 March 45
In the morning the American attack on Rheydt opened with heavy artillery fire. The defenders were forced back by the masses of armour advancing behind [the barrage]. Since there could be no thought of serious resistance in Rheydt and München-Gladbach, and to spare the cities from destruction, the Division fell back to the north. A planned counterattack failed to materialize since the enemy pursued closely and the enemy air force made assembly impossible.
In the morning the Division was ordered to form a line of defense via Viersen–Neersbroich–north bank of the canal to Neuss. However, this order arrived too late.
Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 130 and one battalion of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Bataillon 902 were already in contact with the enemy south of Viersen.
At about 1400 hours American armour attacked by surprise across the canal and captured Schiefbahn and Unterbruch. Low-flying aircraft suppressed isolated centers of resistance. Six German tanks were lost. Since the canal position was considered extremely valuable, an evening counterattack was planned to regain Schiefbahn and the north bank of the canal. At about 2000 hours one battalion (I./Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901), supported by eight tanks, forced its way back into Schiefbahn. However, it could not hold its position there and, after an hour of fighting, was forced back to the north toward Krefeld.
It was apparent that the enemy would, on the next day, attack Krefeld–Uerdingen [Ürdingen].
During the night the Division fell back to the north and took over securing Krefeld to the west, southwest and southeast.
The Division command post was at the northern exit of Krefeld.
At this point the Division returned to the command of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Armee and, thereby, Heeresgruppe H.
2 March 45
The Division was too weak to form a continuous line of resistance. All of the roads entering Krefeld from the west, southwest, south and southeast were guarded by strong outposts reinforced with tanks or tank-destroyers.
Commencing at about 0900 hours the enemy exerted pressure from the southwest, then also from the south and southeast. His tanks advanced both on the roads and also across the terrain. Despite stubborn resistance, the detachments were continually forced back, slowly falling back to the city. Ten enemy tanks were knocked out during this fighting.
By late afternoon Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 had fallen back, fighting, to the southern edge of Krefeld, Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 and Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 to the southeast edge of Krefeld and Ürdingen. The I./Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 secured at the railroad line southeast of Ürdingen. Fifteen tanks arrived at the railroad freight-yard for the division and were unloaded at the last minute.
The Division could not defend the city with the forces at its disposal. The several Volkssturm units that were available or that were in position had no combat effectiveness.
Damaged tanks, relatively immobile elements and trains units that were not vitally needed withdrew across the Rhine via the bridge at Ürdingen.
The enemy broke into the city at about 1800 hours. The problem now became preventing the Rhine bridge from falling into enemy hands. It was prepared for demolition.
However, artillery fire destroyed the demolition wires. [tr. note- As described in Cole The Last Offensive, p. 177, ‘After dark {on 3 March} a six-man engineer patrol led by Capt. George L. Youngblood slipped past the defenders, gained the bridge, and crossed it, cutting all visible demolition wires in the process.’] Restoration would require extensive time. In the evening four tank-destroyers of Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130 blocked the roads approaching [the bridge]. The next day the bridge was partially destroyed by a truck loaded with aerial bombs. [tr. note-The Americans thought they had missed some of the important wires to the demolition charges.] The commander of Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130 assumed responsibility for securing the bridge until then and formed a makeshift line of defense on the right [east] bank of the Rhine. If the enemy had pressed hard on 2 and 3 March then he could have built a bridgehead like the one at Remagen.
During the night the Ia drove to the command post of LXIII Armee Korps. The Division was ordered to form a line of defense south of Moers [Mörs], in contact with the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which had fallen back to Mörs–Homberg.
The Division command post was established in Rheinhausen.
3 March 45
As, sector-by-sector, units fell back to the north fighting developed on the Ürdingen–Mörs road. The Division’s tanks and tank-destroyers knocked out 24 enemy tanks on the countryside near Hochfeld.
The Division had lost considerable combat strength since departing the Uedem area on 26 February 1945, primarily for the following reasons:
Commitment over a wide-ranging area led to supply difficulties, with the result that in a number of cases tanks and other vehicles had to be destroyed because they ran out of fuel. Constant withdrawal impacted maintenance and repairs. Shortage of communications apparatus and the constant presence of enemy aircraft patrolling the roads disrupted communications. Isolated resisting groups were captured. Frequently it took a long time for units to reform. The Division was constantly committed in the hot spots of the defensive fighting, thereby suffering heavy losses.
The Panzergrenadier regiments had been reduced to the point where each had the strength of a reinforced battalion.
Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 had only 20 tanks ready for action.
Panzerartillerie-Regiment 130 had suffered the least losses and was still fully combat-capable.
Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130, Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 130 and Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130 had suffered heavy losses.
Since replacements could not be expected and the Feldersatz-Bataillon [field-replacement battalion] had already been distributed [among the units], stragglers and small stray groups were rounded and used for reinforcements
In the afternoon the enemy pressed hard from the south and the Division had to fall back further to the north, toward Moers.
The Commander of Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 set out with a small staff to collect and organize the elements of the Division that were east of the Rhine in and east of the Muelheim [Mülheim]–Angermuend [Angermünd] area. Actually, the entire Division needed a short rest-period to more-or-less organize its elements. All such requests were turned down.
Action in the Wesel Bridgehead
[tr. note- Contact was established between the British forces of Operation ‘Veritable’ and the American forces of Operation ‘Grenade’ on 3 March at Geldern, thus forming a continuous allied perimeter around the German forces remaining west of the Rhine in what now became the Wesel Bridgehead. Panzer Lehr had the dubious distinction of having first fought the Canadians in ‘Veritable’, as described in MS # B–768, and then the Americans in Operation ‘Grenade’ as detailed above. Now the Division’s remnants would help defend the Wesel Bridgehead, which Hitler stubbornly refused to evacuate.]
Preliminary remarks:
I did not, myself, take part in this action. Therefore the description must be brief, limited to what is available from written and oral reports.
4 March 45
The unit adjoining the Division on the left had fallen back on Homberg and organized a defense at its south and southwest edge. Those elements of the Panzer Lehr Division that were still committed were withdrawn through Homberg in the morning. As ordered, they formed a line of resistance from Rheinkamp–west edge and south edge of the woods west of Lohmannsheide. The Division command post was in Vierbaum.
Before the withdrawal to this line the Panzerartillerie-Regiment 130 and Panzer-Pionier Bataillon 130 were sent across the bridge at Homberg to the right [east] bank of the Rhine. The artillery was ordered to follow the divisions from [the east bank of the Rhine] and to support the defensive battle. Forward observers remained on the left bank with the Division. The pioneers were, likewise, to follow [the division’s movements] and, at any time, to be prepared to enable a crossing by constructing ferries.
The Division took these precautions on its own responsibility, since the end of the bridgehead was visibly approaching and the Division did not wish to uselessly lose its heavy weapons.
In the afternoon the enemy attacked with a strong artillery preparation. The Division was forced back In the evening it established a new line of resistance at Rheinberg—Eversael [Eversäl].
During this fighting the Division was attached to LXV Armee Korps.
5 March 45
Enemy artillery fire strengthened hour-by-hour. Attacks against the line of resistance were repulsed.
Adjoining the Division on the right was the 116th Panzer Division.
The Division command post was in Ossenberg.
6 March 45
The constant attacks greatly narrowed the bridgehead. The Division’s combat strength constantly melted away. Its infantry strength was now down to that of a single battalion. Two tanks were still in action.
The bridgehead built by remnants of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Armee extend from Birten to Ossenberg. The Division was committed on the left of the 116th Panzer Division from the southern edge of Ossenberg to the Rhine. The Division command post was in the north part of Ossenberg.
The enemy artillery fire continued to mount.
It would be superfluous to describe the mood of the totally exhausted soldiers.
7 March 45
In the morning the Division’s staff received orders to fall back with the remnants of the Division over the bridge at Wesel to the right [east] bank of the Rhine. The Division was again attached to Heeresgruppe B.
During the morning the remnants of the Division crossed the bridge. There were no further losses to enemy air activity.
In the evening the staffs and manpower, in approximate company strength, reached the area southeast of Mülheim.
The next day the Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 and Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 130 arrived in that area.
Conclusions
It is no longer possible to recall all the many details that characterized the Division’s actions from memory. Practically daily the same thing recurred one or more times: the Division received a mission, and when it arrived at the appointed place, the situation had already changed drastically. The Division’s forces were far from adequate to accomplish all the missions assigned. The enemy attacked from all sides to gain the bank of the Rhine. Troops were everywhere in short supply. Therefore the Division was continually fragmented, and that under the most difficult conditions for logistical support,
The enemy was vastly superior. The constant low-level aerial patrols often delayed movement so much that the elements of the Division arrived quite late where they were committed. Heavy artillery fire in the restricted Wesel bridgehead caused heavy losses and had a severe effect on troop morale.
Superior enemy forces thrust the Division back to the northwest and north. Neither could it close the gap to Korpsgruppe Bayerlein nor could it significantly delay the enemy advance via Rheydt, München-Gladbach or Krefeld.
[Editor’s note–Although much of the material in the following interview concerns events that took place after Panzer Lehr’s action at the Remagen Bridgehead, I inserted MS # B–850 here, since it is the third in the series of interviews with Major Hudel and opens with the description of the formation and departure of the Kampfgruppe that was sent to Remagen. My notes on the events that took place after the Remagen Bridgehead until the surrender follow MS # A–970 on the Combat of the LIII Korps at Remagen Bridgehead from 10 to 22 March 1945.]
130th PANZER LEHR DIVISION 23 MARCH–15 APRIL 1945
MS # B–850
Helmut HUDEL
Frankfurt am Main, 25 June 1948
Major a.D. [retired]
former Commander
Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130
Employment and Combat of Panzer Lehr Division 130 at the Sieg [River] and in the Evacuation of Winterberg, Schmallenberg to Wardohl–Altena (Ruhr Pocket), 23 March–15 April 1945.
I. Foreword
There are no written records available from the time of the war for the following report. Through interviews with former members of the Panzer Lehr Division an attempt was made to write the most seamless possible account of the Division’s action in the final fighting. The result leaves much to be desired because, as the war drew to an end, both officers and troops were exhausted. Constantly shifted from one hotspot to another in the turbulent rush of events there was no break from the rush of events and experiences. Memory alone does not suffice for a factual report. Accordingly, inaccuracies and omissions in this report could not be avoided.
II. Preliminaries
On 7 and 8 March 1945 the remnants of the Panzer Lehr Division were withdrawn from the Wesel bridgehead. They assembled in the area south of Muehlheim [Mühlheim], where the elements [of the Division] that were immobile or in need of repair had gathered in the early days of March. With that the Division was, at the same time, again attached to Heeresgruppe B, which ordered hasty reconstitution with all available means.
The Division command post was in Ratingen.
On 9 March 1945 a Kampfgruppe [Kampfgruppe Hudel] had to be thrown together in all haste. That same evening it moved out for commitment under Korpsgruppe Bayerlein at the Remagen bridgehead. [tr. note–see MS # A–970, below.] It consisted of the following elements:
2 companies of the I./ Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 (about 18 tanks)
1 Panzer-Aufklärungs Schwadron from Panzer-Aufklärungs-Lehr Abteilung 130
1 company of Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 130
1 Panzer-Grenadier company
1 platoon of Panzer-Nachrichten-Abteilung 130
1 platoon of Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130.
The commander of the Kampfgruppe, [who was] the commander of Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130, reported to the command post of Kampfgruppe Bayerlein in Oberpleis during the night of 9/10 March 1945.
For further information on the actions of the Kampfgruppe see reports of the 11th Panzer Division ands Korpsgruppe Bayerlein (MS # B–590, A–970). [tr. note- MS # A–970 is given below.]
At approximately 1000 hours the Division moved to the area north of Wuppertal. The time for reconstitution ended on 21 March. During that period the staffs and workshops laboured without a break. Along with the fact that the Heeresgruppe made no demands at all on the Division and gave it full support, it was only thanks to this industriousness that the Division was able to return to action in somewhat combat-ready condition.
During the fighting in the Wesel bridgehead the Division had suffered extremely heavy losses. Its personnel actually consisted of no more than staffs and small cadres [of its units]. During the period of reconstitution the Division was brought up to 60% [of its T/O strength] with [personnel from] disbanded homeland Flak-units, Hitler Youth and Volkssturm. [tr.note–Volkssturm units were the final emergency call-up of older men, youths and men physically unfit for or otherwise exempt from military service. Practically untrained and poorly armed with makeshift small-arms, these units were locally raised and committed. Some fought steadfastly, others were mercifully sent home by the commanders of the military units to whom they were assigned.] Practically no trained replacements were assigned. Naturally, there was no possibility of meaningful or effective training or instruction in the short time available to bring the Division to any sort of satisfactory combat-worthiness.
Materiel was lacking, especially vehicles of all sorts. About ten tanks were still in the repair shops. New armour was not provided. There were still about 20 tank-destroyers on hand. Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 had suffered relatively light losses and was still combat-capable. The pioneers and, especially, Panzer-Nachrichten-Abteilung 130 [the communications section] had lost a tremendous amount of their equipment.
The Panzergrenadier regiments had only limited mobility. The weapons, for the most part, could be brought up to [usable levels].
During the period of reconstitution the Division was informed that the tanks of the II. Abteilung of Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 that had been left in the Eifel because of lack of fuel had been lost due to the sudden American armoured advance.
On 21 March, at noon, the Division received orders to move to the Siegburg area. Despite pressure from the Heeresgruppe, it was only on 23 March that the Division arrived in the area south of Eitorf. The reason for this delay was the inadequate nature of the replacements and deficiencies resulting from the short period of reconstitution. In addition, there was a shortage of fuel for this movement.
23 March 1945
The main body of the Division arrived in the area southwest of Eitorf during the evening, [where] it was attached to LXXIV Armee Korps. The command post was set up in Irlenborn, where the commander of Panzer-Lehr-Regimnent 130 reported back with the remnants of the Kampfgruppe that had been sent to Remagen.
The enemy constantly pushed to break out of the Remagen bridgehead. The Division was given the mission of preventing further enemy advance along the Sieg [River] by attacking to the west.
It became evident that Heeresgruppe B expected the enemy to turn to the north in order to roll up the German forces positioned at the Rhine.
24 March 1945
At about 0500 hours two Kampfgruppen of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regimenter 901 and 902, supported by tanks and tank-destroyers, launched an attack to the west from the Blankenberg–Uckerath line. Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 654 was attached to the Division for this attack. The Division had only six of its own tanks available. [tr. note- The war-diary of schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 654, presented in Karlheinz Münch’s ‘Combat History of schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 654’, indicates it committed two Kampfgruppen, one with three Jagdpanther, the other with four. Due to shortage of fuel they were limited to local missions until fuel arrived.]
After considerable fighting the two Kampfgruppen reached their first objective, the stream south of Hennef, late in the afternoon. They were unable to cross the stream and were forced back that evening.
A small Kampfgruppe consisting of four tanks and two Panzergrenadier companies was committed under the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division to block the Sieg [River] road east of Hennef. No fighting ensued.
25 March 1945
In the course of 24 and 25 March the enemy advanced far toward Altenkirchen and broke through the defensive front south of the Division. Since it was not possible to close the existing gap with the available forces and there was no chance of stopping the enemy with an attack, the Division was withdrawn via Eitorf north of the Sieg [River] to form a line of defense directly east of Weyerbusch. As result of disruptions of the march and difficulties in transmitting orders not all the elements of the Division could be brought into action on time. The enemy pressed hard and delivered a lot of artillery fire. Towards evening he broke through the line of defense and advanced farther toward Altenkirchen. The repeated attempt to stop the enemy west of Altenkirchen failed.
The Division command post was at Breitscheid.
26 March 1945
Early in the morning the Division again attempted resistance north of Altenkirchen. Enemy armour, however, succeeded in advancing along the Altenkirchen–Wissen road. Isolated centers of resistance of the Division repeatedly attempted to halt the enemy. Only at the Sieg [River] south of Wissen could a more-or-less continuous line of resistance be formed.
That day the Division lost 14 tanks that were under repair in a workshop at Altenkirchen and which could not be moved because of lack of fuel.
27 March 1945
In accord with the further enemy advance south of the Sieg [River] to the east, the division was withdrawn during the night of 26/27 March 1945 via Friesenhagen–Freudenberg–Kirchen in order to form a new line of resistence along the Wilden-B[ach] [stream] between Betzdorf and the area south of Siegen [to secure the concentration of the corps south of Siegen]. There was no combat that day aside from the usual artillery barrages. The enemy continued to advance eastward south of the Division.
28 March 1945
Since a strong enemy thrust was expected from the south against Siegen, the Division established a new line of resistance directly south of the city. Aside from artillery fire and patrol activity there was no enemy combat activity.
Orders arrived in the afternoon for the Division to move out to the northeast to LIII Armee Korps in the Winterberg area.
During the night of and on 29 March 1945 the Division moved via Schmallenberg–Berleburg to the new area of commitment.
30 March 1945
The Division was supposed to join the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division and an infantry division in an attempt to burst the ring that was then forming around the troops in the Ruhr region and then break through to the east. Friendly forces were to meet [the breakout attempt] from the direction of Kassel.
Under the command of LIII Armee Korps the Division stood ready east of Winterberg with two Kampfgruppen, supported by a few tanks, which were to launch the breakout. The leaders of the Kampfgruppen were the commanders of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regimenter 901 and 902.
Towards evening an American attack, which could barely be held, hit the assembly position. The Kampfgruppen had to fall back to the edge of the forest area east of Winterberg.
31 March 1945
A new early-morning attack launched to the east against the general Hallenberg–Medsbach line also failed. Enemy resistance constantly strengthened. With their present personnel the Kampfgruppen simply could not do more. The practically untrained men and, in part, inexperienced officers were not up to such fighting.
At about noon the enemy attacked and locally caused an over-hasty withdrawal of the Panzergrenadiere.
1 April 1945
This day the attack to the east was temporarily halted. Apparently it was waiting until the German attack westward from Kassel took effect. The enemy carried out isolated reconnaissance thrusts, drawing a locally excessive response from our troops.
At an officer’s conference at the Division command post (directly west of Winterberg) the commander, particularly of the Panzergrenadier regiments, expressed concern regarding the steadiness of their men. They based this on their most recent observations. The courageous deeds of individuals could not conceal the fact that the Division’s former fighting spirit had finally been broken.
2 April 1945
Another attack to the east was planned for this day. The Panzer Lehr Division was to advance on the right of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division toward Neukirchen–Sachsenberg. Again the Division readied its two assault groups. Before the attack could begin, however, the enemy attacked from the southeast and constantly increased his pressure from the Hallenberg area. By evening elements of the division had fallen back to the southeast edge of Winterberg. Such an extensive retreat was excessive.
The Division now attempted to form a line of resistance directly south and west of Winterberg. Due to the large number of military and civilian hospitals, Winterberg, itself, was evacuated.
During the night of 2/3 March [sic., actually, as per Ritgen, 2/3 April] the staff of Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 was surprised by the enemy in Mollseifen and captured.
3 April 1945
The Division extended its line of resistance to the south via the Kahle Asten. [Ritgen says (p. 305) that Alt-Astenberg, the highest-lying village in Germany, lay behind the new line, which he describes as running on both sides of the Kahle Asten. Jean-Claude Perrigault describes the Kahle Asten as the highest point in the Sauerland with an elevation of 841 meters, near Silbach. (Perrigault, La Panzer-Lehr Division).] The Division command post was moved to Rehsiepen, during which the Division Commander, Oberst Niemack, was wounded by an artillery fragment. The commander of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901, Oberst von Hauser, assumed command of the Division.
In the morning the Division received orders from the 15th Armee to recapture Winterberg. Since the condition of the troops precluded such an attack, the Division remained in its positions.
4 April 1945
Strong enemy forces attacked west and southwest from the Winterberg area. The Division’s thin security line was forced back. The Kahle Asten was lost. The evening counterattack aimed at regaining the height failed. The forces that could be assembled for such a counterattack were very weak. Many times in this report the small counter-actions evoked by enemy penetrations have gone unmentioned. Often company and platoon leaders initiated such actions on their own initiative, but even when they had some initial success, they were forced back again because they lacked sufficient forces to hold the ground they had gained.
The Division command post was moved to Nieder Sorpe.
5 April 1945
During the day the enemy continued to advance westward. The Division’s security line, which extended roughly from Alt Astenberg via Westfeld to Oberkirchen, could not be held with the scanty forces. The terrain offered numerous opportunities for the attacker to approach under cover, while the defender had only extremely limited fields of vision and fire. Tanks and tank-destroyers were limited to positions on the roads and were of limited effectiveness in the narrow valleys. As if that wasn’t enough, the number of tanks and tank-destroyers had melted away to a very few. All in all there were only 15 left.
Alt Astenberg and Westfeld fell in the afternoon. Late in the afternoon the enemy captured the vital road junction of Oberkirchen. In the evening a Kampfgruppe was hastily assembled to recapture Oberkirchen (four tanks, one Panzergrenadier company, one Landesschützen-Pionier company and three tank-busting squads).
The attack along the Winkhausen valley road got off to a good start. Lack of the requisite radio apparatus precluded artillery support. After a short stay the German armour that had penetrated into Oberkirchen had to pull out as a result of effective enemy countermeasures from the houses and the fact that the friendly infantry was both too weak and too unskilled. As an example, all the men in the Ladsesschützen-Pionier company were over fifty years old.
At the army’s continued urging three more vain attempts were made during the night and early morning to recapture Oberkirchen. The enemy put up an extraordinarily stubborn defense.
6 April 1945
The Division took up a line of defense on the heights between Almert and Rehsiepen. Early in the morning the 338th Infanterie Division took over the right portion of the sector east of Winkhausen–Grafschaft. During the relief the enemy attacked and captured the commanding forested heights south of Winkhausen. The immediate counterattack by a grenadier regiment collapsed under artillery fire with heavy losses.
In the Panzer Lehr Division sector there was no other significant action.
The Division command post was west of Fredeburg.
7 April 1945
The unit adjoining the Division on the right was forced back by an enemy attack from the south and east. Grafschaft was lost. To prevent the enemy from advancing to the north to Fredeburg a small Panzer Lehr Kampfgruppe was committed on both sides of Gleidorf. Other than a considerable amount of artillery fire there was no fighting.
8 April 1945
During the day the Panzer Lehr Division turned its sector over to the 338th Infanterie Division. The relief was irregular. The arrival of the elements of the 338th Infanterie Division took a long time. Typical of the entire condition of the troops was the fact that the officers of only a very few elements of the relief knew where they actually were.
The elements of the Division assembled in the area west of Fredeburg.
9 and 10 April 1945
The Division fell back before the pursuing enemy generally to the northwest. The units were severely lacerated by incessant aerial attack. It is impossible to form a coherent picture of these two days. There was no heavy fighting.
11 April 1945
The Division was ordered to the sector south of Werdohl with the mission of establishing a security line at the Plettenberg–Lüdenscheid road since a strong enemy attack was expected from the south.
Since there was not yet any sign of the enemy the Division had several hours to organize its units. The Division command post was established in Kleinhammer.
All that was left of the Division was one small Kampfgruppe. The two Panzergrenadier regiments had the strength of two weak battalions. The Pionier battalion and Aufklärungs battalion were at approximately company strength. About ten tanks and tank-destroyers were still capable of limited action. The artillery was notably short of ammunition and could hardly fire. There was still a limited amount of fuel consisting of a mixture of crude-oil and aviation petrol available from stocks remaining in the Ruhr region. Within a short time that [fuel mix] disabled many vehicles with engine trouble.
The Division constantly sought to recoup losses by rounding up stragglers of all origins and repair of all possible vehicles that were found standing driver-less on the roads. However, most of these efforts proved fruitless: the stragglers shortly vanished and, sooner or later, the vehicles had to be abandoned when they ran out of fuel.
12 April
During the day there was no immediate combat action on the Plettenberg–Lüdenscheid road in the Division’s sector. In the afternoon the commander of Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 was ordered to Herscheid as Kampfkommandant. [tr. note-Appointment as Kampfkommandant gave him authority over any forces that happened into his specified area.] The forces at his disposal consisted of three tanks, one weak Panzergrenadier company and those elements of a Flak-Sturmregiment that were stationed in Herscheid. There was no way of holding [Herscheid], which was surrounded on all sides by commanding heights, with these weak forces. That evening in the face of an enemy who was primarily employing artillery, it had to be evacuated.
During the night the Division’s Panzergrenadiere were ordered north to establish a line of resistance east of Werdohl–Neuenrade, since the enemy was pressing in from the east.
The remnants of the pioneer battalion and three tanks blocked the north-south valley road three kilometres northwest of Herscheid.
13 April 1945
During the night the enemy attacked from the east and took Neuenrade. There was imminent danger that he would continue to advance to the west to Lenne and would cut off the forces committed around Werdohl. Early in the morning the blocking group was pulled out of the north-south valley road (three kilometres northwest of Herscheid) and employed along with a weak battalion of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 902 in a counterattack north of Werdohl on Neuenrade. Repeated attempts were made to attack, but the forces were insufficient. What was accomplished was that, particularly thanks to the three tanks, the road at the southwest exit from Neuenrade was blocked by fire,
The remnants of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 901 and Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 were committed east of Altena near Dahle to secure toward the east and southeast.
No significant fighting occurred at Werdohl. At times American artillery laid down heavy fire on the city.
14 April 1945
No significant fighting occurred in the sector east of Altena. Many stragglers collected during the day at the Kampfgruppe north of Werdohl. They, however, were of no use for fighting. In the evening the city had to be evacuated. The three tanks southwest of Neuenrade were cut off by American armour and, after expending their ammunition, had to be blown up.
Late in the evening the Lenne valley was blocked southeast of Altena with the elements withdrawing from Werdohl.
15 April 1945
Early in the morning all the remaining elements of the Division were immediately east and south of Altena. The enemy was only feeling things out. There was no more fighting.
The Ruhr pocket was split by the enemy’s last advances. During the night of 14/15 April 1945 the Division command concluded that further resistance was senseless. At an officer’s briefing at 0600 hours in the morning it was announced that the total destruction of Altena and the total disintegration of the Division were to be avoided. After firing off the remaining ammunition and destroying the heavy weapons, the Division would offer to surrender.
After the ammunition had been expended in the afternoon, the artillery pieces and the Panzergrenadier’s weapons were destroyed. An order from the 15th Armee to continue resistance north of Altena was disregarded. For the last time the elements of the Division in Altena lined up before the Division Commander with their weapons. After a short speech he dismissed the Division. American tanks had already arrived. The remnants of the Panzer Lehr Division, which had been in constant action since June 1944, proceeded into captivity.