The Allied invasion of Normandy began on 6 June. At 0415 in the early morning the Division’s troops were placed in readiness by telephone. As the troops feverishly prepared to move out, the Division received a preliminary order from Oberbefehlshaber West, Feldmarschall von Rundstedt:
The Panzer-Lehr-Division is to hold itself in readiness in its assembly area to advance toward Caen–Bayeux. The Division will provisionally be attached to Armeeoberkommando 7 [Command of the German 7th Armee]. Further instructions [are to be received from] Armeeheadquarters in Le Mans. The Commander is to proceed there for briefing.
The Division commander, Generalleutnant Bayerlein learned about the situation in the landing zone. Subject to approval by the Wehrmachtsführungsstab, which had to release the divisions from its reserve, “The I SS-Panzer Korps–General der Waffen-SS Sepp Dietrich–is to attack with the 716th Infanterie Division, 21st Panzer Division and 12th SS-Panzer Division, seal off the east bank of the Orne and throw the enemy [forces] that have penetrated west of the Orne back into the sea.”1
At about 1430 hours the Führungsstab also released Panzer Lehr Division 130 for commitment against the beachhead. At 1730, due to the worsening situation at the bridgehead, Panzer Lehr Division 130 was attached to the I SS-Panzer Korps, of which Generalmajor Kraemer, interviewed below, was chief of staff.
Generalleutnant Bayerlein, the Division Commander, did his best to convince 7th Armee that the Division would be unable to complete the movement during the hours of darkness and that daytime movement would lead to serious losses due to Allied air attacks and, in fact, would not result in the Division arriving any sooner. His views were emphatically rejected. The Division would keep moving, day and night.