General Montgomery had looked for the fall of Caen on the first day. Caen was critical. It controlled access to the good tank-country of the Caen-Falaise plain, obvious route of advance toward Paris. The air forces wanted the existing and potential airfield sites on the high ground around Caen. The British were stymied by stubborn German defence in their frontal assault on Caen.
Bayeux, on the other hand, fell with little effort, revealing an as-yet undefended sector beyond Panzer Lehr Division 130’s left flank. As noted above, the German command responded to this revelation of vulnerability, the I SS-Panzer Korps redirecting Panzer Lehr Division 130 to recapture Bayeux. Now, however, pressure on Panzer Lehr’s right flank forced it to give up the attack on Bayeux and concentrate on defending the Tilly area.
Montgomery, thwarted in the direct, frontal assault on Caen, next envisioned a two-pronged envelopment, which would begin on 10 June with two simultaneous attacks. The left arm of the pincers would move out of the small bridgehead east of the Orne, the right arm would be the British 30th Corps, which would move south down the Seulles River valley, capturing Villers-Bocage (originally seen as a D-Day objective). Villers-Bocage, located at the head of the Seulles River valley was at the hub of the entire road network of the region, controlling access to the Odon River valley and Caen, to the east, and to Mont Pinçon, ten miles to the south, the commanding height on a rugged plateau. The British forces would then turn east and link up with the British 1st Airborne Division which was to be dropped in the Odon Valley, near Noyers and Evrecy and prevent the German forces in Caen from escaping.
Montgomery’s plan for the air-drop was blocked by Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory. Bad weather in the Channel delayed landing the 51st (Highland) Division and 4th Armoured Brigade, the forces that were to provide the muscle for the left hook. A German attack on the small bridgehead east of the Orne then involved the 51st Division in two days of heavy fighting, assisting the 6th Airborne Division.
With the left arm of the pincers eliminated, Montgomery now put all his hopes on the right arm. The British 30 Corps was to thrust via the Tilly–Norrey area to advance down the Seulles River Valley, capture Villers-Bocage, win crossings over the Odon River, gain the high ground near Evrecy. and cut in behind Caen.
As Panzer Lehr suffered severe attrition holding against the frontal attack during the period from 9–13 June, British forces elsewhere discovered a gap in the German defences, west of the Aure River. American forces were advancing, almost unopposed, toward Caumont. This inviting gap in the German line of defence appeared to extend all the way from the remaining fragments of the 352nd Infanterie-Division retreating before the American thrust to the west flank of Panzer-Lehr Division 130’s position. The British 7th Armoured Division’s commander, General Sir George ‘Bobby’ Erskine discovered this opening which invited a fast armoured thrust via Caumont and Villers-Bocage. The high ground around Villers-Bocage controlled access to the valley of the Odon River which, in turn, would allow an armoured force to cut in and around, behind the hard-fought Tilly–Norrey sector, west of Caen, cutting the city off from the rear. One of the first effects of that advance would, of course, be to undermine Panzer Lehr’s position, forcing it to retreat or be cut off.
The British Second Army Commander, General Miles Dempsey and the 30th Corps Commander, Lt.-General G. C. Bucknall, agreed to the proposal, but took 24 hours to react, which turned out to be a critical 24 hours. While the British 50th (Northumberland) Division fixed Panzer Lehr Division 130 in eventful frontal fighting, the 22nd Armoured Brigade advanced through the gap around its western flank, meeting practically no resistance. It spent the night of 12 June in Caumont, then moved on to Villers-Bocage. Part of the force continued on through the town to occupy Hill 213, a few miles past Villers-Bocage toward Caen.
Unfortunately for the British, the German 2nd Panzer Division had already been alerted to move up from its positions near Amiens and plug this gap. Thanks to the 24 hour delay, the armoured reserve of the I SS-Panzer Korps had already started to arrive. The 1st and 2nd companies of SS-(schwere) Panzer Abteilung 101 were already in position near Villers-Bocage. SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann of the 2nd Kompanie spotted the British force, acted immediately and, in a brilliantly conducted, brief action, Wittmann and his company scuttled the British effort, knocking out about 25 of the vaunted British 7th Armoured Division’s armoured vehicles, shooting up the accompanying infantry and dealing a severe blow to the morale and reputation of the famed ‘Desert Rats’.
The 22nd Armoured Brigade fell back to new positions for the night and requested reinforcement from 30th Corps. Bucknall, commanding 30th Corps, failed to detach the needed reinforcements from the 50th Infantry Division, thinking that the infantry division would break through Panzer Lehr’s defence, thereby making its way to Villers-Bocage. Panzer Lehr Division 130 continued its hard-fought defence and held the British 50th Infantry Division. Bucknall’s action, or lack thereof, lost the British their chance. The 22nd Armoured Brigade might well have held its fall-back positions with adequate reinforcement, but, in the event, had to pull back to the previous British lines. The German 2nd Panzer Division plugged the gap in the German defences.
Henceforth the British would have to fight their way through the hard way, a lengthy process that would take many lives. Panzer Lehr’s part in this stubborn defence was less spectacular than Michael Wittmann’s, but was significant in denying the British their hoped for access to the Orne River crossings and the backdoor to Caen. From Panzer Lehr’s viewpoint, the attempted British end-run via Villers-Bocage and its scuttling was marginal to the Division’s continued battle to ‘hold the line’.
For nearly four weeks Panzer Lehr Division 130 would discover the difficulties and defensive opportunities unique to fighting in Normandy’s bocage, the terrain of hedgerows growing out of massive, three to four foot high, root-bound earthen ramparts, sometimes single as simple field boundaries, sometimes lining both sides of sunken, narrow lanes. The landscape was compartmentalized by the hedgerows into thousands of small fields, each sealed off from its neighbour, each a separate combat problem. Armour ceased to manoeuvre. Tanks became armoured pillboxes, dug in for concealment, their crews afraid to exist during daylight for fear of being spotted, painstakingly maintaining the perfection of their camouflage. Enemy artillery employed sensitive fuses to achieve tree-bursts that drove deadly hails of steel fragments down into trenches below. Cut by streams and rivers, with steep hills and woods, the bocage offered tremendous opportunities for skilled and stubborn defence, but was punishing for defenders and attackers alike.
Where the country was more open, stone-walled farmsteads provided natural fortresses with good fields of fire.
The Allies found the terrain greatly favoured the German defence, but German armoured commanders were frustrated by the degradation of their once-mobile forces to static defence. Until taken out of the line into Heeresgruppe reserve, whence it was called farther west to counter the American bridgehead over the Vire River and Vire-et-Taute Canal in the U. S. push of St. Lô, Panzer Lehr Division 130 took part in blocking the British 30th Corps push down the Seulles River Valley to capture Villers-Bocage and gain the crossings of the River Odon and the high ground near Evrecy. Panzer Lehr Divison 130 departed the area as, on 2 July, the British Operation ‘Epsom’ opened the next phase of the major series of battles for the Odon River crossings that made ‘Hill 112’ infamous in some of the fiercest, horrendously interminable fighting for a commanding piece of ground in the war. Panzer Lehr defended the Rauray Ridge in the preliminary phases of Epsom but was then withdrawn to Heeresgruppe reserve.
But now back to 9 June.
As noted above, the intended left arm of Montgomery’s pincers attack on Caen was stalled by the German 21st Panzer Division attack on the 6th Airborne Division, which drew in the 51st (Highland) Division, that division having been intended, with the 4th Armoured Brigade, to provide the main impetus for that arm of the attack.
The British western arm of the pincers involved the 7th Armoured Division attacking on 9 June through the 50th Infantry Division between the Seulles and Aure Rivers with Hottot as the initial objective. The 8th Armoured Brigade Group, initially attached to the 50th Infantry Division, later to the 7th Armoured Division, was to advance via Tilly south to Villers-Bocage.
Late in the morning of 9 June elements of Panzer Lehr Division 130 attacked, the Division Commander himself leading the attack at the head of detachments of Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130. The reconnaissance battalion bypassed Ellon at noon, reaching Argenchy, a small village southwest of Bayeux. At the same time, the tanks of the II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130, under Prince von Schönburg-Waldenburg advanced toward Ellon, where they came up against the 56th Infantry Brigade, which was attached to the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division. The Germans took the village, establishing an excellent basis for the next phase of the attack. However, at that point the attack order was rescinded, the elements involved called back to the Tilly-sur-Seulles area.
While Panzer Lehr had been attacking north, the British 8th Armoured Brigade Group had launched its own attack in parallel but opposite direction, gaining entry to the village of St. Pierre, the eastern suburb of Tilly-sur-Seulles, thus threatening Panzer Lehr’s right flank. Panzer Lehr Division’s I./ Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 continued to hold the bridge over the Seulles River, but at high cost. That evening Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regimenter 901 and 902 on both sides of the Tilly–Bayeux highway, just north of Tilly-sur-Seulles, 901 on the right, 902 on the left.
Following the cancellation of Panzer Lehr’s attack to regain Bayeux, Generalleutnant Bayerlein reported to I SS-Panzer-Korps headquarters where SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS Sepp Dietrich made it clear that it was no longer a matter of throwing the enemy into the sea, but of going over to the defensive. The Division was ordered to occupy a line of resistance Cristot–Tilly-sur-Seulles–Verrières.
During the night of 9/10 June Panzer Lehr Division 130 (less I./ Panzerregiment 6, which had not yet arrived), occupied a 17 kilometre line of resistance extending southwest from Cristot–skirting south of St. Pierre–Tilly-sur-Seulles–Verrières–just north of la Senaudiere–south of la Belle Epine–then bending south along the east bank of the Aure River. Division headquarters, painstakingly camouflaged, was established at the Sermentot farmstead, southwest of Tilly-sur-Seulles.
On 10 June the British 7th Armoured Division planned to advance between the Aure and Seulles Rivers on Villers-Bocage. An early-morning British barrage pounded Major Uthe’s I./Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901, and the British achieved some local gains, but a spirited counterattack by three companies of Uthe’s battalion (I./ Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901) broke into both the village of St. Pierre and the positions near Point 103. With great difficulty and with strong support from artillery, armour and naval guns, the British hung on to their positions on Point 103 and in the northern part of St. Pierre.
North of Tilly-sur-Seulles and west of the I Bataillon positions, the II./ Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 was also severely hammered by artillery. In the adjoining sector the 3rd Kompanie of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 was on ground where a rocky layer prevented them from properly digging in. Some of the men started to break and run under the fire, but were halted, encouraged and sent back to their positions.
After the barrage the British 22nd Armoured Brigade attacked down the main Bayeux–Tilly road. Infantry support restored movement when the point elements were held up at Jérusalem by combat outposts of the I./ Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902.
Five British tanks broke through, endangering the command post of the I./ Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 101. Fortunately for the commander of the I./902, the 1st Kompanie of Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130 was nearby and proved its new Panzerjäger IV tank-destroyers by knocking out the British tanks.
Partly to prevent other such surprises, Generalleutnant Bayerlein embarked on a personal terrain reconnaissance. At this point, after mopping up German resistance in Jérusalem, the 22nd Armoured Brigade resumed its advance. South of Bucéels the British brigade unknowingly intersected Bayerlein’s recce. Bayerlein estimated the unsuspecting force as regimental in size. The General immediately dispatched his aide, Hauptmann Hartdegan, to bring back whatever he could find, especially a couple of 8.8cm guns.
Hartdegan returned, half-an-hour later, with two 8.8’s and four tanks. With the advantage of surprise, the little German force took excellent firing positions and made a shambles of the British unit. The British artillery response was punishing and forced the little German force to fall back to its own lines without loss. The British regiment, whose assembly for the attack had been disrupted, withdrew.
During the afternoon, another German reconnaissance patrol spotted a Scottish brigade forming up for attack and dispersed it by calling down heavy fire from their supporting 15 cm infantry guns.7
The above description typifies the kind of action Panzer Lehr Division 130 was involved in until its withdrawal to Heeresgruppe reserve, which began on June 26. The remainder of its commitment in the Tilly-sur-Seulles area was equally eventful, with massive artillery preparations and intense British attacks. Again and again local penetrations were cleared up in fierce counterattacks, but, gradually and as the result of severe attrition, sections of the line were forced back. Perrigault provides much fascinating detail, but since such detail is not needed to follow the material covered in the interviews, only a few highpoints will be mentioned.
On 11 June a heavy British attack caused only minor rearrangements of the line, attacks and counterattacks costing lives but ending up with few significant alterations in who held what.. The commander of II./ Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130, Prince Schönburg-Waldenburg, was killed in a counterattack. On the Division’s left, la Belle Epine was lost, drawing attention to the weakness between Panzer Lehr’s left and the 352nd Infanterie-Division.
On 12 June heavy fighting continued, again with little net change in the line. The British 22nd Armoured Brigade launched its ill-fated thrust toward Villers-Bocage, halting for the night in Livry.
On 13 June the British 22nd Armoured Brigade continued to Villers-Bocage, lead elements continuing past the town to Hill 213. As detailed above, Michael Wittmann and his company of Tiger tanks tore up the British force and put an end to its advance.
A surprised Panzer Lehr Division 130 reacted, its II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 was ordered to immediately block the north exits from Villers-Bocage and stand by for a counterattack, while the Division Ia hastily assembled a force of all available soldiers from the Division staff and other elements to likewise occupy a line along the northern edge of the town.
The commander of the II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 put together a force utilizing tanks from the Division repair shop at Parfouru and successfully counterattacked the British on Hill 213. As the Panzer Lehr counterattacks developed, the leading elements of the approaching 2nd Panzer Division cut the British route of advance in several places and turned toward Villers-Bocage, causing the British to fall back to the high ground near Tracy-Bocage.
While engaged in cleaning up the British penetration on its flank and in its rear, Panzer Lehr Division 130 was fully engaged on its front as the attack of the British 50th Infantry Division mounted in intensity. With massive support from artillery and air and against furious defence, after a full day of heavy eventful fighting the British ended up holding part of Lingèvres and taking la Senaudière.
The British 7th Armoured Division was ordered to pull back its force from the positions near Tracy-Bocage which, in light of the newly arrived 2nd Panzer Division, had become a liability. Thus ended the British attempt at an end-run around Panzer Lehr’s left flank.