To avoid interruption to the above questions, the following note picks up the Division’s history at the time it was pulled out of the line briefly into Korps reserve, then, on 8 July, committed in a counterattack on St. Jean-de-Daye against the Americans. (See questions 80 ff above, in ETHINT 66.)
As Generalleutnant Bayerlein noted above, Panzer Lehr Division 130 was relieved by the 276th Infanterie-Division on 26 June. As the individual units were relieved, they moved to the Aunay area for refitting. By 5 July the 276th Infanterie Division had taken over all of Panzer Lehr’s former sector. Panzer Lehr’s Panzer IV Abteilung (II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130), the main body of Panzerjäger-Lehr Abteilung 130 remained behind temporarily to help the new division get established, as did the heavy artillery, schwere Artillerieabteilung 992, which had supported the Division for the last few weeks. Those elements that had been relieved went, for the time being, into Korps reserve while being refitted.
Within a few days of the fall of Cherbourg on 28 June, the American First Army under General Bradley used the troops that had been freed up to extend its attack at the foot of the Cotentin Peninsula. The base of the Cotentin Peninsula was nearly cut off from the mainland by large areas of marsh and poorly drained terrain. On the west side the area between the marshes and the coast was hilly, which, with the large Mont-Castre Forest, controlled the critical road junction of la Haye-du-Puits. The Germans had organized a strong main line of resistance protecting this seaward flank.
To the east slow, sluggish streams converged on Carentan from the south and southwest. Subject to the combination of tidal flooding and flooding due to the tidal effects on the rivers, since Roman times these low-lying areas had gradually been drained for farming. Their wide, marshy flood-plains, criss-crossed by innumerable drainage ditches, were devoid of cover. The Germans had destroyed the floodgates that controlled tidal effects on the rivers, flooding these low areas as a defensive measure. There were only two, relatively narrow corridors of passable ground, one along the axis of the Carentan–St Jean-de-Daye–St Lô highway, the other along the Carentan–Périers road.
The 17th SS-Panzergrenadier Division ‘Götz von Berlichingen’, in particular, had come to know this area well and was prepared and able to put up an extremely stubborn, skilled and flexible defence.30
The limitation of movement to these narrow corridors favoured the German defence. Until Bradley’s American First Army could get past this constriction, it could not deploy its powerful forces to full effect and assert its increasing superiority in men and materiel.
First Army’s attack in early July was planned to start on the western end near the sea and progress eastward in a series of blows. VIII Corps would open the offensive on the west, aiming at la-Haye-du-Puits and the Mont-Castre Hills. Next, on Army order, the VII Corps would attack with the American 83d and 4th Infantry Divisions, with the 9th Infantry Division awaiting sufficient room to join in. Finally, XIX Corps would attack in the zone including the Vire and Taute Rivers, with St. Lô and the adjacent high ground as its objective.
The series of attacks, starting on 3 July in the la Haye-du-Puits sector increasingly strained the German 7th Armee, which had already been feeling the need to pull some of its battered units, such as the 17th SS-Panzergrenadier Divison ‘Götz von Berlichingen’ and the 352nd Infanterie Division, out of the line for refitting or reconstitution even before the new offensive. All such plans fell by the wayside in the frantic effort to reshuffle forces to meet the new threat.
On 7 July XIX Corps launched its attack, initially west of the Vire. On 7 July the American 30th Infantry Division crossed the Vire et Taute canal. The immediate objective was the area of St.-Jean-de-Daye, the important crossroad just south of the village and the small elevation to the east. Capture of the road junction would give access to the two main highways leading west and south in the area north of the hills that begin at Hauts-Vents.
The crossing was successful and, despite problems with the special conditions of fighting in the hedgerows of the Bocage normal to any unit, even one that had trained well for this terrain, St.-Jean-de-Daye was taken and the division established a firm bridgehead. It would, however, turn out to be inadequate in size and depth for what was about to be pushed into it.
General Bradley was sufficiently encouraged by the afternoon of 7 July to order the American 3rd Armored Division to cross the Vire River at the Pont-de-Fromond bridge just west of Airel during the night of 7/8 July and begin its drive after advancing to the crossroads south of St.-Jean-de-Daye.
Combat Command B (CCB) began to move into the bridgehead that evening while Combat Command A (CCA) moved into an assembly area at Ste.-Marguerite d’Elle awaiting developments.
The 113th Cavalry Group entered the bridgehead on 7/8 July, moving to the right of the 30th Infantry Division to cover its right flank. After stiff fighting developed with both the German 639th Ostermark Bataillon and the 38th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment of the 17th SS-Panzergrenadier Divison ‘Götz von Berlichingen’, the cavalry group took up defensive positions on a north–south line based on Goucherie–le Mesnil-Véneron. Effective midnight 8 July, the 113th Cavalry Group was attached to Combat Command A of the 3rd Armored Division. During the day Combat Command A had crossed the Vire River, taking the Airel road toward le Désert, thus strengthening the Corps’ right (west) flank.
The 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Division’s 120th Infantry Regiment had attacked during the day toward the southwest from a position near St-Jean-de-Daye to gain high ground north of le Désert, successfully repulsing a German counterattack. Concerned at the stiff resistance the 113th Cavalry Group had run into and anxious about the vulnerability of its right flank, XIX Corps released to the 120th Infantry Regiment its 2nd Battalion, which had been held in Corps reserve. The 30th Infantry Division now had a strong west flank astride the important highway through le Désert road.
Trouble developed as Combat Command B of the inexperienced armored division tried to pass through troops of the inexperienced infantry division in what was fast becoming a very congested bridgehead. The congestion was about to worsen as the 30th Infantry Division brought in the 3rd Battalion of its 119th Infantry Regiment. Neither the armor nor the infantry included the other in its plans. In some cases the infantry units had no idea American armor was coming through.
Despite these complications, the American bridgehead was strong, and expanding aggressively. The German command was unaware of the strength of the American forces they were hoping to crush.
The German 7th Armee had expected an attack on the Vire sector, but, as mentioned above, was also having to deal with a situation it felt was more pressing west of the Taute River. Reserves were being committed from the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’ to help the 17th SS-Panzergrenadier Division ‘Götz von Berlichingen’, which was under heavy pressure from the attack of the U. S. VII Corps. Seventh Armee hoped to hold the American XIX Corps attack on 8 July with a mobile brigade and a last battalion from the 2nd Fallschirmjäger Korps’ reserve.
However, the Germans anticipated stronger American efforts along the Vire. 7th Armee proposed pulling units of the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’ out of the la Haye-du-Puits sector, at the risk of weakening that critical sector. Heeresgruppe B finally decided to commit the 5th Fallschirmjäger Division, moving it up from Brittany to the Lessay sector and to bring in Panzer Lehr Division 130, which was to assemble between Périers and St. Lô and strengthen the sector from the Vire River westward.
On 9 July, in light of the increasing size of the bridgehead, plans were made to bring in VII Corps’ 9th Division, which would make temporary use of XIX Corps’ gains, ‘borrowing’ some ground on the western flank of the bridgehead, from which it would then fight its way back into the main VII Corps’ zone. By so doing it would add to the security of XIX Corp’s right flank. This would, also, place it in position where Panzer Lehr’s counterattack would run into this experienced division two days later.
The American immediate objective on 9 July was the high ground around Haut-Vents, about 4000 yards from the 30th Division’s forward positions. A long ridge stretching southward between the Vire and Terrette Rivers began at Haut-Vents (Hill 91). This ridge provided excellent observation for the Germans over a wide stretch of country toward St-Jean-de-Daye.
The Germans launched a counterattack on 9 July with the Pionier battalion of the 2nd SS-Panzer-Division ‘Das Reich’, supported by Panzer IV tanks which caused more excitement than real damage to the Americans. The German 7th Armee said that the counterattack ‘disintegrated under heavy artillery fire.’ (Quote from St. Lô, American Forces in Action Series, p. 34)
By the night of 9 July the 9th Infantry Division had assembled in its jump-off positions for the next morning’s attack toward the west and southwest. The 9th Infantry Division was under VII Corps, but it would be operating in the same tactical zone as the 30th Infantry Division. The two divisions would operate in close association in coming days. XIX Corps sector was narrowed considerably.