So much has been written and is readily available on the American Operation ‘Cobra’ that little needs to be added here, except that Panzer Lehr Division 130 was unfortunate enough to be precisely located in the neatly outlined rectangle where over 4,000 tons of bombs were to fall, blasting a way for what was hoped would be the breakthrough (hopes did not yet envision a ‘breakout’). The capture of St. Lô, to which the crossing of the Vire River and Vire et Taute Canal were marginal, placed the American forces out of the swamps at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula and poised to move forward on hard ground.
The American 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions, followed by the 4th Infantry Division, would open a corridor through which the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions and the 1st Infantry Division (‘The Big Red One’) would thrust, exploiting the gap and then swinging westward to the sea, seizing Coutances and cutting off the German forces in the Cotentin Peninsula. The long-term plan was that the American forces would clear the Brittany Peninsula, opening its precious ports, then pivot on St. Lô and swing eastward to advance toward the Seine River with the British and Canadian forces on their left.
After initial postponement from its original date of 20 July due to rain on 20/ 21 July, based on predictions that the weather would be favourable for ground operations and moderately satisfactory for air, Air Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory set H-Hour at 1300 hours, 24 July. Low clouds that would interfere with visibility for bombing resulted in a mid-morning decision to postpone another 24 hours. However, the bombers were already in the air. Although the first formation aborted because of poor visibility, about 35 of the second formation and 300 of the third dropped their loads, totalling nearly 700 tons of bombs.
A tragic accident, the inadvertent release of part of its bomb-load by the lead-bombardier of a heavy-bomber formation, led the remaining fifteen planes of the formation to drop theirs. These bombs fell on American troops killing 25 and wounding 131 members of the 30th Infantry Division.
However, the bulk of the bombs dropped fell on Panzer Lehr’s positions. American troops, which had pulled back from their front lines to provide a (inadequate) safety zone were then ordered to move forward and reoccupy their former positions to prevent the Germans from taking them over. Cobra’ was rescheduled for 25 July. German troops had already advanced into these positions, so regaining them involved some hard fighting.
The Germans interpreted the events of 24 July as a full-scale American attack, preceded by a frighteningly heavy bomb attack. Reduced though the scale of the bombing was, the Germans still lost 350 men and about a dozen tanks and tank-destroyers. The German soldiers prided themselves in having held their existing positions against what they took to be a full infantry attack. Bayerlein, expecting resumption of the American attack on the morrow, pulled his outposts that were north of the St. Lô–Périers road back into his main positions, south of the road. That, of course, inadvertently positioned those troops inside the area outlined for the massive ‘carpet-bombing’ on the 25th.
On the eve of Operation ‘Cobra’ Oberstleutnant Freiherr von Hauser’s Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 adjoined the 5th Fallschirmjäger Division at Point 40, east of le Mesnil-Eury, its front running along the St. Lô–Périers highway to the Terrete Stream. Oberstleutnant Welsch’s Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902, with attached Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 14, held the sector on the right, stretching from the Terrette Stream to the LXXXIV Korps boundary with the II Fallschirmjäger Korps, east of the village of Hébécrevon, where it adjoined a Kampfgruppe of the 352nd Infanterie-Division on the west bank of the Vire River, where the German line met the sharp elbow of the river. Kampfgruppe Heintz, of the 275th Infanterie Division, held five positions near Hébecrevon, each at reinforced-infantry-platoon strength with a few tanks or tank-destroyers and light antitank guns.. The II./ Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 was behind Paznergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902, near Hébécrevon, Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130 backing Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 on the left. Kampfgruppe Brosow of the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’ was scheduled to be withdrawn on 24 July from the Division’s zone for refitting near le Mesnil-Villeman, five kilometres southeast of Gavray.
At 1140 hours on 24 July American fighter-bombers opened the bombing attack, followed by the heavy bombers that dropped their loads in spite of poor visibility. The Americans may have suffered heavier casualties than the Germans from the supposedly-cancelled bombing attack that day, but the German Ländser still found it a harrowing experience.
During the night of 25 June 16 Panther tanks of the I./Panzer-Regiment 6 relieved the dozen Panzer IV’s, which were sent back to Dangy as Division reserve.
At about 0800 hours, American front-line troops again pulled back to establish another, again-inadequate, safety zone for the bombing. This time the full-scale bombing added another 4150 tons of bombs to the previous day’s 700 tons. Again bombs fell on American troops, this time adding, according to Georges Bernage (La Guerre des GI, p.95) 101 more dead and 463 wounded. Among the dead was Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commanding general of the Army Ground Forces and pro tem commander of the U. S. First Army Group, the fictitious entity still being maintained in England to sustain German faith that ‘the real invasion’ was yet to come in the Pas de Calais. General McNair was an onlooker. His death was kept secret, to maintain the deception, the funeral attended by only a select few generals.
Generalleutnant Bayerlein felt that Panzer Lehr Division 130 had been obliterated. At least half of what was left of the division had been destroyed or disabled, the landscape transformed into a cratered moonscape.
Bayerlein was not too far from the truth. While a later assessment revealed fragmented remnants that survived and, by evening most of the American penetration seemed to have been more-or-less sealed off, as Ritgen described it, the Panzer Lehr Division had lost its infantry fighting capabilities and its cohesiveness. The Division was still able to put together two companies of armour, each with 7–8 Panzer IV tanks and send one to what was left of each of the two Panzergrenadier regiments. But ‘[The Division’s] lines were like a rubber-band stretched to its breaking point, ready to snap at the slightest additional pressure.’
The Americans, however, were not that confident. In Panzer Lehr’s sector, shortly after 1100 hours, a heavy artillery preparation followed the immense aerial bombardment. American infantry moved out on a broad front. After the overwhelming, awesome power of the aerial bombardment, many expected a walkthrough. To their amazement they ran into enough isolated pockets of steadfast resistance so that they had to carefully work their way forward.
However, German communications had been totally destroyed, so there was no coordination. Artillery that had been outside the zone of obliteration fired what ammunition it had in pre-arranged fire-plans, but even that was risky, since American and German troops were interspersed. There was no resupply of ammunition.
The American attack on Hébécrevon–St. Gilles was brought to a standstill. A three company attack with armoured support cost the Americans three Sherman tanks. Envelopment likewise failed and it was only much later that the three German Panther at the heart of the resistance were finally knocked out and the block eliminated The entrance to Hébécrevon was mined and the minefield covered by fire from Kampfgruppe Heintz. By the end of the day Kampfgruppe Heintz was entirely wiped out. The town finally fell by midnight.
The American 4th Infantry Division required 18 Sherman tanks in support of a battalion attack to take out a German strong-point north of La Chapelle-en-Juger, in the centre of the sector. Another German strongpoint with two armoured vehicles remained defiant. La Chapelle-en-Juger remained German at the end of the day.
On the left, the American 9th Division advanced toward Marigny, but also ran into fierce opposition from the embattled Fallschirmjäger in the cratered landscape. To the GI at the fighting edge, made wary by sad experience of German skill and tenacity in defence, little seemed to have changed, except that the front line had been bumped forward another mile.
In actual fact, however, Ritgen’s description was accurate. Within the bombed zone, there were enough survivors to interfere with the advance, to require ‘spot-treatment’. But that was all. Though the units adjoining on either side of the bombed-zone rapidly realized they had not been hit and fought fiercely, there were no German reserves. Nothing at all backed up the front lines. The Americans had just neutralized all that was left. The next day they started to realize that there was a difference. By the day after that, they were out in the clear and on the move.
The story of the American advance, of the genuine ‘break-out’ that gave meaning to the world of that new term, can be found elsewhere. We shall restrict this narrative to following the battered remnants of a once-powerful elite division, reduced to such pitiful fragments that it now played a very marginal role in the events leading to the Falaise pocket and the retreat to the Seine.
On 26 July the American infantry divisions had to broaden the penetration, none of them having fully achieved their D-day objectives, and get out of the way of the armoured divisions that were to exploit the breakthrough. The German units adjoining the bombed zone fought with undiminished tenacity. What was about to evolve into the breakout was to achieve its spectacular success precisely because the Germans had ‘everything in the shop window’. Aside from very minimal, very local reserves, nothing at all was immediately available to contest the American advance once it had broken through the hard, thin crust of the German defences. The massive bombardment had put the final breaking-stress on Panzer Lehr Division 130 and the regiment of the 5th Fallschirmjäger Division that came under the bombs. Such fragments as survived put up amazingly effective resistance, but they were overwhelmed by the mass and power of the American forces. Once they were gone, the way was open to the interior.
German reaction was crippled by the failure of communications. LXXXIV Korps commander von Choltitz committed part of his Korps reserve, a reinforced regiment of the 352nd Infanterie Division from its assembly area south of Périers to move eastward and secure la Chapelle-en-Juger, while Hausser, at 7th Armee level committed from his limited reserve a regiment of the 275th Infanterie Division also to move toward la Chapelle-en-Juger from its assembly area near Canisy. These two forces were to converge and seal off the penetration.
Choltitz optimistically launched a counterattack in the Marigny area with a company of tanks and a company of infantry of the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’. That force ran into American armour and infantry.
What Hausser, at 7th Armee, did not know was that, while the one regiment that 5th Fallschirmjäger Division controlled was able to hold the western flank of the penetration, the other Fallschirmjäger regiment and Panzer Lehr Division 130, with the units attached to it, had, essentially, been totally destroyed. The regiment of the 275th Infanterie Division that Hausser had committed was wiped out en route to la Chapelle-en-Juger by American fighter-bombers.
That left the 352nd Infanterie-Division holding just east of the bombed zone with an open left flank which that division was simply too weak to handle.
26 July started out with the arduous completion of the previous day’s infantry missions, but by the end of the day General Collins was confident enough that the penetration was a fact so that he told his infantry divisions to fight on through the night. As will be discussed below, on 26 July General Collins also committed two of his three armoured columns earlier than originally planned in order to secure Marigny and St. Gilles, road junctions essential for later armoured exploitation of the penetration.
Again, Operation ‘Cobra’ was almost entirely within Panzer Lehr’s sector. On the German left, the west flank of the penetration, the American 330th Infantry Regiment of the 83rd Infantry Division fought hard against determined opposition from the Fallschirmjäger and failed to achieve the road junction that was its original D-Day objective. However, by late evening the 330th Infantry crossed the Périers–St. Lô highway and they formed a secure right flank for the American penetration.
General Eddy’s 9th Infantry Division removed itself from the Marigny road and took positions almost two miles west of that road, reaching about two and a half miles south of the road, facing the German 353rd Infanterie Division which was attacking VII Corps’ right flank in its attempt to recapture la Chapelle-en-Juger. The American 4th Infantry Division’s 8th Infantry Regiment captured la Chapelle-en-Juger and continued its southward advance, overrunning part of the German 353rd and Panzer Lehr artillery positions, cutting the Coutances–St. Lô highway and ending the day about five miles south of their original Cobra line of departure.
During the night of 26 July, the American infantry divisions essentially completed all of their D-Day assignments except the singularly resistant road junction that was still denied to the 330th Infantry Division on the west flank and the two vital road hubs, Marigny and St. Gilles.
Also during the night of 26 July the Germans ordered slight withdrawals, in one of which the 352nd Infanterie Division withdrew from the loop of the Vire River, allowing elements of the American 30th Infantry Division to fully occupy that loop.
26 July had been the critical day for the Americans, the day when General Collins decided to commit some of his armoured forces, even though the infantry had not yet captured the two essential road junctions of Marigny and St. Gilles, both of which were critical prerequisites in granting access to the road network the armour required to exploit the penetration. General Collins thus committed two of his three armoured columns to capture Marigny and St. Gilles earlier than originally planned, holding off on committing the third armoured column to reduce the danger of congestion in the limited area.
Brigadier-General Maurice Rose’s Combat Command A of the American 2nd Armored Division crossed the St. Lô–Périers road at 0700 hours and, with the 22nd Infantry Regiment, advanced south, objective St. Gilles. A weak blocking position set up by Oberstleutnant Welsch, the commander of II./Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 consisting of a few Panzer IV of Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130, some artillery and remnants of Fallschirmjäger Regiment 15 was soon eliminated. The force entered St. Gilles by 1300 hours. As CCA continued its advance south toward Canisy it ran into another position set up by Oberstleutnant Welsch, this time a handful of grenadiers and a few Panther tanks of the 4th Kompanie of Panzer-Regiment 6. Fighter bombers helped CCA break through in hard fighting. As darkness descended, Canisy fell to the Americans. CCA did not stop there. South of Canisy it split into two columns, one heading toward le Mesnil-Herman, the other toward St. Sampson de Bonifossé.
In the centre, the 8th Infantry Regiment occupied la Chapelle-en-Juger at about midnight. Of July 25/26. Continuing south along the Terrette stream it crossed the St. Lô–Coutances road at about 1800 hours, reaching the area north of Quibou.
To the west, Major General Huebner’s 1st Infantry Division committed its reinforced 18th Infantry Regiment (Colonel George Smith, Jr.) with Colonel Boudinot’s Combat Command B of the 3rd Armored Division toward Marigny. Losing heavy infantry casualties to small roadblocks and resistance from defended hedgerows, the force advanced with CCB west of the road, the 18th Infantry Regiment to the east.
Northeast of Marigny, at about noon on 26 July, the advancing force ran into the I Abteilung of Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130. The Panzer Lehr artillerymen fought valiantly, with heavy casualties, until about 1830 hours, when the survivors fell back to the south.
As it approached Marigny the 1st Division troops ran up against the German 353rd Infanterie Division and two companies of the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’. CCB tried unsuccessfully to envelop the town to the west. It required a tactical air strike for armoured elements to reach the north edge of Marigny. The enveloping forces closed up for the night west of Marigny. The 18th Infantry Regiment assumed from the presence of American armour in the northern outskirts of Marigny that the town had been captured by CCB. Accordingly, the regiment sent a battalion to bypass the town on the east. That battalion became disoriented in the dark and Marigny remained, for the most part, in German hands. The 18th Infantry finally cleaned out Marigny in the morning of 27 July.
During the night of 26/27 July those surviving elements of Panzer Lehr Division 130 that had been cut off north of the St. Lô–Coutances road broke contact and made their way south. In the morning of 27 July the remnants of the II./ Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 reached Quibou with seven Panzer IV.
27 July marked the start of the spectacular American advances that turned the hoped-for breakthrough into the genuine breakout. General Hobbs exulted, ‘This thing has busted wide open!’ (Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 251.)
Returning to Panzer Lehr Division 130, 27 July was the final day of the breakthrough and breakout. All that was left of Panzer Lehr Division 130 were scattered fragments, out of contact with each other and higher levels. Outflanked to the east, though they fought hard in their isolation, there was little they could do except gain a little time. As the fighting passed them by, such as were able to straggled southward in its wake. As the Americans continued to advance south through Canisy, their aircraft continued to harry anything that moved on the battlefield.
During the preceding night all elements of the Division that could be contacted and the non-combat-worthy elements were sent to the Percy area. The Ib (logistics) headquarters moved to Montbray. The tank-repair shop in Cerisy-le-Salle was able to pull out with its invaluable personnel and most of its equipment, but lack of towing-capacity and congested highways meant that most of the 30 tanks that were under repair had to be left behind.
The exhausted Panzergrenadiere of the II./ Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Bataillon 902 and a few Panzer IV of the II./ Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 whose breakout is mentioned above dug in near Quibou. Pounded since morning by American artillery and hammered by constant fighter-bomber attacks, their resistance collapsed by noon under a frontal attack by the American 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion.
The German high command had yet to realize that Panzer Lehr had effectively ceased to exist. 27 July was the day that Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge’s son appeared at Generalleutnant Bayerlein’s command post.
During the afternoon of 27 July, General White’s CCB of the 2nd Armored Division entered Dangy in the tracks of the 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion, and then moved on toward Pont Brocard. Generalleutnant Bayerlein had attempted to erect another line of defence, the ‘Red Line’, in the sector near the small Soulles River. His command post was by the stream.
Remnant elements of Panzer Lehr Division 130 established contact with the 17th SS-Panzergrenadier Division ‘Götz von Berlichingen’ on the Division’s left, but there was a gap of approximately ten kilometres to the 352nd Infanterie Division on the right. While reconnoitering these positions Generalleutnant Bayerlein’s Schwimmwagen was attacked by fighter-bombers. Bayerlein again escaped but lost his fifth driver to such an attack since 7 June.
At about 1630 hours word arrived at the command post that American armour was only 300 yards away, on the other side of the stream. As the first incoming rounds arrived, the surprised staff discovered that the back windows onto the courtyard had iron bars. Most of the command echelon, including Generalleutnant Bayerlein, escaped from the burning building between bursts of enemy fire, abandoning their gear, but the command bus with all the files and radio apparatus went up in flames.
At this point, as the American armour moved through and beyond the penetration area the story of Panzer Lehr Division 130 fades back into the wings of the great drama. We shall leave that drama of the breakout to others and follow the Division’s remnants far from center stage.
Paul Carell (Sie Kommen, p. 201):
As dusk fell he could be seen, marching alone toward Percy, the commander of the renowned Panzer Lehr, the division of which, three months earlier, Guderian had said, ‘With this division alone you will throw the Anglo-Americans back into the sea.’ Now he made his way on foot. In the Führer headquarters, however, one little flag was removed from the great situation map.
Generalleutnant von Choltitz ordered disengagement during the night of 27/ 28 July in an effort to save a portion of the LXXXIV Korps.
During the night of 27/28 July and during the day a significant number of dispersed elements of the division and vehicles made their way safely back to Percy by widely varying circuitous routes.
In the morning of 28 July the American 330th Infantry Division finally advanced against practically no resistance to rejoin its parent 83rd Infantry Division, the crossroads it had fought so hard for now falling in its lap. As far as the infantry units that had opened the way were concerned, Operation ‘Cobra’ was over.
Enemy pressure let up on Panzer Lehr Division 130 on 28 July. Rain gave a break from aerial attack. Reinforced with a few repaired Panther tanks, Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 established a new security line in a strong position near Villebaudon, about five kilometres north of Percy, which repulsed an afternoon attack by the 2nd Armored Division’s CCA. After an afternoon of hard fighting, the Americans took the village that evening.
General Bradley recognized, on 29 July, that the breakthrough was reality. Although General Patton was not scheduled to take over command with the Third Army until 1 August, on 29 July General Bradley asked Patton to serve as his deputy for the forces on the right and instructed him to supervise VIII Corps operations. As Blumenson puts it (Breakout and Pursuit, p.310):
Though Patton remained in the background of command to the best of his ability, his presence was unmistakable, and his imprint on the operations that developed was as visible as his shadow on the wall of the operations tent.
VIII Corps would, upon activation of Third Army, pass under Third Army control. At the same time, in preparation for the activation of 12th Army Group, which Bradley would command, with Third and First Armies, General Hodges, who would assume command of First Army, was to ‘keep close track’ or the three corps on the American left VII, XIX and V Corps..
During the night of 29/30 August all of Panzer Lehr’s forces were pulled back to the high ground at Percy, where a continuous line of defence was established. Kampfgruppe Wisliceny of the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’ adjoined on the left, the newly arrived 116th Panzer Division of the XXXXVII Panzerkorps on the right.
The XXXXVII Panzer Korps, under General Hans Freiherr von Funck, was transferred from the Panzergruppe West front to take control of the 2nd Panzer Division (note that now both the 2nd Panzer Division and the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’ are present) and the 116th (Windhund) Panzer Division to plug the spreading gap between the LXXXIV and II Fallschirmjäger Korps and launch a counter-attack to cut the American lines of communication on the line Villebaudon–Notre-Dame de Cenilly–Coutances. Hard fighting ensued, but in the evening of 29 August new orders suspended the XXXXVII Panzer Korps attack to the northwest, redirecting it directly west with a new objective, to link up with Panzer Lehr Division 130 and the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’.
The 2nd Panzer Division became heavily engaged in fighting off strong American attacks on its northern flank. Its first objective being to cut the St. Lô–Percy road, the 2nd Panzer Division soon was caught up in an eventful struggle for control of the la Denisière crossroads on that route. The contest ended, on 1 August with the destruction of the German Kampfgruppe 304 of the 2nd Panzer Division that had captured and held the crossroads, temporarily cutting off elements of the 175th Regiment of the American 29th Infantry Division that were at Villebaudon. The German Kampfgruppe 304, itself, in turn was intermittently cut off in la Denisière by the 116th Regiment of the American 29th Infantry Division. The German 116th Panzer Division was caught up in the struggle for the hills around Percy, Villebaudon and Beaucoudrays and proved unable to carry out its projected role in the westward attack.
So much for the effort to reestablish contact with Panzer Lehr and ‘Das Reich’, and also a glimpse of the confusing complexity of the larger battle to whose sidelines Panzer Lehr was now relegated.
Otto Weidinger, in his history of the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’ (p 263) noted:
In Percy tanks of the Panzer Lehr Division provided weak security. There was no contact with the LXXXIV Armee Korps. The overall situation and the situation before the front was unknown.
During the course of the morning orders arrived attaching [the 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’] to the XXXXVII Panzer Korps.
At 1300 hours the 16th Kompanie of SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment ‘Deutsch land’, supported by a few tanks of the Panzer Lehr Division took positions on Mont Robin (two kilometres northeast of Percy). The enemy soon attacked, but was repulsed after the Panzer Lehr Division knocked out six enemy tanks.
The new position withstood attack on 29 July by a reinforced armoured battalion of the American 2nd Armored Division. However, the Americans gained the commanding heights overlooking Percy. Fierce fighting raged throughout the day. Panzer Lehr was severely weakened by the attack, the 116th Panzer Division having to take over a part of Panzer Lehr’s sector.
Finally, in the morning of 30 July the American 29th Infantry Division fought its way into the outskirts of Percy, despite fierce resistance by the 116th Panzer Division. The city was not fully cleared of its defenders until 2 August.
Also, on 30 July, it is necessary to cross the American–British army boundary and note that General Montgomery, perceiving the lack of armour facing the British in the Caumont sector, had ordered General Dempsey to launch a British attack, Operation ‘Bluecoat’ south from Caumont., Operation ‘Bluecoat’ came too late to prevent the German 2nd and 116th Panzer divisions from moving west across the Vire River against the Americans, but it achieved its other objective of capturing the high ground around Mont Pinçon which the Germans might have used as a pivot to swing their left flank back to Avranches. As noted below, it also had British armoured forces approaching Vire.
On 31 July American forces broke through at Avranches, on the west coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. The bridge at Avranche provided access to the Brittany Peninsula and to the interior of France. Now General Patton’s American Third Army entered the fray, its dramatic advances changing the whole complection of the war.
On 1 August the XXXXVII Panzerkorps fell back as ordered to the Vire-sector–Pontfarcy–Villedieu line.
On 2 August the Korps was forced back to the la Raballiere–Forêt de St. Severe line. Panzer Lehr Division 130, or, more correctly, its remnants, were ordered to cover the Korps’ southern flank between Sourdeval and Barenton, a task far beyond its existing capabilities.
The British 11th Armoured Divison approached Vire on 2 August. Vire, however, was just over the British-American force boundary putting it in the American zone. On 4 August the American 2nd Armored Division also approached Vire, endangering the assembly area for German forces about to launch Unternehmen Lüttich (Operation Liège), Hitler’s great assault that was intended to cut off Patton’s Third Army at Avranches.
The Americans saw Vire as entry to a critical area of high ground that the Germans might utilize in erecting another line of defence, and as a key road-junction that would provide the American First Army with a pivot for the wheeling movement that would turn 1st Army to the east and permit Patton’s Third Army to enter Brittany. The capture of Vire, however, required hard fighting until it finally fell to the American 29th Division on 7 August.
All combat-worthy elements of Panzer Lehr Division 130 were assembled into Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr under Oberstleutnant von Hauser, commander of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901. (Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr will, henceforth, be referred to as Kampfgruppe von Hauser to avoid confusion with the later Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr referred to below.) Kampfgruppe von Hauser amounted to a few companies of Panzergrenadiere, which was all that was left of the two Panzergrenadier regiments, a weak company of Panzer IV tanks and an Abteilung of artillery with two batteries of 10.5 cm and one battery of 15.2 cm guns. The remainder of the Division, mostly train elements, were sent to the Alençon area, where they would shortly form the nucleus of another Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr.
The staff of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 was also sent to Alençon to reconstitute the regiment from replacements and returning stragglers.
Armeeoberkommando 7 attached Kampfgruppe von Hauser to II Fallschirmjäger Korps, which was defending Vire and the northern flank of the XXXXVII Panzer Korps as it prepared for Unternehmen Lüttich.
Elements of Panzer Lehr, including Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130, were left to secure the southern flank of the XXXXVII Panzerkorps. The reconnaissance battalion defended a section of line between Barenton and Mortain, facing south.
Also on 2 August, Hitler sent Oberbefehlshaber West the directive ordering von Kluge to launch a powerful armoured thrust via Mortain to Avranches, a thrust that would cut off Patton’s Third Army. The concept might have been brilliant, had the German resources been there to support it. As it was, it hit Kluge like a thunderbolt since he knew there was no way he could carry it out. The attempt would strip the armour from the Normandy fronts and they would collapse. Whatever forces were committed to the thrust toward Avranche would be exposed to being, themselves, cut off and destroyed. It was a shortcut to disaster.
On 3 August the American 1st Infantry Division easily entered Mortain, routing Panzer Lehr’s weak forces, which again took heavy casualties, despite their reinforcement with the 2nd Panzer Division’s Panzeraufklärungs-Abteilung 2. The 1st Infantry Division would be replaced in Mortain by the American 30th Infantry Division on the eve of the German offensive.
Also on 3 August, out in the larger world of the war, General Bradley made a momentous decision that changed the entire course of the campaign and engulfed the microcosm that was the remnants of Panzer Lehr in more great events, as he announced that, abandoning the earlier plans for a methodical and orderly campaign to clear the Brittany Peninsula and seize and open its ports, Patton was, instead, to leave minimal forces to do the job there and turn the rest of his forces to drive eastward, south of the German armies that had defended Normandy and go all the way to the Seine. From this plan, which would have penned the German forces against the lower Seine, whose bridges had been destroyed, developed the shorter-term southern arm of the encirclement that created the Falaise pocket.
Panzer Lehr Division 130 was in the unenviable position of having elements involved in the defence of both the northern and southern flanks of what would finally evolve into the Falaise pocket, as the XXXXVII Panzer Korps attacked Mortain in what it hoped would be the start of a thrust to Avranches and the American and British forces fumbled their way toward cutting those forces off.
On August 5 the American XV Corps’ 90th Infantry Division captured Mayenne and crossed the Mayenne River. The American thrust was already advancing east of where the German XXXXVII Korps, to the north, was about to launch its attack on Mortain in hopes of driving to Avranches and the sea.
By August 6 German forces had to give up Vire after heavy fighting, which included hard-fought but fruitless counterattacks by Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr (von Hauser), and fall back to a new line of resistance to the south.
On 6 August Oberbefehlshaber West directed Armeeoberkommando 7 to pull Panzer Lehr Division 130 and two other divisions out of the front for reconstitution. On 8 August AOK 7 ordered the Division staff, without any other elements of the Division, to go to the LXXXI Armee Korps near Alençon.
The German Unternehmen Lüttich began during the night of 6/7 August with an attack by 2nd SS-Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’, and one column of the 2nd Panzer Division. The other column of the 2nd Panzer Division attacked at dawn. The German offensive was off to a ragged start.
The American 30th Infantry Division in Mortain was hit hard and the 2nd SS-Panzer Divison ‘Das Reich’ forced its way through the town, but the American division battled desperately. One battalion, though cut off and surrounded, valiantly hung on to the critical commanding Hill 317, just east of Mortain, whence, with excellent observation, they called down heavy artillery fire stalling the German advance.
The morning dawned clear. The experienced German soldiers knew, as soon as the morning dawned clear, what would come and immediately dispersed and camouflaged their vehicles, found cover and dug in. German movement came to a complete halt. British Hurricanes and rocket-firing Typhoons pounded the German forces. Fortune favored the American defenders in the availability, sometimes apparently by pure good luck, of divisions that could rapidly be pulled in as reinforcements. Within 24 hours the American VII Corps controlled a total of seven divisions, two of them armoured. Heavy fighting continued, but the German advance was solidly brought to a dead stop. There would be more hard fighting, but no more German advances after the morning of 7 August.
Hitler, however, maintained lofty hopes that Unternehmen Lüttich would not only reach Avranches, but then would bring about the collapse of the Allied Normandy front. He accordingly ordered that additional forces be withdrawn from the remainder of the front and thrown in. Until the renewed attack was ready, those forces already involved were to hold in the positions they had attained.
1st SS-Panzer Division ‘Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’ and the 116th Panzer Division joined the fray in the afternoon of 7 August, but they merely added themselves to the forces that would end up in the pocket.
For, also on 7 August, the First Canadian Army launched a major offensive, Operation ‘Totalize’ which was to advance down that Caen–Falaise plain toward Falaise. The combination of the unexpected German westward thrust toward Avranches and the American XV Corps eastward advance along the Mayenne/Laval–le Mans–Nogent–le-Rotrou axis gave new meaning and scope to Operation ‘Totalize’.
7 August also saw the American XV Corps’ 79th Infantry Division capture Laval, further south of Mayenne on the Mayenne River, while spearheads of the American 5th Armored Division reached the Sarthe River, south of le Mans, which had long been the location of German 7th Armee headquarters. The 5th Armored Division spearhead bypassed the city and crossed the river during the night.
The American 79th Infantry Division entered its part of le Mans on 8 August while the 5th Armored Division spearhead swung up around its eastern outskirts, cutting off the remaining exits.
The 90th Infantry Division entering the northern part of LeMans on 9 August. Le Mans is about 47 miles almost directly south of Alençon.. Alençon is about 35 miles east of Mortain, where the German forces were still attempting to get past the American 30th and 35th Infantry Divisions.
XV Corps’ three hard-hitting divisions were now 85 air-miles southeast of the Germans at Mortain, still headed toward its objective, the Paris–Orleans gap and the Seine River. At this point, however, the military objective of destroying the enemy forces eclipsed the former geographical objective of reaching the Seine.
Returning to Panzer Lehr Division 130: on 10 August the Division was split up among three corps. Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130 was still attached to the XXXXVII Armee Korps, which was in charge of the German assault on Avranches, participating in the defence of the southern flank of the assault force. Kampfgruppe von Hauser was attached to LXXXIV Armee Korps in the Vire area, defending the northern flank, and the staff and rear elements had been sent to the LXXXI Armee Korps for reconstitution.
Armeeoberkommando 7 reported that, for the time being, it would be impossible to withdraw Panzer Lehr Division 130 for reconstitution.
While Hitler’s orders kept the forces of the 5th Armee and 7th Armee committed to the failed Mortain offensive, securing the southern flank of the German 7th Armee in the Domfront–Alençon–Mamers–Nogent-le-Rotrou sector became the mission of the newly arrived LXXXI Armee Korps. Defending a 180 kilometre sector of front was totally beyond the capabilities of Korps’ forces, which consisted of the fought-out 708th Infanterie Division on the right, Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr Division (see below) in the center, and the 9th Panzer Division on the left.
Panzer Lehr Division 130’s assembly area for its battered staff and logistic elements was between the 708th Infanterie Division and the 9th Panzer Division, near Alençon. As untrained reinforcements arrived, Oberst Gerhardt commenced reconstitution of a Kampfgruppe which gradually gained strength as stragglers returned and the Division workshops labored long, coming up with a few Panzer.
The resultant Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr Division included elements of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902, I./Panzer-Regiment 6, Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130, Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 130 and Panzeraufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130. Attached were the I./Grenadier-Regiment 11 and Sicherungs-Regiment 1.
On 9 August the Division staff arrived in la Fresnaye sur Sarthe, 14 kilometres south of Alençon, also the site of the 9th Panzer Division headquarters. The new Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr was assigned the line Jublains–St. Gemmes–the hills south of Sillé (le Guillaume)–Conlie, centered on Sillé. It was to use mobile tactics to deny the enemy access to Alençon.
The American 80th Infantry Division attacked just as the Kampfgruppe reached the important Sillé-le-Guillaume crossroads. By evening the Kampfgruppe had to fall back to the commanding hills to the north.
Also on 9 August, Canadian progress in Operation ‘Totalize’ bogged down on the third day of hard fighting after about eight miles advance, with nearly that much left to go to Falaise.
On 10 August, as noted above, the American XV Corps was now diverted from its Orléans–Paris gap geographical objective to a more immediate military objective of destroying the enemy forces, a move that would affect Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr. Attacking north from le Mans the American 5th Armored Division, the French 2nd Armored Division and the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions outflanked the German 9th Panzer Division. Through a 25 kilometre breach the Americans advanced on Alençon.
The LXXXI Korps command post, southeast of Alençon, was overrun. As American armor pushed into Alençon both Panzer Lehr and 9th Panzer Division staffs had to flee. Although the Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr had no enemy contact, it was ordered to fall back to the north behind the Merderau River to shorten the front and economize on forces.
On 11 August there was only reconnaissance activity on Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr’s front. However, as American forces approached Alençon the trains and logistical elements fled in disorder.
Also on 11 August Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge at last obtained permission from Hitler to temporarily transfer Panzergruppe Eberbach from Mortain to attack the American XV Corps spearheads that were moving north toward Alençon. This was, of course, presented to Hitler as a temporary matter necessary to clear the flank so that Unternehmen Lüttich could be resumed on a larger scale. (The renewed attack toward Avranche was to involve eight divisions, exceeding the command capabilities of a corps. Accordingly, Hitler insisted that General Heinrich Eberbach be transferred from command of what had been Panzergruppe West to command the Mortain force, which would now include XXXXVII Panzer Korps and LVIII Panzer Korps, and would be known as Panzergruppe Eberbach. Eberbach’s former command, Panzergruppe West was now designated 5th Armee under SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS Sepp Dietrich. General Eberbach was disgruntled at what he viewed as a demotion.)
In preparation for Eberbach’s projected attack on XV Corps, the German 7th Armee began to withdraw eastward from Mortain during the night of 11 August.
The pace of events outstripped German plans. On 12 August the Americans captured Alençon and Sées, thereby depriving 7th Armee of its supply base, whereby it became entirely dependant on 5th Armee for logistical support. Eberbach was forced to prematurely commit the forces he intended to employ at Alençon in a futile attempt to defend Argentan.
As the American forces continued their northward advance via Alençon, Sees and Nonant-le-Pin. Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr fell back on a parallel track. The Division was ordered to hold the line Pré-en-Pail–St. Denis on 12 August, its reserve, Kampfgruppe Eltrich, consisting of one company each of pioneers and armour, secured the deep left flank. Grenadier-Regiment 728 of the 708th Infanterie Division was attached.
Kampfgruppe von Hauser reported back to the division from its employment at Vire the night of 12 August. It was sent to the Fontainebleu area where the Division was again to be reconstituted.
The French 2nd Armoured Division on the left and American 5th Armored Division on the right approached Argentan from the south. The French, at one point, utilized the road east of the Forêt d’Ecouves that was assigned to the American division, delaying that division’s advance for six hours, which gave the Germans time to add an armoured unit to their defence of Argentan, preventing what probably would have been an easy capture.
When the American advance resumed, Kampfgruppe Eltrich and advance elements of the 116th Panzer Division attacked the American 5th Armored Division in its approach to Argentan at Montrée, about 23 kilometres southeast of Argentan. Kampfgruppe Eltrich suffered heavy losses, but further delayed the American drive toward Argentan.
The advancing French 2nd Armored Division overran Panzer Lehr forces securing the line east of Pré-en-Pail. Attempts to establish a new front facing south were only partially successful.
On 13 August, as enemy pressure increased in the area south of Argentan, pressure let up on Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr Division in the Carrouges–Boucé line. Contact was lost with the LXXXI Armee Korps
In the evening of 13 August Kampfgruppe von Hauser reported that it had been attached to the newly arriving 331st Infanterie-Division and committed in the defence of Gacé, facing south.
Also on 13 August, the final outcome of allied indecision regarding whether or not the American forces would be permitted to continue their northward advance into what had, originally, been specified as territory assigned to the British, General Patton ordered XV Corps to call back any of its forces that were north of Argentan and hold on the agreed boundary, the Carrouges–Sées, a few miles south of Argentan.
As enemy forces crossed the Argentan–l’Aigle road encirclement loomed. In light of the fact that, on 6 August, Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge had ordered Panzer Lehr Division 130 withdrawn from the line until 12 August for a period of reconstitution, which order the 7th Armee had declared impossible due to circumstances, Generalleutnant Bayerlein, on his own initiative, decided to leave Kampfgruppe Kuhnow behind and turn the Division’s sector over to the 728th Infanterie Regiment of the 708th Infanterie Division.
In the morning of 13 August Kampfgrupe Panzer Lehr was at Habloville, about six kilometres northeast of Putanges. With its vehicles parked in the woods and along the margins of the roads, the Kampfgruppe was suddenly hit by intense air attacks that lasted from 0900 to 1400 hours and caused heavy losses, especially in vehicles.
Nevertheless, the Division staff and remaining elements reached the area east of Argentan on 14 August, thereby escaping the developing Falaise pocket.
It is now time to return to Kampfgruppe Kuhnow, which was left near Carrouges, and events in the developing pocket.
Kampfgruppe Kuhnow, at the time it was left behind, consisted of the remnants of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902, a company of tanks and a battery of howitzers.
On 14 August the enemy captured Carrouges, forcing Kampfgruppe Kuhnow back to the northwest. Losing contact with the 708th Infanterie Division, Major Kuhnow attached his unit to the XXXXVII Panzer Korps. As part of the XXXXVII Panzer Korps the Kampfgruppe was encircled in the Falaise Pocket. On 17 August Major Kuhnow found the command post of the 12th SS-Panzer Division ‘Hitlerjugend’. At about 1800 hours on 19 August Allied forces met near Chambois and closed the Falaise Pocket.
The commander of the 7th Armee, SS-Oberstgruppenführer Hausser, set the night of 19/20 August for the general breakout of the encircled German forces. During the night of 19/20 August the remnants of Kampfgruppe Kuhnow joined the remnants of ‘Panzermeyer’s’ ‘Hitlerjugend’ division and the remnants of Panzeraufklärungsabteilung 21 in successfully breaking out of the pocket. After an eventful and exhausting odyssey, the remnants of Kampfgruppe Kuhnow crossed the Seine at Elboeuf and, in the evening of 21 August, rejoined the remnants of Panzer Lehr Division 130 where it was bivouacked near Senlis. The following day Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 was transferred to the Soissons area for reconstitution near the front.
Now let us return to Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr on 14 August. The delay in the American push northward occasioned by the decision to honor the boundary line noted above gave Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr opportunity to regain contact with LXXXI Armee Korps and to establish a new line of resistance between le Bourg-St. Leonhard and Nonant-le-Pin.
That evening the Kampfgruppe was assigned to block the roads leading north from Argentan to Gacé. Kampfgruppe von Hauser was returned to the Division for that task.
Canadian forces entered Falaise on 16 August. The next day, 17 August, they cleared out the last Germans.
On 17 August leading elements the 344th Infanterie-Division, arriving on the Normandy Front fresh from the 15th Armee, relieved the Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr.
Also on 17 August General Bradley released American forces from restriction to the Overlord lodgement area so that they could advanced to the Seine River. Since most of the German forces that avoided or escaped the Falaise Pocket and those retreating before the advancing Canadian forces were concentrated in the area west of the lower Seine River and north of Paris, this extended the lower jaw of the Allied pincers movement, trapping these forces with their backs against the river. Allied air had destroyed all but one of the lower Seine bridges. Forcing most of those German forces that made it across the Seine to cross by ferry.
On 18 August, effective immediately, Oberbefehlshaber West attached Panzer Lehr Division 130 to Armeeoberkommando 1 for reconstitution near Fontainebleu. That day Generalfeldmarschall Model replaced Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge. Paul Carell (Sie Kommen, p. 220) describes the scene as Generalleutnant Bayerlein reported at Heeresgruppe B headquarters.
As [Generalfeldmarschall Model] came out of the map room from his first conversation with Kluge, General Bayerlein ran into him. ‘What are you doing here?’, asked Model. ‘I am here to take leave of Feldmarschall von Kluge because the remnants of my division are to be withdrawn from the front for reconstitution’, answered Bayerlein. Model’s reply reeked with the merciless nature of the war in Russia: ‘My dear Bayerlein, in the East divisions are reconstituted at the front, and, in the future, that is how things will be here. You and your units will remain where you are.’
According to Ken Hechler (The Bridge at Remagen, p. 150), ‘Bayerlein looked him in the eye and said that if that was the way the German army had operated in Russia it evidently had not been too successful.’ As Helmut Ritgen sums it up (p. 185), ‘Nevertheless, the withdrawal order remained in effect. The situation was stronger than the Feldmarschall.’