| V. | Ruhr Pocket |
| 43. | Q: Did you yourself assume or foresee that we would form the Ruhr Pocket? |
| A: The deliberate creation of the Ruhr Pocket was neither suspected nor assumed by me. I held the view that the American attack spearhead would drive from Giessen and Marburg farther toward the east in order to gain the Weser and then the Elbe River line as fast as possible, and would pay little attention to the German forces located between the Americans and the British. I consider the encirclement of the Ruhr to eliminate a strong portion of the German Army from further participation in operations to be as good a measure as the formation of the smaller Argentan–Falaise pocket in Normandy, preceding the creation of the larger pocket on the Seine. | |
| 44. | Q: What plans were forged in order to break out of the Ruhr Pocket? |
| A: See Sketch 6. On 29 or 30 Mar 45, the Ruhr Pocket was nearly closed; only a gap near Paderborn–Lippstadt was still open. On this day, I was called back from my front near Wissen–Siegburg, and ordered by Genfldm Model to take over the front near Winterberg (in the Rothaar Mountains). | |
| Panzer Lehr and 3 Pz Gren Divs were to be brought under my command, immediately, as was 176 Inf Div (coming up from the Dortmund area) later. The 654 Tank Destroyer Bn and 512 Jagd Tiger Bn were to arrive later. Some heavy artillery batteries were also put under my command, as were the forces already committed in the Winterberg sector (only Volkssturm and fragments of Luftwaffe on foot). | |
| My mission was to attack as soon as possible from Winterberg toward the Eder Dams to the east, in order to burst the threatening encirclement ring and cut across the roads leading north from the Frankenberg region toward Korbach and Brilon. As SS Div ‘Westphalie’ (Ed: actually an SS panzer replacement unit of brigade size) was to attack via Warburg from the outside, and meet my attack. | |
| On 30 Mar 45, I launched a night attack along the forest road with two weak combat commands (more had not arrived) and reached the area southwest and northwest of Medebach. Having received additional troops, I again attacked on 31 Mar 45 and 1 Apr 45 in three combat commands, took Medebach and, with one group, reached the road east of Medebach and Rheder and Hillershausen. Strong American counterattacks from the north and south against my flanks soon brought my advance to a stop and compelled me to retire toward Winterberg, which was taken by American troops on 3 Apr 45. I did not see any sign of the planned attack by the SS division. | |
| Had these attacks been performed with stronger forces (which could have been pulled out from the Rhine and Sieg fronts and brought over in time), they could have been successful. With each succeeding day, the prospects for a successful breakout and a junction with the German forces coming from the east became smaller. By 5 Apr 45, the situation was hopeless. | |
| Genfldm Model (or OB WEST or OKW) still planned an escape attempt and collaboration with the new Twelfth Army which was to come through Hannover. On 10 Apr 45, a breakout attack was to be staged from the Unna region toward the northeast. This attack, however, never took place as the troops needed for it were tied up at other points by the strong American attacks on the south rim of the pocket. It now was too late for a breakout. As the American attack toward the east was already 150 km on its way and was gaining steadily, any attempt to break out would have had no chance of success. | |
| Alfred Zerbel |
Koenigstein/Ts. 30. 5. 50
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS TO PREVIOUS QUESTIONNAIRE
WITHDRAW[AL] FROM FRANCE
| No headings for index. | ||
| [Translated by Frederick Steinhardt. Bracketed notes added by F. Steinhardt. | ||
| Generalleutnant Bayerlein | Ober Ursel, 18 February 1946 | |
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS TO PREVIOUS QUESTIONNAIRE
WITHDRAWAL FROM FRANCE
| 1.) | [tr. note- the numbers here and below refer to the numbers of the questions Bayerlein was answering. The questions were not with the material.] After the St. Lô breakthrough the remnants of the Panzer Lehr Division were committed as follows: |
| a) | From 28 July to 1 August: In the area north of Percy, under command of the 47th Panzer-Korps. | ||
| b) | From 2 to 5 August: In the Mortain–Barenton area in defense, under command of the 47th Panzer-Korps. | ||
| c) | From 6 to 12 August (elements only to 10 August) in the area east and southeast of Vire in defense and counterattack under command of the 2nd Fallschirm-Korps [parachute-corps]. |
As of 2 August the rear elements of the Panzer-Lehr [Division] were in the Alençon [corrected from Allencon] area. They consisted of: logistics troops; workshops; tank crews who were not in action as a result of lack of tanks; the Feldersatzbataillon [field replacement battalion] with some replacements from the homeland; and tanks and tank destroyers [Panzerjäger] that were being repaired. The remnants of Panzergrenadier-Regt. [Regiment] 902 joined these rear elements on 3 August for reconstitution.
All of these elements were committed on 8 August in defense against the advance of the U. S. 3rd Army east from Mayenne, under command of the 81st Korps in the Sillé [-le-Guillaume] area southwest of Alençon as Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr Division.
Strength: Four Panzergrenadier companies, 15 tanks and tank-destroyers, one artillery Abteilung[equivalent to an artillery battalion] with two batteries (eight 10.5 cm guns). On 9 August the reconstituted Pionier [engineer] battalion joined [the Kampfgruppe].
Defensive positions from 9 to 12 August, as well as movements of the division during the nights of 12/13 and 13/14 August and the defensive positions on 13 and 14 August are shown in the sketch maps.
COMBAT OPERATIONS
Sillé was finally lost on 9 August. The defense shifted to the commanding heights north of the built-up area which were held on 10 August. Enemy pressure, however, increased on both sides of the division against the 708th Infanterie-Div. [Division] via Villaines [-la-Juhel] and against the 9th Panzer-Div. [Division] via Fresnay sur Sarthe and against Alençon. North of Fresnay [-sur-Sarthe] the staff of the Panzer Lehr and 9th Panzer-Divisionen were attacked by surprise by U.S. tanks that had penetrated. Southwest of Alençon the staff of the 81st Korps was also surprised by the enemy and had to fall back.
During the night of 10/11 August, in the face of envelopment on both flanks, [Kampfgruppe] Panzer Lehr evacuated the position north of Sillé and fell back behind the Merderau [corrected from Menderau] [River] sector with no pressure from the enemy. On 10 August U. S. infantry had captured Villaines and Averton. The infantry regiment of the 708th Infanterie Division that had been committed there was attached to the Panzer Lehr [Division].
On 11 August the main enemy pressure was directed via Villaines against Préen Pail. There was no strong attack elsewhere on the front held by Panzer Lehr. On 11 August strong enemy pressure against Alençon and westward led to the evacuation of Alençon on 11 August and, on 12 August, to a thrust via Sees–Mortree toward Argentan.
On 12 August Panzer Lehr held the line Pré en Pail–Ormain—Denis sur Sarthon. The Panzer Lehr division reserve (consisting of the Pionier battalion and eight tanks) attacked the flank of the enemy [forces] that had advanced via Mortréee on Argentan and brought them to a halt..
The 9th Panzer-Division–separated by the command in three separate groups that were committed individually–was completely split up and no longer had any effectiveness in combat.
In the evening of 12 August Panzer Lehr turned over its Pré en Pail—St. Denis [sur Sarthon] sector to the 708th Infanterie Division, leaving a weak battalion of PanzerGren. Regt. [Panzergrenadier-Regiment] 902 and six tanks, as well as one battery of artillery, in this sector.
During the night of 12/13 August the division was withdrawn and set in march via Ecouché–Putanges [-Pont Écrepin] to the area east of Argentan to join with the 116th Panzer-Div. [Division] in fending off the enemy advance on Trun.
In the morning of 13 August the first elements of the division occupied a defensive position near St. Leonhard [Le Bourg St. Léonard] and near Nouant le Pin [Nonant le Pin]. That put the division outside the Argentan–Falaise pocket that was forming.
On 11 August Panzergrenadier-Regiment 901, with ten tanks and one battery [of artillery], which had been committed with the 2nd Fallschirm Korps in defense and attack near Vire since 6 August, was returned to the division and set in march to the refitting area near Fontainebleau. The combat effectiveness of the regiment was extremely limited. The regiment was again committed in defense near Gacé and fought until 15 August against enemy forces attacking from the south.
On 17 August the division was withdrawn for reconstitution to the Senlis area and had to leave behind with the 81st Korps a Kampfgruppe in the strength of approximately one battalion of Panzergrenadiere, one Pionier company and ten tanks, along with one battery [of artillery].
| 2.) | Strength of the Replacements in the Senlis Area.–Strength of the Division |
| Replacements: | Panzergrenadiere: 2000 men, organized in four mobile battalions [schnelle Abteilungen], which came from Holland. | ||
| Tanks: 12 Panzer IV and V. [tr. note- Panzer V=Panther] | |||
| Guns: 6–10.5 cm howitzers. | |||
| Combat Strength in the Senlis Area after Incorporation of Replacements: | |||
| Panzergrenadier-Regiment 901: | About 800 men, armoured, on SPW43, inadequately armed. | |
| Panzergrenadier-Regiment 902: | About 300 men, on trucks, inadequately armed. | |
| Aufklärungs Abteilung [Panzer-Aufklärungs-Lehr Abteilung 130] reconnaissance battalion]: | About 150 men, eight armoured cars. | |
| Panzer Regiment : | About 20 Panzer IV and V. | |
| Panzerjäger Abteilung [tank-destroyer battalion]: | Five Panzerjäger. The remaining personnel were assigned to tank-killer squads equipped with Panzerfäuste.44 | |
| Artillerie Regiment: | Two batteries with five 10 cm guns each, One battery with three 15 cm guns. | |
| Flak Abteilung [anti-aircraft artillery battalion]: | Not ready for action. | |
| Pionier Bataillon: | About 150 men. |
The division thus had approximately one-quarter of its T/O (table of organization) strength in Panzergrenadiere and in artillery, only one-eighth of its T/O strength in tanks and tank-destroyers. [Panzerjäger].
The rear area elements in the Soissons area were at approximately two-thirds strength in personnel but with only about half of their motor-vehicles ready for service.
Question No. 3 cannot be answered precisely since I left the division on about 23 August due to wounds. Until about 8 September the division was led by the commander of the Panzer Regiment, Oberst Gerhardt and, until the end of September, by the commander of PanzergrenadierRegiment 901, Oberst Freiherr[Baron] von Hausser [Fhr. von Hauser, see Ritgen, PANZER LEHR DIVISION, Stellenbesetzung der Truppenteile, p. 322.]. These officers are in a position to make exact statements of combat operations.
[signed] Bayerlein
RECONSTITUTION OF PANZER LEHR DIVISION 130 AFTER RETREAT TO THE WESTWALL
As noted above, Panzer Lehr Division 130 had lost most of its combat troops and nearly all of its equipment by the time its fragments made their separate ways back to the Westwall. The first area assigned for reconstitution, the Mayen–Brohl area in the Rhineland, about 30 kilometres west of Koblenz and the Rhine, was unsuitable. It lacked training areas and was too close to the front. The consequent constant exposure to aerial attack would preclude training. In response to protests from the Division, a new reconstitution area was assigned east of the Rhine River, in Swabia.
On 6 September the Division reported that it needed an entire new Panzergrenadier regiment, since Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 had simply ceased to exist. Specific needs for personnel and materiel would follow upon its arrival at the new reconstitution site, but, as ordered by Heeresgruppe B, essentially all armored vehicles and heavy weapons, including prime movers, had been turned over to other divisions when Panzer Lehr departed the front. The Division reported a desperate need for 400 vehicles.
Panzer Lehr Division 130 was to be reconstituted as a standard ‘Panzer-Division 44’. Germany’s desperate situation could no longer provide the materiel for reconstitution as a ‘special division’. Henceforth, Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 would only have its staff and first battalion mounted on SPW, the rest would receive unarmed Steyr 1500 wheeled troop-carriers.
As for tanks, the battalion that had been in training as Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130’s first battalion never got to the Division. Instead, at the completion of its training in July it was sent to Panzer-Bataillon 113 and wiped out in the attack at Lunéville (on the Meurthe River, southeast of Nancy). Hopes that the I./Panzer-Regiment 6 would again replace the Division’s missing first battalion were dashed, when that battalion was returned to its parent 3rd Panzer Division effective 1 October. The Division thus ended up with only a single armoured battalion, the II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130.
On 8 September 1944 Generalleutnant Bayerlein, having recovered from his wounds, resumed command of the Division.
On 10 September individual elements of the Division left for the reconstitution area in Swabia. Kampfgruppe von Hauser, however, remained in action for weeks at the Westwall and never did get to join the Division for reconstitution in Swabia. Beautiful weather in a beautiful area, far from the front, healed morale and discipline regained its former high level. Fuel shortage, however, detracted from vehicle training.
On 15 September, based on the recommendation of the General der Panzertruppen West, Oberbefehlshaber West gave priority for materiel, particularly tanks, prime-movers and heavy equipment, to Panzer Lehr Division 130 and the 21st Panzer Division. That same day Panzer Lehr Division 130 was attached to Panzer-Armeeoberkommando 6 (Oberstgruppenführer und Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Dietrich), which had been specified as the staff to direct reconstitution of all Panzer divisions that had been withdrawn for refitting.
Generalleutnant Bayerlein’s 1 October report to Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen Guderian indicated, in part, that the Division was still short 2500 men from its new (Panzer-Division 44) T/O strength of 14,000, only partially offset by the arrival of 299 replacements and the return of 47 convalescents. As for materiel (probably not including Kampfgruppe von Hauser), the Division did not have a single Panther or Panzer IV tank. It had 22 SPW serviceable, 20 more under repair. The artillery situation was grim, with two anti-tank guns and three artillery pieces.
Particularly critical was the shortage of experienced non-commissioned officers, which, in turn, seriously interfered with the training of the men. In mid-October the Division was transferred to continue reconstitution in Westphalia, in the Paderborn and Detmold area, where there was fear of an Allied airborne landing. The Division still had not received any armour or other heavy equipment.
At long last, Kampfgruppe von Hauser rejoined its parent division.
Finally, at the end of October, replacement equipment began to arrive. The II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 received 16 Panther and 24 Panzer IV tanks. It now consisted of two companies of Panther and two companies of Panzer IV. Back on 1 June 1944 the Division had two tank battalions, one with 86 Panther (Panzer V) and the other with 97 Panzer IV. Shortage of fuel prevented adequate training with tanks or other motor vehicles.
There were still no Panzerjäger (tank destroyers), and the artillery regiment was lacking guns or prime-movers for two of its Abteilungen. Instead of its projected 3.7 cm Flak-Panzer IV self-propelled anti-aircraft units, Heeres-Flak-Abteilung received 37 mm towed anti-aircraft guns, but no prime-movers to tow them.
Instead of the minimum of 400 trucks that the Division had requested as ‘desperately needed’, the Division was allotted 102 from a factory in Cologne. When Allied bombers knocked out the factory no alternative source was provided. The poor condition of the vehicles required ceaseless attention from the repair echelons.
As of 1 November, the last monthly report prior to going back into action, in spite of having received 1,363 replacements, the Division was still short 1,183 men. It now had operational 28 Panzer IV and 18 Panzer V. 50 SPW were in service, 29 undergoing repairs. As for transport, it had 10 Ford Maultier (half-tracked lorries), 216 all-terrain lorries, 34 of which were in the shops, and 686 open trucks, of which 122 were being repaired. There were 38 prime-movers, of which 14 were undergoing repairs. The Division now had six heavy infantry guns (regimental), 13 anti-tank guns and 15 howitzers.
Thus, the Division had only one, instead of two, tank battalions, was still devoid of Panzerjäger (tank destroyers), two of its artillery Abteilungen were entirely lacking in guns or prime-movers, the Flak battalion had none of its intended Flak-Panzer and nothing with which to tow the anti-aircraft guns that it had been given. The list of deficiencies went on at length. Generalleutnant Bayerlein’s 1 November report concluded by saying the Division had 30% mobility and was, for the time being, unfit for either attack or defence. (Perrigault, pp. 327–8)
On 11 November Panzer Lehr Division 130 was ordered to the Hunsrück in Lorraine.
Dispersal of the elements of the Division, which were billeted in villages on both sides of the Hunsrück ridge road, interfered with further training and communication. Despite all these handicaps the Division prepared to go into action.
PANZER LEHR DIVISION 130 IN LORRAINE
Prior to the Normandy Invasion, the SHAEF Planning Staff recommended that, after a lodgement area had been captured on the continent, the eastward advance was to be conducted on a broad front along two mutually supporting axes. The main emphasis was to be toward the northeast, ‘with the object of striking directly at the Ruhr by the route north of the Ardennes’. The ‘subsidiary axis’ was to be south of the Ardennes, toward Metz and the Saar. (Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 8–9)
After its dramatic exploitation of the American breakthrough in Operation ‘Cobra’, Patton’s American Third Army had pursued the German forces across northern France along that ‘subsidiary axis’ in one of the most spectacularly successful campaigns in military history, only to be brought up short of the German border by logistical problems.
The Allies were advancing on a vast front extending from the First Canadian Army on the Channel Coast to Patton’s American Third Army, which, in addition to advancing toward Metz and Nancy, the Saar industrial region and the southern route into Germany via Metz–Saarbrücken–Frankfurt, screened the southern flank of the Allied armies in northern France along the Loire River.
With supplies still coming all the way from Normandy, there were not enough to support ‘everyone, everywhere’. The Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, gave priority to the northern thrust toward the Ruhr industrial area by Montgomery’s British 21st Army Group, supported on its southern flank by Hodges’ American First Army. Hodges’ two northernmost corps were to support the British 21st Army Group in its drive toward the Rhine, the Ruhr industrial region and the heart of Germany.
On 2 September General Eisenhower, in a meeting of Bradley, Hodges, Patton and Major General Hoyt Vandenburg, commanding the Ninth Air Force, stated that, ‘as soon as the First Army forces had completed the mover to the north [to trap retreating German forces in the vicinity of Mons, in conjunction withy Montgomery’s forces], both the First and Third Armies would remain ‘generally static’ until sufficient gasoline and other supplies could be accumulated ‘to permit the Third Army and the V Corps of the First Army to move to the Siegfried Line (West Wall)…’ (Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 13.) Bradley then gave Patton a future axis of advance that would take the Third Army across the Rhine in the Mannheim–Frankfurt sector. Patton then telephoned Third Army headquarters that, except for cavalry reconnaissance, the army was to hold at the Meuse.
Regardless of the order, although the American Third Army had achieved bridgeheads across the Meuse River and its cavalry had scouted to the Moselle River, the gasoline shortage had already halted the advance at the borders of Lorraine and would continue to keep Patton’s army virtually immobilized from 1 to 5 September. By 10 September Patton’s American Third Army would be past the period of critical fuel shortage.
On 4 September General Eisenhower, in a letter to the Allied commanders, while maintaining priority for the northern assault on the Ruhr by Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, supported by Hodges’ American First Army, assigned Patton’s Third Army the mission: ‘to occupy the sector of the [Westwall] covering the Saar and then to seize Frankfurt.’ The following day Eisenhower dictated an office memorandum stating, ‘… I now deem it important, while supporting the advance on eastward through Belgium, to get Patton moving once again..’ (Cole, Lorraine Campaign, pp. 53- 54)
While Panzer Lehr Division 130 worked at integrating and training its new replacements and fretted at the delays and insufficiencies in replacing equipment and weapons that had been lost or turned over to other units when it was withdrawn from combat, General Patton’s American Third Army was finally moving again. The stage was now set for Panzer Lehr Division 130’s next involvement, which would come as Patton’s American Third Army, having crossed the Moselle and advanced through Lorraine, crossed the Sarre River and advanced toward Germany’s vital Saar industrial region. At the same time the left wing of General Patch’s American Seventh Army, which had landed on France’s Mediterranean coast, also crossed the Saar as part of its Vosges Mountains campaign. (Note-Whether a place name includes ‘Sarre’ or ‘Saar’ varies depending on whether the map was of French or German origin, since both claimed this hotly-contested region.)
General Manton Eddy’s American XII Corps of Patton’s Third Army approached the Saar River. On November 23 CCB of the American 4th Armored Division captured Fénétrange, on the west bank of the Saar. The 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron then turned south along the river and crossed at Bettborn, about six kilometres south of Fénétrange. It then met patrols of the 44th Infantry Division of XV Corps, of the American Seventh Army.
On 13 November General Patch’s Seventh Army had launched its XV Corps in a major drive to reach and cross the Vosges Mountains in the vicinity of the Saverne Gap. On 21 November XV Corps broke through the weak boundary between the German 1st Armee and 19th Armee and on 23 November connection was lost between the two armies. Reports of General Patton’s American Third Army’s XII Corps advance toward Saar-Union increased the urgency for counteraction.
There were no reserves or reinforcements available even to OB West (Oberbefehlshaber West). The only way to counter this threat was to call on OKW’s reserves, which included Panzer Lehr Division 130.
Although the Division did not suspect it, Panzer Lehr Division 130 had already been earmarked and set aside for Hitler’s planned Ardennes Offensive. Despite strict OKW orders that the Division was not to be employed for any reason prior to that offensive, when the American Third Army’s XII Corps broke through the German Saar front north of Saar-Union, Panzer Lehr Division 130 was alerted at 1500 hours on November 21. Within an hour the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht released the Division to the 1st Armee, attaching it to XIII SS-Armee Korps..
The Division was ordered to proceed to the Saar-Alben area, ten kilometres south of Sarreguemines, launch an attack in the morning of 23 November against the flank of the American forces that were advancing eastward towards Strasbourg and annihilate them. The Division loaded fuel and ammunition and mounted up in haste. Since the 21 Panzerjäger for the tank-destroyer battalion had not yet arrived, Panzer Lehr Division 130 moved out with no more armour than its single tank battalion, II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130.
Due to the danger from aerial attacks, the Division rolled by night and lay concealed during the day. The first night of marching revealed weaknesses in both training and materiel, Twelve of the precious few tanks dropping out with mechanical problems that ranged from electrical problems to engine and transmission weaknesses. There were instances of apparent sabotage by foreign workers in the plants where they were manufactured.
After a second night’s march at a reduced pace, ‘to spare the equipment’ (Ritgen, p. 210), the Division finally reached Saar-Union by noon of 23 November. A collapsed bridge prevented the arrival of some elements of Panzergrenadiere and fuel vehicles. The commander of Heeresgruppe G, General der Panzertruppen Balck had made it clear in his order of the evening of 21 November that ‘the fate of Alsace depended on an early start of the attack with concentrated forces in a ruthless thrust to the assigned objectives’, so the attack could not wait.
Generalleutnant Bayerlein makes it apparent in the above interview that the attack was launched with little information and no reconnaissance. He did not realize that he was attacking an entire corps, or the fact that advance elements of the American 106th Cavalry Group were already in Weyer, nor the weakness of the defending 361st Volksgrenadier Division.
Generalleutnant Bayerlein organized the attacking force in two Kampfgruppen advancing south on parallel roads. The stronger eastern group, Kampfgruppe von Hauser, comprised of Panzerkampfgruppe von Ritgen (II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130 [-]), and I./Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901, was to advance on the axis Eschweiler–Eywiller–Hirschland. The weaker western Kampfgruppe von Poschinger (Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902) was to advance via Bärendorf–Rauwiller. Their first objective was the Rauwiller–Schalbach line. According to Cole (The Lorraine Campaign), Bayerlein ‘intended that the two columns would continue south to Hazelbourg, at the edge of the Vosges, and then turn north to free the [German] troops around Phalsbourg.’
The German attack fell on the American Thanksgiving Day, as the troops were preparing for a traditional turkey dinner. Kampfgruppe von Hauser captured Eywiller and Eschweiler by 1900 hours. Kampfgruppe von Poschinger overcame strong opposition in taking Postroff and Bärendorf. As the German forces awaited the arrival of their supply columns a new order from General Balck directed that the attack be resumed and carried on through the night.
Accordingly, the armored columns moved out again with nearly empty fuel tanks at 2300 hours on 23 November. At about 0400 hours on 24 November Kampfgruppe von Poschinger drove the American cavalry out of Hirschland. Shortly thereafter Rauwiller also fell into German hands.
Before Weyer, however, the German advance was brought to a halt under heavy fire from American armour and artillery.
On 24 November leading elements of Kampfgruppe von Poschinger, the western column, fought their way into Rauwiller, cleaned up the American resistance and sent approximately 200 prisoners to the rear. Those prisoners, however, were later freed in Bärendorf. Fighting for Rauwiller continued throughout the day with men of the American 4th Armored Division who made their way into Rauwiller during the morning. At 2200 hours orders arrived for the German evacuation of Rauwiller, the last elements of II./Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 pulling out at 2300 hours.
On 24 November two new factors impacted Panzer Lehr Division 130’s position. General Eisenhower visited XV Corps headquarters in Sarrebourg and, after studying the Seventh Army situation, redirected XV Corps advance from directly eastward to northward astride the Vosges Mountains, permitting an offensive by that corps in the Sarrebourg sector.
More directly, CCB (Combat Command B) of the American XII Corps’ 4th Armored Division crossed the Saar River, threatening the flank of the Panzer Lehr Kampfgruppen.. Task Force Churchill crossed at Rommelfing, just south of Fénétrange, Task Force Jaques at Gosselming.
The northern column of CCB, Task Force Churchill moved with little opposition to take a blocking position on high ground west of Postroff. The First Batterie of the I./Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 was shot to pieces in Postroff while changing firing positions, losing six guns, half the firepower of the Abteilung. CCB’s southern column, Task Force Jaques (pronounced ‘Jakes’), overcame brief, but spirited opposition by elements of the 361st Volksgrenadier Division at Kirrberg, then headed north to reach the main road at Bärendorf, striking into Kampfgruppe von Poschinger’s western flank.
Covered by fire from tanks and assault guns, CCB’s 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion waded an icy stream and took the high ground around Bärendorf. Then, in house-to-house fighting, it forced the I./Panzergrenadier-Regiment 902 out of the village. Although Bayerlein reported heavy losses in the defence of Bärendorf, the American forces felt their opponents offered light resistance, evidence of the inexperience of Panzer Lehr’s recent replacements, most of whom were experiencing their first combat.
Kampfgruppe von Hauser, the eastern column, continued its attack southward in the early morning of 25 November while Kampfgruppe von Poschinger attempted an attack toward the American crossing site at Fénétrange. Its initial pre-dawn attack on Bärendorf from the north and east met strong opposition. Both sides lost heavily in a day of intense fighting that ended with the Germans retreating, leaving the American 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion of the 4th Armored Division’s CCB holding the town.
While Kampfgruppe von Poschinger fought in vain to recapture Bärendorf, the eastern column, Kampfgruppe von Hauser, ran into the 2nd Battalion of the American 114th Infantry Regiment (44th Infantry Division) and the American 106th Cavalry Group before Schalbach. Initial uncertainty about the whereabouts of the American 4th Armored Division delayed the onset of American artillery fire, but thereafter it so shattered the German attacks that Kampfgruppe von Hauser fell back on Hirschland after losing heavily, leaving Schalbach in American hands.
The size and strength of the American forces ended German hopes for their destruction. In the evening of 25 November, Generalleutnant Bayerlein ordered the Panzer Lehr Kampfgruppen to fall back and take up defensive positions along the Wolfskirchen–Eywiller–Durstel road. General Balck ordered termination of the attack and reorganization of the German 1st Armee to defend the general line Richerling–Saar-Union–Wingen. Panzer Lehr Division 130 was to secure the construction of the new line of defence and be withdrawn, effective 28 November, into Heeresgruppe G reserve.
The American 4th Armored Division attacked Wolfskirchen on 26 November. By the time it again attacked with air support on 27 November, Panzer Lehr’s forces had already been relieved by the 25th Panzergrenadier Division, which had to give up the town after concentric attacks.
Kampfgruppe von Hauser’s Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 held out in Eschweiler against heavy attacks by Task Force Jaques until the American force captured Gungweiler, about a mile southeast of Eschweiler, rendering Eschweiler untenable.
At Durstel Kampfgruppe von Hauser was able to repulse all attacks of the American 4th Armored Division’s CCA on 27 November, in large part thanks to the belated arrival of Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130. Two days after the Division left Hunsrück for Saar-Alben, its tank-destroyer battalion finally received its promised 21 Panzerjäger IV with the new and more powerful 75 mm Kanone L/70. Without waiting to adjust and inspect the new tank-destroyers, the Abteilung hastened after its parent Division. Necessary adjusting and test-firing was conducted en route, during a march-pause on the edge of the Baumholder Troop-Training Ground. Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130 proved what it could do in combat, despite lack of conversion-training in the new weapons system.
It cost three days of hard fighting for the American forces to force Panzer Lehr Division 130 off the heights east of the Saar-Union–Drulingen road and attain their jump-off positions for attacking Saar-Union, by which time, again, Panzer Lehr Division 130 had been relieved by the 25th Panzergrenadier Division.
Despite its ordered withdrawal from action, the German 1st Armee situation prevented release of the Division. Elements of the Division were sucked into the battle for Saar-Union on 1 December and again on 2 December.
On 3 December elements of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 were committed at Ratzwiller. That evening the I./Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 was assigned to defend Domfessel, where, the next day, 4 December, the Americans cut off and broke into the town, forcing the remaining 140 men of the battalion to surrender.
Also on 4 December, a completely unexpected order arrived for the Division to prepare immediately to load up and head north. The American advance on 6 December threatened the railroad and the Division’s entrainment, but the last trains carrying Panzer Lehr Division 130 rolled out on 9 December, just a bare week before the start of the great Ardennes Offensive, in which Panzer Lehr Division 130 was to play an important role.