This brief account of Panzer Lehr Division 130’s involvement in the Ardennes Campaign focuses entirely on Panzer Lehr’s immediate participation as part of the German XLVII Panzer Korps. Contrary to plans, Panzer Lehr Division 130 was, in part, drawn into the initial battle to gain crossings over the Clerf (Clerve) River. Originally, the Division was to move fast and either take Bastogne in a coup de main or, that failing, bypass Bastogne to the south and race for the Meuse River crossings near Dinant, leaving capture of Bastogne to the 26th Volksgrenadier Division. However, the Division was drawn into the attempt to capture Bastogne and, when extricated from that involvement and freed to move on to the Meuse, it had to leave its most powerful battle-group, Kampfgruppe 901, at Bastogne with the 26th Volksgrenadier Division.
Unless the reader is fully familiar with the Ardennes Offensive or, as it is frequently known in America, the Battle of the Bulge, it is highly recommended that he refer to a good history such as Charles B. MacDonald’s excellent A Time For Trumpets, or Cole’s official United States Army Historical Series volume, The Ardennes, Battle of the Bulge, which still remains indispensable, and highly readable. Peter Elstob’s Hitler’s Last Offensive, though first published in 1971, is still highly useful, being extremely clear and comprehensible in presenting and relating the military events. Panzer Lehr Division 130 fought as part of the XLVII Panzer Korps, the southern of the two Korps in von Manteuffel’s 5th Panzer Armee.
As noted above, despite strict orders that, unknown to the Division, Panzer Lehr Division 130 was not to be committed in any action because it was being reconstituted for the Führer’s top-secret Ardennes Offensive, Die Wacht am Rhein, later renamed Herbstnebel, the American thrust into the Saar required employment of the Division there. While the Division was still involved in hard fighting in the Saar as a result of that commitment, a completely unexpected order arrived on 4 December 1944 for the Division to prepare immediately to load up and head north. Although the American advance on 6 December threatened the railway and the Division’s entrainment, the last trains carrying Panzer Lehr Division 130 rolled out on 9 December, just a week before the start of the great Ardennes Offensive, in which Panzer Lehr Division 130 was to play an important role.
Commitment in the Saar had interrupted the Division’s reconstitution for the impending Ardennes offensive. Hard fighting had taken its toll in casualties to both manpower and equipment. Generalleutnant Bayerlein’s 3 December report (Ritgen, Die Geschichte der Panzer Lehr Division, p.215.) on its condition noted that:
1. State of training:
Inadequate replacement of non-commissioned officers has fallen far short of restoring those lost on the Invasion Front, most seriously impacting the combat effectiveness of the infantry. Constant relocations and commitment has interfered with training of the non-commissioned officers. The new replacements are not up to the demands of difficult offensive and defensive combat. Fuel shortage has resulted in poorly trained drivers for armour and motor-vehicles which, in turn, has led to substantial losses of vehicles. 90% of the two Panzer IV companies that have only recently been converted to Panther tanks are not ready for action.
2. Particular problems:
The Division went back into action before completion of its reconstitution and reorganization. Accordingly, only half of its combat effectiveness was available during the decisive period.
Heeres-Flak-Abteilung 311 had only four 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns and two 2cm single-barrel guns serviceable.
Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 went into action with only five light and six heavy guns. That amounted to one mixed Abteilung instead of the three allotted.
Out of the 500 tons [lorry-transport capacity] allotted to the Division’s supply commander [Kodina] only 120 tons are serviceable, since 25% of the vehicles assigned in Action-X are not usable and, in some cases with serious mechanical problems, are in the repair shops. It is impossible to transport the initial ammunition allotment.
Shipments of replacement parts for armoured vehicles and communications equipment still have not arrived. 95% of the Panzer V [Panther] are immobilized by lack of replacement parts.
Troop morale: is good.
Level of mobility: 100%
Combat capability: The Division is conditionally ready for attack.
After the battering it took in the Saar, the Division assembled from 10–12 December near Cochem on the Mosel River, about 50 kilometres southwest of Koblenz, where it took on about 600 replacement Panzergrenadiere, along with guns, armour and other materiel.
According to the 12 December status report (Perrigault, op.cit., p. 348) out of its T/O strengthy of 34 Panzer V, the Division had 29, of which 23 were ready for action. Out of 34 Panzer IV, the Division had 34, 30 ready for action. The T/O called for 21 Sturmgeschütze. 15 were on hand, 14 in service. Of the 13 heavy anti-tank guns called for, only three were present, all serviceable. 12 light howitzers were allotted, but only five of the seven on hand were ready for employment. The T/O called for 16 heavy howitzers. Nine of the 12 on hand were ready for use.
According to Ritgen (p. 218) the Sturmgeschütze listed above were actually Panzerjäger 40 (self-propelled anti-tank guns) of the Division’s Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130. Perrigault (op.cit. p.348) says that Panzerjäger-Abteilung 130 amounted to two companies equipped with Jagdpanther with 8.8 cm Pak 43/3 [Jagdpanzer V ’Jagdpanther’ with 8.8 cm Pak 43/3 L/71 (Sd. Kfz. 173s)], and an unarmoured company of towed anti-tank guns. Since the Division was still without its I. Abteilung of Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130, schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 559 was attached effective 11 December but did not arrive until after Christmas, and was withdrawn 21 January 1945. Ritgen (p.218) states that schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 559 had ‘a few Jagdpanther’. Sturmgeschütz Brigade 243 was also supposed to join the Division from 11 to 30 December.
The Division remained weak in artillery. Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130 was reduced to two Abteilungen, the II. Abteilung, mixed, with three batteries and the III. Abteilung with two heavy batteries. Due to lack of prime movers, the III. Abteilung was not able to join Kampfgruppe von Hauser until shortly after Christmas.