= 128A DC
[= ps.-Eudocia, Violarium no. 96 p. 95.4–11 Flach]
ὕστερον δὲ παρέβαλε Σωκράτει, καὶ τοσοῦτον ὤνατο αὐτοῦ ὥστε παρῄνει τοῖς μαθηταῖς γενέσθαι αὐτῷ πρὸς Σωκράτην συμμαθητάς. οἰκῶν τ’ ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν τοὺς τετταράκοντα σταδίους ἀνιὼν ἤκουε Σωκράτους, παρ’ οὗ καὶ τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας κατῆρξε πρῶτος τοῦ Κυνισμοῦ.
αὐτοῦ F Φ : ἑαυτοῦ B P1 (corr. P2) | γενέσθαι αὐτῷ συμμαθητάς codd. plur. : συμμαθητὰς αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι F | σταδίους in mg. F2 | ἤκουε P Φ : ἤκουσε B F
But later he became a pupil of Socrates, and he profited so much from him that he advised his disciples to become co-disciples with him of Socrates. He lived in the Piraeus but walked up the forty stades [five miles] every day to learn with Socrates, from whom he adopted sturdiness and emulated resilience to hardship and so first founded Cynicism.
ὕστερον δὲ παρέβαλε: The conversion story could be a Hellenistic fiction, invented to distinguish Antisthenes’ putatively incompatible identities as “sophist” and “philosopher.” See Patzer 1970:247–55; Decleva Caizzi 1966:119. Alternatively, the story could be true, in which case Antisthenes made a decision to reject Gorgias. (For references to Gorgias, see t. 67, 123, 203; notes on t. 53–54.) If the story is an invention, this preceded the career of Hermippus (a Peripatetic of the mid-third century BCE), the source for the single surviving anecdote from Antisthenes’ “rhetorical” career (t. 9).
οἰκῶν τ’ ἐν Πειραιεῖ: The Piraeus, port of Athens, was the home of many merchants and metics: for example, the metic Cephalus, father of Lysias, whose house provides the setting for Plato’s Republic, ran a profitable armaments factory and lived there. It was also the military base for the democratic resistance to the oligarchic revolution of 404–403, an important background to the condemnation of Socrates in 399. A home in the Piraeus could imply that Antisthenes, too, was from a merchant family (whether as metic or citizen). Disillusionment with mercenary goals, especially after the Peloponnesian Wars and oligarchic revolutions, could have inspired Antisthenes’ harsh rejection of money and the social competition associated with money. See, further, t. 74, 82.
τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν . . . τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας: See t. 22A, another list of proto-Cynic and proto-Stoic virtues Antisthenes is said to have founded, from the conclusion of Diogenes’ biography.
κατῆρξε πρῶτος: Peripatetic historians strove to identify the “first founder” of intellectual traditions (Kleingünther 1934): see also t. 151A. The term for a strictly intellectual pioneer would be πρῶτος εὑρετής, “first discoverer”: here, the achievement is, rather, the “foundation” of a standard way of life. Cynicism was never an institution with a fixed location, fixed curriculum, or fixed membership, and so it was never “founded” in this sense, but it had a fixed identity of some kind throughout antiquity. See t. 22–26, 135–40.
= 128C DC
ὁ αὐτὸς πρότερον ῥητορικὴν ἐδίδασκεν· ἔπειτα Σωκράτους εἰπόντος μετεβάλετο· ἐντυχὼν δὲ τοῖς ἑταίροις “Πρότερον,” ἔφη, “ἦτε μου μαθηταί· νῦν δ’ ἂν νοῦν ἔχητε, ἔσεσθε συμμαθηταί.”
The same man [Antisthenes] earlier taught rhetoric: then, when Socrates spoke, he made a conversion. When he met his companions, he said, “Previously you were my disciples. But now, if you have a mind, you shall be my co-disciples.”
On Antisthenes’ prominence in the Gnomologium Vaticanum, see t. 5.
Σωκράτους εἰπόντος: Socrates allegedly won Antisthenes over by his speaking: see also t. 12C; compare t. 34A. It is unclear whether this is a reference to a public appearance, to a kind of “protreptic” discourse such as the one reported in the Platonic Clitophon (407b2–e2; see also t. 208), or to more private interactions with individuals or small groups, such as Socrates describes in Pl. Apol. 29d7–e2 (and compare t. 69). The topics on which Socrates spoke are not stated but were plausibly “protreptic” topics, urging pursuit of wisdom and virtue rather than wealth. If Socrates made such an impact on Antisthenes through this kind of speaking, one (or both) of two scenarios is likely: either Antisthenes pursued money and prestige himself before he heard Socrates, or, well acquainted with the culture that did this, he had already rejected it or was excluded from it, perhaps by “illegitimate” status (t. 1A). In the second scenario, Socrates’ speech would offer confirmation of Antisthenes’ own prior views. But the first scenario squares with the report that Antisthenes taught rhetoric and respected Gorgias, and it seems plausible as explanation for a grand conversion (which need not be incompatible with “illegitimate” status). The structure of the anecdote might imply a contrast between the speech of Socrates and the ῥητορικὴ <τέχνη> that Antisthenes was originally teaching.
ἂν νοῦν ἔχητε: In the apophthegmata, Antisthenes often exhorts people to acquire or use their minds. See t. 105, 132, 171. Heraclitus offers precedent (DK 22B40; see also comments on t. 171).
συμμαθηταί: Antisthenes erases the previous hierarchy between himself and his disciples, and they become equal colleagues under Socrates. After the death of Socrates, Antisthenes might have resumed his superior stance by setting himself up as teacher, but his rigor in accepting disciples (t. 34C, 37B, 169) implies that some might have been colleagues rather than subordinates. In other anecdotes, he figures himself as a doctor, superior in knowledge (t. 122, 167, 169). The term συμμαθηταί could have a markedly democratic resonance. Compare Xen. Hell. 2.4.20, where the democrats’ herald Cleocritus scolds the oligarchs for betraying their community: καὶ συγχορευταὶ καὶ συμφοιτηταὶ γεγενήμεθα καὶ συστρατιῶται (we have been fellow dancers in the chorus, and fellow pupils and fellow soldiers). See also t. 197 note on στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι.
= 128B DC
Hic certe est Antisthenes qui cum gloriose docuisset rhetoricam, audissetque Socratem, dixisse fertur ad discipulos suos “abite et magistrum quaerite; ego iam repperi.” statimque venditis quae habebat, et publice distributis, nihil sibi amplius quam palliolum reservavit. pauperitatisque eius et laboris et Xenophon testis est in Symposio et innumerabiles libri eius: quorum alios philosophico, alios rhetorico genere conscripsit.
Socratem codd. : Socratem de paupertate disputantem Victorius et Bernays
This certainly is the Antisthenes who, after he had taught rhetoric with renown, and had [next] heard Socrates, is traditionally reported to have said to his disciples, “Go away and seek your master: I have now found mine.” And at once he sold what he had and distributed it to the public, and he kept for himself nothing more than a cloak. For his poverty and his work ethic Xenophon is a witness in the Symposium, and also his innumerable books, of which some he composed in the philosophical style, others in the rhetorical style.
Jerome’s treatise (written in 393 CE) defends asceticism against the Christian opponent Jovinian. In defense of asceticism, Jerome cites widely from Porphyry’s De abstinentia: in a section of that text now lost, Porphyry listed Orpheus, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Antisthenes as famous men who either abstained from eating meat completely or practiced “frugality” (Bernays 1866:159–63). Jerome then gives an expanded identification of Antisthenes, which continues into a narration of his relations with Diogenes of Sinope (t. 34C-3) and then a biography of Diogenes, for which Satyrus is cited as the source (Leo 1901:120–21). Whether this supplement was also in Porphyry (who used Satyrus, as Leo holds) or whether Jerome adds directly from Satyrus, whom he cites also elsewhere, is unclear.
The testimonium is important for its illumination of the reception of Antisthenes’ biography. Porphyry mentions Antisthenes nowhere else in his extant philosophical works, but he preserves much of Antisthenes’ surviving Homeric criticism (t. 187, 191; probably t. 188, 189). Because the testimony from Satyrus is closely parallel to Diogenes’ version (t. 12A), Satyrus can be assumed as Diogenes’ source. Diogenes Laertius and Jerome (or Porphyry) have paraphrased Satyrus differently, but in a parallel “texture” (Leo 101:122). See Patzer 1970:93.
venditis quae habebat, et publice distributis: This step in the conversion is common to the story of Crates of Thebes (Diog. Laert. 6.87). Because it appears elsewhere in Jerome (t. 83B) but not otherwise in the testimonia for Antisthenes, this might be Jerome’s fabrication.
palliolum: Diminutive in form, this is a standard translation for Greek ἱμάτιον.
alios philosophico, alios rhetorico genere: The second category corresponds to the rhetorical style (τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος) reported by Diogenes Laertius (t. 11A). The opposed “philosophical style,” which Diogenes does not mention, could have been omitted by Diogenes or added by Jerome.
= 107 DC
(56) “Ὁμολογησώμεθα πρῶτον ποῖά ἐστιν ἔργα τοῦ μαστροποῦ· καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἐρωτῶ, μὴ ὀκνεῖτε ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν ὅσα ἂν συνομολογῶμεν. καὶ ὑμῖν οὕτω δοκεῖ;” ἔφη. “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφασαν. ὡς δ’ ἅπαξ εἶπαν “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” τοῦτο πάντες ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀπεκρίναντο. (57) “Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθοῦ μέν,” ἔφη, “ὑμῖν δοκεῖ μαστροποῦ ἔργον εἶναι ἣν ἂν ἢ ὃν ἂν μαστροπεύῃ ἀρέσκοντα τοῦτον ἀποδεικνύναι οἷς ἂν συνῇ;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφασαν. “Οὐκοῦν ἓν μέν τί ἐστιν εἰς τὸ ἀρέσκειν ἐκ τοῦ πρέπουσαν ἔχειν σχέσιν καὶ τριχῶν καὶ ἐσθῆτος;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφασαν. (58) “Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἐπιστάμεθα, ὅτι ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ ἐχθρῶς πρός τινας βλέπειν;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “Τί δέ, τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ ἔστι καὶ αἰδημόνως καὶ θρασέως φθέγγεσθαι;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “Τί δέ, λόγοι οὐκ εἰσὶ μέν τινες ἀπεχθανόμενοι, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ πρὸς φιλίαν ἄγουσι;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” (59) “Οὐκοῦν τούτων ὁ ἀγαθὸς μαστροπὸς τὰ συμφέροντα εἰς τὸ ἀρέσκειν διδάσκοι ἄν;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “Ἀμείνων δ’ ἆν εἴη,” ἔφη, “ὁ ἑνὶ δυνάμενος ἀρεστοὺς ποιεῖν ἢ ὅστις καὶ πολλοῖς;” ἐνταῦθα μέντοι ἐσχίσθησαν, καὶ οἱ μὲν εἶπον “Δῆλον ὅτι ὅστις πλείστοις,” οἱ δὲ “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” (60) ὁ δ’ εἰπὼν ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται ἔφη· “Εἰ δέ τις καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ἀρέσκοντας δύναιτο ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐχ οὗτος παντελῶς ἂν ἤδη ἀγαθὸς μαστροπὸς εἴη;” “Σαφῶς γε νὴ Δία,” πάντες εἶπον. “Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις τοιούτους δύναιτο ἐξεργάζεσθαι ὧν προστατοίη, δικαίως ἂν μέγα φρονοίη ἐπὶ τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ δικαίως ἂν πολὺν μισθὸν λαμβάνοι;” (61) ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πάντες συνωμολόγουν, “Τοιοῦτος μέντοι,” ἔφη, “μοι δοκεῖ Ἀντισθένης εἶναι οὗτος.” καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης, “Ἐμοί,” ἔφη, “παραδίδως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὴν τέχνην;” “Ναὶ μὰ Δί’,” ἔφη. “ὁρῶ γάρ σε καὶ τὴν ἀκόλουθον ταύτης πάνυ ἐξειργασμένον.” “Τίνα ταύτην;” “Τὴν προαγωγείαν,” ἔφη. (62) καὶ ὃς μάλα ἀχθεσθεὶς ἐπήρετο· “Καὶ τί μοι σύνοισθα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον εἰργασμένῳ;” “Οἶδα μέν,” ἔφη, “σε Καλλίαν τουτονὶ προαγωγεύσαντα τῷ σοφῷ Προδίκῳ, ὅτε ἑώρας τοῦτον μὲν φιλοσοφίας ἐρῶντα, ἐκεῖνον δὲ χρημάτων δεόμενον· οἶδα δέ σε Ἱππίᾳ τῷ Ἠλείῳ, παρ’ οὗ οὗτος καὶ τὸ μνημονικὸν ἔμαθεν· ἀφ’ οὗ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτικώτερος γεγένηται διὰ τὸ ὅ τι ἂν καλὸν ἴδῃ μηδέποτε ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. (63) ἔναγχος δὲ δήπου καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν τὸν Ἡρακλεώτην ξένον ἐπεί με ἐποίησας ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτοῦ, συνέστησάς μοι αὐτόν. καὶ χάριν μέντοι σοι ἔχω· πάνυ γὰρ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. Αἰσχύλον δὲ τὸν Φλειάσιον πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν καὶ ἐμὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον οὐχ οὕτω διέθηκας ὥστε διὰ τοὺς σοὺς λόγους ἐρῶντες ἐκυνοδρομοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ζητοῦντες; (64) ταῦτα οὖν ὁρῶν δυνάμενόν σε ποιεῖν ἀγαθὸν νομίζω προαγωγὸν εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ οἷός τε ὢν γιγνώσκειν τε τοὺς ὠφελίμους αὑτοῖς καὶ τούτους δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀλλήλων, οὗτος ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι φίλας ποιεῖν καὶ γάμους ἐπιτηδείους συνάγειν, καὶ πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιος εἶναι καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις φίλος καὶ συμμάχος κεκτῆσθαι. σὺ δὲ ὡς κακῶς ἀκούσας ὅτι ἀγαθόν σε ἔφην προαγωγὸν εἶναι, ὠργίσθης.” “Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί’,” ἔφη, “οὐ νῦν. ἐὰν γὰρ ταῦτα δύνωμαι, σεσαγμένος δὴ παντάπασι πλούτου τὴν ψυχὴν ἔσομαι.” καὶ αὕτη μὲν δὴ ἡ περίοδος τῶν λόγων ἀπετελέσθη.
(56) ἐστιν ἔργα codd. : ἐστιν τἆργα Mehler : ἐστιν ἔργ’ ἀγαθοῦ μαστροποῦ Stephanus in mg. | ὀκνεῖτε codd. plur. : ὀκνῆτε D F H2 | εἶπαν codd. plur. : εἶπον D F H2 | τοῦτο om. G (57) ἀρέσκειν ἐκ τοῦ πρέπουσαν codd. : ἀρέσκειν ἄγον τὸ πρέπουσαν cit. Schneider (58) ὅτι ἔστιν Castalio : τί ἔστιν codd. (59) ἀρεστοὺς Brodaeus : ἀρίστους codd. : ἀρέσκοντας A in mg. (60) ὁμολογεῖται ἔφη : ὡμολόγηται, εἰ δέ τις, ἔφη Mehler (62) καλὸν A s.v. : κακὸν cet. (63) ζητοῦντες del. Richards (64) τε secundum om. B | αὑτοῖς Leonclavius : αὐτῷ codd. | φίλας codd. plur. : φιλίας A | καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις φίλος καὶ συμμάχος Finckh : καὶ πόλεσι καὶ φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις codd. : καὶ πόλει καὶ φίλοις σύμμαχος Cobet : καὶ συμμάχοις del. Sauppe
(56) “Let us agree first what sorts of things the functions of the matchmaker are. So whatever I ask, do not hesitate to answer, so that we might know how far we are in agreement. Does this seem like a fair procedure to you?” he [Socrates] said. “Definitely so,” they [the symposiasts] said. And after they had said “Definitely so” one time, everyone gave this response for the rest of the argument. (57) “So do you not think that the function of the good matchmaker is to display whichever person he is matchmakering, whether female or male, as pleasing to whomever he is with?” “Definitely so,” they said. “So is not one quality for pleasing derived from having a becoming disposition of hairstyle and dress?” “Definitely so,” they said. (58) “And do we not know also this, that it is possible for a person to look at people in both a friendly and a hostile manner with the same eyes?” “Definitely so,” they said. “And what about this, that it is possible to speak both respectfully and harshly with the same voice?” “Definitely so,” they said. “And this, are there not some hateful speeches, but others that lead toward friendship?” “Definitely so,” they said. (59) “So would not the good matchmaker teach the qualities among these that are expedient for pleasing?” “Definitely so,” they said. “Would he be the better matchmaker who is able to make his clients pleasing to one person, or also to many?” Here, however, the symposiasts were divided, and some said, “It is clearly the one who can make his clients pleasing to the most,” and others said, “Definitely so.” (60) And Socrates, declaring that also this had been agreed, said, “And if someone could display his clients as pleasing to the whole city, would he not be, just in that, an utterly good matchmaker?” “Clearly, by Zeus,” everyone said. “So if someone were able to produce such pleasing people from the clients of whom he is in charge, then he would justly feel proud of his craft, and he would justly earn a large wage?” (61) When everyone had agreed also to this, Socrates said, “Such a man, then, in my view is Antisthenes here.” And Antisthenes said, “Are you handing over your craft to me, Socrates?” “Yes, by Zeus,” he said, “for I see that you have fully achieved also what follows on this craft.” “What is that?” “Procuring,” he said. (62) And he, greatly irritated, asked further, “And what, Socrates, are you aware that I have done along this line?” “First,” he said, “I know that you introduced Callias here to the wise man Prodicus, when you saw that Callias was in love with philosophy and Prodicus was needing money. And I know that you introduced him to Hippias of Elis, from whom he also learned the art of memory. So from that he has become even more erotic, because whatever fine thing he sees, he never forgets it. (63) And just now, indeed, after you made me desire the visitor from Heraclea by praising him to me, you introduced him to me. Indeed I am grateful to you, for he seems to me to be entirely fine and good. And by praising Aeschylus of Phlius to me and me to him, did you not arrange it such that we fell in love through the device of your words and we chased down each other with dogs in our search? (64) So because I see that you are able to do these things, I believe that you are a good procurer. For someone who is able to recognize people who are useful to each other and has the power to make them desire each other, this person, in my view, would also be able to make cities friendly and to arrange suitable marriages, and he would be worth quite a bit for cities and individuals to have acquired as a friend and ally. But you became angry, as if you have been insulted because I said you are a good procurer.” “But now not, by Zeus,” he said. “For if I can do these things, I will be entirely laden with wealth in my soul.” And so that round of speeches came to an end.
Xenophon’s Symposium, like Plato’s, is structured around a cycle of speech making by the guests. (The three-part analysis in Körte 1927 divides the text into a query on the teachability of virtue [ch. 1–2], a cycle of riddles and solutions concerning virtue [ch. 3–5], and Socrates’ final speech on virtuous love [ch. 6–9]: see Patzer 1970:60–61; Huss Xeonphons Symposion:30–37.) In an initial round of short speeches (ch. 3), each diner states what among his resources is “worth the most,” and in a second round (ch. 4), he explains. In the preparation for this passage, Socrates has identified his craft (τέχνη) of matchmaking (μαστροπεία) as the possession he values most (3.10). This term was a euphemistic name for the panderer of prostitutes (the πορνοβόσκος: see von Fritz 1935:26–27; compare t. 62), and Socrates’ statement is understood by the internal audience as a joke (ὑμεῖς μὲν γελᾶτε . . . , 3.10). Here Socrates goes on to give the demonstrative proof (ἀποδεικνύναι, 4.1) for his answer. See also Huss 1999 (Xeonphons Symposion):304–18.
This passage shows Socrates bestowing and Antisthenes accepting the office of successor to Socrates in his most valued craft, matchmaking, which turns out to be a metaphor for the production of fruitful partnerships for generating virtue, as a service to the city. With t. 83A and 14A, this passage has been a focus of attempts to assess Xenophon’s portrait of Antisthenes’ personality (Körte 1927; von Fritz 1935:24–27). Von Fritz argues (1935:33–40) that Xenophon is inspired by Aeschines, whose Aspasia was a matchmaker. The present notes emphasize instead the resonances with other evidence about Antisthenes. The speech is intended as both humorous and serious, as Socrates intimated when he announced his topic at Sym. 3.10. The humor lies in the metaphor, which is paralleled for Socrates in Xen. Mem. 3.11 and Pl. Theaet. 149d5–150a6, amid a longer passage on the midwife, 149a1–151d2. (The craft is also attributed to Aspasia in Xen. Mem. 2.6.36, in Aeschines’ Aspasia [SSR VIA 70 = Cic. De inv. 1.51–53], and allusively in Xen. Oec. 3.14 and possibly Mem. 3.11.16–17 [= t. 14B].) It seems especially jarring when applied to Antisthenes, who renounces bodily eros (t. 122, 123). The serious quality lies in the way philosophy is characterized as useful, general, and interpersonal. Antisthenes is portrayed as both insulted and pleased by Socrates’ choice of himself as successor, in correspondence with the literal versus metaphorical (and serious) meaning of “pandering.” Xenophon’s main point, if it is beyond merely portraying a boorish Antisthenes, might have to do with the success of Antisthenes’ teaching mission in Athens.
(56) ποῖά ἐστιν ἔργα τοῦ μαστροποῦ: Socrates takes a technical approach to his joke, that he is a procurer or panderer (see note above). It is typical of Socrates to define a term before saying more about it (e.g., Meno 71a3–7, 86d3–e1; Phaedr. 237b7–d3). The present identification of the μαστροπός is not a definition of essence, or “what it is,” which Xenophon does recognize as the distinctive Socratic type of definition (see Sym. 6.1, where Hermogenes says, “If you are asking what it [drunken behavior] is, I do not know; but what it seems to me [to be], I could say,” Εἰ μὲν ὅ τι ἐστὶν ἐρωτᾷς, οὐκ οἶδα· τὸ μέντοι μοι δοκοῦν εἴποιμ’ ἄν). Here two features differ from a definition of essence: first, the μαστροπός is defined by functions, not by “what he is”; second, Socrates seeks agreement not about what the functions precisely are but about “what sorts of things” they are, and a list of four examples follows. The second feature, if it is deliberate, is reminiscent of Aristotle’s testimony about the Antistheneans’ stance on definition (t. 150A.4). The first feature seems to be the form of Socratic definition appropriate to the definition of a craft. Socrates conducts a definition by ἔργον also in Mem. 3.4.7 (= t. 72B) and 4.6.14 and in Oec. 1.2; and in ps.-Pl. On Justice 372a4–9, the definition sought is supposed to state how we use the just. (Müller 1972:159, amid a longer argument for associations of the whole text of On Justice with Antisthenes, argues that this passage is a definition by ἔργον.) See also Pl. Rep. 1 332e3–5. Antisthenes’ definition of λόγος (t. 151A) seems also to specify its function.
καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἐρωτῶ, μὴ ὀκνεῖτε ἀποκρίνεσθαι: Antisthenes wrote a text entitled Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως (t. 41A title 7.3). “Question and answer” is terminology for Socratic method throughout Plato’s dialogues (see comments on t. 41A title 7.3). Xenophon, too, seems to acknowledge this pair of terms as a reference to Socratic method (Mem. 1.2.36, 1.4.8, and three times in book 4; once in the Oeconomicus; three times in the Symposium).
ἵνα εἰδῶμεν ὅσα ἂν συνομολογῶμεν: Socrates is claiming not to change anyone’s beliefs but to find the common ground. This is possibly the preparation for his controversial thesis that Antisthenes is the best procurer.
ὡς δ’ ἅπαξ εἶπαν “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν” . . . : Here Xenophon discloses his parody of Socratic conversation, and the whole passage has possibly already been a parody. This may be Xenophon’s device for keeping the depicted conversation light, in the mood of a banquet. Alternatively, the parody of the Socratic respondent, not paralleled elsewhere in Xenophon (unless more subtly in Mem. 3.4.7–9: see t. 72B), could be directed against a particular literary version of Socratic teaching or against Socratic teaching generally (which seems unlikely). Plausibly the parody is not hostile but a happy account of Socrates’ successful teaching. Against the easy agreement Socrates produces, real dialectical tensions dominate Antisthenes’ debates with Callias and Niceratus (t. 78, 83, 185A, 186).
(57) ἀρέσκοντα: This euphemism for attraction is absent from Antisthenes’ discussion of his own sexual affairs (t. 82.38), where he speaks of those who “suffice” (οὕτω μοι τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖ) rather than those who “please.” When it comes to Socrates’ choice of disciples, however, the chosen ones “please” him (οἳ ἂν αὐτῷ ἀρέσκωσι τούτοις συνὼν διατελεῖ, t. 82.44).
ἀποδεικνύναι: To “demonstrate” is to fortify the truth of a proposition: this has a role close to proof. It might be a term important to Antisthenes, and if so, it might carry a difference from the Sophistic term “display” (without backing), ἐπιδεικνύναι. See t. 22B, 157A–C, 159A.
οἷς ἂν συνῇ: The verb συνεῖναι has both a sexual and a philosophical sense. See t. 141A.
δικαίως ἂν μέγα φρονοίη ἐπὶ τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ δικαίως ἂν πολὺν μισθὸν λαμβάνοι: Although Antisthenes has not yet been named, this could be a joke against his unpopularity as a teacher or his difficulty attracting pupils (see t. 34C).
(61) “Ἐμοί . . . παραδίδως . . . τὴν τέχνην;”: Socrates has consistently called his capacity as matchmaker a “craft,” which is associated in Socratic literature with knowledge and constitutes a superior, philosophical practice, in opposition to a “knack” or ability gained through experience (ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή, Pl. Gorg. 463b4): see t. 78. In Xen. Mem. 2.6.30, the interlocutors refer to the “knowledge” or “science” (ἐπιστήμη) of friendship, and the previous episode has featured Antisthenes as an expert (t. 110). Because, in the Symposium, Xenophon generally seems to contrast Antisthenes’ abrupt manner with the smoother manner of Socrates (t. 185A, 78), possibly Antisthenes was known for a failure to practice a τέχνη of human interactions even though he claimed to teach one. There is surely irony in the passage, at Antisthenes’ expense (Morrison 1994:198–203). Xenophon might doubt that Socrates’ talents in teaching really could be passed down to another person.
προαγωγείαν: Whereas the discussion so far has been about the skill of the “matchmaker” (μαστροπός), Socrates here changes his term to the more aggressive field of “procuring” (προαγωγεία). The matchmaker fashions a mutually beneficial relationship, whereas the panderer promotes a client toward a customer. Considering the image of Socratic teaching Antisthenes presents in t. 82 and the image of Sophistic teaching he presents in t. 62–63, it is unlikely that he favored a relationship between teacher and pupil that fulfilled the interests of the teacher but not the pupil. Pl. Prot. 310e and Theaet. 151b1–6 depict or mention Socratic introductions, where a pupil unsuitable for Socrates is matched with a teacher who can offer the instruction that is sought. The distinction between “matchmaker” and “procurer” is made also in Theaetetus, where its function seems gratuitous. See also Epictetus 3.23.22; Maximus of Tyre 38.4b.
(62) καὶ ὃς μάλα ἀχθεσθείς: Antisthenes is offended by the literal sense of Socrates’ term and demands evidence for its assignment to him. Socrates’ next speech aims to mollify him, by applying the “procuring” term to intellectual partnerships, which are said to become productive of good for the city. Whether the four cases of partnership listed by Socrates are ones Antisthenes really aspired to create and whether they were truly productive of good for Athens are not clear, but Antisthenes is depicted as a philanthropist. Yet it is plausible that Antisthenes would have rejected the teaching missions of Hippias (see t. 187) and Prodicus (see next note); he probably would have thought Socrates needed no teachers (see t. 12A).
σε Καλλίαν τουτονὶ προαγωγεύσαντα τῷ σοφῷ Προδίκῳ: This phrase is widely understood as evidence that Antisthenes had a special relationship with Prodicus and possibly with his theory of names. (See Prantl 1927 v.1:16; Momigliano 1930:105–7; Brancacci 1990:61 n.31.) Beyond a shared interest in names, Antisthenes and Prodicus shared an interest in the Heracles story (t. 92–99, 207C) and possibly in a theory about use (or χρῆσις) as fundamental to ethics (see t. 187.4 note on τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν; compare ps-Pl. Eryxias 397e). As for language, Antisthenes’ one-to-one principle (ἕν ἐφ’ ἑνός, t. 152A–D) and his οὑκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν thesis (t. 152A–D, 153A–B) could depend on a theory of synonyms like that of Prodicus, that is, the view that there are no true synonyms and that each word has its own distinct meaning or intelligible object of reference. Such a view would stand in opposition to that of, for example, Democritus, who accepted synonyms as a fact about language that proved its conventionality (DK 68B26), and Plato and Aristotle, who seem to have considered synonyms to be of little interest and some terms to be roughly interchangeable. There is no direct evidence for Antisthenes’ views on synonyms beyond what can be inferred from his one-to-one principle and his paradox. In t. 187.4, he distinguishes the various senses of one word, a project close to the analysis of homonyms, and his wordplay (see t. 8, 57, 131, 143, 148, 171; t. 41A titles 1.5 and 6.3; t. 150A.1 notes) also depends on the conflation of homophones (not the same as homonyms, but related). But Socrates’ speech could be ironic and depend on a recognized aversion between Prodicus and Antisthenes. It is plausible that Xenophon used the Callias of Aeschines as a source for his Symposium as a whole and also for this part (see Dittmar 1912:186–212; Huss 1999 [Xenophons Symposion]:303–5). In Aeschines’ Callias, Prodicus and Anaxagoras represented the worthless Sophists on whom Callias mindlessly spent his money (Dittmar 1912:189; Herodicus in Athenaeus 220c). Because Prodicus famously charged high rates for his teaching and might have had a high-maintenance lifestyle, Antisthenes was probably his opponent when it came to evaluating the worth of association (see also t. 94B, 207C). Earlier in the Symposium, Antisthenes showed himself to be skeptical about the real value of Callias’ financial expenditures (see t. 78, 83). Possibly the first two teachers, Prodicus and Hippias, were matched with Callias because they deserved a depraved pupil, whereas the second two, the Heraclean stranger and Aeschylus of Phlius, were matched with Socrates because they deserved a fine pupil. The very idea that Socrates was enlisted by Antisthenes as a pupil is odd, and the goal of the whole passage could be to imply that the future of education in Athens is insecure (except insofar as Xenophon gets his point across and Athens fixes its shortcomings).
οἶδα δέ σε Ἱππίᾳ τῷ Ἠλείῳ: Hippias of Elis, the pompous interlocutor of Socrates in Plato’s Hippias Minor and Hippias Major, might be also the inspiration for the “accuser” of Odysseus in t. 187. If so, Antisthenes was his opponent rather than his ally.
(63) καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν τὸν Ἡρακλεώτην ξένον: This stranger from Heraclea is sometimes suspected to be Bryson (who is featured elsewhere in Socratic literature and was apparently a dialectician: SSR IIS 1–11; see t. 42) or his father Herodorus, who also wrote a version of the labors of Heracles. The painters Zeuxippus and Zeuxis have also been proposed. See Huss 1999 (Xenophons Symposion):314. Körte 1927:38 proposed that all four figures named here were characters in Antisthenes’ writings.
Αἰσχύλον δὲ τὸν Φλειάσιον πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν: Körte 1927 and Breitenbach 1967:1882 propose that Aeschylus of Phlius was the same Aeschylus known in the fifth century as an astronomer (RE s.v. “Aischylus” 16); surely there would be irony in matching Socrates with an astronomy teacher. See Patzer 1970:82 n.52.
(64) πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιος εἶναι καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις φίλος καὶ συμμάχος κεκτῆσθαι: The emendation of Finckh should be accepted, for the sense of the passage. φίλος has a relational sense and so makes sense as a predicate in parallel with συμμάχος, not as a name for the party who should seek the services of a good procurer. Individuals seek to become friends through the procurer. Compare the expression in Xen. Mem. 2.5.3 (t. 110), where Antisthenes would “purchase someone at any cost to be a friend for me” (τὸν δὲ πρὸ πάντων . . . πριαίμην ἂν φίλον μοι εἶναι). The parties who stand to benefit from the procurer’s expertise are surely cities and individuals (a third class of larger groups such as interstate alliances is not impossible, but there has been no mention of interstate alliances in the whole Symposium), and Xenophon’s standard term for the individual in opposition to the city is ἰδιώτης.
ὡς κακῶς ἀκούσας: Antisthenes finds beneficial “toil” in being insulted or having a bad reputation (t. 86, 113), but this view depends on the moral inferiority of the audience. Here Socrates gives the insult, and Antisthenes is being teased for his reaction.
ἀντίστροφον οὖν ἔοικε γένος εἰρωνείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους· ᾧ καὶ Σωκράτης ἐχρήσατο, τοῦ Ἀντισθένους τὸ φιλοποιὸν καὶ συναγωγὸν ἀνθρώπων εἰς εὔνοιαν μαστροπείαν [καὶ συναγωγίαν] καὶ προαγωγείαν ὀνομάσας.
καὶ συναγωγίαν del. Wyttenbach | προαγωγείαν Wyttenbach e Xen. Sym. : ἀγωγείαν codd.
Now for praise there seems to be a counterpart kind of irony. Socrates used it when he referred to Antisthenes’ capacity for making people friends and enticing them into goodwill by the names “matchmakering” and “procuring.”
Xenophon’s view of topics appropriate for questions and jokes at dinner is Plutarch’s first question in the second book of Table Talk. Just after this passage recast from the Symposium, Plutarch cites Diogenes of Sinope, who also used scoffing words to praise the benefits Antisthenes has given him (t. 34D-1).
Plutarch’s note shows that ancient critics, like modern, saw irony in Socrates’ words to Antisthenes. The irony is understood in Antisthenes’ favor, in reverse from modern critics. See Huss 1999 (Xenophons Symposion):311.
ἀντίστροφον . . . γένος εἰρωνείας . . . τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους: Irony can disguise insult (as Plutarch has already said in the preceding context), but it also disguises praise. This might be a strategy for distinguising praise from flattery.
(4) “Σὺ δὲ μόνος, ὦ Ἀντισθένης, οὐδενὸς ἐρᾷς;” “Ναὶ μὰ τοὺς θεούς,” εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος, “καὶ σφόδρα γε σοῦ.” καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώψας ὡς δὴ θρυπτόμενος εἶπε· “Μὴ νῦν μοι ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄχλον πάρεχε· ὡς γὰρ ὁρᾷς, ἄλλα πράττω.” (5) καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἔλεξεν· “Ὡς σαφῶς μέντοι σὺ μαστροπὲ σαυτοῦ ἀεὶ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖς· τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι, τοτὲ δ’ ἄλλου του ἐφιέμενος.” (6) καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· “Πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, μόνον μὴ συγκόψῃς με· τὴν δ’ ἄλλην χαλεπότητα ἐγώ σου καὶ φέρω καὶ οἴσω φιλικῶς. ἀλλὰ γάρ,” ἔφη, “τὸν μὲν σὸν ἔρωτα κρύπτωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἔστιν οὐ ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ εὐμορφίας τῆς ἐμῆς.”
(4) πάρεχε codd. plur. : πάρασχε Vat. Urbin. 95 (6) κρύπτωμεν R L : κρύπτω μὲν codd. plur : ]ρύπτωμεν P. Lit. Lond. 152
(4) “Are you the only one, Antisthenes, who is in love with nobody?” [Socrates asked]. “Yes I am in love, by the gods,” he [Antisthenes] said, “actually very much with you.” And Socrates, making fun of him as if he were being coy, said, “Now don’t be giving me trouble in the present situation. As you can see, I am doing other things.” (5) And Antisthenes said, “How transparently you, the matchmaker of yourself, always put me off like this. Sometimes you make the excuse of your daimonion and won’t talk with me, other times because you desire someone else.” (6) And Socrates said, “In the name of the gods, Antisthenes, please don’t beat me up. The rest of your difficult demeanor I both tolerate and shall tolerate, with affection. But your love,” he said, “let us hide, because it is actually not for my soul but for my beauty.”
Socrates has introduced a commemoration of the god Eros as a new activity at the party (8.1), and his long speech is the last section of Xenophon’s Symposium. On the three parts of the Symposium distinguished in Körte 1927, see t. 13A.
The meaning of this passage depends foremost on what Antisthenes might have done or written to inspire this treatment, which we do not know. Patzer 1970:185–86 and Huss 1999 (Xenophons Symposion):355 read the passage as a statement that in the upcoming climactic speech on eros (8.7–41), Xenophon’s Socrates will make no reference at all to Antisthenes’ views on the topic, for Antisthenes loves the body, whereas Socrates speaks on love of the soul; the text says farewell here to Antisthenes. This precisely reverses an older interpretation, whereby Xenophon essentially borrows the whole speech, with its distinction between Aphrodite Πάνδημος and Aprodite Οὐρανία, from a text by Antisthenes (Joël 1893; Maier 1913:17–19 n.1). The teasing between Antisthenes and Socrates, which is readily compared to parts of the scene between Alcibiades and Socrates in Plato’s Symposium (213–22), is most often read as a joke against Antisthenes, the enemy of Aphrodite (t. 123), who really is in love with Socrates but either denies this or misunderstands Socrates’ “erotic” tactics in education. (See Lampe 2010.) Alternatively, Antisthenes could be extending the joke, especially since Hermogenes’ love object, just mentioned in Sym. 8.3, might already have captured the correct Socratic answer, ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ καλοκἀγαθία, “the good and fine, whatever it is” (see also von Fritz 1935:30): on the term καλοκἀγαθία, see t. 78, 134s, 172a, 41A titles 3.1 and 3.4; compare t. 208.28.
Since Dittmar, whose 1912 account displaced Joël 1893–1901 in dominating scholarly opinion on the question, it has been assumed that Aeschines’ Callicles (and sometimes Aspasia also) was the major subtext for Xenophon’s portrait of Antisthenes in the Symposium and that episodes hostile to Antisthenes reflect Aeschines’ hostility. But Antisthenes did write a sympotic text, which is active elsewhere in Xenophon’s Symposium (see t. 41A title 2.4 notes). Because the Symposium of Xenophon has an elusive and still unexplained relationship to Plato’s text by the same name (see Danzig 2005), it remains plausible that both Plato and Xenophon are responding to Antisthenes, possibly taking the opportunity to joke on his unlikely sublimation of eros or his total vilification of bodily eros. It is also plausible that Xenophon is reactivating Antisthenes’ clear view of Socratic eros against the ambiguous implications by Plato that the sublimation Socrates professed was not always practiced. In the second case, Xenophon could be alerting his reader in advance of Socrates’ speech on homoerotic chastity that these views are filtered through Antisthenes; Xenophon does recognize homoerotic love affairs elsewhere (Hindley 1999). Maier 1913:17–19 n.1, integrating older studies, argues that the main point in Socrates’ long speech on the god Eros, especially Sym. 8.32–40, depends on a lost text of Antisthenes, which is also the source for the speech of Pausanias in Plato’s Symposium (182b). Whereas Plato “corrects” the sensual love promoted by the original Pausanias figure (who would have been a sordid character), as part of his complex correction and nuancing of Antisthenes’ views on love, Xenophon’s Socrates cites the views of the original Pausanias more faithfully and corrects them in his own voice.
(4) σὺ δὲ μόνος, ὦ Ἀντισθένης, οὐδενὸς ἐρᾷς: This question is a challenge to one who allegedly claimed he would shoot Aphrodite if he could catch her (t. 123) and who spoke, within Xenophon’s Symposium, of the sexual “need” of his body in an alienating way (t. 82.38). Socrates is proving that everyone present is a follower of the god Eros (8.1), and Antisthenes presumably knows that Socrates will show that even he is a lover, if he does not explain this himself. His aggressive attitude toward Socrates, as the active ἐραστής to the passive ἐρώμενος (Dover 1980:85), could be a humorous escape from an awkward question, which Socrates unexpectedly develops. Antisthenes keeps up with the joke throughout the passage, but Xenophon’s purpose in playing this out (at greater length than he does for the other characters: see Sym. 8.1–3) is not clear.
καὶ σφόδρα γε σοῦ: The evidence suggests that Antisthenes did love the human being Socrates on the psychological level (t. 12, 14B, 82.44). By contrast with Apollodorus, who is paired with Antisthenes as lover of Socrates in t. 14B (see notes there), Antisthenes seems to have both loved and understood the meaning of loving Socrates’ logos in addition to loving Socrates: Socrates’ logos survived his death and became the essence of Socraticism as philosophy. (Apollodorus is represented in the opening section of Plato’s Symposium as failing to grasp what loving and reproducing the Socratic logos really means. For the injunction to follow the logos not the man, see Pl. Phaed. 90d9–91c5.) Socrates the man is remarkably absent as a character in mimesis in Antisthenes’ literary remains: see t. 3B, 200. For the possibility that someone can love the dead Socrates, or love him by reputation without having met the person, see t. 84C. Since the question of succession to Socrates is at stake in Xenophon’s Symposium (see t. 13A), it is plausible that Xenophon was commenting more seriously on Antisthenes’ love for Socrates, suggesting that it was inadequate to the task of reproducing Socrates in Athens.
ἐπισκώψας ὡς δὴ θρυπτόμενος: This is language for flirtation. Socrates plays out the role of the ἐρώμενος (Dover 1980:85). Plato’s Alcibiades also could be said to take the active role toward Socrates (Pl. Sym. 217c8). But on the surface, he plays the ἐρώμενος (Sym. 218c7–d1); he accuses Socrates of habitually deceiving his younger disciples, who should be like his ἐρώμενοι, by becoming the παιδικά instead of the ἐραστής (Sym. 222b3–4). See Huss 1999 (Xenophons Symposion):366. Antisthenes’ concept of eros might be highly reciprocal: see t. 58.
(5) σὺ μαστροπὲ σαυτοῦ: See t. 13A, where the matchmaker joins two other parties. Here Socrates serves himself. In t. 13A, Antisthenes also served as matchmaker for Socrates. Here Socrates needs him in this third-party role no more than he wants him as a lover.
ἀεὶ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖς: Socrates evades not only reciprocating but even accepting Antisthenes’ love. This could be a consistent aspect of Socrates’ teaching technique. (See Lampe 2010.)
τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος: Socrates’ private divine voice tells him with whom he should associate (see, e.g., Pl. Theaet. 151a3–5 and the possibly spurious Alc. 1 103a5–b1 and Theag. 128e5). This voice was like an inarticulate noise, capable of signaling “yes” or “no” but not informative further. The verb προφασιζόμενος implies incredulity by Antisthenes, as though Socrates is claiming a pretext. This might imply, humorously, a serious rejection by Socrates, who notes in Theaet. 151a3–5, amid the explanation of his role as a midwife, that some potential pupils are unsuited to himself, as he can tell from his daimonion, and that he passes these on to teachers who can help them, such as Prodicus (151b5). Presumably this daimonion of spiritual association was not fickle but gave constantly reliable advice, and presumably the historical Antisthenes was in good favor with this daimonion. Since Socrates cites his daimonion for approaching Alcibiades (in the Platonic Alc. 1 103a5–b1; this is possibly also implied in Aeschines’ account, SSR VIA 50), Antisthenes might have written something about Alcibiades and the daimonion on which Xenophon is playing. (See Huss 1999 [Xenophons Symposion]:366–67 for more literature on the Socratic daimonion; see also Long 2006 [“How Does Socrates’ Divine Sign Communicate”].)
οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι: Conversation, or a special kind of conversation, διαλέγεσθαι, might be Antisthenes’ way of enacting eros with Socrates: compare the double entendre in συνεῖναι (t. 141A, 92). On the importance of the term διαλέγεσθαι, see t. 41A titles 6.2 and 6.5.
ἄλλου του ἐφιέμενος: Plato’s Alcibiades is also jealous of others (Pl. Sym. 213c2–d6).
(6) μόνον μὴ συγκόψῃς με: The verb συγκόπτω is strong and odd, and this could be an allusion to lost literature. Compare the reports that Antisthenes tried to swat his potential pupils (t. 34C, cited in Huss 1999 [Xenophons Symposion]:368).
τὴν δ’ ἄλλην χαλεπότητα . . . σου: The “difficulty” in Antisthenes’ person is shared, in name at least, with Xanthippe, the “most difficult of all women” (see t. 18, where Antisthenes is Socrates’ interrogator). “Difficulty” in character is assigned to Xanthippe again by Xenophon in Mem. 2.2.79 and to bad character more generally (together with ὕβρις and ἀμέλεια) in Oec. 4.8. Yet “difficult” character in a horse is preferable to the trainer over sluggishness (t. 34A.3), because its natural energy can be redirected through training. There seems to be no particular connection between “difficulty” and the Cynic “strength” (καρτερία, t. 22A) or “harshness” (σκληρότης, t. 34C-1 and 2 [adjectival form]; στρυφνότης, t. 33A), although t. 34A from the Cynic lore uses the horse analogy to describe Diogenes.
φιλικῶς: A truly “friendly” relationship is the highest level of affection for a Socratic, roughly equivalent with eroticism, but on the level of soul not body. In t. 110, Antisthenes is portrayed (by Xenophon) as an expert in φιλία. Patzer 1970:86 reads this sentence as the closure and resolution of the whole relationship between Socrates and Antisthenes as portrayed in Xenophon’s Symposium.
κρύπτωμεν: Manuscript variants here might imply that Socrates used a singular verb instead of a plural one. A surviving papyrus fragment that includes this passage implies another syllable before ]ρύπτωμεν: see Huss 1999 (Xenophons Symposion):368, who notes (367) that papyrological evidence throws doubt overall on the accuracy of the medieval manuscripts of Xenophon.
οὐ ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ εὐμορφίας τῆς ἐμῆς: The immediate joke is, of course, that Socrates is considered ugly in body (Pl. Sym. 215a6–b4; Xen. Sym. 5.8–10). In teasing Antisthenes, Socrates reverses what is presumably Antisthenes’ own position, that Socratic love is properly for the soul and is not sexual: this is also the position Socrates expounds in his own voice in the speech on eros to follow (8.9–41). This teasing, since it is against Antisthenes and not against his position on eros, must have a complicated explanation that was more evident to the contemporary reader than it can be to us. Perhaps it is an indication that Antisthenes, in his adamance in denying corporeal love or in denying that Socrates had a corporeal love affair with any of his disciples (if Xenophon is playing off a scene between Socrates and Alcibiades that Antisthenes wrote), was insincere. But the message against corporeal pederasty is consistent throughout the Symposium (see 4.24–26, 8.12–40: on the broader range of views expressed in Xenophon’s corpus overall, see Hindley 1999). It could, alternatively, be Xenophon’s statement to the reader that although Xenophon’s Socrates is about to restate Antisthenes’ analysis and explanation of eros, this is not because Xenophon’s Socrates is depending on Antisthenes but because Xenophon wishes, in his own right, to write the same message that Antisthenes did. The phrasing of the opposition does not pose “body” (σῶμα) against “soul” (ψυχή), such as we see in Socrates’ upcoming distinction between Aphrodite Πάνδημος and Aprodite Οὐρανία (Sym. 8.10): “You would guess that also they send on their loves [separately], Public [Aphrodite] for bodies, and Heavenly [Aphrodite] for the soul and friendship and fine deeds” (εἰκάσαις δ’ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἔρωτας τὴν μὲν Πάνδημον τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιπέμπειν, τὴν δ’ Οὐρανίαν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων). If this is significant, it could imply that Antisthenes rejected a simple way of separating body and soul, such as it appears in Plato (e.g., Sym. 181b4, 210b2; Phaed. 64c4–8): here the opposition is not between parts of the human but between the body’s highest functioning capacity and its fine shape. Compare Socrates’ beauty contest with Critobulus in Xen. Sym. 5.3–7, where body and soul are not opposed, but the beauty of various body parts is reduced to their functionality. In Pl. Sym. 218e3, Socrates, in diagnosing Alcibiades’ obsession with himself, distinguishes between his own beauty (κάλλος) and the beautiful outward form (εὐμορφία) of Alcibiades. The term εὐμορφία is used by Plato only there and twice in the Laws.
(16) καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώπτων τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην, “Ἀλλ’, ὦ Θεοδότη,” ἔφη, “οὐ πάνυ μοι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι σχολάσαι· καὶ γὰρ ἴδια πράγματα πολλὰ καὶ δημόσια παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ φίλαι μοι, αἳ οὔτε ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἀφ’ αὑτῶν ἐάσουσί με ἀπιέναι, φίλτρα τε μανθάνουσαι παρ’ ἐμοῦ καὶ ἐπῳδάς.” (17) “Ἐπίστασαι γάρ,” ἔφη, “καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;” “ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οἴει,” ἔφη, “Ἀπολλόδωρόν τε τόνδε καὶ Ἀντισθένη οὐδέποτέ μου ἀπολείπεσθαι; διὰ τί δὲ καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμμίαν Θήβηθεν παραγίγνεσθαι; εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν φίλτρων τε καὶ ἐπῳδῶν καὶ ἰύγγων ἐστί.”
(16) And Socrates, making a joke of his own lack of business, said, “But, Theodote, it is not at all easy for me to get free time. I have a large amount of business, both private and public, that keeps me occupied. And I also have my girlfriends, who will let me be apart from them neither by day nor by night, and they are learning from me about love charms and songs of enchantment.” (17) “Then you are knowledgeable also in these things?” she said. “But why, do you think,” he said, “Apollodorus here and Antisthenes never leave my side? And why are Cebes and Simmias here from Thebes? Be assured that these situations do not occur without many love charms and songs of enchantment and binding spells.”
This is nearly the end of Xenophon’s episode staging Socrates’ encounter with the beautiful prostitute Theodote. On the tension between the “friendship” offered by Theodote and that between Socrates and his disciples, see Delatte 1933:148–61; Patzer 1970:55–56; Goldhill 1998.
Antisthenes is paired with Apollodorus (known as narrator of Plato’s Symposium and the most expressive mourner at his death scene in Phaedo, as well as at Xen. Apol. 28 and elsewhere: see Nails 2002:39–40) as one of Socrates’ most persistent companions and his apprentice in the craft of friendship, which has erotic undertones.
(16) εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ φίλαι μοι: The feminine form of “friends,” which must refer to the four named males (see Goldhill 1998:121), shows that Socrates’ relationships to his disciples are comparable to his potential relationship with Theodote.
(17) Ἀπολλόδωρόν τε τόνδε καὶ Ἀντισθένη: Apollodorus is at Socrates’ side in the episode, whereas Antisthenes may not be present. Antisthenes possibly represents a different kind of close Socratic companion than Apollodorus, whose roles in Plato’s texts are not positive.
οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν φίλτρων τε καὶ ἐπῳδῶν καὶ ἰύγγων: These tools that the apprentices are learning are the same ones that captured them. On Antisthenes’ succumbing to Socrates’ discourse, see t. 12B, 12C, 17, 34A.
στρέψαντος αὐτοῦ τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος εἰς τὸ προφανές, Σωκράτης ἰδών φησιν, “Ὁρῶ σου διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν φιλοδοξίαν.”
ante στρέψαντος add. μὴ in mg. P5 γρ
When he [Antisthenes] had turned the torn part of his outer garment into view, Socrates saw it and said, “I see your love of reputation through your outer garment.”
= 148B DC
στρέψαντος δὲ Ἀντισθένους τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος εἰς τοὐμφανές, “Ὁρῶ σου,” ἔφη, “διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν κενοδοξίαν.”
δὲ F : om. B P | διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν φιλοδοξίαν codd. plur. : τὴν φιλοδοξίαν διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος F
When Antisthenes had turned the torn part of his outer garment into view, he [Socrates] said, “I see your vainglory through your outer garment.”
= 148A DC
ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν τὸν Ἀντισθένην τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ ἱματίου μέρος ἀεὶ ποιοῦντα φανερόν, “Οὐ παύσῃ,” ἔφη, “ἐγκαλλωπιζόμενος ἡμῖν;”
And Socrates, seeing that Antisthenes was always making the torn part of his cloak visible, said, “Won’t you stop showing off your pride for us?”
Diogenes preserves the anecdote twice, once in the biography of Socrates and once in the biography of Antisthenes, in a section covering his life in Athens (6.7–8). In Aelian, this is one of three scattered anecdotes featuring Antisthenes (see also t. 16, 34C-2), of which only t. 16 is friendly.
The anecdote was fashioned by someone hostile to Cynicism, perhaps in the Peripatos or perhaps within the Socratic circle, by Aeschines. The Socratic possibility is based on Aelian’s general use of Aeschines: see t. 16.
τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος (A-B)/τοῦ ἱματίου (C): On the terms τρίβων and ἱμάτιον for the philosopher’s garment, see t. 22A. Not only does Antisthenes make do with the garment he has, but he flaunts the fact that he does so.
φιλοδοξίαν (A)/κενοδοξίαν (B): This is a standard charge against the Cynics. (See t. 37C, 139B.)
= 167 DC
Σωκράτης ἰδὼν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν τριάκοντα τοὺς ἐνδόξους ἀναιρουμένους καὶ τοὺς βαθύτατα πλουτοῦντας ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων ἐπιβουλευομένους, Ἀντισθένει φασὶ περιτυχόντα εἰπεῖν· “Μή τί σοι μεταμέλει ὅτι μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν οὐδὲν ἐγενόμεθα ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τοιοῦτοι οἵους ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ τοὺς μονάρχους ὁρῶμεν, Ἀτρέας τε ἐκείνους καὶ Θυέστας καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονας καὶ Αἰγίσθους; οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ ἀποσφαττόμενοι καὶ ἐκτραγῳδούμενοι καὶ πονηρὰ δεῖπνα δειπνοῦντες ἑκάστοτε ἐκκαλύπτονται· οὐδεὶς δὲ οὕτως ἐγένετο τολμηρὸς οὐδὲ ἀναίσχυντος τραγῳδίας ποιητής, ὥστε εἰσαγαγεῖν εἰς δρᾶμα ἀποσφαττόμενον χορόν.”
βαρύτατα τοὺς V x : βαθύτατα T. Smith : τοὺς del. Stephanus | δειπνοῦντες καὶ ἐσθίοντες codd. : δειπνίζοντες Albini : ἑστιῶντες Grasberger : καὶ ἐσθίοντες del. Hercher | ἐκκαλύπτονται V x Φ : ἐκκυκλοῦνται Casaubon | χορόν Holstenius : χοῖρον V x Φ : χειρώνακτα Casaubon : τὸν Ἶρον Faber
They say that Socrates, when he saw that men of reputation were being destroyed under the rule of the Thirty and that those with the deepest wealth were being plotted against by the tyrants, happened to see Antisthenes and said, “Do you regret at all that in our lives we did not become grand and majestic, or the type of person such as the monarchs we see in tragedy, those figures of Atreus and Thyestes and Agamemnon and Aegisthus? For they are portrayed every time being slaughtered and given the tragic treatment and eating their wretched meals. But no poet of tragedy has been so bold and shameless as to bring into his drama a chorus being slaughtered.”
Aelian’s anecdotes have no obvious ordering system. This is a complete anecdote. On the consistently favorable image of Socrates in Aelian, see Taylor 2008:336–39.
If the anecdote has a basis in early Socratic literature, it is evidence that the metaphor of the world as a stage was developed already in the Socratic circle. The idea that social positions—and possibly the more essential aspects of the “self” as well—are performances on a metaphorical stage appears in many anecdotes of Diogenes of Sinope, in statements attributed to Bion of Borysthenes (fr. 16A Kindstrand) and Aristo of Chios (Diog. Laer. 7.160), and in the so-called four-personae theory apparently developed by Panaetius and attested in Cicero (De off. 1.107–21) and Epictetus (e.g., Dis. 3.2.4, 2.22.27; the many passages adduced in De Lacy 1979:171 and Sorabji 2006:161–63). Dümmler 1889:3 associated this cluster of evidence in support of Antisthenes’ authorship of the world-as-stage metaphor. Brancacci 2002:71-78 places Antisthenes centrally in the history of the metaphor. See also t. 208.20.
κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν τριάκοντα: This specification of setting under the Thirty (404–403 BCE) seems to indicate that Aelian has a fourth-century source for his anecdote. A plausible source would be a work of Aeschines, Aelian’s main source for Socratic anecdotes. (See t. 15C and 34C-2, the other two cases where Aelian mentions Antisthenes, both in hostile anecdotes.) If so, this is the clearest example, after Xenophon’s texts, of such a use of Antisthenes as character in Socratic literature by others. Xenophon also might use an image of Antisthenes shaped by Aeschines (see notes on t. 13A, 14A). Dümmler (followed by Decleva Caizzi ad loc.) thinks Aelian takes the anecdote directly from a text by Antisthenes. An ultimate origin of this material in Antisthenes’ writing, however Aelian received it, is supported by the recurrence of the idea in Dio’s Oration 13 (see t. 208.20) and in Epictetus, who integrates thoroughly the Cynic tradition (see t. 34E) but never mentions Aeschines.
παθὼν δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον, ὅπερ φασὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένην πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους σοφίαν παθεῖν, εἵπετο αὐτῷ.
And when he [Demetrius the Cynic] experienced before Apollonius what they say Antisthenes experienced before the wisdom of Socrates, he followed him.
Apollonius is amid his travels through Greece, collecting converts. He meets Demetrius in Corinth. On the likely fictionality of the episodes, see Billerbeck 1979:52–53.
Antisthenes seems to be remembered as the most passionate convert to Socrates. Philostratus has another Antisthenes in his novel, a youth from Paros who is prevented from becoming the pupil of Apollonius, on advice from the Homeric Achilles, whom Apollonius has just met at Ilium (4.11–12). The mixing of “Antisthenes” with Homeric heroes might suggest that this character is his invention; if so, it could show that Philostratus associated Antisthenes very closely with lore about teachers and pupils. On Achilles’ role as a pupil in Antisthenes, see t. 95.
ὅπερ φασὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένην . . . παθεῖν: This tradition seems more dramatic than the account in Diogenes Laertius (t. 12A) but might be related to Antisthenes’ ἔρως for Socrates (t. 14A).
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης εἶπεν· “Ἐν πολλοῖς μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἄλλοις δῆλον καὶ ἐν οἷς δ’ ἡ παῖς ποιεῖ ὅτι ἡ γυναικεία φύσις οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὖσα τυγχάνει, ῥώμης δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος δεῖται. ὥστε εἴ τις ὑμῶν γυναῖκα ἔχει, θαρρῶν διδασκέτω ὅ τι βούλοιτ’ ἂν αὐτῇ ἐπισταμένῃ χρῆσθαι.” καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης, “Πῶς οὖν,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω γιγνώσκων οὐ καὶ σὺ παιδεύεις Ξανθίππην, ἀλλὰ χρῇ γυναικὶ τῶν οὐσῶν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῶν γεγενημένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων χαλεπωτάτῃ;”
δ’ codd. : δὴ Schenkl | χείρων F Q R : χεῖρον cet. | ῥώμης Lange : γνώμης codd.
And Socrates said, “It is clear both in many other situations and in what the young lady is doing here that the female nature turns out to be in no way worse than that of the man, but lacks power and strength. So if any of you has a wife, let him take courage and teach her whatever he would like to treat her as knowing.” And Antisthenes said, “How is it, then, Socrates, if you know this, that for your own part you do not educate Xanthippe, but you deal with a woman who is the most difficult of all who exist, and, I think, of all who have existed or will exist?”
In ch. 2 of the Symposium, preliminary to the central speeches of the diners, Xenophon draws a distinction between Socratic pleasures and virtues and those offered by the professional entertainers. Socrates and Antisthenes watch the hired dancer juggle twelve spinning hoops while she dances, and Socrates notes her skill in calculating how high to throw each hoop so that she can catch it in the rhythm of her dance. A serious discussion of theses about virtue is stimulated by the performance of the popular entertainers: this is the Socratic enhancement. See t. 103A–B.
Antisthenes apparently followed Socrates in claiming that the virtue of a man and a woman are the same, a thesis that was reconsidered by the Stoic Cleanthes (Diog. Laert. 7.175) and debated in Roman times, according to the evidence of Musonius Rufus. (See t. 134r.) The passage might also suggest that Antisthenes helped to transmit the image of Xanthippe as a shrewish consort, but the evidence is divided.
ἡ γυναικεία φύσις: The force of φύσις probably lies in the natural or perhaps bodily based capacity of the female before education or other enculturation. Compare the phrase εὐφυεστάταις γυναιξί (women best in nature), whom Antisthenes recommends as mating partners (t. 58). Whereas Diogenes Laertius (t. 134r) attributes to Antisthenes the identity of virtue of a man and a woman, which is probably the result of education, this passage claims the equivalence of nature, before education. We might assume that the full argument was that the same nature, given the same education, acquires the same virtue. A Socratic debate on the likeness in nature or φύσις between males and females is evident from Pl. Rep. 5 453a–455a, where an analogy with animals secures the equality of female and male natures, apart from the fact that the female gives birth (τίκτειν) and the male copulates (ὀχεύειν).
οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρός: When Aristotle takes up this debate against the Socratics, he reasserts the traditional view that the male and female are different in mental as well as physical nature: in Pol. 1.13 1260a20–23, Aristotle attributes the view that the male and the female are equal in virtue—which is analyzed as σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη (temperance, courage, and justice)—to “Socrates,” presumably citing from Plato’s Meno (72d4–73c8), and rejects it. In NE 8.7 1158b11–19, he says that friendship between unequal persons has many kinds, depending on the kind of virtue held by the parties, such as a man versus a woman. In explicating the debate, the Aristotelian commentator Aspasius (second century CE: see t. 120) summarizes an argument of “the Socratics” that might be traceable to Antisthenes (as proposed by Barnes 1999:29). According to Aspasius’ commentary (177.3–7), ἐρωτῶσι δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Σωκρατικοί. “Ἄρα τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα ἄδικον;” “Οὐ δῆτα.” “Τί δέ; τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα σώφρονα, τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα ἀκόλαστον;” “Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.” οὕτω δὴ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἐπιόντες ἀρετὴν καὶ λαβόντες ὅτι δεῖ καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα πάσας ἔχειν τὰς ἀρετάς, συμπεραίνονται ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρετή. (And they inquire in this way, and foremost the Socratics: “Is it right that the man is just, but the woman unjust?” “Surely not.” “What then? Is the man self-controlled but the woman undisciplined?” “Nor this.” And going through each virtue in this way and assuming that both the man and the woman must have all the virtues, they draw the conclusion that the virtue of a man and a woman is the same.) The hypothetical argument is abridged, and there are no secure grounds for the attribution to Antisthenes (Barnes claims a diatribe style), but there are also none to reject it. (That it is Cynic might be supposed from the argument attributed to Hipparchia in Diog. Laert. 6.97.) Its strategy, to judge from this report, is an indifference argument put in deontological terms: if it is “right” for a man to be just, it is equally “right” for a woman, presumably since both are in the same ethical situation. (On the ubiquity of indifference arguments in the classical period, see Makin 1993, who treats mostly “epistemological” or reason-based arguments, but the form seems common to this one.) Aristotle and the Socratics agree that both women and men have the individual virtues, and the disagreement is over the degree of the individual virtues and how they constitute general virtue. The “Socratics” cited here seem to think that since women need to meet the same ethical requirements as men, their sum of virtue is the same.
οὖσα τυγχάνει: This circumlocution might be intended to reject a divine or other explanation for the equality. Observations are evidence for the equality, which turns out to exist, even though it need not.
ῥώμης δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος δεῖται: The term γνώμης (judgment), unanimous in the manuscripts, should probably be replaced with Lange’s conjecture ῥώμης (physical strength), because (1) the dancer has just been praised through a specifically intellectual term, συντεκμαιρομένη (“having conjectured at the same time,” while she dances, how high to throw the hoops so that she can catch them in rhythm); (2) Socrates’ next comment shows that he is optimistic about the teachability of women’s minds (ἐπισταμένῃ is also strongly intellectual); and (3) a near parallel in Pl. Rep. 5 455e1 and 456a11 appeals only to the physical inferiority of the woman (she is ἀσθενεστέρα than the man; one woman can be ἰσχυροτέρα over another). ἰσχύς implies mental strength sooner than physical in Antisthenes (t. 134c, 54.13) and so possibly throughout Socratic literature: but if mental strength is implied in Rep. 5 456a11, the metaphor is not unfolded. Also in Xen. Oec. 7.23, the female has the “lesser body” (ἧττον τὸ σῶμα) but is presumed to be mentally able to match the man.
αὐτῇ ἐπισταμένῃ χρῆσθαι: The verb χρῆσθαι as used here is synonymous with σύνειναι and ὁμιλεῖν (see t. 22A, 100A, 187.6), in which both Socrates and Antisthenes are said to be experts; and like these other verbs, it can have a sexual connotation. The word must also be related to the ethical χρῆσις mentioned repeatedly in Antisthenes’ literary remains and Socratic literature. (See t. 187.4 note.) In this phrase might be buried the idea that an educated wife is both a resource or instrument for the husband and also a knower in her own right, who becomes an ethical partner through her knowledge. (Penelope could have been Antisthenes’ model for this: see t. 188.) Xenophon might have held less egalitarian views on the subject than Antisthenes did: his Oeconomicus portrays a wife whose independent virtue remains subordinate to that of her husband.
οὐ καὶ σὺ παιδεύεις Ξανθίππην: Antisthenes possibly had a special hostility toward Xanthippe, who, according to later Peripatetic lore, was not the legal wife of Socrates but a permanent female companion and might have lived with Socrates while he was married to his legal wife, Myrto. (See Diog. Laert. 2.26 and SSR IB 48, from Aristoxenus.) If so, this might be parallel to his opposition to Pericles’ companion Aspasia, which is based on sexual distraction (t. 141–44); compare also his discussion of Calypso and Penelope (t. 188). But another version of the Xanthippe story (Gellius, Attic Nights 1.17.1–3; Diog. Laert. 2.36–37) casts Alcibiades in the role of Antisthenes, and this must be an episode with a literary history. For Xenophon’s replacement of Alcibiades with Antisthenes, compare t. 14A; possibly Xenophon assigns to Antisthenes roles that Alcibiades held in Antisthenes’ own background text.
τῶν οὐσῶν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῶν γεγενημένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων χαλεπωτάτῃ: This phrasing might suggest that Antisthenes was attentive to comparisons of individuals across time. The three-part expression is common in archaic poetry for the events knowable to a Muse or prophet. These participles indicate not a series of events but a collection of individual women (all women, for all time) who constitute the field for comparison and evaluation of Xanthippe. Antisthenes is not claiming to know them, as a Muse would, but he uses the expression rhetorically to frame his statement about Xanthippe. On Antisthenes’ possible attention to distribution of individual cases across time, compare t. 151A, 194 notes.
= 131 DC
ἡγεῖτο γάρ, οἶμαι, ὁ Σωκράτης Αἰσχίνου μὲν φιλοσοφήσαντος καὶ Ἀντισθένους ὄνασθαι ἂν ὀλίγα τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν· μᾶλλον δὲ μηδένα τῶν τότε, πλὴν ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἔπειτα, κατὰ τὴν μνήμην τῶν λόγων· εἰ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐφιλοσόφει, ἢ Κριτίας ἢ Κριτόβουλος ἢ Καλλίας, οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν δεινῶν τοῖς τότε Ἀθηναίοις ξυνέπεσεν.
μᾶλλον . . . λόγων del. Markland
For I believe Socrates thought that the city of the Athenians would benefit little from the philosophizing of Aeschines and Antisthenes: or, rather, nobody from those times [would benefit], but only we of a later age, from the preservation of their words. But if Alcibiades had practiced philosophy, or Critias or Critobulus or Callias, none of the terrible things would have befallen the Athenians of his time.
This passage comes in the final sections (9–10) of the oration placed first in modern editions of Maximus and probably intended as his protreptic exhortation to philosophy and promotion of himself as philosophical teacher. (See Trapp 1997:3–4.) Maximus combats the notion that the philosopher should be poor: even Socrates had wealthy pupils and probably favored them, since they had power.
Maximus believes that Aeschines and Antisthenes made no practical impact on their times, whereas the Socratic associates who made a practical impact failed to use philosophy. Maximus cites or alludes to Aeschines repeatedly (Trapp 1997:13 n.33), whereas Antisthenes is not otherwise mentioned.
εἰ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐφιλοσόφει: This is the major question of the Socratic literature on Alcibiades, to which Aeschines and Antisthenes contributed. (See t. 41A title 10.6.) Maximus seems to consider Aeschines and Antisthenes as Socratic disciples on a level with Alcibiades, not as authors of his story.
Κριτίας ἢ Κριτόβουλος ἢ Καλλίας: This list is not matched in extant literature and might have been constructed for its alliteration, to balance the three names beginning with alpha. Maximus seems to have found his characters in Xenophon (Alcibiades in Mem. 1.2.39–48, Critias in Mem. 1.2.29–38, Callias in Sym. 8.37–41, Critobulus in Mem. 1.3.8–15 and Sym. 4.10–28), although lost Socratic literature might be in the background.
= 132A DC
ΕΧ. Ἔτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;
ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἠσθένει.
ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.
ΕΧ. Τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;
ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.
ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;
ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.
Κριτόβουλος T V : ὁ Κριτόβουλος β W P Q S | αὐτοῦ β T : αὐτοῦ Κρίτων δ | Σιμμίας γε β W P V : Σιμμίας τε Q : Σιμμίας τέ γε T : om. S | Φαιδώνδης T Q Λ B2 : Φαιδωνίδης β W P S V Λh
Echecrates: And who happened to be there, Phaedo?
Phaedo: Of the natives, this Apollodorus was there, and Critobulus and his father, and also Hermogenes and Epigenes and Aeschines and Antisthenes. And there was also Ctesippus the Paionian and Menexenus and some others of the natives. But I think Plato was sick.
Echecrates: And were any foreigners present?
Phaedo: Yes, Simmias the Theban, of course, and Cebes, and Phaedondas, and Euclides and Terpsion from Megara.
Echecrates: What about Aristippus and Cleombrotus? Were they there?
Phaedo: Actually they were not. Someone said they were in Aegina.
Echecrates: Was anyone else there?
Phaedo: I think these are the ones, more or less, who were there.
The friends present for Socrates’ death, according to the speaker Phaedo near the opening of Plato’s text, can be divided into the natives and the foreigners. There were also notable absences, Plato himself and Aristippus along with a friend, who were “said to be” in nearby Aegina (a hostile note, according to later tradition: Diog. Laert. 3.36, also reflected in Demetrius, On Style 288). Aristippus is remembered in later tradition as Socrates’ hedonist successor in opposition to the ascetic Antisthenes (see t. 33A–B, 206–7).
This is the only explicit reference to Antisthenes in the corpus of Plato, although it is likely that Plato was mindful of Antisthenes’ role in contemporary Athenian intellectual life throughout his dialogues. Beyond the acknowledgment that Antisthenes was a member of Socrates’ inner circle, his presence implies that Antisthenes “heard” the upcoming accounts of immortality, the philosophical life, the Forms, and the dualist world directly from Socrates, according to Plato’s presentation, without indicating that they were problematic (unless the unnamed interlocutor who intervenes at 103a4 is supposed to be recognizable as Antisthenes). Burnet (1911:xliv), proposes that the acquiescence of the companions is endorsement of the historicity of Socrates’ views as reported here: “Men of such divergent views as Antisthenes and Euclides of Megara are present, but no one asks for a proof of it (the theory of Forms) or even for an explanation.” These doctrines are now more commonly understood as products of Plato’s thought as it developed after the death of Socrates (e.g., Vlastos 1991:66–80); if this is true, there must be heavy irony in Antisthenes’ silent presence.
τῶν ἐπιχωρίων: Plato distinguishes “locals” from the “guests” (Ξένοι), rather than calling them, for example, “Athenians.” This possibly means that the locals included non-citizens, in which case Antisthenes’ status might determine this choice of description. But Hermogenes is a candidate for non-citizen sooner than Antisthenes (Nails 2002:162–64); moreover, Plato might avoid using the term “Athenians” for Socrates’ circle, since it was the “Athenians” who condemned him.
(SSR IH 1, VA 207)
Αἰσχίνης Ξενοφῶντι. . . . (9) τῶν δὲ φίλων παρῆμεν αὐτῷ τελευτῶντι ἐγὼ καὶ Τερψίων καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Φαίδων καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Ἑρμογένης καὶ Κτήσιππος, Πλάτων δὲ καὶ Κλέομβροτος καὶ Ἀρίστιππος ὑστέρουν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων ἐνόσει, τὼ δὲ ἑτέρω περὶ Αἴγιναν ἤστην. ὡς δ’ ἔπιε τὸ φάρμακον, ἐπέστελλεν ἡμῖν τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ θῦσαι ἀλεκτρυόνα· ὀφείλειν γὰρ αὐτῷ κατ’ εὐχήν τινα, ὁπότε ἠσθένει ἀφικόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ μάχης. δακρύσαντες οὖν μετά τινος θαυμασμοῦ ἐκκομίζοντες αὐτὸν κατεθάπτομεν, ὡς τότε ὁ καιρὸς ἐδίδου καὶ αὐτὸς ἐβούλετο.
δὲ ἑτέρω von Fritz : ἑτέρω δὲ P G
Aeschines to Xenophon: . . . (9) When he was dying, we among his friends were there: I and Terpsion and Apollodorus and Phaedo and Antisthenes and Hermogenes and Ctesippus; but Plato and Cleombrotus and Aristippus missed it. For Plato was sick, and the other two were in Aegina. And when he drank the drug, he told us to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius. For he said he owed it according to a vow, when he was ill after returning from the battle at Delium. So we cried, with a certain amazement, and we carried him out and buried him, as the occasion then granted and as he himself wished.
On the Socratic letters, see t. 206.
This is included because lore about the battle of Delium was transmitted by the minor Socratics and perhaps Antisthenes. (See Gigon 1947:173–78 and t. 200.) The majority of this text compresses Plato’s Phaedo, but the interpretation of the cock for Asclepius is added.
ἐκκομίζοντες αὐτὸν κατεθάπτομεν: In Phaed. 115c3–116a1, Plato plays down Socrates’ burial. See t. 84C.
= 133 DC
αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ Ἀνύτῳ τῆς φυγῆς αἴτιος γενέσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ Μελήτῳ τοῦ θανάτου. Ποντικοῖς γὰρ νεανίσκοις κατὰ κλέος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἀφιγμένοις περιτυχὼν ἀπήγαγεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἄνυτον, εἰπὼν ἐν ἤθει σοφώτερον εἶναι τοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐφ’ ᾧ διαγανακτήσαντας τοὺς περιεστῶτας ἐκδιῶξαι αὐτόν.
δὲ F : om. B P | γενέσθαι B P : εἶναι F | μελήτω B P1 : μελίτω F P2 Q | τοῦ Σωκράτους F : τοῦ om. cet. | αὐτοὺς om. F | τὸν Ἄνυτον codd. plur. : τὸν om. F | εἰπὼν om. F | ἐκδιῶξαι codd. plur. : διῶξαι F
And he seems to have been responsible for the exile of Anytus and the execution of Meletus. For he once met some young men from Pontos who had come [to Athens] because of the fame of Socrates, and he led them to Anytus, saying, tongue-in-cheek, that he was wiser than Socrates. The bystanders became agitated by this and drove him out.
This anecdote comes late in Diogenes’ biography of Antisthenes.
The episode is probably fictional, but the anecdote might be modeled on a text Antisthenes wrote or one in which he was a character. Anytus was apparently an interlocutor in a lost Socratic dialogue titled “On Cobblers and Shoemakers” (Dio Chrys. Or. 55.22). Such a dialogue, concerning education in virtue, might be reflected in Xenophon’s Apology and Plato’s Meno as well as later texts. See Dittmar 1912:91–97; Gigon 1947:74–93; Brancacci 2000:248. If Antisthenes was author, Dio knew the text under a title not in the catalog (t. 41A). The titles on virtues in the third tomos have seemed the most likely candidates.
Ἀνύτῳ τῆς φυγῆς αἴτιος: The exile of Anytus probably never occurred: one Anytus, apparently the same man, is still active in Athenian politics in 396 (Hell. Oxy. 6.2).
Μελήτῳ τοῦ θανάτου: The execution of Meletus by stoning is reported in the Suda. This shows that such a story was told in Socratic lore.
Ποντικοῖς γὰρ νεανίσκοις: The young men from Sinope surely include or are modeled on stories of Diogenes of Sinope. The main tradition about Diogenes is that he was driven into exile from Sinope and arrived in Athens alone. In the letters of ps.-Diogenes, Diogenes comes to Athens with a group of friends and encounters Antisthenes (t. 136B). A related story (t. 84B–C) speaks of a single Spartan who came to Athens seeking Socrates.
σοφώτερον . . . τοῦ Σωκράτους: The character Anytus in Plato’s Meno is skeptical that there could be any professional “Sophist” worth paying to teach virtue. Just as Plato ironically portrays Anytus taking a superior stance to Socrates, so might have Antisthenes.
διαγανακτήσαντας τοὺς περιεστῶτας: In the fiction, Antisthenes acts not directly but by staging a debate that affects the bystanders. This is a Socratic tactic reported by Xenophon (e.g., Mem. 2.5 = t. 110; compare Mem. 4.2.3–6), and it is plausible that it appeared in works of the minor Socratics.