= 136A, 3, 135A, 135B DC
[= ps.-Eudocia, Violarium no. 96 “Antisthenes” p. 95.13–96.5 Flach]
(13.) διελέγετο δ’ ἐν τῷ Κυνοσάργει γυμνασίῳ μικρὸν ἄπωθεν τῶν πυλῶν· ὅθεν τινὲς καὶ τὴν κυνικὴν ἐντεῦθεν ὀνομασθῆναι. αὐτός τ’ ἐπεκαλεῖτο Ἁπλοκύων. καὶ πρῶτος ἐδίπλωσε τὸν τρίβωνα, καθά φησι Διοκλῆς, καὶ μόνῳ αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο· βάκτρον τ’ ἀνέλαβε καὶ πήραν. πρῶτον δὲ καὶ Νεάνθης φησὶ ἁπλῶσαι θοἰμάτιον (Σωσικράτης δ’ ἐν τρίτῃ Διαδοχῶν Διόδωρον τὸν Ἀσπένδιον) καὶ πώγωνα καθεῖναι καὶ βάκτρῳ καὶ πήρᾳ χρῆσθαι. (14.) Τοῦτον μόνον ἐκ πάντων <τῶν> Σωκρατικῶν Θεόπομπος ἐπαινεῖ καί φησι δεινόν τ’ εἶναι καὶ δι’ ὁμιλίας ἐμμελοῦς ὑπαγαγέσθαι πάνθ’ ὁντινοῦν. δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων κἀκ τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος Συμποσίου. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης Στωικῆς κατάρξαι· ὅθεν καὶ Ἀθήναιος ὁ ἐπιγραμματοποιὸς περὶ αὐτῶν φησιν οὕτως·
ὦ Στοικῶν μύθων εἰδήμονες, ὦ πανάριστα
δόγματα ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἐνθέμενοι σελίσιν,
τὰν ἀρετὰν ψυχᾶς ἀγαθὸν μόνον· ἅδε γὰρ ἀνδρῶν
μούνα καὶ βιοτὰν ῥύσατο καὶ πόλιας.
σαρκὸς δ’ ἡδυπάθημα φίλον τέλος ἀνδράσιν ἄλλοις,
ἡ μία τῶν Μνήμης ἤνυσε θυγατέρων.
(15.) Οὗτος ἡγήσατο καὶ τῆς Διογένους ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς Κράτητος ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος καρτερίας, αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τῇ πόλει τὰ θεμέλια. ὁ δὲ Ξενοφῶν ἥδιστον μὲν εἶναι περὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας φησὶν αὐτόν, ἐγκρατέστατον δὲ περὶ τἄλλα.
(13) πρῶτον Frobenius : πρῶτος B P F | ἁπλῶσαι B P F : διπλῶσαι Salmasius | καὶ βάκτρω καὶ πήρα B P et Suda : καὶ πείρα καὶ βάκτρω F | χρῆσθαι B P F : χρήσασθαι Suda (14) τῶν Eudocia : om. B P F | ὑπαγαγέσθαι B P : ὑπάγεσθαι F | πάνθ’ P F : παρ’ B | Στοικῶν Marcovich e Pal. Anth. : Στωικῶν B P F | πανάριστα B P2 Q πανάριστοι P1 F | ἡδυπάθημα B P F : ἁδυπάθημα Brunck | ἡ B P F : ἁ Brunck (15) πόλει B P F : πολιτείᾳ Reiske
(13) He used to hold conversations in the Cynosarges gymnasium, a small distance from the city gates. For this reason some [believe] also that the Cynic movement was named from that location. And he himself was called “Haplokuon” [Simple Dog]. He was the first to double his under garment, according to what Diocles says, and he used this only. And he took up the staff and the wallet. Neanthes also says he was the first to use his outer garment only (but Sosikrates in the third book of his Successions says that Diodorus of Aspendus was the first) and to grow a long beard and to use a staff and wallet. (14) Theopompus praises him alone of all the Socratics and says he was clever [at speaking] and able to lead on anyone at all by means of his harmonious company. This is clear from his writings and from the Symposium of Xenophon. He seems to have founded the most manly tradition of the Stoic school. For this reason also Athenaeus the writer of epigrams says the following about them:
Oh experts in the Stoic stories, oh you who set down
The finest principles on your holy pages,
The virtue of the soul is the only good. For this alone
Supports the life of men and their cities.
But one of the daughters of Memory has made
Luxury of the body the chosen aim for other men.
(15) He was the predecessor also of the indifference of Diogenes and the self-control of Crates and the strength of Zeno, setting down himself the foundations for the city. Xenophon says that he was most pleasant in his personal associations, and most self-controlled in other things.
The sayings and anecdotes of Antisthenes end in section 13 of Diogenes’ sixth book (see t. 134), and he appends this discussion of Antisthenes’ position in the history of the Cynics, Socratics, and Stoics before concluding the biography with the catalog of writings (t. 41A) and necrology with epigram (t. 37 and 38A). Compare t. 135A, from the end of the sixth book. There is no explicit notice of any “students” (μαθηταί) of Antisthenes, as there is for other figures (Diogenes at 6.76, Crates at 6.93, Zeno of Citium at 7.36–38): these were possibly accounted for in the earlier conversion anecdote (t. 12A).
This is the oldest source for most of the information transmitted, apart from the Cynic epistles. Diogenes’ citation of his sources allows us to trace some of the Hellenistic debate on the origin of the Cynics and their relationship to the Stoics. Dudley’s thesis (1937:1–15) that Antisthenes was fully distinct from the Cynics takes support from the criteria disputed in this passage. On Dudley, his reasoning, and the scholarly background to his thesis (esp. Delatte 1922), see Döring 1995 and Kalouche 1999:13. On the larger question of Antisthenes’ Cynicism see Giannantoni 1993 and Long 1996 (“The Socratic Tradition”).
(13) διελέγετο δ’ ἐν τῷ Κυνοσάργει γυμνασίῳ: The Cynosarges gymnasium was allegedly a site open to “illegitimate” Athenians (νόθοι) and other metics, in a sanctuary sacred to Heracles. Hence it has seemed appropriate to Antisthenes’ traditional profile, and a coherent account of the origins of the Cynic school from this location of Antisthenes’ alleged school was standard in the nineteenth century. (See Decleva Caizzi 1966:120–22.) But skepticism now prevails, especially under doubts that Antisthenes was the first “Cynic” to claim that name. (See SSR v.4:222–26; Billot 1993; Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996:4–5.) In late antiquity, one explanation for the name “Cynic” derived it from the Cynosarges gymnasium, but its source in the nickname “Dog” was highly preferred (t. 22B). Socrates held philosophical conversation in gymnasiums according to Plato’s depictions (Lysis, Charmides), and a similar location can be imagined for Antisthenes on occasion, even if there was no fixed location for a school. The Cynosarges is featured as a destination for Socrates in the ps.-Platonic Axiochus (364a1 and 372a15, the first and last sentences), although the discussion takes place while he is on his way.
αὐτός τ’ ἐπεκαλεῖτο Ἁπλοκύων: Antisthenes liked to assign nicknames (see t. 41A titles 1.5 and 6.3 comments, 143A, 147) and might have attracted nicknames to himself: two possibilities are in t. 115 and 38B. Thus it is plausible that he received this nickname, which might have been hostile. Diogenes Laertius implies that the name was given during his life. It is also plausible that it was given after his death, in reference to the nickname Diogenes of Sinope had definitely acquired, ὁ Κύων. On the possibility that Aristotle refers to Antisthenes as “the dog,” see Goulet-Cazé 1996 and t. 51A notes; but in t. 150A, Aristotle refers to “the Antistheneans,” not “the Cynics.” On the connections between the prefix Ἁπλο- (simple) and Antisthenes’ theory of language, see Porter 1996. On the possibility that references to “dogs” in the Platonic corpus, specifically in Euthydemus, might have special connections with Antisthenes, see Rappe 2000.
πρῶτος ἐδίπλωσε τὸν τρίβωνα: The origin of the Cynic costume—which consisted in (1) a single, doubled garment (rather than the traditional dress with two separate pieces) for warmth and modesty, (2) a staff as symbol of authority to speak, and (3) a wallet as symbol for itinerancy and self-sufficiency—had been disputed since at least the second century BCE, according to Diogenes here. Two Hellenistic historians of philosophy, Diocles of Magnesia (first or second century BCE) and Neanthes of Cyzicus (third century BCE), credit Antisthenes with inventing the folding of the single garment, although they name the garment differently and probably describe the innovation differently (depending whether the manuscripts’ reading ἁπλῶσαι or the traditional conjecture διπλῶσαι is read in the clause for Neanthes). Diocles calls it a τρίβων, a term used originally of Spartan clothing and otherwise mostly in reference to philosophers who were apparently accustomed to wear out their clothes (etymology τρίβω, “rub”). It must have replaced the fancier, originally Ionian, linen tunic, the χιτών, such as Antisthenes implies (in a speech attributed to him by Xenophon, t. 82.38) he does not need. Neanthes, who might have written the earliest treatment of this question, calls the garment a ἱμάτιον, an outer cloak such as an Athenian might have worn over the χιτών, and this squares with the instruction Antisthenes reportedly gave to Diogenes (t. 34F). Whether Neanthes said Antisthenes was the first to use only the cloak or the first to double the cloak, the point is the same, denial of the need for two garments. Both writers apparently add that Antisthenes invented also the use of the staff and wallet. (Such is the sense of Marcovich’s text. It is possible to repunctuate such that Sosicrates attributed these accoutrements to Diodorus, not Neanthes to Antisthenes: this is the reading of Dudley 1937:6.) In an anecdote reported twice by Diogenes, Socrates chides Antisthenes for always turning the torn part of his τρίβων toward view, hence making a show of his frugality (t. 15A–B); Aelian’s variant refers to the ἱμάτιον (t. 15C). Antisthenes has at least two rivals for the claim of inventing the doubled or single garment: in the present passage, Diogenes cites Sosicrates of Rhodes (second century BCE) for attributing the innovation to Diodorus of Aspendus, the Pythagorean figure from the fourth century BCE, and this attribution is confirmed by references in Middle Comedy (Delatte 1922; Dudley 1937:6–7; Burkert 1972:202–4). Diogenes Laertius credits also Diogenes of Sinope in 6.22, where he cites his sources vaguely at first (κατά τινας) and then specifies them as three little-known figures who might have been characters in a dialogue by the Peripatetic Theophrastus (as argued in von Fritz 1926 and endorsed in Dudley 1937:6–7). The assumption that the Cynic costume had one definite inventor might be Hellenistic or Peripatetic. Socrates himself was well known for the simple dress made necessary by his neglect of the pursuit of wealth, as we know from Plato’s Symposium (174b3–4). In a climactic scene in that text (219b5–c1) Alcibiades throws his own ἱμάτιον around Socrates’ body because Socrates has none, and then Alcibiades puts his hands under Socrates’ τρίβων. Given the possibility that a text by Antisthenes stands behind the Symposium texts of both Plato and Xenophon and accounts for some of the correspondences that have been hard to explain (see t. 41A title 2.4), it is not impossible that Antisthenes did first thematize the cloak and tunic and the sufficiency of the tunic alone, taking his impetus from the life of Socrates.
(14) Θεόπομπος . . . δεινόν τ’ εἶναι: (FGrHist 115 F 295) The quality of being clever at speaking (δεινὸς λέγειν) is denied by Plato’s Socrates (Ap. 17a4–b6), in reference to speeches before a large audience. Socrates, with Antisthenes, was recognized for his persuasive powers over individuals and not groups (t. 69), and the same should probably be attributed to Antisthenes here because the addressee mentioned in the following phrase is singular: although Antisthenes’ range of addressee is total, he deals with them one at a time. (Compare also Xen. Mem. 4.6.15, where Socrates calls Homer’s Odysseus an “infallible rhetor.”)
δι’ ὁμιλίας ἐμμελοῦς ὑπαγαγέσθαι πάνθ’ ὁντινοῦν: The vocabulary has associations with rhetorical power: on ὁμιλία see t. 100A notes; for μέλος see t. 187.5. It also has sexual undertones: ὁμιλία can indicate sexual as well as conversational “intercourse”; ὑπαγαγέσθαι has the sense of subjection, if not also seduction. The word is repeated in Xenophon’s testimony below, §15.
δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων κἀκ τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος Συμποσίου: Diogenes compares Theopompus’ statement to Xenophon’s text about Antisthenes’ art of procuring, μαστροπεία (t. 13A), and presumably Theopompus, too, is referring to this passage. Alternatively, Antisthenes’ speech on his wealth (t. 82) could be what charmed Theopompus (so Caizzi 1964:95). Whether it was Theopompus or Diogenes who found Antisthenes to be portrayed as harmonious company in Xenophon’s Symposium, this is exactly counter to the virtually unanimous judgment in the modern tradition (e.g., Huss 1999 [Xenophons Symposion]:310; Patzer 1970:87–88) descending from Bruns 1896 and possibly Wieland 1800–1802. Either Theopompus was drawn into a polemic that revised Antisthenes and occluded part of Xenophon’s meaning, which Diogenes also missed, or ancient readers looked to different aspects of Xenophon’s text than modern readers. On Theopompus’ hostility toward Plato, which could have caused him to favor Antisthenes, see Brancacci 1993.
τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης Στωικῆς: The word for “manly” is etymologically related to “bravery” but might have militaristic associations: see t. 198, where it is used of Alcibiades.
Ἀθήναιος ὁ ἐπιγραμματοποιός: Athenaeus the epigrammatist, who uses a Doric dialect, is known only from Diogenes Laertius. The same epigram is cited at 7.30, for the death of Zeno of Citium, and another on Epicurus is cited at 10.12. (Both are also in the Palatine Anthology, at 9.496 and 4.43 respectively.) Diogenes says that this epigram is about the Stoics (περὶ αὐτῶν), not about Antisthenes himself, but it must use language that Diogenes or his tradition associates with Antisthenes, that is, Stoic conceptions that he “founded” (κατάρξαι). The main point that Antisthenes established for the Stoics is presumably that virtue of the soul is the only good (τὰν ἀρετὰν ψυχᾶς ἀγαθὸν μόνον). For other ancient accounts of the Stoic and Cynic succession from Antisthenes, see t. 137A–B, 138A–B.
(15) καὶ τῆς Διογένους ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς Κράτητος ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος καρτερίας: These three nouns for the moral virtue of Diogenes, Crates, and Zeno are closely related, and Diogenes Laertius or his source might provide a merely rhetorical variation: the three phrases share a rhythm. On their collective connection to ἰσχύς, the virtue of “strength” that Antisthenes privileged (t. 134c), see Goulet-Cazé 1986:146–47. Compare the Socratic qualities Antisthenes first admired, τὸ καρτερικόν and τὸ ἀπαθές (t. 12A). Compare also Cicero’s apparent translation of these terms in t. 138B, where they refer to qualities of dialecticians, not general moral agents. ἀπάθεια must describe Diogenes of Sinope’s emotional indifference to, for example, the hot and cold extremes of the weather (Diog. Laert. 6.23); more seriously, Julian (To the Uneducated Cynics 192A: see t. 37C), speaking of Diogenes’ purpose in eating raw meat, states that ἀπάθεια is the ethical goal or τέλος for the Cynic school. (This is one of several goals he attributes to them in the text: see Goulet-Cazé 1986:35.) In Stoicism, ἀπάθεια becomes the standard term for the sage’s resistance to improper emotions (πάθη): the Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια does not eliminate all emotion but allows for “pre-emotions” (προπάθειαι) and “good emotions” (εὐπάθειαι) (Graver 2007:35–60). ἐγκράτεια is the foremost virtue attributed by Xenophon (Mem. 1.5) to Socrates, who can both restrict his desires for bodily satisfaction and resist his valid desires, when circumstances do not allow them to be filled. (Joël 1893 opened the inquiry into Antisthenes’ role in supplying this image of Socrates to Xenophon.) καρτερία is synonymous with the second aspect of ἐγκράτεια: whereas intemperance (or ἀκρασία) is the vice of unbridled desire, καρτερία is the ability to resist valid desire (e.g., hunger, thirst, and need of sleep) in the service of a higher good: see Xen. Sym. 4.5.9–10; see also Brancacci 1993:41–43 (Brancacci wants to associate this passage with Antisthenes).
αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τῇ πόλει τὰ θεμέλια: This statement suggests that the Republic of Zeno and therefore probably that of Diogenes also were based on Antisthenes’ foundations. See t. 41A title 3.3, 138A. Since the passage is otherwise about ethical virtue and since politics is mentioned only in the epigram, editors (reported fully in Marcovich) have emended πόλει to σχολῇ (“leisure”: see t. 82) or πραγματείᾳ (“practicality”: see t. 134d).
= 136n. DC (SSR IH 9)
τρίτη αἰτία, ὅτι φρουρητικὸν ζῷον ὁ κύων· ἐφρούρουν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ δόγματα τῆς φιλοσοφίας διὰ τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ μέγα ἐφρόνουν ἐπὶ τούτῳ· φαίη γὰρ ἂν ἡ τύχη πρὸς Ἀντισθένην τὸν προστάτην τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης οὕτως·
ἐννέα δὴ προέηκα τανυγλώχινας ὀιστούς,
τοῦτον δ’ οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν κύνα λυσσητῆρα,
ὅτι, φησί, “τοσαύτας αὐτῷ συμφορὰς ἐπήγαγον, καὶ οὐκ ἠδυνήθην αὐτοῦ καταβαλεῖν τὸ φρόνημα.” αὕτη καὶ ἡ τρίτη αἰτία.
προστάτην codd. plur. : προστάντα H | ἐννέα codd. : ὀκτὼ : Homer Θ 297 | καταβαλεῖν K : καταβάλει H P b | ἡ τρίτη codd. plur. : ἡ om. K
The third reason is that the dog is an animal for guarding, and also they guarded the doctrines of philosophy through their demonstrations, and they took great pride in this. For Fortune might speak to Antisthenes, the founder of this sect, like this:
I have thrown out nine long-pointed arrows,
But I cannot hit this mad raging dog.
[Il. 8.297, 299]
That is, she says, “I drove so many misfortunes on him, and I could not strike down his purpose.” And this is the third reason.
Elias (the name assigned to the author of this Neo-Platonic commentary from the later sixth century CE, about whom nothing is known) gives seven styles for the naming of a philosophical sect. (See also t. 153C.) The Cynics illustrate the fifth style, a sect named from a way of life. He then gives four reasons for the name “Cynic,” of which this is the third. The first is their indifference to custom and manners in their pursuit of what is good or bad by nature. The second is their shamelessness, which attacks those hostile to philosophy. The fourth is their ability to recognize a friend and a foe. Elias’ fuller text is printed in SSR as IH 9, in an assembly with parallels from Simplicius, Ammonius, Olympiodorus, and John Philoponus. Only Elias and Philoponus (t. 22C) mention Antisthenes by name.
This passage sets Antisthenes as founder of the Cynics (but see t. 153C for a conflicting statement by Elias). More important, it preserves a fragment from a literary passage in which Antisthenes and Fortune were characters and in which verses from Homer were reused in a Cynic setting. Stobaeus (2.8.21) preserves nearly the same passage, quoting only Il. 8.299 and attributing it to Diogenes of Sinope, who appears to speak of a battle between Fortune and himself: Διογένους. Διογένης ἔφη νομίζειν ὁρᾶν τὴν Τύχην ἐνορούουσαν αὐτῷ καὶ λέγουσαν . . . (From Diogenes. Diogenes said he thought he saw Fortune assaulting him and saying . . .). Plausibly Diogenes was the author, and plausibly he wrote about Antisthenes: the pronoun αὐτῷ could be either a third-person anaphoric pronoun or reflexive, depending on the original context. Other candidates for author, if both Diogenes and Antisthenes were characters in the text, would be Timon of Phlius, Bion of Borysthenes (see t. 6), Crates of Thebes, or Menippus of Gadara. It is possible that the attribution to Antisthenes is fallacious and that only Diogenes battled Fortune in this story.
τὰ δόγματα τῆς φιλοσοφίας: Antisthenes appears dogmatic in the doxographic tradition (e.g., t. 134), and some have argued or assumed that he is essentially dogmatic (e.g., Brancacci 1990:221).
διὰ τῶν ἀποδείξεων: Elias might refer to performative demonstrations (as in t. 159, for which he is a source) or demonstrations in speech (see t. 13A, 157C). A special tie between the Cynics and demonstration might be implied here.
φαίη γὰρ ἂν ἡ τύχη: A personified or more lightly reified Fortune (or chance or fate) has several functions in classical Greek discourse. On a human level, it indicates absence of knowledge and technique, often expressed in the opposition τέχνη versus τύχη. (See Schiefsky 2005:5–13, commenting on On Ancient Medicine 1.1–2.) On a supernatural or metaphysical level, it indicates absence of divine purpose (e.g., Pl. Tim. 25e4). In the Hellenistic period, Fortune was worshiped as a positive divine power in its own right (Goulet-Cazé 1993:127–28). Philosophy, especially for the Cynics and Stoics, was supposed to fortify the wise man against suffering from the waves of fortune, whatever its ontology. Some, perhaps the Epicureans, seem to have thought fortune was the name popularly given to random or mechanical positive powers that were real in so far as they had to be reckoned with emotionally; the Stoics probably thought fortune was negative, the absence of knowledge, and hence an illusion. (For this opposition, see, e.g., fors versus ratio as the cause of happiness in Horace, Serm. 1.1.1–3.) In this story, the personified Fortune, whether it is a power or a deficiency, cannot get the best of Antisthenes. Antisthenes’ lifestyle as described in t. 82 could be compatible with a battle or defense against Fortune, but the term does not appear.
ἐννέα δὴ προέηκα: The speaker in the Iliad is Teucer, who refers to his efforts to hit Hector. The Cynic text has changed the number of blows from eight to nine: unless this is a mindless error, it might have significance for the trials of the Cynic hero. In the Iliad, there are eight victims Teucer has struck down in his attempt to hit Hector.
οὐκ ἠδυνήθην αὐτοῦ καταβαλεῖν τὸ φρόνημα: Strength of the intelligence is a trait of Antisthenes’ Heracles (see t. 41A title 4.2). The term φρόνημα, by contrast with φρόνησις, suggests will and stubbornness, not just intellectual capacity.
= 136C DC (SSR IH 9)
(ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν αἱ τῶν φιλοσόφων αἱρέσεις λέγονται ἑπταχῶς) . . . ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς ζωῆς ὡς οἱ κυνικοί, ὧν ἡγήσατο Ἀντισθένης.
(Since indeed the sects of the philosophers are named in seven ways) . . . or from their form of life, as the Cynics, whose leader was Antisthenes.
Like t. 22B, the text lists the styles of name for philosophical schools.
= 136B, 183E DC
[= Hesychius of Miletus, Onomatologium no. 61 “Antisthenes” p. 16.12–21 Flach]
Ἀντισθένης Ἀθηναῖος ἀπὸ ῥητόρων φιλόσοφος Σωκρατικός. ὅστις Περιπατητικὸς ἐκλήθη πρῶτον, εἶτα ἐκύνισεν. . . . οὗτος οὖν καὶ τῆς Κυνικῆς κατήρξατο φιλοσοφίας, ἥτις οὕτως ἐκλήθη διὰ τὸ ἐν Κυνοσάργει τῷ γυμνασίῳ διδάξαι αὐτόν. καὶ Διογένους δὲ καθηγητὴς γέγονε τοῦ Κυνὸς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.
ἐκλήθη . . . ἐκύνισεν om. S | Διογένους ed. Chalcondylis 1499 : Διογένης codd.
Antisthenes of Athens, from the rhetors [became] a Socratic philosopher. He was called a Peripatetic at first, and then he became a Cynic. . . . This man, then, also founded the Cynic philosophy, which is so named because he taught in the Cynosarges gymnasium. And he became the teacher of Diogenes the Dog and the rest.
This is the end of Hesychius’ entry for Antisthenes. The Suda adds his death anecdote (t. 37D).
This testimonium shows that the Suda’s sources confused Antisthenes the Socratic with the later Peripatetic Antisthenes of Rhodes. It thus explains the false attribution of the title Magikos to Antisthenes the Socratic (t. 41D).
Κυνοσάργει τῷ γυμνασίῳ: See t. 22A.
Διογένους: The manuscript tradition makes a unanimous error, nominative Διογένης for genitive Διογένους (“And also Diogenes became the leader of the Dog and of the rest”). The effect is to distinguish Diogenes from Antisthenes, rather than making Antisthenes his teacher.
καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν: This probably refers to the serial succession of the Cynics, Diogenes’ pupils and so on, not other disciples of Antisthenes.
= 130A DC
Σωκράτους δὲ ἀκούσας Ἀντισθένης μὲν ἐκύνισε, Πλάτων δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν ἀνεχώρησε.
And after following Socrates, Antisthenes became a Cynic, and Plato withdrew to the Academy.
Clement outlines the history of Greek philosophy.
For discussion of the Socratic succession that traces Antisthenes’ line to the Cynics and Stoics, see t. 138A–B, 139A.
. . . cur non aliquando possint omnia quoque paria usu venire, ut exsistant per huiuscemodi stellarum concursiones et similitudines, Socratae simul et Antisthenae et Platones multi genere, forma, ingenio, moribus, vita omni et morte pari?
Platones F O X Π N X : Platone G Q : om. V
Why could not all things [in the skies] sometimes also run equal, so that because of these kinds of encounters and likenesses of the stars there would come into being at the same time many Socrateses and Antistheneses and Platos, with equal birth, appearance, intelligence, traits of character, complete course of life and death?
Gellius recalls a lecture by Favorinus refuting the astrological wisdom of the Chaldeans.
The “genius” of each Socrates and Plato was presumably unique, and it is striking that Antisthenes is placed with them. The passage has rough parallels in Cicero’s On Divination: at the relevant point in the argument (2.47.97), Cicero appeals to the unique “genius” of Homer. There is little evidence that Favorinus noticed Antisthenes, although he refers often to Diogenes of Sinope. Antisthenes and Diogenes appear together in a citation from Favorinus in t. 52C.
= 137 DC
ἡγεμόνα μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὑρεῖν, ἐφ’ ὃν ἀνενέγκαι χρὴ πρῶτον αὐτό, εἰ καί τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν Ἀντισθένει τοῦτο καὶ Διογένει προσήκειν. τοῦτο γοῦν ἔοικεν Οἰνόμαος οὐκ ἀτόπως λέγειν· “Ὁ κυνισμὸς οὔτε ἀντισθενισμός ἐστιν οὔτε διογενισμός.” λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν κυνῶν ὅτι καὶ ὁ μέγας Ἡρακλῆς, ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἴτιος κατέστη, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τούτου τοῦ βίου παράδειγμα τὸ μέγιστον κατέλιπεν ἀνθρώποις.
αὐτό U: αὐτόν Klimek | ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν τις αἴτιος U : τις del. Cobet | οὗτος κατέλιπεν U : οὗτος del. Cobet
It is not easy to identify the leader [of the Cynics], to whom one should attribute Cynicism first, even if some assume this role fits Antisthenes and Diogenes. For this statement by Oenomaus seems not out of place: “Cynicism is neither Antistheneanism nor Diogeneanism.” In fact, the nobler of the Cynics say that also the great Heracles, just as he was responsible for our other goods, so also he left to humans the greatest example of this way of life.
Julian’s oration rehabilitates old Cynicism and Diogenes of Sinope against contemporary attacks on the austerity of the old Cynics. This passage comes after Julian’s discussion of philosophy in general, as he turns his focus to Cynicism.
This shows that the identity of the “original Cynic” was already an ancient problem in the second century CE, the time of Oenomaus.
Οἰνόμαος: Oenomaus was a Cynic from Gadara, of the second century CE, two centuries before Julian. Elsewhere Julian attacks him, for general “shamelessness” and irreverence for oracles.
οὔτε ἀντισθενισμός . . . οὔτε διογενισμός: Some philosophical identities took their ancient name from a single founder, such as Platonism or Epicureanism. Oenomaus points out that Cynicism is not among these. This discussion must have contributed to the full and systematic treatment by Elias in t. 22B (see also the parallels in SSR IH 9).
καὶ ὁ μέγας Ἡρακλῆς: Antisthenes’ character Heracles (or his book title) seems to have been known as “the great Heracles” (t. 85) or “the greater Heracles” (t. 41A title 4.2). The adjective might here designate the scale of Antisthenes’ book, in distinction from his shorter treatments listed in the tenth tomos, or it might designate the way Heracles is represented in the longer story. See t. 92–99.
= 151, 152 DC
[= Arsenius p. 108.5–11 Walz]
Ἔσκωπτέ τε Πλάτωνα ὡς τετυφωμένον. πομπῆς γοῦν γινομένης ἵππον θεασάμενος φρυακτήν φησι πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνα· “Ἐδόκεις μοι καὶ σὺ ἵππος ἂν εἶναι λαμπρυντής·” τοῦτο δὲ ἐπεὶ καὶ συνεχὲς ὁ Πλάτων ἵππον ἐπῄνει. καί ποτ’ ἐλθὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν νοσοῦντα καὶ θεασάμενος λεκάνην ἔνθα ὁ Πλάτων ἐμημέκει ἔφη· “Χολὴν μὲν ὁρῶ ἐνταῦθα, τῦφον δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ.”
τε F : om. B P Φ et Arsen. | γοῦν F : οὖν B P Φ et Arsen. | γινομένης B P Φ : γενομένης F et Arsen. | ἐδόκεις B P F Φ et Arsen. : δοκεῖς Richards | εἶπεν ἐπεὶ B P F : ἐπεὶ Φ et Arsen. : B P F : | καὶ del. Marcovich | συνεχὲς B P F : συνεχῶς Φ et Arsen.
And he chided Plato that he was inflated with arrogance. For when a parade was underway, he saw a hot-tempered horse and said to Plato, “I should think you, too, would be a proud horse.” He said this because Plato was constantly praising the horse. And once he [Antisthenes] went to him [Plato] when he was ill and, after seeing the basin where Plato had vomited, he said, “I see the bile there, but the arrogance I do not see.”
This pair of anecdotes initiates a section in Diogenes’ life of Antisthenes (6.7–10) illustrating his life in Athens, rather than his opinions in the abstract.
This is the only direct evidence for Antisthenes’ share in the mission of deflating “bloated arrogance,” τῦφος, a core mission of the Cynics and, probably through them, Timon of Phlius and the Skeptics. (See also t. 111.) It attests to hostility between Antisthenes and Plato: compare t. 148–49, 41A title 6.3, 28–30. See also Riginos 1976:99–100 (anecdotes 46–47) and anecdotes 71, 111; Kindstrand 1976:195; Long 1978:74–75; Decleva Caizzi 1980.
τετυφωμένον: The fight against inflated moral arrogance, τῦφος, is more prominent in later Cynicm than in Antisthenes’ fragments, but see Decleva Caizzi 1980 on the possibility that the anecdote has historical basis: Decleva Caizzi notes that τῦφος in Pl. Phaedr. 230a3–6 seems to be an etymological allegorical understanding of the beast Typhon, and so the passage could allude to Antisthenes’ contemporary activities in the criticism of divine beings in myth and poetry. A similar anecdote about Cynic attacks on Plato’s τῦφος occurs in Diogenes Laertius’ life of Diogenes of Sinope (6.26): there Plato is allowed to reply that the attack on τῦφος is itself a form of τῦφος.
λαμπρυντής: This is a grammatical noun, derived from the causative verb λαμπρύνω (make bright), rather than the adjective λαμπρός (bright), and attested only here. It is possibly Antisthenes’ coinage and joke or a coinage and joke of the Cynicizing anecdote. The adjectival form λαμπρυντικός, “bright” or “making bright,” is attested later. The suffix is ambiguous. The nominal suffix –τής is for a noun of agent, so Plato could be “a horse, a performer of glamour.” But the nominal suffix -της (with different accent and gender) was Plato’s marker for the hypostasis or reification of a quality (τὸ ποῖον) into an entity (ἡ ποιότης) (Theaet. 182a: see t. 149B-1, 151B). By this interpretation, Plato could be “a horse, the essence of glamour itself.” “Horseness” cannot be seen and so might not exist, according to Antisthenes’ criticism of the theory of Forms (t. 149), but he might be joking that “glamorous-ness itself” is a candidate for what is real with the same degree of likelihood that “horseness” is real and that if it were real, it would be instantiated in (or identical to) Plato.
συνεχὲς ὁ Πλάτων ἵππον ἐπῄνει: On the importance of horses and “horseness” in Antisthenes’ ontology and in dispute with Plato, see t. 149 and 72A. A further anecdote (Diog. Laert. 3.39) presents Plato as wary of incurring “horse pride” (ἱπποτυφία): this must be the Platonists’ response to the Cynics’ charge.
χολὴν μὲν ὁρῶ ἐνταῦθα, τῦφον δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ: The formulation of the sentence must be a reference to Antisthenes’ dispute with Plato over the reality of Forms. See the parallel verbs in the quotation repeated in t. 149, and compare the parallel anecdote between Plato and Diogenes of Sinope in Diog. Laert. 6.53. There is no play here on the language or suffix Plato uses for Forms, only the opposition between sense perception and intellectual perception. Bile is visible in the basin, but the moral quality for which it is the sign cannot be seen. Diogenes of Sinope is also on record for noting the χολή, or bilous character, of the Socratic Euclides (Diog. Laert. 6.24), presented as a better name for Euclides’ teaching style, or σχολή.
= 150 DC
ἀκούσας ποτὲ ὅτι Πλάτων αὐτὸν κακῶς λέγει, “Βασιλικόν,” ἔφη, “καλῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν.”
Πλάτων B P Φ : ὁ Πλάτων F | αὐτὸν κακῶς B P Φ : κακῶς αὐτὸν F
Hearing once that Plato was speaking badly of him, “It is kingly,” he said, “to act well and receive a bad reputation.”
This anecdote appears prominently, near the beginning of Diogenes Laertius’ account of Antisthenes’ wisdom through his sayings: see t. 3.
This quotation of Antisthenes probably comes from his Cyrus (t. 86). A setting was apparently created from a likely antagonist in Antisthenes’ own life, and the product is a plausible anecdote. On the fabrication of anecdotes, see Wehrli 1973.
= 154 DC
Σωκρατικοῦ. Σωκρατικὸς ὁ κυνικὸς ἀκούσας ποτὲ πονηροῦ τὸν τρόπον κακῶς λέγοντος Πλάτωνα, “Παῦσαι,” ἔφη· “οὔτε γὰρ κακῶς λέγων ἐκεῖνον πιστευθήσῃ οὔτε ἐκεῖνος σὲ ἐπαινῶν.”
lemm. habet M A : sine lemm. rosetum Macarii Chrysocephali: Κράτης ὁ κυνικὸς coni. Gaiford : vel <Ἀντισθένης> ὁ Σωκρατικὸς Hense | post γὰρ add. σὺ A m. rec.
From a Socratic. The Socratic Cynic, when he once heard a man wretched in his character speaking badly of Plato, he said, “Stop. You will not be trusted when you speak badly of him, nor will he be trusted when he praises you.”
Stobaeus’ chapter is “On Vice” (Περὶ Κακίας), a relatively brief collection of forty-seven passages that complements ch. 3.1, “On Virtue,” which has 210 entries.
Understanding the joke requires an understanding of philosophical (Cynic) rejection of flattery.
Σωκρατικὸς ὁ κυνικός: Stob. 2.31.33 (t. 162) refers to Antisthenes as “Antisthenes the Socratic philosopher,” but Stobaeus elsewhere uses only Antisthenes’ name. Contrast Epiphanius’ “τὸ πρῶτον Σωκρατικός, ἔπειτα Κυνικός” (t. 107).
πονηροῦ τὸν τρόπον κακῶς λέγοντος: The credibility of what is said depends on the moral value of the person who says it. This principle might be embedded in Antisthenes’ criticism of Homer (see esp. t. 186, 189); compare t. 41A title 1.1.
Παῦσαι: This connotes “firm but friendly remonstrance” in its common use in Attic tragedy (Finglass 2011:510). Possibly the original form of Antisthenes’ apophthegma did scan as trimeters, in parody of tragedy.
ἐκεῖνος σὲ ἐπαινῶν: Plato might respond as a Cynic, welcoming misplaced abuse from base enemies (see t. 109 with further refs.). But his praise of the base person would be itself an error, perhaps one Plato would make through his own willingness to flatter.
= 153 DC
ὁ αὐτὸς Πλάτωνός ποτε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μακρολογήσαντος εἶπεν· “οὐχ ὁ λέγων μέτρον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀκούων τοῦ λέγοντος.”
The same man [Antisthenes], when Plato had once discoursed at length in his school, said, “The speaker is not the measure of the audience, but the audience of the speaker.”
[= Cod. Vat. Gr. 1144 f. 231v.]
Πλάτων θεασάμενος Ἀντισθένην ἐν τινι διατριβῇ μακρολογοῦντα σιγᾶν ἐκέλευεν· τοῦ δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιζητοῦντος ἔφη· “μέτρον ἀριστόν ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ λέγων ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀκούων.”
Plato, upon seeing Antisthenes discoursing at length in a diatribe, asked him to be quiet. And when he [Antisthenes] asked for the reason, he said, “The best measure is not the speaker, but the audience.”
[= ps.-Maximus Confessor 40.27/35 Ihm; Arsenius p. 422.15–17 Walz]
Πλάτων Ἀντισθένους ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ ποτε μακρολογήσαντος, “ἀγνοεῖς,” εἶπεν, “ὅτι τοῦ λόγου μέτρον ἐστίν, οὐχ ὁ λέγων, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀκούων;”
ἐν τῇ Stob. : ἐν τινι ps.-Max. | μακρολογήσαντος Stob. et ps.-Max. : μικρολογήσαντος Arsen.
Plato, when Antisthenes had once discoursed at length in his diatribe, said, “Are you unaware that the measure of the speech is not the speaker, but the audience?”
On the Gnomologium Vaticanum, see t. 5. This apophthegma appears twice there, once attributed to Antisthenes and, in the section on Plato, reversed and used by Plato against him. The second version is the one repeated in the other gnomologia. The parallel with t. 104A (listed just before in the Gnomologium Vaticanum) and the similarity to an anecdote involving Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.26) suggest that an attribution to Antisthenes originally is plausible, and a hostile tradition reversed it. Stobaeus’ chapter is “On Idle Rambling” (Περὶ ἀδολεσχίας), and Maximus’ is “On Talking at Painful Length” (Περὶ γλωσσαλγίας).
As in other cases (compare t. 27, 148, 149), the tension between Antisthenes and Plato preserved in anecdote runs both ways. If Antisthenes performed or wrote long harangues (see t. 53, 54, 208; compare t. 41B), this would explain attribution of the complaint to Plato. But Antisthenes is also presented as being curt to Plato (t. 148) and concise in many quips (e.g., t. 100A–B, 101B, 102, 116).
ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μακρολογήσαντος (A): Plato had accused the Sophists of extended speaking, which was less didactic and more prone to deception than Socrates’ dialectical method of question and answer (Prot. 328e ff., 334c ff.; Gorgias 449b; Hip. Min. 373a). But the Cynics might have lodged the same charge against all dogmatists, which include Plato when he speaks “in his school”: that their statements exceed their own credibility. (See Sternbach ad loc.)
ἐν τινι διατριβῇ μακρολογοῦντα (B)/ ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ ποτε μακρολογήσαντος (C): The charge against Antisthenes is put when he holds forth in monologue, perhaps to an indeterminate audience in a public performance. The anecdote might assume that Antisthenes delivered stereotypical Cynic “diatribe.” Given the thought expressed in t. 104A–B, however, as well as Antisthenes’ apparent attention to Socrates’ method of question and answer (t. 41A title 7.3) and his interrogating tactics as portrayed by Xenophon (t. 78, 83, 185A, 186), it seems that Antisthenes put high value on engagement with his audience and his pupils (t. 34A.4). Plausiby he was sometimes unsuccessful at this (t. 34C), and when engagement failed, the next best tactic was long-winded preaching. Arsenius’ reading, μικρολογήσαντος, might imply that Antisthenes’ subject matter was trivial. (Compare t. 41B.)
μέτρον ἀριστόν (B): On the term μέτρον, compare t. 160, 82.43. On the scale and unity of a particular λόγος, compare t. 54.11, 150A.4.
= 156 DC
ὁ αὐτὸς Διονυσίου λυπουμένου, ὅτι θνητός ἐστιν, “ἁλλὰ σύ γε,” ἔφη, “προελθόντος τοῦ χρόνου λυπηθήσῃ, ὅτι μηδέπω ἀποθνῄσκεις.”
μηδέπω ἀποθνῄσκεις Sternberg | μηδέπω ἀποθνήσκης cod. : μηδέπω ἀποθνήσκων V
The same man [Antisthenes], when Dionysius was lamenting that he was mortal, said, “But in your case, as time goes by you will lament that you are not yet dying.”
On the Gnomologium Vaticanum, see t. 5.
This could be evidence for older anecdotes about interaction between Antisthenes and Dionysius of Syracuse, whose court gives the setting for many episodes in the Cynic epistles. (See t. 206, 207.) Surely Antisthenes never went to Sicily, and probably he never met Dionysius. Aeschines is a more likely player in this anecdote, if it has a historical basis. See also t. 33B, 128. The age of the anecdotes in the Gnomologium Vaticanum is unknown, but its composition is placed in the early empire: see t. 5.
σύ γε . . . λυπηθήσῃ: This implies that Dionysius had never acquired a mind and, in Antisthenes’ opinion, never would. See t. 105.
= 155 DC
(SSR IVA 19)
ἐπέσκωπτε δ’ Ἀντισθένην ἀεὶ διὰ τὴν στρυφνότητα.
And he [Aristippus] was always mocking Antisthenes because of his harshness.
This sentence appears in the Suda’s second biography of Aristippus, which devotes most of its space to an anecdote in the Sicilian court involving Plato. It might share a source with the Cynic epistles.
There is scant direct ancient evidence for antagonism between Antisthenes and Aristippus (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:150), and the Cynics and Cyrenaics share some traits, such as satisfaction with present resources. (Compare t. 82 with Diog. Laert. 2.66 and SSR IVA 51.) But it is likely that the two Socratics had their conflicts over ethical and aesthetic issues, especially the role of pleasure. Xenophon’s two portrayals of Aristippus (Mem. 2.1, 3.6) put him in opposition to Socrates. A probably Peripatetic writer preserved on papyrus polarizes Antisthenes’ and Aristippus’ views on pleasure (t. 122B). The Socratic epistles 8 and 9 are fictional letters from Antisthenes to Aristippus and in reply, with tension (t. 206). See also t. 117B. In Diogenes Laertius and most later anecdotes, it is Diogenes of Sinope, rather Antisthenes, who criticizes Aristippus’ fondness for luxury (Diog. Laert. 2.68).
στρυφνότητα: This term seems to refer primarily to “sourness” or “bitterness” of taste in food and then to be applied to “harshness” in personal and literary style (Dionys. Hal. De comp. verb. 22). Its cognates are attested only twice in the works of Plato and twice in Xenophon, and it is not attested elsewhere in reference to Antisthenes, although the more common adjectival form στρυφνός is associated by Galen with αὐστηρός (“harsh” or “bitter”), whose modern cognate is not seldom applied to Antisthenes but which also appears nowhere in the direct ancient evidence. (See t. 140.) Xenophon’s Socrates refers to Antisthenes’ “difficulty” (χαλεπότης) in personality (t. 14A), and there could be a pattern in attributing Antisthenes with a nominalized ethical quality as a joke against his ontology, which seems to resist hypostasis. (See t. 149, 27.) Isidore (t. 115) implies that Antisthenes was αὐχμηρός (sordid), but this is different from both “bitter” and “harsh.”
= 194 DC
(SSR IVA 46)
Antisthenes, cynicus philosophus, cum oluscula lavaret et animadvertisset Aristippum Cyrenaeum philosophum cum Dionysio, tyranno Siculorum, ingredientem, dixit: “Aristippe, si his contentus esses, non regis pedes sequeris,” cui respondit Aristippus: “at tu si posses commode cum rege loqui, non his contentus esses.”
Antisthenes, the Cynic philosopher, when he was washing his vegetables and noticed Aristippus, the Cyrenaic philosopher, walking with Dionysius, the tyrant of the Sicilians, said, “Aristippus, if you were content with these, you would not be subservient to the king.” To him Aristippus replied, “But you, if you could speak appropriately with a king, would not be content with these.”
This work falsely attributed to the Neronian poet Caesius Bassus was written in later antiquity.
The anecdote appears frequently with Diogenes Sinope in the role here given to Antisthenes (versions collected in SSR IVA 44–48); the sympathy can be with Aristippus against the Cynics (IVA 47–48), as here, but Diogenes sometimes gets the last word (IVA 44–46). Plato can also take Aristippus’ role and be bested by Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.58), and the full tradition is even more complicated. (See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:151.) All versions must be fiction, since it is unlikely that the Cynics went to Syracuse. For related episodes in the imperial epistles, see t. 206. For a comment attributed to Antisthenes on the relationship between the wise man and the king that shows more sympathy to Aristippus’ position in this anecdote, see t. 166.
= 139 DC (SSR VB 584)
[= Stob. 3.13.38, reduced from sections 2–3]
(T. 34A–H appear in SSR as VB 584 and 17–24, under Diogenes of Sinope.)
(1) Διογένης ὁ Σινωπεὺς ἐκπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος, οὐδενὸς διαφέρων τῶν πάνυ φαύλων Ἀθήναζε ἀφίκετο, καὶ καταλαμβάνει συχνοὺς ἔτι τῶν Σωκράτους ἑταίρων· καὶ γὰρ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρίστιππον καὶ Αἰσχίνην καὶ Ἀντισθένην καὶ τὸν Μεγαρέα Εὐκλείδην· Ξενοφῶν δὲ ἔφευγε διὰ τὴν μετὰ Κύρου στρατείαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων ταχὺ κατεφρόνησεν, Ἀντισθένει δὲ ἐχρῆτο, οὐκ αὐτὸν οὕτως ἐπαινῶν ὡς τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἔλεγεν, ἡγούμενος μόνους εἶναι ἀληθεῖς καὶ μάλιστα δυναμένους ἄνθρωπον ὠφελῆσαι. (2) ἐπεὶ αὐτόν γε τὸν Ἀντισθένην παραβάλλων πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἐνίοτε ἤλεγχεν ὡς πολὺ μαλακώτερον, καὶ ἔφη αὐτὸν εἶναι σάλπιγγα λοιδορῶν· αὑτοῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἀκούειν φθεγγομένου μέγιστον. καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ὑπέμενεν αὐτὸν ταῦτα ἀκούων· πάνυ γὰρ ἐθαύμαζε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν. (3) ἔλεγεν οὖν ἀμυνόμενος ἀντὶ τῆς σάλπιγγος τοῖς σφηξὶν αὐτὸν ὅμοιον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τῶν σφηκῶν εἶναι τὸν μὲν ψόφον τῶν πτερῶν μικρόν, τὸ δὲ κέντρον δριμύτατον. ἔχαιρεν οὖν τῇ παρρησίᾳ τοῦ Διογένους, ὥσπερ οἱ ἱππικοί, ὅταν ἵππον θυμοειδῆ λάβωσιν, ἄλλως δὲ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ φιλόπονον, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀποδέχονται τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ ἵππου· τοὺς δὲ νωθροὺς καὶ βραδεῖς μισοῦσι καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν. (4) ἐνίοτε μὲν οὖν ἐπέτεινεν αὐτόν, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐπειρᾶτο ἀνιέναι, ὥσπερ οἱ χορδοστρόφοι τὰ νεῦρα [τείνουσι], προσέχοντες μὴ ῥαγῇ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπέθανεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδένα ἡγεῖτο συνουσίας ἄξιον, μετέβη εἰς Κόρινθον.
(1) Ξενοφῶν codd. plur. : οὗτος Ξενοφῶν U B | ἔφευγε codd. plur. : ἔφυγε U B (2) Ἀντισθένην : Ἀντισθένη U B P | αὐτὸν codd. plur. : αὑτοὺς U B | ἀκούειν codd. plur. : ἤκουε U B V | φθεγγομένου codd. : φθεγγόμενον mavult Cobet (4) τείνουσι secl. Wilamowitz
(1) Diogenes of Sinope, when he had been expelled from his country, arrived in Athens in a state no different from the very poor, and he coincided with several of the companions of Socrates who were still living, Plato, Aristippus, Aeschines, Antisthenes, and the Megarian Euclides. Xenophon had gone into exile because of his military campaign with Cyrus. He quickly learned to disparage most of them, but he kept company with Antisthenes, because he praised not so much the man, but the words that he spoke, and Diogenes considered them alone to be true and most able to benefit the human being. (2) For in comparing Antisthenes himself against his words, he would sometimes prove that he was far softer, and he said by way of rebuke that he was a war trumpet: for he did not hear himself, since he spoke the loudest. And Antisthenes put up with him when he said these things, for he was fully amazed at the nature of the man. (3) So, defending himself against the comparison to the war trumpet, he said Diogenes was like the wasps: for also of wasps there is a small sound, of the wings, but a very bitter sting. So he took joy in the outspokenness of Diogenes, just as horse trainers, when they take on a spirited horse that is otherwise brave and fond of work, they accept the difficult quality of the horse no less. But the sluggish and slow ones they hate and reject as unworthy. (4) So sometimes he incited him, and other times he tried to make him relax, just as tuners of instruments do for the strings, taking care lest they snap. And when Antisthenes died, and he thought none of the others worthy of his company, he moved to Corinth.
Dio’s eighth oration, On Virtue, uses Diogenes of Sinope as an opening exemplum for the virtuous man.
This is the most colorful surviving story of the relationship between Diogenes and Antisthenes and is plausibly the oldest. (The Cynic epistles could be older; anecdotes preserved in Diogenes Laertius could be older.) Von Fritz 1926 argued that Dio’s stories about Diogenes are highly fictionalized, whereas the shorter anecdotes and bare apophthegmata in Diogenes of Laertius’ life of Diogenes of Sinope represent the kind of information really transmitted about the historical Diogenes of Sinope. Brancacci 2000:256–57 argues, further, that Dio here betrays the fictionality through a number of details. This is a possible, but not inevitable, account.
(1) ἐκπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος: This account of Diogenes’ departure from Sinope implies a political expulsion (ἐκπεσών) but omits the story of defacing the currency, which Diogenes Laertius cites, in multiple versions, as the reason for his exile (6.20–21).
οὐδενὸς διαφέρων τῶν πάνυ φαύλων: The explicit comparison between Diogenes and the lowly, which seems gratuitous, might imply that in his original homeland Diogenes identified himself with the wealthy.
Ἀθήναζε ἀφίκετο: Compare the phrase Ἧκον, ὦ πάτερ, Ἀθήναζε, which opens ps.-Diogenes’ Letter 30 (t. 136B). A set of letters of Diogenes of Sinope, which circulated as early as 200 BCE (different from the spurious letters still extant) and which could have been written by the historical Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.80, citing Sotion; see also Malherbe 1977:14 on the scholarly arguments), should not be overlooked as a possible source for certain uniquely surviving details in Dio’s anecdotes about Diogenes of Sinope. Dio could have set out to give new life to the Diogenes story by recycling from his own letters, which have been otherwise transmitted only in a different and less attractive recycling, the surviving letters.
καὶ γὰρ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρίστιππον καὶ Αἰσχίνην καὶ Ἀντισθένην καὶ τὸν Μεγαρέα Εὐκλείδην: This list of Socratic disciples and candidates for teacher whom Diogenes allegedly meets is unparalleled in the tradition about Diogenes (Brancacci 2000:256–57) and might show that Dio has supplemented from a traditional list. The only extant parallel for a list containing Aristippus, Aeschines, and Euclides is Diog. Laert. 2.47. Neither Aristippus nor Euclides ever makes the lists of Socratic stylists, as in t. 43B or 48; compare also Diodorus’ list of teachers active at Athens in t. 35B. Possibly Dio has assembled the characters of the Socratic epistolary tradition, where all these names appear. (See previous note.)
τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἔλεγεν: Brancacci 2000:257 posits that τοὺς λόγους here refers to literary production and indicates that Diogenes knew Antisthenes through reading his works. But the verb ἔλεγεν seems to suggest exactly the opposite, a live encounter. Surely Dio has fashioned his own version of the story. But he does not intimate a purely literary encounter between these figures. Antisthenes, too, is attracted to Socrates through his words (t. 12B).
(2) ὡς πολὺ μαλακώτερον: Compare t. 37A.
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν: On Antisthenes’ view of φύσις, see t. 41A introduction to second tomos. Compare t. 18.
(3) τοῖς σφηξίν: Aristophanes’ Wasps of 422 BCE used this metaphor for the old men of the Athenian juries.
τὸν μὲν ψόφον τῶν πτερῶν μικρόν, τὸ δὲ κέντρον δριμύτατον: Diogenes’ rhetorical force is his power of understatement.
τῇ παρρησίᾳ: This Cynic trait is nowhere explicitly attributed to Antisthenes, although apophthegmata such as t. 178 imply it.
ὥσπερ οἱ ἱππικοί: This is a standard comparison in Sophistic and Socratic discussions of education. It is applied also to wives in Xenophon’s Symposium (2.10, in the context of t. 18).
τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ ἵππου: See t. 14A on the “difficulty” of Antisthenes’ character.
(4) ἐνίοτε μὲν οὖν ἐπέτεινεν αὐτόν: The grammatical subject seems to be still Antisthenes, since the action seems to be a teacher over a pupil. But Diogenes, the subject of the main story, could be the subject of this sentence, after a digression about the trumpet and the wasps.
προσέχοντες μὴ ῥαγῇ: Antisthenes (or Diogenes) seems to be wary of a psychological breakdown and to know how to avoid it. Diogenes might have met modern criteria for a neurotic or psychotic disorder. (He is called “mad” by the end of Dio’s text.)
= 138D DC (SSR VB 18)
τούτου δὲ ἀκουστὴς γέγονε Διογένης ὁ Κύων, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς θηριωδέστατα φρονεῖν δόξας πολλοὺς ἐπηγάγετο.
And Diogenes the Dog became the pupil of him [Antisthenes], and he himself, seeming to think most savagely, was leader of many.
See t. 139A.
= 138A DC (SSR VB 19)
γενόμενος δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Ἀντισθένει παρέβαλε. τοῦ δὲ διωθουμένου διὰ τὸ μηδένα προσίεσθαι, ἐξεβιάζετο τῇ προσεδρίᾳ. καί ποτε τὴν βακτηρίαν ἐπανατειναμένου αὐτῷ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὑποσχών, “παῖε,” εἶπεν, “οὐ γὰρ εὑρήσεις οὕτω σκληρὸν ξύλον ᾧ με ἀπείρξεις ἕως ἄν τι φαίνῃ λέγων.” τοὐντεῦθεν διήκουσεν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἅτε φυγὰς ὢν ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸν εὐτελῆ βίον.
Ἀντισθένει codd. plur. : Ἀντισθένη B
And when he [Diogenes of Sinope] got to Athens, he joined in with Antisthenes. And when Antisthenes was repelling him, because he was accepting no one, Diogenes tried to force him from his position by staying close by. And once, when Antisthenes was brandishing his staff over his head, he held out his head and said, “Strike me. For you will not find wood so hard that you will keep me away, as long as it is clear that you have something to say.” And from that time he was his pupil, and because he was in exile, he started his frugal lifestyle.
This is part of Diogenes’ opening narrative of the life of Diogenes of Sinope.
ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸν εὐτελῆ βίον: For the opposition εὐτελής/πολυτελής said of lifestyle, see t. 82.41–42, 206. Diogenes Laertius attributes this decision by Diogenes to his status in exile and might suggest that Antisthenes did not also practice such a stringently frugal lifestyle. (See t. 34A, 37A, 82.38–39.)
= 138B DC (SSR VB 19)
Ἐπεὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης πολλοὺς προύτρεπεν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, οἳ δὲ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ προσεῖχον, τέλος ἀγανακτήσας οὐδένα προσίετο. καὶ Διογένην οὖν ἤλαυνεν ἀπὸ τῆς συνουσίας αὑτοῦ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν λιπαρέστερος ὁ Διογένης καὶ ἐνέκειτο, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη καὶ τῇ βακτηρίᾳ καθίξεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἠπείλει· καί ποτε καὶ ἔπαισε κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς. ὃ δὲ οὐκ ἀπηλλάττετο, ἀλλ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐνέκειτο φιλοπόνως, ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ διψῶν, καὶ ἔλεγε· “σὺ μὲν παῖε, εἰ βούλει, ἐγὼ δὲ ὑποθήσω τὴν κεφαλήν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν οὕτως ἐξεύροις βακτηρίαν σκληράν, ὥστε με ἀπελάσαι τῶν διατριβῶν τῶν σῶν.” ὃ δὲ ὑπερησπάσατο αὐτόν.
οὐδὲν Koraïs : οὐδεὶς V x | αὐτῷ del. Koen | προσεῖχον V : προσεῖχε x | καί ποτε καὶ V : καὶ secundum om. x | ἀπηλλάττετο V : ἀπηλάσσετο x
When Antisthenes was trying to convert a lot of people to philosophy, but they paid no attention to him, finally he got angry and received nobody. So even Diogenes he drove away from his company. But when Diogenes was being rather obstinate and was insisting, then he went so far as to threaten to put him in his place with his staff. And once he actually struck him on the head. But Diogenes did not go away, but all the more he insisted, with a fondness for the toil, thirsting to learn from him. And he said, “You can strike me, if you want to, and I will offer you my head. But you could not find a staff hard enough to drive me away from your conversations.” And he [Antisthenes] embraced him [Diogenes] beyond measure.
This is a complete anecdote, amid a series (10.11–17) on Diogenes, Socrates, and Critias, along with two others (Archytas and Aristides).
ὑπερησπάσατο αὐτόν: The same rare verb is used in t. 82.38, for the behavior of Antisthenes’ unusual girlfriends. Compare also t. 84C, 143A.
= 138C DC (SSR VB 19)
nam cum discipulorum Antisthenes nullum reciperet, et perseverantem Diogenum removere non posset, novissima clava minatus est, nisi abiret. Cui ille subiecisse dicitur caput, atque dixisse: “nullus tam durus baculus erit qui me a tuo possit obsequio separare.”
For when Antisthenes was accepting none of his [potential] disciples, and he could not get rid of Diogenes, who was persisting, he threated him with a brand new club, unless he would go away. Diogenes is said to have lowered his head for him and said: “No staff will be so hard that it can divide me from deference to you.”
(SSR VB 20)
ποιεῖ δ’ εὔχαρι σκῶμμα καὶ μέμψις ἐμφαίνουσα χάριν· ὡς Διογένης περὶ
Ἀντισθένους ἔλεγεν·
“ὅς με ῥάκη τ’ ἤμπισχε κἀξηνάγκασεν
πτωχὸν γενέσθαι κἀκ δόμων ἀνάστατον”·
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως πιθανὸς ἦν λέγων· “ὅς με σοφὸν καὶ αὐτάρκη καὶ μακάριον ἐποίησεν”.
ῥάκη Stephanus : κάρη T
who dressed me in rags and forced me
to become a beggar and separated from my house.
For he would not have been so persuasive if he had said, “who made me wise and self-sufficient and happy.”
See t. 13B, which directly precedes this passage.
ὡς Διογένης: This pair of unattributed iambic trimeters (= fr. 88 F 5 TrGrF Snell) could be from a tragedy Diogenes wrote or a tragedy in which he appeared as a speaker. Plausibly the trimeters were from a famous tragedy, such as Euripides’ Bellerophon (suggested by R. Janko per litt.).
ὅς με ῥάκη τ’ ἤμπισχε . . . : The spurious letters of Diogenes explain, also, that Antisthenes was responsible for Diogenes’ choice of lifestyle (context following t. 136B from epistle 30). See also t. 34C-1.
(SSR VB 21)
sic et Diogenes Antisthenem cynicum, magistrum suum, solebat velut vituperando laudare: “ipse me,” aiebat, “mendicum fecit ex divite et pro ampla domo in dolio fecit habitare.” Melius autem ista dicebat quam si diceret: “gratus illi sum quia ipse me philosophum et consummatae virtutis virum fecit.”
In the same way also Diogenes used to praise Antisthenes the Cynic, his teacher, in a manner like blame: “This very man,” he used to say, “made me a beggar from a rich man and in place of a splendid house caused me to live in a canister.” For better he said this than if he had said, “I am grateful to him because he made me a philosopher and a man of perfect virtue.”
Macrobius follows and loosely translates Plutarch’s Table Talk II.1.7 632e (t. 34D-1).
me . . . mendicum fecit ex divite et pro ampla domo in dolio fecit habitare: In paraphrasing the trimeters Plutarch attributes to Diogenes, Macrobius adds information from the Diogenes legend beyond what Plutarch transmits.
= 118 DC (SSR VB 22)
διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ὅτι “ἐξ οὗ μ’ Ἀντισθένης ἠλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδούλευσα.” πῶς ἠλευθέρωσεν; ἄκουε, τί λέγει· “ἐδίδαξέν με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμά. κτῆσις οὐκ ἐμή· συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι, φήμη, συνήθεις τόποι, διατριβή, πάντα ταῦτα [ὅτι] ἀλλότρια. ‘σὸν οὖν τί; χρῆσις φαντασιῶν.’ ταύτην ἔδειξέν μοι ὅτι ἀκώλυτον ἔχω, ἀνανάγκαστον· οὐδεὶς ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, οὐδεὶς βιάσασθαι ἄλλως χρήσασθαι ἢ ὡς θέλω.”
τὰ ante οὐκ del. s | κτῆσις <ὅτι> C. Schenkl (pater) | ὅτι delevi : fort. ὅτι (ταῦτά) ἐστιν ἀλλότρια Schenkl | <ὅτι> οὐδεὶς C. Schenkl
This is why he [Diogenes] said, “From the time Antisthenes freed me, I have no longer been a slave.” How did he free him? Listen to what he says: “He taught me what is mine and what is not mine. Possession is not mine. Relatives, members of the household, friends, reputation, customary places, conversation, all these are of another. ‘So what is yours? [Antisthenes asked.] The use of [your] mental impressions.’ He showed me that I have this [as a possession] unhindered and unconstrained. Nobody can block it; nobody can force me to use it otherwise than as I wish.”
Epictetus’ discourse is a lengthy one, on how to separate oneself from what is not up to us (τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). What is up to us is the topic of his first discourse and the center of his teaching. Diogenes serves as an example of the man who has achieved this virtue.
This anecdote attributes to Antisthenes the very basis of Stoic and Cynic ethics, such as Epictetus teaches. Like the Platonic Alcibiades I (and other Socratic texts), it separates the self from externals. The body and soul are not differentiated here, however, as they are in Alcibiades, and the χρῆσις φαντασιῶν that constitutes the core of the self might identify the fundamental interface of body and soul.
ἠλευθέρωσεν: This concept of freedom from externals and from delusion about the impotance of externals is close to that which Antisthenes celebrates in t. 82.
κτῆσις / συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι / φήμη / συνήθεις τόποι / διατριβή: These items deemed to be goods “of another” have some correspondence to Antisthenes’ discussion of his “wealth” and the true needs of his soul in t. 82 and elsewhere. He rejects property first (t. 81A). The three classes of persons listed here (not considered in t. 82) may be ordered from remote to close according to Antisthenes’ thought generally: see t. 134l–q, 110; t. 188 might offer evidence for οἰκεῖοι who have a draw on Odysseus, but without comparison to kin; kin and members of the household would lack the qualifications and emotional bonds of φίλοι. The last three goods are apparently aspects of the individual. Reputation, which arises from enemies as much as friends, is appropriated to the individual self in certain ways (t. 112), but it can also remain more like a πόνος than a part of oneself (t. 134f; see also t. 86). Habitual places and discourse might represent space and time where the individual is located; for Antisthenes, they come close to his prized companionship with Socrates (t. 82.44: ὂ πλείστου ἐγὼ τιμῶμαι, Σωκράτωι σχολάζων συνδιημερεύειν). It is striking, however, that there is no statement of a separation between body and soul, as in Pl. Alc. 129e9–130c7.
πάντα ταῦτα [ὅτι] ἀλλότρια: τὰ ἀλλότρια is almost a technical term in Plato’s Socratic works (e.g., Lys. 222c4; Sym. 205e7–8; Rep. 463b12), but its usual opposite term, τὰ οἰκεῖα, does not appear in this passage. (The full opposition here is τὰ ἐμὰ versus τὰ οὐκ ἐμά.) οἰκεῖοι are instead one member of the class of the ἀλλότρια.
χρῆσις φαντασιῶν: If any part of this anecdote is phrased in the original words of Antisthenes, this core message would be the first candidate. However, the correct “use of appearances” is Epictetus’ core ideal, and the expression occurs throughout his Discourses. This does not mean that Epictetus did not adapt the phrase from older ethical discussion. Höistad (1948:39–40) defends the Antisthenean origin of this phrase against von Fritz (1926) and Dudley (1937), who hold that φαντασία, both in this passage and in the fuller discussion in Diog. Laert. 6.70–71, can only be a Stoic term. Höistad argues that the present usage fits into a middle position between the uses in Plato and Aristotle and the fully theorized Stoic sense. Its connection to Antisthenes is here supported by the phrase built from χρῆσις, paralleled in the book title Περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως (t. 41A title 9.7) and in the phrases τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν and χρῆσις ποικίλη λόγου in his discussion of Odysseus (t. 187.4, 11). Such phrases feature also in Socrates’ discussions of goods in other texts (Pl. Meno 88a5; Xen. Sym. 8.15, 8.28; Xen. Oec. 3.10). φαντασίαι are basically sensations of the body, not events in the soul, in Plato (Theaet. 152c, 161e) and Aristotle (De anima 3.2), although they cross the boundary into the soul, where they must be apprehended or interpreted by a strictly mental sense. This would be Antisthenes’ χρῆσις, which might count as the same interface of consciousness and moral choice over inanimate, indifferent matter or other substrate (whether wine, as in t. 41A title 9.7, or language, as in t. 187) that is evident in the other attested phrases built on this term.
= 149 DC (SSR VB 23)
Διογένει χιτῶνα αἰτοῦντι πτύξαι προσέταξε θοίματιον.
When Diogenes asked for a cloak, he [Antisthenes] told him to double his outer garment.
πτύξαι . . . θοίματιον: See t. 22A note on πρῶτος ἐδίπλωσε τὸν τρίβωνα.
= 141 DC
ἐτελεύτησε δὲ Ἀθήνησιν ἑβδομηκοντούτης γενόμενος.
And he [Antisthenes] died at Athens when he was seventy years old.
Apart from this sentence, ps.-Eudocia’s biography of Antisthenes is produced directly from Diogenes Laertius. Whatever good source the author Konstantinos Palaiokappa could have had in the sixteenth century CE for Antisthenes’ age at death is obscure to us. (On Palaiokappa, see t. 1D.) This testimony is normally dismissed in favor of Diodorus Siculus (t. 35B), who says that Antisthenes was active in Athens in 366 and thus that he probably lived to be older than seventy. If we believe ps.-Eudocia, Antisthenes lived from c. 445 to only c. 375 BCE. If he lived until 370, long enough to comment on the battle of Leuktra of 371 (t. 10), his birth date would need to be as late as 440. The anecdotes about his military campaigns with Socrates from the mid-420s (t. 3B) would then be chronologically impossible. If we dismiss ps.-Eudocia in favor of the plausibility, if not the historicity, of t. 3B and 10, Antisthenes lived to be at least seventy-five. If we accept the historicity of t. 35B also, he lived to be at least eighty.
= 140 DC (SSR IH 3)
Ὑπῆρξαν δὲ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους ἄνδρες κατὰ παιδείαν ἄξιοι μνήμης Ἰσοκράτης τε ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ οἱ τούτου γενόμενοι μαθηταὶ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἔτι δὲ Ἀναξιμένης ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς καὶ Πλάτων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ τελευταῖοι, Ξενοφῶν τε ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας συγγραψάμενος ἐσχατογήρως ὤν· μέμνηται γὰρ τῆς Ἐπαμεινώνδου τελευτῆς μετ’ ὀλίγον χρόνον γεγενημένης· Ἀρίστιππός τε καὶ Ἀντισθένης, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Αἰσχίνης ὁ Σφήττιος ὁ Σωκρατικός.
Σφήττιος codd. plur. : σφητιος P
In these years the foremost men worthy of memory in the field of education were Isocrates the rhetor and his pupils, and Aristotle the philosopher, and further Anaximenes of Lampsacus and Plato of Athens, and also the last of the Pythagorean philosophers, and Xenophon, who composed histories when he was in his final years: for he mentions the death of Epaminondas, which took place a short while later. And Aristippus and Antisthenes [were then active], and in addition to these Aeschines of Sphettus the Socratic.
This is the end of Diodorus’ entry for the year 366/65 BCE.
This text is used to set Antisthenes’ date of death after 366. See discussion at t. 35A, the alternative account of ps.-Eudocia. The field of five Socratics, with Plato distinguished in the more detailed opening section and Xenophon considered a historian, is close to the field that appears in the lists from Augustan and early imperial periods. (See t. 43B, 48–50.)
= 144 DC
φιλοσόφους μὲν γὰρ ἴσμεν ἅπαντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους κακοὺς κακῶς ἀποθανόντας, τοὺς μὲν ἐκ καταδίκης, ἑαλωκότας ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι, φαρμάκῳ, τοὺς δὲ καταπρησθέντας τὸ σῶμα ἅπαν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ δυσουρίας φθινήσαντας, τοὺς δὲ φυγόντας.
καταπρησθέντας κτλ.] “φαρμάκῳ” ὡς Σωκράτης, “καταπρησθέντας τὸ σῶμα” ὡς Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος, “φθινήσαντας” ὡς Ἀντισθένης, “φυγόντας” ὡς ** .
φυγόντας ὡς U Ω : om. φ : ὡς om. V : excidisse Ξενοφῶν proponit Rabe e Dio Chrys. 64.18
For we know that all philosophers, or most of them, have died wretchedly as wretched men, some by poison resulting from condemnation in court, when they have been convicted for the greatest crimes, some by incineration of their whole body, some having wasted away from difficulty in urination, and some by exile.
[Lucian, On the Parasite 57]
Burned up etc.: “By poison” like Socrates, “burned up in the whole body” like Heraclitus of Ephesus, “wasting away” like Antisthenes, “sent into exile” like <Xenophon?>.
This scholion is preserved in four manuscripts on Lucian’s On the Parasite (which mentions Antisthenes: see t. 4). Its distribution in the manuscripts points to authorship by the early tenth-century archbishop Arethas (or, otherwise, an older, unknown scholar) (Rabe ad loc.). Lucian’s character Simon is arguing that the death of the parasite is preferable to the death of the philosopher.
For this scholiast, Antisthenes came to mind as the most famous philosopher who died by wasting away. (Possibly he knew the saying of t. 37E.) The scholiast is probably incorrect in his interpretation of Lucian, who was probably referring to Epicurus.
ἀπὸ δυσουρίας φθινήσαντας: Antisthenes’ reportedly long, slow death (t. 37) might be considered “wasting away.” For his notice of someone else’s wasting away (with different vocabulary), see t. 51A. The association with urination has no clear resonance in the testimonia, although Antisthenes is said to have used the designation “urine receptacle” as the name of a drinking vessel (t. 65).
= 142 DC
ἐτελεύτησε δὲ ἀρρωστίᾳ· ὅτε καὶ Διογένης εἰσιὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔφη· “Μήτι χρεία φίλου;” καί ποτε παρ’ αὐτὸν ξιφίδιον ἔχων εἰσῆλθε. τοῦ δ’ εἰπόντος· “Τίς ἂν ἀπολύσειέ με τῶν πόνων;” δείξας τὸ ξιφίδιον, ἔφη· “Τοῦτο·” καὶ ὅς, “Τῶν πόνων,” ἔφη, “εἶπον, οὐ τοῦ ζῆν.” ἐδόκει γάρ πως μαλακώτερον φέρειν τὴν νόσον ὑπὸ φιλοζωίας.
εἰσῆλθε B P Φ : εἰσήει F | ἀπολύσειε Cobet : ἀπολύση B P F Φ | ἔφη εἶπον Φ : εἶπον B P : εἶπεν F
He died of a lingering infirmity. It was during this time that Diogenes went into his room and said, “You don’t have need of a friend, do you?” And once he went to him holding a dagger. When he [Antisthenes] said, “Who could release me from my toils?” he showed the dagger and said, “This.” And he said, “I said from my toils, not from my life.” For he seemed somehow to bear his illness rather feebly, because of his love of life.
This anecdote, the only extended anecdote in Diogenes Laertius’ condensed biography, follows the account of Antisthenes’ writings (t. 41A–B) and precedes the epigram (t. 38A).
The set of anecdotes about Antisthenes’ final illness presents Antisthenes as unwilling to die. The overall message seems to be positive, that he was willing to endure his pain; but this is never directly praised. Diogenes Laertius’ version highlights ethical deficiency in Antisthenes’ lust for life (37A) when escape was available, whereas the other versions (37C–E) highlight Diogenes’ bravery in offering the dagger. Lucian might offer a caricature of Antisthenes’ lust for life in Dialogues of the Dead 22.9. Aelian (VH 10.11, in the context of t. 34C-2) tells an anecdote that praises Diogenes’ endurance of pain.
ἀρρωστίᾳ: This is, literally, “lack of strength.” Generally in Diogenes it indicates an illness from which one recovers through medical treatment (3.85, 7.115). The Academic Polemon also died of it, as an old man (Diog. Laert. 4.20); the Peripatetic Lyco suggests in his will that a lingering ἀρρωστία might lead him to end his own life (Diog. Laert. 5.69). The anecdote seems to be hostile to Antisthenes, and the name “lack of strength” for his last illness might be a play on his use of a term meaning “strength” for moral quality (t. 41A title 10.2, 34).
χρεία φίλου: A “friend” for Antisthenes probably had to meet a very high standard: see t. 110, 37B, 14B, 134. Diogenes might be inquiring whether he himself qualifies. (See t. 34C.) There might be a joke, too, on the term χρεία, which accounts in many contexts for the ethical content of an act: basic materials such as “names” or “wine” might be morally neutral, but their use makes them good or bad. (See comment on t. 187.4.) Diogenes might be asking Antisthenes for an ethical act, in using his “friend” well. This suggestion is stronger in t. 37C–D.
ξιφίδιον ἔχων εἰσῆλθε: In the other versions of the anecdote (37C–D), Diogenes visits only once, and the dagger itself is the friend. Diogenes’ offer of a death-inflicting weapon might indicate trust in Antisthenes’ moral condition and Antisthenes’ true state of “friendship” in the eyes of Diogenes, as well as vice versa. This confidence that a wise man knows how to use for good an object that could also be used for evil might, in turn, reflect the debate in Plato’s Gorgias and Rep. 1 and the pseudo-Platonic On Justice. See t. 76.
τῶν πόνων: Antisthenes normally exalted toil as beneficial exercise. Here his toils are bad, which could suggest a hostile origin for the anecdote.
μαλακώτερον: Diogenes of Sinope uses the same term to dismiss the ethical rigor of Antisthenes in t. 34A.
φιλοζωίας: This is a vice, a fear of death.
= SSR VB 24
(62) Πυθομένου δὲ τοῦ νεανίσκου, εἰ νοσήσας ἀξιοῦντος φίλου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν ὥστε νοσοκομηθῆναι ὑπακούσει, “Ποῦ δὲ φίλον μοι δώσεις Κυνικοῦ;” ἔφη. (63) “δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄλλον εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἵν’ ἄξιος ᾖ φίλος αὐτοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαι. κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ σκήπτρου καὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ διάκονον ἄξιον, εἰ μέλλει φιλίας ἀξιωθήσεσθαι, ὡς Διογένης Ἀντισθένους ἐγένετο, ὡς Κράτης Διογένους. (64) ἢ δοκεῖ σοι, ὅτι, ἂν χαίρειν αὐτῷ λέγῃ προσερχόμενος, φίλος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, κἀκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἄξιον ἡγήσεται τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰσελθεῖν;”
(62) Κυνικοῦ Meibom : κυνικόν S | ἔφη ins. S m. pr. (ut vid. Schenkl) (63) ᾖ φίλος αὐτοῦ S : fort. ᾖς . . . σαυτοῦ Reiske (64) ἢ ed. Basiliensis : ἦ S | ὅτι <ὅστις> Reiske : ὅτι <ὃς> Korais | ἐστὶν S : εἶναι Salmasius
(62) When the young man [aspiring to become a Cynic] asked whether he should consent if, when he was sick, a friend should ask him to come to his house to be cared for, he [Epictetus] said, “Where will you find me a friend of a Cynic? (63) For he needs to be another man of like kind, to be counted as a friend worthy of the first. He needs to be a partner in the scepter and in kingship, and a worthy servant, if he is going to be valued worthy of friendship, such as Diogenes became for Antisthenes, and as Crates for Diogenes. (64) Or do you think that, if [someone] greets him when he meets him, this man is his friend, and the Cynic will consider him worthy of going to his house?”
This is from Epictetus’ so-called Cynic discourse. After the speaker (Epictetus) has described the requirements for being a Cynic, the interlocutor poses a series of “skeptical questions” (as they are described in Schofield 2007:86) testing the social capacities of the Cynic. This question opens the series, which proceeds from the minimal social level, friendship, to marriage and then broader social activities. This seems to be a Stoic checklist: see also t. 134.
εἰ νοσήσας ἀξιοῦντος φίλου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν: The scenario seems to count as a test for friendship in the background tradition (Seneca, Ep. 9): see Billerbeck 1978:127. The anecdote of Antisthenes’ death does not quite fits the scenario: the visiting is reversed.
ἄξιος . . . φίλος . . . ἀριθμεῖσθαι: For the terms of valuing and counting, compare t. 110.
κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ σκήπτρου καὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ διάκονον ἄξιον: The first two qualities of the potential friend are aspects of kingship and imply full collegiality between the Cynic and his friend (compare t. 197.31 συστεφανοῦσθαι), whereas the third quality indicates a subordinate position. The servitude might be reciprocal, or it might imply deference to a third party outside the friendship, such as virtue or the divine.
ὡς Διογένης Ἀντισθένους ἐγένετο: See the anecdote in t. 34C.
= 143 DC; SSR VB 94
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν τοῦ πολύποδος κωμῳδεῖ καί φησι τὸν Διογένη τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ κενοδοξίας ἐκτετικέναι δίκας ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κωνείου τῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρέντα. οὕτω πόρρω που σοφίας ἐλαύνει ὥστε ἐπίσταται σαφῶς ὅτι κακὸν ὁ θάνατος. τοῦτο δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὑπελάμβανεν ὁ σοφὸς Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνον [Ἀντισθένη καὶ] Διογένης. ἀρρωστοῦντι γοῦν, φασίν, Ἀντισθένει μακρὰν καὶ δυσανάληπτον ἀρρωστίαν ξιφίδιον ἐπέδωκεν ὁ Διογένης εἰπών· “εἰ φίλου χρῄζεις ὑπουργίας”· οὕτως οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεινὸν ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲ ἀλγεινὸν τὸν θάνατον.
ἐλαύνει : hinc deest V usque ad 202b2 | Ἀντισθένη καὶ Διογένης sed ς erasum vid. U : Ἀντισθένη καὶ del. Petavius
But he [my opponent on the topic of the Cynics] even ridicules the eating of the octopus and says that Diogenes paid the penalty for ignorance and vanity, in being destroyed by his food as if by hemlock. So far, I suppose, in wisdom he [my opponent] advances that he knows clearly that death is an evil. But the wise Socrates assumed he did not know this, and also after him, Diogenes. For they say that when Antisthenes was ill with a long illness, hard to recover from, Diogenes gave him a dagger and said, “In case you need the help of a friend.” To such a degree this man believed that death was nothing terrible or painful.
This is near the opening of Julian’s oration against a contemporary Cynic who attacked Diogenes for pretension and stupidity. According to one tradition (Diog. Laert. 6.76), Diogenes died from eating raw octopus. The attacker seized on this as evidence of stupidity, and Julian defends Diogenes.
Julian uses the anecdote to defend Diogenes’ attitude toward death, not to illuminate Antisthenes’ attitude, which is implied elsewhere (t. 37A, 37C) to be cowardly. Perhaps, then, it was preserved in a tradition that distinguished Diogenes from Antisthenes, who could not be counted as a true Cynic because he was πολὺ μαλακώτερον (much more soft) than Diogenes (t. 34A). The same adjective, μαλακώτερον, is in the version of this death anecdote in t. 37A.
κενοδοξίας: Socrates made the same accusation against Antisthenes, according to Diogenes Laertius (t. 15B). See also t. 139B.
οὕτω πόρρω που σοφίας ἐλαύνει: This is a near quotation of Pl. Euthyphr. 4b1–2.
κακὸν ὁ θάνατος: Diogenes is credited with knowing that death is no evil in Epictetus 1.24.6, Diog. Laert. 6.68, and Stob. 4.29.19. In Plato’s Apology and Phaedo, Socrates denies that death is an evil. There is no such record for Antisthenes, and evidence generally suggests that he would not have said this. See t. 178 and, for the quest for immortality or escape from death, 176 and (perhaps) 170.
[Ἀντισθένη καὶ] Διογένης: The deletion of “Antisthenes” (which seems to be in the wrong case) is probably correct, for the reason given in the preceding note. However, Julian’s report of the anecdote omits the normal allegation that Antisthenes fears death, and it is possible that he wished to imply a three-generational tradition, descending from Socrates, to reinforce his claim, central to his whole speech, that Diogenes’ self-inflicted death was not evil and, therefore, not stupid.
εἰ φίλου χρῄζεις ὑπουργίας: Here and in t. 37D–E, it is clear that the weapon is itself the friend, because suicide is good. This notion is as old as Sophocles’ Ajax (v. 822). (See Finglass 2011:381 with further discussion.) Since it seems also, from t. 37A, that Antisthenes rejected this option (contrast t. 37E), the whole anecdote must have been crafted as an attack on or joke about Antisthenes’ integrity.
ὅτι ἀρρωστοῦντι Ἀντισθένει μακρὰν καὶ δυσανάκλητον ἀρρωστίαν ὁ Διογένης ξιφίδιον ἐπιδέδωκεν εἰπών· “εἰ φίλου χρῄζεις ὑπουργίας.” οὕτως ᾤετο ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἀλγεινὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὥστε γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀρρωστίαν τρυφὴν αὐτόχρημα.
Because when Antisthenes was ill with a long illness, hard to be called back from, Diogenes gave him a dagger and said, “In case you need the help of a friend.” To such a degree this man [Diogenes] believed that death was nothing painful, that the illness came to be a luxury in itself.
This is the conclusion of the Suda’s entry for Antisthenes, filling about a quarter of the text.
μακρὰν καὶ δυσανάκλητον ἀρρωστίαν: The Suda’s version makes a small change in the adjective, from δυσανάληπτον (hard to recover from) to δυσανάκλητον (hard to be called back from). If this is deliberate, not a manuscript error, the Suda’s version injects the sense that the illness is somehow voluntary.
Εἰ φίλου χρῄζεις ὑπουργίας: ἐπὶ τῶν γενναίαν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων. ἀρρωστοῦντι γὰρ Ἀντισθένει ξιφίδιον δέδωκε Διογένης εἰπὼν τοιοῦτον λόγιον.
ἀρρωστοῦντι codd. plur. : ἀσθενοῦντι I | τοιοῦτον codd. plur. : τό τοιοῦτον F | λόγιον codd. plur. : λόγον I V
“If you need the help of a friend”: [said] of those having a noble soul. For when Antisthenes was ill, Diogenes gave him a dagger after speaking such a line.
Diogenes’ utterance stands as a separate entry in the lexicon, as if it is a proverb.
The utterance seems to have gained a life of its own in early Byzantium. This version of the anecdote seems to imply that Antisthenes used the dagger.
ἐπὶ τῶν γενναίαν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων: It is unclear who is implied to have the noble soul in this anecdote, whether Diogenes, Antisthenes, or both. Maximus of Tyre (lecture 7.5) advises that the noble soul is not unwilling to depart at the destruction of the body, which suggests that Antisthenes should be the referent. But other versions of the anecdote make Antisthenes reluctant (t. 37A) and present Diogenes as the hero (t. 37B–D). It is possible that Diogenes is the hero here also and that his possession of a noble soul is related to facing death, but not his own death.
καὶ ἔστιν ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχον·
τὸν βίον ἦσθα κύων, Ἀντίσθενες, ὧδε πεφυκὼς
ὥστε δακεῖν κραδίην ῥήμασιν οὐ στόμασιν·
ἀλλ’ ἔθανες φθισκός, τάχ’ ἐρεῖ τις ἴσως. “τί δὲ τοῦτο;
πάντως εἰς Ἀίδην δεῖ τιν’ ὁδηγὸν ἔχειν.”
γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀντισθένεις τρεῖς· Ἡρακλείτειος εἷς, καὶ ἕτερος Ἐφέσιος, καὶ Ῥόδιός τις ἱστορικός· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺς ἀπ’ Ἀριστίππου διεληλύθαμεν καὶ Φαίδωνος, νῦν ἑλκύσωμεν τοὺς ἀπ’ Ἀντισθένους κυνικούς τε καὶ Στωικούς. καὶ ἐχέτω ὧδε.
ἔχον οὕτως F | κύον A. Pal. | ‘ὧδε πεφυκὼς . . . στόμασιν’ Marcovich | κραδείην F | φθισικῶς B1 (corr. B2) | δεῖν F : δῆι P1 (corr. P2 Q) | ἔχει A. Pal. | τρεῖς om. F | ἡρακλείτιος F | εἷς P : οἷς B : om. F | ἕτερος om. F
And I have composed the following for him:
In life you were a dog, Antisthenes, so created by nature
As to bite the heart with words, not with the mouth:
But you died by wasting away, someone perhaps might say. “And so what?
It is fully necessary to have some guide to Hades.”
There have been also three other Antisthenes: one a Heraclitean, and a second from Ephesus, and a certain Rhodian historian. Since I have narrated the successions from Aristippus and Phaedo, now let me show the derivations of the Cynics and Stoics from Antisthenes. And here it is.
This is the end of Diogenes’ life of Antisthenes.
The epigram reflects Diogenes Laertius’ own impression of Antisthenes, which is clearly as a Cynic. The listing of other known thinkers by the same name is standard in Diogenes, who often cites Demetrius of Magnesia’s On Poets and Writers of the Same Name as his source. On this list, see also t. 159D. Numerous other individuals named “Antisthenes” are attested but not included by Diogenes Laertius: for the Athenians, see PAA 136760–995 (including twenty-one individuals dated to fifth- and fourth-century Athens and many known from epigraphical evidence only). On the men named “Antisthenes” in Athenian literature of the decades 430–370, see Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:196–97, discussing earlier scholarship.
κύων: On the name “Cynic” and the nickname “dog,” see t. 22–26.
πεφυκώς: “Nature” is an important term for Antisthenes: see t. 41A titles 2.1 and 8.8–9, 18, 123, 179.
δακεῖν κραδίην ῥήμασιν: Many of Antisthenes’ apophthegmata could be said to use “biting” words: his techniques include profanity (t. 148) and direct insult (e.g., t. 32). Toils also “bite” those who are not used to them (t. 113). Speech with “biting words” is a standard description of the Cynics (see, e.g., Demetrius, On Style 260–61).
ἀλλ’ ἔθανες φθισκός: According to Hesychius of Miletus (fr. 7.141 Jacoby), Diogenes is accusing him in this epigram also of “love of life” or cowardice in death. (Compare t. 37A.)
πάντως εἰς Ἀίδην δεῖ τιν’ ὁδηγὸν ἔχειν: The traditional guide to Hades would have been the god Hermes, not a dog. The dog of Hades, Cerberus, was a guard sooner than a guide.
τάχ’ ἐρεῖ τις ἴσως: An interlocutor who sees the tombstone is imagined.
Ἡρακλείτειος εἷς, καὶ ἕτερος Ἐφέσιος: We have no other record of either figure, and a few scholars have proposed that the “Antisthenes, interpreter of Heraclitus” mentioned in Diog. Laert. 9.6 is the Socratic Antisthenes, whereas the individuals listed here could be fictions generated to disguise that fact. (See t. 159D.) Patzer (1970:162 and n. 54) endorses the account generally accepted since 1840 (when A. B. Krische responded to F. Schleiermacher), that an otherwise unknown Antisthenes educated himself from the writings of Heraclitus, then became his disciple. Diels’ fragments of the pre-Socratics identifies this Antisthenes the Heraclitean as an individual thinker (DK 66). Since Heraclitus was from Ephesus, the “second [Antisthenes] from Ephesus” might be a second name for the same follower (and ms. F seems to combine these two names into one). Plato mentions an Ephesian school of interpreters of Heraclitus that could be either real or the source for later fiction: at Theaet. 179d6-e180a1, the character Theodorus reports on a movement of neo-Heracliteans “around Ionia” and “around Ephesus” who derive their beliefs from “craftless” exegesis of Heraclitus’ writings. If these two names are doublets, we have a more satisfying identity for the unknown Antisthenes, but also a more plausible fiction.
καὶ Ῥόδιός τις ἱστορικός: The historian Antisthenes of Rhodes is known separately (FGrHist 508) and is conflated by the Suda with Antisthenes the Socratic (see t. 23, 41D).
(not in SSR)
Προταγόρας
Ἀντισθένους
Σινοπεύς
Protagoras of Sinope, son of Antisthenes
This is an inscription on a plain marble tombstone, once painted blue on the cornice, found in the Piraeus in 1860 (IG editio minor 10348 = Conze 459 T 302 = Traill PAA 136995) and now in the Piraeus museum, dated to the mid-fourth century (360–340 BCE: the margin of error is about twenty years).
This evidence is included for the possibility that it is related to Antisthenes the Socratic. Quite possibly it is not. All published details about it (the date, location, and three proper names) would be consistent with a memorial to Antisthenes the Socratic, if it were possible to imagine that a tombstone could deliver a joke. The total coincidence of data from this tombstone with information independently associated with Antisthenes is the reason for entertaining the possibility of a straight-faced joke, such as the Cynics so often deliver in other modes (e.g., t. 32).
If identification of this Protagoras of Sinope with Antisthenes the Socratic is, in the end, implausible, it is hardly more implausible than the story of the desecrated coin minted by Hikesias of Sinope, allegedly the father of Diogenes, which is supposed to disqualify Diogenes of Sinope from having met Antisthenes (Selten 1929, endorsed by Dudley 1937:54–55, questioned by Höistad 1948:10–12 and Döring 1995 but still generally accepted). If this were Antisthenes’ tombstone, it would settle two central questions about Antisthenes: his relationship to Plato’s “Sophists,” especially the Protagoras of Theaetetus, and his relationship to Diogenes of Sinope. The case for the humorous tombstone cannot be proved. It can be disproved, should a fact be discovered about this tombstone, in itself and not from statistics or comparanda, that renders identification with Antisthenes through joke impossible.
Πρωταγόρας: Sinope has more attested persons named “Protagoras” (five of them) than any other Greek city, including Abdera, the home of the famous Sophist (LGPN v.5A:383 for Sinope, v.4:292 for Abdera). If this is the tombstone for a real Protagoras of Sinope, son of Antisthenes, Protagoras would have emigrated from Sinope to Attica and lived and died in the Piraeus, where his tombstone was erected. This is plausible: Sinope, a colony of Miletus, which was, according to legend, a colony of Athens, was an important commercial and artistic center in the classical period and seems to have received a settlement of several hundred Athenians in the mid-fifth century (Stoyanov 2012:411). We have record of 102 individuals from Sinope who lived as foreigners in Attica (Osborne and Byrne 1996:289–93), of whom about twelve can be dated as early as the fourth century. (This number includes the present Protagoras and Antisthenes, both bearing unique names amid this set.) The argument to be made in support of a fictional Protagoras is that the name “Protagoras” was firmly known in Athens from the Peloponnesian War period through the mid-fourth century as the name of a Sophist from Abdera: Eupolis mentions him on the comic stage; Plato features him in two dialogues and mentions him in several others; and apart from the present case, the name is entirely unattested in documentary evidence from Attica before the late third century (Traill PAA v.15:12–14: of the ten individuals recorded, seven are dated to 212–139 BCE, one is dated to the third century BCE, one is the Sophist, and one is the present subject; LGPN v.2:383 records five individuals named “Protagoras” known in Athens, of which two are from the second century BCE and three from centuries CE). All other extant uses of the name “Protagoras” from Athens of this period refer to the Sophist. If it is possible to imagine that a funerary inscription could make a joke, perhaps this inscription contains a joke of naming, in the style of Antisthenes himself (see t. 41A titles 1.6 and 6.3, 143A, 147, 148). Like Protagoras of Abdera, Antisthenes published a book called Truth (t. 41A title 6.1), and Plato cites by title from the Truth of Protagoras repeatedly in his Theaetetus (161c4, 162a1, 171c6, and further likely puns); the character Protagoras, meanwhile, behaves very oddly in Theaetetus, once rising from the dead to defend an interpretation of a key sentence from his book Truth (171c11–d3). If Antisthenes was recognizable as the new Protagoras, in line with Plato’s discussions of Protagoras in Theaetetus, it is not impossible that Antisthenes’ heir, who would have to be Diogenes of Sinope in this case, could have played on this association. If Theaetetus was written before Antisthenes died (c. 365: see t. 35B), the tombstone might have noted the fact that “Protagoras” was dead again; conversely, if Antisthenes died and the tombstone was made before Plato wrote Theaetetus, it is Plato who would have extended the joke. A grave memorial for Diogenes himself was notably splendid: Pausanias mentions it first among the shrines outside the city of Corinth in his Guide to Greece 2.4, and this memorial must have been funded by sponsors beyond his heir, since Diogenes would have left no estate. (The city of Sinope, too, seems to have constructed unusually monumental tombs in its cemeteries in the fourth century BCE: see Stoyanov 2012:411.) Antisthenes probably had some property (see t. 81A, 82), for which he had no known heir. If the property fell to Diogenes, it is plausible that Diogenes would have seen no better option than to spend it on a silly tombstone.
Ἀντισθένους: The name “Antisthenes” is typically Attic, like many names built on the unit Ἀντι- (see LGPN v.2:233–40, where sixty-five personal names are listed with this first unit). Such names are attested throughout Greece, and two prominent characters in the Odyssey have such names. But names built from this unit are rarely attested in Sinope or in Pontus overall (LGPN v. 5A:34–40). If the inscription is a joke, it marks its real reference through both the patronymic and the ethnic adjective. The real patronymic of Antisthenes the Socratic was “son of Antisthenes” (t. 1A).
Σινωπεύς: The ethnic Sinopeus would connote a reassignment of fatherland, from the Athens Antisthenes had symbolically fled (t. 8, 72A) to the Sinope Diogenes had really fled, before he became symbolically Athenian; and so it would give another clue to the real identity of the deceased individual and his symbolic, or adopted, next of kin. For Antisthenes’ home in the Piraeus, see t. 12.
ANTISTHENIS CYNICI IMAGINI SUBDITI:
inventor primus Cynices ego. “quae ratio istaec?
Alcides multo dicitur esse prior.”
Alcida quondam fueram doctore secundus:
nunc ego sum Cynices primus, et ille deus.
titulum om. F T 1 cynices codd. plur. : cinices M L T 4 cynices T2 : cinices T
To the image of Antisthenes the Cynic beneath:
I am the first inventor of Cynic wisdom. “What is this reasoning?
Heracles is said to be much older.”
I was once second to Heracles, my teacher:
But now I am First Cynic, and he is a god.
Ausonius (c. 310–394 CE) wrote about 120 epigrams, amid other work. He addresses philosophical topics occasionally, probably representing their occurrence among the Greek epigrams he is imitating rather than a special interest of his own. On Cynics in imperial epigram generally, see Follet 1993.
This offers a parallel to t. 26, where the founder of Cynicism is disputed.
ANTISTHENIS CYNICI IMAGINI SUBDITI: The heading implies that it is the caption above a portrait. Giannantoni’s classification of these epigrams with Antisthenes’ necrology is motivated by the traditional association between epigrams and tombstones.
Cynices: This Greek first-declension genitive adjective stands for cynices sophiae (compare κυνικὴν σοφίην in the next epigram) or cynices philosophiae. See Kay 2001:138–40.
Alcides multo . . . prior: See Oenomaus’ opinion on the founder of Cynicism, cited by Julian (t. 26).
Alcida . . . doctore: On Heracles in Cynic tradition, see Höistad 1948:47–73. The tradition that Heracles was the original Cynic teacher appears in the Cynic epistles, which predate Ausonius and probably Oenomaus.
et ille deus: Whatever the importance of apotheosis as a goal in Antisthenes’ thought (see t. 176), this divinized Heracles has gone beyond the realm of Cynicism. Perhaps (proto-)Cynic wisdom was useful only in the world of humans.
<de eodem>
discipulus melior nulli meliorve magister
εἰς ἀρετὴν συνέβη καὶ κυνικὴν σοφίην.
dicere me novit verum, qui novit utrumque
καὶ θεὸν Ἀλκείδην, καὶ Κύνα Διογένην.
non separ. a praec. codd. : disiunxit Scaliger 1 melior nulli codd. plur. : molior K : nulli melior T 3 novit verum A : verum novit cett. 4 κύνα codd. plur. : νῦν δὲ E
<On the same man [Antisthenes]>
No one had a better pupil, no one a better teacher
On the path to virtue and Cynic wisdom.
He knows that I say the truth, who knows them both,
both the divine Heracles and Diogenes the Dog.
These verses are transmitted in combination with t. 39, as one eight-verse poem. But the alternation between Latin and Greek in these verses, together with the form of riddle and solution, shows that this is a separate poem. Any original heading was lost through this combination.
Antisthenes’ situation between Heracles and Diogenes is similar to that defended in the previous epigram. Ausonius’ alternation between Latin and Greek language is common to other epigrams, where it is sometimes a clue that puns are relevant to the meaning of the whole. Here it seems only to mark the theme of philosophy and possibly the double identity of the Cynic, who is not only a human and between the levels of animal and god (see the discussion of φύσις in t. 41A title 2.1) but a being who shares in both levels. See Kay 2001:140–42.
discipulus melior nulli meliorve magister: This is a kind of riddle, situating Antisthenes as good or fortunate by reference to his pupil Diogenes and his teacher Heracles. The answer to the riddle is revealed in the last verse.
εἰς ἀρετὴν συνέβη καὶ κυνικὴν σοφίην: The Greek verb συνέβη governs the dative Latin object nulli in the previous line: this is not only an alternation of Latin and Greek verses but a tight syntactical combination. The verb is impersonal, standard for “it pertained” or “it happened.” But the directional phrase εἰς ἀρετὴν . . . καὶ κυνικὴν σοφίην implies an educational journey, as does the image of pupil and teacher. This suggests that a more etymological sense of συμβαίνω, “walk together,” might resonate. Such a sense is not normal Greek: συμβαίνω in the personal use normally means “come to agreement.” But Ausonius was a foreign speaker.