Section 4 Antisthenes’ Writings

Testimonia 41–52

41A. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 6.15–18 (Marcovich)

= 1 DC

Φέρονται δ’αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα τόμοι δέκα· πρῶτος, ἐν ᾧ

Περὶ λέξεως ἢ Περὶ χαρακτήρων,

Αἴας ἢ Αἴαντος λόγος,

Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ [Περὶ] Ὀδυσσέως <λόγος>,

5 Ὀρέστου ἀπολογία,

Περὶ τῶν δικογράφων <ἢ> Ἰσογράφη<ς> καὶ Δεσίας

[ἢ Ἰσοκράτης],

Πρὸς τὸν Ἰσοκράτους Ἀμάρτυρον.

Τόμος δεύτερος, ἐν ᾧ

10 Περὶ ζῴων φύσεως,

Περὶ παιδοποιΐας ἢ Περὶ γάμου ἐρωτικός,

Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωμονικός,

Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος,

δεύτερος, τρίτος,

15 Περὶ Θεόγνιδος δ’ ε’.

Τόμος τρίτος, ἐν ᾧ

Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ,

Περὶ ἀνδρείας,

Περὶ νόμου ἢ Περὶ πολιτείας,

20 Περὶ νόμου ἢ Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου,

Περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ δουλείας,

Περὶ πίστεως,

Περὶ ἐπιτρόπου ἢ Περὶ τοῦ πείθεσθαι,

Περὶ νίκης οἰκονομικός.

18 ἀνδρίας P | 19 ἢ om. F | 20 om. F | 22 post πίστεως addit ἢ B (unus tit. cum 23) 23 περὶ² om. F

25 Τόμος τέταρτος, ἐν ᾧ

Κῦρος,

Ἡρακλῆς ὁ μείζων ἢ Περὶ ἰσχύος.

27 ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος om. F

Τόμος πέμπτος, ἐν ᾧ

Κῦρος ἢ Περὶ βασιλείας,

30 Ἀσπασία.

Τόμος ἕκτος, ἐν ᾧ

Ἀλήθεια,

Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἀντιλογικός,

Σάθων,

35 Περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν α’ β’ γ’,

Περὶ διαλέκτου.

32–33 unus tit. in B P : ἢ (unus tit. 32–33) add. Hirzel | 34–35 ἢ (unus tit. 34–35) add. Kuehn | 35 ἀντιλέγειν B P : διαλέγειν F | α’ β’ om. F

Τόμος ἕβδομος, ἐν ᾧ

Περὶ παιδείας ἢ Περὶ ὀνομάτων α’ β’ γ’ δ’ ε’,

Περὶ ὀνομάτων χρήσεως ἢ Ἐριστικός,

40 Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως,

Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης α’ β’ γ’ δ’,

Περὶ τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν,

Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου,

Περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου,

45 Περὶ φύσεως α’ β’,

Ἐρώτημα Περὶ φύσεως α’, Ἐρώτημα Περὶ φύσεως β’,

Δόξαι ἢ Ἐριστικός,

Περὶ τοῦ μανθάνειν προβλήματα.

Τόμος ὄγδοος, ἐν ᾧ

50 Περὶ μουσικῆς,

Περὶ ἐξηγητῶν,

Περὶ Ὁμήρου,

Περὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀσεβείας,

Περὶ Κάλχαντος,

55 Περὶ κατασκόπου,

Περὶ ἡδονῆς.

51 Περὶ <τῶν Ὁμήρου> ἐξηγητῶν Marcovich | 54–55 Περὶ Κάλχαντος ἢ περὶ τερατοσκόπου (unus tit.) Winckelmann | 56 Περὶ Ἐλένης A. Müller

Τόμος ἔνατος, ἐν ᾧ

Περὶ Ὀδυσσείας,

Περὶ τῆς ῥάβδου,

60 Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ Περὶ Τηλεμάχου,

Περὶ Ἑλένης καὶ Πηνελόπης,

Περὶ Πρωτέως,

Κύκλωψ ἢ Περὶ Ὀδυσσέως,

Περὶ οἰνου χρήσεως ἢ Περὶ μέθης ἢ Περὶ τοῦ Κύκλωπος,

65 Περὶ Κίρκης,

Περὶ Ἀμφιαράου,

Περὶ [τοῦ] Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Πηνελόπης,

Περὶ τοῦ κυνός.

Τόμος δέκατος, ἐν ᾧ

70 Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Μίδας,

Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἰσχύος,

Κυρσᾶς ἢ Ἐρώμενος,

Κύριος ἢ Κατάσκοποι,

Μενέξενος ἢ Περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν,

75 Ἀλκιβιάδης,

Ἀρχέλαος ἢ Περὶ βασιλείας.

70 καὶ Decleva Caizzi et olim Welcker : ἢ P F : om. B spatio litt. 6 relicto | 71 om. F | καὶ Decleva Caizzi : ἢ B P | 72 Κυρσᾶς Patzer : Κύρνος Winckelmann : κύριος B P : κῦρος F | 73 κύριος B P : κῦρος F : κύριοι Winckelmann

καὶ ταῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἃ συνέγραψεν.

His writings are transmitted in ten volumes:

The first, in which [are]

On Diction or On Characters

Ajax or The Speech of Ajax

Odysseus or The Speech of Odysseus

The Apology of Orestes

On the Writers for Lawcourts or Balanced-writer and Binder

In Reply to the “Without Witnesses” of Isocrates

The second volume, in which [are]

On the Nature of Animals

On Child-making or On Marriage, [an] erotic [work]

On the Sophists, [a] physiognomic [work]

On Justice and Courage, the first, second, third protreptic

On Theognis, the fourth, fifth [protreptic]

The third volume, in which [are]

On Good

On Courage

On Law or On the Constitution

On Law or On Fine and Just

On Freedom and Slavery

On Trust

On Entrustment or On Persuasion

On Victory, [a work] on household management

The fourth volume, in which [are]

Cyrus

Heracles the Greater or On Strength

The fifth volume, in which [are]

Cyrus or On Kingship

Aspasia

The sixth volume, in which [are]

Truth

On Discussing, [an] antilogical [work]

Sathon

On Gainsaying, books 1, 2, 3

On Dialectic

The seventh volume, in which [are]

On Education or On Names, books 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

On the Use of Names or [The] Eristic [Man]

On Question and Answer

On Belief and Knowledge, books 1, 2, 3, 4

On Dying

On Life and Death

On Things in the Underworld

On Nature, books 1, 2

Inquiry on Nature, book 1, Inquiry on Nature, book 2

Beliefs or [The] Eristic [Man]

On Learning, problems

The eighth volume, in which [are]

On Music

On Interpreters

On Homer

On Injustice and Impiety

On Calchas

On [the] Scout

On Pleasure

The ninth volume, in which [are]

On [the] Odyssey

On the Wand

Athena or On Telemachus

On Helen and Penelope

On Proteus

Cyclops or On Odysseus

On Use of Wine or On Drunkenness or On the Cyclops

On Circe

On Amphiaraus

On Odysseus and Penelope

On the Dog

The tenth volume, in which [are]

Heracles and Midas

Heracles or On Intelligence and Strength

Kyrnas or Beloved

Lord or Scouts

Menexenus or On Ruling

Alcibiades

Archelaus or On Kingship

And this is what he wrote.

Importance of the Testimonium

Among the dozens of catalogs preserved by Diogenes Laertius, this list of titles is outstanding for its length, structure, detail, and range of topic. The most nearly comparable lists are those for Democritus, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Heraclides of Pontus, and Chrysippus, which are also long, detailed, wide ranging, and systematic, and these comparanda might indicate the value attributed to Antisthenes’ works by at least some part of ancient tradition. Since almost all of the works listed are lost, the catalog itself is the best surviving evidence for Antisthenes’ range of thought, presented here in a structure probably imposed by an editor, but without the stonger mediation of a text with a true author. A mediating party in the time period between Antisthenes and Diogenes Laertius would have been interested, most likely, in asserting what school Antisthenes belonged to and what kind of thinker—rhetorical or philosophical, Socratic or sophistic, Cynic or Stoic—he was; but this catalog betrays little of this kind of agenda, and its arrangement, while structured, is hard to describe under these categories. Whereas Diogenes Laertius’ biography and doxography of Antisthenes (6.1–16) do depend on such Hellenistic traditions, this book list represents Antisthenes’ literary output in a more direct way. This catalog also documents Antisthenes’ substantial body of writing on logical topics (tomoi 6–7) and ethical topics (tomoi 2–3 and presumably passim), well beyond what the surviving testimonia would suggest. Although he might have said the same trivial things in many texts at great length, this is only one possibility, and it is more likely that his large output indicates a major contribution to the Socratic discourse of the 390s, 380s, 370s, and 360s. The catalog is also remarkably complete by reference to the Antisthenean titles documented separately: although some titles of works that do not appear here are mentioned, there is no clear case that cannot be identified with one of the works listed (Decleva Caizzi 1966:77–78; Patzer 1970:150–63; see also t. 41D, 84A, 137A, 159D, 197). Patzer (1970, following suggestions in Decleva Caizzi’s 1966 edition) organized his treatment of Antisthenes around this book catalog, and the ordering of fragments in SSR also follows it. See Decleva Caizzi 1966:77–78; Patzer 1970:91–255; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:235–56. Brancacci 1990:17–41 discusses the sixth and seventh tomoi. Susemihl 1887 is basic for disputes about authenticity in the tenth tomos.

First τόμος: This tomos, containing probably six works (assuming the combination of titles in 1.5), consisted of forensic speeches in the voices of mythical characters and texts about forensic speeches and speech writers. This section of the catalog was believed by earlier scholars (as reflected in Rankin 1986:151–73) to represent a pre-Socratic, “sophistic” phase in Antisthenes’ career, but close reading of the extant Ajax and Odysseus speeches shows how fully Socratic these texts are (see commentary on t. 53–54), and there is no clear sign that any of Antisthenes’ writing is from a pre-Socratic period. (See t. 9, 12A; Patzer 1970:246–55.) Possibly the author of the catalog thought these texts should be separated as “rhetoric.”

1. Περὶ λέξεως ἢ Περὶ χαρακτήρων

This first title in the tomos, like several others (especially in the sixth through ninth tomoi), seems to introduce the topic of the set. Unlike most of the others, however, this is a double title, which associates either two aspects of rhetoric or one aspect of rhetoric and one aspect of ethics. The term λέξις (diction) is plausibly Antisthenean: it is cognate with λέγειν and λόγος, which were critically important to Antisthenes and his contemporaries (t. 150–59), and it is common in Plato and Aristotle as a technical term for the vocabulary, diction, or style of a text, author, or speaker. The term χαρακτήρων, plural from χαρακτήρ (character), is more problematic. In the later terminology of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, χαρακτήρ refers to a level of rhetorical style: the canonical three levels of style recognized in the late Roman Republic and early Roman Empire, which scholars have tried to trace back to Theophrastus, are the “characters of diction” (χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως). Nineteenth-century scholars hence proposed that Antisthenes first developed such a theory. (For a survey, see Luzzatto 1996:277–81.) But no fourth-century rhetorical text, either by Theophrastus or by Aristotle or Anaximenes, uses the term χαρακτήρ as Dionysius later uses it. The sense of ethical “type,” however, was in use in Antisthenes’ time. Derived from the verb χαράσσω, “I stamp,” the noun χαρακτήρ designated the product of this stamping, as in the stamp or type of coined currency. In late fifth-century drama, it had common metaphorical usage for “types” of person, with reference to outer, perceptible traits of persons, such as their appearance or—in, for example, Aristophanes’ Peace (217 ff.; 421 BCE)—style of speech. In Theophrastus’ Ethical Characters (ἠθικαὶ χαρακτῆρες) of a century later, the term referred instead to types of inner subjectivity (to be distinguished from the subjectivity of individual persons). Given the Socratic interest in the inner, ethical person who is supposed to be trained through discussion, as well as the explicit connections drawn in Socratic texts between knowing oneself and understanding how to use words (e.g., Xen. Mem. 4.6.1), it is plausible that Antisthenes used this term in his own work to designate personal types that are the same as or discernible from styles of speech, with some view also to types of subjectivity. In Antisthenes’ interpretation of Odysseus πολύτροπος (t. 187), a double conception of the term τρόπος in the meanings “ethical character” (ἦθος), on the one hand, and “use of verbal account” (χρῆσις τοῦ λόγου), on the other, is an important step in the argument: this passage supports the possibility that the present title poses a close relationship between the ethical and linguistic aspects of types of persons. (See also Patzer 1970:164–90; Patzer wishes to assign t. 187 to this title.) Moreover, if the extant Ajax and Odysseus were assigned their positions in the catalog because they illustrate general points presented in this opening text, this makes the ethical meaning of χαρακτήρ quite likely: Ajax and Odysseus debate the nature and measures of virtue while also instantiating different types of virtue and using language and names in markedly different ways. (See t. 53–54.) For the term elsewhere in Antisthenes’ testimonia, see t. 44C, 46. The term “cross-stamp the currency” (παραχαράξαι τὸ νόμισμα), with reference to ethical norms, is an imperative in Cynicism from Diogenes of Sinope (e.g., Diog. Laert. 6.20), and the shared use of this term might be more than a coincidence. In this opening text, Antisthenes might have asserted a positive statement or program about the connection between personal rhetoric and ethics. Whether it was a systematic doctrine of “something like ethopoiia” (Kennedy 1963:172) or just proclamation cannot be judged.

2. Αἴας ἢ Αἴαντος λόγος

This text survives: see t. 53 and the comment on the following title. It seems plausible from the position of these titles in the catalog, as well as their content, that these were pieces designed to attract pupils for Antisthenes.

3. Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ [Περὶ] Ὀδυσσέως <λόγος>

This text survives: see t. 54. Casaubon (sixteenth century) edited the title of Odysseus’ speech to parallel that of Ajax’ speech. The asymmetry of the transmitted titles, if it is not a crude error or confusion with the famous Περὶ Ὀδυσσείας (title 9.1, t. 50), suggests that the speeches were not considered exactly parallel by the author of the catalog. Indeed, the speeches are quite different in tone, and their pairing has been doubted. (See Focardi 1987.) Dorandi 2013:415 is the first modern editor to doubt Casaubon’s emendation, although he, too, prints the emended text.

4. Ὀρέστου ἀπολογία

The Defense Speech of Orestes, which does not survive, was presumably similar in form to Ajax and Odysseus, although without a partner text. Orestes’ speech probably responded to the charge of matricide traditional in the myth, as in the versions in Aeschylus’ Eumenides and Euripides’ Orestes. If Antisthenes’ speech was like Ajax and Odysseus, it might have been a depiction and implied psychological examination of the ethical character who would commit matricide, just as Ajax is, on one level, a depiction of the character who would commit suicide. Joël (1903 II.655–704) proposed that this text was a response to Antiphon’s speech Against the Step-Mother, in which the accused is compared briefly to Clytemnestra. Radermacher (1951:126) saw all three of Antisthenes’ speeches—Orestes, Ajax, and Odysseus—as exercises in speech writing according to rules of oratory, pointing to Aristotle’s reference to an apology of Orestes by Theodectes (Rhet. 2.24 1401a35). Chroust (1957:129, 285–86 n.886–87) proposed that Antisthenes was responding to an apology of Clytemnestra by Polycrates, mentioned by Quintilian (2.17.4). It is plausible that all three of Antisthenes’ speeches had meta-rhetorical elements, that is, indications that they not only are pardigmatic speeches but also deliver parodies of speeches or commentary about contemporary speech making or the construction of personae. The two extant speeches have ethical dimensions, implications for epistemology, and teasing play with the ontological status of previous mythical “facts” as presented in older poetry, all of which is equally plausible for Orestes’ defense speech.

5. Περὶ τῶν δικογράφων <ἢ> Ἰσογράφη<ς> καὶ Δεσίας [ἢ Ἰσοκράτης]

This title (or pair of titles, according to the manuscripts) points to polemic against the contemporary speech writers Isocrates and Lysias, whose names are presented through puns. (The reading here follows Decleva Caizzi, whose text is also the basis for Marcovich. Pohlenz 1907 first accepted and interpreted the puns transmitted in the manuscript readings. See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:265–70 for a history of the alternatives, most of which restore the real names of the orators.) If this is one text with a double title, it was possibly a dialogue or a parody of a dialogue, with indication of the topic of discussion and the main speakers, as in the Thrasyllan titles for Plato; but on the Thrasyllan model, the order should be reversed. The puns carry jokes on the rhetorical capacities of each orator, in a game Antisthenes played also against Plato (title 6.3; see also t. 147–48) and possibly Aspasia (t. 143A). Isocrates—here renamed “Isographes,” or “Even Writer,” by a change of two Greek letters—was known for writing in parallel syntactical segments having equal prosodic rhythm. (Plato himself is said to be ἰσογράφος by Timon of Phlius [fr. 30 Di Marco].) Lysias—here renamed “Desias,” or “Binder,” also by a change of two letters—was known for enchanting lovers and presumably, by extension, other audiences, at least according to Plato’s parody of his erotic discourse in Phaedrus (227c4–6, 231a–234c). In addition, Lysias’ actual name, meaning “one who frees or releases,” has just the opposite meaning to “Binder,” which might then refer to his failures in court, where his clients became bound to penalties (ἐδέθη, as in, e.g., Demos. On the Crown 107), rather than released from the charges. Finally, a special sort of freedom of the person was of central importance to Antisthenes and the Cynics (see t. 82, 34F) and also discussed as a goal of action by Lysias and Isocrates, possibly in a different sense: if Antisthenes addressed ethical as well as rhetorical issues here, the name “Binder” might imply failure to deliver real freedom. The appearance of Lysias and Isocrates also elsewhere in the Socratic discourse suggests that they were the contemporaries closest to the boundaries of the actual Socratic movement, perhaps its closest external rivals: Plato refers to both in Phaedrus, and Lysias is also mentioned in Clitophon (406a) as someone with whom the title character has discussed his meetings with Socrates; the Republic is set in his father’s house. (Clitophon, in turn, might have associations with Antisthenes: see t. 208.) Lysias was said to have written a defense speech for Socrates’ trial, which Socrates rejected (Diog. Laert. 2.40–41); he is also reported to have written an On Sycophancy against the Socratic Aeschines (Diog. Laert. 2.63). Isocrates, for his part, attacked the Socratics for useless educational methods and goals, especially in Against the Sophists and Helen, and pairing this title with the next supports the possibility that some of his attack was against Antisthenes in particular. (See t. 66, 156, 170.)

6. Πρὸς τὸν Ἰσοκράτους Ἀμάρτυρον

Isocrates’ Without Witnesses is an extant forensic speech now known under the title Against Euthynus, probably delivered soon after the restoration of the democracy in 403 BCE, to which Lysias wrote the opposing Against Nicias concerning the Deposit, known by title only. Isocrates’ speaker uses arguments from “evidence” and probability that do not depend on the testimony of eyewitnesses, who are lacking for the key incident. See t. 55. The form of this title suggests a text in a monologic authorial voice, addressed to the historical Isocrates, but parody is a possibility. If the text was a forensic speech, like titles 1.2–4, it might have been separated from the others because title 1.5 stands as an introduction.

Second τόμος: This tomos, containing probably five texts (assuming one double title), that is, three one-part texts and two titles consisting in five shorter parts described as “protreptics,” introduces a sequence of ethical texts that continues into the third tomos. The three titles before the “protreptics” stand outside this ethical sequence and call for separate explanation. Nineteenth-century scholars assigned these three titles to the domain of natural science (physics), allegedly a separate catalog section that, some thought, was resumed in the second half of the seventh tomos, where eschatology and theology were added: the separation of these sequences was considered an error in the tradition. (See Patzer 1970:127–35; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:250–53.) Under this understanding, these writings would have addressed what would become the Peripatetic and Stoic field of physics, and behind the arrangement in tomoi 2–7 of the catalog would stand the tripartite division of Stoic philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, possibly in the order ethics, logic, and physics. However, the titles on marriage and childbearing and the “physiognomic” work on the Sophists have immediate ethical and political associations, and it is more likely that all three of these texts were ethical, not part of natural science. The three titles together are united by an interest in human nature as defined by comparison to animals, whereas the titles on nature and eschatology at the end of the seventh tomos might consider human nature by comparison to gods: this understanding yields both a birth-to-death sequence and a sequence in the order of being.

1. Περὶ ζῴων φύσεως

The terms in the first title, On the Nature of Animals, suggest two oppositions that were important in Pre-Socratic Greek thought: nature or φύσις was opposed to culture or νόμος, according to many versions of this claim being made in the latter half of the fifth century (Heinimann 1945), and animals were opposed to humans, according to a standard conception of Greek identity (Diog. Laert. 1.33). Both Antisthenes and the Cynics continued to oppose φύσις against νόμος, and they drove this opposition to various radical extremes, sometimes for reasons different from those of the Sophists. Since the term νόμος occurs in two titles in the third τόμος of Antisthenes’ catalog, it is plausible that this opposition is important in the sequence, which might, then, proceed from nature to culture. Although Antisthenes prefers φύσις over νόμος in his theology (t. 179A), and the Cynics and Stoics, too, promoted nature over custom in their call to live according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, Diog. Laert. 6.71, 6.94, 7.4), one should not assume that his views were simple. It might be that some aspects of nature—that is, the nature that humans share with the animals—need education or enculturation in order to become good. (See t. 123 for a negative sense of φύσις.) A double conception of nature, in which a primitive nature needs culture and in which a higher inborn nature is served or even liberated by the right culture, could explain the divided positions of the φύσις titles in the catalog. Regarding animals, the positions of Antisthenes and the Cynics were also different from traditional Greek ideology. Traditional Greek thought cast animals as an important category of the “other,” polarized so completely to the ideal, male, Greek-speaking self that there was no blurring of boundaries between human and beast but were only reversals or monstrous combinations of body parts, as they occur in myths and polemic such as Semonides’ poem on the races of women. Thales (and also Socrates) was credited with the statement that he thanked fortune that he was born a human and not a beast, a man and not a woman, a Greek and not a barbarian (Diog. Laert. 1.33). By contrast, the view of humanity developed by both Antisthenes and the Cynics rejected an a priori opposition between humans and beasts, together with these other oppositions. (Continuity between humans and animals was clear also for Aristotle, as it had been for Empedocles and other Pre-Socratics.) In Antisthenes’ texts and testimonia, animals remain largely negative models, but they reside on a continuum with human beings, not in polar opposition: humans who are like animals seem to be deficient in virtue (t. 54.14, 96, 189A-2). Antisthenes might have emphasized that, ideology aside, humans are animals, and every human risks being no more than an animal when he or she does not cultivate virtue. Animals are also metaphors for humans in Antisthenes’ testimonia, where they seem to be meant as funny when the issue is not an individual’s personal virtue but social relationships and hierarchies (t. 5, 68). For Diogenes of Sinope, dogs became positive models for lifestyle, because they lacked the noxious aspects of culture: the name of the Cynic sect is famously “the Dogs” (see t. 22B). If humans and animals were similar as well as different for Antisthenes in the way described, then On the Nature of Animals might stand first in the ethical sequence because it laid out what the human, as an animal, essentially is. The basic facts that humans are born, they move, they eat, they grow, they seek protection from the elements, and they die might have been discussed in a way that set foundations for ethics. Reflections of such a basis for ethics are in t. 82.

2. Περὶ παιδοποιΐας ἢ Περὶ γάμου ἐρωτικός

This text might have been the source for the report that Antisthenes advocated marriage (or mating) for the sake of reproduction (t. 58). This statement conflicts with the lifestyle Antisthenes claims for himself (see t. 82; compare t. 57). But the main topic in this text could have been not the partners in marriage but their children, whose foundations might have been tracked to the marriage that produced them. There is little attested interest in childhood in classical Athens, but passages in books 8 and 9 of Plato’s Republic give colorful treatments of the origins of men’s political views in the natal family. The term ἐρωτικός indicates that the text also treated the erotic attraction between the partners in marriage. This could seem at odds with the picture of philosophical love of the soul that dominates the extant testimonia (see t. 14A, 84C, 92A–C, 134k; contrast also 123, 175), but Antisthenes, like the character Socrates in the Symposium of Xenophon, might have recognized two kinds of love, a sublime form consummated through philosophy and a bodily form intended for reproduction and therefore always heterosexual. (See t. 14A, 123.) Possibly some marriages, like that of Odysseus and Penelope, had both.

3. Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωμονικός

T. 62 (from Athenaeus’ Wise Men at Dinner) is said to come from “the physiognomic discourse,” and historical interpretations of this title are based on that evidence. (See discussion in Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:281–83.) It seems that the Sophists and their pupils are assimilated to animals (pigs in t. 62). Most interpretations of this title assume that Antisthenes used a kind of physiognomic system in a positive way (if with humor), to show the nature of the Sophists’ souls through their external animal forms. It has also been proposed that this text by Antisthenes parodied and thus rejected the art of physiognomics. Possibly the label “physiognomonic” was applied at a later date to Antisthenes’ text but did not occur in it; but a craft of physiognomics, in which inner character was inferred from external appearances, was featured in Socratic literature, most famously in the Zopyrus of Phaedo (SSR IIIA 11: see Döring 1997; Rosetti 1973, 1980). This text portrayed the traveling physiognomist Zopyrus in an encounter with Socrates: he misread Socrates’ character from his face (declaring him stupid and excessively inclined to sex with women) and was shown up as a fool. Socrates emphasized in his rebuttal that his basic nature might have been as Zopyrus read it but that his character had been reformed through philosophy. This yields a negative view of physiognomics for Phaedo, but this could have been a topic for polemic among the Socratics. Despite the famous disparity between Socrates’ ugly external form and his beautiful soul (Pl. Sym. 215a6–b4; Xen. Sym. 5.8–10), the idea that a person’s external form represents his or her inner nature seems consistent with some evidence for Antisthenes (t. 193) and with Xen. Mem. 3.10.1–5, where Socrates interviews the painter Parrhesias about the way a beautiful (ethical) face is portrayed. Antisthenes’ ability to recognize a horse at sight (t. 149) and presumably to distinguish it from the similarly appearing ass (see t. 72A) could imply that he thought essential traits are accessible to sense perception. Possibly physiognomics could be used to “read” souls only in pre-philosophical beings, as Socrates’ retort to Zopyrus suggests and as the current title might uphold, or possibly Antisthenes meant his comparisons of the Sophists and their pupils to animals as a telling metaphor rather than a serious claim.

4. Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος

This is the catalog’s first title built from terms central to Socratic ethics as they are known from Plato and Xenophon. Because the text is also called “protreptic,” it seems to be preliminary to the further Socratic-sounding titles in the third τόμος. For Diogenes Laertius (t. 11B), Pollux (t. 64C–D), and Athenaeus (t. 63), Protreptics or Protreptic is the primary title of the work or set of works. This is also the catalog’s first title to have enumerated parts, here signified in the fully written words “first, second, third” rather than with the letters used normally for ordinal numbers. Surviving testimonia (t. 63–66) indicate that the Protreptics were set at least partly as a symposium, at which Socrates appeared as a speaker (t. 64A). Possibly these were Socratic dialogues with multiple interlocutors, as one would find at a symposium and finds in Plato’s Symposium and Xenophon’s Symposium. Diogenes Laertius cites the Protreptics as an example of dialogue into which Antisthenes inserted the rhetorical form (t. 11B): so longer speeches must have been included. Possibly the subtitle “protreptic” refers instead to extended, protreptic speeches included within the text at the setting of the symposium: the number three, then, might have indicated three speeches rather than three books. But the numbering of the next title in the catalog, On Theognis, with the more normal signs for “fourth” and “fifth,” shows that the cataloger understood the numbers to refer to three books of protreptic content, to which he understood the two books On Theognis as a sequel: the cataloger seems to have inherited the labels “first, second, third” and continued the series in the more common idiom, which is also used elsewhere in the catalog. This more normal enumeration system designates book-length parts in all known cases (Wilamowitz 1919 II:26). (For further proposals about the forms of these titles, see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:285–86.) It is hard to doubt that at least some of these five texts, the three pieces On Justice and Courage and the two pieces On Theognis, were among Xenophon’s sources for his Socratic Symposium. Justice and courage are topics of discussion for Xenophon’s symposiasts, in both the unstructured discussion of chapter 2 and the cycle of speeches in chapters 3 and 4; and Antisthenes is featured centrally in discussion of both virtues (justice in t. 78, 83; courage in t. 78, 103A). There are also detailed correspondences. At 2.4 is quoted a passage from Theognis (verses 35–36) that can otherwise be associated with Antisthenes: it is quoted again at Mem. 1.2.20, in a context where Xenophon disputes the permanence of moral virtue in relationship to Alcibiades, a topic Antisthenes probably handled (see t. 99, 103C, 198-9). Most passages explicitly attributed in ancient sources to Antisthenes’ Protreptics are discussions of drinking cups (t. 64–65), a topic also evoked in Xenophon’s Symposium (2.26 = t. 67). The thesis that the Protreptics were the main source for Xenophon’s Symposium was argued in detail in Joël 1893–1901 v.2.2:708–949: see the summary and assessment in SSR v.4:290–94. Joël’s lengthy treatment is marred by unmethodical and cumulative speculation, but its basic thesis on this topic seems impossible to doubt. Whether all other material about Antisthenes in Xenophon’s Symposium—that is, the debate with Callias about making men just (t. 78, 83), the debate with Niceratus about knowing Homer (t. 185A, 186), the discourse on the wealth of the soul (t. 82), and the joking about Socratic love and procurement (t. 14A, 13A)—should be attributed also to the Protreptics, as Joël believed, cannot be proved. Dittmar’s counter-thesis of 1912, that Aeschines’ Callias and Aspasia were the major sources for some of these passages (which also cannot be proved), has dominated subsequent scholarship: allegedly Aeschines presented a hostile portrait of Antisthenes in these texts. The fact that evidence for Joël’s thesis is scarce cannot be confused (as it is in Huss 1999 [Xenophons Symposion]:364) with the proposition that either there was or there was not a literary relationship between Xenophon and Antisthenes, which a contemporary reader could see. The answer would matter if we knew it.

5. Περὶ Θεόγνιδος δ’ ε’

The cataloger understands the two-part text On Theognis as a sequel to the text just before: see notes there. On Theognis must have been a discussion about the elegiac poetry attributed to Theognis and its moral themes of justice, wealth, and so on, which seems to have been recited and interpreted at Athenian drinking parties, to judge from Xen. Sym. 2.4. When Socrates quotes Theognis (verses 35–36) at the symposium, the purpose is to provide a jokingly authoritative answer to the question at hand, how boys become educated in virtue (although the literal question on the table is how the father of the boy can assume the smell of virtue when he is too old for the gym). The same verses are quoted by Plato’s Socrates in Meno 95d4–e1 to support the positive answer to a dilemma embedded in Theognis’ corpus, whether or not teaching virtue is possible. It is impossible to know from Xenophon’s and Plato’s use of this quotation how Antisthenes would have used Theognis. Possibly Theognis’ verses provided a provocative springboard from which discussion continued, whether in support or opposition, in the same way Homer’s text functions for Antisthenes (t. 187–92). Theognis recommended a ποικίλον ἦθος (“varied character,” verses 213–18, 1071–74: see Thimme 1935:16–18), in a positive, political sense that could have been an inspiration for Antisthenes’ own analysis of Odysseus πολύτροπος (t. 54, 187). Stobaeus (4.29c.53), in a section called “On Good Birth,” preserves an excerpt from a text he calls On Theognis by Xenophon, and some have proposed that this is an error for Antisthenes: a summary of this discussion is in Giannantoni 1990 v.4:286–89.

Third τόμος: After the Protreptics, the eight titles in the third tomos offer a series of ethical and political terms familiar from Socratic literature. By contrast with most of the other tomoi, the third contains no proper names. The contrast to the fourth, fifth, and tenth tomoi, where the primary titles are almost all proper names, is sharp. Those other texts, moreover, are cited in the doxographical tradition for Antisthenes’ positions on ethical topics (see esp. t. 85, 98, 99), whereas no explicit attribution survives to any title in the third tomos. This might indicate that these texts were abstract, formal, or possibly aporetic treatments of the same ethical topics treated in a more positive or demonstrative style elsewhere, embedded in the stories of heroes. Döring 1995 proposes that “definitions” of virtues might have been sought in these texts, but the conclusions were statements about what kind of thing the virtues were (ποῖόν τι), not what they were (τί), in true satisfaction of the Socratic question. (See t. 150A.4.) According to Brancacci 1990, Antisthenes did find definitions of ethical terms. Possibly the material in these texts was absorbed or repeated by writers such as Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the Stoics, but Antisthenes’ contributions were not acknowledged because they appeared primitive or inconclusive. The form of the titles in this tomos suggests dialogues, but without characterized interlocutors. The conversations in Xen. Mem. 4.2, the Platonic Clitophon and Theages, and the short dialogues of the Appendix Platonica exemplify a simple dialogue style that Antisthenes could have used. In these, Socrates’ interlocutor is minimally characterized, often has no name, and takes no real role in the discussion, except to agree with Socrates, perhaps as a model for the reader. (For coincidences that might point to Antisthenes as author of this kind of dialogue, see t. 13A.56, 72B.8.) Müller 1972 argues for a close relationship between On Justice in the Appendix Platonica and Antisthenes’ work, possibly title 3.4 below. See also Müller 1995 and title 3.4 below. The only avenues for interpreting these titles are from their ordering and collective position in what seems to be a special section of the catalog, on ethics and politics; their terminology in the context of Socratic literature; and (with Brancacci 1990, but with caution) the reception and integration of these same terms by Xenophon and later authors, such as Dio Chrysostom.

1. Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ

This text presumably pursued or presented a revisionist, Socratic account of “good,” in opposition to popular accounts focused on wealth, social status, or pleasure. The absence of an article in this title might be significant, in line with Antisthenes’ denial of Plato’s theory of Forms. (See t. 85.) In the catalog and in all of Antisthenes’ remains, there seems to be no instance of a nominalized adjective meant in the general or universal sense. T. 187.9–11 has abstract substantive adjectives, all neuter singular formulations that refer to individual items, not to universals. (They might also be Porphyry’s language.) The Form of the Good was Plato’s central Form and the one that Aristotle criticized in most detail.

2. Περὶ ἀνδρείας

In distinction from the protreptics on justice and courage, this text might have sought an account of courage, such as Xenophon’s Socrates pursues in Mem. 4.6.10 and Plato’s in Laches.

3. Περὶ νόμου ἢ Περὶ πολιτείας

This title and the following are both On Law, and (unless they are doublets) the distinction is in the second title. Here the actual Athenian state could have been the topic, possibly in the wake of the reign of the Thirty (whose contempt for the “established constitution,” τῆς καθεστώσης πολιτείας, was blamed on Socrates, according to Xen. Mem. 1.2.9) or the restoration of the democracy in 403 BCE, which newly distinguished between statutes (νόμοι) and the “constitution” (πολιτεία). Title 3.4, in distinction, might have treated ideal norm or custom and its relationship to the fine and just in their ideal or Socratic sense (Decleva Caizzi 1966:80). The second title here, περὶ πολιτείας, invites comparison with Plato’s work by a similar name, as well as the tradition apparently formed by Diogenes of Sinope’s Politeia, Zeno of Citium’s Politeia, and Chrysippus’ On the Politeia. Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazousai (388 BCE) seems also to parody a previously proposed communist state, and Plato’s Politeia (c. 378 BCE) could be rehabilitating the older philosophical proposal in the wake of this attack. (See Ussher 1973:xv–xx.) The ideas shared by Aristophanes and Plato seem to be Socratic, and one likely promulgator of such ideas in the 390s, after the Athenians undertook various real constitutional reforms and finally restored the democracy, might be Antisthenes. See t. 22A, where Diogenes Laertius seems to credit Antisthenes with the political ideas on which Zeno and Diogenes built. Antisthenes goes unnoticed, however, in important contexts where communist states are discussed: Aristotle’s discussion of communist proposals in Pol. 2.5–7 1262b37–67b21 never mentions him but says directly that Plato was the first to make women and children common and to institute common meals; Diogenes Laertius (7.131) lists Zeno, Chrysippus, Plato, and Diogenes as advocates of the community of wives and children. From the statements and implications about marriage in title 2.2 and t. 58, it seems that Antisthenes did not advocate for community of wives and children, although from t. 59 and 82.38, it seems that he did assume sexual relations were promiscuous. From t. 82, further, it seems that Antisthenes would have advocated for the economic self-sufficiency of each household, not for communism. On his possible discussion of the community of Homer’s Cyclopes in these terms, see t. 189. Yet the property of the household that Antisthenes imagines in t. 82 is minimal, and he might have proposed generous sharing among friends to account for the higher pleasures in life: according to Diogenes’ doxography, “the wise man is self-sufficient, for everything of others is also his” (t. 134e), and the same idea is in Xenophon (Mem. 1.6.10); Antisthenes is plausible as the link from Socrates to the Cynics. Antisthenes’ Socrates shares his wisdom, the most valuable ware in the city, generously without attention to weight and measure (t. 82.44). An economic communism of a certain kind—one that makes the best goods from wisdom shared or public and, through private minimalism, creates space for personal leisure to engage in true pleasures such as conversation with the wise—would fit with these ideas. If Antisthenes’ more literal pronouncements about politics favored the household and ignored or attacked the city, this could be the reason that he is not acknowledged in the tradition (unless through parody in Plato’s Republic).

4. Περὶ νόμου ἢ Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου

According to the doxography (t. 134g), Antisthenes said that the wise man will be governed not by the “legislated laws” (τοὺς κειμένους νόμους) but by the law of virtue. On law, see also t. 68, 189; on behavior contrary to law, see t. 141A, 189A-1 and B-2. Müller 1975:174–87 argues that the pseudo-Platonic Περὶ δικαίου (On Justice) stems from this text; Müller 1995 argues, further, that both the pseudo-Platonic Minos and Cicero’s De legibus also depend on this same text by Antisthenes; in Cicero’s case, there would probably be an intermediate, Stoic source. Minos shows that the argument for natural law, which carries divine justice, can be attested in the fourth century in association with Socraticism, and Antisthenes, as Müller argues, is the most likely author of such a theory. Giannantoni 1990 v.4:245 rejects as “too Sophistic” Müller’s 1975 account of Antisthenes, according to which language measures justice. But this might be a prejudiced position: see Müller 1995:251 n.22; see also comments on names as the measure in t. 160.

5. Περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ δουλείας

The position of this title after those on law and before those on (probably) political subordination and dependence and property suggests that the “freedom” and “slavery” discussed might be literal political and legal freedom and slavery sooner than the ethical freedom from irrational desire and slavery to irrational passions or ignorance common in Socratic literature. Possibly these metaphors, or ethical revisions, were enacted in these texts. Aristotle (Pol. 1.3 1253b18–23) indicates that certain unnamed writers have written against the natural status of literal slavery, and Antisthenes could have been among these (so Vogt 1971). However, this argument seems to depend on the assumption that Antisthenes’ mother was a slave or that his own social position was close to slavery (t. 1–3); the only surviving evidence for Antisthenes’ thoughts about freedom and slavery is about ethics (see t. 79, 80, 82), for which slavery is used as a metaphor. Such a metaphor appears prominently as the last word of Herodotus’ Histories (9.122), in a statement attributed to Cyrus. Since Antisthenes wrote a fiction of Cyrus, he could have contributed to the reception of this metaphor in Socraticism, by showing, as Herodotus did, how ethical slavery usurps political freedom. See also Xen. Mem. 2.1.10–13, where Antisthenes must be in the background to Socrates’ instruction of Aristippus about ethical slavery. (See t. 112.) In t. 82, Antisthenes makes an explicit ethical metaphor from the literal sense of “wealth,” and “freedom” might be treated there in the same way, without the explicit notice. Breitenbach (1871:919) proposed that titles 3.5–8 form a set in a different way: detecting the vocabulary of titles 3.5–7 in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, he thought these were subtitles for parts of Antisthenes’ own Oeconomicus (as named in 3.8). This plausibility deserves further study, although Xenophon’s differences from Antisthenes and his capacity to revise him should not be underestimated.

6. Περὶ πίστεως

If this title and the next are in an intentional sequence with the previous, the individual’s surrender of freedom in some social framework (whether in a democracy or a more elite group) might have been the main theme. In Plato’s Crito (51b3), Socrates recites the citizen’s duty to “persuade or do what it [the state] commands” (ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ), and this is the main principle by which Socrates accepts the Athenians’ death sentence. This association is supported by the note on the following title.

7. Περὶ ἐπιτρόπου ἢ Περὶ τοῦ πείθεσθαι

The combination of titles implies surrender of intellectual responsibility. In t. 53.9, Ajax reluctantly surrenders (ἐπιτρέπω) authority over his future to the incompetent jurors, who, however, have official jurisdiction over his fate. The Athenians’ surrender of authority, in education and politics, to experts such as the rhetoricians is lamented in t. 208.22 (ἐπιτρέψατε).

8. Περὶ νίκης οἰκονομικός

This title suggests a text about success in household management, to be measured through competition against other households. This is the only catalog title clearly about property (unless that is implied in the “guardian” named in the preceding title), a topic not normally considered Socratic, although Xenophon’s Oeconomicus presents Socrates teaching what he has learned about managing property from Ischomachus. For the possibility that Xenophon’s episode in Mem. 3.4 is related to this title, see t. 72B. Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, if its title can be attributed to Xenophon, might have integrated elements from this text (Pomeroy 1994:7–8, citing the traditional proposal; on p. 213, the hypothesis is rejected). Ps.-Aristotle’s Oeconomicus, which clearly follows Xenophon, has also been seen in Antisthenes’ tradition (Victor 1983:188–92, citing ps.-Aristotle’s ideas that agriculture is useful for philosophy and that corporeal labor is good).

Fourth τόμος: These two texts and the two that follow in the fifth tomos, of unknown form but probably featuring dramatic representations of the title characters, were the most famous work of Antisthenes for Diogenes Laertius and to the time of Julian and Themistius. Their titles are cited more often than any other, and doctrines are reported from them in reduced form. (See t. 85–87, 98–99.) The texts must have been long, if two filled a tomos, and might have had episodic form, like a novel (Hirzel 1895).

1. Κῦρος

Antisthenes wrote two texts called Cyrus, of which one could be called Small Cyrus (t. 43A) and one, possibly the same one, was “second” (t. 141A). Probably there were exactly two texts entitled Cyrus, titles 4.1 and 5.1, subtitled On Kingship. (See discussion on t. 50; see also titles 10.3–4 and t. 43A and 84A.) The surviving testimonia do not reveal the difference between the two Cyrus texts. It is likely that one featured Cyrus the Great (c. 600–530 BCE) and the other featured Cyrus the younger, contemporary of Alcibiades (see t. 141A), who never became king of Persia but died in his attempt. (See discussion of the many historical proposals in Giannantoni 1990 v.4:295–308; see also Höistad 1948:73–77.) Small Cyrus might then be an alternative for the present title, and the text might have featured Cyrus the younger who was not king. In that case, “small” could refer to the man, not the scale of the text, which, according to placement in the tomos, should roughly match the other. The text on Cyrus the Great (5.1) might then have been known to some as Κῦρος ὁ μέγας (a title not attested), in parallel to title 4.2 on Heracles. It is plausible that Antisthenes used Cyrus the younger as a negative exemplum. If he did, this could offer a parallel to Aspasia, who has mixed or negative value in the fragments surviving from Aspasia (title 5.2), and it would create a balance between the fourth and fifth tomoi, so that each contains one quasi-divine hero from mythical times and one real human from the contemporary world. If Antisthenes is the source of the Socratic speech in t. 208, he had scorn for the Persians of the Persian War period, their system of education, and their king (§23–25), as well as little respect for any nation of his present day (§26). Plausibly Antisthenes was inspired to investigate Perisan character, culture, and virtue in the late fifth century BCE because of his prior interest in Alcibiades.

2. Ἡρακλῆς ὁ μείζων ἢ Περὶ ἰσχύος

This must have been Antisthenes’ most famous Heracles text. For all the fame that Antisthenes’ Heracles character seems to have generated (t. 43, 44C, 85, 98–99), we know little about him or the text. Beyond the extant fragments (t. 92–99 and probably 127, some of which could be from the titles in the tenth tomos), indirect evidence might survive in the later Stoic and Cynic traditions. (See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:309–22 for a history of speculations based on possible parallels in Xenophon, Dio Chrysostom, and others. See also Höistad 1948:22–73; Luz 1994, 1996.) Antisthenes’ Heracles might have been inspired by Athenian tragedy, especially Euripides. (See Höistad 1948:26–28; t. 106.) Aristotle (Poet. 1451a20) complains that poets have composed a Saga of Heracles that is episodic rather than unified. This cannot refer to Antisthenes, since his work was in prose, but it seems likely, from the surviving testimonia and from other treatments of the Heracles myth, that Antisthenes’ story was also episodic, featuring Heracles gaining instruction at the hands of various teachers and possibly encountering various beasts (perhaps allegories for moral and intellectual hazards) on the path to virtue and perhaps even immortality. (Such a structure is implied in the Cynicizing fourth epistle of ps.-Heraclitus.) The concept of “strength” indicated in the second title was clearly central to Antisthenes (t. 134c), and the “strength” Heracles gained or developed in this story must have been primarily mental strength. The tradition of the “double education” in mind and body (Diog. Laert. 6.70–71) might have begun with Antisthenes’ Heracles (Höistad 1948:22–73; see t. 163, 122G). Heracles is never an intellectual hero in the Greek tradition, so this strength must pertain to assets such as persistence, endurance of pain, toil and indignity, and a heightened internal power to persist and endure regularly. But apprehension of “higher” objects of intelligence is exhorted in t. 96, and the governance of pain and pleasure might involve intelligence and reasoning (mentis prudentiam calliditatemque in t. 96, τοῖς ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς in t. 134v) of a sort different from the intelligence and reasoning Aristotle isolates in his own ethics. The second title of the Heracles text listed in the tenth tomos (which could be a duplicate for this one), associates or possibly equates “strength” with “intelligence” (Περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἰσχύος). Antisthenes’ hero Heracles was surely different from his Odysseus, the intellectual hero of rhetorical assets, but see t. 127, 188A, and 197 for possible parallels. He was probably more different from Ajax, who rejects discourse. (But see also Rankin 1986:167, who compares Ajax and Heracles.) On “strength” in Antisthenes, see, further, t. 54.13 (with Lévystone 2005:186–88), 106, 134c, 191, 198.

Fifth τόμος: This continues the series of the fourth tomos.

1. Κῦρος ἢ Περὶ Βασιλείας

This was probably Antisthenes’ text on Cyrus the Great, which bears some relationship to Xenophon’s Cyropaedia and the larger tradition of Cyrus literature. See t. 85–91, esp. t. 86. For discussion of relationships in the tradition, see Dittmar 1912:72–76; Höistad 1948:73–94; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:299–308; Mueller-Goldingen 1995:25–44. Mueller-Goldingen finds a shared optimism between these two Socratics, in distinction from Plato, for the possibility of intelligent ethical kingship; but Höistad (1948:78–82) rightly emphasizes the difference between Antisthenes’ likely praise of political slavery or countercultural values and Xenophon’s strong commitment to social propriety. One can add that the exhortation to Antisthenes’ Cyrus to endure bad reputation (t. 86) fits poorly with Xenophon’s declarations, from the opening of the Cyropaedia, that Cyrus was “most loving of honor” (φιλοτιμότατος, 1.2). Although there are signs in Antisthenes’ remains that honor from the right people was a good to be sought (t. 112, which Xenophon seems to echo in Mem. 2.1.19 and 2.1.31, a Heracles story, as well as in Hiero), the idea that Cyrus must endure bad reputation (κακῶς ἀκούειν) is distant from Xenophon. Overall, it seems that Antisthenes’ ideal of kingship was a fiction meant at the level of a person’s kingship over himself and his life: his actual political views seem to presuppose a polis culture like that of Athens (see t. 70, 72A) or, in t. 189 and 82, a collection of households with equal and modest material resources or power over one another, where each could rule his own. Xenophon, by contrast, seems to have a vision of real enlightened kingship. (See Gray 2007:4–13.)

2. Ἀσπασία

The sparse remnants from this text are polemical and hostile against Pericles and his sons by his first marriage, who were not sons of Aspasia (t. 142–44). Dittmar (1912:1–59) laid out an interpretation that has remained dominant, that Antisthenes was hostile to Aspasia because she distracted Pericles through pleasure and that Aeschines replied by constructing a sympathetic Aspasia, who then became normal in the rest of Socratic literature, a source of wisdom on interpersonal topics such as love and rhetoric (Pl. Menexenus; Xen. Mem. 2.6 and Oec. 7–21; this is the paradigm understood behind Plato’s Diotima in Sym. 201d–212a and Xenophon’s Theodote in Mem. 3.11). By this interpretation, there was no primary positive Socratic discourse about Aspasia, but this was an apologetic fiction. (See also Ehlers 1966:30–33; Henry 1995:30–32. Jouanna 2005:65–66 is more optimistic about the Socratic reception but still assumes that Antisthenes’ Aspasia was a negative figure.) Yet we have little real evidence for what Antisthenes said about Aspasia herself, in distinction from Pericles and the members of his family, and the generally positive image in Socratic literature could stand on its own and need not reflect the special achievement of Aeschines. Both the length of Antisthenes’ text, which filled half a tomos, and its arrangement next to Cyrus or On Kingship and in parallel to Heracles the Greater or On Strength suggest that Aspasia could have been a positive figure for Antisthenes as well. Since he held that the virtue of man and of woman are the same (t. 134r), one might expect that he presented a paradigm for female virtue alongside his paradigms for male virtue, two of which formed the tidy polarized pair “one from the Greeks and one from the barbarians” (t. 85). In this way, he would cover all the human possibilities in the Greek matrix for “self” and “other” (as reflected in Diog. Laert. 1.33: see the general comment on the second tomos above) by way of questioning or rejecting its boundaries.

Sixth τόμος: The catalog turns here to language, dialectic, logic, and epistemology, topics to which Antisthenes devoted at least nine texts (five here and at least four and as many as seven in the seventh tomos), almost double the number of Plato, if we count Cratylus, Euthydemus, the Republic, Theaetetus, the Sophist, and Parmenides: of course, Plato’s texts might be longer, but this we do not know. The intensive interest distinguishes Antisthenes from Cynicism, which renounced logical technicality and the liberal arts (t. 135); but his views on these topics might have been negative, against Plato’s development of Socraticism, and hence would fit a proto-Cynic profile. Brancacci 1990:34–41, developing a suggestion of Caizzi (1964:49; see also Patzer 1990:28–30), reads a chronological and thematic progression through the epistemological, logical, and linguistic titles of the sixth and seventh tomoi. It seems clear that the sixth tomos is negative and polemical, by contrast with the more positive and constructive tones of the titles in the seventh tomos. But an editor could have fashioned this ordering, which might then have no relationship to the order of composition. Although the order should be considered in all speculation about the differentiation of these nine titles, certainty about how each of these titles is related to the others is impossible. The order of the second through the seventh tomoi , whoever created it, implies a progression from ethics to logic, in agreement with the Socratic curriculum as it is announced by Xenophon (Mem. 4.3.1), with the development of Plato’s interests as represented in his corpus, and possibly with Isocrates’ assumptions about Socraticism. (See t. 156, where, however, logic precedes ethics in his discussion.) Brancacci 1990:129–38 argues that Xenophon’s curriculum is inspired by Antisthenes. The thesis that, according to Socrates, ethics must be mastered before logical studies are possible is older: see Maier 1913:68–70.

1. Ἀλήθεια

This text is one of Diogenes Laertius’ two examples of a dialogue that contained “the rhetorical style,” probably equivalent to embedded speeches (see t. 11A). The title Truth was used previously by Protagoras and Antiphon, and it is mentioned in polemical contexts by Isocrates (Against the Sophists §1, t. 170) and Plato (Crat. 391c6 and Theaet. 162a1, in reference to Protagoras’ book; Soph. 246b9, in reference to “the materialists”); Aristotle refers to “those who have proclaimed about truth” (Met. 993b17) and equates this with “first philosophy” itself, one of his names for the subject matter of the Metaphysics. It appears to be a polemical title inherently for these fourth-century writers, and the fact that Antisthenes (or his editor) also used it must connect him into this nexus in some way. There are many possibilities, which cannot be evaluated thoroughly here. A clue in favor of the Protagoras tradition might be found in the fame of Antisthenes’ thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (t. 152–56). This thesis is indicated in the present series of titles (6.4), and an antithesis between “false” (ψευδής) and “true” (ἀληθής) different from the antithesis assumed in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle is explicitly part of the discussion: like Plato’s Protagoras, Antisthenes seems explicitly to reject the antithesis assumed as normal by Aristotle and his tradition. More broadly, this alternative conception of “truth,” opposed not to “falsity” in Aristotle’s normal sense but to something like absence of cognition, could be descended from the etymological sense of ἀλήθεια, as it is used by Pindar and other poets (Detienne 1996). See also Brancacci 1990:25–27, recording earlier discussion about the title. But response to Antiphon is also plausible, since Xenophon presents an episode of debate between Socrates and Antiphon (Mem. 1.6). In this case, the main interest of the text might have been ethical and political. Parmenides’ poem, with its distinction between “Truth” (Ἀλήθεια) and “Opinion” (Δόξα) (DK 28B2), probably stands behind the whole later discourse. The title Περὶ ἀληθείας is attributed to the Socratic Simmias (Diog. Laert. 2.124).

2. Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἀντιλογικός

These terms, like the previous title, recur in Plato (e.g., in Protagoras, esp. διαλέξεσθαι at 335a2 and ἀντιλέγων at 335a6, and in Theaetetus, esp. διαλέγεσθαι at 189e8 and ἀντιλογικός at 197a1), and it is possible that this was an alternative title for the Truth, in parallel with the case of Protagoras’ Truth that carried the alternative title Ἀντιλογικά (Hirzel 1895 I:119 n.1). Whatever the case may be in relation to Plato, this text probably addressed a type of formal (philosophical/Sophistic/Socratic) discussion. The term διαλέγεσθαι is surely positive for Antisthenes: it is an aspect of the wise rhetor’s skill in t. 187.6. Xenophon calls it a Socratic method in Xen. Mem. 4.5.12, although the etymology given there is not from discussion but from “sorting” (διαλέγειν) particular individuals (πράγματα) and assigning them to their classes (γένη), which are, probably, the good versus the bad. (Brancacci 1990:149–52 attributes Xenophon’s account to Antisthenes; contra, see Patzer 2010:251–55, neglecting, however, to account for these titles.) But the description ἀντιλογικός would appear to be pessimistic about argumentative method, if it is to be connected with the impossibility of gainsaying (ἀντιλέγειν, t. 148, 152–56; different but still negative senses are also in t. 53.7 and 174). Moreover, the separation of this title from title 7.3, On Question and Answer, which is also likely to have been a treatment of a Socratic form of conversation, together with the position of the current title between the Truth and Sathon, two titles likely to be polemical, raises the possibility that the kind of discussion treated in this text was non-ideal or pessimistic. On the tendency of debates associated with Antisthenes to end in failure, see the notes on t. 83A. Both Isocrates and Plato use the term ἀντιλογικός in a positive sense (Brancacci 1990:27–28); but Plato also has the negative sense (e.g., Phaedo 90c1), in alignment with eristic. The attested positive senses of ἀντιλογικός in the fourth century might justify Brancacci’s rejection of the old allegation (Birt 1882:449 n.2) that this subtitle conflicts with the text’s first title. But Antisthenes’ own attested uses of this word stem should be privileged, and the ordering of the titles suggests a polemical text.

3. Σάθων

Correspondence with other evidence (t. 147–48) makes it likely that Antisthenes himself assigned the vulgar title Sathon, although later origins have been proposd (Decleva Caizzi 1966:99). (For the meaning of Σάθων, see t. 147B.) The nineteenth-century editor Kuehn combined the title Sathon with the next title transmitted in the manuscripts, About Gainsaying (in three books), on the basis of Diogenes’ anecdote (t. 148). Modern editors follow this decision. At stake is the origin of the quarrel between Antisthenes and Plato and the intention behind Antisthenes’ paradoxical thesis. If the texts are kept separate, it is possible that Antisthenes first proclaimed his thesis against gainsaying as his own provocative advertisement for his teaching, with no reference to Plato or even to any controversy over what Socrates taught (title 6.2 or 6.4); Plato attacked the thesis (e.g., in Euthydemus and Cratylus), and this led Antisthenes to attack Plato’s theory of Forms, which had enabled the refutation of his thesis. (See also Brancacci 1990:34–40.) On this view, Antisthenes helps to inspire the field of post-Socratic logic, when Plato is provoked to respond to him. An alternative possibility, consistent with the combination of these titles, is that all of Antisthenes’ “logical” work was response to Plato’s theory of Forms, which Antisthenes found too dogmatic as a representation of Socrates. (This seems to be the basic view of Döring 1985, 1998, 2011.) This would make sense of the negative thrust evident in the surviving remains. This second account seems less satisfactory as explanation for the volume of Antisthenes’ writings in this field, however, and the connections between his study of language and study of Homer (see t. 187). These seem to have an impetus independent of Plato, to which Plato is instead responding in his frequent attacks on the study of Homer.

4. Περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν α’ β’ γ’

The apparently lengthy text On Gainsaying, in three parts, must have contained Antisthenes’ discussion of his famous thesis, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (see t. 148, 152–56, esp. 152–53). It is striking that the title refers to the act of gainsaying in positive form, even though the thesis claims that this act does not or should not occur. (See t. 148, where in the anecdote the title in the anecdote is Περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν.) Presumably Antisthenes recognized the positive phenomenon of the misguided concept or notion of gainsaying (even if it could never really occur in the way its practicers believed it could) and discussed this at length, in three books or parts. If the title should be combined with the previous one (see the note on that title), Plato might have been featured as speaker in a discussion of the thesis. Rankin 1974:318 implies that the present text presented the rejection of the theory of Forms and used the thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν to do so.

5. Περὶ διαλέκτου

Without evidence, it is hard to distinguish this title from previous titles, especially 6.2. It could be significant that this title uses a noun etymologically related to the substantive verb in that title. (Compare titles 3.6–7, 7.5–6.) It is unclear whether [ἡ] διαλέκτος here is a simple nominalization of διαλέγεσθαι (as it is in Pl. Sym. 203a and Theaet. 146b) or whether it verges toward the sense of regional “dialect” or “style,” as it means for the later Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (cited in Diog. Laert. 7.56). If the sixth tomos has a progressive order, from refutation of Plato to positive views distinctive of Antisthenes, a sense in the range of “dialect” (whether individual and personal or proper to ethical types) might be plausible.

Seventh τόμος: This series of titles contained at least some positive doctrine, as the testimonium from Epictetus (t. 160) shows. Listed are about eleven titles (some with textual uncertainties), more than for any other tomos, including several with many parts. If this tomos really contained the equivalent of about twenty books, its size presents problems for the hypothesis that the tomoi were uniform. See the detailed discussion in Patzer 1970:133–43.

1. Περὶ παιδείας ἢ Περὶ ὀνομάτων α’ β’ γ’ δ’ ε’

Epictetus’ testimony (t. 160) suggests that the content of this long text was a basic plank in Antisthenes’ positive educational system. He seems to share the field of names basically with Prodicus, who said (according to Pl. Euthyd. 227e3), “First it is necessary to learn about the correctness of names” (πρῶτον . . . περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ). Possibly Antisthenes followed in Prodicus’ tradition to the extent that he differentiated synonyms, but the evidence suggests tensions (see t. 13A.62, 207C). Democritus, also, is attributed with a title related to names, On Homer or Correct Diction and Foreign Words (Περὶ Ὁμήρου ἢ ὀρθοεπείης καὶ γλωσσέων, Diog. Laert. 9.48). There is no evidence for a relationship between Antisthenes and Democritus. Beyond Epictetus’ passage, the surviving evidence for the doctrines Antisthenes wished to teach about names is embedded in his Homeric studies (esp. t. 187, 189, 191), in his speeches of Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54), and possibly in t. 179B; see the notes to t. 150A.1 for a collection of his references to syllables and sounds. The Homeric studies show special interest in compound words and in explaining what might be called homonymity, multiple meanings carried by one word. This differs from Prodicus, who, according to our evidence, investigated words of one semantic unit, not compounds, and was interested in differentiating synonyms, multiple words with the same or similar meaning. (See Mayer 1913:22–41, Mayhew 2012:xiv–xvii.) Moreover, Antisthenes might have sought essential or “natural” meanings, independent of the agreement of a speech community but based on etymology (a speculative possibility), whereas Prodicus seems to have specialized in conventional meanings, what “people call” by a certain term (see Pl. Euthyd. 277e3–278a5). See, further, the next title.

2. Περὶ ὀνομάτων χρήσεως ἢ ἐριστικός

This text must continue from the previous in some way. The expression χρῆσις ὀνομάτων (use of names) might imply ὀρθὴ χρῆσις ὀνομάτων (correct use of names) and so align this text with Prodicus’ demand for knowledge of the “correctness” of names (ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων); Plato’s Cratylus has a similar alternative title in the Thrasyllan catalog, Κρατύλος ἢ περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων, λογικός (Diog. Laert. 3.58). The doctrine of οἰκεῖος λόγος (t. 152A) might seem also to imply a doctrine of correct use of names from Antisthenes; but it is nowhere clear what the οἰκεῖος λόγος doctrine implies as its object of naming, whether a particular individual or a type of thing. Probably χρῆσις should not be simply equated with ὀρθότης, not least because the second title, ἐριστικός, suggests conflict or dispute: it implies either that the text was “eristic” in its tone or subject matter or that an “eristic” protagonist was featured. (Compare Plato’s Euthydemus, which is called Εὐθύδημος ἢ ἐριστικός, ἀνατρεπτικός, at Diog. Laert. 3.59: see Brancacci 1990:31–32.) If the second title is to be retained as transmitted, this text might have illustrated the importance of education in naming by showing how clever interlocutors can exploit ambiguities and how deficiencies in understanding lead to eristic dispute: Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations engages with these problems. The term χρῆσις almost certainly has ethical overtones for Antisthenes (see t. 34E, 187.4), but if dispute is involved in the use of names, nothing precludes Antisthenes’ interest also in κατάχρησις or “incorrect use,” such as might be documented, dimly, for Gorgias (κατάχρησις is listed in the Suda among Gorgias’ hallmark topics in rhetoric, at DK 82A2). The speeches of Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54) illustrate differing uses of vocabulary by the two speakers, and it is plausible that neither speaker is ultimately the standard for correct usage (that the two are just different) and that their “conversation,” if it occurred, would be eristic. The only mention of χρῆσις ὀνομάτων extant in Antisthenes’ testimonia outside the book catalog is χρῆσις ποικίλη λόγου, “variegated use of discourse” (t. 187.11), which is implied to be good through comparison to a κατόρθωσις τῆς τέχνης, “successful performance of the art [of medicine],” a pluralist description, referring not to single correct pairings between names and objects but to a range of word use, as appropriate to the range of receptiveness in the audience.

3. Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως.

“Question and answer” is mentioned throughout the Platonic corpus as though it is a special Socratic method. The terms are used frequently in this pairing (e.g., Crito 50c8; Phaedo 75d3–4, 78d2; Rep. 7 534d9, where it is equated with διαλεκτική). Antisthenes is presented using this kind of method with Callias and Niceratus in Xen. Sym. (t. 78, 83, 185A, 186), whereas they respond to his presentation only after he has been allowed a long speech (t. 82.45). See also t. 13A.56.

4. Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης α’ β’ γ’ δ’

From the Platonic corpus (esp. Meno, the Republic, Theaetetus), one might surmise that the disciples of Socrates debated extensively about the criterion that distinguished mere true belief from secure or infallible knowledge. Antisthenes shows interest in this distinction (t. 53–54, 189), and his four-part text probably addressed it: the apparent length of this text, as well as the partitioning, suggests that Antisthenes’ views were not simple. However, the doxographical tradition attributes to Antisthenes no doctrine on the relationship between belief and knowledge or the nature of either. Varied assumptions have governed reconstructions of Antisthenes’ views. Some have assumed that Antisthenes was dogmatic and did not recognize the subtle problems in distinguishing between knowledge and true belief: therefore, only the cruder distinction, between false belief and knowledge, should be attributed to him. (This is the distinction that his character Ajax makes: see t. 53.9.) For example, Momigliano 1930:107 assumes that doxa must be Gorgianic doxa (i.e., false belief) and that Antisthenes must have rejected it out of hand. Brancacci 1990:200–201 attributes the most important surviving testimony on Antisthenes’ logical views (t. 150–52) to this title, arguing that his logical views are clear and positive and that knowledge was opposed foremost to false belief, not true. Others propose, as a more sophisticated positive view, a basic continuity between episteme and doxa, which are differentiated by the criterion logos, in line with the thesis that appears in Pl. Theaet. 202c7–8: ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; (Are you then happy to pose it like this, that knowledge is true belief with an account?). Maier 1900 II.2:12–19 (after Zeller 1882) attributes this view of knowledge to Antisthenes, understanding doxa in the materialist sense developed in Theaet. 155e; Caizzi 1964:61-3 follows this account. See also Romeyer Dherbey 1996:252 n.3, who omits the materialist mechanisms. Indeed, it is unclear how Antisthenes could have claimed knowledge of moral terms such as justice and courage under a materialist understanding of reliable apprehension. Further, if logos is somehow (behind Plato’s parody or appropriation) Antisthenes’ criterion for knowledge, it is unclear whether Antisthenes had a conception of logos that can yield a satisfactory objective grounding for knowledge, rather than a circular one. It is not obvious that logos is the same as horos, “definition,” in his view. (See t. 151B.) It is important to recognize, also, that Antisthenes did not necessarily have a foundational view of knowledge, as it has been assumed on the basis of a certain interpretetation of his one-to-one principle (t. 152A). He could have had a kind of global coherence theory, such as Aristotle alludes to in the opening of the Posterior Analytics (t. 157A). It is a matter for conjecture whether Antisthenes asserted some single criterion for the distinction between true belief and knowledge, suggested several criteria, or asserted aporia in the quest for a scientifically valid criterion of knowledge. Various testimonia show that Antisthenes was no skeptic: the convictions and reasonings of the wise man, which either constitute or are the product of his nous or his phronesis, are said to be secure (t. 134u–v); the wise few stand in opposition to the many ignorant fools (t. 134o); Homer is said to have said some things “in truth,” others “in opinion” (t. 194).

5. Περὶ τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν

This title and the following one appear twice in all the manuscripts, once near the opening of the tomos (positions 2 and 3) and again in their present position, where they form a cluster with titles 7–9 on the topics of death and eschatology. On the editorial history and its interpretive implications, see Patzer 1970:130. Brancacci 2003 speculates on the contents of these texts, connecting them to the death of Socrates and also to the grounding of ethics.

6. Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου

This is the oldest attested Greek title to address “life” in its own right, and the opposition might ground ethics. Plausibly Antisthenes drew this opposition from Homeric ethics (on the lines of Griffin 1980), and such an insight could explain the position of the Homeric titles in the following two tomoi. The differentiation between a title formed from a substantive infinitive (7.5) and another formed from a cognate noun is common to titles 6.2 and 6.5.

7. Περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου

This title is attested also for Protagoras (Diog. Laert. 5.87) and Demosthenes (Diog. Laert. 9.46). A similar phrase occurs in Plato (Apol. 29d5; Phaedo 85b2) and in the Derveni papyrus (col. 5). Stating that Plato used myth to speak of these topics (t. 44C), Julian implies, by omission, that Antisthenes did not, although the text might have been unknown to Julian. It could be significant that Antisthenes’ title has no substantive for the “affairs” or “goods” or “evils” or “souls” (etc.) in the underworld but leaves the possibilities open: contrast Julian (in reference to Plato) in t. 44C (τὰ ἐν ᾅδου πράγματα); Pl. Phaedo 85b2 (τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀγαθά). In later texts, Eusebius (Dem. ev. 10.8.68) assumes that they are souls, and Basil of Caesaria (Quod Deus 31.332.41) assumes that they are punishments or souls being punished. Brancacci 2003 proposes that this text treated Socrates’ situation after death.

8. Περὶ φύσεως α’ β’

This title was given to the major works on natural philosophy by Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles in Aristotle’s own lectures on physics and seems to be Aristotle’s invention (Schmalzriedt 1970). But this discussion of older texts “on nature” was developing in the Socratic period, and it is possible that Antisthenes’ title was his own. In that case, the title need not indicate the same kind of text as those of the older thinkers. See t. 179–80, apparently cited from this text.

9. Ἐρώτημα Περὶ φύσεως α’, ἐρώτημα Περὶ φύσεως β’

This might duplicate the previous title (see Brancacci 1990:22–23), but compare the third and sixth tomoi for sequences of apparently overlapping titles. The first word suggests that the format was an inquiry or discussion, not exposition.

10. Δόξαι ἢ ἐριστικός

This title might show a retreat from knowledge to belief, when it comes to eschatological subject matter. The following title would be related.

11. Περὶ τοῦ μανθάνειν προβλήματα

This title might indicate aporia or skepticism, not about the existence of objective reality, but about the possibility of coming to know objective reality. Its position in the catalog is ambiguous. Possibly it is the climax of the sixth and seventh tomoi; alternatively, the author of the catalog might have placed it at the end of the “epistemological” section because it was difficult to fit elsewhere. It is plausible that the skepticism was directed at a particular curriculum in philosophy, rather than “understanding” in itself.

Eighth τόμος: The eighth and ninth tomoi include the titles on Homer, and the first two titles might indicate more general topics in poetry. Titles 8.4–7 seem to treat the Iliad, whereas the ninth tomos seems to treat the Odyssey. In both sets, the titles might follow the order of the episodes treated (so Müller 1860). But from t. 187, it seems clear that Antisthenes could treat many Homeric episodes in one discussion. See also Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:331–37.

1. Περὶ μουσικῆς

Since this title introduces the tomos, it probably treated poetry in general, not just Homer’s. In Plato (Rep. 2 376e5–9), “music” seems to stand for only the words and thoughts in poetry, but this is no basis for deciding that Antisthenes discounted sounds, rhythms, and tones from the study of “music.” See t. 187.5, 67; Luloffs 1900:22–27. Antisthenes might have applied the predicate μουσικός to Socrates: see t. 152A and notes. There is evidence that Antisthenes was interested in poets beyond Homer, but it is unclear which titles, beyond 3.5 on Theognis, would have included such discussions. For Hesiod, see t. 189; for Aeschylus, t. 187.2 and title 9.9; for Sophocles, t. 54.6, 137A (possibly), 182; for Euripides, t. 195–96.

2. Περὶ ἐξηγητῶν

On the analogy of Περὶ τῶν δικογράφων (On the Speechwriters, title 1.5), Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν (On the Sophists, title 2.3), and Σάθων (Sathon, title 6.3), it seems that this text was a polemic against contemporary literary critics. Plato’s Ion offers a parallel: see t. 185A, 191.

3. Περὶ Ὁμήρου

The title suggests treatment of Homer the author rather than his poems, but there is no evidence to clarify the central question, whether Antisthenes was interested in the historical person or whether he understood “Homer” as the author implied by texts circulating under this name. Antisthenes’ character Odysseus refers to Homer as “the wise poet about virtue” in t. 54.14.

4. Περὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀσεβείας

If titles 8.4–7 treat the Iliad in order, this text probably addressed the opening scene (Il. 1.11–305), where Agamemnon might be thought to commit ἀσέβεια (impiety) against Chryses and ἀδικία (injustice) against Achilles. The terms ἀδικία and ἀσέβεια do not occur in Homer: he uses vocabulary built on αἰδώς (shame) and τιμή (honor) (e.g., αἰδεῖσθαί, 1.23; “ἠτίμησ’, 1.94). Antisthenes could have discussed the translation of Homer’s moral vocabulary into contemporary terms. He could have discussed Agamemnon’s ethical behavior, which Homer does not describe but shows. Compare t. 186.

5. Περὶ Κάλχαντος

Homer’s character Calchas the priest of Apollo appears only in Il. 1.68–100. Odysseus cites his prophesy in 2.300–332, and Poseidon adopts his appearance at 13.45. The Athenian tragedians present characters who cite Calchas’ prophetic powers and religious authority, sometimes with irony (Aeschylus in Agamemnon, Sophocles in Ajax, and Euripides in Helen and Iphigeneia in Aulis), and Antisthenes might have done the same. Alternatively, Antisthenes might have looked back to Homer for a positive image of Calchas, as he might have done with Odysseus (t. 54, 187, 188, 190). But if Antisthenes thought that the many gods of Olympian religion were fictions (see t. 123, 179, 188, 189), he might have sought to question or rationalize the prophetic powers of Homer’s Calchas.

6. Περὶ κατασκόπου

The term κατάσκοπος (scout) does not occur in Homer, but in Cynicism, the scout is a figure for the philosopher. (See title 10.4.) The reference in this title could be to the night mission of Odysseus and Dolon in Il. 10, which could be related to Odysseus’ theft of the Palladium and his contribution through intelligence to the sack of Troy. (See t. 53.6, 54.3.)

7. Περὶ ἡδονῆς

The noun ἡδονή (pleasure) does not occur in Homer, but words formed on the stem are frequent in descriptions of wine, sleep, aromas, banquets, laughter, and friendship. (See t. 123–28 for Antisthenes’ sayings on such pleasures.) There is no evidence, however, that Antisthenes studied the background culture of Homer’s world, only the speeches and acts of his characters (t. 187–92). If this text was about the Iliad’s characters and action, it could have addressed the goal of the war, including the recovery of Helen. (See t. 54.2, 123.) Helen’s name is in title 9.4, and some have wanted to emend this title or see a wordplay between ἡδονή and Ἑλένη (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:333–34).

Ninth τόμος: These titles are mainly on the Odyssey. Title 9.9, if not also others, probably went beyond Homer.

1. Περὶ Ὀδυσσείας

Phrynicus cites this title (t. 50). It is plausibly the source of any of the passages on the Odyssey in the Homeric scholia (t. 187–90), as well as material in the scholia not attributed to Antisthenes. (Dindorf [1855] and Schrader [1890] both thought that Antisthenes is relevant to passages beyond those where he is cited.)

2. Περὶ τῆς ῥάβδου

Three characters in Homer have magical wands: Hermes (Od. 5.47–48, 24.2–4; Il. 24.343–34), Circe (Od. 10.238, 319, 389), and Athena (Od. 13.429, 16.172, 16.456). Antisthenes is interested in Odysseus’ appearance as a beggar (t. 53.6), which Athena caused with her wand. He might have been interested in Circe’s power to transform some men into pigs (see title 9.8), which she did with her wand. Hermes’ wand has the more general power to rouse people or put them to sleep. On Antisthenes’ own claim to use a silver wand with his pupils, see t. 169.

3. Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ Περὶ Τηλεμάχου

In Od. 1.156–323, Athena advises Telemachus to make a journey in search of his father. This title, together with 9.6 below, deviates in form from the other Homeric titles by naming a character in the nominative form, rather than as object of περί. If this is meaningful, this text might have been a dialogue in which Athena appeared as speaker, with Telemachus discussed as a topic. Schrader 1890:175 proposes that a scholium on Od. 1.284 (his p. 18.15–20), explaining Telemachus’ need to make a journey so that he “become flexible like his father” (πολύτροπον γενέσθαι παραπλησίως τῷ πατρί), might descend from this text.

4. Περὶ Ἑλένης καὶ Πηνελόπης

T. 188, where Penelope is contrasted with Calypso, implies that Antisthenes wrote a longer discussion of Penelope’s virtue. If Helen represented either a hedonist ethical subject or an object of pleasure for others, this text could have contrasted the women on these terms. (See Richardson 1975:81 for the possibility of a connection between this title and Pl. Rep. 9 586c, where the phantom Helen is compared to the phantom of bodily pleasure.) Isoc. Helen §66 implies that contemporary “philosophers” blamed her. If Antisthenes shared in this interpretation, it would be a departure from Gorgias: but t. 123 might imply that, subjectively speaking, Aphrodite, rather than Helen, was responsible for Helen’s ruin. In later writers, Penelope is posed against Helen as ethical subject: in Plut. Marriage Precepts 140f, she is σώφρων (of sound mind), whereas Helen is φιλόπλουτος (loving of money). For Antisthenes’ views on Helen, see t. 61, 54.2. Without reference to Helen, Penelope is used to signify philosophy as the true goal, in opposition to the kind of education (τὰ ἐγκύκλια παιδεύματα) sought by the suitors: Aristippus is credited with this statement at Diog. Laert. 2.29, Gorgias in the Vatican Codex (DK 82Β29). Unlike Helen, who was so widely discussed in Antisthenes’ period, Penelope appears not to have been a common topic. Aeschylus is credited with a title Penelope, as is his relative Philocles, a tragic poet of the late fifth century. She is mentioned in Theognis (1125–26) for loyalty and by Aristophanes (Thesmo. 546–50) as the kind of woman Euripides never portrayed. Antisthenes might have been original in reexamining Homer’s character of the virtuous woman.

5. Περὶ Πρωτέως

In Od. 4.363–570, Menelaus narrates his encounter with Proteus and his daughter Eidotheia off the shore of Egypt during his homecoming. Antisthenes’ Proteus could have been a model for the able or adaptable speaker, as he becomes in later literature and the scholia. (See Richardson 1975:80 and title 9.9; see also t. 185B.) Plato, for his part, uses Proteus as a model for an unjust interlocutor (Ion 541e7; Euthyph. 15d3; Euthyd. 288b8), on the assumptions that two parties in negotiation must remain constant in their basic positions if the negotiation is to proceed and that “shape changing” is an unjust usurpation of power. It is not impossible that the evocation of Proteus at the end of Ion is a clue pointing to Antisthenes.

6. Κύκλωψ ἢ Περὶ Ὀδυσσέως

Two titles are about “the Cyclops,” who is probably Polyphemus, although t. 189 treats all the Cyclopes and distinguishes them from Polyphemus. Possibly the first text was about Polyphemus’ impiety and the second about his intemperance (Dümmler 1882:19): only impiety is discussed in t. 189. To judge only from the form of this title, the Cyclops should have appeared as a speaking character in discussion about Odysseus. (See the parallel in title 9.3.) Such a text would represent a literary novelty in its reversal of main speaker and his subject matter: Odysseus narrates the Polyphemus episode in the Odyssey.

7. Περὶ οἰνου χρήσεως ἢ Περὶ μέθης ἢ Περὶ τοῦ Κύκλωπος

This might be the title mentioned by Aristides (t. 197), and it could be related to t. 189, although that discussion covers issues other than drunkenness. See also t. 191, which does not fit obviously under any titles on the Iliad.

8. Περὶ Κίρκης

This text might have treated Odysseus’ resistance to Circe (Od. 10.316–32) through his self-control or ἐγκράτεια (see t. 22.15), in a way similar to the Socratic interpretation Xenophon reports at Mem. 1.3.7. Dio Chrysostom’s Oration 8 (20–25) might preserve resonances (see Weber 1888; Richardson 1975:79 and n. 2), as might Plutarch’s Gryllus.

9. Περὶ Ἀμφιαράου

Amphiaraus is not a Homeric character but belongs sooner to the Theban cycle. He is mentioned twice in the Odyssey (15.244–47, within a genealogy, where he is said to be beloved of Zeus; 11.326–27, where he is referred to but not named). He might have illustrated the Cynic maxim that the wise are friends to the gods (Diog. Laert. 6.37: see Decleva Caizzi 1980:58–59). In the Axiochus of ps.-Plato, Prodicus cites these lines from the Odyssey in praise of death (Richardson 1975:80). If Antisthenes’ text went beyond Homer, Amphiaraus might have illustrated freedom from τῦφος (pride), as he does in later appearances in Julian (Ep. 1.89 303b) and Plutarch (Mor. 32d, 88b), where Diogenes of Sinope also appears reciting one of Amphiaraus’ most famous lines (from Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes), that he “wants not to seem but to be just.” Finally, Amphiaraus appears in a tradition of wisdom literature as a spokesman of gnomes addressed to his son (Wehrli 1973:197). Education of sons was a common topic but was also of special interest to the Socratics and to Antisthenes. (See the discussion of Anytus under t. 21; compare t. 173.) Antisthenes’ Amphiaraus could have been such a teacher or advisor. It is intriguing that the advice attributed to Amphiaraus by Clearchus the Peripatetic (cited in Athen. Deip. 317a) includes advocacy for the same kind of “versatile” behavior that Odysseus and Proteus show: πουλύποδός μοι, τέκνον, ἔχων νόον, Ἀμφίλοχ’ ἥρως, / τοῖσιν ἐφαρμόζου τῶν κεν <κατὰ> δῆμον ἵκηαι (Having the mind of an octopus, my child, Amphilochus my hero, match yourself to those to whose home you come). The conflict between this characterization and the “simple” one in Aeschylus, which Plato’s character Glaucon cites in Rep. 2 361b7, could have been related to the conflict between character types in t. 187.1–2 and t. 53–54. For the Cynic, “being just” might not have amounted to simplicity. Pyrrho and the Skeptics also made use of Amphiaraus: Timon’s Python was set at the temple of Amphiaraus. (See discussion in Chiesara 2001:126–27.)

10. Περὶ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Πηνελόπης

This could be the source of t. 188. See also title 9.4. Plausibly Antisthenes understood the relationship between Odysseus and Penelope as a philosophical marriage.

11. Περὶ τοῦ κυνός

This text must have been about Odysseus’ dog Argos (Od. 17.290–327), treating his ability to recognize his friend Odysseus despite appearances, his endurance of suffering (like Odysseus), or both topics. The quality of good watchdogs, to be φιλομαθεῖς, is a joke for Plato at Rep. 2 376b but is associated seriously with the name of the Cynic school by Elias in the context before t. 22B (where he cites a reference to the dog in Il. 8.299). See Weber 1887:110; Luloffs 1900:58; Richardson 1975:80.

Tenth τόμος: The form of these titles implies dialogues, in which the main speaking character forms the first title and the subject matter forms the second title (as in Thrasyllus’ titles for Plato’s works). By contrast with the fourth and fifth tomoi, also containing titles with proper names, the number of titles here implies shorter works. The order is alphabetical, apart from the last two titles. The characters in the last three titles—Menexenus, Alcibiades, and Archelaus—were contemporaries of Socrates and are familiar from Socratic literature: therefore, it seems likely that these were conversations with Socrates, perhaps all on the topic of ruling. Susemihl (1887) doubted the authenticity of this entire tomos on the basis of ancient disputes about the authenticity of some titles and the apparent proliferation of works titled Cyrus (t. 43A). It was common practice in antiquity to place spurious or doubted works at the end of a catalog. Susemihl’s doubt has not prevailed in scholarship, and even if some titles here are spurious, it is not necessary that all are.

1. Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Μίδας

Welcker (1833) proposed that this text was similar to the “Choice of Heracles” attributed to Prodicus in Xen. Mem. 2.1.21–33. Whereas Heracles chose to follow a life of virtue, Midas took the opposite course of lust and luxury. This would make sense insofar as Antisthenes’ piece on the choice of Heracles is likely to have been short, for demonstration. (See t. 94B, 44C.) Other speculations are in Decleva Caizzi 1966:85–86.

2. Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἰσχύος

This could be a duplicate for title 4.2, but it is also plausible that Antisthenes composed two short Heracles pieces for live performance or “demonstration,” whereas the long Heracles was addressed to readers. The terms φρόνησις and ἰσχύς appear repeatedly in the testimonia and indicate core ethical assets. (See title 4.2.)

3. Κυρσᾶς ἢ Ἐρώμενος

The first title in both this and the following entry is transmitted in two of the major manuscripts as κύριος (lord) and in one as Κῦρος (Cyrus). The disagreement in the manuscripts points to a problem, and “Cyrus” is probably wrong, because there were apparently only two Cyrus texts; the reading could have been assimilated from titles 4.1 and 5.1. (See t. 43A, 141A.) By analogy with the surrounding titles, one expects a proper name for a primary speaking character in a dialogue on the topic of the second title. “Lord” is plausible as a kind of proper name in combination with the second title in 10.4, but here it matches poorly with the subtitle ἐρώμενος (beloved). Two plausible proposals for a six-letter proper name of a beloved have circulated. Winckelmann 1842 printed Κύρνος (Cyrnus), the name of the beloved dedicatee in Theognis’ elegies. Because Theognis’ poetry was used in the Socratic circle (see title 2.5), it is plausible that Antisthenes wrote a dialogue in the voice of Cyrnus. The second option, Κυρσᾶς, is supported by more evidence: see t. 84A. The surviving anecdote (t. 84B–C) suggests that Kyrsas should have been the lover and Socrates the beloved, rather than vice versa, but this could be only part of the original story. Possibly love was reciprocal for Antisthenes. (See t. 14A, 58, 82.38.)

4. Κύριος ἢ Κατάσκοποι

See comment on title 10.3. Here the reading “lord” does fit with its second title, on the terms of Cynicism. The later Cynics, possibly already Diogenes of Sinope, called themselves the “scouts” of Zeus (Epictetus, Discourses 1.24.6), those who learned the full truth about human existence from a perspective beyond normal human cognition and had been authorized by Zeus to announce it to ordinary humans. Such a scout can also be addressed as “lord,” as in Epictetus’ Cynic discourse (3.22.38, the crowd addressing the Cynic preacher): Ἐν τίνι οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν; εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, κύριε ἄγγελε καὶ κατάσκοπε. (In what then is the good, since it is not in these things? Tell us, lord messenger and scout.) The same set of titles for the Cynic philosopher appears also at 3.22.70. Although this reading could be anachronistic, it is possible that Antisthenes used terms and images whose full Cynic meaning was derived later in the tradition: compare title 9.11, On the Dog, which has also been questioned because of the “Cynic” problem; and see t. 53.6, 54.9. On the image of the scout in Epictetus, see Schofield 2007:75–80.

5. Μενέξενος ἢ Περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν

The text Menexenus attributed to Plato is Socrates’ conversation with the agreeable young man Menexenus, from a family of rulers, who himself aspires to rule. It is plausible that the last three texts in this tomos were short dialogues about Socrates’ political teaching. Possibly there is a relationship between the lost text of Antisthenes and the Platonic Menexenus, whose attribution to Plato is problematic. See Decleva Caizzi 1966:86; Nails 2002:202–3. See also t. 204.

6. Ἀλκιβιάδης

This text could be the source for t. 200, where Socrates’ concession to Alcibides of his prize for valor after a battle in the Peloponnesian War was dramatized or discussed; it could be the “story of Antisthenes about the beauty of Alcibiades” mentioned in a marginal note to Olympiodorus (t. 199B). Antisthenes wrote about Alcibiades also in one of his Cyrus texts (t. 141A). It is unclear which of the several other passages about Alcibiades (t. 198–202) belong to the present title and which to Cyrus (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:347–48; and see t. 43A on the possibility that Antisthenes did not write an Alcibiades). See also t. 19. The Socratics Aeschines (Diog. Laert. 2.61), Euclides (Diog. Laert. 2.108), and Phaedo (in his Suda entry) are credited with works called Alcibiades, in addition to the two extant Alcibiades dialogues transmitted in the Platonic corpus and Plato’s Symposium 212–23. Xenophon takes pains in the first chapters of the Memorabilia (1.2.39–48) to separate Socrates from responsibility for Alcibiades’ outrageous behavior, which had been charged against him in the accusation of Polycrates (Isocrates, On the Team of Horses). The fragments from Antisthenes are ambiguous on the question whether Antisthenes admired him for his innate powers or scorned him for his failures in education and use of power: these are not incompatible; see esp. t. 198. There might be a relationship between the Alcibiades character in Thucydides and Antisthenes’ Odysseus: see t. 54.2 note. Alcibiades’ betrayal of Athens would probably not, in itself, be offensive to Antisthenes, and he might have blamed Athens for Alcibiades’ bad traits. Scholarship since Dittmar 1912:68–91 assumes that Antisthenes’ assessment was negative.

7. Ἀρχέλαος ἢ Περὶ βασιλείας

Archelaus, king of the Macedonians in 413–399, raised the cultural level of his nation through financial progress, military progress, and patronage of famous artists, including the Athenian tragedians Euripides and Agathon and the painter Zeuxis of Heraclea. The Athenians issued him honors in a public decree of 407/6 (ML 91). He allegedly invited Socrates to his court, and Socrates declined. The anecdote of Socrates’ refusal survives throughout antiquity (Arist. Rhet. 1398a24; Epictetus fr. 11 Schenkl; Diog. Laert. 2.25; Aelian, VH 14.17; Gnom. Vat. no. 495; Dio of Prusa, Or. 13.30 [see t. 208]; Socr. epist. 1: see Decleva Caizzi 1966:101) and could descend from Antisthenes’ text, since it is not attested in any other primary Socratic literature. The form of the title implies that Antisthenes’ text was a dialogue featuring Archelaus as a speaker, possibly with Socrates, in a discussion of kingship. T. 203 shows that the text included abuse of Gorgias. Possibly the text had an intertextual relationship with Plato’s Gorgias, where Plato mentions Socrates’ refusal of Archelaus’ invitation (470d9).

41B. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 6.18 (Marcovich)

= 2 DC

ᾧ Τίμων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπιτιμῶν “παντοφυῆ φλέδονά” φησιν αὐτόν.

Timon scolds him [Antisthenes] for the volume [of his writings] and calls him a “comprehensively productive trifler.”

Importance of the Testimonium

This implies that Antisthenes’ corpus was large and varied.

Notes

Τίμων: (fr. 37 di Marco) Timon of Phlius (c. 310–220 BCE) was the main literary witness to the Skeptic philosopher Pyrrho of Elis. His poem the Silloi (Lampoons) attacks philosophers: frr. 26–28 (di Marco) attack other Socratics. Timon picks out Euclides as the eristic Socratic (fr. 28 di Marco), and his objection to Antisthenes seems to be different, that he has nothing worthwhile to say about any of his wide-ranging topics. In some respects, Timon was similar to the Cynics, especially his contemporary Crates of Thebes, and the Cynics beginning with Diogenes of Sinope are never attacked (Long 1978:74–77). See t. 22B and 159A for possible remains of Timon’s works in Elias.

παντοφυῆ φλέδονα: The adjective παντοφυής, built from a base cognate with φύσις (nature), is rare, and Timon could be making a joke on a position Antisthenes held about φύσις in or of literature, in a semantic field related to the Hellenistic and Platonic term πολυειδής and its derivative πολυείδεια. (See Clayman 2009:148–73 and passim on Timon’s influences on Hellenistic poetry; Gutzwiller 1996:131–33 on πολυείδεια as a literary term, including its likely roots in Plato.) Such a question is obscure to us, but see t. 150A.3 for the possibility that the status of verbal constructions, whether or not they had a φύσις, might have been of interest in Antisthenes’ time. The Suda catalogs this same statement of Timon under the entry φλέδων, with the implication that it, too, is a rare word: τὸν Ἀντισθένην τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπιτιμῶν ὁ Τίμων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος παντοφυῆ φλεδόνα καλεῖ (Trifler: Timon, in scolding the philosopher Antisthenes because of the volume [of his writings], calls him a “comprehensively productive trifler”). In fr. 28, Timon attacks all the Socratics as “those triflers” (οὔ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει).

41C. Suda, no. A.2723 “Antisthenes” (Adler)

[= Hesychius of Miletus, Onomatologium no. 61 “Antisthenes” p. 16.15–18 Flach]

οὗτος συνέγραψε τόμους δέκα· πρῶτον μαγικόν· ἀφηγεῖται δὲ περὶ Ζωροάστρου τινὸς μάγου, εὑρόντος τὴν σοφίαν· τοῦτο δέ τινες Ἀριστοτέλει, οἱ δὲ <τῷ> Ῥοδίῳ ἀνατιθέασιν.

<τῷ> R. Janko per litt. | Ῥοδίῳ Bernhardy : Ῥόδωνι edd. : Ῥόδων A

He wrote ten volumes. The first is magical, and it tells of Zoroaster, a wizard, and his discovery of wisdom. But some attribute this to Aristotle, and others to Antisthenes of Rhodes.

Importance of the Testimonium

The Suda’s attribution of a magical work to Antisthenes must be an error: the work on Zoroaster should be attributed to Antisthenes of Rhodes, a historian in the Peripatetic tradition (Diog. Laert. 6.19). The Suda says also (t. 23) that Antisthenes was a Peripatetic before he became a Cynic, and this shows the same conflation. Earlier scholars (Dümmler 1882; Jöel 1903:II.165 ff. and 950 ff.; Dittmar 1912:167) understood this title as evidence for interest in the Persian east by Antisthenes the Socratic. This was to be connected with later Cynic recognition of the Gymnosophists as wise men and with Antisthenes’ positive interest in Cyrus (t. 41A title 5.1, 85–87). See Decleva Caizzi 1966:87. Sayre (1938, 1948) and others considered Cynicism generally an oriental movement. On the falsity of this characterization, see Kindstrand 1976:7 n.28; Bosman 2010.

42. Athenaeus, Wise Men at Dinner 11 508c–d (Kaibel)

= 4 DC

καὶ γὰρ Θεόπομπος ὁ Χῖος ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῆς Πλάτωνος διατριβῆς τοὺς πολλούς, φησί, τῶν διαλόγων αὐτοῦ ἀχρείους καὶ ψευδεῖς ἄν τις εὕροι· ἁλλοτρίους δὲ τοὺς πλείους, ὄντας ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστίππου διατριβῶν, ἐνίους δὲ κἀκ τῶν Ἀντισθένους, πολλοὺς δὲ κἀκ τῶν Βρύσωνος τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου.

For also Theopompus of Chios in his Against the Discourse of Plato says that the majority of his dialogues one would find useless and false: most of them are the work of others, being from the discourses of Aristippus, and some are also from those of Antisthenes, and many are from those of Bryson of Heraclea.

Context of Preservation

This is from an extended rant against Plato delivered by Athenaeus’ character Pontianus, himself a philosopher. Athenaeus’ source seems to be Herodicus “the Cratetean” of Babylon (Düring 1941:54–59, 63–81). See t. 147B. This section of the speech attacks Plato for his doctrines, initially those on nature (508c) and then those on humanity and eros (508d).

Importance of the Testimonium

The Peripatetic Aristoxenus also attacked Plato for plagiarism (Diog. Laert. 3.37, 9.40): on the issue overall in the fourth and third centuries, see Brancacci 1993. Theopompus’ favorable reception of Antisthenes is attested in t. 22A.

Notes

ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστίππου διατριβῶν: The term “diatribe” is broad here, referring to Plato’s corpus as well as the writings of the minor Socratics. Its use does not show that any of these figures wrote “diatribes” in the style of Epictetus or Musonius Rufus. See Kindstrand 1976:25.

τῶν Βρύσωνος τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου: Bryson of Heraclea could be the “guest from Heraclea” of t. 13A.63.

43A. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 2.61 (Marcovich)

= 6 DC

καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ δὲ τοὺς πλείστους Περσαῖός φησι Πασιφῶντος εἶναι τοῦ Ἐρετρικοῦ, εἰς τοὺς Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξαι. ἄλλα καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένους τόν τε μικρὸν Κῦρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἐλάσσω καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην. καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἐσκευώρηται.

κατατάξαι B P F : κατατετάχθαι Roeper | interpunctionem sic feci | ἄλλα καὶ Delattre : ἀλλὰ καὶ codd. | τῶν Ἀντισθένους B P : τοῦ Ἀντισθένους F | δὲ ἐσκευώρηται codd. : δὲ ἐσκευωρῆσθαι Kuehn : διεσκευώρηται vel διεσκευωρῆσθαι Susemihl

And of the seven [dialogues of Aeschines], Persaeus says that most are from Pasiphon the Eretrian, and that he [(Pasiphon?)] arranged them among the works of Aeschines. [He did the same with] others, and among the dialogues of Antisthenes both the Small Cyrus and the Lesser Heracles and Alcibiades. And those of the others he [(Pasiphon?)] has fabricated.

Context of Preservation

This is from the first half of Diogenes’ brief life of Aeschines, treated among the minor Socratics between Xenophon (who is first after Socrates) and Aristippus. On the passage overall, see Goulet-Cazé 1997. The text is corrupt as transmitted and has been much debated: I adopt Delattre’s emendation (on advice from R. Janko) and repunctuate slightly.

Importance of the Testimonium

The text suggests that the Small Cyrus, the Lesser Heracles, and Alcibiades attributed to Antisthenes were Socratic dialogues, since the discussion concerns the authenticity of Aeschines’ Socratic dialogues. It might show that these three texts somehow overlapped with the corpus of Aeschines, whether as source material, false attributions, or forgeries. Even if the text is correct in its allegation that these three texts were really written by Pasiphon, the whole matter shows that Antisthenes did write Socratic dialogues. Susemihl (1887) used this passage as the basis to argue that Antisthenes’ tenth tomos—listing the titles Heracles (two of them), Alcibiades, and, by Susemihl’s reading, Cyrus (two of them)—contains the texts considered spurious in antiquity. But there are many open questions. See Patzer 1970:102–6; Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:236–38; Goulet-Cazé 1997:167–75.

Notes

Περσαῖός φησι: Diogenes does not say that Persaeus is correct in his charge or even that he accepts his judgment in this widespread Hellenistic debate over the authenticity of Socratic literature. (Compare the allegations of Herodicus of Babylon in the context of t. 42 and 147A–B; on this context, see Alesse 1997:284.) In Aeschines’ case, Diogenes goes on to endorse the seven dialogues that represent Socrates well. One point to be extracted is that the Small Cyrus, the Lesser Heracles, and Alcibiades (whether they were written by Antisthenes, Pasiphon, or someone else) all contained representations of Socrates.

Πασιφῶντος . . . τοῦ Ἐρετρικοῦ: Because he is identified as an Eretrian, Pasiphon might have been a direct pupil of Menedemus of Eretria (c. 339–265 BCE), as the “school” did not survive long. In that case, he would have flourished in the mid-third century, a rough contemporary of Persaeus, who might have sought to attack him for philosophical reasons and used literary allegations as his tactic. (See Patzer 1970:105.) Plutarch cites from his dialogue Nicias, which Pasiphon must have composed under his own name as a throwback to the late fifth century. If he composed the dialogues attributed to Aeschines (and others), they, too, would be more than a century younger than the original Socratic dialogues. See also Diog. Laert. 6.73, where one Pasiphon is alleged as a forger of the tragedies of Diogenes of Sinope.

εἰς τοὺς Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξαι: The agent of this false attribution of Pasiphon’s dialogues to Aeschines is unclear. (See the extensive discussion by Goulet-Cazé, who considers all possible agents for this editorial action, including Peristratus, an editor mentioned in a previous clause.) If it is Pasiphon, there is a syntactical break in the sentence, because the subject of the infinitive should be in the accusative case.

ἄλλα καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένους τόν τε μικρὸν Κῦρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἐλάσσω καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην: In the transmitted text (with Delattre’s reading of the neuter plural ἄλλα instead of the conjunction ἀλλά traditionally understood), this list in the accusative case is parallel to the previous reference to titles, τῶν ἑπτὰ . . . τοὺς πλείστους. This previous phrase is ambiguously both subject of one clause, Persaeus’ attribution to Pasiphon, and object of another clause, what the interpolator did (unless Roeper’s emendation to a passive infinitive κατατετάχθαι is adopted). The construction to be understood for Antisthenes’ titles is probably the second, for reasons of word order. In that case, Pasiphon did to these texts what he also did to most of Aeschines’ texts, forged them and added them to the official corpus. (See also Goulet-Cazé 1997, who reports but does not accept Delattre’s conjecture.) Some editors (discussed by Giannantoni) have, alternatively, understood that Aeschines is the grammatical subject and that the verb governing the accusatives is ἐσκευώρηται: Aeschines, then, forged these texts. Others, pushing the sense of ἐσκευώρηται (usually as emended to διεσκευώρηται), have understood the point to be that Pasiphon (or Aeschines) used three texts of Antisthenes plus texts of “the others” as source material for his own composition of new dialogues. (See Giannantoni 1990:237.) It is not impossible that this reference to Antisthenes, which, under most interpretations, has nothing to do with the biography of Aeschines, was originally a marginal note, added into the text at a later stage of transmission.

καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἐσκευώρηται: The widely noted textual problem, pertaining to the text punctuated as one continuing sentence, is that the particle δέ cannot be used near the end of a clause but must come near the beginning: Giannantoni and others remove this problem through emendation of the simple verb ἐσκευώρηται to the compound διεσκευώρηται. One can preserve δέ as a connective at the clause level, as well as the simple verb ἐσκευώρηται in favor of the rarely attested compound, by understanding that a new clause does begin καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων δέ, just as the previous one began ἄλλα καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένους and as the one before that began καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ δὲ <Αἰσχίνου> τοὺς πλείστους. The combination καὶ . . . δέ has a parallel in this first clause about Aeschines.

43B. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 2.64 (Marcovich)

= 5 DC (SSR IH 17)

πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφῶντος, Ἀντισθένους, Αἰσχίνου· διστάζει δὲ περὶ τῶν Φαίδωνος καὶ Εὐκλείδου, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀναιρεῖ πάντας.

<Ἀριστίππου> add. Brandis post Αἰσχίνου

Of all the Socratic dialogues, Panaetius thinks those of Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines to be authentic. He is undecided about those of Phaedo and Euclides, and he throws out all the others.

Context of Preservation

This appears near the end of Diogenes’ biography of Aeschines. (See t. 43A.)

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the clearest evidence that Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues, in which Socrates appeared as a speaking character. Direct literary evidence survives for Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines, but direct evidence for Antisthenes is tenuous. For testimonial evidence, see t. 43A, 64A, 200. T. 187 is sometimes considered the remains of a Socratic dialogue. See also t. 95 and 197, possibly from dialogic frames in Heracles or other texts. Panaetius, whether or not his judgment was accurate or fair, probably influenced later tradition, in which the dialogues of these four Socratics remained canonical while those of the other Socratics were essentially lost. (See t. 48; Brancacci 2000:245.)

Notes

ἀληθεῖς: Debate surrounds the question whether this adjective refers to the “authentic” or “genuine” authorship of the dialogues or to the “true” or “reliable” portrayal of Socrates within them. For the former interpretation, see the discussion in Patzer 1970:107; for the latter, Alesse 1997:284.

44A. Julian, To the Cynic Herakleios (Oration 7) 209a (Guido)

= 8A DC

εἰ δ’ Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ὥσπερ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἔνια διὰ τῶν μύθων ἀπήγγελλε, μήτοι τοῦτό σε ἐξαπατάτω· καὶ γὰρ μικρὸν ὕστερον ὑπὲρ τούτου σοι διηγήσομαι.

μήτοι V : μήτι Cobet : lac. in U | fort. <μή> ante ἐξαπατάτω Petavius | σοι διηγήσομαι sub macula in V leg. Spahn : lac. in U

And if Antisthenes the Socratic, like Xenophon, related a few things through myths, let this not mislead you. For I shall explain to you about this man a little bit later.

Context of Preservation

In To the Cynic Herakleios, Julian attacks a contemporary Cynic for his live performance of “myths” or fictions that scorn the gods. He rejects irreverent fictions attributed to Diogenes and the later Cynic Oenomaus (second century CE) and suggests that myth is not true to Cynicism at all (t. 44A). He concedes that myth is appropriate to two divisions of philosophy (t. 44B), theology and ethics. He supports his schematic argument (t. 44C) with citation of classical writers: Plato and Orpheus, who wrote theological myths, and Antisthenes, Xenophon, Plato, and (by implication) Prodicus, who wrote ethical myths. He points to Iamblichus as an exemplary contemporary writer of philosophical myth and concludes the work with his own example (227c–234c).

Importance of the Testimonia

These passages show that Antisthenes was recognized still in the fourth century CE for the distinct style of his “myth” writing. (See also t. 96 from Julian’s contemporary Themistius.) Julian’s comments are not traditional, and so he must be reading the works himself.

Notes

Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικός: In this oration, Julian distinguishes Antisthenes from the Cynics, by virtue of the way he used myth and presumably by virtue of his respect for the divine. In t. 26, Julian associates Antisthenes with Cynicism, by virtue of the ethical example he set through his lifestyle.

ἀπήγγελλε: This is the frequent verb for the divine mission of the Cynic “scout” in reporting to humans the news from the gods. See t. 41A title 10.4; Epictetus, Discourses 1.24.6, 3.22.23.

44B. Julian, To the Cynic Herakleios (Oration 7) 215b–c (Guido)

= 8B DC

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Ξενοφῶν φαίνεται καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Πλάτων προσχρησάμενοι πολλαχοῦ τοῖς μύθοις, ὥσθ’ ἡμῖν πέφηνεν, καὶ εἰ μὴ τῷ κυνικῷ, φιλοσόφῳ γοῦν τινι προσήκειν ἡ μυθογραφία· μικρὰ οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἴτε μορίων εἴτε ὀργάνων <ῥητέον>.

<ῥητέον> Rochefort : <ῥητέον> prior Boulenger suppl. post μορίων : <προρρητέον> Reiske : lacunam pos. Hertlein

Moreover, also Xenophon and Antisthenes and Plato seem to have added myths in many places, so that it is apparent to us that myth writing is fitting, if perhaps not to a Cynic, surely to a philosopher. Some things, then, must be said about the parts, or the tools, of philosophy.

Notes

προσχρησάμενοι: The verb implies that these authors attached myths, as an additional element, onto their discourses or λόγοι. Such a description is appropriate for Plato (e.g., Gorg. 523a; Phaed. 108d; Rep. 614b) and Xenophon (e.g., Mem. 2.1.21–34). For Antisthenes, there is no direct evidence. The fictional speeches of Ajax and Odysseus are homogeneous, with no distinction between λόγος and μῦθος. The works Heracles and Cyrus are generally assumed to be entirely mimetic or “mythical” too: the present passage might throw that assumption into question. See t. 197 for a possible example.

εἰ μὴ τῷ κυνικῷ, φιλοσόφῳ γοῦν: Julian elsewhere (To the Uneducated Cynics 182c–189b) goes to great length to explain that Cynicism is not only philosophy but a noble form of it.

ἡ μυθογραφία: The primary composition of new myth, not the interpretation of traditional myth.

εἴτε μορίων εἴτε ὀργάνων: Julian alludes to a dispute in post-Aristotelian philosophy, whether logic was a “part” of philosophy or a “tool” for all philosophy. He goes on to assign myth as a tool within two of the nine parts of philosophy: the part of theoretical philosophy that is theological and the part of practical philosophy that is about individualist ethics. In theology, myth provokes deeper thought about the divine without assimilating it to the human (222c–d). In ethics, myth addresses “children” or men who are intellectually like children (223a, 226c–d).

44C. Julian, To the Cynic Herakleios (Oration 7) 216d–217b (Guido)

= 8C DC

φανεροῦ δὲ ἤδη γενομένου τίνι καὶ ποίῳ φιλοσοφίας εἴδει καὶ μυθογραφεῖν ἔσθ’ ὅτε <προσήκει . . . >. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ μαρτυρεῖ τούτοις ἡ τῶν προλαβόντων ἀνδρῶν προαίρεσις, ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτωνι πολλὰ μεμυθολόγηται περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου πραγμάτων θεολογοῦντι καὶ πρό γε τούτου τῷ τῆς Καλλιόπης, Ἀντισθένει δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶντι καὶ ταὐτῷ Πλάτωνι πραγματευομένοις ἠθικάς τινας ὑποθέσεις οὐ παρέργως ἀλλὰ μετά τινος ἐμμελείας ἡ τῶν μύθων ἐγκαταμέμικται γραφή, οὓς ἐχρῆν, εἴπερ ἐβούλου μιμούμενος, ἀντὶ μὲν Ἡρακλέος μεταλαμβάνειν Περσέως ἢ Θησέως τινὸς ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ἀντισθένειον τύπον ἐγχαράττειν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς Προδίκου σκηνοποιίας ἀμφὶ ταῖν ἀμφοῖν θεοῖν ἑτέραν ὁμοίαν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ θέατρον.

<προσήκει> suppl. Reiske : lacunam ampliorem posui | μαρτυρεῖ vix leg. in V : μάρτυρι U | ταὐτῷ Boulenger : αὐτῷ V : αὐτῷ <τῷ> Guido | <σ>’ ἐχρῆν suppl. Rochefort secutus Hertlein | μιμούμενος V : μιμούμενον Hertlein | ταῖν ἀμφοῖν θεοῖν scripsi : τοῖν ἀμφοῖν θεοῖν V : ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν θεοῖν Petavius

And now that I have made it clear to which branch and to what kind of philosophy the composition of myth can be appropriate . . . For in addition to my argument, evidence for this is found in the choice of the men who have gone before us, since many things have been told in myth also by Plato, when he divines about matters in Hades, and even before him by the son of Calliope [Orpheus]; and when Antisthenes and Xenophon and this same Plato elaborate certain ethical theses, not haphazardly but with a certain harmony, the composition of myths is mixed in. If you wanted to imitate these men, you should have taken up in place of Heracles the name of some Perseus or Theseus and stamped in the Antisthenean type, and in place of Prodicus’ setting of the scene about the two goddesses, you should have brought into the theater another similar situation.

Notes

ἡ . . . προαίρεσις: Julian implies that the writers he will mention used the mode of myth deliberately. Plato (Gorg. 523a; Phaed. 108d) and Xenophon (Mem. 2.1.20–21), at least, state directly how myth supplements the non-mythical λόγος. Possibly Antisthenes did so also.

περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου πραγμάτων θεολογοῦντι: Antisthenes, too, is credited with a text titled On Matters in Hades (t. 41A title 7.7). Either Julian does not know it, or he knows that it does not use myth.

πραγματευομένοις ἠθικάς τινας ὑποθέσεις . . . ἡ τῶν μύθων ἐγκαταμέμικται γραφή: As in t. 44B (προσχρησάμενοι), Julian’s wording implies that ethical theses were both stated in literal discourse and embellished or illustrated through myth.

μετά τινος ἐμμελείας: Compare Theopompus’ judgment that Antisthenes used “harmonious persuasion” (δι’ ὁμιλίας ἐμμελοῦς, t. 22A).

ἀντὶ μὲν Ἡρακλέος μεταλαμβάνειν Περσέως ἢ Θησέως τινὸς ὄνομα: The “name” of the hero constitutes his traditional identity. Presumably some events (e.g., the famous labors of these three characters) or traits were attached necessarily to this name, but apparently a “style” (τύπον) and a “scene” (σκηνοποιίαν) were contributed by the author of the new myth. Antisthenes was famous for his Heracles character (t. 92–99), and Julian seems to say that Perseus and Theseus, who might have been comparable heroes, are still available for a new writer to use. Isocrates wrote a Theseus myth in his Helen (§18–44), possibly in competition with Antisthenes’ Heracles. Julian considers Isocrates a rhetorician, but not a myth writer (236b).

τὸν ἀντισθένειον τύπον ἐγχαράττειν: Julian implies that there is a “type” of Antisthenes that his addressee should transfer to or “stamp out” onto a new character. Morgan 2000:114 argues that this is an ethical or philosophical message, which could be stamped onto any hero. Alternatively, this could be a performative or literary style, a style of mimesis: the addressee Herakleios performed his myth before a live audience, and Antisthenes reportedly performed an epideixis, or display piece, titled Heracles (t. 94B). Since Julian’s examples are overall literary, he might imply foremost a style of writing. Plato, too, implies for the term τύπος a live performance through reading aloud, or mimesis: in Rep. 396d2–e1, Socrates notes that the moral reader will be reluctant to “step into the patterns of his inferiors” (ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακιόνων τύπους), that is, to imitate their characters by reading literature in which they have speaking roles. On the term χαράττειν, see t. 46, 41A title 1.1.

ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς Προδίκου σκηνοποιίας: The reference is to the “scene” of the choice of lives invented for Heracles by Prodicus and told by Xenophon in Mem. 2.1.21–34. It is not clear whether Julian implies that the Antisthenean type and the Prodican setting were to be found in the same model. If so, he must know the tradition of competition between these two transmitted in the Cynic epistles (t. 207C). Possibly Antisthenes stamped his type onto Prodicus’ scene.

ἀμφὶ ταῖν ἀμφοῖν θεοῖν: The feminine form (“about the two goddesses”) in the text as emended would refer to the paired figures Virtue and Vice who appear before Heracles in Xen. Mem. 2.1.22. These are not said explicitly to be divine, but they are large in stature and have some kind of superhuman status. (The translation in Morgan 2000:113, “the two goddesses,” assumes a feminine phrase.) The transmitted masculine form would have to refer to the two gods who appeared not in Prodicus’ scene but in the opponent Herakleios’ production, Zeus and Pan (Guido ad loc.). These are mentioned later in the text (234c–d), but a reference here would be obscure. Possibly Heracles and Dionysus (mentioned at the opening of the text, 204b) are meant, but the feminine form makes better sense of the sentence. Feminine dual forms are attested three times in Julian’s extant work: in Misopogon 20, he uses the phrase ἀμφοῖν . . . ταῖν ζημίαιν ([sharing in] both punishments), and the feminine dual article is attested two additional times.

45. Demetrius, On Style 249 (Roberts)

= 12 DC

ποιητικὸν δὲ δεινότητός ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τέλει τιθέναι τὸ δεινότατον (περιλαμβανόμενον γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ ἀμβλύνεται), καθάπερ τὸ Ἀντισθένους·

σχεδὸν γὰρ ὀδυνήσει ἄνθρωπος ἐκ φρυγάνων ἀναστάς·

εἰ γὰρ μετασυνθείη τις οὕτως αὐτό,

σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐκ φρυγάνων ἀναστὰς ἄνθρωπος ὀδυνήσει,

καίτοι ταὐτὸν εἰπὼν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἔτι νομισθήσεται λέγειν.

ὀδυνήσει primum P in mg: ὀδυνήσειεν ἂν Radermacher | ὀδυνήσει secundum Goeller: ὀδυνήσειε P: <ἂν> ὀδυνήσειε Radermacher

It is also productive of forcefulness to place the most forceful phrase at the end (since it loses its edge when buried in the middle), as in the line of Antisthenes:

“For generally a man will cause shock, standing up out of the dry sticks.”

For if one should rearrange it like this,

“For generally, standing up out of the dry sticks, a man will cause shock,”

then, although he is saying the same thing, he will no longer be considered to say the same thing.

Context of Preservation

On Style can probably be attributed to Demetrius the Syrian, a teacher Cicero met in Athens c. 80 BCE, although dating criteria remain controversial. (For Demetrius the Syrian, see Chiron 2001:365–66; for a survey of the problems, see Innes 1995:312–21.) Demetrius shows wide, precise knowledge of Greek literature and must have had access to a good library. The reference to Antisthenes comes early amid treatment of the δεινός (forceful) style, the final of four styles treated (240–301). (The previous three are the grand style, μεγαλοπρεπής; the elegant style, γλαφυρός; and the plain style, ἰσχνός. A faulty style corresponding to each receives brief treatment.) Later in his treatment of δεινότης, Demetrius speaks of the Cynics (259–62) and the Socratics (287–91, 296–98). Antisthenes appears in neither group: the Cynics are Diogenes and Crates, and the Socratics are Aristippus, Xenophon, Aeschines, and Plato. Contrast t. 46–49, where Antisthenes is included for his style in sets of Socratics, and t. 52B, where he is in a set of Cynics. This implies that Demetrius knows Antisthenes’ writing directly, not as part of a traditional list.

Importance of the Testimonium

This text is important for its preservation, endorsement, and analysis of a sample from Antisthenes’ own work. It is likely to be a quotation from Antisthenes.

Notes

τὸ ἐπὶ τέλει τιθέναι τὸ δεινότατον: The “most forceful” segment in the statement must be ἐκ φρυγάνων ἀναστάς, for this is what Demetrius transposes in the hypothetical revision. This phrase, which describes the act that causes the response in the viewer, might have “forcefulness” in its surprising informational content. (Blass 1892 v.2:342 finds the same effect in several sentences in the Ajax speech, t. 53.) It also has an anapestic rhythm, which could mark closure (although elsewhere, in §189, Demetrius advises against this rhythm).

καθάπερ τὸ Ἀντισθένους: Demetrius commends the ordering of words Antisthenes produced, contrasting it to his hypothetical reordering. (Some interpretations reverse this. But Demetrius’ standard practice is to cite an exemplary sentence and then show how the same message can be said less effectively: compare §11, where he rewrites the exemplary period from Demosthenes cited in §10.)

σχεδὸν γὰρ ὀδυνήσει: The faithful quotation of Antisthenes, before rearrangement, is a marginal addition in ms. P of Demetrius, the manuscript on which all other extant copies depend. But the many corrections in P indicate that another manuscript of the text was in circulation (Radermacher 1901:v). (The present text differs from SSR and Decleva Caizzi. P’s marginal addition presents the verb ὀδυνήσει, a future indicative, but P’s main text preserves, for the rearranged version, the optative ὀδυνήσειε, without the potential particle ἄν. These must be reconciled. Earlier editors—Goeller (1832), followed by Roberts (1902)—printed two futures, whereas Radermacher (1901), whom Decleva Caizzi and Giannantoni follow, saw in P’s marginal addition traces of the particle ἄν before ἄνθρωπος and printed the optative, while adding the particle to the revision. This also removes the hiatus from the original, which could be counted as a technical flaw. However, the future indicative seems more appropriate than a potential optative to Demetrius’ perception of rhetorical force. For hiatus as a device of forceful style, see Demetrius §299 and, further, §68–74.

ἐκ φρυγάνων ἀναστάς: The source text can only be conjectured. One possibility is a discussion on the Odyssey (t. 41A title 9.1; references to Homer might have appeared throughout Antisthenes’ writings): at Od. 6.127, Odysseus rises naked from under the bushes to meet Nausicaa and her friends (ὣς εἰπὼν θάμνων ὑπεδύσετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς). Although he tries to make himself presentable by covering himself with leaves, he scares the girls, who run off down the beach. A second possibility is a reference to a man standing up out of his funeral pyre: τὰ φρύγανα are often kindling (Hdt. 4.62; Th. 3.111; see, further, LSJ ad loc.), and ἀνίσταμαι often refers to rising from a sickbed or from death. One of the Heracles texts might have mentioned the funeral pyre. These meanings could also have been combined: Odysseus’ survival of the shipwreck could be considered miraculous, and his visit with the Phaeacians, which guarantees his homecoming, could represent a kind of new life. Dümmler (1889:170), endorsed by Giannantoni 1990 (at t. 45 and v.4:567), suggested that the fragment comes from a narrative of a human life that was developed, by the Cynic tradition and especially by Crates, into a lament on the pains of life, used in polemic against hedonist theories of virtue. But that suggestion seems groundless, not least because the interest here is in the effect caused by the man on the spectator, not in his own experience.

εἰ γὰρ μετασυνθείη τις οὕτως αὐτό: The new order puts the events in chronological order, but the main impact of the sentence is buried in the middle. The new version also ends in an irregular rhythm, three long syllables followed by three shorts and two longs. Unless ἄν is added to the text, Demetrius’ rearrangement omits hiatus. But avoiding hiatus was not a goal in the forceful style.

46. Epictetus, Discourses 2.17.35 (Schenkl)

“θέλεις ἀναγνῶ σοι, ἀδελφέ, καὶ σὺ ἐμοί;” “Θαυμαστῶς, ἄνθρωπε, γράφεις.” “Καὶ σὺ μεγάλως εἰς τὸν Ξενοφῶντος χαρακτῆρα.” “Σὺ εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος.” “Σὺ εἰς τὸν Ἀντισθένους.”

. . . ἀδελφέ;” “καὶ σὺ ἐμοί;” interpunxit Schenkl secutus Elter | “θαυμαστῶς” R

“Do you want me to read aloud to you, brother, and you to me?” “You write marvelously.” “And you magnificently in the character of Xenophon.” “You in the style of Plato.” “You in the style of Antisthenes.”

Context of Preservation

Epictetus’ Discourses 2.17 promotes the elementary philosophical task of learning to match particular facts to philosophical conceptions, and he warns the reader away from jumping too fast into advanced topics in the works of Chrysippus: a pupil without preparation is likely to resist learning anything new from the text and, instead, to see merely confirmation of what he already believes he knows. This digression is a scornful reference to unphilosophical engagement with literature, where the readers seek only mutual praise and confirmation for superficial virtues. The authors named, like the writings of Chrysippus, are probably valuable in his view: at least, they are current among philosophy students in the first century CE.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is classified with Xenophon and Plato as writers with distinctive styles, worthy of emulation in literary games.

Notes

χαρακτῆρα: The term distinguishes three individual writers in philosophy (specifically in τὰ Σωκρατικά, as he calls the literary type in 3.23.20) from one another. In Discourses 3.23.33, Epictetus uses the same term, χαρακτήρ, to distinguish three styles within the discourse of philosophy: the προτρεπτικός (stye for “conversion” or “exhortation”), ἐλεγκτικός (style for “refuting”), and διδασκαλικός (style for “teaching”). It is possible that these three styles in philosophy correspond to the three Socratic writers named (presumably Xenophon would be διδασκαλικός, Plato would be προτρεπτικός, and Antisthenes would be ἐλεγκτικός; the last two could be reversed). But Epictetus elsewhere portrays Socrates as a mixer of these styles, and his own writing is presumably also a mixture (Long 2002:52–64). So it is unclear that he would want to reduce the Socratic writers to single “characters” from an external scheme (although Lucian might have: see t. 52B). Elsewhere, Epictetus uses the term χαρακτήρ to designate the particular style of an individual person, such as Diogenes or Nero, and this sense might be dominant when the χαρακτήρ of a single writer is in question. The distinction among these three writers is emphasized nowhere else: other evidence cites them in a list for their basic similarity (t. 42–44, 47–50; Antisthenes is distinguished by Demetrius in t. 45 and by Lucian in t. 52Β). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who uses the term χαρακτήρ in On the Arrangement of Words 21 to designate high, middle, and low style, also uses the term for the style of an individual writer (e.g., On Lysias 15–19) as well as a general style. That is most likely its sense here, as in the similar formulation of Julian, t. 44C: τὸν ἀντισθένειον τύπον ἐγχαράττειν. The term appears in Antisthenes’ book title as well, where it might also have an individualist sense: see t. 41A title 1.1.

θαυμαστῶς, ἄνθρωπε: These are both terms Epictetus uses when he mimics the popular style of unphilosophical people, those who delight in epideictic display and award easy praise. (Compare 3.23.11 and 23–24.) The slang language has proven tricky to punctuate, but in this passage (unlike 3.23), it is clear that the readers are reciting their work back and forth to each other.

47. Fronto, Book on Eloquence to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus 2.13 p. 141.15–16 (van den Hout)

Diodori tu et Alexini verba verbis Platonis et Xenophontis et Antisthenis anteponis.

You put the words of Diodorus and Alexinus before the words of Plato and Xenophon and Antisthenes.

Context of Preservation

Fronto’s letter, written no earlier than 161 CE, when his pupil Marcus became emperor, but before his death in c. 167, scolds the emperor for his adherence to Stoic tenets in rhetoric, which were minimalist. This sentence appears early in the climactic section of the letter, where, after preparatory sections on technique in various arts, Fronto addresses Marcus’ favorite, philosophy.

Importance of the Testimonium

The strong differentiation between the two groups of philosophical writers suggests that Antisthenes’ texts resembled those of Plato and Xenophon in their texture and were not filled with dense logical puzzles or paradoxes, as one might infer from the testimonia for the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox, t. 152–53, or comparison to Plato’s Euthydemus. If he was “eristic” in his living presence, as some infer from Xenophon’s Symposium (t. 83), he did not represent this quality of speech in the texts known to Fronto. The grouping with Plato and Xenophon is common to t. 44A, 44C, 46, and 47, as well as within longer lists in t. 47 and 48.

Notes

Diodori . . . et Alexini: These are philosophers of the “dialectical” type, Diodorus Cronus of Iasus of the Megarian school, c. 300 BCE (Diog. Laert. 2.111), and Alexinus of Elis (Diog. Laert. 2.109). They use language primarily to represent and develop logical paradox. Even Chrysippus is more rhetorical than they are, as Fronto goes on to argue.

48. Cassius Longinus, Art of Rhetoric fr. 48.199–207 (Patillon-Brisson)

= 11 DC

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν φῦλον καὶ τὸ τῶν κωμῳδῶν, μελοποιῶν τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, τό τε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ὅπου [μὴ] μηδὲ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπερεώραται καὶ παρημέληται· τῷ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτωνι καὶ τῷ Ξενοφῶντι Αἰσχίνῃ τε καὶ Ἀντισθένει περιττῶς διαπεπόνηται καὶ ἱκανῶς ἠκρίβωται. τῶν δὲ ῥητόρων τῷ κορυφαίῳ ταύτην εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο κρατεῖν ἂν δοκοίη τῶν ἑτέρων τῶν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ γένους.

[μὴ] del. Walz | ὑπερεώραται Spengel : ὑπερώραται P : ὑπερόραται Walz | ante ταύτην fort. κορυφαίαν Spengel

And [consider] further the band of the tragic poets, and of the comic poets, and of the lyric poets and the like, and that of the sophists, where not even by the philosophers has [this value of artistic arrangement] been overlooked and neglected. For [style in diction] has been abundantly worked out and arranged with ample precision by Plato and Xenophon, by Aeschines and Antisthenes. For the prince among the rhetors, this turned out to be the [crowning] virtue, and by this criterion he would seem superior to the others in the same genre.

Context of Preservation

Cassius Longinus (c. 210–72 CE) was a Middle Platonist scholar and rhetorician, a pupil of Ammonius Saccas (a teacher also of Plotinus), and a teacher of Porphyry. The fragment survives as a set of folios included by accident in a text attributed to Apsines. The Art of Rhetoric follows in the tradition of Aristotle and the Rhetoric to Alexander: this passage is from the introduction to his section on style, which quotes Xenophon, Thucydides, Plato, and Demosthenes.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows recognition of Antisthenes for exemplary style in high circles of the third century CE.

Notes

τό τε τῶν σοφιστῶν: This class includes the philosophers.

Πλάτωνι καὶ τῷ Ξενοφῶντι Αἰσχίνῃ τε καὶ Ἀντισθένει: This is the only testimony for exactly this list, which corresponds to the authors of Socratic dialogues Panaetius considered “genuine” (t. 43B). All four are included within a longer list in t. 50. Without Aeschines, the other three are listed together in t. 44B–C and 46–47.

49. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Thucydides 51 p. 941 (Usener-Radermacher)

= 9 DC

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸν ἀρχαῖον βίον ἀναφέροντας τὴν Θουκυδίδου διάλεκτον ὡς δὴ τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις οὖσαν συνήθη, βραχὺς ἀπόχρη μοι λόγος καὶ σαφής, ὅτι πολλῶν γενομένων Ἀθήνησι κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησιακὸν πόλεμον ῥητόρων τε καὶ φιλοσόφων οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν κέχρηται ταύτῃ τῇ διαλέκτῳ, οὔθ’ οἱ περὶ Ἀνδοκίδην καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Λυσίαν ῥήτορες οὔθ’ οἱ περὶ Κριτίαν καὶ Ἀντισθένη καὶ Ξενοφῶντα Σωκρατικοί.

In response to those who relate the dialect of Thucydides to the antiquity of his lifetime, and say that it is customary for people of that time, a short and clear reply suffices for me: that there were many rhetors and philosophers in Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War, and none of them uses this dialect, neither the rhetors in the circles of Andocides and Antiphon and Lysias nor the Socratics in the circles of Critias and Antisthenes and Xenophon.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that in early Augustan Rome, Antisthenes was classified as a Socratic, in opposition to the rhetors, and was counted as a model of Socratic style. Compare t. 50, where Thucydides is classified with these Socratics.

Notes

οἱ περὶ Κριτίαν καὶ Ἀντισθένη καὶ Ξενοφῶντα Σωκρατικοί: Dionysius’ inclusion of Critias and omission of Plato and Aeschines as models for Socratic style is unique amid surviving evidence. In t. 50, Phyrnicus also includes Critias, among the standard four.

50. Photius, Library cod. 158 101b4–11 (from Phrynicus) (Henry)

= 10 DC

εἰλικρινοῦς δὲ καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ ἀττικοῦ λόγου κανόνας καὶ σταθμὰς καὶ παράδειγμά φησιν ἄριστον Πλάτωνά τε καὶ Δημοσθένην μετὰ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ τῶν ἐννέα χοροῦ, Θουκυδίδην τε καὶ Ξενοφῶντα καὶ Αἰσχίνην τὸν Λυσανίου τὸν Σωκρατικόν, Κριτίαν τε τὸν Καλλαίσχρου καὶ Ἀντισθένην μετὰ τῶν γνησίων αὐτοῦ δύο λόγων [τοῦ] περὶ Κύρου καὶ τοῦ περὶ Ὀδυσσείας, τῶν μέντοι κωμῳδῶν Ἀριστοφάνην μετὰ τοῦ οἰκείου, ἐν οἷς ἀττικίζουσι, χοροῦ, καὶ τῶν τραγικῶν Αἰσχύλον τὸν μεγαλοφωνότατον καὶ Σοφοκλέα τὸν γλυκὺν καὶ τὸν πάνσοφον Εὐριπίδην.

Κριτίαν A : κρατίαν M | [τοῦ] del. Natorp | Ὀδυσσείας A : Ὀδυσσῆς M

And for pure, clean, Attic style he [Phrynichus] says the yardsticks and measuring lines and best model are Plato and Demosthenes, along with the chorus of the nine rhetoricians; Thucydides and Xenophon, and Aeschines son of Lysanias the Socratic, and Critias son of Callaeschrus and Antisthenes with his two authentic writings about Cyrus and the one about the Odyssey; and of the comic poets Aristophanes with his proper chorus, in which they sing in Attic; and of the tragedians the grand-sounding Aeschylus and the sweet Sophocles and the very wise Euripides.

Context of Preservation

Photius (writing c. 850–893 CE) summarizes the recommendations for Attic diction that he found in Phrynichus’ work Preparation for Wise Speaking (Σοφιστικὴ Παρασκευή), composed c. 180 CE from sources datable to the Augustan and Hadrianic periods.

Importance of the Testimonium

The testimonium shows Antisthenes’ recognition as a canonical author. It implies that some of Antisthenes’ corpus was thought to be inauthentic, but several interpretations are possible.

Notes

ἀττικοῦ λόγου κανόνας: Phrynichus, one of the strictest arbiters of pure Attic style in the Second Sophistic, selects Plato and Demosthenes as first models, then divides prose authors into rhetoricians, historians, and a third class that appears to be writers of Socratic dialogues. The inclusion of Antisthenes implies that his “Gorgianic” style (see t. 67) either was inoffensive to Phrynichus or was not accentuated in the texts mentioned.

μετὰ τῶν γνησίων αὐτοῦ δύο λόγων: It is unclear why titles are named for Antisthenes but for no one else and why the question of authenticity is raised. Either Antisthenes is included only for the titles named, with the note about authenticity securing the value of these two titles alone; he is included especially for the titles named; or the titles are mentioned to remind the audience who he is. Natorp’s deletion of one definite article (1894: col. 2541) is needed to restrict the authenticity question to the two Cyrus texts; see t. 43A for signs that the authenticity of the “smaller” Cyrus was doubted. If Phrynichus meant to deny the authenticity of Antisthenes’ entire corpus apart from two texts, this would be a radical difference from the rest of ancient evidence. His implied argument would have to be that only two titles are sufficiently Attic in style to be judged authentic: style is the criterion for authenticity (Patzer 1970:106–7).

τοῦ περὶ Ὀδυσσείας: Exactly this title is transmitted (t. 41A title 9.1). Phrynichus’ choice of this title might reflect its special popularity or importance among the many texts that Antisthenes wrote on Homer.

51A. Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.4 1407a8–15 (Kassel)

= 157 DC

. . . καὶ ὡς Δημοκράτης εἴκασεν τοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς τίτθαις αἳ τὸ ψώμισμα καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδία παραλείφουσιν. καὶ ὡς Ἀντισθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῷ εἴκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει. πάσας δὲ ταύτας καὶ ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς ἔξεστι λέγειν, ὥστε ὅσαι ἂν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς μεταφοραὶ λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον ὅτι αὗται καὶ εἰκόνες ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες μεταφοραὶ λόγου δεόμεναι.

τὸν λεπτὸν codd. et Guillelmus de Moerbeke : τῷ λέπτῳ γρ. Θ, γρ. Σ | πάσας δὲ ταύτας Guillelmus de Moerbeke : πάσας γὰρ ταύτας codd.

. . . and as Democrates likened the rhetors to nurses who slurp up the morsel and smear the children with saliva, and as Antisthenes likened Cephisodotus the slim to frankincense, because in wasting away he cheers people up. It is possible to speak of all these both as similes and as metaphors, with the result that those which are successful when said as metaphors will clearly also succeed as similes, and similes will be metaphors lacking a ratio.

Context of Preservation

In Rhet. 3, Aristotle treats diction suitable for prose. He endorses metaphor as the best device for lending distinction to prose (3.2) and adds simile (3.4) as closely akin to but more poetic than metaphor. Overblown metaphor is condemned as one of four types of frigidity in 3.3, but the nine similes in prose cited in 3.4 are examples of success. Eight of the nine examples are from contemporary fourth-century Athenians, and the other is from Pericles. (See Trevett 1996 on Aristotle’s habits of citation in the Rhetoric, usually from literary texts, not real speeches.) Soon before the example from Antisthenes, listed last, Aristotle cites three similes from Plato’s Republic (1406b32–1407a2) that can be confirmed against the text: these use nearly the same words as Plato, in a condensed syntactical structure. Therefore, the report of Antisthenes might also be a condensed quotation. Plato’s title is cited, whereas no title is cited for Antisthenes. Yet Aristotle nowhere cites a title for Antisthenes.

Importance of the Testimonium

Similes (εἰκόνες) are common in Socratic literature. Plato’s Meno (80c–d) suggests that composing similes was a form of friendly teasing among Socrates and his friends; see also Rep. 6 487e4–488a2 and 509a9; 10 588b10. Alcibiades compares Socrates to Silenus in Plato’s Symposium (216d); see t. 51B for a parallel in Xenophon’s Symposium. Such banter in literature of the symposium probably imitates the real institution (Aristophanes, Wasps 1311–14). See also t. 150A.4 and 181, where it seems that the possibility of “learning from a likeness” (ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος) might be among Antisthenes’ basic views. Von Fritz (1935:32 n.1) proposed that the simile of the bite of love (Xen. Mem. 1.3.12–13; Pl. Sym. 217e; Seneca, Epist. mor. 94.41 [= SSR IIIA 12, Phaedo of Elis]) is originally from Antisthenes.

Notes

Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτόν: A few chapters later in the Rhetoric (1411a5, 23, 28), Aristotle mentions an Athenian politician named Cephisodotus (prominent in 371–349 BCE), who was also praised by Demosthenes (20.150) for his forceful speaking (δεινότης) in court. Since the present Cephisodotus is distinguished as ὁ λεπτός, however, he might be someone else, possibly the cithara player who attended the famous wedding of the Athenian general Iphicrates to the daughter of a Thracian king in about 380 BCE, known from the comic poet Anaxandrides (fr. 42.3 PCG). (On Anaxandrides, see also t. 115.) This earlier Cephisodotus fits better with Antisthenes’ chronology. But see Goulet-Cazé 1996:414–15 for a proposal that these references in the Rhetoric are to the same Cephisodotus, with further implications for Antisthenes’ relevance in the other passages. Another possibility might also be considered: a certain Cephisodorus (Κηφισόδωρος) is known (see Dionys. Hal. De Isoc. 18.4) as a pupil of Isocrates and defender of his style against Aristotle. Since Antisthenes attacked Isocrates (see t. 41A titles 1.5–6), it is plausible that he attacked his pupil also and that transmission of the name was muddled.

ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει: The citharist seems more likely than the politician, to leave Cephisodorus aside, not only for chronological reasons, but from these details: it is an entertainer’s job to εὐφραίνειν, or “gladden.” Being λεπτός becomes an aesthetic virtue in Hellenistic poetry, and there could be reference here to a style of song or performance. The term ἀπολλύμενος, meanwhile, is often associated with a disease such as consumption or starvation and corresponds to λεπτός in this way. Cameron (1995:488–93) proposes that the aesthetic virtue has a connection to the thin human body and indicates its Athenian origin.

51B. Xenophon, Symposium 6.8–7.1 (Marchant)

(not in SSR)

(6.8) καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπε· “Σὺ μέντοι δεινὸς εἶ, ὦ Φίλιππε, εἰκάζειν· οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος λοιδορεῖσθαι βουλομένῳ ἐοικέναι;” “Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δί’,” ἔφη, “καὶ ἄλλοις γε πολλοῖς.” (9) “Ἀλλ’ ὅμως,” ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “σὺ αὐτὸν μὴ εἴκαζε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ σὺ λοιδορουμένῳ ἐοίκῃς.” “Ἀλλ’ εἴπερ γε τοῖς πᾶσι καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς βελτίστοις εἰκάζω αὐτόν, ἐπαινοῦντι μᾶλλον ἢ λοιδορουμένῳ δικαίως ἂν εἰκάζοι μέ τις.” “Καὶ νῦν σύγε λοιδορουμένῳ ἔοικας, εἰ πάντ’ αὐτὸν βελτίω φῂς εἶναι.” (10) “Ἀλλὰ βούλει πονηροτέροις εἰκάζω αὐτόν;” “Μηδὲ πονηροτέροις.” “Ἀλλὰ μηδενί;” “Μηδενὶ μηδὲ τούτων εἴκαζε.” “Ἀλλ’ οὐ μέντοι γε σιωπῶν οἶδα ὅπως ἄξια τοῦ δείπνου ἐργάσομαι.” “Καὶ ῥᾳδίως γ’, ἂν ἃ μὴ δεῖ λέγειν,” ἔφη, “σιωπᾷς.” αὕτη μὲν δὴ ἡ παροινία οὕτω κατεσβέσθη. (7.1) Ἐκ τούτου δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ἐκέλευον εἰκάζειν, οἱ δὲ ἐκώλυον.

(9) πάντ’ αὐτὸν βελτίω Cirignano : πάντ’ αὐτοῦ βελτίων codd.

And Antisthenes said, “You are clever at making likenesses, Philip. Don’t you think this man [the Syracusan entertainer] resembles someone wanting to level abuse [and be abused]?” “Yes, by Zeus,” he said, “and many other things, too.” (9) “But even so,” said Socrates, “don’t you make a likeness about him, or you, too, will look like someone leveling abuse [and being abused].” “But if I liken him to all the fine and best men, someone could more rightfully liken me to a praiser than to someone leveling abuse.” “And now you actually do resemble someone leveling abuse [and being abused], if you claim he is in all respects better.” (10) “Then do you want me to liken him to worse people?” “Not to worse, either.” “Then to no one?” “Liken him to none of these.” “But if I keep quiet, I don’t know how I can perform worthily of the dinner party.” “But that is easy,” he said, “if you are silent about what should not be said.” And in this way the wine-induced brawl was put out. (7.1) And then some of the guests were asking him to make a likeness, while others were asking him not to.

Context of Preservation

Antisthenes interrupts a quarrel about to erupt between the Syracusan entertainer and Socrates. The Syracusan entertainer has grown jealous of Socrates because the guests at Callias’ party prefer banter about the aesthetic qualities of dialectical discourse over the entertainment he has been hired to provide (6.1–6: see t. 101A), and he has begun to recite charges against Socrates from Aristophanes’ Clouds (6.6–8) when Antisthenes interrupts.

Importance of the Testimonium

Beyond confirming Antisthenes as likely advocate for a craft of making likenesses, this episode casts Antisthenes as Socrates’ fervent defender. Xenophon’s allusion to Aristophanes’ Clouds in the preceding passage can be recognized because the text survives. There might be allusions to further texts from the literary trial of Socrates that cannot be recognized because the texts do not survive. See t. 21; and for the literary trial of Socrates—that is, the discussion surrounding Polycrates’ pamphlet—see Chroust 1957.

Notes

(8) λοιδορεῖσθαι βουλομένῳ: In its first instance, the infinitive is ambiguously either middle or passive (Gray 1992:68). In its three subsequent uses, it is more clearly in the middle voice, naming the kind of speaking opposite to praise. Antisthenes’ first interruption of the conversation is a harsh threat to the Syracusan. The whole episode develops the idea that praise and blame circulates in a responsive and reflexive way, where participants in the discourse implicate themselves. Compare t. 29.

(9) πάντ’ αὐτὸν βελτίω: See Huss 1997:44–45 on the emendation of Cirignano (Diss., University of Iowa, 1993).

(10) Μηδενὶ μηδὲ τούτων εἴκαζε: Literally, Socrates asks Phillip to liken the Syracusan to neither of these comparanda, neither better nor baser men, so that the nastiness can end. But there may be a second meaning, that the Syracusan rates as a “nobody” (Huss 1999 [Xenophons Symposion]:345).

αὕτη μὲν δὴ ἡ παροινία: Chapter 6 began with Socrates’ question to Hermogenes, what is παροινία? Hermogenes was unable to supply a definition (Εἰ μὲν ὅ τι ἐστὶν ἐρωτᾷς, οὐκ οἶδα) but gave his opinion, an etymology of the term. Socrates then pointed to an example, which was Hermogenes’ silence. This responding episode provides a second, opposing example of παροινία, uncontrolled talking stopped by Socrates’ demand for silence. This could be Xenophon’s very clever response to debates about the Socratic question “What is it?” Insofar as Antisthenes related likenesses to this Socratic question (see t. 150A.4), Antisthenes’ own views on the Socratic question might have inspired Xenophon.

52A. Lucian, Against the Uneducated Book-Collector 27 (Macleod)

Ἡδέως δ’ ἂν καὶ ἐροίμην σε, τὰ τοσαῦτα βιβλία ἔχων τί μάλιστα ἀναγιγνώσκεις αὐτῶν; τὰ Πλάτωνος; τὰ Ἀντισθένους; τὰ Ἀρχιλόχου; τὰ Ἱππώνακτος; ἢ τούτων μὲν ὑπερφρονεῖς, ῥήτορες δὲ μάλιστά σοι διὰ χειρός; εἰπέ μοι, καὶ Αἰσχίνου τὸν κατὰ Τιμάρχου λόγον ἀναγιγνώσκεις; ἢ ἐκεῖνά γε πάντα οἶσθα καὶ γιγνώσκεις αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, τὸν δὲ Ἀριστοφάνην καὶ τὸν Εὔπολιν ὑποδέδυκας;

Ἀρχιλόχου Γ^x : Ἀντιλόχου Γ¹ Ω β | μάλιστά σοι τούτων codd. : τούτων del. Jacobitz

And I would gladly ask you, since you have so many books, which of them do you read the most? Those of Plato? Antisthenes? Archilochus? Hipponax? Or do you frown at these and have the rhetors mostly at hand? Tell me, do you read also Aeschines’ speech against Timarchus? Or do you know all these and understand all of their points, and have you ventured into Aristophanes and Eupolis?

Context of Preservation

Lucian’s text is a tirade against someone who collects books but has not read them. This passage comes near the end; the main thought appeared already in the first paragraph.

Importance of the Testimonium

The passage has been understood as an indication that Antisthenes’ books were available in Athenian bookstores in the second century CE. More recently, this list has been understood to suggest unavailable books, rather than available books, perhaps as a final joke against the author’s own charlantanry: all the authors named here are mentioned elsewhere in Lucian’s work, but possibly this is only name-dropping. (See Hopkinson 2008:139.) A more plausible interpretation is that one strand of Lucian’s audience would have recognized this set of authors as important precedents to Lucian’s own text, as the ignorant addressee cannot, not having read them. Nothing in Lucian’s corpus overall offers evidence convincing, to us, that he read Antisthenes firsthand. (See t. 4, 36, 52B.) But Lucian rarely does cite his “source” authors in a way that can be recognized without prior knowledge; he recasts them. It is hard to recognize recasting of Antisthenes without independent knowledge of Antisthenes’ writings.

Notes

τὰ Πλάτωνος: Plato’s works were readily available in the second century, and Lucian uses them closely. Plato had also been called a “new Archilochus” (Athenaeus 505e, citing Gorgias as reported by Herodicus of Babylon; see t. 147B).

τὰ Ἀντισθένους: Possibly the names in this list are paired such that one well known author is matched with one obscure author. But it seems unlikely that Lucian drops a name unless his external audience is able to recognize the relevance. The relevance of Antisthenes in this text has two possible levels. Presumably Antisthenes, like all other names on this list, is an author of abuse literature. (See t. 52B; t. 53–54 contain abusive language.) In addition, it is likely that Antisthenes, with the Cynics, would have been Lucian’s ally in his main message: that books are for reading and inspiring thought, not for collecting as objects (see t. 168 for a similar idea). Earlier in the text, Lucian has mentioned Cynics of his own day in relation to the mission to advance beyond material objects: Demetrius (§19) combats ignorant reading; Peregrinus “Proteus” (§14) was able to dupe someone into overvaluing his staff as a physical relic, after he leaped into a pyre to his death.

52B. Lucian, The Fisherman 23 (Macleod)

ΠΛΑΤΩΝ: Μηδαμῶς, ἀλλά τινα τῶν σφοδροτέρων προχειρισώμεθα, Διογένη τοῦτον ἢ Ἀντισθένη ἢ Κράτητα ἢ καὶ σέ, ὦ Χρύσιππε· οὐ γὰρ δὴ κάλλους ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ δεινότητος συγγραφικῆς ὁ καιρός, ἀλλά τινος ἐλεγκτικῆς καὶ δικανικῆς παρασκευῆς· ῥήτωρ δὲ ὁ Παρρησιάδης ἐστίν.

Plato: Not at all, but let’s use one of the more vehement [speakers], Diogenes here or Antisthenes or Crates, or even you, Chrysippus: for it is not in present circumstances the moment for beauty and cleverness of prose, but for a sort of cross-examining and forensic presentation: since Parrhesiades is a rhetor.

Context of Preservation

A band of philosophers returned from the underworld puts the character Parrhesiades (Son of Outspokenness) on trial for his slander against them. Chrysippus has just proposed that Plato should represent the philosophers as spokesman in court, because of his fine style. Plato points out that the situation calls for a different style, and Diogenes is appointed. Neither Antisthenes nor Crates is mentioned elsewhere in the text, although other famous philosophers are named multiple times.

Importance of the Testimonium

As in Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead 22, Antisthenes is grouped with Diogenes and Crates, and even his rhetorical style is classified with theirs. Compare t. 22A, 138A, 139A–B, 183.

Notes

τινος ἐλεγκτικῆς καὶ δικανικῆς παρασκευῆς: With Diogenes and Crates, Antisthenes is an emblem of this “elenctic” style. (See t. 46.) This is the only extant passage where Antisthenes is classified with the Cynics for rhetorical style. When Diogenes volunteers to speak, he says, “Nor do I think long accounts will be at all necessary” (οὐδὲ γὰρ πάνυ μακρῶν οἶμαι τῶν λόγων δεήσεσθαι): compare t. 30, 53.8, 150A.4.

ἢ καὶ σέ, ὦ Χρύσιππε: Chrysippus is famous for bad style. The implication may be that the Cynics’ style is also bad.

52C. Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 18.7.4 (Julien)

(not in SSR)

(Favorinus:) Vel ipsum hoc, quale existimatis, quod nunc de philosophis dixit? Nonne, si id Antisthenes aut Diogenes dixisset, dignum memoria visum esset?

(Favorinus:) For example, what do you think about what he just said about philosophers? If Antisthenes or Diogenes had said it, would it not have seemed worthy of memory?

Context of Preservation

Gellius tells of an encounter in Rome between Favorinus and a well known “mad” grammarian named Domitius, an expert in lexical usage. When Favorinus attempts to provoke Domitius to a performance in his art, Domitius blows up and charges that philosophers are interested only in words, whereas grammarians are superior in substantive questions. Favorinus explains later that Domitius’ madness has a certain connection to “heroism” and truth.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is paired with Diogenes as a fitting spokesman for Domitius’ message. With t. 52B, this is the earliest surviving case of this pairing for rhetorical quality. Diogenes is far more common than Antisthenes as an exemplum for outspoken rhetorical quality.

Section 4

Antisthenes’ Writings

Testimonia 41–52

41A. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 6.15–18 (Marcovich)

Importance of the Testimonium

Composition of the Catalog

Systematic Arrangement

Titles and Alternative Titles

Notes

41B. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 6.18 (Marcovich)

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

41C. Suda, no. A.2723 “Antisthenes” (Adler)

Importance of the Testimonium

42. Athenaeus, Wise Men at Dinner 11 508c–d (Kaibel)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

43A. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 2.61 (Marcovich)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

43B. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 2.64 (Marcovich)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

44A. Julian, To the Cynic Herakleios (Oration 7) 209a (Guido)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonia

Notes

44B. Julian, To the Cynic Herakleios (Oration 7) 215b–c (Guido)

Notes

44C. Julian, To the Cynic Herakleios (Oration 7) 216d–217b (Guido)

Notes

45. Demetrius, On Style 249 (Roberts)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

46. Epictetus, Discourses 2.17.35 (Schenkl)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

47. Fronto, Book on Eloquence to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus 2.13 p. 141.15–16 (van den Hout)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

48. Cassius Longinus, Art of Rhetoric fr. 48.199–207 (Patillon-Brisson)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

49. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Thucydides 51 p. 941 (Usener-Radermacher)

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

50. Photius, Library cod. 158 101b4–11 (from Phrynicus) (Henry)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

51A. Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.4 1407a8–15 (Kassel)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

51B. Xenophon, Symposium 6.8–7.1 (Marchant)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

52A. Lucian, Against the Uneducated Book-Collector 27 (Macleod)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

52B. Lucian, The Fisherman 23 (Macleod)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium

Notes

52C. Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 18.7.4 (Julien)

Context of Preservation

Importance of the Testimonium