= 177 DC
ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁμιλεῖν.
περιεγένετο F | ἔφη in mg P2
When asked what he had gained from philosophy, he said the power to associate with himself.
This appears near the end of Diogenes’ series of apophthegmata (6.3–6). On the ordering of the list, see t. 3.
This illustrates Antisthenes’ self-sufficiency.
τί αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας: The same question is put to Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2.68), Plato (Gnom. Vat. no. 430), and Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.63) in the doxographies and must have been a standard topic. The answers of Aristippus and Plato refer, respectively, to associating with and superiority over others. There might be a direct responsion between Antisthenes and Aristippus (Giannantoni 1990 v.2:177). In To Nicocles §39, Isocrates might refer to Antisthenes’ individualist interpretation of wisdom, which he opposes (Dümmler 1889:64).
τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁμιλεῖν: Antisthenes’ basic answer is self-sufficiency, with a dialogical tone. To “unify” or “associate” or “assimilate” opposing parties through speech is a characteristic talent of the politically adept speaker, from Nestor in the Iliad (Il. 1.261) to Alcibiades in Thucydides (Histories 6.17.1): more generally, the rhetorician “associates” with his civic audience in Pl. Gorgias 484d4. In Antisthenes, “association” is the social relationship among the participants at a symposium (t. 22A, 125). The related term συνεῖναι is said of the wise rhetor’s relation to his audience in t. 187.6. Overall, “association” is normally an external relationship between different persons.
=193 DC
ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἀντισθένους μνημονευόμενον· θαυμάσαντος γάρ τινος, εἰ δι’ ἀγορᾶς αὐτὸς φέρει τάριχος, “ἐμαυτῷ γ’” εἶπεν.
But the traditional saying of Antisthenes helps me: For when someone wondered at the fact that he was carrying salted fish across the agora himself, he said, “For myself, of course.”
Plutarch cites Antisthenes in the course of explaining how his own service of sanitation control is not demeaning. He reverses part of Antisthenes’ point in his next sentence, by saying that his own menial duty is “not for myself but for my country.”
This illustrates Antisthenes’ self-sufficiency in a Cynic sense.
τὸ τοῦ Ἀντισθένους μηνμονευόμενον: This is probably a term for “the saying of Antisthenes that is recalled in tradition” (substantive participle), rather than “when I call it to mind” (circumstantial participle). The former suggests a looser fit with Antisthenes, who might have been assimilated to the Cynics. (On this assimilation, see t. 6, 22B.) Plutarch regularly uses the term ἀπομηνμόνευμα where the doxographical tradition uses ἀπόφθεγμα (Kindstrand 1986:222).
αὐτὸς φέρει τάριχος: Salted fish is a “currency” for economic exchange in Cynic discourse attributed to Diogenes of Sinope. (See t. 172d.) This chreia indicates economic self-sufficiency, indifference to norms of privacy, and indifference to external “harm” such as the bad reputation arising from menial duty. (See t. 54.9, 82.40.)
καὶ ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη· “ὅταν οὖν ὁ Ἀντισθένης ὁδ’ ἐλέγχῃ τινὰ ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ, τί ἔσται τὸ αὔλημα;” καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπε· “τῷ μὲν ἐλεγχομένῳ οἶμαι ἂν,” ἔφη, “πρέπειν συριγμόν.”
And Callias said, “So when Antisthenes here refutes someone at the symposium, what will be the music on the pipes?” And Antisthenes said, “For a person refuted, I think a shrill whistling would be appropriate.”
Chapters 5–7 in Xenophon’s Symposium, between the cycle of speeches on “what is worth the most” and Socrates’ climactic speech on eros, contain short episodes on various sympotic and Socratic themes. (See also t. 51B.) In ch. 6, discussion turns to the match between sympotic music and speech, and Hermogenes is defeated in the discussion. Socrates refutes Hermogenes, whereas Antisthenes refutes others in other scenes (t. 78, 83, 185A, 186).
ὅταν . . . ὁ Ἀντισθένης . . . ἐλέγχῃ τινά: The unmotivated reference to Antisthenes suggests that he is a recognized expert in refutation through dialogue. But Callias is a hostile commentator, and Antisthenes is possibly being insulted for his failures. Earlier in the text, he has attempted but failed to refute Callias on the topic of justice (t. 83).
τί ἔσται τὸ αὔλημα: The context in Xenophon implies that certain modes of music follow certain modes of speaking, in a secondary way. There is an implied contrast to tetrameters, where the musical rhythm directs the speech. In Rep. 3 (398e1–399e6), Plato discusses musical modes (ἁρμόνιαι) appropriate to various emotional states and situations, including the drinking party, but bans the αὐλός, an elaborate reed instrument, from the ideal state, because that instrument is “many-moded.” He allows the σύριγξ, a simpler pipe, for shepherds in the fields. On styles of philosophical speech, see also t. 46.
καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπε: That Antisthenes delivers the answer suggests that he is the expert on the topic, even while he is the butt of Callias’ joke. Xenophon must be delivering either a joke at Antisthenes’ expense or an imitation of his typical tactic, to answer a personal insult by redirecting it toward a more general statement, as in many of the preserved apophthegmata. (See t. 1A.)
συριγμόν: This is a play on words: the rustic musical instrument is called the σύριγξ, whereas a συριγμός (by a dead metaphor) is a sound of derision from the audience, as in hissing or booing.
= 159 DC
εἰπόντος αὐτῷ τινος παρὰ πότον, “ᾆσον,” “σὺ <δέ> μοι,” φησίν, “αὔλησον.”
πότον P F Φ : τόπον B | <δέ> Cobet
When someone said to him over drinking, “Sing,” he said, “And you, play the pipe for me.”
This is the twenty-fourth in Diogenes’ list of twenty-seven apophthegmata from Antisthenes: see t. 3. The Protreptics, Antisthenes’ symposiastic work, is a possible source. Compare t. 63–67.
σὺ <δέ> μοι . . . αὔλησον: This response is appropriate to competitive and insulting banter at the symposium. Antisthenes puts words before music, a point that could be ambiguous in t. 101A.
= 158 DC
διὸ καλῶς μὲν Ἀντισθένης ἀκούσας ὅτι σπουδαῖός ἐστιν αὐλητὴς Ἰσμηνίας “Ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπος,” ἔφη, “μοχθηρός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω σπουδαῖος ἦν αὐλητής.”
ἄνθρωπος codd. et edd. : ἅνθρωπος Janko per litt.
Wherefore Antisthenes said it well, when he heard that Ismenias was a good flute player: “But he is a bad human being. For he would not otherwise be such a good flute player.”
Plutarch’s preface to his Life of Pericles explains the value of observing examples of excellence. This statement comes in a digression (1.4–2.2) that explains that admirable cultural products sometimes derive from human behavior not excellent in itself.
The remark implies that to be a human being is something more than to be a flute player (or to serve in any other particular role). There are parallels in Socrates’ warnings against certain brands of learning for its own sake, rather than for the purpose of becoming a better human being (e.g., Xen. Mem. 4.7.2). Diogenes of Sinope repeated this message more emphatically—for example, scorning the musicians for harmonizing the strings on their lyre but not the aspects of character in their soul (Diog. Laert. 6.27–28, 73).
Ἰσμηνίας: This might be the wealthy Theban Ismenias mentioned in Plato’s Meno (90a). However, the Ismenias who was most famous as a flute player, the son of Plato’s Ismenias, went on campaign with Philip II in 339, too late for Antisthenes to have said this about him (Stadter 1989:56–57). Ismenias seems to be a stock example for a bad flute player, even when he has a superior flute (Lucian, Against the Uneducated Bookseller §5).
ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπος . . . μοχθηρός: R. Janko (per litt.) would emend to ἅνθρωπος . . . μοχθηρός, “to make clear the subject.” But the subject is probably still Ismenias: the phrase “good flute player” is accepted as a predicate for him, but the phrase “good human being” is not accepted.
μοχθηρός . . . σπουδαῖος: This polar opposition is probably equivalent to those elsewhere attested for Antisthenes: φαύλους/σπουδαίους (t. 71), κακούς/ἀγαθούς (t. 134o). σπουδαῖος, a term which generally carries social connotations, refers to ethical virtue in Antisthenes’ testimonia (t. 134l; the similar ἀστεῖος appears in t. 106). Antisthenes might have reassigned the semantic value of this term, as he does for the similar term εὐγενής (t. 134b) and, most explicitly, for πλοῦτος (t. 82).
καὶ ὁ μέν τις αὐτῶν εἶπε· “Ποῦ οὖν εὑρήσει τούτου [sc. καλοκἀγαθίας] διδάσκαλον;” ὁ δέ τις ὡς οὐδὲ διδακτὸν τοῦτο εἴη, ἕτερος δέ τις εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο μαθητόν. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἔφη· “Τοῦτο μὲν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφίλογόν ἐστιν, εἰς αὖθις ἀποθώμεθα.”
αὐτῶν : αὐτῷ A B E H1 Ha | εὑρήσει : εὑρήσεις A B E H1 Ha | οὐδὲ : οὐ B | τοῦτο D A : τούτου cet. | μαθητόν Stephanus : μαθητέον codd.
And one of them said, “So where will he find a teacher for this [trait of being fine and good]?” And another said that this was not even teachable, and a third said that, if anything else was learnable, also this was. And Socrates said, “Since this is disputable, let us postpone it for later.”
In ch. 2 of the Symposium, preliminary to the central speeches of the diners, Xenophon sets the scene by drawing a distinction between Socratic pleasures and those offered by the professional entertainers. Here Socrates intervenes into Lycon’s concerns about how to educate his son Autolycus. (Lycon is probably one of Socrates’ accusers of 399: see Huss 1999 [“The Dancing Socrates”].) Antisthenes is not named, but the possibilities for speakers here are limited, and the debate and language suggest that he is implied.
These passages (103A–C) are relevant to Antisthenes’ views on the teachability of virtue (t. 134a, 99), the virtue of women (t. 18 and 134r), the problem of Alcibiades (t. 198–202), and the use of Theognis (t. 41A title 2.5). All are possible topics for Antisthenes’ three-part protreptic text On Justice and Courage (t. 41A title 2.4), as well as his On Good and On Courage (titles 3.1–2) and On Theognis (title 2.5).
τούτου (sc. καλοκἀγαθίας) διδάσκαλον: Antisthenes asks Callias about his ability to teach καλοκἀγαθία, as well as its relationship to justice, later in the Symposium (t. 78, 83). The theme is fundamental in Socratic literature: see, e.g., Pl. Apol. 20a–c; Pl. Meno 90a–91c; Pl. Prot. 318d–320b; Xen. Apol. 30–31. In Meno and Xenophon’s Apology, the father who seeks to educate his son is Anytus, who, like Lycon, was one of Socrates’ accusers. Antisthenes might be the author of a lost dialogue featuring Anytus: see t. 21.
μαθητόν: The “learnability” of virtue, in distinction from teachability, is included in the range of possibilities in ps.-Pl. Clitophon 407b5–7 and Pl. Meno 70a1–4. Both these passages also include ἀσκητόν (able to be developed through exercise) as an option. Given the prominence of πόνος (toil) in Antisthenes’ ethics, it seems likely that Antisthenes emphasized the “learnability” of virtue through an individual’s self-directed exercises, at least as much as, if not more than, its “teachability” by the agency of another person: see t. 34, 131, 163; t. 187 and 189 might imply that reading Antisthenes’ texts on Homer was a form of training. On the history of this widely discussed question of the fifth and fourth centuries, see Müller 1975:220–48; Slings 1999:106–11.
ἀμφίλογον: This term here might anticipate Socrates’ declaration in t. 103B that a certain question about virtue can no longer be disputed. Antisthenes declares a thesis ἀναμφιλογωτάτη, “indisputable,” at Xen. Sym. 3.4 (t. 78). On the possibility that ethical debates had priority in the scope of Antisthenes’ thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, see t. 152B.3 notes.
καἰ ὁ Σωκράτης καλέσας τὸν Ἀντισθένην εἶπεν· “Οὔτοι τούς γε θεωμένους τάδε ἀντιλέξειν ἔτι οἴομαι, ὡς οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία διδακτόν, ὁπότε αὕτη καίπερ γυνὴ οὖσα οὕτω τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ ξίφη ἵεται.” καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπεν· “Ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ τῷδε τῷ Συρακοσίῳ κράτιστον ἐπιδείξαντι τῇ πόλει τὴν ὀρχηστρίδα εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν διδῶσιν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναῖοι χρήματα, ποιήσειν πάντας Ἀθηναίους τολμᾶν ὁμόσε ταῖς λόγχαις ἰέναι;”
οὐχὶ : οὐ D F H2 | οὖν codd. : οὐ Richards | ἐπιδείξαντα F | ποιήσειν Stephanus : ποιήσει codd.
And Socrates, calling to Antisthenes, said, “Indeed people who see these performances will not, I think, still dispute that even courage is teachable, when this dancer, although a woman, charges so boldly toward the swords.” And Antisthenes said, “So then it would be best also for this Syracusan to display his dancing girl to the city and say that, if the Athenians give him money, he will make all the Athenians dare to charge up to the spears?”
This is from a private discussion between Socrates and Antisthenes on the entertainer’s show.
οὔ . . . ἀντιλέξειν ἔτι: On Antisthenes’ thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, see t. 148, 152–56. Socrates seems to be joking, by applying a sophisticated principle to an unimportant situation. This text suggests that those who engage in disputes are open to changing their minds and that firsthand evidence should be sufficient to settle a question. See also t. 159.
καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία διδακτόν: On the tradition that Antisthenes held that virtue is teachable (t. 99, 134a), see t. 103A note.
καίπερ γυνὴ οὖσα: The virtue of a man and a woman is the same, according to t. 134r. See also t. 18. In Pl. Rep. 5 (466d–467b), courage for the dangers of warfare is assumed to be the same for men and women.
ἐὰν διδῶσιν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναῖοι χρήματα: “Paying money” is mentioned sarcastically in Socratic texts as an unrealistic way to attain virtue. (According to Isocrates in his Antidosis, meanwhile, public teachers of gymnastics were employed in fourth-century Athens). Compare Antisthenes’ discussion with Callias (t. 83) and Pl. Prot. 311d–e. In extending Socrates’ joke, Antisthenes shows that he gets it (von Fritz 1935:28).
ἴσως οὖν εἴποιεν ἂν πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἄδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ὁ σώφρων ὑβρίστης, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν μάθησίς ἐστιν ὁ μαθὼν ἀνεπιστήμων ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ τούτων οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκω.
Perhaps, then, many of those claiming to be philosophers would say that the just man could never become unjust, nor the self-controlled man violent, nor could someone who has learned anything else of the things for which there is learning ever become a non-knower. But I do not recognize the same conclusions about these questions.
This statement, in Xenophon’s own voice, about the experts’ views on the permanence of virtue is part of his explanation that Socrates was not responsible for the vices of Alcibiades and Critias.
This passage might be relevant to Antisthenes’ views on Alcibiades, depending on the identity of Xenophon’s would-be philosophers. It shows Xenophon’s independence of thought from his sources, as well as his preference for the wisdom of Theognis, whom he cites as an authority in 1.2.20, over that of philosophers.
πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν: Compare t. 53.4, where Ajax complains about those who “claim to be kings” (φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς). It is not impossible that Xenophon mocks Antisthenes here; but Xenophon also uses this expression often himself.
ἀνεπιστήμων: This refers to an intellectualist theory of virtue: that virtue is knowledge and that whatever is learned cannot be erased from the mind. Therefore, virtue gained cannot be lost. Reference to Antisthenes is widely recognized because he is attributed with the thesis that virtue is inalienable (t. 99), because there is no other such ready candidate, and because of Xenophon’s general use of Antisthenes (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:392). There are problems in identifying a reference to Antisthenes, however. Antisthenes’ view cannot be entirely intellectualist: t. 134d says that deeds were more important than accounts; according to t. 134c, virtue required also the component “strength,” which could presumably be lost if exercise is relaxed. In t. 161, it appears that virtue achieved can be lost through exposure to others (which is Xenophon’s very point in what follows at Mem. 1.2.20). Goulet-Cazé (1986:141–50) has tried to reconcile these problems by arguing that Antisthenes separates the intellectual and willful components in virtue whereas Xenophon subordinates virtue, from the start, to ἐγκράτεια, which captures the component Antisthenes calls “strength.” On Antisthenes’ views of Alcibiades and his potential for changing, see also t. 198. Gigon (1953:45) thought that Xenophon here refers to a Sophistic thesis, from opponents of Socrates.
= 86 DC
[= Gnom. Vindob. no. 99]
ὁ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὴν ἀρετὴν βραχύλογον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἀπέραντον.
ἀπεραντολόγον Wachsmuth e Diog. Laert. 6.26
The same man [Antisthenes] said that virtue is brief in speech, but vice is boundless [in speech].
= 87 DC
inscitiae esse multa dicere, et qui hoc faceret, quid esset satis, nescire.
It is characteristic of ignorance to say a lot, and it is characteristic of the person who would do so not to know what is enough.
On the Gnomologium Vaticanum, see t. 5. Caecilius Balbus is the name (probably a pseudonym) assigned to the author of a Latin anthology of ethical maxims composed in about the second century CE and transmitted through the Middle Ages: John of Salisbury cites him as a source, and from there his works were reconstructed by Woelfflin in 1855. The Munich codex, which is the fifth of six parts in Woelfflin’s reconstruction, has forty-eight topical sections. Section 27, with six entries (all from Socratics), is on loquacity.
This apophthegma might be related to the rivalry between Antisthenes and Plato (see t. 30, which is listed next in the Gnomologium Vaticanum), although it is attributed also to Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.26). A similar statement is attributed to Theocritus of Chios in a nearby passage in Caecilius Balbus (26.6).
τὴν ἀρετὴν . . . εἶναι (A): Giannantoni 1990 v.4:389 takes this text as a “definition” of virtue and associates it with Antisthenes’ statement that virtue is in deeds not words (t. 134d, 53.1).
βραχύλογον (A): βραχυλογία, or terseness in speech, is considered a characteristic of the Spartans (Pl. Prot. 343b5; Arist. fr. 13 Rose) and also of philosophers. Socrates associates its virtue with a dialogical setting, where there is continuous exchange and understanding between the interlocutors. The aphoristic mode of pronouncement associated with the Cynics depends on no definite interlocutor but implies a quality of intelligence in getting to the point. The provocation of a response is implied, but from a greater distance than in Socratic dialectic.
ἀπέραντον or ἀπεραντολόγον (A): Diogenes of Sinope begs for wine and figs from Plato and then accuses Plato of being “boundless in speech” when he fails to treat Diogenes on his own terms but instead showers him with generosity (Diog. Laert. 6.26). Diogenes tells Plato that it would be the same to say that two and two make twenty: he neither gives in response to the request nor answers in response to the question. His abundance indicates an agent obtuse to the other party to exchange, whether in discourse or another mode, Cynic begging.
= 67 DC
καὶ μὴν οὐχ ἕτερα δεῖ βιβλία διειλῆσαι τοῦ Χρυσίππου τὴν πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐνδεικνυμένους μάχην, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ Ἀντισθένους ἐπαινῶν προφέρεται τὸ δεῖν κτᾶσθαι νοῦν ἢ βρόχον. . . . Ἀντισθένη μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινῶν ὅτι τοὺς μὴ νοῦν ἔχοντας εἰς βρόχον συνήλαυνεν, <αὑτὸν> αὐτὸς ἔψεγεν εἰπόντα μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν πρὸς τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν.
ἐνδεικνυμένου Φ | ἑαυτοῖς F a A1 (ε eras.) | προσφέρεται v z : φαίνεται g | ἀντισθένην g et fort. X1 | <αὑτὸν> add. Reiske et post αὐτὸς Bernardakis
Moreover, there is no need to show Chrysippus’ battle against himself by unrolling other books of his, but in these very ones, he at one time brings up and praises the saying of Antisthenes that one must acquire a mind or a noose. . . . [but criticizes Plato for saying that not living is more profitable than living badly and ignorantly]. So in praising Antisthenes because he drove those having no mind to the noose, [Chrysippus] blamed himself for saying that vice is no reason for us to depart from life.
Plutarch has listed examples of Chrysippus’ self-contradiction in his doctrine and turns, in ch. 14, to contradictions in his criticisms of other thinkers.
T. 133 confirms that Antisthenes was known for this apophthegma in the Cynic reception. Diogenes of Sinope was reportedly famous for a similar statement (Diog. Laert. 6.24 = SSR VB 303), as was Crates of Thebes (various, SSR VH 79). See also t. 32.
ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις: The book is Chrysippus’ Περὶ τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι (On Exhortation). This might be an indication that Antisthenes offered the injunction in his own Protreptics.
συνήλαυνεν: The sense of an escorted departure, as in an exit from the stage, has a parallel in t. 133, ἐξάγειν.
= 91 DC
ἀλλ’ ἄπιστον ἴσως τοῖς μὴ πεπονθόσιν ἀρετὴν τὸ λεγόμενον· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τοῖς τοὺς παγκρατιαστὰς οὐκ εἰδόσι, γέγονε δ’ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐπ’ ἀληθείας. εἰς ταῦτα δ’ ἀπιδὼν Ἀντισθένης δυσβάστακτον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἀστεῖον· ὡς γὰρ ἡ ἀφροσύνη κοῦφον καὶ φερόμενον, <οὕτως> ἡ φρόνησις ἐρηρεισμένον καὶ ἀκλινὲς καὶ βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον.
ἀρετὴν codd. plur. : ἀρετῆ M : <πρὸς> ἀρετὴν Mangey : προσπεπονθόσιν ἀρετῇ Wilamowitz | λεγόμενον : γινόμενον Q T | παγκρατιαστῶν (in ras.) F | εἰδόσι codd. plur. : ἰδοῦσι v | post ἀπιδὼν add. καὶ in mg. F | <οὕτως> add. Cohn | ἐρηρισμένον A, corr. supra : ἐρηρεισμένη H P | ἀκλινὴς H P
But perhaps what I am saying is incredible to those who have not experienced virtue: for also that episode is incredible to those who do not know pancratiasts, but, nonetheless, it truly happened. In consideration of these ideas, Antisthenes said that the good man is hard to bear: for just as foolishness is light and fickle, so intelligence is fixed and unwavering and unshakable in its weight.
Philo’s treatise in defense of the Stoic thesis that “everyone good is free” opens with an apology for the counterintuitive character of the thesis, of which this passage is almost the end. Philo has just described a wrestling scene (the pankration), in which the aggressor delivered many more punches but the defensive contestant stood firm and won the prize. The text continues with argument for the thesis and then a series of examples of virtuous men, who include Heracles (cited from Euripides’ lost satyr play Syleus, possibly through Antisthenes) and Diogenes of Sinope.
This is evidence for the Stoic reception of Antisthenes and possibly for his wordplay. The colorful vocabulary, together with its overlap of one term with t. 107, might be a sign that Philo is quoting Antisthenes, if indirectly. Panaetius of Rhodes also used the pancratiast as a figure for the wise man, or vir prudens: see notes. Philo’s text also shares material with his own Allegories of the Laws 3.201, which von Arnim attributed to Chrysippus (fr. 676 SVF III.169). Chrysippus is a plausible link from Antisthenes to both Panaetius and Philo. See also Joël 1893 v.1:353 n.2; Decleva Caizzi 1966:114.
τοῖς μὴ πεπονθόσιν ἀρετήν: The expression “experience virtue” is puzzling, since virtue seems to be an active trait whereas the Greek verb is strongly marked as passive. Perhaps the examples of the defensive athlete and Antisthenes’ stalwart hero illuminate what it could mean to “experience virtue,” namely, to endure assault. It is unclear whether the implied addressee of the text and the implied audience of the pancratiast should enact his or her own (defensive, endurance-based) virtue privately in response to the impression taken from the exemplar or should merely be a (passive) witness to the virtue of this exemplar. The examples might suggest the former, but the parallel to the audience who does not “know” the pancratiasts suggests the latter. Colson 1941:26 offers further possibilities but finds none persuasive.
τοὺς παγκρατιαστάς: Wrestlers (παλαιστικοί) are a common metaphor for competitors in philosophy or eristic (see t. 3C), and a metaphorical use of pancratiasts fits with this. Plato’s character Gorgias uses the pancration as a metaphor for rhetorical contest (Gorg. 456d2). In literal athetics, the pancratiast differs from the wrestler in being allowed a wider range of tactics and hence practicing a rougher, more brutal sport. Here the metaphor seems to reflect life at large, not just in eristic. In a parallel passage, Panaetius speaks of the moral agent who “lives in the middle of events” and so faces “trouble and sudden dangers constantly and almost daily” (fr. 116 van Straaten).
εἰς ταῦτα δ’ ἀπιδών: The citation of Antisthenes’ words as response to the vision of a scene has a parallel in t. 95. This strategy is typical of the chreia and could indicate that the narrative situation is contrived just to provide a setting for the apophthegma (Wehrli 1973). But the fit here between the apparent wordplay and the pancratiast’s setting suggests that the saying was composed for this context.
δυσβάστακτον: This rarely attested word might be deliberately ambiguous and provocative. Its literal sense, “hard to lift,” gives way to a metaphorical sense, “hard to endure or tolerate,” when said of a person who is ostentatiously “good” (so Zeller 1888). Antisthenes’ outspoken manner in correcting others might fit this metaphorical sense. But the rest of the statement startles by restoring the literal sense, within a new metaphor of the “weighty” versus “light” soul. Philo clearly understood this latter sense.
τὸν ἀστεῖον: This term for the ethically good person, usually associated with social status rather than virtue, is absent from Plato but apparent elsewhere in Antisthenes’ remains (t. 165) and prominent in a facetious syllogism attributed to Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.72 = SSR VB 353).
ἡ φρόνησις: The term is in the title of the “lesser” Heracles (t. 41A title 10.2) and probably in the Greek original of t. 96 (for prudentiam). See, further, Brancacci 2005 (“Episteme and phronesis”).
βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον: On weight and the superior soul, compare t. 191 (of Nestor). The adjective ἀσάλευτον is used for the walls of the soul in t. 107.
= 90 DC
Ἀντισθένης ὁ ἐκ Θρᾴττης μητρός, αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀθηναῖος, τὸ πρῶτον Σωκρατικός, ἔπειτα Κυνικός, ἔφησε μὴ χρῆναι τὰ καλὰ ζηλοτυπεῖν ἑτέρων ἢ τὰ παρ’ ἀλλήλοις αἰσχρά, τὰ δὲ τείχη τῶν πόλεων εἶναι σφαλερὰ πρὸς τὸν ἔσω προδότην, ἀσάλευτα δὲ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τείχη καὶ ἀρραγῆ.
καλὰ Holl : κακὰ J | ἑτέρων Cornarius : ἕτερον J | ἀλλήλοις codd. : fort. ἄλλοις Diels : ἢ τὰ παρ’ ἀλλήλοις αἰσχρά secl. Diels
Antisthenes, who had a Thracian mother but was Athenian himself, and who was at first a Socratic but then a Cynic, said that one should not be jealous of the good things of others or the bad things people do to each other, and that the walls of cities are vulnerable to the traitor within, but the walls of the soul are unshakable and unbreakable.
Between 374 and 377, Epiphanius (c. 320–403 CE), bishop of Salamis in Cyprus, active in the Christian persecutions of pagans and paganism, wrote a compendium of eighty heresies for the purpose of combating them, which he called the Panarion (Medicine chest). A summary of Christian orthodoxy (entitled, separately, Σύντομος ἀληθὴς δόξα τῆς καθολικῆς καὶ ἀποστολικῆς ἐκκλησίας, or De fide in Dummer’s edition) concludes the text in some manuscripts, and Epiphanius (or the tradition) appends to this statement a second, expanded list of pagan heretics, much more extensive and from a different source than the list in his main text. This list, arranged chronologically, is not integrated into the overall anti-heretical polemic. Three Cynics are treated (Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates), placed after Plato and three Cyrenaics and before the later, skeptical Academics Arcesilaus and Carneades. Diels (1879:175–77) assigns the source (an optimus scriptor) to the tradition he calls the Placita of Aëtius, a Stoicizing compilation from the Tiberian period, and commends its information on paternity and nationality, which Epiphanius himself has sometimes corrupted. The overlap of vocabulary (ἀσάλευτα) with t. 106 suggests that the language is close to Antisthenes’ own words.
ἔπειτα Κυνικός: There are no parallels for the notion that Antisthenes converted from Socraticism to Cynicism. (For the combination of the terms, see t. 29.) This suggests a pro-Socratic and anti-Cynic tradition, surely through the Stoics (whose entries on Epiphanius’ list are the most numerous and detailed).
τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τείχη: Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus also transmit the metaphor of walls of the soul (t. 134u–v; implied in t. 124).
τὸν ἔσω προδότην: Antisthenes thinks that persons who have bad souls are corrupted from within: see t. 129.
ἀσάλευτα . . . καὶ ἀρραγῆ: Goulet-Cazé 1986:141–50 discusses the ethical implications of these terms.
= 92 DC
[= Arsenius, Violetum p. 108.1–2 Walz]
Ὁμονοούντων ἀδελφῶν συμβίωσιν παντὸς ἔφη τείχους ἰσχυροτέραν εἶναι.
ἔφη παντὸς F
He said that the shared life of like-minded brothers was stronger than every city wall.
This is one of the few apophthegmata in Diogenes’ series (see t. 3) that is phrased as a doctrine, rather than an anecdote, and so resembles more the doxography in 6.11–13. The apophthegma is also preserved, unattributed, in a short florilegium (Cod. Paris. Gr. 1168 f. 106v no. 18) that might be descended from Favorinus (J. Freudenthal, RM 35 [1880]: 414).
The metaphor of the city wall coheres with t. 107 and 134u–v. This is the only reference to a familial relationship in Antisthenes’ literary remains, apart from the statements about marriage and childbearing (t. 56–58), a brief reference to divergent brothers in t. 82.35, and notice of the goal of fostering good relations with family (including brothers) in t. 208.16 (if this is from Antisthenes). Discussion on how to train a son is evident in t. 103B, 173, and 208.16–17. No title in Antisthenes’ catalog is obvious as a source for this apophthegma. Possibly Xenophon was inspired by Antisthenes in Mem. 2.3, where Socrates counsels a brother about getting along well with his brother.
ὁμονοούντων: In t. 107, the walls of the soul are superior to those of the city. If the same metaphor is active here, the “like-minded” brothers form a certain unity in virtue, opposed to the unity of any city. This could be the same unity that forms the core of the alternative, philosophical city, as implied by t. 134g, m, and o. On ὁμόνοια, see also Höistad 1948:107–10.
= 77 DC
[= ps.-Maximus 16.20/24 Ihm]
ὅθεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μέλλουσι σῴζεσθαι φίλων δεῖ γνησίων ἢ διαπύρων ἐχθρῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νουθετοῦντες τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας, οἱ δὲ λοιδοροῦντες ἀποτρέπουσι.
For this reason Antisthenes was right when he said that those who are going to survive need genuine friends or ardent enemies: for the former deter those who stray by their warnings, the latter, by their rebukes.
Plutarch turns from the benefits in insulting one’s enemies to the benefits in receiving insults from them. Whereas friends tend to flatter, enemies tell the truth. Maximus, who also attributes the maxim to Antisthenes, classifies it under the title “On Warning.”
The apophthegma is attributed also to Diogenes of Sinope (SSR VB 420), twice by Plutarch: with closely similar wording in the first clause in How Someone Would Know That He Is Progressing in Virtue 74c, and phrased differently earlier in How to Make Use of One’s Enemies 82a. Cicero attributes a similar saying to Cato (On Friendship 24.90). See parallels in Ihm.
νουθετοῦντες . . . λοιδοροῦντες: The metrical equivalence of these participles might be intentional, and the phrasing might then be genuine to the “Gorgianic” Antisthenes. Versions of the statement attributed to Diogenes use different words.
οἱ δὲ λοιδοροῦντες: Related ideas, that one should beware of flattery from base people and endure their scolding, are in t. 28, 86, 88–90, and 130–32.
Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε καὶ ἄλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὃς ἐδόκει μοι προτρέπειν τὸν ἀκούσαντα ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτὸν ὁπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη. ἰδὼν γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλου πενίᾳ πιεζομένου, ἤρετο Ἀντισθένη ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν· “Ἆρ’,” ἔφη, “ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, εἰσί τινες ἀξίαι φίλων, ὥσπερ οἰκετῶν; τῶν γὰρ οἰκετῶν ὁ μέν που δυοῖν μναῖν ἄξιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ οὐδ’ ἡμιμναίου, ὁ δὲ πέντε μνῶν, ὁ δὲ καὶ δέκα· Νικίας δὲ ὁ Νικηράτου λέγεται ἐπιστάτην εἰς τἀργύρεια πρίασθαι ταλάντου· σκοποῦμαι δὴ τοῦτο,” ἔφη, “εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων εἰσὶν ἀξίαι.” “Ναὶ μὰ Δί’,” ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης· “ἐγὼ γοῦν βουλοίμην ἂν τὸν μέν τινα φίλον μοι εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δύο μνᾶς, τὸν δ’ οὐδ’ ἂν ἡμιμναίου προτιμησαίμην, τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μνῶν ἑλοίμην <ἄν>, τὸν δὲ πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόνων πριάμην ἂν φίλον μοι εἶναι.”
ἀντισθένει B | δυοῖν Victorius : δύο codd. | οὐδ’ ἂν Φ : οὐδὲν B | <ἄν> Schneider | πρὸ del. Muretus | πόνων B Φ : πόνω A : †πόνων† Marchant
And I once heard also another discourse of his [Socrates’], which seemed to me to direct the audience to examine himself regarding how much he was worth to his friends. For when he saw one of his associates neglecting a friend who was pressed by poverty, he asked Antisthenes in the presence of the man who was neglecting, as well as many others: “Antisthenes, are there certain values for friends, as there are for slaves? For among our slaves, one is worth about two minae, another not even half a mina, but a third worth five minae, and a fourth worth even ten. Nicias, son of Niceratus, is said to have purchased an overseer for his silver mines for a talent. So I inquire about this,” he said, “whether, just as for slaves, so also for friends there are values.” “Yes, by Zeus,” said Antisthenes. “Speaking for myself, I would wish one person to be my friend more than I would wish to have two minae, but another I would rate ahead of not even half a mina. And a third I would have for the price of ten minae, and a fourth I would buy for all my money and toil to be my friend.”
In the second book of the Memorabilia, Xenophon presents conversations of Socrates that demonstrate his positive usefulness and protreptic practices. The early episodes focus on family and friends. This is the majority of episode 2.5, omitting only Socrates’ conclusions about the lesson. Libanius applauds the episode in his Apology of Socrates 150: τί βέλτιον ὧν περὶ φίλων πρὸς Ἀντισθένην Σωκράτης διεξήλθε; (What is better than what Socrates narrated about friends to Antisthenes?). On the episode see also Gigon 1956:121–25 and Dorion 2011:188–91.
If concern about the pricing of friends can be attributed to Antisthenes, this shows that Antisthenes perceives exchange as fundamental in a social network: even friendship can be translated into commensurable terms of exchange, until the highest level. Xenophon is fascinated by finance himself, but his depictions of Antisthenes consistently privilege awareness of two-way exchange: see t. 13A, 82, 83A. There is no obvious source for this episode in Antisthenes’ catalog. However, a man named Nicias (not the famous general) was the defendant in a lawsuit on “the deposit,” for which Isocrates wrote the prosecution speech (under the title Against Euthynus) and Lysias wrote the defense speech and about which Antisthenes wrote a critique. (See t. 41A title 1.7, 55.) In Isocrates’ extant text, a lot is made of Nicias’ friends, and he seeks to recover the money from a cousin.
ἤκουσα δέ ποτε: This formula seems to indicate that Xenophon is presenting a Socratic conversation of his own composition, rather than rewriting older Socratic literature. He could still have used written sources.
ἰδὼν γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλου: Xenophon presents Socrates conducting discussion with one party for the purpose of influencing a third party in several episodes of the Memorabilia, including 1.3.8 and 4.2.2. See Dorion 2011:189.
πενίᾳ πιεζομένου: Both Socrates and Antisthenes renounced the pursuit of money in order to pursue philosophy, and Socrates depended on his friends for financial support (Pl. Apol. 36d; Pl. Crito 44c). On this model, Antisthenes might sympathize with the impoverished man who nevertheless has great value and who is worth “buying” or maintaining at whatever price he commands. The lesson in the episode is addressed not to this man oppressed by poverty but to the negligent friend, whose lesson is, nevertheless, to be the sort of friend who would not himself get betrayed in favor of money (2.5.4). Gigon 1957:123 notes a “difficult hiatus of thought” between the apparently innocent neglected friend and Socrates’ final lesson, that nobody gives up a valuable friend. The connection could be located in Xenophon’s two previous episodes, where Socrates has persuaded interlocutors that friendship is reciprocal (2.3) and that it must be tended and maintained (2.4).
ἀξίαι: This term becomes important in Stoic ethics, as a component in things good by nature, rather than merely preferable (Gigon 1956:124: see fr. 124–26 in SVF III.30; Long and Sedley 1987 v.2:349–55). If Antisthenes is approached as an expert on “values,” he might have held distinctive views that were developed by the Stoics. (See also t. 135A.105.) This episode does not say what constitutes the value of a friend, just that it has a calculus, until the highest level, where the scale of commensurability is exceeded. The following episode, 2.6, does offer a view of what constitutes the value of a friend. Basis for the Stoic position can also be found in Plato (Long and Sedley 1987 v.2:350) and so is presumably Socratic.
Νικίας: Nicias the Athenian general (c. 470–413) is a common figure in Socratic literature (see Nails 2002:212–15), and his son Niceratus spars with Antisthenes in the Symposium (t. 185A, 186), about the value of knowing Homer. This is the wealthy Nicias who inherited silver mines. If the Nicias in Isocrates’ Against Euthynus is also relevant, the connections cannot be recovered.
ταλάντου: This very high price is six times higher than the previous: the ratios from the first case to the fifth are 4:1:10:20:120. If Nicias paid this much for his slave, he was exceeding the normal scale in the marketplace and exercising the privilege of his extraordinary wealth. The slave has this high value to Nicias, but the price is not commensurate with what he is “worth” in the slave trade that assigns monetary values to people. (Antisthenes might have rejected this slave trade, and the example might have been chosen for the way it sets up the case that shows the limit of the system. If so, Xenophon missed this point.)
ἐγὼ γοῦν βουλοίμην ἄν: That Antisthenes, who allegedly has no money (t. 81A, 82), speaks with such authority about his buying price for friends has raised queries (see, e.g., Gigon 1954:122). It is not implied that Antisthenes really has these sums of money: the whole statement is hypothetical and possibly humorous.
τὸν μέν . . . , τὸν δ’ . . . , τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μνῶν: Socrates’ pattern for evaluating slaves is here applied almost exactly to friends, until Antisthenes comes to the case that exceeds the limits of the assumption that friends have monetary value.
πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόνων: Since Antisthenes cannot spend a sum of money comparable with Nicias’ talent, he uses his own terms to express total commitment to the value of this friend. Compare the phrase πάντα μὲν πόνον, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑποδύονται in t. 82.35, of people who misplace their expenditure. (These are also favorite terms of Xenophon, sometimes joined with “expenditures,” δαπανήματα: e.g., Hell. 3.15.12.) This value exceeds any calculus of other, exchangeable goods or expenditures, in both the abstract medium of money and the real medium of toil. Friendship with Socrates presumably fits the bill for Antisthenes (t. 14A, 82.44). Whether or not Antisthenes supported Socrates financially, he made the toilsome journey every day from the Piraeus to have his company (t. 12A). Antisthenes himself is deemed by Socrates to be “worth a lot for cities and individuals to acquire as an ally and friend” (t. 14A).
= 97A DC
πάλιν Ἀντισθένης μὲν τὴν ἀτυφίαν [sc. τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι ἔταξε] . . .
On the other hand, Antisthenes [situated] lack of arrogance [as the goal of life] . . .
Clement’s second book is on ethics, and §127–36 address the end for humans, beginning from a wide survey and narrowing to Plato from §131. Clement treats hedonism first and then alternatives: Antisthenes falls toward the end of this second part, after a chronological treatment of the Stoics in §129 and amid a survey of “the physicists” in §130, ranging from pre-Socratics such as Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Democritus to later figures such as Apollodorus of Cyzicus and Nausiphanes of Teos. No true Cynic is mentioned. Negative views of the goal (terms with alpha privative) are attributed also to Nausiphanes and Democritus. Conceptions that seem to be attached to Antisthenes elsewhere are in Clement’s list, attributed to others: self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) is attributed to the historian of Egypt Hecataeus of Abdera (c. 300 BCE), freedom (ἐλευθερία) to Anaxagoras. The Stoics are credited with “living according to virtue” (Zeno) and “living in agreement with nature” (Cleanthes).
= 97B DC
ὁ δὲ Ἀντισθένης τὴν ἀτυφίαν [sc. ἔσχατον ὑπέλαβε ἀγαθόν.]
And Antisthenes [adopted] lack of arrogance [as the final good].
Theodoret’s discussion is condensed from Clement’s or from the same source and appears under the heading Περὶ τέλους καὶ κρίσεως (On the End and Judgment), which introduces his section on ethics. He reduces his treatment of the Epicureans, omits (or lacks the source for) the Stoics, and gives fullest (but reduced) treatment to those in Clement’s §130, before putting his focus on Plato. The order is changed, and Antisthenes appears between Hecataeus and Anaxagoras. (In Clement, he appears just after the later Stoic Diotimus (c. 100 BCE), who had an inclusive view of many goods, and in the same sentence with the later Cyrenaics, who thought that the end for man is particular to each action: both are omitted by Theodoret.)
Antisthenes’ position is surprising because it is classified by Clement under “the physicists” and because this Cynicizing doctrine, by no means false for Antisthenes but never isolated elsewhere, prevails over alternatives such as those listed above. Diogenes Laertius’ account prefers the more positive, perhaps Stoicizing alternatives and leaves ἀτυφία latent in the anecdotes. But Clement clearly has a detailed, comprehensive source. On the Cynic “end,” see Goulet-Cazé 1993 (“Le Cynisme Est-il une Philosophie?”).
ἀτυφίαν: The terms τῦφος and ἀτυφία appear elsewhere in Antisthenes’ testimonia only in t. 27. (See also Decleva Caizzi 1980.) Opposition to conceit and pretension seems to be Antisthenes’ goal in his interactions with Plato, according to anecdotes that show both ethical and intellectual aspects to this attack. (See t. 27, 148, 159.)
= 191 DC
Das aliquid famae, quae carmine gratior aurem
occupat humanum?
occupat R Ψ (excl. λ) Porphyrion : occupet a E λ V
hoc Antisthenes dixisse traditur. is enim cum vidisset adulescentem luxuriosum acroamatibus deditum, ait: “Miserum te, adulescens, qui numquam audisti summum acroama, id est laudem tuam.”
Do you grant anything to fame, which catches the human ear more welcome than a song?
[Horace, Satires 2.2.94–95]
Tradition holds that Antisthenes said this. For he, when he saw an extravagant young man given over to the public entertainments, said, “Wretched are you, boy, who have never heard the highest entertainment, that is, praise of yourself.”
Antisthenes philosophus cum vidisset adulescentem multum acroamatibus delectari: “O te,” ait, “infelicem, qui summum acroama numquam audisti, idest laudes tuas,” quia plus delectamur laudibus nostris.
Antisthenes the philosopher, when he saw a young man taking great delight in the public entertainment, “Oh, you unhappy boy,” he said, “you who have never heard the highest entertainment, that is, praises of yourself,” because we delight more in praises of ourselves.
This is an apophthegma preserved in commentaries on Horace composed probably in the third century (Porphyrion) and fifth century (ps.-Acron) CE. The passage in ps.-Acron might depend on Porphyrion, but it seems to have an independent source for the quotation. In Horace’s satire, the verses introduce the speaker’s point that an ostentatious host might be able to display a luxurious table but could gain better fame by spending for the public good or saving for a time of need.
This apophthegma seems to oppose the several that call public shame better than public flattery (see t. 109). The difference must be that the praise recommended here is sincere praise from a knowing audience for genuine virtue. A plausible setting is a symposium, where the Socratics disdained hired entertainment and preferred educating discourse (t. 103A). It is likely, too, that the original context for this speech or a similar one was one of Antisthenes’ Heracles stories (see notes).
summum acroama numquam audisti, idest laudes tuas: A close parallel, apparently the Greek original for this Latin translation, appears in Xenophon’s account of the speech of Virtue to Vice before Heracles at the crossroads (Mem. 2.1.31): τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι (But the sweetest sound of all, praise of yourself, you do not hear, and you do not see the sweetest vision of all: for you have never yet seen your own fine deed.). The speech begins (fifteen lines back) with the exclamation Ὦ τλῆμον (Oh, wretched one). This might indicate that Antisthenes’ Heracles myth was a common source or background for both Xenophon and the Horace commentators. It could also mean that Antisthenes imitated Prodicus. (The parallel is noted in Maier 1913: 64 n.2 and Joël 1901 v.2.2:518–19.) See also t. 207C.
quia plus delectamur laudibus nostris: This last clause was probably added by the scholiast as general explanation; it might miss Antisthenes’ distinction between real praise and flattery.
= 96 DC
[= Gnom. Vindob. no. 95]
Ἀντισθένης τοὺς πόνους ἔφησεν ὁμοίους εἶναι κυσί· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἀσυνήθεις δάκνουσιν.
ἔφησεν εἶναι τοὺς πόνους ὁμοίους Gnom. Vindob.
Antisthenes said that toils are like dogs: for also they bite people who are not used to them.
On Antisthenes’ prominence in the Gnomologium Vaticanum, see t. 5.
This gnome supports the appearance that Antisthenes endorsed toil for its own sake, rather than as a means to a clearly conceived end. (See also t. 85, 134f.) Antisthenes seems to have developed a concept of exercise, or ἄσκησις, that was essentially voluntary toil, in service of education and self-improvement (t. 163). In this conception, he (and the Cynic and Stoic traditions that followed him) might have opposed rival ideologies of toil, such as that in traditional aristocratic athletics or traditional models of military service or service to the state. (See Höistad 1948:37–47; Goulet-Cazé 1986:53–76.) If Antisthenes advocated toil for advancing personal virtue only, if the nature of this “virtue” was unclear, and if the persons whose virtue was being developed were not aristocrats and had no obvious value to the city, he could have been vulnerable to the charge that he advocated useless or vain toil. Such a charge is made by Isocrates (Helen §24) in reference to Heracles (although Isocrates elsewhere upholds the value of profitable toil) and so was current in the early fourth century. In the present image, moreover, the development of personal virtue is defensive, as development of immunity against future trouble or toil, not a means to positive performance.
ἀσυνήθεις: In Rep. 2 375e1–2, Plato notes the φύσις (nature) of a good dog to be gentle toward “customary and familiar” people (συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους) and the opposite toward “unknown” (ἀγνῶτας) people. For Antisthenes, the humans are the party experiencing familiarity (or not), and the dogs’ treatment of them is a consequence. Although the image is simpler in Plato, it is not impossible that Plato’s use of the dog imagery is supposed to trigger allusion to Antisthenes’ theory of education.
ὁμοίους . . . κυσί: This is one of the few references to dogs in Antisthenes’ literary remains. (See t. 22B, 41A, title 9.11, and notes on 51A; Goulet-Cazé 1996.) The external toils, not the ethical subject or the figure of the wise man, are like dogs.
(German translation from a Syrian manuscript presumed to represent a Greek original)
Nicht also flieht gute Werke, wenn sie an Ungemach [πόνος?] geknüpft sind, denn Ungemach ist (zwar) den nicht daran Gewöhnten Lästig, gering aber denen, die durch es geübt sind. Den Hunden gleicht das Ungemach, denn wie jene die, an die sie nicht gewöhnt sind, beissen, aber die, an welche sie gewöhnt sind, anwedeln, so ist auch das Ungemach; es bringt den nicht Geübten Leiden und bekommt den Geübten wohl.
So do not flee from good tasks, when they are tied to toil, for toil is a burden to those not accustomed to it, but trivial to those who have practiced in it. Toil is similar to dogs, for just as they bite those to whom they are not accustomed, but wag their tails for those to whom they are accustomed, so also is toil: it brings suffering to the unpracticed and does good for the practiced.
This text appears in a Syrian manuscript from the eighth or ninth century, under the title On Exercise (rendered by the editors as Περὶ ἀσκήσεως) and attributed to Plutarch. The style of the text has been deemed unsuitable to Plutarch, but there are correspondences with his On Education of Youth, and it seems to be a composition of the same period. This manuscript is the same that contains Themistius’ On Virtue, excerpted in t. 96.
The text consists in a series of anecdotes with settings from the fifth to the first centuries BCE that attest to the power of practice and exercise for overcoming a bad natural character. Included are a discussion between Socrates and the physiognomist Zopyrus and a discussion of Aspasia’s instruction of Pericles. Because so many anecdotes from the Socratic period are included, with more detail than survives elsewhere, the author had sources with roots in Socratic literature. Connection to Antisthenes is therefore plausible. The discussion fits neatly with t. 113A and even Pl. Rep. 2 376a5–7.
δι’ ἣν γὰρ αἴτιαν Σωκράτης μὲν κωνείῳ κατακριθεὶς οὐκ ἐνόμισεν ἀδικεῖσθαι; Πλάτων δ’ ἀπεμποληθεὶς οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἐκπεπτωκέναι τῆς ἐλευθερίας; Διογένης δὲ ἐν ῥακίοις ζῶν τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως ἡγεῖτο ἑαυτὸν πλουσιώτερον; Ἀντισθένης δὲ ῥυπῶν καὶ αὐχμῶν ἔχαιρε, καὶ κατὰ τῶν τρυφώντων ὥπλιζε τὴν γλῶτταν;
Because was it not for this reason that Socrates, when condemned to the hemlock, did not believe he had been wronged? And Plato, after being sold, did not think that he had been expelled from freedom? And Diogenes, while living in rags, thought himself more wealthy than the king of the Persians? And Antisthenes used to rejoice in being dirty and squalid, and would arm his tongue against those living in luxury?
Isidore (died c. 449 CE), an ascetic Egyptian monk, is credited with some two thousand letters addressing theological issues of his time and citing pagan philosophers, in a general and undetailed way, for support. This lengthy letter (three columns in Migne’s edition, about five or six times longer than surrounding letters) aims to show that εἱμαρμένη (fate) and τύχη (fortune) are not real. After the four philosophers, Isidore cites the fourth-century Athenian general Phocion.
This reference shows the cliché under which Antisthenes was known to Isidore, who seems to be quoting, probably indirectly, a comic verse from the fourth century BCE. Isidore does not mention Antisthenes elsewhere, whereas the others in the list are more frequent in his letters.
Πλάτων δ’ ἀπεμποληθείς: The story of Plato’s sale into slavery is first attested in the first century BCE (in Philodemus, Index Academicorum and in Diodorus Siculus, in different versions), but it could have origins in earlier comedy or farce (Riginos 1976:86–92).
ῥυπῶν καὶ αὐχμῶν ἔχαιρε: This is a near quotation from the Odysseus of the fourth-century comic poet Anaxandrides (fr. 35.6 PCG), preserved in Athenaeus 242e–f: χαίρει τις αὐχμῶν ἢ ῥυπῶν, κονιορτὸς ἀναπέφηνεν (if someone rejoices in being dirty or squalid, he is shown up to be a cloud of dust); the verb αὐχμέω is derived from the noun αὐχμός, which means “drought,” and the cloud of dust activates this etymology. The passage is about reductive nicknames, in a list. There is no other surviving evidence in classical texts for the association of these qualities, being dirty and squalid, with Antisthenes, but the traits are associated with the Cynics, including Antisthenes, by their detractors: see t. 207C.2 (and, on the Cynics generally, Epictetus 3.22.89; Lucian, Menippus §4). If the verse in Anaxandrides was associated with Antisthenes, this would be new evidence for his currency on the comic stage (see also t. 128); its source in a play called Odysseus lends support. Antisthenes’ Odysseus of the Judgment of the Arms is not squalid to this degree, but he has let himself be beaten (t. 53.6); there could be Homeric precedent, at Od. 13.434–38. See also Xen. Mem. 2.1.31, from the final speech of Virtue in the “Choice of Heracles,” where association with Antisthenes is likely, although this is probably indirect and also involves Xenophon’s likely preference for Prodicus’ “Choice of Heracles” over that of Antisthenes. (See t. 112, 94B, 207C.) Lucian’s caricature of Antisthenes (Dialogue of the Dead 22.1, 6) shows him rejoicing in watching the pain and grief of others, though not in the midst of it himself.
κατὰ τῶν τρυφώντων ὥπλιζε τὴν γλῶτταν: See t. 172b. If the metaphor of arming is from Antisthenes, it coheres with other military imagery for the wise man’s battle in current society (t. 134m–o, 53, 54, 61; see Malherbe 1983). But Isidore himself is interested elsewhere in how one fights and how the tongue is a weapon.
= 163 DC
Ἀντισθένους. Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς “τί ἐστιν ἑορτή;” ἔφη “γαστριμαργίας ἀφορμή.”
From Antisthenes. Antisthenes, when asked “What is a feast?” said, “The starting point of gluttony.”
Maximus’ section is titled “On Incontinence and Gluttony.”
Parallels for this chreia appear in the Gnomologium Parisinum and the Loci Communes of Antonius the monk: all are repetitions of this text and are unattributed (Ihm 2001:602).
ἀφορμή: A wordplay between ἑορτή (feast) and ἀφορμή (starting point), which have the same metrical shape and a common middle syllable, might be intended. Compare t. 109, 131.
= 111C DC
Φύσει τε μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· εἰ γάρ τί ἐστι φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, πᾶσιν ὀφείλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν, ὥσπερ ἡ χιὼν πᾶσι ψυχρόν· οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν πάντων ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὑπό τινος δοξαζόμενον ῥητέον ἀγαθὸν ἢ οὐ πᾶν· καὶ πᾶν μὲν οὐ ῥητέον, ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑφ’ οὗ μὲν δοξάζεται ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἡ ἡδονὴ ὑπὸ Ἐπικούρου, ὑφ’ οὗ δὲ κακόν, ὑπ’ Ἀντισθένους.
τί P1 F Φ : τοι B : om. D, expunxit P4 | φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν Φ : φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν B P F D | πᾶσιν . . . κακὸν om. B | ὥσπερ P F D : ὥστε B | οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν BP : κοινὸν δὲ οὐδέν F | φύσει ultimum codd. plur. : φύσις Β | πᾶν μὲν οὐ ῥητέον F2 : πᾶν μὲν ῥητέον codd. plur., | ὑπὸ Ἐπικούρου om. F D | ὑπ’ Ἀντισθένους P B F D : ὡς ὑπ’ Ἀντισθένους Φ
[The Skeptics say that] by nature there is neither good nor evil. For if a thing is good or evil by nature, it ought to be good or evil for everyone, just as snow is cold for everyone. But nothing is good or evil in common to all. Therefore, [nothing] is good or evil by nature. Further, either everything thought by anyone to be good must be said to be good, or not everything. And everything [thought by anyone to be good] must not be said [to be good], since the same thing is thought by one person to be good, for example, pleasure by Epicurus, but by another person evil, by Antisthenes.
Diogenes summarizes the positions of the Skeptics in book 9, under the life of Pyrrho.
Like t. 120 and 122, this passage shows that Antisthenes was counted in some ancient traditions as the foremost opponent of pleasure as a good. The example of Epicurus’ and Antisthenes’ opposed positions on pleasure was probably set up by the Skeptics, possibly already Pyrrho (c. 360–270 BCE), for the purpose it serves here: to claim, by means of the flat contradiction, that neither position and hence no position can be correct. (See also t. 122D–E.) They have simplified the position of Epicurus and so probably also that of Antisthenes. If this is mainly a Pyrrhonist tradition, the story might have been formulated before the Hellenistic ethical debates became complex. Cicero’s virtual silence about Antisthenes (see t. 121) in his discussions of pleasure in moral philosophy (e.g., in De finibus) suggests that later debates among the Hellenistic schools did not assign the role of opposing pleasure to Antisthenes.
= 111A DC (SSR IH 13)
sic autem diversas inter se Socratici de isto fine sententias habuerunt, ut (quod vix credibile est unius magistri potuisse facere sectatores) quidam summum bonum esse dicerent voluptatem, sicut Aristippus; quidam virtutem, sicut Antisthenes, sic alii atque alii aliud atque aliud opinati sunt, quos commemorare longum est.
Moreover, the Socratic disciples had such diverse opinions among themselves about this end [of virtuous action]—an issue one can hardly believe could have created factions from a single master—that some would say that the highest good is pleasure, just as Aristippus did, and some [would say] virtue, just as Antisthenes did, and likewise different followers had different opinions, whom it is too much trouble to recount.
Preliminary to his discussion of Plato’s natural theology, Augustine discusses its background. Ch. 3 is on Socrates, and the aporetic conclusion about minor Socratics points to Plato, introduced in ch. 4, as the main subject for treatment.
Augustine cites a plausible contemporary antagonist for Antisthenes, rather than Epicurus. Compare t. 122B. If Augustine is not reflecting an actual fourth-century assessment of the Socratics (see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:150), this picture might have been fabricated in Republican Rome: see t. 138B (Cicero), 70C (Augustine, possibly through Varro). On the conflict between Antisthenes and Aristippus in general, see t. 33A.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ’ αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν.
τὸ ἀγαθὸν Kb : ἀγαθὸν codd. plur. : Aspasius de lectione dubitat (vid. t. 120)
Some thinkers, however, believe that no pleasure is a good, neither in itself nor accidentally: for [they say] the good and pleasure are not the same.
οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν.
And those who say that the man undergoing torture or falling on great misfortunes is happy, if he is good, make no sense, whether intentionally or unintentionally.
Aristotle is discussing pleasure and pain and their relationship to the final end or goal in ethics. His own view, as it emerges, is that pleasures are good, but not the supreme good. Different but overlapping discussions of the topic are in books 7 and 10. (See t. 119.)
Reference to Antisthenes here is uncertain. The commentator Aspasius (second century CE) recognizes Antisthenes in 118A, but he is not sure (see t. 120). Modern commentators hold that Aristotle refers to views held by members of the Old Academy. (See Gosling and Taylor 1982.) The possibility that Aristotle refers to Antisthenes’ ethical views must be considered despite its uncertainty. (See also Giannantoni 1990 v.4:400–401.) If Aristotle refers to Antisthenes, this would give him a firm proto-Stoic position in the history of ethics; t. 134, the supporting material, is already filtered by the Stoics. It could be thought odd that Antisthenes is not identified by name if he truly matters here, but Aristotle might avoid naming contemporary intellectual players from outside the Academy. (Compare the discussion at t. 68 of Antisthenes’ possible position in the background to Aristotle’s Politics.) Aristotle’s catalog of six contemporary arguments for the thesis that pleasure is not at all good, at NE 7.11 (1152b12–20, directly after t. 118A), can be compared with surviving evidence for Antisthenes: the fourth and sixth arguments (1152b16–18, 19–20) seem compatible with t. 123 and 54.7 respectively; the third argument (1152b15–16) seems flatly incompatible with t. 85.
(A) οὔτε καθ’ αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός: This is Aristotle’s standard language for opposing the nature of a thing in its own right, without reference to its circumstances, consequences, or any other properties, against its nature when these other factors are included. Here κατὰ συμβεβηκός refers to the possibility that pleasure could be a good instrumentally, as a means to something good in its own right, or consequentially, as a product of something good—and perhaps in other senses as well. In t. 126 and 127, pleasure for Antisthenes is worth pursuing and good in some circumstances, which might be κατὰ συμβεβηκός on Aristotle’s terms. If Aristotle writes here with total precision, this conflict would eliminate the possibility that he refers to Antisthenes. It is possible, however, either that Aristotle uses rhetorical inflation or that he has misunderstood Antisthenes’ rhetorical inflation. It is also possible that Antisthenes’ view of good pleasure is not covered by Aristotle’s class κατὰ συμβεβηκός but had some nature more special or subtle than Aristotle accommodates in his distinction.
οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν: Aristotle’s indirect discourse form (infinitive and accusative) shows that this is a quotation of the rival’s view. This reason for denying that pleasure is good—that it is not identical with a good or the good (the transmitted text wavers on the presence or absence of the article, as Aspasius notes in the extended context of t. 120)—would be consistent with one interpretation of Antisthenes’ linguistic philosophy, that which denies that a morally evaluative predicate such as “good” can be predicated of anything without the implication that the thing is entirely good, admitting of nothing bad. (Compare t. 78.) Even if this is not Antisthenes’ view in general, the term “good,” like “virtue,” has a special status in his enunciations (t. 80, 134f, 134s), and he wrote a text under this title (t. 41A title 3.1), listed in the apparently emphatic first position in its tomos. In saying that toil is “good” (t. 85), Antisthenes’ purpose was probably not only to assert that toil is entirely good (although he might have thought this); he might have intended also to gainsay, for rhetorical as well as philosophical purposes, the opposing thesis, that pleasure is “good.”
(B) τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα: In the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54), Ajax attacks Odysseus for holding that a man who is good could submit himself to torture (t. 53.6), and Odysseus predicts that Ajax will meet his demise by “falling upon” (περιπεσών) some unidentified evil; yet no good man can suffer anything bad, at either his own hands or those of a friend or enemy (t. 54.6). It seems that Odysseus is both good and happy, despite the torture, and that Ajax is not happy and (in the strict sense demanded by this ethical position) not good. When Ajax encounters bad fortune, then, it does count as bad. T. 53–54, probably protreptic pieces, allow for various levels of interpretation, including this one consistent with the present text from Aristotle.
ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες: Aristotle recognizes that those who state this position might be presenting nonsense deliberately. This would be consistent with his interpretation of motive in t. 119. Such an accusation seems more plausible for Antisthenes than for a member of the Academy.
οἳ μὲν γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἳ δ’ ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἳ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἳ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον.
For some say that pleasure is the good, and others, conversely, say that it is entirely bad, the former perhaps because they are persuaded that this is the case, the latter believing it is better for our lives to advertise pleasure as one of the bad things, even if it is not: for common people are inclined to it and serve as slaves to their pleasures, and therefore it is necessary to lead them in the opposite direction. In this way they would come to the middle state.
This is from the introduction to Aristotle’s second discussion of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics, in book 10.
Reference to Antisthenes here is not certain, but the possibility is worth considering for reasons given above (t. 118).
οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι . . . ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν: This might be like the rhetorical exaggerations of Diogenes of Sinope, his tendency to sing in a key too high so that others will hit the right note (Diog. Laert. 6.35). Zeller 1888:309–10 n.2 makes the same comparison.
(1) ἐνίοις μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μηδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἧς δόξης φασὶ καὶ Ἀντισθένη γεγονέναι· λέγουσι γοῦν τὴν ἡδονὴν μήτε καθ’ αὑτὸ μήτε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι ἀγαθόν. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὑτά, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἰατρεῖαι τομαὶ καύσεις καὶ οἱ πόνοι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων αἱρούμεθα δι’ αὑτό, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἕτερον καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οὐδετέρως εἶναι ἀγαθὸν οὔτε ὡς καθ’ αὑτὸ οὔτε ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκός. (2) “οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν”· οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐχούσης τῆς γραφῆς, ῥᾳδία ἡ ἐξήγησις· οὐ γάρ φασιν οὔτε καθ’ αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστι †τινὶ† ταὐτὸν τινὶ ἀγαθῷ. (3) ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ σὺν τῷ ἄρθρῳ γεγραμμένον, “οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν,” ἀλόγως φανεῖται τοῦτ’ ἐπενηνέχθαι· εἴτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς γένος λαμβάνεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴτε ὡς εὐδαιμονία, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνδείκνυται, ὅτι οὔτε τῶν καθ’ αὑτό τι ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός; ὥσπερ γὰρ αἰτίαν ταῦτα ἐπιφέρει, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἰτία τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῷ μήτε γένη εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν μήτε ταὐτὸν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.
(1) αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι Heylbut : αἱ καθ’ αὑτὰς ἐνέργειαι Z N | δι’ αὑτό Z : δι’ αὐτῶν N, corr. in δι’ αὐτό (2) οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν Z N : οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν codd. plur. Arist. NE 1152b9–10, excepto cod. Kb : οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἀγαθῷ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν censet Aspasium legisse Diels, e versione sequ. in §3 : †τινὶ† susp. Heylbut (3) εἴτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν Z : εἴτε γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν N | πῶς Heylbut : πως Z N | ἐστιν om. Z
(1) Some thinkers, indeed, believe that no pleasure is a good, and they say that Antisthenes was of this opinion. They say that pleasure is a good neither in itself nor accidentally. For among goods, some are good in themselves, for example, the virtues and the activities according to the virtues, and others are good accidentally, for example, medical treatments (surgeries and cauterizations) and toils: for we choose none of these things for itself, but for something else and accidentally. But pleasure [they say] is a good in neither way, neither as something good in itself nor as something good accidentally. (2) “For good and pleasure are not the same” [Arist. NE 1152b9–10]. When the text is written like this, the interpretation is easy: for they deny that pleasure is good either in itself or accidentally, because it is not possible for any [individual attribute] [to be] the same as any good [attribute]. (3) But if it is written with the article, “For pleasure is not the same as the good” [Arist. NE 1152b9–10], this argument will seem to have been adduced without reason. For whether “the good” is taken as the class of good things, or whether as happiness, how does this show that pleasure is neither one of things good in itself nor one of those good accidentally? For he [Aristotle, citing his opponents] adduces this as a reason, but there is no reason for pleasure not to be good by [virtue of] its being neither classes of good things nor the same thing as happiness.
Aspasius lived c. 80–150 CE and taught Peripatetic philosophy, perhaps in Athens. His text sometimes provides illustrative detail that is historically false (Barnes 1999:2–3), but the names he supplies for philosophers show no such mistakes, as far as we can tell. (See, overall, Barnes 1999:1–50.) This passage of commentary treats NE 1152b8–10 (t. 118A).
This is evidence that Antisthenes was a name familiar to Aspasius as an anti-hedonist. Its suggestion that Aristotle refers to Antisthenes in NE 1152b8 is neither reliable nor impossible: his exposition could be his own interpretation of Aristotle’s text. No commentary on NE 10, where Speusippus’ views against pleasure are discussed, survives from Aspasius, whose single reference to Speusippus (p. 150.3–4 Heylbut, on 1153b1, where Aristotle himself names Speusippus) rates him as an advocate of pleasure as a good. Apparently, Aspasius received no tradition about positions on pleasure held by members of the Old Academy (to whom most modern commentators refer Aristotle’s statement at NE 1152b8–10), and he chooses the most famous figure he knows from Aristotle’s time who opposed pleasure.
(1) ἧς δόξης φασὶ καὶ Ἀντισθένη γεγονέναι: The language shows that Aspasius’ knowledge of Antisthenes is indirect. The exposition of this minority view continues in the plural, which means that Antisthenes is remembered as the outstanding spokesman of this argument, not the only one.
τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτά, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι: This primary class of goods forms the basis of virtue ethics, as advocated presumably by Socrates and by the Peripatetics, Cynics, and Stoics. Asclepius seems to attribute the distinction between primary (or essential) and accidental goods to his opponents (λέγουσι γοῦν), but his language in this additional sentence does not use indirect discourse, and he is probably just reciting Aristotle’s doctrine, which differs from rigorous Stoicism and Cynicism for its classification of accidental goods (as follows).
τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἰατρεῖαι τομαὶ καύσεις καὶ οἱ πόνοι: The very concept of accidental or instrumental goods might have been devised by Aristotle (and less clearly by Plato, in Euthydemus and Rep. 2) to combat the absolute ethical positions of others, such as Antisthenes or Socrates. The present list of examples happens to include “goods” prominent in the literary remains from Antisthenes. πόνος is outright called a “good” (t. 85); medical treatments, especially surgery, are mentioned (t. 124). The instrumental value of medical treatment is clear, and surely the goodness Antisthenes recognized in πόνος was also instrumental, as training. But it is not clear that Antisthenes would have analyzed goodness in the same way as Aristotle, putting toil in a lower class. Plausibly his own distinction of “real” goodness had more to do with the unmixed quality of goodness: actions were good when they shared in nothing bad (t. 78). This qualification would have nothing to do with pleasure and pain but would involve goodness only, as derived from conceptions such as strength, health, or godliness. So far, Asclepius is offering exposition of Aristotle’s doctrine, not explaining Antisthenes’ denial that pleasure is good. But he could be anticipating that view.
(2) “οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν”: The quotation differs from the text of Aristotle transmitted in the manuscripts in two respects, both probably trivial. The expression translated as “the same thing” has a final ν here, an alternative spelling for the neuter accusative form, and the noun meaning “pleasure” has an article. Both features recur in the second citation of the sentence, in §3. But the second citation differs in a third way from the manuscripts of Aristotle: there, “good” (which is “the good,” with the definite article) is in the dative case, not the accusative (which stands for what would be nominative in primary discourse). Diels (according to Heylbut’s report) proposed that Aspasius read the dative also in the first citation. Grammatically, either form is sound, but the sense differs subtly, and the dative fits better with the “interpretation” (ἐξήγησις) that Aspasius offers as the “easy” one, where “the same” also construes with the dative (τινὶ ἀγαθῷ). Written with all accusatives, the clause would be translated “For good and pleasure are not the same,” where “good” and “pleasure” are considered as though they are symmetrical entities, which, as it turns out, fail to match up. If “good” is in the dative case, however, the translation is “For pleasure is not the same as the good,” and here “good” seems to be the prior standard that pleasure fails to match. Possibly this is only a rhetorical difference. But a similar problem or ambiguity appears among moral terms in t. 54.13 (see notes), and it is not impossible that some syntax of ontology, so to speak, lurks behind these variations. Aristotle’s own ontology sometimes seems to depend on linguistic syntax, especially of the dative and genitive. (See Aubenque 1962.)
ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστι †τινὶ† ταὐτὸν τινὶ ἀγαθῷ: This is the new information Aspasius brings to the interpretation: there is no certainty that it is external rather than his own exegesis. Unfortunately, the text seems to be corrupt, but Aspasius is clearly drawing the contrast between a particular good thing (τι ἀγαθόν), that is, an individual attribute “good,” and the universal good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), which he will gloss (in §3) as either the set of good things or happiness. If the opponents’ argument is that the particular good thing—that is, the attribute of goodness in a larger “individual” such as a person or action —is not identical to another particular thing (τινί), it is easy to explain, Aspasius says, what this means. In context, the second particular thing should be a particular pleasant thing. (See, alternatively, Konstan 2006:202 n.359, emending to supply the universal “pleasure,” τὴν ἡδόνήν, and translating “it is not possible for pleasure to be the same as any particular good.”) Behind this point might be a more general one, that no particular can be identical to another particular; a fortiori, no particular good thing can be identical to a different particular. Pleasant “things” might not even be things, in Antisthenes’ view: see t. 82.38, where the vocabulary of seeming is regularly used for experience of the pleasant. The present text needs supplement, but perhaps simply ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστι τινὶ ταὐτὸν <εἶναι> τινὶ ἀγαθῷ, “since it is not possible for anything [other] <to be> the same as any good thing.” Surviving evidence for Antisthenes does not allow much evaluation of the likelihood that he engaged in such ontological subtlety. But see t. 187.11–12, where individuals are differentiated at the minute level; see t. 150A.5 and 150B.8, where Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus might imply that Antisthenes had a doctine concerning noetic particulars. Aspasius seems to accept this first argument, on the level of particulars, for the non-identity of good and pleasure. Possibly this is trivially true (so Konstan 2006:202 n.358).
(3) εἴτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς γένος λαμβάνεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴτε ὡς εὐδαιμονία: The class of good things or happiness are the accounts Aspasius supplies for the rivals’ two possible assumptions about “the good” as a universal. If the argument was meant on the universal level, he explains, it fails, because it neglects the possibility that pleasure can be a component in the good. This is Aristotle’s own doctrine in book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics.
laudat tenuem victum. Philosophi id quidem, sed si Socrates aut Antisthenes diceret, non is qui finem bonorum voluptatem esse dixerit.
He [Epicurus] praises the frugal lifestyle. Philosophers indeed do this, but if Socrates or Antisthenes were speaking, [this would be appropriate], not he who said that pleasure is the highest of goods.
In the fifth book of the Tusculan Disputations (written in the second half of 45 BCE), the interlocutors discuss the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness, even under conditions such as torture. The immediate context is a discussion of how even the Epicureans could defend this claim. Antisthenes is not mentioned anywhere else in the text or in Cicero’s De finibus.
This passage is valuable mostly for its negative evidence, Cicero’s general neglect of Antisthenes as ethical theorist. A possible explanation is that Cicero’s sources were closely linked to the Academy, where he had studied and where the more recent and developed positions of Stoics, Epicureans, and Peripatetics were discussed; whatever Antisthenes might have contributed to the rudiments of the active debates had been absorbed and developed by later figures. But Cicero read at least some of Antisthenes’ texts directly: see t. 84A, dated soon before the composition of the Tusculan Disputations.
= 108A DC
ἔλεγέ τε συνεχές· “Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην.”
συνεχές B P : συνεχῶς F Φ | ἂν μᾶλλον F
And he used to say constantly, “I would go mad rather than have pleasure.”
Diogenes records this apophthegma almost immediately after the basic biographical information on Antisthenes. It is paired with t. 56, the injunction to “keep company with such women as will be grateful.”
As the full set of passages shows, this is the most striking and famous evidence for Antisthenes as an adamant anti-hedonist. However, given the references to good or acceptable pleasures elsewhere (t. 125–27, 82.39), it is likely that the “pleasure” he speaks of here is a certain kind of pleasure, modeled on erotic pleasure caused on sub-rational levels, and that the comparison with madness shows why he opposed it: it conflicted with his pursuit of wisdom and the ordering of his life in a way that maximizes opportunity for the pursuit of wisdom. Only Theodoret (t. 122H, 123B) specifies erotic pleasure as the type Antisthenes privileged. Being in love is compared to madness several times in the Platonic corpus: Rep. 403a4–11; Phaed. 244b–245b. (See discussion of the fuller Greek tradition in Holmes 2010:252–59.)
μανείην . . . ἡσθείην: The first-person verbs suggest a quotation of Antisthenes in life rather than from a book. Possibly this apophthegma was collected from Antisthenes’ historical behavior; possibly a character Antisthenes was represented saying this in the writings of another author. Aristotle (t. 153A) knows Antisthenes as someone who makes proclamations on his individual authority.
(not in SSR)
. . . .]αὐτὸς γοῦν οὗτος ὁ Ἀντι-
[σθέ]νης ἀσμεναίτερον ἂν
[μα]νῆναί φησιν ἢ ἡσθῆ-
ναι.]
αὐτὸς γοῦν οὗτος vidi ex imagine : οὗτος γοῦν οὗτος vid. Hughes and Parsons
Indeed this very Antisthenes says he would more gladly go mad than have pleasure.
The papyrus fragment (= 18 3T CPF), dated to the second or third century CE, is from a diatribe or dialogue against philosophers, showing that they disagree more boisterously than a house full of madmen. Whereas Antisthenes would prefer madness over pleasure, Aristippus would do anything, including going mad, to get pleasure (but the text is missing here), and Plato held some third position (perhaps that going mad and having pleasure are the same). The authorities cited, who include also the archaic natural philosopher Thrasyalces of Thasos (DK 35), otherwise known only through a tradition stemming from Aristotle, point to the later fourth century, perhaps the Peripatos, as the setting for composition. Hughes and Parsons look, rather, to the second sophistic, comparing Lucian and Dio Chrysostom, with Seneca as a predecessor. There are possibilities, as well, in the Hellenistic schools, as represented in the embedded diatribes in Cicero and Philodemus. In addition to the reference to Thrasyalces, the use of Aristippus (rather than Epicurus) in opposition to Antisthenes supports an early date.
αὐτὸς γοῦν οὗτος ὁ Ἀντι[σθέ]νης: From the image of the papyrus available from the Oxyrhynchus Online project, it appears to me that the first letter in this line is a partly preserved A, not O, as read by Hughes and Parsons. In this case, the language indicates that Antisthenes was cited earlier in the text. Antisthenes might have been known for an opinion about the color of silver (t. 150A.4), the topic on which Thrasyalces is cited just above. If one reads a repeated demonstrative pronoun, this could imply Antisthenes’ presence in the setting of the text (a possibility denied by Hughes and Parsons) or as literary interlocutor. A doubled οὗτος is not otherwise attested in ancient Greek.
ἀσμεναίτερον: This alternative for the otherwise unanimous μᾶλλον and κρεῖττον could be original to Antisthenes, especially if he intended a wordplay with the stem of ἁνδάνω or ἥδομαι.
= 108C DC
de voluptate veteres philosophi diversas sententias dixerunt. . . . Antisthenes Socraticus summum malum dicit; eius namque hoc verbum est: “μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην.”
On pleasure, the ancient philosophers pronounced various opinions. . . . Antisthenes the Socratic says it is the highest evil. For this saying is his: “I would go mad rather than have pleasure.”
Gellius’ short summary of views on pleasure has no obvious goal. His source seems to be Stoic and post-Peripatetic, and his sympathy lies with the anti-hedonists. Epicurus is the hedonist, and the list of those opposed includes Speusippus, Zeno, Critolaus, Plato, and Hierocles. His source seems, then, to be different from that of the patristic writers in t. 122F–H.
= 108B DC
οἷον τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησιν, ὁ δὲ εἰπών· “Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην” κακόν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον.
For example, pleasure is said to be a good thing by Epicurus, but a bad thing by the one who said, “I would go mad rather than have pleasure,” and indifferent and not preferable by those from the Stoa.
ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἠσπάσαντο ὡς ἀγαθόν, τινὲς δὲ κακὸν αὐτὴν ἄντικρυς εἶναί φασιν, ὥστε καί τινα τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναφθέγξασθαι “Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην.”
Some greeted pleasure as a good thing, whereas some say it is straight-out a bad thing, to the extent that one of those employed in philosophy actually declared, “I would go mad rather than have pleasure.”
Sextus uses the same statement for the same purpose in two contexts (t. 122D–E), as an argument against the possibility of ethics. According to this argument, there is no good and bad by nature, since opinions of reputable thinkers are opposed. In neither passage is Antisthenes named; in Against the Professors 11.74, the quotation is said to belong to “someone of the Cynics.” The juxtaposition of Epicurus versus Antisthenes appears also in t. 117A, and these examples are chronologically plausible for Pyrrho himself, the original Skeptic. The mention in t. 122D of the third position of the Stoics implies that Antisthenes’ rejection of pleasure was strong and that he did not consider it merely indifferent (as one could infer from evidence such as t. 125).
= 108D DC
καὶ Ἀντισθένης δὲ μανῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθῆναι αἱρεῖται.
And also Antisthenes prefers to go mad rather than have pleasure.
Clement’s second book is on ethics, and §103–26 advocate for asceticism. In §120–21, he documents his view that Greek philosophy, like Hebrew, uses fear, threat, and warning to enforce asceticism. Antisthenes is cited between Socrates and Crates of Thebes. Zeno of Citium follows.
= 108E DC
Σωκράτους τοίνυν ἀκουστὴς ἐγένετο Ἀντισθένης, Ἡρακλεωτικός τις ἀνὴρ τὸ φρόνημα, ὃς ἔφη τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τὸ μαίνεσθαι κρεῖττον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ παρῄνει τοῖς γνωρίμοις μηδέποτε χάριν ἡδονῆς δάκτυλον ἐκτείνειν.
Ἡρακλεωτικός edd. : Ἡρακλειωτικός codd. : Ἡρακλείτειος Mullach
Now Antisthenes became the pupil of Socrates, and he was a Heracleotean sort of man in his thought. He said that being mad was better than having pleasure. Therefore he also used to advise his associates never even to stretch out a finger for the sake of pleasure.
Eusebius discusses doctrines of being and soul: see t. 139A.
Ἡρακλεωτικός τις ἀνὴρ τὸ φρόνημα: Eusebius is the only author who associates the property “Heracleotean” with the citation of this apophthegma. As emended by editors, the adjective is a derivative from Heracles the hero (see t. 92–99) or from one of the cities called “Heraclea” after Heracles. (See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:197 n. 7; Athenaeus 500a also uses this form.) Presumably Antisthenes’ Heracles resisted pleasure in his “thought” (On Intelligence [Περὶ φρονήσεως] is an alternate title for one of Antisthenes’ Heracles texts, t. 41A title 10.2), and so Antisthenes is compared to his fictional character. Mullach’s emendation, Ἡρακλείτειος, makes Antisthenes not similar to Heracles but a follower of Heraclitus of Ephesus. This option is flatly rejected in current scholarship. However, in the discussion of the Stoic doctrine of soul that follows closely, Heraclitus’ doctrine of fire is cited in comparison to Zeno’s doctrine. (See Chiesara 2001:80–81, calling this comparison “a commonplace” crafted originally by Cleanthes.) In light of this detail, Mullach’s reading might be reconsidered. In case it is correct, either Eusebius’ combination of the description “Heraclitean” with the thesis on pleasure is arbitrary, or Antisthenes had a position about change and motion that was related to his position on pleasure, as did Aristippus of Cyrene, according to Diog. Laert. 2.85–86, and as did some of the anti-hedonists Aristotle cites in the context of t. 118A. See also t. 159D.
μηδέποτε χάριν ἡδονῆς δάκτυλον ἐκτείνειν: Julian reports a Cynic injunction (in To the Uneducated Cynics 200d) that one should not “taste luxury” (γευέσθω τρυφῆς) even “with the tip of the finger” (μηδὲ ἄκρῳ τῷ δακτύλῳ) until one has fully mastered one’s inner desires for vulgar pleasure. Eusebius’ phrase δάκτυλον ἐκτείνειν seems to refer to effort expended in pursuit of pleasure, but the original meaning might be related to the risks one takes in making any contact with pleasure before the soul has become indifferent to it. (Compare notes on t. 124A-B.)
= 108F DC
καὶ Ἀντισθένης δὲ ὁ Κυνικὸς—Σωκρατικὸς δὲ καὶ οὗτος—τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τὸ μαίνεσθαι κρεῖττον εἴρηκεν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ παραινεῖ τοῖς γνωρίμοις μηδὲ δάκτυλον ἐκτεῖναί ποτε εἵνεκα ἡδονῆς.
And also Antisthenes the Cynic—and he, too, a Socratic—said that being mad was better than having pleasure. Therefore he also advises his associates never even to lift a finger for the sake of pleasure.
Theodoret is demonstrating, in the midst of ethical discussion that occupies his final books 11 and 12, that virtue is difficult in the face of temptation. He sets up Antisthenes as a Cynic teacher whose strong advice was disobeyed by his disciples Diogenes of Sinope and Crates of Thebes, who fell into bad ways; both are famous for erotic adventures. Clearly Theodoret shares a source with Eusebius (122G), but he also cites the same verses from Crates as Clement (122F). Arius Didymus (a Stoic teacher from Alexandria who taught Augustus in the late first century BCE) might be the common source for all. Aristocles of Messene is cited later in the context as the source for scandals in the Peripatos. Compare t. 139A, where the same two writers are the best candidates for Eusebius’ source on Antisthenes.
= 109A DC
ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποδέχομαι τὸν Ἀντισθένη, “τὴν Ἀφροδίτην,” λέγοντα “κἂν κατατοξεύσαιμι, εἰ λάβοιμι, ὅτι πολλὰς ἡμῶν καλὰς καὶ ἀγαθὰς γυναῖκας διέφθειρεν.” τόν τε ἔρωτα κακίαν φησὶ φύσεως, ἧς ἥττους ὄντες οἱ κακοδαίμονες θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν. δείκνυται γὰρ διὰ τούτων ἡττᾶσθαι τοὺς ἀμαθεστέρους δι’ ἄγνοιαν ἡδονῆς, ἣν οὐ χρὴ προσίεσθαι, κἂν θεὸς λέγηται, τουτέστι κἂν θεόθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς παιδοποιίας χρείαν δεδομένη τυγχάνῃ.
But I accept [the view of] Antisthenes, when he says, “I would shoot down Aphrodite, if I could catch her, because she has destroyed many of our fine and beautiful women.” And he says that eros is an evil of nature, and those ill-fortuned people who are beaten by it call the disease a goddess. He shows through this discussion that the ignorant are beaten by it because of their ignorance about pleasure, which one must not accept, even if it is called a goddess, that is, even if it happens to be divinely given for the necessity of making children.
Clement cites Antisthenes amid his discussion of asceticism (Misc. 2.103–26), which he grounds in imitation of the divine and for which he cites support from biblical and pagan sources. He has just mentioned Helen of Troy and attacks on her by Menelaus and Euripides; after his mention of Antisthenes, there is a quotation from Xenophon’s account of Heracles at the crossroads (Mem. 2.1.30).
This is the fullest explanation preserved for Antisthenes’ rejection of sexual eros and also the clearest surviving evidence for his allegorization of the gods. (See Laurenti 1962.) It shows, as well, that φύσις (nature) in his conception cannot be fully good. Antisthenes’ original text might have concerned Homer, especially the character Helen (e.g., Il. 3.373–420), as one could infer from Clement’s context, Theodoret’s different context (t. 123B), and close parallels of language in Gorgias, Encomium of Helen §19 (details below). Title 9.4, On Helen and Penelope, is possibly the text. Decleva Caizzi 1966:116 suggests a treatment of Il. 5.330 ff., although it is not clear which of Antisthenes’ titles could have discussed this episode.
τὴν Ἀφροδίτην . . . εἰ λάβοιμι: Antisthenes speaks, certainly with humor, of a public benefaction, not a private cleansing of his own desire, which probably is within his power. He speaks on behalf of all “fine and beautiful” women. (Similar public efforts are visible in t. 57 and 61.)
τόν τε ἔρωτα κακίαν φησὶ φύσεως: This is the only use of ἔρως in the testimonia that renders it definitely bad. Elsewhere, ἔρως is sublimated and good: see t. 92A–B and the conjectural 84C; t. 14A is a joke on this very question; t. 41A title 2.2 is presumably good. Sex is called ἀφροδίσια (t. 82.38). Evidence apart from this passage suggests that Antisthenes distinguished ἔρως from ἀφροδίσια in the same way Plato and Xenophon distinguished between two Ἔρωτες and two Ἁφροδῖται (Pl. Sym. 180c6–e3; Xen. Sym. 8.9–10). Either Antisthenes also distinguished two Ἔρωτες (he would not have recognized a heavenly Aphrodite), or the tradition has contaminated his distinction. Because φύσις (nature) seems inherently to have or generate νόσος (disease), it cannot be fully good for Antisthenes, as it would be according to a simple antithesis between φύσις and νόμος such as is sometimes attributed to the Cynics (e.g., Heinimann 1945:42). φύσις itself might have two meanings, one animal and one divine, for Antisthenes: see, further, comments on the second tomos at t. 41A.
ἧς ἥττους ὄντες: In Gorgias, Encomium of Helen §19, Helen’s eye is said to be “pleased” by the body of Alexander (τῶι τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης ὄμμα ἡσθέν): the eye then gave desire to the soul. In the next sentence, the speaker asks how someone “lesser” (ὁ ἥσσων) than Eros is able to push it away. A pun or semantic connection between ἡσθέν (pleasured) and ἡσσωθέν (beaten) might have been intended by Gorgias or perceived by Antisthenes. The idea of being beaten by pleasure or Aphrodite is common: compare Ar. Clouds 1081; Democritus DK 68B214 (see, further, Holmes 2010:210 n.63). Eros is figured as a kind of slavery by the Cynics: compare Diogenes of Sinope in Diog. Laert. 6.66, and see Zeller 1888:306–7 and n.1.
οἱ κακοδαίμονες: This term was current in the late fifth century (Aristophanes used it of Socrates in Clouds 104) and may be a play on Socrates’ beneficent guiding spirit, the δαιμόνιον. It could then be Antisthenes’ term, though it fits also with the theology of Clement and Theodoret. Antisthenes could be assigning the most radical cause of those who divinize love to a previous divine force, albeit a malevolent one. Or he could be using the term as a joke.
θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν: Some humans, those who are controlled by this “evil” in nature, make it into a goddess by calling it one. On the face of it, this is a statement about popular culture, language, and religion, not about poetry. Socrates similarly refers, in Xen. Mem. 1.3.13, to an erotic element as “this beast, which people call beautiful and youthful” (τοῦτο τὸ θήριον, ὃ καλοῦσι καλὸν καὶ ὡραῖον). See also discussion of the “many gods” in t. 179 and 180. The likely connection to Homer’s Aphrodite and Helen raises the possibility that the poet’s voice is also responsible for generation of this fiction. Gorgias, by contrast, offers the possibilities, first, that eros is really divine (εἰ μὲν θεὸς <ὢν ἔχει> θεῶν θείαν δύναμιν . . .) and, second, that it is a “human illness and ignorance of the soul” (ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα), which is therefore no “error” but “bad luck” without ethical liability.
τοὺς ἀμαθεστέρους δι’ ἄγνοιαν ἡδονῆς: The phrasing is close to Gorgias’ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα.
οὐ χρὴ προσίεσθαι: There is ethical liability to resist this disease, according to Antisthenes. T. 58 suggests that there might be a positive ethical liability also, to love some people (in the sublimated sense): μόνον γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν.
κἂν θεὸς λέγηται: Many things are widely “said” to be the case, in Antisthenes’ view, and often these must be actively resisted or refined. See t. 149A.2, 179B, 72A.
ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς παιδοποιίας χρείαν: A parallel is in t. 58, and title 2.2 in Antisthenes’ catalog links procreation with eros, although the term ἐρωτικός in the title could be the language of a bibliographer, not Antisthenes.
θεόθεν . . . δεδομένη: Clement concedes in the context that pleasures are divinely given, but only to accompany what is necessary. Whether Antisthenes, too, had this view cannot be assessed from surviving evidence. If Brancacci 1997 (“Le modèle animal”) is correct in conjecturing that Antisthenes was Xenophon’s source for his discussion of the benevolent creator god in Mem. 1.4 and 4.3, he might have agreed with Clement, that erotic pleasure has this divine purpose.
= 109B DC
αὐτίκα τοίνυν Ἀντισθένης, ὁ Σωκράτους ἑταῖρος καὶ Διογένους διδάσκαλος, τὴν σωφροσύνην περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενος καὶ τὴν ἡδόνην μυσαττόμενος, τοιάδε περὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης λέγεται φάναι· “ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην κἂν κατατοξεύσαιμι, εἰ λάβοιμι, ὅτι πολλὰς ἡμῶν καλὰς κἀγαθὰς γυναῖκας διέφθειρεν.” τὸν δέ γε ἔρωτα κακίαν ἐκάλει τῆς φύσεως, ἧς ἥττους ὄντες οἱ κακοδαίμονες, θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν. ταύτῃ τοι μανῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθῆναι ᾑρεῖτο.
κἂν κατατοξεύσαιμι Raeder e Clem. (123A) : κἂν τοξεύσαιμι K : κατατοξεύσαιμι ἂν B L V : κατατοξεύσαιμι M S C
Immediately in any case Antisthenes, the companion of Socrates and teacher of Diogenes, who values self-control foremost and feels disgust at pleasure, is said to have made the following remark about Aphrodite: “I myself would shoot down Aphrodite, if I could catch her, because she has destroyed many of our fine and beautiful women.” And he called eros an evil of nature: and those ill-fortuned people who are beaten by it call the disease a goddess. And for this reason, of course, he preferred to “be mad rather than have pleasure.”
Theodoret discusses Greek rationalist interpretation and allegory amid his broader discussion of supernatural beings, with the intent to dismiss Greek “theology” as fallacious. Antisthenes is the first example given for Greek allegorism, which is said to cover an array of Olympian gods and to contain many sorts of nonsense and self-contradiction.
τὴν σωφροσύνην περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενος καὶ τὴν ἡδόνην μυσαττόμενος: This is the only testimonium suggesting that self-control (σωφροσύνη) is the leading virtue for Antisthenes; t. 161 might support this. See t. 77 for the focus on courage (ἀνδρεία), and compare also t. 78. The term is not in Antisthenes’ catalog, whereas courage, the good, the fine, and justice are there.
ταύτῃ τοι μανῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθῆναι ᾑρεῖτο: Theodoret explicitly connects Antisthenes’ paradox of t. 122 with bodily eros.
= 112A DC
Ἀντισθένους· Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν τὰς μὴ κατὰ θύρας εἰσιούσας ἡδονὰς ἀναγκαῖον μὴ κατὰ θύρας πάλιν ἐξιέναι· δεήσει οὖν τμηθῆναι ἢ ἑλλεβορισθῆναι.
lemm. hab. M A : sine lemm. L | θύρας (bis) L Md : θύραν A | δεήσει L Md A : δεήσειν tacite Gesner2 | ἐλλεβορισθῆναι codd.
From Antisthenes. Antisthenes used to say that pleasures that do not come in through the doors necessarily do not go back out through the doors. There will be need, then, to get them out by surgery or hellebore.
= 112B DC
τὰς μὴ κατὰ θύρας, φησὶν ὁ Ἀντισθένης, εἰσιούσας ἀπολαύσεις δεήσει ἢ σχασθῆναι ἢ ἑλλεβορισθῆναι ἢ πάντως λιμαγχονηθῆναι, κακὰς ἀμοιβὰς ἐκτίνοντα τῆς προγεγενημένης ἀπληστίας ἕνεκα μικρᾶς καὶ ὀλιγοχρονίου ἡδονῆς.
θύρας S Md A : θύραν Hense | σχασθῆναι S A : χασθῆναι Md | ἢ ἐλλ. A1 mg. ἐλλεβορισθῆναι S Md | λιμαγχονηθῆναι S A : λιμαγχονισθῆναι Md | ἐκτίνοντα S (?) : ἐκτείνοντα M : ἐκτείνοντα cum ϊ superscripto A
Enjoyments that do not come in through the doors, Antisthenes says, will need to be purged by an incision or hellebore or strangled by hunger, [each an intervention] that pays back bad compensations for small and short-lived pleasure caused by previous insatiate desire.
Stobaeus’ third book begins with sections titled “On Virtue” and “On Vice” and then proceeds through aspects of virtue in paired sections, those with odd numbers being about a virtue and those with even numbers, the corresponding vice. These passages come, respectively, under the headings Περὶ ἀκολασίας (On lack of discipline) and the similar Περὶ ἀκρασίας (On lack of self-control). There is overlap of topic within these sections, but the passages collected are largely different. The two passages from Antisthenes are similar enough that they are probably versions of the same statement.
T. 124–27 add complexity to the reconstruction of Antisthenes’ views on pleasure, which must recognize types that are good (or accompany something good) in at least some ways. The intruding pleasures in t. 124 are contrasted, by implication, with those that are admitted legitimately, through the doors of the soul, which is probably the rational faculty. The “doors” may be something like self-respect (ἡ αἰδώς), such as Antisthenes constructs through his brand of exercise and toil in good and bad reputation. Epictetus refers to αἰδώς as the Cynic’s replacement for a house and its doors (and so on): ὁ Κυνικὸς δ’ ἀντὶ πάντων τούτων ὀφείλει τὴν αἰδῶ προβεβλῆσθαι. . . . τοῦτο οἰκία ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο θύρα . . . (3.22.15). The present passages use technical vocabulary and colorful metaphors, even mixing two strong metaphors of the house and the diseased patient. If they are close to textual quotations from Antisthenes, they show a style more marked in these respects than t. 53–54. Metaphors are typical of apophthegmata, which are usually understood to be products of oral transmission (see Kindstrand 1986:240, citing Diogenes Laertius’ reference at 5.34 to the “unwritten voice,” ἄγραφος φωνή, of the apophthegma), but the dense abstract vocabulary is not.
κατὰ θύρας: This metaphor figures the mind or soul as a house or building, rather than a city, which would have been implied by κατὰ πύλας. On the soul figured as a city, with walls (τείχη), see t. 109, 134, 54.7. On the soul or the whole individual person possibly figured as a house (οἰκία) with its walls (τοῖχοι) and roof (ὄροφοι), see t. 82.38.
ἡδονάς (A) / ἀπολαύσεις (B): These are results of a previous act (or thought), not desires for the future. (Compare Xen. Mem. 1.3.8–13, where Socrates warns Xenophon and Critobulus against a kiss.) Presumably they are dangerous because they generate desire for more such pleasures.
τμηθῆναι ἢ ἑλλεβορισθῆναι (A) / σχασθῆναι ἢ ἑλλεβορισθῆναι ἢ πάντως λιμαγχονηθῆναι (B): These are strongly medical metaphors. For the philosophical teacher as doctor of the soul, see t. 167, 169, 174, 187.9, 53.4. Hellebore is an emetic, causing vomiting; it is also said, in later sources, to be a cure for madness (Horace, Sat. 2.3.166); compare t. 206, where it is a cure for attraction to pleasure. The cutting in question is probably bloodletting, as implied in σχασθῆναι, not surgery, as implied in τμηθῆναι: classical Greek doctors did not perform surgery. λιμαγχονηθῆναι is literally “to be strangled by hunger,” as though food is analogous to breath. The metaphor is absorbed in the technical language of the Hippocratic corpus, where the term means “be weakened or reduced by low diet.” This is a medical treatment in On Joints 81, although it is elsewhere a symptom. To “reduce the diet” of a pleasure might be to eliminate a desire by refusing to satisfy it. The other metaphors are harder to rationalize, and they might indicate desperation and the unlikelihood that such pleasures can be expelled at all. Diogenes of Sinope is said to have recommended λιμός (fasting) or βρόχος (the noose) as a solution for ἔρως (love) (Diog. Laert. 6.86).
κακὰς ἀμοιβὰς ἐκτίνοντα τῆς προγεγενημένης ἀπληστίας ἕνεκα μικρᾶς καὶ ὀλιγοχρονίου ἡδονῆς (B): This implies, perhaps, a calculus of pleasures, such as Socrates discusses in Plato’s Protagoras, Republic, and Phaedo. The dimensions of pleasure here would be magnitude (μικρά), in some presumably non-temporal sense, and longevity (ὀλιγοχρόνιος).
= 93 DC
[= ps.-Maximus 12.37/36 Ihm]
Ἀντισθένους· οὔτε συμπόσιον χωρὶς ὁμιλίας οὔτε πλοῦτος χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἡδονὴν ἔχει.
Ἀντισθένους add. Trincavellus : sine lemm. hab. M A | χωρὶς A Tr : ἄνευ Md | ὁμιλίας codd. Parisini (A et al.) : ὁμονοίας cet. | χωρὶς . . . ἔχει om. A
From Antisthenes: Neither a symposium without community nor wealth without virtue brings pleasure.
Stobaeus’ lengthy ch. 1 in book 3 is titled “On Virtue.” Maximus’ section is titled “On Wealth and Poverty and Love of Money.” The maxim is attributed to Socrates later in the same chapter of Stobaeus (3.1.87) and to Plutarch or the Athenian general Phocion elsewhere in the tradition (Arsenius).
The implication is that real pleasure comes from community (of the wise) and virtue, not from the symposium or the wealth on which these good things supervene. There seem to be three levels: the symposium and the wealth, whose value is not given (but is presumably indifferent); the community and virtue, which are good (as indicated in other evidence); and the pleasure, whose value is also not given. Antisthenes’ own symposiastic text (t. 41A title 2.4) might be the source.
συμπόσιον / πλοῦτος: There is no indication that wealth is bad, as the testimonia on luxury (t. 114–15), love of wealth (t. 80), and poverty (t. 81–82) might imply. This saying of Antisthenes is not proto-Cynic. It suggests that the passages in Xenophon implying that Antisthenes held some positive attitudes toward society (t. 13A, 110, possibly 72B) are not entirely farces, but reflect the real Antisthenes in some way.
χωρὶς ὁμιλίας / χωρὶς ἀρετῆς: Community (of the wise) and virtue are clearly good in Antisthenes’ view generally, and the terms occur often. (See t. 22A, 100, 134.)
= 113 DC
Ἀντισθένους· ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους διωκτέον, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων.
lemm. hab. S M A
From Antisthenes: Pleasures after toils should be pursued, but not those before toils.
Stobaeus’ section is titled Περὶ φιλοπονίας, “On Fondness for Work.” On his general practices of citation, see t. 79.
With t. 127, this is the most positive assessment of pleasure in the evidence for Antisthenes. Both might be ultimately from Heracles.
τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους: This implies either the rewards for which the toil was the means, such as being with Socrates after the hike from the Piraeus (t. 12A), or the heightened enjoyment after abstinence, if abstinence can be called a “toil.” Abstinence (from food and drink) is often recommended by the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon as an induction of pleasure. It is unclear whether pleasure necessarily follows every toil, or whether this is a statement about some toils. The temporal sequence implies an exchange or succession of toils and pleasures, in reverse direction from that in t. 124B.
= 110 DC
Ἀντισθένης δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκεν τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον.
Antisthenes, when he claimed that pleasure is a good, added, “when it is not regretted.”
Athenaeus’ twelfth book is presented in a uniform authorial voice, rather than in the voices of dinner guests he has used previously. The topic is pleasure, and Megaclides, a Peripatetic literary critic active probably in the late fourth or early third century BCE (Janko 2000:138–43), is cited at length as advocate for a figure of Heracles who indulged in pleasures, not Heracles the soldier. After Megaclides blames the lyric poets Stesichorus and Xanthus for inventing Heracles’ fiercer iconography, he immediately cites this opinion of Antisthenes. The Heracles topic ends there, and Megaclides goes on to the hedonism of Odysseus, documented from Od. 9.5–11, where Odysseus admires the banquet of the Phaeacians. This turns out to be not Odysseus’ sincere opinion but a special communication to the Phaeacians, whom he must please in order to secure a homecoming. Because of the sequence and because of the parallel with t. 188 (where this explanation is attributed to Aristotle, though Antisthenes is cited also; possibly both critics used it), it is plausible that the example of Odysseus is borrowed also from Antisthenes. On Odysseus’ alleged hedonism in the Cynic tradition, see t. 53.6 notes.
This is the only evidence that attributes to Antisthenes an outright statement that pleasure is good. In its original context (probably one of the Heracles texts or possibly a treatment of Odysseus), it could have been meant as a paradox, which the added last word helps to resolve. But see t. 82.39, where Xenophon portrays Antisthenes as saying that his lifestyle brings him pleasure, even more than what is right. The kind of pleasure in question is hard to identify, but according to the citation from Megaclides, Heracles enjoyed sex, food, drink, baths, and warm beds, and Odysseus enjoyed the banquet. The phrase ἡδοναὶ ἀμεταμέλητοι in Letter 10 of ps.-Crates refers to moderate wine drinking. If the reference to Antisthenes should be read with the discussion of Odysseus rather than Heracles, this passage suggests that Megaclides might have followed Antisthenes as a literary critic.
Ἀντισθένης . . . φάσκων προσέθηκεν: The apophthegmatic form might indicate that Megaclides had an intermediate source for Antisthenes; but his otherwise direct citation of the literature he discusses, as well as his historical position, favors direct knowledge.
ἀμεταμέλητον: Plato uses this word once, when the title character at Timaeus 59d1 refers to indulgence in a “likely account” of cosmic creation (rather than rigorous discussion of eternal objects) as an “unregrettable pleasure”: ἣν ὅταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ καταθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως πέρι διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῖτο (When, for the sake of a rest, one puts aside the accounts about what always is and surveys instead the likely accounts about creation, and so gets an unregrettable pleasure, he would make a moderate and sensible amusement in his life.) Possibly there is a parody of Antisthenes here, if Antisthenes counted fiction writing as a harmless pleasure. Plato’s passage may refer also to Gorgias (παιδιάν) and to “Heraclitean” ontological preferences (τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ καταθέμενος λόγους), both plausible associations with Antisthenes. Letter 10 of ps.-Crates (cited above) points to wine drinking as the most obvious source of unregrettable pleasure.
ὡς ἐξεῖναι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι καλῶς Ἀντισθένης τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον. ἡ τοιαύτη γὰρ μόνη ἀγαθόν, οὐ μὴν ἅπασα ἡδονή.
Therefore it is possible to say that Antisthenes did well, when he was claiming that pleasure is a good, to add “when it is not regretted.” For only this kind of pleasure is a good, not, indeed, every pleasure.
Eustathius digresses into discussion of Paris’ responsibility for the Trojan War through his choice of pleasure. Empedocles is cited for blaming Aphrodite, and Antisthenes’ doctrine follows.
This could suggest that Homeric discussion, rather than a Heracles text, was the context for Antisthenes’ statement about unregretted pleasure. He could have used the same concept in multiple texts. Compare t. 141B, where Eustathius again overlaps closely with Athenaeus in the phrasing of a report about Antisthenes, and possibly Athenaeus is the source here also.
[= Stob. 4.20.34]
πάλιν δὲ τὸ συνουσίᾳ τὸν ἐρῶντα μὴ κρατεῖσθαι, διὰ τὸ τῇ αὐτῇ συγγενόμενον ἄλλον ἀπαλλαγῆναι καὶ καταφρονῆσαι, τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ λέγοι τις μηδὲ χυμῶν ἡδονῇ δεδουλῶσθαι Φιλόξενον τὸν ὀψοφάγον, ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν Ἀντισθένης γευσάμενος οὐδὲν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτον· μηδ’ ὑπὸ οἴνου μεθύειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὅτι Σωκράτης πίνων τὸν ἴσον οἶνον ἔνηφεν.
ἄλλον <μὲν δουλοῦσθαι ἄλλον δ’> ἀπαλλαγῆναι Wyttenbach : “alter irretiatur” Gesner : post καταφρονῆσαι lac. stat. Meineke
And again, the argument that the lover is not overpowered by intercourse, because another lover who lies with the same woman walks away and spurns her, is the same sort of argument as if someone should say that Philoxenus the delicacy eater is not enslaved to the pleasure of flavors, because Antisthenes, when he took a taste of the same things, experienced nothing of this kind, or that Alcibides does not get drunk from wine, because Socrates, when drinking equivalent wine, was sober.
Stobaeus’ excerpt from Plutarch’s lost On Love is an exegesis of a fragment from a comic poet, said by Plutarch to be Menander (fr. 541 Koch = 568 Koerte; authorship is doubted by more recent editors of comic fragments), that rejects the senses as the cause of love and calls it a νόσος ψυχῆς (disease of the soul) that is καιρός (opportunity bound). The contrast between Antisthenes and Philoxenus could come from a single lost written story or Socratic dialogue, just as the contrast between Alcibiades and Socrates is probably from Plato’s Symposium.
This might show that Antisthenes was used as an example of the ascetic character in some fourth-century literature, whether a Socratic dialogue or a comedy.
δεδουλῶσθαι: “Slavery” is a common Socratic metaphor for attachment to pleasure in general and to erotic desires in particular: see t. 79 and 80; Xen. Mem. 1.3.11. The comic fragment on which Plutarch comments asks to what the lover is enslaved and proceeds to dismiss vision and συνουσία (as anticipated), because these experiences do not have the same causal powers over everyone. Plutarch’s answer counters that some people are enslaved to their senses and that this interpretation of love is not disproved by the fact that others are not.
Φιλόξενον τὸν ὀψοφάγον: Probably the same Philoxenus is mentioned repeatedly in Athenaeus’ Wise Men at Dinner (e.g., 5f–6b and 6e–7a, both in passages attributed to Peripatetic sources). If this is the dithyrambic poet Philoxenus of Cythera (RE 23), he lived c. 435–380 and was the subject of stories involving Dionysius I of Syracuse, as were many of the Socratics. (See t. 206–7.)
= 82 DC
[= Arsenius, Violetum p. 107.25–27 Walz]
ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰοῦ τὸν σίδηρον, οὕτως ἔλεγε τοὺς φθονέρους ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ἤθους κατεσθίεσθαι.
Just as iron is eaten up by rust, he [Antisthenes] used to say that jealous people are eaten up in the same way by their own character.
This apophthegma appears near the middle of Diogenes’ list: see t. 3. The same saying is also attributed to Cleitarchus the Peripatetic in most manuscripts of ps.-Maximus; one assigns it to Plutarch (47.31/54.38 Ihm).
The internal self-destruction of the jealous character is consistent with t. 100 and 107. Metaphors and images of metal occur also in t. 83A, 150A.4, 165, 169, and 170.4.
τὸν σίδηρον: Men of iron are the lowest of the five classes in Hesiod, Works and Days 174–78 and in Pl. Rep. 3 415a–c. Corruption of iron by rust is noted, among other forms of corruption proper to a given thing, in Rep. 10 609a2, where the goal is to show that the soul, too, is corrupted by injustice and other vice.
[= Antonius 1.52.22 Migne]
ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς “Τί τῶν θηρίων κάκιστα βλάπτει;” ἔφη “Τῶν μὲν ἀγρίων συκοφάντης, τῶν δὲ ἡμέρων κόλαξ.”
The same man, when asked “Which of the beasts harms the worst?” said, “Among the wild ones, the informer; among the tame, the flatterer.”
This is an apophthegma attributed in ancient sources to Diogenes of Sinope only. See Diog. Laert. 6.51 and SSR VB 423. It is close in thought to t. 131, with which it is adjoined in Antonius, and there is no reason it could not be associated with Antisthenes, but no ancient source makes this attribution.
= 84A DC
κρεῖττον ἔλεγε, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν ταῖς Χρείαις, εἰς κόρακας ἢ εἰς κόλακας ἐμπεσεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νεκρούς, οἱ δὲ ζῶντας ἐσθίουσιν.
He said it was better, according to what Hekaton says in his Chreiai, to be thrown in among the crows than among the flatterers. For the former eat corpses, the latter, living persons.
= 84B DC
[= ps.-Maximus 11.26/33 Ihm; Antonius 1.52.24 Migne]
Ἀντισθένους. Ἀντισθένης αἱρετώτερόν φησιν εἰς κόρακας ἐμπεσεῖν ἢ εἰς κόλακας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποθανόντος τὸ σῶμα οἱ δὲ ζῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν λυμαίνονται.
lemm. hab. M A, om. S Br Mac | Ἀντισθένης et φησιν om. Br | ζῶντος suppl. A2
From Antisthenes. Antisthenes says it is preferable to be thrown in among the crows than among the flatterers. For the former make spoil of the body of the dead, the latter, the soul of the living.
This apophthegma appears in the first half of Diogenes’ list: see t. 3. Stobaeus’ section is titled “On Flattery” (Περὶ κολακείας), and ps.-Maximus’ section has the same title.
This is one of the clearest examples of punning wordplay (εἰς κόρακας . . . εἰς κόλακας), if the phrasing is from Antisthenes. The same joke is in the opening scene of Aristophanes’ Wasps. Diogenes’ citation of Hekaton’s Chreiai (c. 100 BCE) as a source supports attribution to Antisthenes. The apophthegma is attributed also to Diogenes of Sinope (Athenaeus 254c) and Demosthenes (Gnom. Vat. no. 206 and elsewhere: see Sternberg ad loc.).
εἰς κόρακας . . . ἐμπεσεῖν: This euphemism for death is often used a curse, as in “To the crows!”–that is, “Drop dead!”
οἱ μὲν . . . ἀποθανόντος τὸ σῶμα οἱ δὲ ζῶντος τὴν ψυχήν: Gorgias also polarized body and soul (Encomium of Helen §1 and passim), and the survival pattern of the apophthegma, including its use by Aristophanes, could point to Gorgias as the original inspiration (as suggested by R. Janko per litt.). With t. 163, this is the clearest case of polar opposition between body and soul in Antisthenes. As in t. 163, there are no implications of ontological separability.
= 89 DC
Ἀντισθένους. Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν ὥσπερ τὰς ἑταίρας τἀγαθὰ πάντα εὔχεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς παρεῖναι, πλὴν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς κόλακας οἷς σύνεισιν.
sine lemm. hab. S, addito lemm. M A | παρεῖναι S Md A : περιεῖναι Meineke
From Antisthenes. Antisthenes used to say that just as female companions pray for all good things to belong to their lovers, except for a mind and intelligence, likewise also flatterers, for those who keep their company.
Stobaeus’ section is titled Περὶ κολακείας, “On Flattery.” This item comes just after t. 131B, separated by one saying of Pythagoras, which is similar in sense to t. 109.
πλὴν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως: It is likely that these are the only sources of good, according to Antisthenes.
οὕτω καὶ τοὺς κόλακας: The Syracusan entertainer at the dinner party in Xenophon’s Symposium prays that his audience acquire a φρενῶν ἀφορία, “dearth of wits” (Sym. 4.55), and this statement would render him a flatterer on this account. See t. 63, from the Protreptics, which might have connections to both this testimonium and the passage in Xenophon.
= 165 DC
“ὁρῶ γὰρ πολλὴν παρ’ ὑμῖν τῆς φακῆς τὴν σκευήν· εἰς ἣν ἀποβλέπουσα συμβουλεύσαιμ’ ἂν ὑμῖν κατὰ τὸν Σωκρατικὸν Ἀντισθένην ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς τοῦ βίου τοιαῦτα σιτουμένους.”
[Nicion speaks:] “For I see that you have an abundant supply of lentil soup, and when I look at it, I would advise you, to quote the Socratic Antisthenes, to lead yourselves out of this life, if that is what you eat.”
At the dinner party of Larensis, the Cynic character Cyniscus takes the floor to commend a simple meal of lentils. In support, he cites The Cynics’ Drinking Party, by Parmeniscus, an otherwise unknown author of unknown date. In that text, which is in the form of a letter, two courtesans break in to scold the diners for their simplicity. One of the courtesans, called “Nicion the dog-fly” (because she is a nuisance to Cynics, who deny sexual relations inspired by bodily qualities), delivers these words to the diners. The quotation from Antisthenes is embedded in three layers of citation, and at least one is a parody. But ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς τοῦ βίου, τοιαῦτα (verb replaced) could be a genuine quotation.
This shows a Cynic reception of Antisthenes (possibly his Protreptics, which were probably set at a symposium: see t. 63–67) in the time of Parmeniscus, whenever that was. The letter of Parmeniscus cites Meleager of Gadara (fl. c. 95–93 BCE) as a “forefather” of the Cynics: this places Parmeniscus in the first or second century CE. (Possibly he is Athenaeus’ own fiction.) The fourth-century BCE comic playwright Eubulus wrote a play called Parmeniscus, and fragments surviving from his other plays show that he wrote of dinner parties. If this was the same Eubulus who wrote a Sale of Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.30), his works might have inspired later Cynic literature. Meleager, who wrote a Symposium, could be responsible for transmitting details, such as the citation of Antisthenes, to later authors. See Martin 1931:161–62, denying this hypothesis but collecting opinions from previous scholarship.
ἐξάγειν αυτοὺς τοῦ βίου: A parallel is t. 105, where Antisthenes recommends “getting a mind or a noose.” See also t. 32, 178. Antisthenes’ own life seems to be worth living, as he is reportedly too reluctant to die (t. 37A). The remainder of Parmeniscus’ letter equates heavy eating with demise of the mind, which may be closer to Antisthenes’ real position.
τοιαῦτα σιτουμένους: For the meager evidence on Antisthenes’ injunctions about eating, see t. 116, 128. Presumably this is a parody, the very opposite of his own position, shared with the later Cynics, in support of simplicity and frugality. For frugality in eating, see t. 135A–B; for frugality with wine, t. 64, 82.41, 197.
= 69, 70, 80, 95, 101, 81, 79, 71, 76, 74, 72, 73, 88, 63 DC
(SSR omits two sentences here and prints them as t. 58, where they are discussed herein.)
(10) ἤρεσκεν αὐτῷ καὶ τάδε. (a) διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετήν. (11.) (b) καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς οὓς καὶ ἐναρέτους· (c) αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος. (d) τὴν τ’ ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων. (e) αὐτάρκη τ’ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. (f) τήν τε ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ. (g) καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς. (h) γαμήσειν τε τεκνοποιίας χάριν, ταῖς εὐφυεστάταις συνιόντα γυναιξί. (i) καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δέ· μόνον γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν. (12.) ἀναγράφει δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ Διοκλῆς ταυτί. (j) τῷ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἄτοπον. (k) ἀξιέραστος ὁ ἀγαθός· (l) οἱ σπουδαῖοι φίλοι· (m) συμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς εὐψύχους ἅμα καὶ δικαίους· (n) ἀναφαίρετον ὅπλον ἡ ἀρετή· (o) κρεῖττόν ἐστι μετ’ ὀλίγων ἀγαθῶν πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς κακοὺς ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν κακῶν πρὸς ὀλίγους ἀγαθοὺς μάχεσθαι. (p) προσέχειν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰσθάνονται. (q) τὸν δίκαιον περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ συγγενοῦς· (r) ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή· (s) τἀγαθὰ καλά, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά· (t) τὰ πονηρὰ νόμιζε πάντα ξενικά. (13) (u) τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν· μήτε γὰρ καταρρεῖν μήτε προδίδοσθαι. (v) τείχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὑτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς.
(11) (b) οὓς Richards : τοὺς codd. | (f) καὶ codd. : κατ’ Croenert | (g) τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς B P Φ : τοὺς τῶν ἀρετῶν F | (h) συνιόντα B P : συνόντα F | (i) χρὴ codd. : δεῖ Φ et Hesych. (12) (j) τῷ σοφῷ F Φ : τῷ γὰρ σοφῷ B P | οὐδ’ F P4 : om. B P1 Φ | ἄτοπον Kuehn teste Dorandi : ἄπορον Stephanus : ἄπο P F : ἀπὸ B : om. Φ (13) (u) προδίδοσθαι codd. plur. : προδίδωσθαι F : προδίδοσθαι τύχῃ Arsenius | (v) αὑτῶν φ et Arsenius : αὐτῶν B P F
(10) He held also the following views. (a) He used to demonstrate that virtue is teachable. (11) (b) And that the same people are wellborn who are also endowed with virtue. (c) And that virtue is self-sufficient for happiness, needing nothing in addition except for Socratic strength. (d) And that virtue is a characteristic of deeds, needing neither a lot of words nor learning. (e) And that the wise man is self-sufficient: for everything belonging to others belongs to him. (f) And that bad reputation is good and equivalent to toil. (g) And that the wise man will conduct government not according to the legislated laws, but according to the law of virtue. (h) And he will marry for the sake of producing children, mating with the women best in nature. (i) And he will fall in love: for only the wise man knows whom it is right to love. (12) Diocles ascribes to him also the following views. (j) To the wise man, nothing is foreign or out of place. (k) The good man is worthy of love. (l) The good are friends. (m) One should make allies of those good in soul and likewise just. (n) Virtue is an inalienable weapon. (o) It is better to fight with a few good men against all the bad ones than with many bad men against a few good ones. (p) One should pay attention to one’s enemies, for they are the first to notice one’s errors. (q) One should value a just man more than a relative. (r) Virtue is the same for a man and a woman. (s) Good things are fine, and bad things are ugly. (t) Believe that all base things are foreign. (13) (u) Intelligence is the safest city wall, for it neither falls down nor is betrayed. (v) City walls must be constructed in one’s own unassailable reasonings.
Diogenes gives Antisthenes’ doxography, marked by a formal transition, after the anecdotes that illustrate his life and before the list of book titles.
The doxography appears to come from a Stoic history of philosophy, which is both accurate, on the one hand, and interested, on the other, in representing Antisthenes and perhaps early Cynicism as proto-Stoic. It is consistently positive and optimistic in its tone, indicating nothing of Antisthenes’ possibly dour or pessimistic persona (for which see notes on t. 14A and 208.26), and there is no humor or paradox. Mansfeld 1986 (following older scholarship) argues that this whole doxography is from Diocles, not just the passage beginning at section 12. If this is true, Diogenes has an intermediate source for the first section (10–11), since some of the maxims are doublets, phrased differently (e/j, f/p, i/k), and the second section (12–13) emphasizes militaristic imagery, which is absent in the first. The first section is also written with connective particles, whereas the items in the second list have none. Schofield 1991:141–43 argues that the first section follows the same scheme as the doxography of Diogenes of Sinope in Diog. Laert. 6.72: both cover real virtue first, then false virtue, then political participation, then marriage. Both doxographies, Schofield says, have been Stoicized.
Diocles of Magnesia is one of Diogenes Laertius’ main sources for Cynicism and Stoicism (see t. 22A; Mejer 1978:42–45; Mansfeld 1986; Goulet-Cazé 1992). His dates are uncertain, but possibly he wrote soon after the time of Chrysippus, c. 200 BCE (Schofield 1991:11 n. 20). The maxims are doubtless drawn from Antisthenes’ whole corpus, selected and paraphrased in the interest of answering the questions posed in a Hellenistic Stoic “checklist” on ethics (Schofield 1991:119–27). Some have parallels in other evidence, but many are unique testimonia. A similar list for Aristotle appears at 5.30–31, where the doxography has three clear sections: logic, ethics, and physics. Only the middle section is parallel to the present doxography of Antisthenes. This might imply that Antisthenes had doctrines only in the realm of ethics, according to the judgment of the source. His ample writing on “logic” was either too negative to count or too fully superseded by later developments. See also the broadly historical passages in t. 22A and 135A.
(a) διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετήν: The mention of demonstration might suggest actual teaching performances: see t. 94B, referring to the Heracles story. The Hellenistic debate on whether virtue is “teachable” probably assumes a simple opposition between “teachable” versus “not teachable,” whereas the Sophistic and Socratic debate imagined a larger set of distinctions, including also “learnable” (μαθητήν) and “trainable” (ἀσκητήν).. See t. 103A.
(b) τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς οὓς καὶ ἐναρέτους: Antisthenes is attributed with several identity statements in the realm of virtue, not only in this passage (see also 134s–t), which seems to be reduced, but also in t. 54.13 and 187.6; see also t. 78. These resemble statements set out frequently in Plato’s dialogues as Socratic theses, to which an interlocutor is asked to agree before discussion proceeds. Presumably they reflect a Socratic thesis (or inquiry) about the identity of virtue: true virtue, however we call it, is one thing, and terms such as “wellborn” or “noble” or “high class” or “beautiful” or even “wealthy” (t. 82) might have differentiated senses in popular usage, but when correctly applied, they all refer to the same thing, virtue. Since Antisthenes seems eager in some cases to differentiate multiple senses of single words or syllables, rather than reduce multiple words to one sense (see t. 187, 189), it is plausible that human ethical virtue was the special realm where he advocated for this unity underlying differentiated language. We lack adequate material to investigate this question directly. It seems plausible that the nuances in Antisthenes’ thinking on this topic are reflected in the pseudo-Platonic dialogues (for example) in addition to Xenophon and Dio Chrysostom, the sources consistently favored in Brancacci 1990.
(c) αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην . . . : This is Antisthenes’ position on the (possibly anachronistic) Hellenistic ethical question whether virtue or pleasure is sufficient for happiness. For a different account of Antisthenes’ view of the ethical goal, see t. 111. For the term εὐδαιμονία as the goal, see t. 136B, 136D. The phrase [τινὸς] προσδεομένη is used repeatedly in Plato’s construction of the complex city in Rep. 2 373c1–8, for which the basic motivation is that no individual person is “himself sufficient for himself toward living well” (αὐτὸς αὑτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, 387e1): it is plausible that competing minor Socratics, as reflected in Xenophon and possibly including Antisthenes, held a distinctive view against which Plato was writing. The definition of happiness in the Platonic Definitions is “a self-sufficient power toward living well” (δύναμις αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, 412d10–11). The addition of one additional element beyond ἀρετή in Antisthenes’ account of happiness seems critically significant, given this background discourse.
Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος: This additional element seems to be something external to “virtue” that must complement it before happiness is achieved. This would distinguish Antisthenes’ view from the Stoic position as reported in doxographies, that virtue alone is sufficient. Some versions of Stoic theory do require a “strength” in every act that will count as moral, not indifferent (Galen, Diagnosis and Cure of the Soul’s Errors 1.3). Exactly what this “strength” is depends partly on what “virtue” is: if “virtue” is purely intellectual, a matter of understanding certain things, then “strength” adds the will or power to overcome hindrances and temptations and to use wisdom toward happiness. If virtue already includes the ethical dimension (see Segvic 2000 for this interpretation of Socratic virtue), then “strength” may be more like a special power to confront difficulty inherent in human life, as in the metaphor of the path to the top of the mountain (t. 136B; Hesiod, WD 289–92; Xen. Mem. 2.1.21–33). Possibly it is an inborn quality (see t. 198). On the possible connection with the force or motivation of philosophical eros, see t. 92. The term is in the title of Antisthenes’ minor work on Heracles (see t. 41A title 10.2). See Goulet-Cazé 1986:141–50.
(d) τὴν τ’ ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων: This statement, along with the rejection of the traditional curriculum in education and rejection of literacy (t. 161), has traditionally been understood as part of a Cynic tradition of “radical anti-intellectualism” (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:389: see, e.g., Sayre 1948:18–19; Dudley 1937; Cynic evidence in Kindstrand 1976). But the abundant evidence for Antisthenes’ interest in language (t. 41A tomoi 1 and 6–9) tells against this interpretation for him. Either the statement reflects a tradition that Cynicizes Antisthenes at a high cost of falsification, or it must be understood in a way that admits his extensive work in the realm of language. Antisthenes’ doctrine probably did not oppose “deeds” and “accounts” as mutually exclusive: see t. 53–54. Because λόγοι is here coupled with μαθήματα, it seems that the opposition between practice and theory is also relevant. Ethical doctrine does not constitute virtue, but ethical behavior does; and the “use” of λόγοι, both passively and actively, is ethical behavior. Brancacci 1990:92 n. 19 emphasizes that πλείστοι λόγοι are rejected here, not λόγοι simply; this can be compared to Ajax’ rejection of πολλοὶ καὶ μακροὶ λόγοι (t. 53.8).
(e) αὐτάρκη: The term αὐτάρκης as a description of the wise man, important for both Zeno and Epicurus, appears nowhere in Antisthenes’ literary remains. The verbal form ἀρκεῖ occurs six times in t. 82, and Xenophon insists that Socrates was αὐτάρκης, possibly by inspiration from Antisthenes (so Joël 1893–1901). With or without the term, the idea of self-sufficiency is clearly important to Antisthenes. (See esp. t. 82, 100A, 53–54.)
(f) τήν τε ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθόν: See t. 85–86, 90. This sentence confirms that bad reputation is a form of toil (or “like toil,” if this difference is significant), a form of ethical training (t. 85) that might supplement athletic and intellectual training (t. 163).
(g) οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς: A similar position is attributed to Socrates, by his accusers, at Xen. Mem. 1.2.9. Whereas the legislated laws are many, the law of virtue is singular. Since law, like theology, is embedded in language, the difference between the one real law and the many in circulation might be parallel to the one and many gods of t. 179–80. (See also Müller 1995:259.) This opposition between kinds of law might be the basis for the differentiation of titles 3.3–4 in Antisthenes’ catalog (Decleva Caizzi 1966:80). Compare also the individualist implications in t. 68 (where the powerful “are themselves the law”), 189. Pl. Rep. 9 592a5–10 ends with the observation that the good man will practice politics “in the city of himself, and not in his fatherland” (ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι).
(h–i) γαμήσειν . . . τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν: This is t. 58. See also t. 123, 41A title 2.2.
(j) τῷ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδέν οὐδ’ ἄτοπον: The term ξένον suggests a transcendence of nationalism or ethnic boundary. In making a hero of the barbarian Cyrus, Antisthenes might have practiced this (see t. 85), and Cynic cosmopolitanism could be related. Odysseus’ journeys and knowledge of the minds of many men (Od. 1.3) might also be related: Schrader 1890 ad loc. proposes that surviving scholia on this verse can be traced to Antisthenes. The term ἄτοπον (Kuehn’s conjecture recovered by Dorandi in place of the normally printed ἄπορον) is roughly synonymous and resonates with Stoic tenets.
(k) ἀξιέραστος: On Antisthenes’ view of philosophical eros, see t. 92A–C.
(l) φίλοι: Friendship for Antisthenes might have a political as well as a personal basis, depending how one reads evidence from Xenophon: see t. 13A, 110. But his relationship to Socrates is one of both personal eros (of the philosophical kind) and friendship (see t. 14A). Compare t. 37B.
(m) εὐψύχους ἅμα καὶ δικαίους: These are probably further descriptions of the same virtuous persons who are called εὐγενεῖς and ἐναρέτους in (b), σπουδαῖοι in (l), ἀγαθούς in (o), and τὸν δίκαιον in (q). See also t. 102.
(n) ἀναφαίρετον ὅπλον: This is the proto-Stoic view that virtue gained cannot be lost. Such a view might be basically intellectualist, but there is nothing to exclude memories of all kinds, including emotional, from the virtue accumulated in the soul. See the nearest parallel in t. 135A; for Xenophon’s apparent objections to the doctrine, see t. 103C.
(o) κρεῖττόν ἐστι . . . μάχεσθαι: A close parallel is in Xen. Mem. 2.6.27: πολὺ δὲ κρεῖττον τοὺς βελτίστους ἐλάττονας εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τοὺς χείρονας πλείονας ὄντας. But Xenophon interprets “better” and “worse” in reference to wealth, “well-off in resources” versus “needy.”
(p) προσέχειν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς: See t. 109.
(r) ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή: This is the most direct surviving evidence that Antisthenes followed Socrates in a view of full identity between the virtue of a male and a female. See, further, t. 18, 143A. The Stoic Cleanthes is credited with a book title on the thesis (Diog. Laert. 7.175), and the theme may be visible in the evidence for Zeno of Citium, as well as in the marriage of Crates and Hipparchia. It is likely that the Stoics followed Antisthenes’ tradition in their view of ethical and philosophical equality between the sexes. (See Schofield 1991:43–46; Asmis 1996.)
(s) τἀγαθὰ καλά, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά: See note on (b).
(t) τὰ πονηρὰ νόμιζε πάντα ξενικά: Zeller 1888:304 and n.1 compares similar maxims in Pl. Sym. 205e and Charm. 163c and Themistius On Virtue (from which comes t. 96) and posits that the notion of equivalence between τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ οἰκεῖον and between τὸ κακόν and τὸ ἀλλότριον was primarily Antisthenes’ doctrine. See also t. 34E, 152B.2 notes.
(v) τείχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὑτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς: This seems to show that logos is not merely a tool for attaining virtue but must be exercised continually to maintain virtue against defeat by the enemies (Decleva Caizzi 1966:110). For the term λογισμοῖς, see t. 149B-2. Compare ἀναπόβλητον (t. 135A–B) with ἀναλώτοις.