(1) εἰκότως, τὸ δὲ προσέχειν Preller : εἰκότως τότε προσέχειν cod. (2) τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεὶς Schrader : καὶ ἄλλων οὐδεὶς cod. (3) <ὁ> add. Schrader (4) ὁμογνώμων prima littera e correctione (5) ἀθεμίστια lectio incerta | <δὲ> add. Schrader e schol. Vd (189C-1)
“It is in no way possible to avoid a sickness from great Zeus,
but you should pray to your father, the lord Poseidon.”
[Od. 9.411-12]
(1) How, when the Cyclops has previously said, “For Cyclopes do not pay heed to Zeus the aegis-bearer, nor the blessed gods, since we are much more powerful” [Od. 9.275–76], did the poet later portray the Cyclopes saying: “It is not in any way possible to avoid a disease from the great Zeus, but you, pray to your father, the lord Poseidon” [Od. 9.411–12]? For it seems to be a contradiction, when he is not saying the same things about the same things: for not to attend to the gods would likely be characteristic of greater beings, whereas to attend to them would likely be characteristic of lesser beings. (2) The problem is again solved from the persona of the speakers. That the Cyclopes are much greater than the gods, Polyphemus has said to Odysseus, but that the Cyclopes are more powerful than the gods, nobody of the others has said. (3) If, then, the poet said these things, or the same [speaker] in the poet, they would be opposites. But since the one speaking is different in each case, it must be considered to whom he assigned the rather senseless words. (4) And it is clear that he assigned them to Polyphemus, who was not of like mind with the others, nor was he in agreement in his belief about the gods: for “he tended his flocks,” as the poet says, “in isolation, nor did he come and go among the others, but being far away he knew unlawful things” [Od. 9.188–89]. (5) So, recognizing himself the lawless things even about the gods, he thought that also the other Cyclopes believed the same things as he, but it turned out that they, being better in their nature than he, did not recognize the same things as he: for about them the poet said: “who, having trusted the immortal gods . . .” [Od. 9.107].
(1) ἐναντίωμα γὰρ φαίνεται, μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντος: The accuser presents the technical problem of contradiction. “Contradiction” is already the name of a critic’s problem in Aristotle’s Poetics (1461a31–34, 1461b23), where the resolution seems to be lexical: the critic should analyze “in how many ways this <word> might be meaningful in the statement” (ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, 1461b32–33). This contradiction is the third in the discussion as preserved: the original problem in t. 189A-1 (and 189A-2–3) is a contradiction (not named as such) within 9.106–7: the answer to the first contradiction generates a second, between 9.107 and 9.275–76, raised and answered in t. 189A-2.3–4; that answer generates a third, between 9.275–76 and 9.411–12, raised and answered here. The topic of all three contradictions is the same, the piety of the Cyclopes, but different verses, giving the statements of different speakers, constitute the three instances.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ προσέχειν τοῖς θεοῖς κρειττόνων . . . τὸ δὲ προσέχειν πάλιν ἡττόνων: The contradiction is phrased precisely as mutually contradictory statements in a mathematical sense: the Cyclopes must claim to be either greater or lesser than the gods, and there is no other possibility.
(2) λύεται δὲ πάλιν ἐκ προσώπου τῶν λεγόντων: This is a second application of the solution from the persona, as the adverb πάλιν shows. It was used in t. 189A-2 to solve the second contradiction. The “solution from the persona” is not named as such in ch. 25 of Aristotle’s Poetics, but a related tactic seems to be implied twice: at 1461a4–9, the identity of the speaking character is part of a larger framework to be considered before applying moral evaluation to speeches or deeds; at 1461b15–18, apparent contradictions can be resolved by distinguishing various factors—the reference and the manner of the things said—so that the poet does not speak against what he says himself. Although the text at 1461b18 may be corrupt, with a sentence perhaps missing (see Lucas 1968:249), it seems unlikely that Aristotle would have resolved an apparent contradiction by differentiating the speakers: throughout ch. 25, it is always the poet who speaks, and he has a consistent message, which can be found. Porphyry, for his part, reports that the solution from the persona is a kind of lusis “adduced by many” for the problem at hand (see §3 note); in his own voice, however, he dismisses this technique and instead distinguishes different occasions for the activity (MacPhail 2011:118), giving the text a consistent meaning as though it were said in one voice. Antisthenes seems to side with the many critics Porphyry dismisses, using the solution from the persona as a final solution for the problem of contradiction. He reads the Odyssey as though it were a dramatic dialogue.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οἱ Κύκλωπές εἰσι πολὺ φέρτεροι τῶν θεῶν . . . ὅτι δὲ οἱ Κύκλωπες τῶν θεῶν εἰσι κρείττους: In the discussion as preserved, it is clear that πολὺ φέρτεροι τῶν θεῶν and τῶν θεῶν . . . κρείττους are understood synonymously. It is plausible that a fuller version of the discussion investigated the difference, or equivalence, between being “greater” and being “more powerful” than the gods.
ὁ Πολύφημος εἴρηκε πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα: The person addressed, not only the person speaking, can explain a partial or skewed (i.e., intentionally false) element in what the speaker says. Aristotle would presumably agree with this (see t. 188A-1), although the person addressed is not a dimension introduced to resolve any problem in Poet. 25.
(3) εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ ποιητὴς ταῦτα εἴρηκεν ἢ <ὁ> αὐτὸς παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, ἐναντία ἦν: This is the same principle Porphyry explains quite fully when he addresses the problem in Il. 6.275, an apparent contradiction over the soldier’s proper use of wine (MacPhail 2011:116–19): οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστὸν εἰ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ ἐναντία λέγεται ὑπὸ διαφόρων φωνῶν. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐξ ἰδίου προσώπου, ταῦτα δεῖ ἀκόλουθα εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις· ὅσα δὲ προσώποις περιτίθησιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων νοεῖται, ὅθεν καὶ ἐπιδέχεται πολλάκις διαφωνίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις. (And it is nothing remarkable if opposite things are said in the poet by different voices. But whatever he himself said from himself, from his special persona, these must be consistent and not in opposition to each other. For this reason [the poem] admits disagreement very often, as also in these lines.) Porphyry’s careful explanation, as though this were an unfamiliar idea, is consistent with his statement soon below that a different approach is better: ἄμεινον δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο λέγειν καὶ δεικνύειν, ἑκάτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχεσθαι λόγου καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐναντία τὰ περὶ τοῦ οἴνου λεγόμενα, ἐὰν σκοπῇ τις, ὅτι ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγματος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τὸ μέτρον πολὺ διαλλάττει (But a better approach is to say and demonstrate this, that each of the statements depends on a reason, and the things said about the wine are not opposed, if one considers that for each thing the occasion and the measure vary greatly). This implies that the phrasing in the present passage could be Porphyry’s, but the application of the principle to solve the problem is likely to be from Antisthenes. The distinction between the poet and “the same one in the poet” might refer explicitly to the fact that the character Odysseus is narrating Od. 9.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, σκεπτέον τίνι περιέθηκε τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους λόγους: The phrasing could come from Antisthenes: the odd phrase ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος is attested once in the Aristotelian Problems (888b24); once each in Plutarch, Galen, Herodian, and Aelius Aristides; three times in Themistius; and otherwise only in later writers. (It has been argued to me in private correspondence that Schrader did not punctuate correctly and that there should be a comma after the first ἄλλος and a full stop after ὁ λέγων. The translation would then be “But since it was another [who spoke these words], also it is another who speaks. One must consider to whom he [the poet] assigned the rather senseless words.” This must be incorrect, for several reasons. Foremost, the first two clauses then say nothing. In the passage (§1), there are two parties whose speeches have been considered, and the critic has just asked whether these speakers are the same. They are not: they are different, not jointly from the poet and from “the same speaker in the poet,” but from each other.) In this case of the third contradiction, the two speakers are Polyphemus (in 9.275–76) and the other Cyclopes (in 9.411–12). If one assumes this explanation should cover also the second contradiction (in t. 189A-2), one can distinguish the poet (in 106–7) from Polyphemus (in 9.275–76). Indeed “the poet” seems to be put on a level with his characters by the principle stated in the previous note. But when one goes back to the original contradiction (in t. 189A-1), there is no such distinction to be made, for the speaker of both conflicting verses, 9.106–7, is the poet. Therefore, the solution from the persona does not resolve that contradiction, and indeed the solution, when it was labeled (in t. 189A-3.6), was called a solution from the diction. But the solution from the diction as applied in t. 189A-3.6–7 is not the same solution Antisthenes uses in t. 189A-1.4. In t. 189A-3.6–7, the critics cite Homeric parallels that support the positive sense for each epithet, and they designate these as the sense active in 9.106–7. This is consistent with Aristotle’s recommendation in Poet. 1461a32–35, that the critic should consider “in how many ways [the word] could have meaning in the statement, like this or like this, in order that he might best adopt [one]” (ὡς μάλιστ’ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι): the fact that the meaning is one is not said here, but when solutions from the diction are illustrated in Poet. 1461a9–21, the solution is always one. Antisthenes, by contrast, claims that Homer’s epithets have two senses each and implies that both are active simultaneously in 9.106–7: the first epithet does not occur elsewhere in book 9 (see t. 189A-1.6). (His basis for claiming these senses is presumably the analysis of compounds and etymology we see in t. 189A-1.1–3 and 189A-2.1, as well as in t. 187.4–5, not the mere citation of parallel passages we see in t. 189A-3.6–7. That the negative senses are not supported through analysis and etymology is either an accident of transmission or an omission of the obvious, since the accuser already sees the negative senses.) Although Antisthenes does not split Homer’s persona in 9.106 into two voices, there is a sense in which the compound statement that Homer makes there is like the two voices that are resolved in the other contradictions of the discussion.
σκεπτέον τίνι περιέθηκε τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους λόγους: This language is close to t. 189A-2.4.
(4) οὐχ ὁμογνώμων ἦν τοῖς ἄλλοις: See the parallel in t. 189C-2.2. This is the exegete’s explanation for Polyphemus’ impiety: he is not like-minded with the others in general, and so he disagrees in this case also.
ἀπάνευθεν ἐὼν ἀθεμίστια ᾔδει: Living apart is apparently Homer’s explanation for Polyphemus’ “knowledge” of unjust things. The term ἀθεμίστια is nearly the same as the Cyclopes’ second epithet ἀθεμίστων, and at least one manuscript (Vd = t. 189C-2) transmits a spelling here that agrees with the epithet rather than with Homer’s text: Schrader reports the reading here in T as “uncertain.”
(5) καὶ περὶ θεῶν τὰ ἀθεμίστια εἰδώς: Homer does not say that the ἀθεμίστια are theological: this is the critic’s conclusion. It is unclear whether Antisthenes would endorse the implication that knowledge of the divine is caused by community. His own lifestyle (t. 82) seems to renounce community, and he also seems to renounce conventional religion (t. 178, 182), but not theology (t. 179, 180). Either he thought the correct religious community was something like the Socratic circle, or he did not endorse Homer’s explanation of Polyphemus but had another, such as the explanation from φύσις that follows. On the three epistemological attitudes in this sentence (εἰδώς, ἡγεῖτο, δοξάζειν), see t. 189C-2.3.
βελτίους ἐκείνου τὴν φύσιν ὄντας: See comment on t. 189C-2.3.
= 54 DC
“ὡς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ’ ἰήσεται οὐδ’ Ἐνοσίχθων.”
διὰ τί ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς πρὸς τὸν κύκλωπα οὕτως ἀνοήτως εἰς τὸν Ποσειδῶνα ὠλιγώρησεν τῷ λόγῳ εἰπών· “ὡς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ’ ἰήσεται οὐδ’ Ἐνοσίχθων;” Ἀντισθένης μέν φησι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐκ ἦν ἰατρὸς ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἀλλ’ ὁ Ἀπόλλων. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐ δυνήσεται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐ βουλήσεται, διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τοῦ Κύκλωπος.
πρὸς τὸν κύκλωπα Τ : om. H Q | τῷ λόγω Τ : om. H Q | διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι H : διατί εἰδέναι Τ | βουλήσεται T : βουληθήσεται H | διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν Τ : διὰ τὴν πορείαν H |
“That not even the Earthshaker will heal your eye.”
[Od. 9.525]
Why did Odysseus so foolishly insult Poseidon by his statement to the Cyclops, in saying “that not even the Earthshaker will heal your eye”? Antisthenes, first, says it was because he knows that Poseidon was not a doctor, but Apollo was. But Aristotle says [that Odysseus implied] not that he would be unable, but that he would not want to, because of the depravity of the Cyclops.
This scholium is preserved fully in mss. T, H, and Q (Q is reported by Dindorf and not Schrader) and in a generalized, anonymous form in ms. M (see descriptions of the manuscripts under t. 187 and 188). In Dialogues of the Sea Gods 2.4, Lucian presents his character Poseidon giving Antisthenes’ explanation. The manuscripts make no attribution to Porphyry, but Porphyry’s role in transmission might be conjectured from the juxtaposed solutions of Antisthenes and Aristotle and the identity of the manuscripts. It is possible that Antisthenes’ material comes originally from the same source as t. 189C-1.
The interpretation shows the lengths to which Antisthenes went to defend the virtue of Odysseus. The Odyssey, in the voice of Zeus (1.68–75), says that Odysseus made a critical error and gained Poseidon’s wrath by harming his son; one can assume the taunt contributed to this wrath. This interpretation of the event in Od. 9 is central to the plot of the Odyssey.
διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι: The knowledge of characters is key also in t. 188A2.3, 189C-2.3, and 189D.5. Here, as in the case of Polyphemus in t. 189C-2 and 189D, Odysseus’ knowledge of the divine may be relative to his position as a character in the story, or within the society that worships these gods: it seems that Antisthenes himself should deny the divinity of the various Olympians, except for Zeus, and especially their differentiation into special realms, such as a god of the sea who is different from a god of healing (see t. 179–80).
οὐκ ἦν ἰατρὸς ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἀλλ’ ὁ Ἀπόλλων: Odysseus’ apparently impious utterance might fail to make any statement at all, on the terms of t. 153B.3 (οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄν τι λέγοιεν περὶ αὐτοῦ; compare t. 152B.6). If Poseidon the healer is the referent implied in the sentence “not even the Earthshaker will heal your eye,” and if there is no such being as Poseidon the healer, then the statement might fail to say anything at all. Odysseus’ intelligence would be hard to reconcile with this kind of error, if it were really an error. Rather, Odysseus’ statement must be intentionally misleading, to to taunt or scare his interlocutor. This is the clearest case in the evidence for defensive intentions in Antisthenes’ criticism of Homer and his hero Odysseus.
Ἀριστοτέλης δέ: Whereas Antisthenes reinterprets the human attitude, Aristotle (fr. 174 Rose) reinterprets the divine attitude, as indicated in Odysseus’ ambiguous words.
= 55 DC
“ἄλλος μὲν μογέων ἀποκινήσασκε τραπέζης,
πλεῖον ἐόν, Νέστωρ δ’ ὁ γέρων ἀμογητὶ ἄειρεν.”
διὰ τί πεποίηκε μόνον τὸν Νέστορα αἴροντα τὸ ἔκπομα; οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ῥᾷον αἴρειν νεωτέρων. Στησίμβροτος μὲν οὖν φησιν, ἵνα δοκεῖ εἰκότως πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι· εἰ γὰρ παράμονος ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ οὐχ ὑπὸ γήρως μεμάρανται, καὶ τὰ τῆς ζωῆς εὔλογον εἶναι παραπλήσια. Ἀντισθένης δέ· οὐ περὶ τῆς κατὰ χεῖρα βαρύτητος λέγει, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμεθύσκετο σημαίνει· ἀλλ’ ἔφερε ῥᾳδίως τὸν οἶνον. Γλαύκων δὲ ὅτι κατὰ διάμετρον ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὦτα, ἐκ μέσου δὲ πᾶν εὔφορον. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὸ “Νέστωρ ὁ γέρων” ἀπὸ κοινοῦ ἔφη δεῖν ἀκούειν ἐπὶ τοῦ “ἄλλος,” ἵν’ ᾗ· “ἄλλος μὲν γέρων μογέων ἀποκινήσασκε τραπέζης, Νέστωρ δ’ ὁ γέρων ἀμογητὶ ἄειρεν”· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς καθ’ ἡλικίαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι τὴν σύγκρισιν.
διὰ τί . . . νεωτέρων om. B | νεωτέρων Schrader : νεωτέρον F Le | καὶ Στησίμβροτος μὲν οὖν F Le : καὶ om. MacPhail : Στησίμβροτος δὲ B | Ἀντισθένης Spitzer : Ἀντιφάνης codd. | Ἀντισθένης . . . οἶνον om. B | Γλαύκων Heitz : Γλαῦκος codd.
“Another man would have moved it from the table with difficulty,
since it was full, but the old man Nestor was lifting it easily.”
[Il. 11.636–37]
Why has he portrayed only Nestor raising the drinking cup? For it is not plausible that he lifts it more easily than younger men. Stesimbrotus says [that Homer writes in this way] so that he [sc. Nestor] might appear plausibly to have lived many years: for if his strength is still with him and is not defeated by old age, it stands to reason that matters of his life span are similar. But Antisthenes says that he [sc. Homer] does not speak about the heaviness in the hand, but he signals that he [sc. Nestor] did not become drunk: rather, he carried his wine easily. And Glaucon says that he [sc. Nestor] grasped the handles along the diameter, and everything is easily lifted from the center. And Aristotle said that it is necessary to understand “Nestor the old man” in conjunction with “another,” so that the reading would be “another old man would raise it from the table with effort, but Nestor the old man lifted it effortlessly”: for the comparison is to those alike in age.
The passage is preserved in scholia in a second hand added to one Iliad manuscript, F (Escurialensis 509, eleventh century), and in the scholia in another Iliad manuscript, Le (Leidensis Vossianus Graecus 64, fifteenth century). Both manuscripts also preserve the Odysseus polytropos explication (t. 187). A third manscript, B (Venetus Graecus 821, eleventh century), preserves part of the passage, also in a later hand, but omits the sentence about Antisthenes, as well as another sentence. The scholiasts of mss. F and Le cite Porphyry as source. Because the passage records four solutions to the same Homeric problem and because Aristotle’s opinion is the last, this is the best evidence available that Porphyry’s source for Antisthenes was the lost Aristotelian Homeric Problems or a similar text by one of his associates, such as Dicaearchus or Heraclides Ponticus. As far as we can tell, the solutions are in chronological order.
This passage demonstrates Antisthenes’ rivalry with and differences from other contemporary interpreters of Homer, suggests an aspect of his exegetical method, and suggests that he translated Homer’s meaning into principles from Socraticism.
μόνον τὸν Νέστορα αἴροντα τὸ ἔκπομα: Athenaeus (Wise Men at Dinner 488a–492e) documents a rich tradition of exegesis on Homer’s account of Nestor’s cup descending from the Alexandrian pupils of Aristarchus.
οὐ γὰρ εἰκός: The problem of implausibility is part of the system of problems and solutions that Aristotle discusses in ch. 25 of the Poetics, which might summarize a longer treatment in his lost Homeric Problems. Implausibility is apparently a subclass of the charge of “irrational” (ὡς ἄλογα, 1461b23; compare 1461b13–15). The problem in this passage might have been founded not only in probabilities from real life but in Nestor’s difficulties with lifting heavy objects elsewhere in the Iliad (11.668–69, 23.627–28).
Στησίμβροτος: This critic appears as one of Antisthenes’ rivals in Xenophon’s Symposium and as one of Ion’s rivals in Ion 530d1. (See discussion of his identity at t. 185A.) Glaucon, too, appears in Ion. The independent survival of Stesimbrotus’ name in this series in the scholia suggests that there is historical truth behind the rivalry suggested by Xenophon. Therefore, it is reasonable to look for a competitive relationship between his interpretation of Nestor’s strength and that of Antisthenes. The term ἰσχύς, “strength,” occurs nowhere in Homer but is contributed by Stesimbrotus; it is, meanwhile, an important term for Antisthenes. Nestor has physical strength of body, Stesimbrotus says, and it is exaggerated in the poetry (maybe through poetic license) to support the more important point that Nestor has lived for more years than most people.
οὐ περὶ τῆς κατὰ χεῖρα βαρύτητος λέγει, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμεθύσκετο σημαίνει· ἀλλ’ ἔφερε ῥᾳδίως τὸν οἶνον: The force of Antisthenes’ reinterpretation over that of Stesimbrotus is to deny the literal meaning of Homer’s words ἀμογητὶ ἄειρεν and to replace this with a different meaning, that Nestor was “carrying easily” (ἔφερε ῥᾳδίως) the wine, not the heavy cup, because he had “strength” of mind, not of body or hand. For Antisthenes’ recognition of “strength” in mind rather than body, see t. 54.13, 134c, 41A titles 4.2 and 10.2. There is also evidence for “weight” of mind rather than the kind of physical weight felt in the hand: see t. 106. The scene at the end of Plato’s Symposium (223b–d) shows Socrates able to drink all night and still conduct his normal routine the next day (Pépin 1993:7). This is probably not a core meaning of the “Socratic strength” Antisthenes calls for in t. 134c, but the Symposium scene implies that Socrates’ immunity from drunkenness is related to his ethical superiority. This summary does not preserve a justification or method for Antisthenes’ rather aggressive reinterpretation (by contrast with t. 187 and 189, where relics of a method are preserved), nor do we know that he treated Homer as speaker in the same way he would treat a character who speaks in the poems. When the term ἐπισημαίνεται is used of Odysseus in t. 188B.2, there is a sign in the text, the gratuitous adjective περίφρων, that effects the indicating, on a level beyond what Odysseus is literally saying to Calypso. Here we do not learn exactly which oddity the critic is interpreting: perhaps the occurrence of the imperfect tense of the verb ἄειρεν, when one might expect an aorist for a simple action, indicates that the poet really speaks of an enduring situation rather than an act. To judge from the detailed explanations in t. 187–89, we can assume that the original text explained the solution better than this epitome. The two actions by the poet, λέγει versus σημαίνει, need not be an exclusively opposed distinction (as Pépin 1993 argues, pointing to a parallel in Heraclitus’ statement about the Delphic oracle, at DK 22B93). Rather, to judge from t. 153B1, a speaker must indicate (σημαίνει) that about which he speaks through what he says (λέγει). It is the speaker’s job to use the semantic medium correctly, and σημαίνει is a more precise word for part of the action rendered more fully by λέγει. What is negated in the first clause here is the referent, that about which Homer speaks: he speaks not περὶ τῆς κατὰ χεῖρα βαρύτητος but περὶ τῆς κατὰ νοῦν βαρύτητος, indicating immunity to drunkenness. Since the conclusion of Antisthenes’ interpretation is so catching in its own right, the epitomizer had no need to expound intricacies such as which word or words in Homer’s utterance were the key indicating ones.
Γλαύκων: This Glaucon is likely to be the same critic mentioned by Plato at Ion 530d1 and by Aristotle at Poet. 1461b1. See Lanata 1963:271–81. His interpretation here seems to follow from that of Antisthenes because it assumes from the start that Nestor’s “strength” is mental, not bodily. He moves from the ethical strength of enkrateia to intellectual strength, a skill in geometrical reasoning.
Ἀριστοτέλης: Aristotle’s interpretation seems to be independent of this series and to make a new start by addressing the linguistic medium, Homer’s text, rather than its meaning. He assumes (implausibly) that the text elides a word and removes the problem of improbability by restoring this word. Porphyry might have agreed with Aristotle against the series of increasingly more radical solutions proposed by the other three, but it seems clear from Athenaeus that the Alexandrian tradition was more interested, like Antisthenes, in how much wine Nestor could hold.
= 56 DC
ἔνθά κ’ ἔτι μείζων τε καὶ ἀργαλεώτερος ἄλλος
πὰρ Διὸς ἀθανάτοισι χόλος καὶ μῆνις ἐτύχθη,
εἰ μὴ Ἀθήνη πᾶσι περιδείσασα θεοῖσιν
ὦρτο διὲκ προθύρου, λίπε δὲ θρόνον ἔνθα θάασσε,
τοῦ δ’ ἀπὸ μὲν κεφαλῆς κόρυθ’ εἵλετο καὶ σάκος ὤμων,
ἔγχος δ’ ἔστησε στιβαρῆς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἑλοῦσα
χάλκεον· ἣ δ’ ἐπέεσσι καθάπτετο θοῦρον Ἄρηα·
“μαινόμενε φρένας ἠλὲ διέφθορας· ἦ νύ τοι αὔτως
οὔατ’ ἀκουέμεν ἐστί, νόος δ’ ἀπόλωλε καὶ αἰδώς.”
πᾶσι <περι>δείσασα: ἀντὶ τοῦ “πάντων.” εἰκότως δὲ ὡς δεδοικυῖα τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἤδη πεπαιδευμένη μὴ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἡ Γλαυκῶπις φροντίζει. ἐκ τούτου καὶ Ἀντισθένης φησίν, ὡς εἴ τι πράττει ὁ σοφός, κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖ, ὡς καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τριχῶς νουθετεῖ τὸν Ἄρην.
εἰκότως . . . ἐναντιοῦσθαι b (BCE3E4) T et Li | περὶ . . . φροντίζει b (BCE3E4) et Li : “ὄφρ’ εἰδῇ γλαυκῶπις” (Θ 406) T | ἐκ τούτου . . . τὸν Ἄρην Li : om. cett.
Then another anger and rage, still greater and more difficult,
would have struck from Zeus against the immortals,
if Athena, fearing for all the gods, had not
come out from the doorway, and left the throne where she was sitting,
and taken his helmet from his head and his shield from his shoulders,
and stopped his bronze spear, taking it from his sturdy hand.
And she addressed the battle-hungry Ares with words:
“You mad man, deranged in your wits, you are ruined. In vain you have
ears to hear, and your mind has perished and your shame.”
[Il. 15.121–29]
“Fearing for all”: for “fearing about all.” Probably because she fears her father and has already been taught not to oppose him, the bright-eyed one takes thought about things to come. From this [verse] also Antisthenes says that if the wise man does anything, he is active according to all of virtue, just as Athena, too, warns Ares in three ways.
The first sentence of the passage appears throughout the bT tradition. The second sentence about Antisthenes is preserved only in the Leipzig codex Graecus 32 (fourteenth century), which contains, amid its exegetical scholia, excerpts from Porphyry and from another scholar (MacPhail 2011:9: the name is Σεναχηρ(ε)ίμ). Because Porphyry is so important in the transmission of Antisthenes’ other Homeric interpretations, it seems likely that he is the source for this one also.
This passage has been used in discussions of Antisthenes’ view of virtue, on whether he holds a “unity of virtue” thesis such as that described in Plato’s Protagoras (330–34, 349–50) and possibly implied in t. 134c. It is also relevant to his possibly “allegorical” interpretation of Homer’s gods.
ἐκ τούτου καὶ Ἀντισθένης: Commentators have debated whether the reference “from this” means the Homeric verse or the previous comment (Tate 1930:6 n.7). If Antisthenes is thought to be extending the previous interpretation, the reference to unified virtue could be part of a Stoic reception of the verses, apologizing for Athena’s apparently unbefitting fear. But Antisthenes’ interpretation does not seem to address Athena’s fear, and the separate transmission of the two sentences implies that they are independent. The Li writer or his source probably marked a fresh reference to Homer’s text with the phrase ἐκ τούτου. Tate 1930:6 n.7 cites a parallel from the scholia on Il. 24.526, where Epicurus is said to derive a statement about the gods “from this.” MacPhail 2007:17 notes scholiasts’ use of εἰς to connect passages from Porphyry to particular passages in the Homeric text. This could imply that Antisthenes used the text to ground a preconceived doctrine, as he appears to do in t. 191, rather than interpreting the text in its own right. But the fuller evidence of t. 54 and 187–89 also suggests that he was a careful reader.
ὁ σοφός: The main comparandum for the wise man seems to be Athena, since she is subject of the next clause. But it is possible that Ares’ lack of wisdom is also of interest as a contrast to the wise man: Ares may be warned because he fails to act as a wise man but instead acts as a madman (μαινόμενος), which, in Stoic vocabulary, covers everyone who is not wise. (See, e.g., Stob. 2.7.5b13 and Alex. Aph. De fato p. 199.19–20 [CAG 2.2 ed. Bruns]; Xen. Mem. 1.1.16 opposes τί σωφροσύνη, τί μάνια as some of Socrates’ questions.)
κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖ: This seems to appeal to a doctrine that virtue for the wise man is single and unified, a Stoic and possibly Socratic thesis. (Zeller 19225 v.2.1:312 n.5 characterizes it as intellectual virtue, knowledge.) The term ἐνεργεῖ, “be in action” or “operate,” seems to refer to activating one’s resources of self. In the Stoic fragments, however, its occurrences refer sooner to irrational activity than to rational (Alex. Aph. De fato p. 205.28 [CAG 2.2 ed. Bruns]; Galen quoting Chrysippus, De plac. Hipp. et Plat. 4.6.6). This implies that, whatever “all of virtue” means, this virtue is not both Stoic and exclusively rational.
ὡς καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τριχῶς νουθετεῖ τὸν Ἄρην: The reference of the word “in three ways” seems to be the key to the meaning of the whole statement. There are several possibilities. First: Athena’s protest against Ares’ behavior has three parts: he has failed to use his ears, his mind, and his sense of decorum. By this interpretation, Athena is holding Ares to the standard of the wise man and finding him to be the opposite, a madman. ὁ σοφός, then, would refer to Athena, but “according to all of virtue” or “in three ways” would refer not to her own action but to the ideal way of acting that she implies in her scolding of Ares. Being active according to all of virtue would have three levels: the physical level of sense perception (hearing), the mental level of understanding (mind), and the ethical-emotional level of sensing the kind of behavior appropriate to the situation. Its entirety would be not the unity or identity of bravery, wisdom, temperance, and justice, the cardinal virtues whose relationship was debated in the Stoic period (see, e.g., Cic. De off. 2.35), but the successful operation of these three vertical levels, so to speak, in one moment of behavior. (On Stoic virtue as vertical in this way, see Striker 1983.) A second possiblility is that Athena introduces her protest against Ares with three insults, at verse 128. Porphyry is cited (at verse 128 in ms. T) for commenting on the way Athena’s address to Ares should be punctuated: one should not feel a break between φρένας ἠλὲ and διέφθορας (translating “deranged in your wits, you are ruined”) but should take them together so that the mental aspect of destruction is clear (translating “you are ruined in your wits, you deranged one”). He then assigns her scolding in verse 129 to these words: having ears in vain supplements μαινόμενε, and lacking mind and shame supplements φρένας and ἠλέ. This yields a similar view to the the first option for the way three aspects constitute a whole, in Ares, who should be wise but is not. That this interpretation is cited from Porphyry supports the possibility that this was the kind of discussion to which Antisthenes contributed. A third possibility is that Athena’s actions in approaching Ares can be divided into three parts, by various ways. This would be the only way to understand “the whole of virtue” in reference to Athena as the wise one. She stands, she strips his weapons, and she speaks. When she strips his weapons, this takes three stages. Athena has the traditional epithet τριτογένεια, “born from Triton,” for which Democritus (DK 68B2), understanding Athena as the personification of intelligence, φρόνησις, gave the innovative etymology “triple by nature,” specifying the three aspects of her virtue as calculating well, speaking well, and doing what one should. Possibly such a three-part analysis of Athena the character or of her action in these verses was already in circulation and became the target of Antisthenes’ use of the term τριχῶς. T. 192B, if it is really from Antisthenes, implies a more clearly “allegorical” interpretation of Athena and rates her directly as “the intelligent one” (ὁ φρόνιμος).
(not in SSR)
ὣς εἰποῦσ’ ὑπὸ ποσσὶν ἐδήσατο καλὰ πέδιλα,
ἀμβρόσια χρύσεια, τά μιν φέρον ἠμὲν ἐφ’ ὑγρὴν
ἠδ’ ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν ἅμα πνοιῇσ’ ἀνέμοιο.
εἵλετο δ’ ἄλκιμον ἔγχος, ἀκαχμένον ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ,
βριθὺ μέγα στιβαρόν, τῷ δάμνησι στίχας ἀνδρῶν
ἡρώων, τοῖσίν τε κοτέσσεται ὀβριμοπάτρη.
καλὰ πέδιλα] τὸ λέγειν τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν καλὰ πέδιλα φορεῖν οὐκ ἄλλο δηλοῖ ἢ ὅτι τῆς φρονήσεως αἱ ἐνεργητικαὶ δυνάμεις στιβαραὶ καὶ ἄλκιμοί εἰσι. τὸ δὲ ἐπέχειν ἔγχος ἐν ᾧτινι δαμάζει τοὺς ἥρωας τὸ πληκτικὸν ὑποσημαίνει τῆς φρονήσεως. ὁ γὰρ φρόνιμος διὰ τοῦ οἰκείου λόγου πλήττει τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα. τὸ δὲ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατελθεῖν οὐκ ἄλλο αἰνίττεται ἢ ὅτι ἡ φρόνησις ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ κατέρχεται.
τὸ πληκτικὸν ὑποσημαίνει E : ὑποσημαίνει τὸ πληκτικὸν D J | ὅτι ἡ φρόνησις D E : ὅτι καὶ ἡ φρόνησις J
After saying this, she bound her beautiful sandals on her feet.
divine and golden, which carried her both across the water
and across the dry land with the breaths of the wind.
And she took up her sturdy sword, edged with sharp bronze,
heavy, large and sturdy, with which she tames the ranks of heroes,
those at whom she is angered, the goddess of mighty father.
[Od. 1.96–101]
“beautiful sandals”: To say that Athena wears beautiful sandals shows nothing other than that the active powers of intelligence are sturdy and stout. And to hold a sword by which she masters the heroes suggests the striking power of intelligence. For the intelligent man strikes the rebellious one through his proper discourse. And that Athena comes down from the heaven hints at nothing other than that intelligence comes down from the mind.
This scholion is preserved in a set of manuscripts totally separate from those that preserve interpretations attributed by name to Antisthenes: D (Par. Gr. 2403, thirteenth or fourteenth century), E (Ambr. E 89 supp., early fourtheenth century), and J (Vat. Gr. 1320, fourteenth or fifteenth century). Whether or not Antisthenes is the source of this interpretation, it was transmitted in a tradition separate from Porphyry. Eustathius knows allegorical interpretations of Athena’s sandals (in Od. 1395.13) and shield (in Od. 1395.28).
A source in Antisthenes’ works is conjectured in Lulofs 1900:54 and Brancacci 1990:261 n.62 on the basis of the ethical allegory of Athena’s equipment and its particular terms.
αἱ ἐνεργητικαὶ δυνάμεις: The verb “activate” is in Antisthenes’ interpretation of Athena or Ares in t. 192A.
ὑποσημαίνει: Compare the use of σημαίνει in t. 153A and 191. Compare the term ὑπόνοια in t. 185. If this is Antisthenes’ word, it shows an interesting difference from the more commonly attested ἐπισημαίνομαι (used with a personal subject). This would be the only attested use by Antisthenes of the ὑπο- prefix.
διὰ τοῦ οἰκείου λόγου: οἰκεῖος λόγος might be a technical term for Antisthenes: see t. 152A; Brancacci 1990:260–62.
πλήττει: Antisthenes, as would-be teacher, is said to strike his pupils in t. 169.
αἰνίττεται: This term has no parallel in Antisthenes’ literary remains, but it is a standard term for indicating that a poet or writer has intentionally planted a cryptic message, which requires allegorizing interpretation (Struck 2004:21–76 ).
ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ: This is an allegorizing etymology for ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, reinforced by the verb “comes down.” Compare Antisthenes’ playfulness with καινοῦ in t. 171. Scholia in the same manuscripts (D,E, and J) at Il. 1.101 explain that Athena is called ὀβριμοπάτρη because νοῦς is the father of φρόνησις (Dindorf 1855 ad loc.).
= 57 DC
ἦλθε δ’ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο
πάντ’ αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ’ ἐϊκυῖα
καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῒ εἵματα ἕστο·
ἐντεῦθεν Ἀντισθένης ὁμοσχήμονας φησὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς περιέχουσι σώμασιν. Χρύσιππος δὲ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματός φησιν αὐτὰς σφαιροειδεῖς γενέσθαι.
σώμασιν T : σώμασιν εἶναι A | Χρύσιππος δὲ . . . A T om. b | γεν. T : γενέσθαι δογματίζει A
And up came the soul of wretched Patroclus,
Resembling him fully in stature and the beautiful eyes
And voice, and it wore similar clothing on its flesh.
[Il. 23.65–67]
From here Antisthenes says that souls are alike in shape to the bodies that surround them. But Chrysippus says that after the separation from the body they become spherical.
The passage in the scholia was probably transmitted through a doxographical source, to judge from the adjacent interpretation attributed to Chrysippus.
This testimonium has been drawn into debates begun in the nineteenth century about Antisthenes’ views on materialism of the soul, immortality of the soul and physiognomy. See historical discussion in Brancacci 2003:268 n.29 and his own argument, pp. 268–70. The scholiast’s source might have been a general doxography on the nature of the soul after death, which was brought to the reading of Homer by a medieval scholar, or an ancient text might have already linked these views to Homer, insofar as he recognized the same truth. Antisthenes’ titles on the Iliad in the eighth tomos present no obvious candidate for the source of this discussion. Possibly the original text was about eschatology, for example, On Things in the Underworld (t. 41A title 7.7). In Republic 3 (386d4–5, 387a2–3), Plato cites lines close in context (Il. 23.100–104, where Patroclus’ soul departs back to Hades) among examples of bad teaching on the nature of death, needful of censure because they cause fear. If Antisthenes used the lines here as Homeric accounts of the truth, this could explain Plato’s choice.
ἐντεῦθεν: The adverb implies that Antisthenes supported his view of the truth from the Homeric passage. Chrysippus’ view, however, responds to that of Antisthenes, not that of Homer (because Patroclus’ ghost cannot be recognized individually if all souls are spherical). This setting is a reason to conjecture that the Stoics represented Antisthenes’ interpretation of Homer as doctrine about nature.
ὁμοσχήμων: The verb ὁμοσχημονέω appears in testimonia about the Atomists’ materialist theories (DK 67A10, Leucippus, on creation of stars; 68A128, Democritus, on hearing) and indicates affinity of a phenomenal object to its matter, which, on the atomic level, has various possible shapes. This might be evidence for the materialism of soul for Antisthenes (Brancacci 2003:268–70, citing older advocates). However, we do not know whether Antisthenes thought Homer’s account of Patroclus’ ghost was literally true, or whether he thought Homer was speaking in the terms of “belief” appropriate to poetry (see t. 194). In addition, we do not know whether Antisthenes counts Patroclus as representative of any dead person, or whether he held a difference between the souls of dead philosophers versus non-philosophers: in Plato’s Phaedo, the soul of the non-philosopher remains bound up with matter after separation at death, wherefore it is also visible like a shade, which presumably keeps the shape of its former body (81c4–d4). The reception in the scholia seems to take Antisthenes to be endorsing Homer as mouthpiece for the truth about the physical state of all disembodied souls.
τοῖς περιέχουσι σώμασιν: The word περιέχουσι, too, supports continuity of kind between body and soul. In Pre-Socratic cosmologists, material substances such as the air and mind are said to embrace the earth in this way (DK 13B2, Anaximenes; 59B2 and B14, Anaxagoras). This account seems to rule out one of the arguments for the immortality of the soul given in Plato’s Phaedo, the so-called argument from affinity, in which the body and the soul are fundamentally different in kind. It also shows Antisthenes’ deviation from contemporary attempts to locate the soul in a certain part of the body, by implying that it has the same extension as the body. This could be a return to a Homeric view (Brancacci 2003:269–70), but the parallel in Phaedo (81c4–d4) suggests that such a view was discussed among the Socratics.
σφαιροειδεῖς: On Chrysippus’ view of the soul’s shape after death, see Pohlenz 1948. A spherical shape for the disembodied soul of the philosopher is suggested also in Plato’s Phaedo (67c8, 70a7, 80e5), in different language (συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν).
= 58 DC
ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου ψέγει, ἅμα διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, ὅπως μὴ φαίνηται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι. ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δόξῃ, τὰ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ. ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ Περσαῖος ὁ τοῦ Ζήνωνος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν γέγραφε καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους.
τῶν om. M B U1 | τοῦ: del. Wilamowitz | ψέγει Emperius : λέγει codd. | ἅμα Jacobs : ἀλλὰ codd. | ὁ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον U : οὐδὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον P H B M | κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν Geelius : κατ’ αὐτὴν U1 : κατὰ τὴν cett.
Zeno blames none of the verses of Homer, but in the course of setting them out in detail he teaches that Homer has written some according to opinion and others according to truth, in order that he not appear to be contradicting himself in certain verses that seem to be said in opposition to each other. This principle is previously from Antisthenes, that some things have been said by the poet in opinion and some in truth. But he did not work it out, whereas he [Zeno] showed it according to each of the parts. And further also Persaeus pupil of Zeno has written according to the same hypothesis, and many others.
Dio introduces a tradition of reading Homer with a defensive strategy against those who attack him. In the previous context (§2–3), Plato attacks Homer, who is defended by unnamed physical allegorists.
This passage has formed the basis for interpretations of Antisthenes as an “allegorist” (see, further, t. 185 note on τὰς ὑπονοίας; Dümmler 1882; Höistad 1951; Tate 1953; Laurenti 1962; Detienne 1962:48; Schäublin 1977; Hillgruber 1989; Pépin 1993). Elsewhere (Or. 55), Dio transmits information about a Socratic interest in Homer that is not otherwise preserved; hence he may have had direct knowledge of Antisthenes’ Homeric exegesis (Weber 1887). The Stoic history outlined in this passage could be the construction of Dio, or it could have come from an older source. The immediate passage offers no indication of the topics addressed in the Stoic and proto-Stoic interpretive tradition, but Dio’s discourse overall focuses on theological statement and ethical statement, the categories Plato attacks at Rep. 2 377d–392c. Proposing that the tradition documented here informs also Philo of Alexandria, who puts it to theological purpose, Pépin (1993) implies that the whole tradition is theological in its main concerns.
ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου ψέγει: (= fr. 274 SVF I.63) The implied neuter substantive with οὐδὲν τῶν must be ἐπῶν, which Dio has used above, in τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ χάριν τὴν τῶν ἐπῶν in §2. (The partitive conception is contained also in ἔνια τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων in §1, although ὑπό would not fit the syntax of this abbreviated reference.) Zeno must have addressed distinct parts of Homer’s poetic work (the Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Margites are mentioned in the previous sentence), not different levels of meaning transmitted by an individual passage. This idea is resumed in the language τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, said to be Antisthenes’ principle.
τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν: The opposition between δόξα and ἀλήθεια resonates foremost with Parmenides (DK 28B1.29–30), who distinguished absolutely between these two “paths” of human cognition. Surely a similar absolute distinction is operating here. But the difference is inherent in Homer’s composition, not distinguished through the skill of the interpreter (as Pépin 1993 emphasizes). Of course, this implies that Homer composed with intentions about how he should be understood. Moreover, interpreters under this principle would claim to be revealing the craft of the primary composer, not performing their own craft. By contrast, Plato implies in Ion that the rhapsode catches a creative energy (like the power of magnetism in a magnet) from the poet he interprets. Dio’s language seems to be insistent on this point, that the distinction was part of Homer’s craft and is not supplied by the interpreter: in subsequent sentences, he repeats also εἰρῆσθαι and εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ.
ὅπως μὴ φαίνηται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι: Here there may be a more aggressive intervention by the exegete Zeno, because he had an overall purpose in interpreting according to his principle, resolving apparent contradictions in Homer. But this is a purpose that responds to the poem, which has an internal inconsistency. The word φαίνηται and the phrase ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν leave space for subjective judgment on this score, but there is grounding for a non-circular interpretive method.
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μαχόμενος: The figuring of Homer’s inconsistency as a battle with himself is mirrored in the critic’s accusation in t. 189.
ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι: The allegation of “speaking in opposite manner” is closer (than the battle imagery) to the world of logic and occurs again in Antisthenes’ paradox against gainsaying (t. 152B, 153B). Antisthenes applies the principle to Homer in t. 189.
ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δόξῃ, τὰ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ: Zeno’s “principle” is attributed to Antisthenes, though his purpose not necessarily. To judge from Antisthenes’ interest in gainsaying and contradiction, however, and his practice in interpreting Homer as documented by the extant evidence, Antisthenes probably did have the same purpose as Zeno, reconciling apparent self-contradictions. T. 189 may show that apparent self-contradiction can be resolved by distinguishing Homer’s own voice from that of his characters, and this could be the force of Antisthenes’ distinction between δόξα and ἀλήθεια: that characters speak from partial perspective, in belief, whereas Homer speaks from full perspective, in truth. There is no other evidence for exactly this antithesis between δόξα and ἀλήθεια Antisthenes’ literary remains, but κατὰ νόμον and κατὰ φύσιν are opposed in t. 179A, and δόξα and ἐπιστήμη are apparently opposed (though they might also be compared) in a book title (t. 41A title 7.4). Some interpretations of Antisthenes read the opposition here between δόξα and ἀλήθεια in a global way, as a marker of the difference between the philosopher and the folk, and equivalent to the oppositions in t. 179A and the book title.
ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο αὐτόν: Mueller 1860:51 understands this to mean that Antisthenes did not write systematic commentaries but only picked out passages that supported his interests.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ Περσαῖος ὁ τοῦ Ζήνωνος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν γέγραφε: Dio discerns a whole Stoic tradition in using this principle, which may have taken a route different from the orthodox succession through Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Persaeus was contemporary with Cleanthes, who became the scholarch in the second generation. In t. 195, Cleanthes is aligned with Antisthenes. In t. 135, Aristo of Chios, yet another member of the second generation, is aligned with Antisthenes.
= 60 DC
ὅθεν οὐδ’ αἱ παραδιορθώσεις φαύλως ἔχουσιν αἷς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐχρήσατο καὶ Ἀντισθένης, ὁ μὲν εὖ μάλα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβήσαντας ἰδὼν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ πρὸς τὸ
τί δ’ αἰσχρόν, ἢν μὴ τοῖς χρωμένοις δοκῇ;
παραβαλὼν εὐθύς,
αἰσχρὸν τό γ’ αἰσχρόν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν μὴ δοκῇ.
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβήσαντας ἰδὼν Paton : θορυβήσαντας ἰδὼν codd. : τῶν Ἀθηναίων θορυβησάντων codd. | θεάτρῳ M : θεάτρῳ πρὸς τὸ c | ἢν μὴ . . . δοκῇ Γ : εἰ μὴ . . . δοκεῖ O
For this reason the corrections that Cleanthes and Antisthenes practiced are not bad. Antisthenes saw the Athenians crying out in the theater against the verse, “What is foul, unless it appears foul to those involved?” [Euripides, from Aeolus]. Right away he tossed back the line “The foul is foul, both if it appears [so] and if it does not.”
Plutarch opens a new point in his discussion, the possibility that the philosophically wise audience or reader can correct the poets. See Hunter and Russell 2011.
Like t. 194, this passage aligns Antisthenes into a Stoic tradition of literary criticism. See also t. 105 and 137A (where Antisthenes is the object of Stoic reading rather than a predecessor).
αἱ παραδιορθώσεις: This term indicates corrections written into the margins of a text. (See Nussbaum 1993:132–33.) The anecdote implies that Antisthenes delivered his response live in the theater (παραβαλὼν εὐθύς), not in writing. The anecdote is probably fictitious, and Antisthenes probably commented in writing, for example, as a parody in a text on an ethical topic, probably not in an exegesis of Euripides. Cleanthes or another Stoic could have used Antisthenes’ line as a paradiorthosis in their own text of Euripides.
τί δ’ αἰσχρόν, ἢν μὴ τοῖς χρωμένοις δοκῇ: The line is from Euripides’ Aeolus (fr. 19 TGrF) and is also parodied in Aristophanes’ Frogs (1475). The topic is the incest of Aeolus’ children: his sons married his daughters (Od. 10.5–7). See t. 141B, where Antisthenes is again cited in reference to the incest of Aeolus’ children.
αἰσχρὸν τό γ’αἰσχρόν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν μὴ δοκῇ: This is a statement of essentialist ethical value, said against the ethical relativism apparently endorsed in Euripides’ verse. Antisthenes is consistently opposed to incest: see t. 141. This position is either inherited from Greek culture (as opposed to Persian) or related to his interest in eugenics: see t. 58. On the different approach Antisthenes’ character Odysseus takes to acts of temple robbing and corporal punishment, where ethical evaluation of the individuated act must take into consideration the nexus of causes and consequences, see t. 53–54 and notes.
= 59 DC
οἷόν γε πού ’στιν αἱ σοφαὶ ξυνουσίαι.
καὶ διὰ τούτου φαίνεται ὑπονοῶν Εὐριπίδου εἶναι τὸ
σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ.
ἔστι δὲ Σοφοκλέους ἐξ Αἴαντος Λοκροῦ. ἐνταῦθα μέντοι ὑπονοεῖ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἥρωσιν ἄντικρυς ἀποφαίνεται. καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Πλάτων Εὐριπίδου αὐτὸ <εἶναι> ἡγοῦνται, οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ὅ τι παθόντες. ἔοικε δὲ ἤτοι πεπλανημένος συνεξαπατῆσαι τοὺς ἄλλους ἤ, ὥσπερ ὑπονοοῦσί τινες, σύμπτωσις <γενέσθαι> τῷ τε Σοφοκλεῖ καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων τινῶν. τὸ μέντοι δρᾶμα ἐν ᾧ Εὐριπίδης ταῦτα εἶπεν, οὐ σῴζεται.
<εἶναι> add. Bekker | παθόντες Burges, Bekker : παρόντες R | ἤτοι πεπλανμένος ἢ συνεξαπατῆσαι R : ἤ alt. transp. Schneider | σύμπτωσις Dindorf : σύμπτωσεις R | <γενέσθαι> add. Schneider
What a thing is consorting with brilliant men.
[Aristophanes, Thesmo. 21 (Kinsman speaking)]
Through this [statement] he [Aristophanes] is clear in his suggestion that the verse is from Euripides: “Tyrants are wise by association with the wise.” But it is from Sophocles, from Locrian Ajax. Here, however, he only suggests [this attribution], whereas in the Heroes he declares it straight out. Both Antisthenes and Plato think this verse is from Euripides, but I cannot say what influenced them. It seems that either he [Aristophanes] made a mistake and deceived the others, or, as some suspect, there was a coincidence between Sophocles and Euripides, as also in other cases. But the play in which Euripides said this is not preserved.
In the prologue of Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae, Euripides and his kinsman banter as they approach the house of Agathon. Here the kinsman reacts to Euripides’ instruction on physics. The scholia to Thesmophoriazusae are transmitted in the single manuscript that transmits the play, Ravennas 429 (R, written c. 950). The present scholium (= fr. 14 TGrF) is an expansion, apparently in a second hand, of a simpler version that does not refer to Antisthenes and Plato.
Antisthenes’ and Plato’s common citation of a verse from tragedy suggests that the citing texts—Rep. 9, Theages, and an unknown text by Antisthenes—could have an intertextual relationship.
καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Πλάτων: Plato (Rep. 9 568a8–b1; Theages 125b5–d6) attributes the verse to Euripides. Antisthenes’ work is lost, but his speech on his wealth in Xenophon’s Symposium (t. 82.36) shares terms with Rep. 9 (575b6). Possibly there was an intertextual relationship between Rep. 9 and some text by Antisthenes, such as the Protreptics, which seems to be one of Xenophon’s sources in the Symposium. If the scholiast is correct that the attribution to Euripides is an error, the common error is argument for interdependence.
σύμπτωσις <γενέσθαι> τῷ τε Σοφοκλεῖ καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ: Possibly Sophocles and Euripides used the same phrase. The thought is similar to that in verses from Theognis (35–36) repeatedly cited in Socratic literature. (See t. 103B.) See Austin and Olson 2004:58–59 for cases of coincidence between verses in Sophocles and Euripides.
= 41 DC
(30) βιβλίον τι τῶν σπουδαίων ἔδοξα ἀναγιγνώσκειν, οὗ τὰ μὲν καθ’ ἕκαστον, πάλιν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐρῶ λόγον, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν. πῶς γὰρ τοσοῦτόν γε ὕστερον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τὸ τῇ μνήμῃ προσέχειν ἀφελομένης; (31) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει τοῦ βιβλίου τοιάδε μάλιστα ἐνῆν—ἦν δὲ ὡς ἐπί τινος τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν λεγόμενα—“ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ὁ θεὸς συλλογισάμενος καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ ῥεῦμα ἄρδην φερόμενον προσέταξεν ὕδωρ πίνειν, οἴνου δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι, εἴ τι δεῖται νικῆσαι· ‘ἃ δὴ καὶ σοί,’ ἔφη, ‘ἔξεστι μιμησαμένῳ στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι.’” ἐνταῦθα ἔληγεν. εἶθ’ ὑπεγέγραπτο τοῦ λόγου δὴ τοὐπίγραμμα, “φιλοστέφανος” ἢ “φιλησιστέφανος.” (32) ὅσον μὲν οὖν τινα χρόνον διήνεγκα τὴν ὑδροποσίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔχω λέγειν· ὅτι δ’ εὐκόλως τε καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀεί πως πρότερον δυσχεραίνων τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ναυτιῶν. ὡς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐλελειτούργητο, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος ἀφίησί με, οἴνου δὲ ἔταξε μέτρον, καὶ ἦν γε τὸ ῥῆμα “ἡμίνα βασιλική”· γνώριμον δή που ὅτι ἔφραζεν ἡμικοτύλιον. ἐχρώμην τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἤρκει ὡς οὐκ ἤρκει πρότερον τὸ διπλάσιον, ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ φειδομένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεδιέναι μὴ ἐπιλείπῃ περιῆν. οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἐποιούμην ἐξαίρετον εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔδει τῷ μέτρῳ στέργειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτην εἶχε τὴν πεῖραν, ἀφίησιν ἤδη πίνειν πρὸς ἐξουσίαν, οὑτωσί πως χαριεντισάμενος, ὅτι μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶεν ὅσοι τῶν ἱκανῶν εὐποροῦντες μὴ τολμῶσιν ἐλευθέρως χρῆσθαι. (33) καὶ τὸ βιβλίον αὐτὸ ἐδόκει εἶναι Ἀντισθένους περὶ χρήσεως· ἔφερεν δὲ εἰς οἶνον, καὶ Διονύσου προσῆν τινα σύμβολα. οὕτω δ’ οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς συνηθείας διεκείμην, ὥστε καὶ ἐφέντος τοῦ θεοῦ μικρόν τι παρήλλαττον πίνων τοῦ μέτρου. καί τινα ἐπόθουν τρόπον τὴν ταμιείαν τὴν τότε.
(30) ἂν ἔχοιμι T S2 : ἀνέχομαι A S1 D (31) εἶθ’ ὑπεγέγραπτο : εἶθ’ ἑπεγέγραπτο T addito ἐ sup. π : εἶθ’ ἑπεγέγραπτο S2 (32) μὴ ἐπιλείπῃ Canter : μὴ ἔτι λείπῃ O : μή μέ τι λυπῇ Keil
(30) I seemed to be reading one of the serious books, from which all of the details—for again I will tell the same story—I would not be able to tell. For how could I, after such a long time, especially when my text has taken away [my ability] to supply my memory? (31) But toward the end of the book things of this sort were mostly in it—and they were as if spoken about one of the competitors—“So all these things the god considered, and seeing that the stream was running in full, he ordered [him] to drink water, and to abstain from wine, if he wanted at all to have victory. ‘And it is possible for you,’ he said, ‘to imitate this and win the crown or a share in the crown.’” There it stopped. Then there had been written under the account the epigraph “Lover of the crown” or “In love with the crown.” (32) For how much time I endured the water drinking, also this am I unable to say. But [I can say] that I endured it calmly and easily, although previously I always somehow disliked water and got sickened by it. And when also this service had been paid, he [Asclepius] took me off water and ordered a portion of wine, and the term was “kingly half portion”: it is recognizable, of course, that he meant a half-cup measure. I consumed this, and it was sufficient to such a degree that double the amount previously had not been sufficient: and there were times when it was even left over, since I was sparing out of fear that it might run out. However, I did not set this aside for the next day, but it was necessary to be content anew with the portion [for that day]. And when he had also this proof, he allowed [me] next to drink to indulgence, joking in the following kind of way, that foolish are the people who are wealthy in sufficient things but do not dare to use them liberally. (33) And the book itself seemed to be Antisthenes’ On Use. It told about wine, and there were some symbols of Dionysus present. And therefore I was so disposed from my habit that, even when the god permitted, I would depart [only] a small bit from drinking my portion, and in a certain way I longed for the stewardship of that time.
This passage appears near the end of Aristides’ third book of Sacred Tales, a set of narratives recording his experiences and dreams while in communication with the healing god Asclepius, dated to 144–55 CE. See Petsalis-Diomidis 2010: esp. 267–69 on Aristides’ practice of evoking healing advice in his dreams from the authority of ancient books. Antisthenes’ portrait was present on the “covered way” of second-century Pergamum that led from the city to the precinct of Asclepius, the setting of Aristides’ Sacred Tales. (See Petsalis-Diomidis 2010:174–79.)
This cryptic passage seems to quote from a text of Antisthenes (although it is not impossible that Aristides fabricates the quotation). It seems to give evidence for speaking gods in his texts, for “symbols” in his texts, for subtitles, and possibly for a frame dialogue. A setting at the athletic games, common in stories about Diogenes of Sinope (SSR VB 449), is otherwise not attested for Antisthenes, although it could be implied in t. 106. The text is not like anything else surviving from Antisthenes (and hence Decleva Caizzi 1966:101 hesitates in attributing it). If Aristides’ illness and dreaming state have left their mark on this account, these can hardly be stripped away. Although Aristides cites the title as On Use (usually identified with t. 41A title 9.7), the content can be associated with Antisthenes’ Protreptics (title 2.4), which had a sympotic setting (t. 64C–D) and a mixed style (t. 11) and could have included inset mythical episodes.
(30) βιβλίον τι τῶν σπουδαίων: Although Antisthenes’ writing sometimes might have been witty (to judge from t. 54 and 187; compare also the apophthegmata in, e.g., t. 57, 70, 72, 75, 131, 168, and 171), the topic here, abstinence from wine, could have called for earnest treatment (see t. 191, 64). Contrast also Timon’s judgment that Antisthenes was a “trifler” (φλέδων, t. 41B). An association with the character Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium might not be idle: having stated that drunkenness is “bad for humans” (176d1–2), Eryximachus proposes (quoting Phaedrus) that the company should make speeches on Eros because praises of far lesser beings have been made: “indeed I myself have in the past encountered a certain book of a wise man, in which there were [kinds of?] salt carrying marvelous praise toward their usefulness” (ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε ἤδη τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφελίαν, 177b4–6). This praise of salt, which is coupled with bumblebees in Isocrates (Helen §12), is often attributed to Polycrates (Dover 1980:88). But see t. 66.
τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τὸ τῇ μνήμῃ προσέχειν ἀφελομένης: In Sacred Tales, Aristides sustains the proposition that he wrote down three hundred thousand lines about his experiences in a book that he has lost but tries to reproduce (Sacred Tales 2.1–4). This extension might be a joke on the Socratics’ warnings that writing compromises the memory, which Antisthenes (t. 168) seems to share with Plato (Phaedr. 275a).
(31) ἦν δὲ ὡς ἐπί τινος τῶν ἀγονιστῶν: The “competitors” are probably contestants at an athletic festival (possibly a symbolic one: see t. 162), since they are aiming to win a crown. If Antisthenes’ text was On Use of Wine or On Drunkenness or On the Cyclops (t. 41A title 9.7), as Aristides’ citation of a title in §33 has normally been understood, and if this text was fully about the Odyssey, as the position of that title in the catalog suggests, the competition could have been related to the Phaeacian games in Od. 8.186–98, and the victor could have been Odysseus. In a different mythical context, Heracles would be a plausible recipient of this divine instruction about gaining victory (compare t. 96). Antisthenes might have made Odysseus and Heracles parallel in some ways (compare t. 188). In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates compares philosophical love and its afterlife to winning the true Olympian wrestling matches (Phaedr. 256b4–7), and this imagery might support a serious symbolic meaning for the athletic contest in Antisthenes’ writings also.
ὁ θεός: The god giving orders within the reported story could be Zeus, insofar as he is Antisthenes’ preferred Olympian (see t. 188). But his identity is not clear. The god giving orders to Aristides in the external story (§32) is Asclepius. The symbols of Dionysus present in the reported story (§33) probably do not imply that Dionysus is the god speaking, since Dionysus should be more suited to encourage wine drinking.
εἴ τι δεῖται νικῆσαι: Antisthenes has a book title referring to victory (t. 41A title 3.8). Xenophon’s character Antisthenes in Mem. 3.4 (t. 72B) is an expert on victory. The verb δεῖται might refer to an objective need or deficiency rather than a subjective desire of the contestant (see t. 82.38). The force of this verb here is hard to judge, because the context is so slight.
‘ἃ δὴ καὶ σοί,’ ἔφη, ‘ἔξεστι μιμησαμένῳ . . .’: There are two possibilities for the speaker of these words. Either the god mentioned is instructing his advisee to imitate some behavior not identified, presumably the good drinking practice of someone else; or, more likely, a second speaker on another level, such as in a framing dialogue, is telling a second advisee to imitate the actions of the hero in the embedded story. The ideal behavior is presumably to drink water instead of wine. If this is a dialogue frame around a mythical episode, the closing frame is very short. (Aristides’ suggests that the end is abrupt.) On Antisthenes’ characters as models for mimesis, see t. 44C.
στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι: The distinction is odd, and Aristides probably did not generate it idly but might be quoting Antisthenes’ text. Sharing the crown might apply to a victor who is joining a group of victors, perhaps the philosophically select, rather than being the first. But he is also earning his crown in his own right, and hence the simple verb is appropriate. In t. 200, Socrates seems to decline sharing the “prize” (γέρας) that belongs to Alcibiades, yet the interlocutor insists that Socrates granted an opportunity and so implicitly retains a share of the honor. The contest for the armor in t. 53–54 is also relevant to the question whether a victor must be alone, or whether victory can be shared: Ajax and Odysseus might hold different positions. In Xenophon’s Hiero 7.9, the tyrant’s dream is that his people will “crown [him] because of shared virtue and benefaction” (καὶ στεφανῶσι κοινῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐεργεσίας ἕνεκα). See also t. 12B note on συμμαθηταί.
τοὐπίγραμμα, φιλοστέφανος ἢ φιλησιστέφανος: “Lover of the crown” or “In love with the crown” (φιλησιστέφανος is attested otherwise only in a fragment from Pindar’s paeans, fr. 52a) could be a subtitle for the extract from Περὶ χρήσεως that Aristides is citing (so Brancacci 2003:265); alternatively, it could be a title for one of the Protreptics, which more certainly had parts (see t. 41A title 2.5). An ancient practice of giving subtitles to parts of works is paralleled for Homer’s poems (which had named episodes, e.g., the Τειχοσκοπία, or “View from the Wall”), but not otherwise. Therefore, if Antisthenes’ texts had subtitles, the most likely explanation for their origin would be his own hand. Aristides’ citation of two alternative forms for the subtitle could be related to his pretense of a bad memory.
(32) “ἡμίνα βασιλική”· γνώριμον δή που ὅτι ἔφραζεν ἡμικοτύλιον: The term “kingly half portion” is not otherwise attested, and it is plausibly Antisthenes’ term, in reference to the kingly life led by the man who controls his appetites (see t. 82 §37–41). A “half cup” (ἡμικοτύλιον) is a standard of measure, used mostly by medical writers, sometimes for wine. The full cup as a standard of measure (κοτύλη) is particularly Athenian usage (Athenaeus 478f): according to the grammarians, the Italian or Sicilian equivalent would be ἡμίνα (Athenaeus 479a–b). If this equivalence holds here, the “kingly half portion” is only half of the unqualified Sicilian “half portion,” since the former is equal to a half cotyle and the latter to a full cotyle. If Antisthenes adopted a Sicilian term and added the description “kingly,” this could be a case of his reversal of normal meanings (compare “wealth” in t. 81A and 82), and he could be referring critically or playfully to the Sicilian tyrants of the early fourth century. (See t. 82.36 notes.) For other ideologically loaded names for drinking cups in Antisthenes, see t. 64–65.
οὕτως ἤρκει ὡς οὐκ ἤρκει πρότερον τὸ διπλάσιον: Compare the language in Antisthenes’ description of his complete satisfaction from moderate consumption in t. 82.37–41, esp. στρωμνήν γε μὴν οὕτως ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχω ὥστ’ ἔργον μέγ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνεγεῖραι (§38).
ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ φειδομένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεδιέναι μὴ ἐπιλείπῃ περιῆν: Fear of running out of resources is probably not appropriate to the wise or kingly man, but it could be appropriate to someone still making progress. If Aristides is tracing a pattern of progress in acquiring self-control, or enkrateia, that he found in a text by Antisthenes, this is unique evidence for these intermediate phases in the transformation. There is a textual problem in the verb ἐπιλείπῃ, but this conjecture makes most sense of the story, expecially the next sentence, about how a day’s excess is handled. Keil’s alternative, that Aristides fears he will be harmed by too much wine, is not motivated in the text. Even the speaking god makes no reference to harm from wine.
ὅτι μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶεν ὅσοι τῶν ἱκανῶν εὐποροῦντες μὴ τολμῶσιν ἐλευθέρως χρῆσθαι: Aristides has learned wisdom, in respect to wine, similar to that which Antisthenes seems to know more generally in t. 82. Compare §38–41, where Antisthenes’ sufficient resources are described as excess, and §43, where Antisthenes claims that his frugal lifestyle makes him generous with the wealth of his soul, toward external parties: ἄξιον δ’ ἐννοῆσαι ὡς καὶ ἐλευθερίους ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος παρέχεται. Aristides’ use of his (material) resources remains private, for himself, more like the image in §38–41.
(33) Ἀντισθένους περὶ χρήσεως: The citation of Antisthenes’ title here, although the quotation ended several lines earlier, implies that the intervening narrative about Aristides’ own treatment is related to Antististhenes’ advice and inspiration. Decleva Caizzi and Giannantoni elide §32. Antisthenes’ title is usually understood to be Περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ Περὶ μέθης ἢ Περὶ τοῦ Κύκλωπος (t. 41A title 9.7), but the form Περὶ χρήσεως admits other possibilities, for example, the Protreptics, if we allow deviation from the catalog. Aristippus is also credited with titles formed on the term χρεία and with titles referring to wine (Diog. Laert. 2.84); but the supernatural and allegorical elements in the story seem even less fitting to Aristippus than to Antisthenes.
Διονύσου . . . τινα σύμβολα: If the texts contained “symbols” of Dionysus, he was probably not present as a character in the text. It is odd that Aristides mentions these “symbols” in his summary statement, so they must have been prominent. The “symbols” of Dionysus could be implements for drinking wine: Porphyry’s allegorical interpretation in On the Cave of the Nymphs (§13) calls mixing bowls and wine jugs the “symbols of Dionysus.” Or possibly they were wine or grapes.
τὴν ταμιείαν τὴν τότε: Aristides must refer to the ancient days of Antisthenes or the mythical times of his characters. Antisthenes is proud of his own “stewardship” in t. 82.41 (ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιεύομαι).