Patron-client challenges and inadequate strategic empathy among US officials further undermined the prospects of bringing the war into a peace process. Other key stakeholders, of course, had their views and interests that would need to be addressed for reconciliation to gain sufficient traction. At the risk of oversimplification, I will focus on the Afghan government, the Taliban, and Pakistan, recognizing that they are not unitary actors (or the only actors) but that their positions had to address views from an array of internal and external stakeholders. Their policies, in many ways, were designed to account for these varied inputs, pressures, and constraints.
Karzai had an altogether different view on reconciliation than did SRAP. In some ways, Karzai could not accept the fact that Afghans were fighting against his government. He believed that local fighting was the result of America bringing the war to Afghan (mainly Pashtun) villages and the associated backlash over civilian casualties and questionable detentions.1 The Taliban leadership, Karzai believed, was wholly a creature of Pakistan. With enough money and American pressure on Pakistan, he aimed to convince Taliban senior leaders to defect.2 To increase pressure on Pakistan, the Afghan government had also begun clandestine support of the Pakistani Taliban.3
Karzai was not interested in formal talks between his government and the insurgency, which he believed gave the latter political legitimacy they did not deserve. He rejected participation in reconciliation conferences in which his government was one of many “Afghan parties” along with the Taliban, political opposition figures, and civil society groups.4 Many analysts in the US intelligence community did not believe Karzai’s approach was realistic. The Taliban had political cohesion, their ties with the Pakistani government were weakening, and there was little chance of eradicating Taliban sanctuaries that resided in densely populated Afghan refugee camps and city sectors.5 By 2014 only one estranged former Taliban senior leader, Agha Jan Mutasim, had defected. And he did that only after he was shot and left for dead by his erstwhile compatriots.6
Karzai’s approach reflected the limited political space in Afghanistan for reconciliation. Elites from the former Northern Alliance, warlords, and civil society actors were adamantly opposed to negotiations with the Taliban.7 Such talks might reopen the issue of accountability for war crimes during the Afghan civil war (anti-Taliban warlords had orchestrated an amnesty bill in 2007 that forgave them of such crimes).8 They also feared that a deal with the Taliban would come at their political and economic cost. Civil society actors highlighted the potential for backsliding on human rights. A peace deal or process would likely result in discussions about political reform or changes to the constitution. Karzai’s co-option model would not. India, meanwhile, was not keen on any reconciliation effort that diminished the influence of its supporters or increased Pakistani sway in Afghanistan.9
To build support for his approach, Karzai held a Consultative Peace Jirga in June 2010. The jirga appointed a High Peace Council under the leadership of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani.10 Rabbani was the head of the Badakhshan-based Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan Party during the Soviet war and had served as the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996, when the Taliban ousted his government. The High Peace Council led by the fiercely anti-Taliban Rabbani could provide Karzai with the political cover he needed. As Indo-Afghan ties strengthened due to Pakistan’s malign activity, so did Karzai’s caution on reconciliation.
The view from the Taliban was quite different. Although many US and international officials regarded Secretary Clinton’s February 2011 speech as a breakthrough toward peace, the Taliban viewed the red lines as preconditions.11 To lay down arms and cut ties with their allies, even ones as problematic to them as al Qaeda, before entering talks seemed like surrender. Moreover, to forfeit so much leverage before negotiations would be foolish and potentially suicidal. The Taliban were under substantial military pressure, to be sure, but their sanctuaries remained intact, and they had no trouble recruiting in Afghanistan or funding the insurgency.12 They were not on the brink of surrender or defeat, and many senior leaders remained confident in their prospects for eventual success. Besides, acceding to the constitution meant accepting the legitimacy of the Bonn process that excluded them and the provision that equated resistance to the Taliban with resistance to the Soviets.13 Some current and former Taliban senior leaders considered the rule hypocritical, noting to me that Afghan officials and warlords do not themselves abide by the constitution.14
The Taliban developed their dual-track approach.15 They were keenly interested in discussions with the United States, but not in negotiations to end the conflict. Their approach to talks was not cynical; it reflected strategic calculation.16 They would continue the military campaign but use diplomacy to build legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans and the international community.17 If the Taliban overthrew the government, they would need foreign assistance to survive.18 As Tayyab Agha explained to me in September 2010, “We were the government once, but we were isolated from the international community. . . . When we return to government, we need to have good relations with the world, especially the United States.”19 If the Taliban could not win outright and the war came to a stalemate, their leverage in negotiations would be far higher after international forces left. The gradual drawdown of foreign troops increased the Taliban’s bargaining leverage while reducing that of the United States.
The Taliban had audience costs to consider, too. They had to build support carefully within their diverse and highly decentralized movement, just like the United States and the Afghan government would have to bring along their constituencies. After vilifying the Karzai government as puppets and the international forces as infidel occupiers, a sudden move toward peace negotiations risked splintering the insurgency.20 The dual-track approach sustained the military campaign while building international credibility that would be needed if the Taliban returned to power.21
Confirmation bias and political frictions undermined the US government’s ability to exploit differences between the Taliban and al Qaeda. Many senior US officials and members of Congress equated the Taliban and al Qaeda and wanted no negotiations with terrorists.22 Of course, such a view was overly simplistic. The relations between the Taliban and al Qaeda were always rocky and had atrophied.23 As discussed in chapter 4, bin Laden was invited to Afghanistan in 1996 by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf with Rabbani’s permission. Tayyab Agha commented several times during the talks that the Taliban had “inherited al Qaeda.” They accepted their support and provided them sanctuary, too.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine some of the documents from the bin Laden raid that have been released recently by the Department of National Intelligence. In one, al Qaeda senior leader Abu Yahya felt compelled to issue a guidance letter about proper behavior to presumably Gulf Arab Wahabbis wanting to join the fight in Afghanistan among Afghan Deobandis.24 In a letter to bin Laden, an al Qaeda operative describes their support as only moral and symbolic: “We are participating in the work in Afghanistan, and we have to do that, but praise be to God, Taliban almost does not need us.”25
After bin Laden questioned Mullah Omar on the wisdom of talking with the international community, Tayyab Agha issued a strongly worded reply explaining the Taliban’s rationale on religious and practical grounds and rejecting bin Laden’s description of talks as appeasement.26 The Taliban also seem to have asked bin Laden not to return to Afghanistan or to appoint an al Qaeda representative for Afghanistan.27 The Taliban, in short, could potentially offer the United States what it wanted most (cutting ties with al Qaeda) in exchange for what the Taliban wanted most: withdrawal of international forces so the insurgency could fight an unaided Afghan government.28
To support their diplomatic efforts, the Taliban revamped their strategic communications and political program. Before 2008, their Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha statements attributed to Mullah Omar were pedantic vitriol. By 2009, these statements became far more sophisticated and aimed at both Afghan and international audiences. The new narratives repeatedly noted the strictly national aspirations of the Taliban and that they posed no threat to other countries. The September 2009 Eid al-Fitr message explained:
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan wants to maintain good and positive relations with all neighbors based on mutual respect and open a new chapter of good neighborliness of mutual cooperation and economic development.
We consider the whole region as a common home against colonialism and want to play our role in peace and stability of the region. We assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as a responsible force, will not extend its hand to cause jeopardy to others as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us.29
The Taliban crafted the last line to distance themselves from international terrorism. Although western governments missed the nuance, the statement caused a stir within the jihadi community, who felt the Taliban were betraying them.30 Despite the controversy, the Taliban doubled down on the sentiment in an October 14, 2009, open letter to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Conference.31 The Taliban also began discussing issues such as good governance, civilian protection, and human rights in terms that were not dissimilar to Afghan government positions.32 Some compared quite favorably to US allies in the Gulf.
One potential explanation for the change in tone and substance was taqiyya—the statements were propaganda designed to deceive Afghans and the international community about the Taliban’s real agenda. Their increased use of suicide bombings and victim-operated IEDs in 2009, for instance, certainly undermined elements of the Taliban narrative. On the other hand, the Taliban may have surmised that they were getting little strategic benefit from al Qaeda but incurring considerable legitimacy costs. They may also have determined a need to focus on governance and to adapt to Afghan expectations on various political and social issues.33 The “progressive” statements were likely more reflective of the views of the political commission rather than the rank and file. Nonetheless, the new narrative caused no apparent ripple within the Taliban movement.34 Sincerity, of course, would need to be tested.
The Taliban senior leadership authorized their political commission in 2009 to begin outreach with the international community, including the United States. To support these efforts, the Taliban established a private office in Doha, Qatar, which would give those not on the UN sanctions lists, such as Tayyab Agha, access to the outside world. Having an office in Doha also helped the Taliban political commission operate independently of Pakistan.35 Diplomatic efforts by the Taliban required freedom of movement and the ability to meet interlocutors, but an office in Pakistan could be subject to considerable pressure from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Because Qatar hosted a US military base, the Taliban believed that the Americans might be more willing to engage them in Doha. They likewise surmised that the Qataris could play an intermediary role. Qatar, aspiring to be a diplomatic force in the Gulf, accepted the opportunity.36 The Taliban had reached out to over 20 countries by the end of 2011 and participated in unofficial conferences in Norway, Japan, and France.37
Pakistan, with its national security policy run by the army, was arguably more of a unitary actor than the others. Their spy service, ISI—whose external operations branch is responsible for monitoring, liaising, and supporting various “asymmetric groups”—is subordinate to the chief of army staff. Stephen Tankel argues that scholars have developed three broad terms to explain government relationships toward militant groups: collaboration (active support), enablement (passive support), and belligerence. Borrowing an economics word, Tankel adds a fourth relationship: coopetition, which denotes “frenemies” or groups that straddle more than one category.38 The categorization has its limits but is sufficiently useful to describe the relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, and its effects on reconciliation.
The ISI collaborates with Kashmir-oriented groups like Lashkar e-Taiba. Their support for Afghan insurgent groups during the Soviet war could be described as somewhere between collaborative and enabling—providing logistics, funding, and expertise, but not directing operations in Afghanistan.39 In contrast, the ISI’s relationship with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—or the Pakistani Taliban—on the other hand, is belligerence.40 The Pakistani relationship with the Afghan Taliban appears to be a hybrid. The Taliban have sanctuary in Pakistan, particularly within the densely populated refugee camps that have been in existence since the late 1970s, where they can recruit, train, strategize, and organize logistics. The Afghan Taliban, moreover, has been destabilizing the India-friendly Afghan government, something that works to Pakistan’s interests. The latter may see little need to assert direct control—an attempt to do so would likely create animosity. The relationship, however, is distant; the Afghan Taliban needs and fears Pakistan.41 They need the sanctuary; they fear being perceived as or coerced into being a puppet.42 This dilemma helps explain why the Taliban sought a political office in Doha, a country outside Pakistan’s orbit and pressure. The ISI’s longstanding relationship with the Haqqani Taliban, on the other hand, is much closer to collaboration.43 Occupying parts of North Waziristan, the Haqqanis (who reportedly have closer ties with al Qaeda) have been useful to the ISI as intermediaries with various TTP groups and with the Quetta-based Taliban leadership. In return, the Haqqanis receive direct support from the ISI, enabling them to carry out high-profile operations inside Afghanistan.
This view of the relationship is not universal. Many Afghans and some US officials and scholars view Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban as master and puppet—an extreme form of collaboration.44 Pakistani officials, who have become open about the existence of Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, seem to corroborate these views.45 ISI apprehended Mullah Omar’s deputy Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi in early 2010, allegedly for participating in unauthorized talks.46 A Pakistani security official told the New York Times, “We picked up Baradar . . . because [the Taliban] were trying to make a deal without us. We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”47 Such statements seem proof positive of Pakistan’s control of the Afghan Taliban. However, they are also consistent with the hybrid model, in which Pakistan acquiesces in Taliban presence and provides enabling support but will act against them when the Taliban threatens Pakistani interests. The hybrid model also better explains the Taliban’s decision to put the political office in Doha and Pakistan’s adverse reaction to it.48
The nature of the relationship is vital for reconciliation. Were Pakistan the puppet master, they could have delivered the Taliban to negotiations. These have been the demands of the Afghan and US governments. If, however, the relationship is a hybrid in which the Taliban are autonomous in their strategic decision-making but not entirely independent (due to the needs and constraints of the sanctuary), the prospects of Pakistan forcing the Taliban into negotiations are unrealistic. As Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid conclude, “No state can be successfully pressured into acts it considers suicidal.”49 The idea of forcing the Afghan Taliban into the arms of the Karzai government is unrealistic, given Pakistan’s historic tensions with Afghanistan and India. As such, they have opposed the capitulation and the defection models because they believe the result would be a stable, hostile, pro-India Afghanistan. Pakistan would prefer Afghanistan to be a client state but would settle for a less hostile or even neutral Afghan government.
These challenges and conflicting views among key actors would affect the trajectory and ultimate failure of the Obama administration’s reconciliation efforts.