The ORHA staff arrived in Iraq on April 21. Three days later, Rumsfeld informed Lieutenant General Garner that Ambassador L. Paul Bremer would be coming to Iraq as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The Bush administration had not settled in advance on whether to turn administration over to Iraqis immediately or to govern as an occupying authority and transition more slowly to Iraqi control.1 “The President’s goal,” Rumsfeld recorded in an October 14 memo, “is to stabilize Iraq and then turn it over to the Iraqis.”2 Indeed, this was the advice of figures such as Ahmed Chalabi.3 As the Saddam regime disintegrated and Iraqi exiles began to bicker, the administration changed course.4 The CPA would govern Iraq under United Nations authority with the support of an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) until handing it over to an Iraqi government.5 Bremer arrived in Baghdad on May 12. He made two controversial decisions: de-Ba’athifaction and disbanding the Iraqi Army.
Bremer issued CPA Order Number 1, known as de-Ba’athification, on May 16, his first official act. The order banned members of Hussein’s Ba’ath Party from holding public office. Since Sunnis held most of the power in the Ba’ath Party, the order disproportionately affected that community.6 Later that day, Bremer delayed the transfer of authority to Iraqi officials.7 Hamid Bayati, from the Shi’a party Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), reportedly warned CPA leaders, “the longer Iraqis are not in control of their political life, the more problems would arise.” Chalabi and others registered concerns about a US broken promise to turn over power to Iraqis within weeks.8 Bremer nonetheless appointed the 25 members of the IGC, which consisted of 13 exiles and 12 local Iraqis.9 Twelve of the 25 were Shi’a, and five were Kurds. Five Sunni Arabs were included in the body (20 percent), three of whom were local.10 Most Iraqis were reportedly unfamiliar with the IGC and its members.11
Bremer gave the IGC the responsibility for implementing de-Ba’athification. This decision gave those wanting to consolidate their power a potent tool to eliminate the competition. The IGC wasted no time in pressing for an expansion of the program while preventing former Ba’athists who had committed no crimes from returning to government.12 Ahmed Chalabi, for instance, used these aggressive de-Ba’athification authorities to undercut support for his political rival Ayad Allawi, a secular Shi’a who aimed for greater Sunni inclusion.13
The decision to disband the army, CPA Order Number 2, was issued on May 23. Since Saddam’s army was also led mostly by Sunni Arabs, the order had a disproportionate effect on them and risked alienating some 385,000 armed and trained men.14 It prompted angry reactions.15 Demonstrations occurred for weeks in Baghdad. Violent protests in Mosul, where Major General David Petraeus was trying to gain local support, wounded 16 American soldiers. One senior military official noted that “the insurgency went crazy. . . . One Iraqi who saved my life in an ambush said to me, ‘I can’t be your friend anymore.’”16 On June 18, an estimated 2,000 former Iraqi soldiers protested outside the Green Zone. “We will not let the Americans rule us in such a humiliating way,” declared one speaker.17 American soldiers reportedly fired into the crowd, killing two.18
The military plan relied on the defeated Iraqi Army to provide security and reconstruction assistance.19 Disbanding the army meant there was no local Iraqi force and far too few international soldiers to fill the security vacuum. Chaos and looting were rampant in Iraqi cities. Meanwhile, officials at the CPA and in the military command disapproved efforts by US military and intelligence officials to reach out to Sunni military leaders. One Sunni leader reportedly told his American counterpart, “All right, my friend, this is the last time we will speak, and I wish you luck in the hard times to come.”20
The CPA’s first two official orders, de-Ba’athification and disbanding the army, prompted Sunni Arab resistance.21 Dobbins notes that de-Ba’athification and disbanding the Iraqi army—both orders which were cleared by the Department of Defense and the White House—could have benefitted from further review. But he downplays their significance. After all, de-Ba’athification affected 0.1 percent of the Iraqi population—25 times less than the de-Nazification policy in post-war Germany.22 The Iraqi Army had already dissolved itself, he argues, so there was little reason to issue the order. Bremer instead could have put them on inactive status, sustained their pay, and recalled individuals and units selectively.23 These orders did, as Dobbins observes, antagonize the Sunni community from which the insurgency grew.24
These acts sent a statement, whether intended or not, about who was welcome and who was not. Each order taken individually might not have been as problematic as some critics suggest. Still, together with other actions, they suggested that Sunni leaders had no place in the new order.25 “I remember one prominent US National Security Council official telling me more than once that the answer for Iraq was the ‘80-percent solution,’” Washington Post columnist David Ignatius recalls. “Kurds and Shiites would build the new state regardless of opposition from the 20 percent of the population that was Sunni. This view was recklessness dressed up as realpolitik.”26 “The resistance developed,” reflected a Sunni Arab political leader, “once it became clear to the Sunni community that they were being excluded from the political process.”27
Military actions increased resentment. In April 2003, soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division in Fallujah fired into a protesting crowd after allegedly taking fire from some militants, killing 17 and wounding more than 70.28 Within weeks they reportedly shot and killed some of the local policemen after mistaking them for insurgents.29 Similar problems were occurring around Tikrit, another part of the Sunni triangle. The 4th Infantry Division was using tactics like the ones seen in Anbar: large-scale sweeps, liberal use of firepower in populated areas, indiscriminate night raids that hauled in high volumes of detainees, many of whom were innocent.30 Insurgent attacks increased nearly four-fold countrywide, from roughly 15 per day in June 2003 to 60 by November.31
These orders and military actions took place as a new communications revolution was getting underway. Without the benefit of mobile phones and digital technology, information had traveled slowly in previous post-war environments. Individuals and groups had fewer opportunities to share ideas and communicate problems. Officials had more reaction time.
Iraq in 2003 was vastly different. Mobile phones and the Internet speeded communication among families, leaders, and social networks. Outrage echoed across aggrieved Sunni Arab communities, amplifying indignation into resistance at a pace that far exceeded the ability of US officials to react. A prime beneficiary was a Jordanian named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his group, al Qaeda in Iraq.32
In addition to Sunni insurgent and terrorist groups, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Iran-backed Shi’a militia, Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army), began agitating in Baghdad and Najaf.33 Sadr was challenging Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the senior Shi’a cleric in Iraq, for influence and took the competition into the streets. His militia allegedly murdered Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoei in April 2003. They also began a series of sectarian murders designed to purge Sunni Arabs from areas of Baghdad.34 The killings prompted a debate between the CPA (who wanted Sadr arrested) and the military commander, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sánchez, the Pentagon, and the CIA (who did not).35 The US decided not to detain him, and Sadr continued operating with impunity, taking over the Samir Hotel in Najaf on October 15 and naming it his Ministry of Defense.36
Despite the start-up challenges and an increasingly difficult security situation, the CPA did manage to put together an action plan by July 2003: “A durable peace for a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security.”37 The plan focused on four core foundations: security, governance, economy, and essential services. The CPA later added strategic communications to this list.38 It listed benchmarks and timelines for each foundation.39
Meanwhile, Shi’a and Kurdish leaders were working the CPA process to press their advantage. A redistribution of power among the major groups in Iraq toward proportional representation was bound to work against the Sunnis but did not have to alienate them so aggressively. The IGC selected a 25-member cabinet, with only three positions going to Sunni Arabs (plus an interior minister from April to June 2004).40 The cabinet’s appointed status did not sit well with many Iraqi leaders. Sistani issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, on June 28 calling for Iraqis to elect a body that would write a new constitution.41 Sistani and other Iraqi leaders (including some Sunnis) demanded elections as soon as possible.42 With the Sunni political community fragmented and many leaders joining the insurgency, elections would heavily favor organized Shi’a political parties and movements.43 To press their advantage, Shi’a leaders in the IGC called for more expansive de-Ba’athification.44 Militants registered their protests by targeting IGC members as well as international forces.45 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network Tawhid wal-Jihad (the precursor to al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI]) bombed the UN compound on August 19, killing Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello and prompting the United Nations to pull out of the country.46 Some IGC leaders advocated the use of militias, such as Peshmerga and the Badr Corps, to help stem the violence, but the CPA rebuffed them.47
The efforts to gain international legitimacy were running into problems, too. The Arab League announced in July 2003 that it would not recognize the IGC.48 They relented after heavy lobbying by the Bush administration and the United Nations.49 On September 23, the IGC banned the Qatar-based al Jazeera news channel along with al Arabiya, the Saudi-owned, Dubai-based network, on suspicion of encouraging violence and provoking sectarian strife.50 Both are stations sponsored by Sunni Arab states.
Bremer refined his plan. In a September 8 op-ed in the Washington Post, reportedly without clearance from the Pentagon, he outlined his seven-step plan to Iraqi sovereignty. These steps included: (1) creation of a broadly representative Iraqi Governing Council, (2) IGC to name a constitutional preparatory committee (CPC) to develop a way forward in developing a new Iraqi constitution, (3) appointment by the IGC of 25 ministers to run the Iraqi government, (4) writing a new Iraqi constitution, (5) popular ratification of the constitution, (6) election of a new government, and (7) dissolving the CPA.51 The CPA estimated that this seven-step process would require 540 days to complete.52 Leaders in Washington and Iraq reportedly were stunned.
The Bush administration and the Pentagon were aiming for a near-term handover to Iraqi authorities. Bremer’s plan would take far longer than the administration desired. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice grew increasingly concerned and asked Robert Blackwill, a former ambassador to India, to assess the situation. Blackwill characterized Bremer’s plan as unrealistic and done without Iraqi support.53 Ultimately, the Americans would hand over authority to an Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) in mid-2004 with Ayad Allawi as prime minister. National elections would be held six months later, in January 2005.54
While the Shi’a-dominated IGC showed little interest in winning over Sunni Arab support, US actions continued exacerbating the latter’s sense of alienation. Derek Harvey, the chief intelligence analyst for the military command in Iraq, wrote a classified assessment in February 2004 of the burgeoning insurgency called “Sunni Arab Resistance: Politics of the Gun.”55 The report detailed how Saddam Hussein had expanded the Special Republican Guards (Fedayeen Saddam), the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and the Ba’ath Party militia as a hedge against internal rebellion. These forces had placed arms caches and explosive materials in safe houses throughout the country. Harvey estimated that 65,000 to 95,000 of these men, a ready-made insurgent cadre, were in and around Baghdad.56 As the political process excluded them, Sunni Arabs perceived that US military operations aimed to repress them, which created a mutually reinforcing cycle that inflamed the insurgency. The detentions system became a fertile recruiting ground.57 Most detainees were Sunni Arabs. Military officials reportedly estimated that 70 to 90 percent of them were innocent. The Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal, combined with widespread perceptions of injustice, added fuel to the insurgency.
Harvey and others believed that outreach to Sunni Arabs was essential if the United States hoped to reduce the levels of violence. When American and British intelligence officials developed a plan to reach out to Sunni tribes, however, CPA officials demurred.58 “I was struck by the desperation of Iraq’s Sunni sheikhs, who feared and in many cases despised the brutal Zarqawi,” writes David Ignatius, “But couldn’t get tone-deaf U.S. officials in the international Green Zone to take their problems seriously.”59
In Anbar, the 1st Marine Division took over from the 82nd Airborne in March 2004. Their commander, Major General Jim Mattis, issued instructions to limit civilian casualties.60 Nonetheless, the marines found patrolling into Fallujah tough going. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who arrived in Iraq in August 2002 expecting a US invasion, was growing Tawhid wal-Jihad into a formidable terrorist network and angling to inflame a nascent sectarian civil war.61 Large numbers of Anbaris, as well as foreign jihadis, flocked to join his ranks.62 On March 31, they ambushed Blackwater security guards and hung their charred and beaten bodies on the city’s main bridge. Fallujah had become violently anti-coalition.63 Sánchez ordered an immediate offensive. Mattis argued that the timing was wrong and that the mission was ill-advised until they could improve popular support, but Sánchez insisted on moving forward.64 Marines kicked off Operation Vigilant Resolve on April 6 to deal with the growing threat in Fallujah. Most Iraqi security forces who were to participate deserted immediately.65 The offensive, the first large-scale assault on a major city since the end of Saddam, outraged Iraqis and played into Zarqawi’s hands. A heated exchange took place as Bremer demanded that Sánchez call off the operation.66 Sánchez relented.
The military shifted to the Sadr threat. Sánchez designed the plan and briefed Bremer, who sought White House permission. The latter disapproved of the plan to arrest Sadr, believing that such an operation could enrage Shi’as and disrupt the June transfer of power.67 Washington failed to appreciate the internal Shi’a rivalry. The coalition had increased military pressure on the Sadrist Party-cum-militia Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), which created a backlash in some Shi’a communities but bloodied the Mahdi Army. Sadr ordered his forces to stand down in the face of substantial losses.68 He remained at large and his popularity grew, however, while Sunni Arabs seethed.69