Just as in Afghanistan, the situation in Iraq suffered from client-patron problems involving interest misalignment, information asymmetry, and moral hazard. The US government (the patron) and the Iraqi government (the client) never developed a common strategy for the war.1 These problems, coupled with US officials’ poor strategic empathy, masked significant interest misalignment. Subtle divergences and outright conflicts over objectives such as political inclusion, Iraqi security forces development, and US military operations and troop dispositions were undermining the prospects of success. These problems, which often occurred along the seams of US diplomatic and military silos, were masked by information asymmetries that Iraqi officials repeatedly used to their advantage. US officials found themselves unable to hold Iraqi officials accountable for actions that were intensifying the conflict. Manipulation by Iraqi officials reinforced Bush administration perceptions that the Casey transition-and-withdraw plan was the right one.
The problem of Sunni Arab marginalization was not unknown to US officials. Sunni Arab acceptance of the new government was essential to achieve the stability conditions that would enable America to withdraw, and cables from Baghdad show US officials encouraging political inclusion and their Iraqi counterparts responding in agreement.2 As early as September 2005, the US embassy in Baghdad formulated an action plan to address “deep-seated anxieties among the Sunni Arab population.3 The Americans aimed to assist the Iraqi government in reaching out to Sunni Arab Rejectionists, who were considered reconcilable, and in defeating the Former Regime Elements (Ba’athists), who were not.4 In 2006, the Bush administration listed “security and national reconciliation” first in their three-track approach with the Maliki government.5
Such backing must have seemed successful. Because the Sunni Arab boycott of the January 2005 elections left them little representation in the Iraqi Transitional Government that was to write the constitution, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari expanded the constitutional committee to include them.6 Maliki developed a plan for reconciliation soon after taking office in 2006.7 The US government does not appear to have devoted any resources or conditionality to addressing the “deep-seated anxieties” of the Sunni Arab community or measuring whether reconciliation efforts were having any effect. US civilian and military leaders viewed reconciliation as a matter for the Iraqi government. When some commanders in Anbar experimented successfully with outreach to Sunni tribes in 2005, Casey applauded their efforts but denied requests for additional support.8 Casey assured Iraqi officials that US commanders were not “negotiating with insurgents.”9 The October 2005 US “civ-mil action plan” focused on capacity-building and did not address issues such as sectarianism or corruption.10 US officials would often encourage Iraqi officials to “do more,” but they stopped short of conditionality.11
The Jaafari and Maliki governments, however, maintained a dual-track policy of convincing the Americans of their politically inclusive bona fides while relentlessly pursuing the Shi’a consolidation of power. Iraqi security forces had been engaging in systematic human rights abuses, mainly targeted at Sunni Arabs. The Jaafari and Maliki administrations each defined Sunni Arab insurgents as Ba’athists, which promoted repression.12 Within its first 90 days in Iraq in 2005, the US 3rd Infantry Division alone reported 57 allegations of detainee abuse by Iraqi officials.13 US officials received many reports about these and other problems, conveyed their concerns to Iraqi officials, but took little to no action to address them (other than creating more capacity-building efforts).14
For their part, Iraqi officials were adept at assuaging US concerns. Jaafari’s notoriously sectarian Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr repeatedly assured American officials that human rights reform was at the top of his reform agenda.15 He dismissed reports that one of his units, the so-called Wolf brigade, was engaged in human rights abuses, noting that they were his “most effective” special police forces.16 Iraqi investigations into reports of torture and abuse of 168 detainees at the so-called Bunker facility (a Ministry of Interior prison) were slow-rolled and largely forgotten.17 Despite such extensive reports, US officials visiting from Washington, D.C., would take efforts to support their Iraqi counterparts. One senior Pentagon delegation told Jabr that they had been “impressed by what they had seen” at police training sites.18 The official does not appear to have raised human rights concerns.
The American plan to stand-up Iraqi security forces, turn over battlespace, and withdraw from the cities reinforced the Iraqi government’s sectarian strategy. Jaafari told the Washington Post on June 24, 2005, “We strongly prefer an increase in quality of Iraqi forces, increase in number, increase in efficiency, increase in the effectiveness of tactics they use, as well as increase in equipment . . . anything that will raise efficiency of Iraqi forces is something that will be very welcomed because it will allow other forces, especially American forces, to withdraw.”19
US military officials poured money into police training. General Casey declared 2006 to be the “Year of the Police.” The American general officer in charge of Iraqi police development told the New York Times, “We’re trying to develop the police capability to the point where by the end of 2006 we can begin the transfer to civil security.”20 With Sunni Arabs increasingly marginalized in the security ministries, the ISF provided the Iraqi government with powerful muscle for the struggle against their sectarian rivals.21 Absent conditionality, capacity-building efforts made the ISF into more active predators.
As reported extensively in chapter 22, US military operations unwittingly played into Sunni Arab fears.22 American forces targeted and detained Iraqi Islamic Party leader Dr. Muhsin Abdal Hamid during a May 30, 2005, operation. Placards in Sunni Arab parts of Baghdad denounced the raid as “terrorism American-style” and vowed to throw out the occupier. US officials apologized after learning of the incident, and then congratulated themselves on their “damage control” efforts.23 Despite US military operations against Sadrist militia Jaish al-Mahdi, perceptions of bias persisted. Jaafari’s Minister of Defense Saadoun al-Dulaimi, a Sunni Arab, warned US officials that Sunni Arabs believe that Iraqi and American forces are “blatantly anti-Sunni Arab.”24 Sectarian reprisals soared. In Baghdad alone, one eyewitness reported in early 2006, roughly 50 bodies were found daily. “The Sunnis usually beheaded their victims, while the Shiites drilled holes in their heads.”25
Sunni Arab participation in the December 2005 election did not reduce the violence. It got worse. Even before becoming prime minister, Maliki’s sectarianism was well-known.26 He was a compromise candidate put forward by US ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad when neither Jaafari nor Allawi could form a government.27 Maliki’s position was fragile. He faced an internal Shi’a threat from the Sadrists, who had opposed him in favor of Jaafari. Any move to accommodate Sunni Arabs risked fracturing his governing coalition and ousting him from power.28 Eliminating Ba’athists, however, was a unifying theme. A Dawa Party official (Maliki’s party) confided that “the Shi’a’s deep-seated fear of the Ba’athists’ return to power drives all Shi’a political decisions.”29 Maliki told US officials that Ba’athists were the “primary threat” to Iraq’s security.30 The divergent views between US and Iraqi officials of the Sunni Arab insurgency had consequences. An assessment of sectarian violence in Baghdad concluded that American operations had unwittingly trapped Sunnis in their neighborhoods, allowing Shi’a militias to go after and eliminate them. The Shi’a-dominated National Police “were using us to cleanse areas of Sunni presence,” reported an American battalion commander serving in Baghdad, “and we essentially have no option because we’re supposed to partner with these guys.”31
Although most reporting focused on the police, the Iraqi Army had sectarian challenges as well. Jaafari’s Minister of Defense Dulaimi complained of pressures to put more Shi’a officials into the ministry.32 Frictions between the Ministries of Interior and Defense sometimes resulted in violence.33 Maliki’s minister of defense, Abdul Qader Obeidi, assured US officials that the Iraqi Army was nonsectarian and loyal to the Iraqi state.34 Iraqi officers, however, reported that Shi’a militia influence was growing in the ranks.35
Maliki and his officials largely dismissed mounting evidence of sectarian atrocities given to them by American officials, with few consequences.36 Jawad al-Bolani, Maliki’s interior minister, assured US officials that promoting human rights was among his top priorities.37 US officials issued a demarche after hearing more allegations of police abuse.38
In response to a congressional query regarding widespread human rights violations, US officials emphasized “vetting arrangements” with the Ministry of Interior, human rights, and rule of law training for Iraqi police, their efforts to “press senior Iraqi officials” on the matter, and demarches.39 A US congressional delegation urged Bolani to “purge” sectarian elements from the police.40 It seems that at no time before 2007 did US military officials, diplomats, or Congress penalize Iraqi officials or the government for perpetrating such abuses. The American general in charge of the police training mission insisted that reports of corruption, infiltration by sectarian militias, and dysfunction within the Ministry of Interior were inaccurate and unfair.41 One cable, while criticizing him for lackluster reform efforts, gave Bolani “good marks” for positive changes in human rights.42
Assurances from the Iraqi government that they would take the lead on Sunni Arab political inclusion and conflict resolution would be proven cynical by such rampant sectarianism.43 These promises kept the Americans out of the reconciliation business until 2007. For Jaafari and Maliki especially, Sunni Arab political inclusion threatened their consolidation of power and their ability to prevent a return of an authoritarian Sunni Arab regime that could once again persecute Shi’a Iraqis.44 Even Iraqi president Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish leader, rejected the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation that the government reconcile with former Ba’athists.45 SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim flatly stated that Iraq already had a government of national unity, so there was no need for a reconciliation program. “We will never reconcile with the Saddamists. They were killing us for the last thirty-five years, and now we are paying them back.”46
The flaccid response by US officials toward the systematic sectarianism is puzzling. These actions were alienating Sunni Arabs and creating support for insurgent groups that were killing American soldiers. Inducements—encouragement and better training—seemed to be the preferred approach. Sovereignty concerns probably provided some rationale—US officials wanted to avoid the appearance of meddling in Iraqi political affairs (despite Khalilzad’s activist approach in promoting Maliki for prime minister). US officials do not appear to have considered the consequences to American credibility of acquiescing in such sectarianism.