In the aftermath of World War II, as the United States created its first large-scale standing army to keep the post-war peace, Samuel Huntington developed the intellectual underpinnings of the right relationship between political authorities and military officials. The key for America was to have a professional military that was under the control of elected political leaders and would not threaten a coup or play a political role. In The Soldier and the State, Huntington explained the difference between subjective and objective control of the military.1
Subjective control occurs when the political leadership co-opts the military, often through some combination of personal enrichment or political influence balanced by pitting military officials against one another to prevent one from getting too powerful. The advantage of this system is that the political authority can use the military as an instrument of political control without fear of a coup. The downside is that the incentives toward personal power and enrichment tend to be more potent than the ones for military readiness and professionalism. In subjective control systems, military officials tend to buy their positions from the political leaders for a significant amount of money. To make good on the cost of the job and to turn a profit, military leaders become participants in the system. They use their positions to extract bribes, extort customs or business revenues, participate in illicit economies, seize land and lucrative contracts, sell military positions in their commands, and participate in other income- or asset-producing activities. In some cases, the military is allowed or even expected to use military force to suppress internal dissent and rival groups. These activities come at the cost of military readiness.
Objective control is different. In this model, the military enjoys professional autonomy in exchange for being apolitical. The military focuses on training and readiness against external threats while getting sufficient pay and support. In a force-on-force engagement, a professional army that spends its time training will defeat a comparably sized subjective control army that spends its time looting. Objectively controlled military leaders stay far away from politics. Military education indoctrinates the force on loyalty to the constitution or system of government—the state—rather than allegiance to a particular individual or group. This principle of civilian control of the military is unquestioned among senior officials in the United States and NATO countries. Most western military officers have never been exposed to subjective control and do not understand its incentives.
The professional military culture that makes objective control second nature to western officials may also heighten their risk of mirror imaging when working with subjective control militaries. Mirror imaging is a cognitive bias that occurs when group A views group B through their own lenses and experiences rather than trying to understand group B’s perspective. In this case, military officials raised under objective control will perceive their counterparts as equally interested in professionalism and being apolitical. Subjective control officials, meanwhile, may play into these perceptions to maintain a positive relationship and mask self-enrichment efforts, or might mirror image that US officials played the same game.
Mirror imaging often masks patron-client problems. US military and civilian officials never questioned whether the Iraqi government practiced objective control; Maliki, however, wanted subjective control because he feared a coup.2 Much of the Iraqi security forces were under the operational control of the US military. Although American officials in Iraq did not contemplate encouraging a coup, the United States had a history of supporting them during the Cold War.3 A much stronger fear for Maliki was the growing influence of Sadrist and Sunni militias within the army and police.4 “I am afraid to clash with militias and tribes,” Maliki confided in late October 2006 to Khalilzad, “because I am afraid the army or police might commit treason.”5
The most effective way for Maliki to reduce his vulnerability to an American-sponsored coup was to weaken the US military’s grip on the ISF. Maliki repeatedly expressed concerns about the weaknesses of the ISF, the need for better weapons and equipment, and his desire to accelerate the transition and withdrawal of American troops.6 Maliki told a visiting congressional delegation in October 2006 that significant numbers of American forces could leave within a year.7 He badgered Casey that coalition military operations were damaging his political reconciliation efforts.8 In early November, Maliki told Bush’s national security advisor, Stephen Hadley, that he wanted greater control over Iraq’s security. Hadley replied that President Bush supported the objective.9 Maliki pressed the issue with Casey in early February 2007, demanding full control of Iraqi special operations forces.10 To address the threat of a coup, Maliki told Casey and Khalilzad that “reliability” should be a key consideration for ISF senior leaders.11 As Maliki gained more control over the ISF, he purged key officials who opposed his political agenda and advanced those who supported it.12 Maliki’s March 2008 Charge of the Knights operation in Basra and subsequent operations in Sadr City served as tests of loyalty as the prime minister took on the Sadrist threat to his regime.13
For Bush, Iraq was too important to fail, and Iraqi leaders used that leverage to their advantage to maintain the status quo—sustaining lucrative capacity-building efforts and easing international forces out of the cities and the country, all while resisting suggestions about reconciliation or troop surges. Even though the Americans would insist on outreach to the Sunnis, the Bush administration believed until late 2006 that preventing failure overall meant uncritically supporting Maliki despite his sectarianism and the risks this posed to success. For his part, Maliki had far greater incentive to keep the Shi’a coalition on his side and to consolidate his grip on power than to risk fracturing his base by addressing Sunni Arab inclusion—especially while he had Americans fighting the Sunnis for him. Iraqi government incentives aligned with those of American leaders who advocated staying the course. The result was the perpetuation of a status quo that was damaging to US interests.