Bush announced the new approach on January 10, 2007.1 Similar to Obama’s later decision to surge in Afghanistan, Bush’s decision came at a time when US public support for the war was at an all-time low.2 To execute the new approach, Bush changed his command team in Iraq, kicking Casey upstairs to be army chief of staff and selecting General David Petraeus to replace him in Iraq. Middle East expert Ambassador Ryan Crocker took over from Khalilzad as chief of mission in Baghdad.
The new team wasted no time implementing the new strategy. Several close to the changes noted that the new approach “reversed virtually all of the previous concepts.”3 Bush began to hold weekly video teleconferences with Petraeus and Crocker and with Maliki. “Iraq consumed 80 percent of the NSC’s bandwidth in 2007 and 2008,” Bush’s former Deputy National Security Advisor Doug Lute recalled, to the neglect of other issues.4
The March 2007 Department of Defense report to Congress, authored mainly by Petraeus, was a radical departure from the earlier themes of optimism and progress: “The strategic goal of the United States for Iraq remains a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and that is an ally in the war on terror. . . . To regain the initiative, the GOI is working with the United States and its Coalition partners, embarking on a new approach to restore the confidence of the Iraqi people in their government; to build strong security institutions capable of securing domestic peace and defending Iraq from outside aggression; and to gain support for Iraq among its neighbors, the region, and the international community.” The report noted that its assessment of the situation should be “read as a baseline from which to measure future progress, and indications of success must be heavily caveated given the dynamic situation in Iraq.”5 In other words, Congress should discard the claims from previous reports.
The new approach was tactically successful. Weekly attacks spiked in the summer as the surge brigades arrived and began operations. An AQI-inspired civil war trapped Sunni Arab leaders in a war they could not win. The surge and the so-called Anbar Awakening—when Sunni leaders in Anbar province turned against AQI and worked with the Americans—became mutually reinforcing.6 Sunni Arab leaders began turning to the American military for protection against AQI reprisals and from the Iraqi government and its supportive militias. Violence levels fell dramatically in late 2007 as the Awakening spread throughout Sunni Arab communities.7
Maliki’s Charge of the Knights, a surprise Iraqi military offensive in Basra, ended an ulcerating Sadrist threat from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shi’a militia.8 Senior US officials viewed this operation as proof that Maliki was a “post-sectarian” leader.9 As discussed earlier, a better explanation is that Maliki needed to put an end to Sadr’s threat to his governing coalition and to test the loyalty of the Iraqi security forces. US officials continued to underestimate these internal political challenges, reflected former senior White House and Defense officials.10 Maliki’s political strategy focused on consolidating his power among the Shi’a parties as the Americans were busy co-opting Sunni Arab tribes. With his base secure, he could take on the perceived Ba’athist threat. Roughly 15 months after the surge began, violence levels had plummeted from a high of 1,800 per week to approximately 400 per week. They declined to under 200 per week in 2010.
Some fundamental problems remained that would undermine efforts to conclude the war in Iraq successfully. First was the continued lack of a coordinated strategy between the United States and Iraq.11 Lute argued that this masked divergent interests and objectives, which gave Maliki more space for his sectarian agenda.12 The Bush administration focused on milestones but underappreciated how Iraqi elites were manipulating them, a problem that heightened after Petraeus and Crocker left Iraq.
Second, while more assertive efforts by Petraeus and Crocker curbed some of Maliki’s sectarian tendencies, they were unsuccessful in changing his political calculus and its effect on Iraqi institutions. An independent commission led by Marine Corps general James L. Jones sent to investigate the Iraqi security forces offered a scathing review of the Interior Ministry and recommended disbanding and rebuilding the Iraqi National Police.13 Despite an influx of resources and a new approach to ISF development, the Iraqi security forces achieved only temporary gains in readiness and performance.14 The United States never addressed the subjective control problem, so sectarianism resumed. “Maliki asserted his control over the security forces,” Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Dubik recalls. “He assumed the positions of Minister of Defense and Interior, used the Office of the Commander in Chief to sell positions to those he considered to be politically reliable . . . and he directed their operations” to advance his sectarian agenda.15 The continued alienation of Sunni Arabs fostered the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).16 General Petraeus lamented that by 2014 ISIS made “short work of the ISF which were led by individuals I’d insisted be fired back in 2007.”17
Third, there was little thought about how to create a favorable and durable outcome. The surge was supposed to reverse a declining situation and did not address war termination.18 Senior officials acknowledged the concerns about sectarianism and political inclusion but had no political strategy.19 In the difficult days of 2007, it is understandable that the US senior leadership in Baghdad focused on the immense near-term challenges. Still, no one in Washington, D.C., appeared to focus on creating durable success.20