Introduction
I’m young, I’m handsome, I’m fast, I’m pretty, and can’t possibly be beat” – Muhammad Ali
Bobby Fischer, like Ali, grew bigger than his sport, and he bent our perceptions on how well a human can play chess. His life was one of legend, power, hubris and eventual self-destruction. More than any other great player, Fischer’s triumphs and falls plumbed the depth of human experience. He was simultaneously extraordinary and pathetic, and the inevitability of his fall was on par with the lives of Hamlet and Willie Loman. His is essentially a feel-bad story, of rags to riches, to borderline-crazy recluse.
The most dominant chess player who ever lived was born March 9th, 1943, in Chicago. Even as a child, Bobby lived his life with the supreme confidence of one who knows he is cut out for big things. I sense that he loved chess because it had the power to take him somewhere else, out of his deep, inherent unhappiness – if only temporarily.
By the age of 14, he won the U.S. Championship, eight titles in all, each by a point or more. His 1963-1964 11-0 sweep of the championship may never be repeated. By age 15, Fischer qualified at Portoroz to become the youngest ever candidate for the world championship cycle. By 1970, he won the Palma de Mallorca Interzonal by an astounding 3.5 points ahead of his nearest competitor. By 1971 he was ranked number one in the world chess rankings. Then came his legendary match victories.
6-0, 6-Oh my God!
“Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy.” – The Buddha
First, Soviet GM Mark Taimanov fell by a typo-like 6-0 score. Many top players at the time interpreted this as an anomaly, of maybe Taimanov being horribly off form. Nobody expected Fischer to repeat this performance against the legendary GM Bent Larsen, then ranked equal 3rd/4th in the world. Yet Fischer did just that. If you just barely defeat an opponent, people may think you were lucky; brutalize an opponent, and future opponents learn to fear you.
Now Taimanov and Larsen were more resilient than most. If I were a world class player and lost to someone 0-6, I would most certainly suffer from post traumatic stress disorder, and would require antidepressants and therapy for years to come. Vasily Panov wrote: “Both (Fischer and Larsen) consider themselves the world’s strongest chess players, and, of course, they are jealous towards each other, like Miss America and Miss Denmark.”
Larsen declared before that he would win the Candidates’ matches and then the world title, and that “Fischer will never become a world champion”, because he supposedly “always fears to lose a game”. Before the match, Larsen boasted that he wasn’t intimidated by Fischer, who he felt was cocooned by an undeserved legendary reputation. He claimed he would draw first blood, then get inside Fischer’s head. Then after defeating Fischer, Larsen predicted he would go on to become world champion. Boy, was he proven wrong! After losing a razor-close first game (which you can play over in Chapter Four), which was as suspenseful as a Hitchcock film, Larsen just collapsed.
At this point, so enlarged was Fischer’s legend, that I suspect his future opponents, Petrosian and Spassky, imputed hidden meaning into even his ordinary moves. Fischer then went on to dismantle former World Champion Tigran Petrosian by a dominating 6.5-2.5. Normally, Petrosian had a knack for sucking the life out of an otherwise dynamic position, like flies into the nozzle of a vacuum cleaner, but not this time. At age 10, I remember reading a quote by some GM, asked to predict the outcome of the match. He replied: “What happens when a man who wins nearly every game he plays, meets a man who draws nearly every game he plays?”
The Match of the Century
Then show time, the 1972 world championship match against Spassky. It started disastrously for Fischer. In game one, in a completely drawn ending from this diagrammed position, Fischer committed an inexplicable beginner’s blunder:
W
Now, you, me and every other player in the world rated over 800 would play 29 ... Ke7. Instead Fischer played the insane 29 ... Bxh2??, after which he duly got his bishop trapped, after the painfully obvious 30 g3. Fischer’s beginner’s blunder left the chess world in slack-jawed disbelief. Your writer was at the time a dorky 11-year-old E-player, and even I knew the move was idiotic.
So Bobby just threw away game one. He claimed the cameras in the playing hall disturbed his concentration and refused to play game two with them on. The organizers had banked on income from the televising of the match and refused. Therefore Fischer failed to show up for game two, forfeiting. The entire match was in jeopardy. Those who dealt with Fischer soon learned: don’t expect compromise from an essentially irrational personality. The nervous match organizers backed down and agreed to have Spassky and Fischer play in a back room, sans cameras or live spectators.
‘Compromise’ was a word alien to Fischer’s unamenable mind, which interpreted the world in blacks and whites, with no room for shades of grey. So starting the match 0-2, Fischer proved the prognosticators all wrong, by trouncing Spassky in the remaining games of the match, winning it by a score of 12.5-8.5 (which was really 7.5 for Spassky, since it included the forfeit loss, which no writer is going to put in a best games collection).
Now Spassky could have walked out after two games, and nobody could blame him. But he was a gentleman, and also, there was the psychological factor: Fischer was the older brother, stronger, smarter, meaner and always one or more steps ahead – so much so that virtually every GM of his day felt dwarfed by his immensity. Spassky in 1972 was the reigning champion, and Fischer the challenger. Yet didn’t it feel like it was the other way around, where Spassky was the one who had something to prove?
“I have a minus score (against Spassky). I lost three and drew two. I was better than him when I lost those games. I pressed for the win. My overall tournament record is much better than his. I’m not afraid of him, he’s afraid of me,” claimed Fischer in an interview prior to the match. To his great credit, Boris remained to finish the match, and they produced some beautiful chess.
Was Fischer Mentally Ill?
What happens if a group of people worship a god, and then the god loses his mind? Fischer was a man whose disturbed psyche was profoundly unfit for an ordinary life. He was even more unfit to deal with fame, renown and financial success. He was a societal misfit with the courage to realize his misfitdom. Of course it’s futile for a person like me, whose grounding in psychology is merely that of an interested lay person. I’m not qualified to try and probe into Fischer’s swiftly degenerating mental status, since I’m not a psychiatrist or psychologist (I’m currently working on another book with Columbia Psychology professor Joel Sneed, and boy do I need his help here in this book).
No matter how irrational a person becomes, he or she rarely reaches a point where they are oblivious to their own sense of misery. Fischer was a man who couldn’t be beaten on the chess board, yet was beaten in life by his own mind states. To the paranoid mind, every stranger is a potential enemy. His rising paranoia fast embraced a conspiratorial world view of a cabal of Communists, Jews (yes, Fischer was Jewish himself, although he vehemently denied it later in his life), and later the entire United States, out to get him.
Kasparov wrote: “Apart from chess, Fischer had nothing ... After becoming World Champion, Fischer could not play anymore. This was the danger: he achieved perfection, and everything after this was already less than perfect.” Of course there are myriad books on Fischer’s life, which he crowded with controversy. So in this one we just touch on his chess games, not his life.
Fischer’s Style: the Fischer-Capa Connection
“The great Cuban José Capablanca had played this way half a century earlier, but Fischer’s modern interpretation of ‘victory through clarity’ was a revelation.” – Garry Kasparov
Intuition is that ethereal quality which we can’t taste, hear, smell, touch or see. Yet we still place our trust in it. Fischer’s intuition was on par with Capablanca’s, where he just knew the right idea, seemingly without analytical contemplation. On the chess board Fischer had a taste for the orderly, which was strangely at odds with his disorderly mind. Few huge tasks are completed without exertion, yet Fischer in his prime, like Capablanca, had the gift of defeating world class players, seemingly without resistance. He was the sighted mariner living in the world of the blind, oriented and guided by the stars which the rest of us were unable to see.
Fischer wasn’t an amphibious player, equally suited to strategic and irrational positions. He excelled in the former, which made him vulnerable to the Tals and Gellers of the world, in the latter. Fischer was above all a strategist, an aggressive Capablanca. His pieces exuded a flow of performing in efficient unison and his deadly strategic encroachment had a way of grappling the enemy, pulling him closer. He found hidden defects in his opponent’s positions with an optometrist’s eye for anomaly in the his patient’s retina. He somehow mysteriously tamed chaos into pure mathematics. Fischer, like Capa, had an almost magical way of chasing a distant complication, which when reached, revealed itself in utter simplicity. He unearthed the central principle of its natural process – its beating heart – around which the position hinged.
I have to admit that I always found it odd that a person of Fischer’s disputatious nature was capable of such harmonious, flowing chess. We all harbour different interpretations of the word ‘acquire’. To a natural tactician, a chaotic position is something to be cherished, while for a positional player, the fact that queens have been removed from the board is a cause for joy. Fischer is a candidate for the latter category.
Like Capa, Fischer ruled in the realm of endings and clear positions. Like Capa before him, Fischer was renowned for his almost instantaneous capacity to uncover a position’s elemental factor, no matter how deeply hidden. Intuition isn’t merely a guess. Instead, it is actual analysis done secretly in some back room in our subconscious mind. Fischer also never endured that shivering sense of dislocation the rest of us experience, when our clocks run low – mainly since he tended to move with astounding speed and almost never got into time pressure.
Fischer’s armour wasn’t chinkless, since he lost games via overextension, pushing past tolerable limits trying too hard to win. He was also a notorious material grabber, whether earned honestly or ill gotten didn’t seem to matter to him. Yet these unauthorised withdrawals from his opponent’s bank accounts were not done without taking on appalling risks. In some cases it almost appeared as if Fischer provoked opponents to a degree to which he hoped to be contradicted.
Fischer’s Openings and Contributions to Theory
In the opening phase, Fischer, like Botvinnik and Alekhine before him, intimidated opponents. He memorized theory the way ancient poets recited the Iliad. And he was a font of creativity, always ready with a prepared novelty in virtually every opening he played. In this book, prepare yourself for some stock scenery. This book, unlike other players’ games collections, lacks a broad demographic cross-section of opening lines. The reason? Fischer’s incredibly narrow opening repertoire.
Fischer’s Alma Mater lines were: Fischer-Sozin Sicilian, Najdorf Sicilian, King’s Indian and King’s Indian Attacks (which remain to this day, authoritative blueprints on how to handle the line), which we visit over and over again. These, and other favourites laid claim to Fischer’s lifetime allegiance. As for opening preparation, Fischer dominated his rivals, continually surprising them, sometimes with sound ideas, and sometimes with single game, semi-sound ambushes, which were also implements of his craft: For example:
In Fischer-Myagmarsuren 1967, Bobby just challenged precedence with 13 a3!!. Now you may ask why this innocuous move is so strong? Well, it prevents Black from puncturing the queenside dark squares with ... a3. Fischer correctly judged the slight opening of the queenside doesn’t hurt White. The idea is so strong that it remains White’s main move in the position even today.
At the same tournament, Fischer, as Black against Robert Byrne, just unleashed the devastating novelty 13 ... h5!!, a move which in a single stroke undermines e4 and which de-popularized his own beloved Fischer-Sozin Sicilian.
Imagination is often stifled by the fear of committing a blunder, but not this time. This is one of the most shocking opening novelties of all time, and one played in a world championship game. Fischer just played 11 ... Nh5!?, goading Spassky to chop the knight and seriously devalue Black’s kingside pawns. Spassky did just that, but followed with uncharacteristic over-caution and got strategically crushed. As it turns out, Fischer’s novelty was dubious, yet did exactly what it was designed to do in a single game: confuse and disorient the opponent.
In the final diagram, Fischer once again confused Spassky in their 1992 rematch, with a crazy yet sound Wing Gambit idea arising from a Rossolimo Sicilian.
Fischer, the Greatest of them all?
Fischer is in all probability, the most idealised (and hated!), and most over-praised player in the chess pantheon. I swore to myself that I would be objective when beginning this book, yet found myself gushing over his many double exclams. Fischer faced powerful intellects across the board, who were all vanquished by his telepathic intuition, which overrode his opponents’ intellect and logic.
Then when he became world champion, his chess came to a standstill. In a way Fischer was the worst world champion of all, since he refused to play even a single serious tournament or match game during his tenure. It’s almost as if he channelled Nietzche, thinking: “That which doesn’t beat me, makes me stronger.” And how can one lose if one never plays a game?
Fischer was a prodigious worker who studied chess (in his head), virtually every waking hour. He claimed to have deeply studied over 1,000 books, and even studied the great romantics like Adolf Anderssen and Paul Morphy – which should be a lesson to young players who only study opening books and databases.
I don’t really know what ‘greatest’ means, since there are so many categories. A few months ago, a group email discussion raged among players which included GMs Yasser Seirawan and Jim Tarjan, and IMs John Watson, Jack Peters, Jeremy Silman, Tony Saidy, John Donaldson and yours truly. We agreed on the following categories (although I added a few) which constitute ‘greatness’:
Creativity: Here, the greatest may be Anderssen, Reti, Nimzowitsch, Bronstein, Korchnoi, Larsen, Tal, Petrosian, Ivanchuk – only two of which became world champions.
Irrational positions: This was Fischer’s weakest category. My candidates: Andersson, Lasker, Bronstein, Tal, Spassky, Korchnoi, Kasparov, Anand, Morozevich, Nakamura.
Attacking ability: My candidates for greatest in this category would be Anderssen, Morphy, Alekhine, Keres, Bronstein, Geller, Tal, Spassky, Fischer (although the inclusion of Fischer in this category may be debatable, since his attacks invariably flowed from strategic superiority), Kasparov, Topalov, Anand.
Defence and counterattacking ability: Lasker, Capablanca, Petrosian, Korchnoi, Fischer, Karpov, Kramnik, Carlsen.
Strategic understanding and planning: Morphy, Staunton, Tarrasch, Steinitz, Capablanca, Euwe, Botvinnik, Smyslov, Petrosian, Fischer, Karpov, Kramnik, Carlsen.
Intuition: Morphy, Capablanca, Smyslov, Fischer, Karpov, Kramnik, Carlsen.
Tactical ability and combinational vision: Anderssen, Morphy, Alekhine, Keres, Bronstein, Tal, Fischer, Kasparov, Topalov, Anand.
Feel for the initiative: Morphy, Alekhine, Keres, Bronstein, Geller, Tal, Botvinnik, Spassky, Fischer, Kasparov, Anand, Topalov.
Calculation ability: Lasker, Korchnoi, Kasparov.
Opening research ability: Alekhine, Botvinnik, Fischer, Kasparov, Anand.
Endgame technique: Rubinstein, Lasker, Capablanca, Fischer, Karpov, Kramnik, Carlsen.
Peak strength: No other world champion dominated like Fischer did from 1970-72.
Longevity: Lasker, Smyslov, Korchnoi, Karpov.
In my lists, Fischer leads in the categories. Obviously, there is no such thing as ‘greatest player’, since it’s impossible to know if Morphy was stronger (for his era) than Capablanca or Fischer were for theirs. I can’t say Fischer was the best chess player of all time, but I do know that his games have almost become the standard by which other great players are judged.
I would think it would be exasperating for great players to be compared to Fischer, and have their chess skills judged lacking. Appreciation of art comes more from the observer, than the object itself. One tourist can look upon the Mona Lisa and think: “Eehh. Big deal!”, while another may be entranced by her smile. Players either like or dislike Nimzowitsch, Larsen, Tal or Petrosian’s games. With Fischer’s games, there is no debate. I haven’t met a single player who dislikes Fischer’s chess games or his style. Have you?
Post World Championship Blues
After his triumphant 1972 match with Spassky, Fischer basically fell off the grid, living the life of a recluse, only to resurface in 1992, for his rematch with Spassky. Fischer won this one decisively, but neither player was the same man of 1972. Still, the combustible Spassky/Fischer combination brought out the best in both, and they produced some pretty games. This is where it gets depressing.
In 1992, war-torn Yugoslavia (Sveti-Stefan/Belgrade was the site of their rematch) was under a U.N. embargo. First, the U.S. State Department forbade Fischer to play the match (although nearly all of us harboured a secret Edward Snowden-like stick-it-to-the-man sympathy for Fischer at the time, and clearly wanted him to play). You guessed it. Fischer called a press conference and ‘loudly’ spat on the State Department letter. The unamused U.S. government immediately demanded income tax on Fischer’s winnings in the match. Fischer refused to pay.
He made anti-American, anti-communist, anti-Semitic remarks on multiple radio stations. I still remember his interview with a Filipino radio station the day after the 911 attack, where Fischer made vile, blood pressure-raising statements, which I won’t repeat here, since they are all available on the internet. In 2004 he was arrested in Japan. The U.S. State Department revoked his passport (he shouldn’t have spit on that letter!), and he was held in a cell for eight months, under constant fear of deportation and prosecution to the U.S. In 2005, Iceland granted Fischer citizenship. He lived out his life there and died of renal failure (he irrationally refused treatment for a urinary tract infection, which then morphed into kidney failure) in 2008, at age 64, the same number of squares on the chess board.
The Games Selection in the Book
One problem with a book on Fischer is that there are a million other books on the same subject. IM Byron Jacobs suggested that I look for some unknown games, rather than his well-known masterpieces. So I would guess that the ration is around 70% of his familiar games, and 30% of games you may not have seen.
In the following game, GM Leonid Stein, a master of complex positions, lured Fischer into an irrational position – Fischer’s bête noire. So we get a glimpse of Fischer in his worst possible position, against one of the top GMs in the world, and still he pulls off a victory.
Game 1
R.Fischer-L.Stein
Sousse Interzonal 1967
Ruy Lopez
1 e4 e5!?
GM Leonid Stein was mainly a Sicilian player, so he clearly came to the game with prepared analysis against Fischer’s Ruy Lopez.
2 Nf3 Nc6 3 Bb5 a6 4 Ba4 Nf6 5 0-0 Be7 6 Re1 b5 7 Bb3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 Bb7 10 d4 Na5!?
This is a bit of an odd mix of variations. Today, most players choose 10 ... Re8, the Zaitsev variation, which hadn’t really come into existence when this game was played.
11 Bc2 Nc4?!
Stein was clearly trying to confuse Fischer by taking him out of theory, early on. In doing so, he confuses himself, reaching an inferior version of the Breyer variation. Black is better off playing 11 ... c5 12 Nbd2 cxd4 13 cxd4 exd4 14 Nxd4 Re8 15 Nf1 Bf8 16 Ng3 g6. Black’s d-pawn isn’t weak and his pieces are active, B.Vuckovic-R.Rapport, Plovdiv 2012.
12 b3 Nb6
13 Nbd2
Question: Why didn’t White pick off the e-pawn?
Answer: Black regains it via tactics after 13 dxe5 dxe5 14 Qxd8 Rfxd8 15 Nxe5 and now Black can simply go 15 ... Nxe4!, since the c1-bishop is loose at the end of the variation.
13 ... Nbd7
Now the game looks like a Breyer line, but one where Black loses time, since it took him five moves (!) for his knight to reach d7.
14 b4
A new move at the time. 14 Bb2 c5 15 Nf1 Re8 16 a4 Bf8 17 Ng3 Qc7 18 Qd3?! was P.Keres-S.Gligoric Zurich 1959. This is an awkward placement for White’s queen (he would be better off closing the centre with 18 d5), and at this point, Black stands at least equal after the freeing break 18 ... d5!.
14 ... exd4!?
Question: Why did Black give up control of the pawn centre?
Answer: This capture, followed by ... c5 is typical for many Lopez positions. Black turns the game into a kind of Benoni structure, considerably sharpening the game. Stein’s move is more accurate than 14 ... Re8 which allows White’s knight access to a5 after 15 Nb3, V.Liberzon-F.Trois, Buenos Aires 1979.
15 cxd4 a5
15 ... c5!? leads to a kind of super-Benoni after 16 bxc5 dxc5 17 d5. I prefer White’s 5:3 kingside/central majority over Black’s 3:1 queenside majority.
16 bxa5 c5 17 e5!?
Fischer essentially abandons all queenside intent to go after Stein’s king. He can also try the calmer strategic route 17 Bb2 Qxa5 18 a4! when White seizes control over the c4-square.
17 ... dxe5
Stein wasn’t the type of player who went for a move like 17 ... Ne8.
18 dxe5 Nd5 19 Ne4
We note a clear territorial demarcation between the two camps. Black places his hopes on his queenside initiative, while Fischer takes direct aim at Black’s king.
19 ... Nb4!
This causes discord in White’s camp.
20 Bb1
Of course White must preserve his light-squared bishop if he has hopes of a successful assault on Black’s king. It comes at high cost: Fischer’s a1-rook is completely out of play, and will be for a long time.
20 ... Rxa5
21 Qe2
Fischer decides to provision his forces before launching the invasion. Also to be considered are the lines:
a) 21 e6 fxe6 22 Nfg5 Ra6 23 Nd6 Bxd6 24 Bxh7+ Kh8 25 Qh5 Nf6 26 Qh4 which looks deadly. However, Black has a startling defence with 26 ... Bg3! 27 fxg3 Qd4+ 28 Qxd4 cxd4 29 Bd2 Nxa2 30 Bd3 Bd5 31 Bxb5 Rb6 and he stands no worse.
b) 21 Nfg5! Bxe4 22 Bxe4! Bxg5 23 Bxg5 Qxg5 24 Qxd7 Qd8 25 e6! fxe6 26 Qxe6+ Kh8 27 Rad1 Qf6 28 Qxf6 gxf6 29 Rd7 Re8 30 Re3 f5 31 Bxf5 Rxe3 32 Rxh7+ Kg8 33 fxe3 c4 34 Rb7 (Black will be hard pressed to save the game) 34 ... Nxa2 35 h4 (the h-pawn is ready to roll down the board) 35 ... Kf8 (intending ... b4, without allowing Be6+) 36 h5 b4 37 Bb1 Nc3 38 Bg6 Rb5 39 Rc7 and Black is busted, since there is no longer a good defence to the h-pawn’s push to the promotion square.
21 ... Nb6?
Question: Why condemn this move when
Black’s initiative is obviously on the queenside?
Answer: Faith in some doctrines is impossible to validate through personal experience. We fear death in the abstract, since we all operate under the mistaken assumption: “I realize that I will die some day in the distant future – but not today.” We sense a conflicted intention, the way a person may dubiously place sushi and lasagne next to each other on the buffet plate.
Stein mistakenly recruits a piece to accelerate his queenside initiative, while at the same time, depriving his king of a key defender, a far higher priority. All fair contracts include reciprocal trades or obligations. In this case I see Black giving up a lot (his king safety), and getting far less in return.
Fischer suggested 21 ... Re8?! intending ... Nf8. Even then, White’s chances look promising after 22 Neg5! Nf8 23 e6!, and if 23 ... f6? 24 Nxh7! Nxh7 25 Bg6! gives White a winning attack, since it’s hard to find a defence against the coming Nh4 and Qh5.
Houdini suggests 21 ... Qb6! 22 a3 c4 23 Be3 Qa6 24 Bd4 Nd3! 25 Bxd3 cxd3 26 Qxd3 Qg6 when for the pawn, Black obtains bishop-pair, light-square control, and most importantly, a safer king than in the other lines.
22 Nfg5!
It’s a jarring realization when we discover that our baseline assumption was completely mistaken. Now Stein is powerless to evade the consequences of his last move and a quick glance tells us that White’s attack is of a decisive nature.
22 ... Bxe4
A huge concession, which not only hands over bishop-pair and light squares, but also gives White’s queen a free jump into the attack. It may feel as if this swap fails to generate proportional relief to the concession given away, yet he had nothing better. Searching for a saving defence in this position is a bit like the lost hiker attempting to discover the location of a snow-covered trail, now completely devoid of landmarks.
Alternatives are not very encouraging for Black, and the geometry intersects precisely to form a perfect series of lines where all of White’s wishes come together. For example:
a) 22 ... h6 may have been Stein’s original intent, until he realized White had 23 Nh7!!. This nocturnal flash of lightning gets our attention: 23 ... Re8 (23 ... Kxh7?? walks into 24 Nxc5+ Kg8 25 Nxb7, forking queen and rook) 24 Nhf6+! Bxf6 (24 ... gxf6?? 25 Qg4+ Kh8 26 Nd6! Bxd6 27 Qf5 forces mate) 25 Nxf6+ gxf6 26 Qg4+ Kf8 27 Bxh6+ Ke7 28 e6! (Black’s king is too exposed to hope for long-term survival) 28 ... Kd6 29 Bf4+ Kc6 30 Be4+ N4d5 31 exf7 Rxe4 32 Rxe4 (threat: Re8, which can’t be halted) 32 ... b4 (or 32 ... Qf8 33 Qe6+ Qd6 34 Qxd6 mate) 33 Re8 and White promotes.
b) 22 ... g6 leaves gaping punctures in Black’s kingside dark squares. Black is unable to survive the sacrifice: 23 Nxh7!. If 23 ... Kxh7 24 Nd6! Bxd6 25 Qh5+ Kg7 26 Qh6+ Kg8 27 Bxg6 (27 Bb2!! also works for White) 27 ... fxg6 28 Qxg6+ Kh8 and now White has the shocking 29 Bb2!!. The bishop believes in his own saintliness, mainly based upon the hypothetical act of self-sacrifice which he has yet to perform. Following 29 ... Be7 30 e6+ Rf6 (30 ... Bf6 31 e7 forces a quick mate) 31 Re5!! Black is mated after 31 ... Rxg6 32 Rh5+ Kg8 33 Rh8.
23 Qxe4 g6 24 Qh4 h5
Black’s kingside is gravely weakened. He can’t tolerate 24 ... Bxg5? 25 Bxg5 Qe8 26 Bf6 N4d5 27 Qh6! Nxf6 28 Bxg6! fxg6 29 exf6 Qf7 30 Re7 winning the queen.
25 Qg3
The queen takes aim at the softest spot in Black’s camp: g6.
25 ... Nc4
Exercise (combination alert): It becomes obvious that Black’s
king position is a sparrow’s nest, built near a family of hawks.
The position screams for a combination. How would you continue?
26 Nf3?
This is a segregated society of those who work and those who don’t. White’s lazy knight, as you may have concluded, is firmly in the latter category. A rare case of Fischer playing it safe – and mistakenly so.
Answer: White can obliterate Black immediately with annihilation of the king’s cover: 26 Nxf7! Rxf7 27 Bxg6 (now Black’s kingside is the domain of the dead, more than the living) 27 ... Rh7 (or 27 ... Rg7 28 Bh6 Qf8 29 a4 bxa4 30 Re4 Nb6 31 Rf4 and Black is unable to move his queen; if 31 ... Qd8? 32 Bf7+ forces mate) 28 e6 Ra7 29 a3 Nc6 30 Qf3! Bf6 (after 30 ... N6e5 31 Bxh7+ Kxh7 32 Qxh5+ Kg8 33 Rxe5 Nxe5 34 Bb2 Bf6 35 Bxe5 White wins) 31 Qxc6! Bxa1 32 Qxb5 Nd6 33 Bxh7+ Rxh7 34 Bg5! Nxb5 (34 ... Qxg5 35 Qb8+ Kg7 36 Qxd6 Bc3 37 e7 wins) 35 Bxd8 Bc3 36 e7 Nd6 37 e8Q+ Nxe8 38 Rxe8+ Kf7 39 Re7+ Kg6 40 Rxh7 Kxh7 leaves White up two pawns in the bishop ending, with an easy conversion.
26 ... Kg7
26 ... Nd3 is met with 27 Bxd3! (27 Rd1? walks into Black’s cheapo 27 ... Nxc1! which removes White’s fearsome dark-squared bishop) 27 ... Qxd3 28 Bg5! (even stronger than 28 Bh6 Re8 29 e6 Qf5) 28 ... Bxg5 29 Qxg5 Qf5 30 Qh6! (threat: Ng5) 30 ... f6 31 e6 Ne5 32 Nxe5 fxe5 33 e7 Re8 34 Rxe5! with a winning position.
27 Qf4
Threatening infiltration to h6.
27 ... Rh8 28 e6
The pressure of further contact increases the pain of a bruise. Fischer loosens Black’s kingside cover further.
28 ... f5
Alternatively, 28 ... Bf6 29 exf7 Ra6 30 Re8! Rxe8 31 fxe8N+ Qxe8 32 Qh6+ Kg8 33 Bxg6 with a decisive attack.
Exercise (combination alert): Black’s disorienting peril is similar to the mountain climber who suddenly experiences dizziness from low blood sugar, while clutching the ledge. Three black pieces loiter on the queenside, far away from their king. White must act before they come to the rescue. How would you continue White’s attack?
Answer: Annihilation of the king’s cover.
29 Bxf5! Qf8
This move’s expression is one of necessity struggling with distaste. Acceptance also fails: 29 ... gxf5 (a move made with the philosophy: pay a blackmailer to leave you alone, and he just takes your money and returns the next day, demanding more) 30 Qg3+ Kh7 (30 ... Kf8?? 31 Qg6 Qe8 32 Bh6+ Rxh6 33 Qxh6+ Kg8 34 Ng5 Bxg5 35 Qxg5+ Kh8 36 Rad1 Ra8 37 Rd7 forces mate) 31 Bg5! Rg8 32 Rad1 Qe8 33 Rd7 Rg7 34 Qc7 and Black collapses.
30 Be4?
This little indiscretion represents a blemish on the bishop’s otherwise stainless life. When we press, how much is too much? It isn’t easy to arrive at the precise point, between too much and too little. In this case, Fischer’s move falls into the too-little category. Even Fischer’s misjudgements were similar to Capa’s. Fischer relegates a promising attack into the not-worth-the-effort category. He opts for the safe, technical endgame route, which gravely complicates his winning task.
30 Nh4! is powerful, as shown by 30 ... Bxh4 (30 ... g5 31 Qg3 Qb8 32 Ng6 Qxg3 33 fxg3 Re8 34 Nxe7 Rxe7 35 Bxg5 Re8 36 Rad1 is decisive) 31 Qxh4 and then:
a) 31 ... gxf5 32 Qg5+ Kh7 33 Qxh5+ Kg7 34 Qg5+ Kh7 35 e7 Qe8 36 Re6 Ra6 37 Bb2!! (“Temporal boundaries are for mere mortals,” claims the mad bishop, as he leaps off the cliff, thinking he can fly; as it turns out, he can) 37 ... Nxb2 38 Rae1 and White forces mate.
b) 31 ... Qf6 32 Qg3! (eyeing a nasty check on c7) 32 ... Ra7 33 Bb1! Nc6 34 a4 when White has a winning attack.
30 ... Qxf4 31 Bxf4 Re8?
Stein was in awful time pressure. Black gets serious counterplay after 31 ... Rxa2! 32 Rad1 Ra7. White’s initiative threatens to dwindle to insignificance. It’s not so clear how White should proceed, but he has to do something, otherwise those black queenside passers soon advance.
32 Rad1 Ra6 33 Rd7! Rxe6
After 33 ... Nxa2 34 Bb1 Nb4 35 Bg5 Nc6 36 Be4 Kf8 37 Bxg6 Bxg5 38 Bxe8 Black’s game collapses.
Exercise (combination alert): White to play and win material.
Answer: Pin/knight fork.
34 Ng5!
The knight drives Black’s e6-rook off the file, after which the pinned e7-bishop gets hammered.
34 ... Rf6 35 Bf3!
Even stronger is 35 a3!.
35 ... Rxf4
35 ... Kf8?? gets forked all the same, after 36 Nh7+ Kf7 37 Nxf6 Kxf6 38 h4! and the e7-bishop is doomed.
36 Ne6+
And there is the knight fork.
36 ... Kf6
The one benefit of poverty is that it tends to simplify our accounting issues.
37 Nxf4
Fischer bagged a full exchange and now the game enters the technical phase.
37 ... Ne5 38 Rb7 Bd6
Cheapo alert: ... Nxf3+, followed by ... Rxe1+.
39 Kf1 Nc2 40 Re4 Nd4 41 Rb6!
Fischer begins to work this pin.
41 ... Rd8 42 Nd5+! Kf5
42 ... Ke6 43 Nc7+ Kd7 44 Nxb5 dismantles Black’s last hope.
43 Ne3+ Ke6
Exercise (combination alert): How did Fischer win more material?
Answer: Take aim at b5.
44 Be2! Kd7
Alternatively, 44 ... b4 45 Nc4 Kd5 46 Rxd6+ Rxd6 47 Rxe5+ wins, or 44 ... Nxe2 45 Kxe2 and 45 ... b4?? isn’t possible due to 46 f4.
45 Bxb5+
Black’s counterplay parched position continues to wither and die.
45 ... Nxb5 46 Rxb5 Kc6 47 a4 Bc7 48 Ke2
Covering his second rank.
48 ... g5 49 g3!
Fischer prepares to create a passed pawn with a future f4 break.
49 ... Ra8 50 Rb2 Rf8 51 f4 gxf4 52 gxf4 Nf7
And not 52 ... Ng6?? (blunders like this make the blood rise to our cheeks) 53 Re6+.
53 Re6+ Nd6 54 f5 Ra8 55 Rd2!
Fischer sacrifices his a-pawn, adding pressure to the d6 pin, while advancing his passed f-pawn.
55 ... Rxa4 56 f6 1-0