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Voiceless Glasnost

Responding to Government Pressures and Lack of a Free Press Tradition in Russia

Victor Akhterov

A quarter century ago two Russian words, coined and popularized by charismatic Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, became known throughout the world: Glasnost (openness; exact translation: voiceness) and Perestroika (rebuilding). In an effort to gather support for desperately needed reforms, Gorbachev chose to use the media to propagate a plan to rebuild the Soviet Union into a more democratic socialist country. Thus, Glasnost became a vital tool to energize the Soviet people to accept, support, and initiate change on a local level. Now, as Gorbachev, one of the least popular people in Russia, is paid to advertise luggage and Russian media is largely under government control, an examination of the history of Glasnost is in order.

The present political course of the country has been described as moving in reaction to the initial post-Soviet reforms; terms such as “quasidemocracy,” “pseudo elections,” and so forth, are prevalent in the works of many observers (e.g., Petrov, 2005; Shevtsova, 2006). As far as freedom of the press is concerned, Russian media exist in relative freedom (Greene, 2009) and some segments such as the Internet are almost completely unrestricted.1 Despite these opportunities, Russian media have no meaningful or powerful enough independent voice to inform or transform society; the current situation in Russian media is actually a Voiceless Glasnost.

One of the deepest roots of this state of affairs is the lack of appreciation for a free press by ordinary Russians. The Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology demonstrates this in an authoritative report on bureaucracy and power in Russia (2005). When asked to identify the largest threats to democracy in Russia, only 9% mentioned the media’s lack of independence. In contrast, nearly half of those interviewed identified the large gap between the rich and poor as a major threat, while selective applications of the laws (36.5%), or the unwillingness of people to fight for their rights (23.1%) was mentioned far more than the lack of a free press. People do not see media independence as a pillar of a democratic society. Instead, they are ready to lose their freedom of speech to gain more social justice (Solodovnik, 2006, p. 46), however oxymoronic this may sound.

In addition, more than 70% of Russians at the onset of Putin’s rule considered free media a sham and believed it had no influence on the decision-making process of the rich and powerful. Not only that, more than 30% of Russians believe the media should be controlled by the government, and more than 50% believe the government should coown and subtly control media (Solodovnik, 2006, p. 58). According to the Levada Center (2007), 26% think that even tighter government control would be beneficial for media, while 36% believe that stricter control would have no effect on it; 27% believe that control is already extremely strict and half of the population does not trust the media in reporting sensitive matters such as events in Chechnya (pp.160–162). While young people see media primarily as an entertainment tool, older Russians see it as a kind of paternalistic aid that allows them to bring their complaints to the government, as it used to be under the Soviet system (Solodovnik, 2006, p. 63). Interestingly, journalism is not a respectable career: it occupies 14th place in the ratings of the most popular professions. Still, almost a third of the Russian population sees media as the most powerful agent for forming opinions (Bureaucracy and power, p. 66).

Students of Russian national characteristics (Danilova, 2005) indicate several classifications of Russian mentality in an attempt to explain the media development in Russia:

This lack of concern about media independence from government explains why Russian media lacks a consistent, powerful voice that can be seen by the public as a critical source of power for the people. Instead, Russia has a largely obedient media with some nonconsequential agenda-driven rebels who claim to embody “free press;” they are hardly popular or authoritative.

Brief Overview of Media Transformations in Russia

There are two early notable historical sketches by Grebelnikov and Andrunas that cover Russian (post-Soviet) media. First, Grebelnikov (1996) presents a large amount of information on the media, but the author demonstrates his failure to understand the process as a whole, to analyze the results of important changes that occurred in media, and his inability to see how media can function in a normal, vital, and democratic society. He devotes one chapter to confrontations within the media world, between media and the government, media and society, and so on, clearly implying that in an ideal world media would not confront or challenge the ruling class or various societal forces. Grebelnikov sees journalists as “spiritual pastors, whom our trusting people are following.” These “pastors” ought to bring good things into the lives of Russian citizens instead of confronting societal evils or providing objective information. While Grebelnikov’s overview exemplifies the dire misunderstanding of the healthy role of media in a free society, in many ways this view of media is still prevalent among the Russian people today; the reasons for this will be explored later in this essay.

Representing a more Western way of thinking in Russia, Elena Androunas (1993) presents a completely different framework for analyzing Russian media transformation. She regards the USSR as a totalitarian state and believes that the establishment of a new media system is not possible without a fundamental change of attitudes among journalists. Instead of fulfilling governmentally-assigned roles, journalists should be attentive to the informational needs of their readers, viewers, and listeners. She states: “It seems that journalists do not realize this problem. They mistake the absence of government control for freedom. But in most cases everything ends up by journalists serving another boss. Everyone is tired of the outgoing boss, while the new owner seems liberal and understanding” (p. 32). The recipe for healing the media is, according to Androunas, is in forming a true market for informational services. “Only economically independent structures, private property in exchange of informational services, selling of information for profit and not for ideological purposes as well as effective use of information as product will let us form a mass media market” (p. 114). This might be true in the Russian context, but the independence of ownership is not a guarantee of objective journalism.

The current media age can be labeled the Putin Age despite the election of the new president Dmitriy Medvedev in 2008; judging by the first two years in power, Medvedev has been continuing Putin’s course and working with Putin as the prime minister. The Putin Age began at the dawn of the new millennium and brought with it a much stricter rule over media. However, the current system is hardly the Soviet system of total control. Becker (2004) calls Putin’s era Russian media system neo-authoritarian. So, while the Russian media have been suffering under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, circumstances are in no way as dire as in the pre-Gorbachev period, nor even as bad as some journalists’ rights organizations might suggest. By using comparative analysis and incorporating political science literature that offers typologies of nondemocratic systems of governance, Becker insists that contemporary Russian media find much in common with authoritarian regimes across the world. In many ways Becker is right. However, he seems to discount the power of self-censorship by journalists and fails to identify the deeper roots of Russia’s current media problem.

Zassoursky (2005) identifies three periods in the transformational period of Russian media. The first period was Glasnost (1985–1990), when Gorbachev used the system of party regulations to bring more democracy to Soviet society. During the second period, (1990–1995), media was “largely independent” and was able to influence both society at large as well as the government. Then, from 1995 on, they label media as being “commercial” and “ruled by business structures.” Yassen Zassoursky, the former dean of the school of journalism at Moscow State University, lamented the fact that Echo Moskvy, the station that MSU helped establish, came under the control of a business structure. “We are planning to create a university station, a new station,” he stated (2005, p. 146). However, the dream of the famous late professor remains unfulfilled; his beloved station is now majority-owned by Gazprom, a government-controlled company (Greene, 2009, p. 60). As Soldner puts it, “it is no longer big business but state actors for who control of media outlets is of prior importance (2008, p. 172). Eventually, Yassen Zassoursky identified three periods of transformation: 1985–1995, 1996–1999 – the late Yeltsin period, and a third period that began with Vladimir Putin coming to power in 2000 (I. Zassoursky 2001).

McNair (1994) identified a short “Golden Age” of Russian media from 1990 to August 1991 (the period immediately following the passing of the new USSR Media Act), but how free was that age? By Soviet standards, the freedom was limitless; by democratic standards not so free. Vzglyad (The View), one of the most influential television programs of the early 1990s, was under constant scrutiny by government officials. According to Vzglyad’s director, Lysenko, every program produced 2 hours of hysterical response from his bosses, who were government bureaucrats (Mayoffice and Kukulin, 2007, pp. 47–49). In was during this “Golden Age” that Soviet media were transformed into Russian media.

One thing is undeniable: from 1985 to 2000 there was an unprecedented influx of freedom in different forms into the old Soviet system, and very soon this untrained freedom was tamed by the business interests and, later, stricter political control. However, it would be a mistake to equate this influx of freedom with journalistic excellence, which many Western and pro-Western Russian researchers do. Olessia Koltsova (2006) rightly states that we must take into account that while weaker Russia under Yeltsin’s rule was more convenient for the West than a stronger Russia of the Putin Age, many feel the need to label Putin’s Age as authoritarianism in the area of media. Koltsova states (2006, p. 228):

In practice, I see little difference in, for example, the role of the Russian media in covering Yeltsin’s and Putin’s elections … The difference in the degree of determinacy and institutional consolidation … is, however, apparent. Routinization of new journalistic practices, professionalization of sources … – all these stabilizing tendencies are easily observable.

These positive signs of stabilization and professionalization are commonly being ignored by pro-Western one-sided observers.

In any case, as both American and British experiences demonstrate, neither private nor governmental ownership of media by itself is the problem. The problem is in the absence of traditional articulation of media independence and the tradition that media’s main goal is to inform their audiences, to see the audience as the main client. Koltsova rightly identifies the problem, saying that during the rapid changes of the 1990s, media top-managers made the fateful mistake in choosing their main clients. “Media’s main clients were not audiences, and not even legal advertisers, but hidden promoters, propagandists, and external owners” (Koltsova 2006, p. 160).

Failure to Inform

For Gorbachev, Glasnost was never a value in itself; he simply used it as an instrument to bring a limited dose of democracy to the nation in order to accomplish radical, but limited, political reforms that would revive and strengthen socialistic society of the Soviet Union. Emancipated but still controllable, the media was the only reliable force he could use against the reactionary communist forces in the Soviet government.

Gorbachev was the first Soviet politician who understood the power of free media and used it as a political weapon and an image-making tool for his reforms. The enormous influence of media, particularly television, was demonstrated by the first live broadcast of the gatherings of the people’s deputies. Ivan Zassoursky (2001, p. 62) calls it “an enormous soap opera;” streets were empty when these television broadcasts aired; everyone was at home watching. This, however, was not a nonconsequential entertainment show, but a raw, unexpected and direct influence on the masses. Along with dozens of documentaries and movies about the crimes of the Soviet government, these broadcasts have become a powerful tool that politicized the population of the Soviet Union.

However, as Gorbachev’s openness became an integral part of Soviet society, economic conditions worsened, and Gorbachev felt the power of the media turn against his system. Government meetings where conflicts between leaders suddenly became open to the public affected the Soviet society in powerful and unexpected ways. During the next several years the nation experienced a complete turnaround in the way people viewed the government, the Communist party, and socialism as a political system. If not for the power of media, this revolution of minds would have taken years and, possibly, would have included a civil war.

It is important to remember that this revolution of minds was initiated by the general secretary of the Communist party, who was promoted to power by the head of the KGB; this was not a revolution generated by the media’s response to some grassroots movements. In fact, at this time, when the media appeared vibrant, fresh, and free, it was still serving a government that was about to become bankrupt, at least at the beginning stages of Glasnost. Media was simply used as a tool in order to achieve specific results. During that time there was no effort or specific goal to establish the culture of media independence, objectivity, or a mere separation of reporting from rendering opinions. Solodovnik (2006, p. 70) plainly states: “In Russian media there is no separation of ‘news’ and ‘views.’ ” Russian journalists see nothing wrong with inserting their opinions, attitudes, and feelings into their news broadcasts. In an extended conversation published by Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie (Mayoffice and Kukulin, 2007), many journalists who worked during the 1990s talked about those times as journalistic romanticism, ambiguous media transformations, social/political activism, and miscalculations.

It is of special note that all the hosts of the popular television show Vzglyad (The View) except one were elected congressmen; all of them said that politics was the continuation of their journalistic mission. They saw no contradictions in calling themselves journalists and pushing for specific political agendas. Later, there was a movement to establish some principles of objectivity for news reporting, but the dilemma of separating news from opinion still continues.

In some ways it was impossible to separate journalism from politics in the 1990s. Dmitry Zakharov produced several documentaries about communist leaders. In one of them he reports that the first action of the 1918 Bolshevik government in Moscow was to order 90 Rolls Royce cars; such reporting of facts was, of course, political by its very nature. Often, however, opposition to the communist government among new journalists was explicit. Reporter Politkovskiy was walking through the Kremlin with a nose clip he used whenever he came close to the “smelly communists.” Vladimir Pozner,2 perhaps the most respected journalist in Russia today, says that it is precisely during the Glasnost era that a new breed of reporters was born: those capable professionals such as Mitkova or Osokin who always expressed their opinions while reporting the news (Mayoffice and Kukulin 2007, p. 15).

It is important to note that most of these new wave journalists came from Soviet foreign media services and were familiar with BBC, CBS, AP, France Press, and so forth. French and American influence was especially strong. It is also remarkable that many of the most prominent broadcasters of the Glasnost era, such as Pozner, Zakharov, Lubimov, and Listyev were raised in capitalist countries. Malkin, who worked on the television show Vzglyad, described the team that came from the foreign services as “people of a different quality when it comes to … internal freedom” (Mayoffice and Kukulin, 2007, p. 224). However, they were also the propaganda workforce who for years simply carried out the government’s program. This combination of powerful techniques of free media, strong personal conviction combined with the Soviet habit to indoctrinate under the pretence of informing proved deadly for Russian journalism – for years to come.

Mayoffice and Kukulin (2007, p. 234) conclude that all the media leaders they interviewed expressed the feeling that they did not fight for freedom but rather received it from the government. Most journalists interviewed admitted they failed to make sure that the public considers free media a necessary element for a free country.

Arutunyan (2009, p. 78) rightly states that “many of the problems that plague journalists today arise not from censorship or lack of security, but from failures of purpose, identification, and credibility.” One of the mistakes that Russian journalists have made is that they aspired to still be the “pastors,” “truth (Pravda)-tellers,” and “engineers of human souls,” often forgetting their mission to provide objective, clear, and impartial information. This failure to inform instead of indoctrinating (no matter in which way) has consistently undermined the journalists’ credibility before the people. They failed miserably to become an independent voice that would be appreciated and respected by their audiences. Their habit of indoctrinating under the cover of informing made it easier for journalist to tolerate corruption in all its forms.

Corruption in Journalism

Ivan Zassoursky identified several serious problems with the new Russian journalism, from “black PR” to business promotional articles, such as “news” about new cell phone discounts to articles written to order. Zassoursky writes: “Nevertheless, articles written to order represent perhaps the least harmful type of bios in journalism …journalists rarely formed and defended their own positions, but preferred to solidarize with the position of the owner of the publication” (2001, p. 93).

Perhaps the biggest problem that such an environment gave birth to is that journalists themselves stopped believing in journalistic ethics in the 1990s. Andrew Jack, the Financial Times reporter, observed:

Such was the cynical, mercantile atmosphere of the period that any critical article or broadcast was perceived as having been paid for. The reality was not always so simple. There was so much “dirt” in circulation that it was perfectly possible for a good journalist to unearth true but scandalous materials in all honesty and objectivity (Jack, 2005, p. 141).

The dirt was available on the journalists/media owners as well. The hostile takeover of Gusinsky’s/Kiselyov’s NTV channel is often portrayed as the end of real pluralism in the Russian media. However, Oleg Dobrodeyev, who cofounded NTV with Kiselyov, left in 2000, accusing Kiselyov and Gusinsky of twisting coverage over the years for their own political advantage. The mogul Gusinsky admitted “mistakes” of supporting Yeltsin during the 1996 elections, instead of giving the people objective information to help them make their own decision (Jack, 2005, p. 142). It was not a prodemocracy zeal that led oligarchs into troubled territory, however. When privatization of Svyazinvest, a telecommunications company, did not go according their interests (Gotova, 1997), they attempted to bring down the government. The former head of NTV news Vladimir Kulistikov recalls:

NTV worked against the reformist government … Gusinsky and the journalists at NTV – who called themselves liberals and democrats – worked against it. We campaigned against the government until it was destroyed and re[laced by something much less liberal (Burrett 2009, p. 74).

Jack (2005, pp. 140–155) provides multiple examples of alleged corrupt deals by NTV, such as receiving tens of millions of dollars in exchange for positive press for various businesses – and in this case we are talking about the most prodemocratic channel in Russian TV. NTV received the license to continue broadcasting soon after the 1996 elections – by special presidential decree (Soldner, 2008, p. 165).

Corruption in Russian media brought forth the lack of trust from the general population. While the immediate goals of reelecting the anticommunist president and uncovering the evils of communism were achieved, the deeper issue of building media as a viable democratic tool necessary for a free society to function was left unattended. Failure to inform, coupled with blatant corruption is to be blamed for the following statistic, produced by the World Public Opinion organization in April 2009. Only 23% of responders felt “very strongly” that it is important for media to publish news and opinions without government control. This is the lowest number among the 22 countries surveyed.

Given such statistics, why would the government not exercise more control? Today this control is increasing. The Russian media professionals face more government control over media, as part of all-encompassing move towards a more “orderly” society. As the famous Russian writer Boris Strugatsky said in an interview given to Novaya Gazeta, “ ‘You wanted it, George Dandin …’ We wanted this peace and order. We got it. Now it will stay with us for a long time” (Strugatsky, 2009).

Given the reality of the situation, what are the ethical ways to respond to it for Russian journalists? One, obviously, would be to do everything they can to keep their craft free of blatant corruption. However, the main challenge today is not to resist a temptation to publish something for money, but to withstand subtle government pressure to work in the regime of limited freedom, where some topics such as the situation in Chechnya or the direct criticism of the Putin-Medvedev tandem are off limits. Many, the vast majority of Russian journalists, decide to exercise some form of self-censorship.

Self-censorship

As sad as it is, perhaps the biggest breakthrough of the past couple of years on Russian television was the decision of Channel One executives to include in their festive New Year’s program a cartoon of dancing and singing President and Premiere. Newspapers talked about “the event” for days: does it mean that the new times are coming? Yet, while TV is tightly controlled, there are still voices that criticize the government even there – in the right tone, of course. There are further opportunities to criticize the government via other media outlets, although not many decide to engage in such criticism.

Masha Gessen, the editor of an independent Moscow-based magazine, wrote a poignant essay about their editorial decision to publish or not publish newsworthy information that was critical of the government. Gessen concludes that “in an important sense we have returned to the late Soviet period, the Brezhnev era. At that point, Soviet terror was not total … they just needed frequently to punish a few people at random” (Gessen, 2005b). In her article Gessen expresses the emotional torment of making this decision. She meditated on the lives of her two grandmothers, one of whom had chosen to compromise with the Soviet secret police, while the other withstood the pressure.

An objective observer could point out that Gessen openly wrote about her decision-making process in a Western newspaper, that she lives interchangeably between Russia and America, and at the worst case scenario she stands to lose her magazine, not her child, as in her grandmother’s case. The torment, however, is of the same nature: do I conquer my fear and do what I think is right or do I succumb to the pressure, engage in self-censorship and survive? Alexei Simonov, the founder of the Glasnost Foundation, speaks eloquently about this moral dilemma, saying that the government is playing on the fears of journalists similar to the worst of the Stalin years. From time to time the government “touches that chord, which is now becoming increasingly real to people, and hears in response the tune it wants to hear” (Simonov, 2005).

In 2004 President Putin was asked about a free press in Russia. His ambiguous response still haunts him today. He said: “There is a phrase in a famous Italian film – ‘a real man should always try, while a real woman should always resist.’ ” Since the only official source of the quote is the government’s Rossiyskaya Gazeta, there is no clarity of how exactly Putin said it, and what he actually meant. What is interesting is the way the press reacted. The phrase was reprinted by numerous publications with clear understanding that the government, as a man, should try, while the press, as a woman, should resist (Arutunyan, 2009, p. 6). Moskovsky Komsomolets3 columnist Alexandr Minkin openly accused the president of condoning rape (Minkin, 2006). The fact that Putin could have meant the press as a man and the government as a woman completely escaped the journalists. Indeed, Putin later clarified that this is what he meant, that the government will be always trying to cover its mistakes, and the press should be aggressive in uncovering them (Arutunyan, 2009, p. 6). The real issue is the reaction of the journalists who once again demonstrated how deeply they have internalized their subordinate role. Journalism was never truly free and independent in Russia, and this lack of tradition of freedom is the key problem.

All this occurs in the environment where Internet is free; there is no government control over it. Three largest Russian players, Yandex, Rambler, and Mail.ru are partially owned by foreign companies, which could be seen as an insurance policy against government control. However, the fact remains that an important sector of new media is free from government control for the most part, while there are some attempts to assert influence over it.4

This description of Russian journalism portrays journalists and their managers as spineless, unprincipled, and fearful amoebas afraid of government control shadows. Unfortunately, in many cases this is an all-too accurate depiction. Dmitri Bykov, a journalist, columnist, and TV personality states that he never experienced any pressure from the government. However, he said he has always experienced very strong pressure from his bosses, “who would always try to run in front of the government train. People are overly cautious without any basis in being so” (Arutunyan, 2009, p. 6).

If corruption in media obviously breaks the journalistic code, can self-censorship be perceived as a serious ethical problem? Gessen (2005a) reports an embarrassing alleged story of GQ German executives falsifying the “man of the year” poll results because Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, imprisoned by the Kremlin, came out as the winner. Bernd Runge, the publisher of the magazine, is a citizen of Germany and has little to be afraid of as far as personal retribution from the Russian government. Yet, compromises were made, with similar compromises are being made all the time; at what point do they clearly break ethical standards? Given van Dijk’s assertion that the “unsaid” can sometimes be more important than what is “said,” (van Dijk, 1991) is there a clear line between obvious lying and withholding information because of fear? Gessen concludes with an uncompromising statement that merely being mindful of the limitations of freedom makes one an enforcer of these limitations; the consequences of not being mindful, however, are too grave (Gessen, 2005a, p. 118). The choice today, however, is not necessarily between independent journalism and a prison camp; more likely it is between working for a more influential or less influential media outlet.

Real Control Exercised

Media watchdog groups have harshly criticized Russia’s recent authoritative stance towards the media. In its 2001 annual report, the media rights organization Reporters sans Frontières described then President Putin’s antimedia actions as “too grotesque to be true,” and they named him one of the world’s “predators of press freedom” (Reporters sans Frontières, 2002). The same organization’s Worldwide Press Freedom Index ranks Russia 141st out of 173 countries reviewed in 2008 and 153rd out of 175 countries reviewed in 2009, trailing countries such as Sudan and Oman. Since Putin came to power in 2000, 65 journalists in Russia have been murdered, including seven who were murdered under President Medvedev’s rule.

Although the Russian constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press, authorities are able to use the judicial system to harass and prosecute journalists for independent reporting. “Authorities also took advantage of legislation like the Law Against Extremist Activities, which prohibits the dissemination of information supporting ‘extremist activities’ and allows authorities to shut down media outlets after three warnings” (Karlekar, 2006, p. 202). Becker (2004) notes that this judicial pressure is meant to create a sense of uncertainty and, through that, cultivate self-censorship, “the most common and important limit on journalistic activity.”

Evaluating the manner in which Russian media cover the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, Arman Djilavyan (2006) came to the conclusion that the Russian media closely follow the official point of view. Furthermore, when the Kremlin’s position is clearly defined, there are virtually no alternative positions for the Russian media. When the government position is more neutral, several positions may be presented. Djilavyan (2006) also points out that establishing an agenda for covering foreign policy is also a full prerogative of the Russian president and foreign minister and concludes that media has virtually no effect on the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. A comparison with America’s coverage of the Iraq War, for example, is not possible.

Foreign policy is not an isolated area excluded from the influence of freedom in media, however. Analyzing the ways that media has changed in Russia’s post-Soviet society, Danilova (2005) emphasizes that while media outlets changed their outer image, the manner in which they receive and transmit information is changing very slowly; for the most part, they still disseminate information provided to them by political elites.

While in most cases critical articles are not openly punished by the government, the government has been successful in creating an expectation of a crackdown, described by Gessen (2005a) above. One example is the case of Natalia Morar, who wrote for The New Times about corruption in parliamentary election campaign and presidential administration. There were no consequences for The New Times, but Morar, a citizen of Moldova, a former Soviet republic, was barred entry at the airport by the FSB (former KGB) in 2007. The reason given was that she “presented a threat to the Russian Federation” (Arutunyan, 2009, p. 77). While no one was imprisoned or murdered, Morar’s career suffered greatly.

Comparing the censorship of the final years of the Soviet Union to today’s pressures, journalist by the name of Alexandr Politkovskiy (his former wife Anna Politkovskaya, a famous journalist who wrote about Chechnya, was killed in 2006) states that in the past there were not as many limitations. At that time, the rules were harsh, but familiar and avoidable. Many of the journalists feel that the problem is not in open censorship, but in self-censorship of today’s media personalities; it is almost impossible to define, but everyone knows it is there (Mayoffice and Kukulin, 2007, pp. 47–49). Many feel pressured to make a decision: use self-censorship and have some influence or lose an opportunity to practice journalism altogether one way or another.

In his state of the nation address in June 2000, Putin divided the media into state and antistate (or prosociety and antisociety – the distinction is obscured in Russian) categories and criticized private owners for turning media into “mass misinformation outlets” and “into a means of struggle against the state” (Albats, 2001; Coalson, 2000). Putin believes that the media should support his efforts to “bring order back” to Russia by strengthening the “vertical power structure.” The media, for the most part, complied, serving the government once again.

The most coveted media the government would like to control is television. And they do. Vladimir Pozner, a respected TV journalist and President of Russian Television Academy, in an interview he gave to Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 2006 characterized the state of Russian television as dismal. Acknowledging that there is no censorship, he said:

Now there is something different. In the first place control from above, consisting from meetings and telephone calls in which you are told what you can and cannot do. And in the second place an enormous amount of self-censorship, when those who work in television respond to the slightest hint that there may be danger ahead in the manner of Pavlov’s dogs (Varshavchik, 2006).

As Dunn (2009, p. 44) notes, since Putin became president, there has been a significant depolitization of Russian television. Pozner’s comments apply only to the slight programming segment where politics is discussed. This creates a feeling that there is a lot of freedom on Russian television, as channels present a variety of entertainment programs and shows about a wide variety of subjects, from cooking to international travel – it is nothing like tightly controlled Soviet media. Formerly influential journalists like Sorokina or Parfyonov are still allowed to make programs, but not about politics. Political satirists and humorists such as Shenderovich or Morzhov and Kapusta were replaced by apolitical Petrosyan and Galkin (Dunn, 2009, p. 45). Pozner himself hosts a program where he interviews newsmakers; he asks tough questions, but is noticeably muffled, does not push too far; his program airs at 1a.m. on Channel One. Another tactic used by the government is when high-rank nationalists like Zhirinovsky, Luzhkov, or Leontyev say aggressive and outrageous things on national television; compared to them, Putin and Medvedev seem like moderate, prodemocratic politicians.

Today, the main channels of Russian television – Channel One, Rossiya, NTV, Kil’tura, Sport are either directly or indirectly owned by the central government; only the first three provide news/commentary service. Channels such as CTC, Domashniy, DTV, and MTV provide only entertainment and educational types of programs and are registered as international companies. In 2006, television grossed almost half of the total Russian advertizing market. Nonpolitical CTC channel is rising to the third position after Channel One and Rossiya (Zassoursky, 2009, pp. 31–32).

In April 2001 the state gas monopoly Gazprom executed a hostile takeover of Russia’s most prodemocratic national television channel NTV. When NTV reporters and commentators moved to TV6 to continue their independent reporting, the station was closed by court order in January 2002. When the journalists moved to yet another station, TVS, the Press Ministry pulled that station off the air in June 2003. Some see NTV’s closure as a tragedy for media freedom, while others dismiss it as a failure of another oligarch’s business. Those two views are not mutually exclusive. Koltsova rightly states, while it is true that NTV owners were “struggling for power, material resources, and other personal interests, a by-product of this activity was media diversity, since having a private national channel along with two state ones is definitely closer to the democratic ideals of press freedom” (2006, p. 204).

Alex Lupis (2005) notes that remaining national television channels, state-run Rossiya and Channel One along with new NTV, have revived the old Soviet approach to news reporting, focusing heavily on the president’s daily meetings with national and international leaders as well as ordinary people, promoting him as a decisive and capable leader. Putin, of course, is a capable communicator who is often seen as direct, no-nonsense people’s person, doing the work of the people – employing the qualities that Russian prodemocratic journalists often lack.

When Anna Politkovskaya, a famous crusader for the rights of the Chechen citizens suffering from the abuses of the Russian army, was killed October 7, 2006, on the 54th birthday of Putin, he, visiting Germany at the time, in an interview to the Sueddeutsche Zeitung newspaper said that the killing was despicable and those guilty of it must be punished. He also said that Politkovskaya’s materials, in his opinion, were too radical, even though the press is supposed to be critical of the power structures. He also said, quite convincingly, that since she was better known in the West than in Russia,5 her death is much more damaging to the image of the Russian government than her publications were, saying, in effect, that it would be stupid for the Russian government to order such a killing. In fact, he conveniently mentioned that he thinks that some anti-Kremlin oligarchs who moved from Russia have something to do with this murder, trying to raise a wave of antigovernment sentiments in the country.

Rated much higher than Great Communicator, Ronald Reagan, however, Putin became Time magazine’s man of the year in 2007, with Time’s pronouncement that “the Tsar was born.” Were they trying to draw parallels with the first Tsar of all Russia, John the Terrible, who reached such mountain peaks of manipulation, that he voluntarily left the throne on more than one occasion and made Muscovites ask him to come back as their ruler?

In any case, if government control is real and self-censorship only enables it, what are some practical and ethical ways of improving the situation? Some look for other sources of power that could in some way counterbalance the unmitigated power of the central government.

Polarized Pluralism

Hallin and Mancini (2004) describe the media situation in some southern democracies such as Italy or Greece as “polarized pluralism.” In the environment of sharply polarized and conflicting politics, news content tends to be less dispassionate. Different worldviews are communicated to audiences through the news.

As mentioned previously, during the second part of the 1990s the “free media” was owned by commercial interests and clearly delivered nonobjective information (Zassoursky, 1998, p. 48). However, some measure of objectivity was achieved by the multiplicity of media outlets, before central government took control of the most powerful.

Analyzing Russian media of the early-1990s, John Downing (1996, p. 145) characterized the situation in the Russian media as a “competitive pluralism of power.” Colin Sparks also noted that the struggle between different power centers may best explain the development of post-Socialist media in Russia (Sparks and Reading, 1998, p. 137). In part, Russia is still experiencing what can be called a “muffled polarized pluralism,” where the central government monologism is broken not by independent journalists, but by journalists representing other views and interests, primarily of the local governments.

While national television channels are under firm control of the central government, regional television has developed a format of structured free speech, which permitted some criticism of the federal government. Despite tightening control of the federal government these local outlets enjoy some measure of freedom. Moscow’s Third Channel, financed and controlled by the Moscow city government, from time to time expresses criticism of the national government, but is embarrassingly saccharine towards the Moscow mayor (Simonov, 2005, p. 81). Since the mid-1990s, regional media has been playing a larger role with 45% of Russians now using only regional media (Solodovnik, 2006, p. 63). Of regional media in Russia 85–90% is controlled by local governments (Gurevich, 2004). Before the mayor of Moscow was fired by the President on September 28, 2010, all federally-owned media TV channels placed negative programming about the mayor. The third channel spoke favorably about him. Some observers think that with the new appointed mayor of Moscow, local media outlets will be significantly weakened.

This timid, but nevertheless real, competition between powerful federal TV channels and local channels controlled by local governors is reminiscent of the polarized pluralism system identified by Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 11). It differs from the liberal media model by emphasizing commentaries and analysis as well as a strong role for state entities. However, it brings some varied views to the overall environment of the Russian media.

Taking advantage of the paralyzed pluralism approach, however, will most likely lead to the same result: reaching short-term goals and losing more respect for the journalistic profession in the process. Unfortunately, many Russian journalists are following this prescription. The result will probably be the same, only more people will be asking not for more government control, but for more centralized government control.

Practicing Unbiased Journalism

The only real and long-term answer to the mistrust of the “independent” media is to practice professional, nonbiased, and informative journalism. There are several areas where, despite the growing government control, it can be done with considerable ease.

One area that exemplifies informative and free journalism is Russia’s business press. Katja Koikalinen (2009) conducted an investigation of two Russian business dailies: Kommersant and Vedomosti and discovered that both newspapers work within well-established journalistic frameworks, very similar to one another. Since these publications do not directly comment on the politics, they operate with a greater amount of freedom. The readers of these dailies are businesspeople and those who are more interested in information than opinions. In fact, the older Kommersant6 is proud of the fact that it rarely uses even expert opinions – echoing disconnect between Soviet-era experts and the new economy of the 1990s. Vedomosti, a newer publication, is incorporating expert opinion which, however, is clearly marked as analysis.

This fact-hungry audience has helped the editorial offices of these publications craft policies that bring forth a consistent flow of reliable information. These practices include: taking into account business leaders’ tendency to provide positive self-portrayal; choosing the real decision-makers for interviews and information, instead of the more eloquent ones; trading business information with their sources;7 using variety of sources; double-checking facts; including an opposing opinion to the opinion expressed by an interviewee; careful use and clear identification of anonymous sources as anonymous; using the first voice of the person interviewed as much as possible, instead of retelling the story. These business publications, particularly Kommersant, are widening their coverage to include sports, culture, and entertainment, setting new journalistic standards in those areas; also, Kommersant has 14 regional editions, paying attention to the local issues.

Such fact-oriented and customer-oriented practices of business publications provide a great example to the rest of the journalistic community in Russia. Admittedly, media outlets that cover politics are operating in a more controlled environment, but there is a lot of room to grow, especially in making sure that the public is the main client of the publication.

What today’s “free and loud” Russian journalism is associated with in minds of many Russians are oppositional publications such as Novaya Gazeta, the former home of Anna Politkovskaya, murdered in 2007, or the Echo Moskvy radio station. These, however, are hardly the models of pure informative media outlets.

As iniquitous and horrible the murder of Anna Politkovskaya was, as brave as this woman was in uncovering the horrors of Chechnya, she was more than an investigative journalist, she was a crusader. She had an agenda and expressed this agenda in her every article. She always gave specific recommendations. She always took sides. Vividly describing horrible abuses that one Chechen man experienced at the hands of other Chechens, loyal to the central Russian government, she only casually mentioned that he used to fight against the local authorities, but “only for a short time” (Novaya Gazeta, January 30, 2006). Then she gives admonitions and concrete recommendations. As noble and as brave the work of the advocate for the suffering is, such approach, again, is mixing opinions and arguments with news. The long-term result will be the same: people will reject opinion under the cover of news and reject “free journalism” as such.

Ideals of real free journalism could be nurtured not only in business publications, but also in media outlets that cover other areas that do not deal directly with politics, that is culture, entertainment, social life, basics of civil society, human interests, religious issues, and so on. If media outlets fully devote themselves to these particular areas and nurture journalistic idealism there, they can be both ethical and progressive in terms of building the tradition of objective journalism. In other words, the answer is not to leave journalism to protest censorship, but to leave political journalism. The market forces are pushing media into serving specialized audiences in any case.

Another successful model of journalistic excellence in Russia is the joint Russian-Western publications such as Russian Newsweek, Russian Forbes, Russian Esquire, and so on, – GQ obviously does not belong to this group. These publications are not merely translations of the Western version of these publications they are adapted to the traditions of Russians. When it comes to journalistic ethical standards and practices such as separating news from opinion, and the quality of writing, by many accounts Russian versions are superior to their parent publications. Often serving as standard-bearers, these publications influence the way Russian independent publishers practice journalism.

Such joint ventures, along with business publications, could serve as one of the ways to establish a liberal model of journalism in Russia – without corruption and with clear distinctions between news and opinion. There is an audience for such quality materials, and this audience is bound to grow.

A third option, less feasible, but one that could be extremely effective, is creating news organization directly funded by the people, similar to the National Public Radio or Public Broadcasting System in the United States. Such a noncommercial, public-supported media structure that sets independent and objective journalism as its highest value would create unprecedented support from the public. It might have been impossible to create something like this in the past, but today broad public financial support for various humanitarian projects is becoming a reality. If someone like Vladimir Pozner would start such radio network, it could become a new way to ignite people’s interest in a free press. As long as it would be clear where the money is coming from and as long as the sizable portion of support comes from individual listeners, such a network could become a reality and it would be difficult for the government to control it.

Openly Opinionated Media

The fact that news should be separated from opinion does not mean that expressing opinion should always be avoided. Just the opposite: clearly defined opinionated pieces are exactly what the Russian media consumer needs. What is especially needed is a well-formulated, audience-based case for freedom of the press for a new generation of Russian people. There are several venues for achieving this, with various chances of success.

Internet

RuNet (so named for .ru domain), particularly the blogosphere, is the most free and diverse marketplace of opinions. Without going into a description of the RuNet, it will suffice to say here that, according to All Russian Center for Public Opinion Research, only 24% of Russians used the Internet in 2006, and of those less than 20% used it as a source of news. Even if these numbers doubled during the past 4 years, still less than 10 of the Russian population uses the Internet as a source of news and even fewer – as a source of commentary.

Thus, the influence of the Internet is not widespread – yet. In a strange way, the low numbers of users could be the greatest blessing for RuNet. Since in general the government continues its “hands off” policy towards the Internet, the culture of unrestricted freedom is being formed. When the Internet use explodes because of new technological achievements, it will be difficult to use censorship, especially given Internet’s multiplicity of sources. Unlike Russian television of the 1990s with just a handful of channels, Internet will be a far more difficult animal to tame, especially if a considerable number of people will get used to receiving information and opinion free from the government control.

The habits of freedom are hard to break. Russia’s most popular blogging site (Antropova and Grigoryev, 2007), Livejournal.com has become a virtual agora for Russian influential intellectuals, and when its Russian part was bought by SUP, a Russian Kremlin-friendly company, many became suspicious and voiced their opposition. However, no restrictions of any kind were introduced.

Only time will tell, of course, what role the Internet will play in the history of Russian journalism. Some think that the new Russian empire that controls the free press will melt in the Internet (Zassoursky 2009, p. 40) – again, setting political goals instead of striving to achieve the free press in Russia; in any case, the technology by itself will not bring the change. What is needed is an honorable tradition of free and independent press, and such tradition is still lacking in Russia. RuNet is a great platform for promoting the value of free press.

Newspaper/magazine opinion pages

While opinion sections in printed magazines and newspapers are functioning, there are two issues that plague them. First is declining audiences, especially for newspapers, reflecting the worldwide trend. Second, is the way opinion pages are written; for reasons of self-censorship and a desire to appeal to “cultured” audiences, many columnists use “Aesop’s language”8 to get the information across without getting into trouble. While such columnists might be successful in reaching elites, they are ineffective in affecting wide audiences. Arutunyan observes: “With a few notable exceptions, journalism is either too elite to make a profit, or too yellow to be considered quality journalism” (2009, p. 115).

Could it be, however, that “yellow journalism” is what’s needed to propagate the value of the freedom of the press to the masses? Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK) is a vividly typical Russian tabloid, incorporating high and low, sophisticated and carnivalesque. It is one of three most widely read newspapers in Russia – the other two are Komsomolskaya Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty. MK’s circulation in Moscow is over 2 million. Resnyanskaya (2006, p. 228) characterizes MK as combining uncombinable: “Analysis sits next to epatage, intellectual writings about art are adjacent to intimate exposes from newsmakers; vivid commentary next to ideological tendentiousness.”

It was Moskovsky Komsomolets, however, that was able to publish a front-page critical opinion piece two days before the 2008 Presidential elections. In part, it said:

The problem is that election, by definition, is a show. And the only difference between ourselves and the Americans is that their show is “directed” by thousands and millions of people. In our spectacle everything to the last letter is choreographed in advance by a group of “producers” (Rostovsky, 2008, p. 1).

The title of the article was humorous, depicting Americans as not really needed as teachers of democracy in Russia. The style of the writing is also full of carnivalesque laughter. Yet the commentary is direct, harsh, and understandable. Because of their “not serious” style they are able to clearly and popularly express meaningful, consequential ideas. It could be that such an approach, connecting with the masses of common people could revive their interest in free media that will not be controlled by the government.

Television

Television that exists under the government control is yet to produce programs that could incorporate clear ideological views and discussions. There were several attempts to create battles of opinions on both more liberal NTV with Solovyov as the host and on more conservative Channel One with Shevchenko, but more liberal Solovyov’s show was cancelled at the end of 2009, and more pro-Kremlin Shevchenko’s show airs after midnight. Both hosts pretended to be journalists and not the ideologues that they are, as can be seen from their writings. Solovyov opened a similar show on the Rossiya Channel in the Fall of 2010, but the topics discussed seem less ideological. For now, there is no equivalent to openly ideologically partial hosts such as Sean Hannity of Fox or Rachel Maddow of MS NBC on Russian TV. The main problem is the audience’s expectations or the lack of them. This chicken-and-egg problem will not be resolved soon because audiences’ expectations, not because of Russian TV professionals’ inability to produce opinionated programs. As Russia Today, the government-sponsored CNN-like English-language channel has demonstrated, even an openly pro-Kremlin channel can produce healthy discussion programs with opposing views (Arutunyan, 2009, p. 137), as long as audiences expect them.

Given the current political climate, the potential is there for television to propagate free media by exemplifying what it means to present interactive discussions that are not necessarily political, but personal and ideological in nature. The famous “television bridges” between Soviet and American audiences (Pozner-Donahue) were not political in nature. They were personal, people-to-people conversations, but they had worldview-shattering influence on the Russian psyche. They also shook the system. “Sunday Night with Vladimir Pozner” was another tremendously influential program. “This was a true talk show, where the audience played a key role,” says Pozner (Mayoffice and Kukulin, 2007). Frank, passionate, people-to-people conversations were revolutionary for the Russian media and the Russian way of thinking. This could be repeated in the future, but a change in government would have to precede such a change.

Radio

Radio is a medium with great potential to present views that would help openly promote democratic ideals, among them the importance of free and independent media. Despite the lack of freedom for the press in Russia, radio remains the most emancipated medium, and many are listening: talk/news stations like Mayak and Echo Moskvy each get 10% of the audience (comccon-2.com). Yassen Zassoursky states clearly: “Freedom of mass media has been mostly realized in radio broadcasting”; he calls it the most independent and pluralistic (2005, p. 144). The popularity of radio in Russia is due to its ubiquity and availability (Keith et al., 2004, p. 75).

Yudin, a well-known Russian researcher and journalist, gave a thorough overview of the development of Russian radio since the beginning of Glasnost (Yudin and Keith, 2003). She listed the number of privately-owned, independent radio stations, as the main and lasting achievement of Glasnost. Dozens of such stations are operating in Moscow and St. Petersburg alone, and thousands are in operation throughout Russia. Most of these stations have adopted a Western approach, emulating US programming models. Other researchers agree: “Programming is often an eclectic mix of Russian and Western rock and pop and can include weather and helicopter traffic reports and disc jockey patter that would be familiar to Western ears, although Russia has yet to develop an indigenous Howard Stern” (Terry and Richte, 2004).

While drawing close parallels between Russian and American radio environments, Yudin acknowledges that there is only one information-oriented commercial radio station in Moscow, Echo Moskvy, which receives little competition from state-owned Radio Rossii and Mayak, which clearly promote the state’s point of view on current affairs. Yudin fails to mention that an American city comparable to Moscow has not only several independent public radio stations, but also commercial news stations and, most importantly, vibrant talk radio stations, where not only news, but ideological commenting on the news is present. Keith et al. (2004, p. 76) also arrives at a similar mistaken conclusion that despite “very different origins and traditions, modern Russian and American radio have grown to become exceptionally similar,” also ignoring the weak positions of public and commercial talk radio in Russia.

Russian radio stations do promote particular values. The most discussed are: values of state, liberalism, patriotism, Western orientation, and high culture. There is no clash of these different values, however; government-owned stations subtly promote values of state and patriotism, while nongovernmental stations subtly promote liberal values (Ruvinskiy et al., 2007). There is no dialogue; rather, most stations pretend they have no ideology and are simply in the business of informing the public. Again, this dishonesty is detrimental to both journalism and opinionated media.

As Chibita and Fourie (2007) conclude from their research of media influence, the very presence of different voices, different “public spheres” in broadcast media gives people a larger degree of participation in the way they live and are governed (2007, p. 23). With such an abundance of evidence for the Voiceless Glasnost, is radio going to become the last outlet open to people to express their political opinions and be heard by others? Or will it be further regulated, manipulated, and pressured to become as controlled as television?

Uncovering of the reasons for the absence of ideologically-driven dialogical talk radio in Russia are beyond the goals of this essay, but the opportunity to promote democratic ideals of free media on talk radio are both obvious and are obviously being ignored. What is needed is opinionated talk radio with the style similar to mischievous and often sharp Russian tabloids, similar to Moskovsky Komsomolets, with a powerful mix of entertainment and news analysis, humor and dissecting opinion pieces, among them open ideological propaganda of the benefits of free press. In fact, as music-oriented radio is being hit by new technologies such as MP3 players (Zassoursky, 2009, p. 36), radio could be saved by the news/talk radio format.

Conclusion

Thus, there are two obvious problems that led to the current state of apathy of the Russian population towards the free and independent media: (1) failure to objectively and impartially inform the population; and (2) the blatant corruption in Russian media during the transition period of the 1990s, as owners and business structures, and not the public was chosen as its main clients. In the environment where the ideals of media independence are brought from the outside, they were quickly forgotten, and the central government took control of most important media outlets under its soft control.

Russian media professionals responded in unproductive and unethical ways:

Such reactions will lead to the same results as the mistakes of the 1990s: people will see no need for independent media.

There are also two feasible solutions: (1) practice informative journalism in different media outlets and help people develop an appreciation for independent press – create Russian Public Radio and use nonpolitical media outlets to nurture a tradition of objective reporting; and (2) propagate the values and benefits of free media in openly opinionated media outlets, using opinionated talk radio and especially the Internet, as its availability spreads to wider circles of the population in the years to come.

Notes

1 While RuNet continues to enjoy almost complete freedom, some observers (for example, see Strukov, 2009, p. 219), notice that there is a growing list of legislations that attempt to classify Internet as the means of mass communication, which will bring it under the direct government control.

2 Born in France of Russian immigrant father and French mother, Pozner also lived in the United States, growing up in Brooklyn, before the family moved to Russia, escaping accusations of espionage for Russia. Vladimir later became a Soviet “intellectual propagandist,” broadcasting the Soviet virtues to Western audiences. When Perestroika came, he became one of the proponents and practitioners of the liberal model of journalism.

3 Moskovsky Komsomolets is a Russian tabloid that, while accused by many of being “yellow press,” provides some sharp, thought-provoking commentary.

4 For example, in April 2007 a popular website gazeta.ru received an official warning for publishing an interview with Eduard Limonov, an anti-Kremlin activist, whose Nationalist Bolshevik Party was banned by court order several months earlier (Yashman, 2007).

5 This assessment of Putin is absolutely right not only concerning Politkovskaya, but concerning many radical antigovernment figures in Russia who, like the chess champion Kasparov, for example, are more popular in the West than in Russia.

6 In September 2006 the Kommersant publishing house was sold to a subsidiary of Gazprom, so it is now indirectly owned by the government (Soldner, 2008, p. 168).

7 While some may see it as a negative, such exchanges of reliable information build trust between journalists and their sources.

8 Highly allegoric language, referring to Aesop’s fables, writings ascribed to a Greek slave storyteller.

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