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Numbers in italics refer to pages with images.
Abrashoff, Michael, 102
Advanced Weather Technologies, 9, 115
Alaska, Tote’s Tacoma–Anchorage run to, 11, 56, 98, 99–100, 134, 149
Alternate Compliance Program (ACP), 154–55, 156, 232, 233
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), 26n, 100, 155, 156, 231–32
American Maritime Officers (AMO) union, 70n, 82
American Practical Navigator (Bowditch), 47
Anchorage, Tote’s Tacoma run to, 11, 56, 99–100, 134, 149
Anderson, Philip, 30n
anemometers, 48, 66–67, 71, 123, 136, 182
Applied Weather Technology (AWT), 40
autopilot (“Iron Mike”), 57, 176
Bahamas Defence Force, 11
Baird, Charles, 42
ballast system, 25–26, 26n, 43n, 185–86, 197–98
Barer, Stanley, 108
Bermuda Triangle, 9–10
bilge pump system, 178, 185–86, 204
black box. See voyage data recorder (VDR, or black box)
Bobillot, Laurie Randolph, 11, 28–29, 43–44, 174
hurricane’s impact on, 198
inspection of, 122–23
maintenance of, 120, 121, 122–23
steam system using, 14, 59–60, 61–62
Bon Voyage System (BVS), 40–41, 72, 73, 104, 114–15, 118, 125, 127, 143, 165, 174
Borisade, Olabode “Odd Rod,” 27
Bowditch (Nathaniel), American Practical Navigator, 47
bridge of El Faro
broken anemometer on, 48, 66–67, 123, 136
familiar routine during sailing in, 57
watch change routine on, 68
Bruer, Kurt, 5–6, 10, 31, 70, 76, 233
Buys Ballot’s law, 71n
BVS (Bon Voyage System), 40–41, 72, 73, 104, 114–15, 118, 125, 127, 143, 165, 174
captains
safety responsibility of, 102
CargoMax program, 26, 43n, 50, 67, 98, 207n, 232
Carl Bradley (ore carrier), 13n
Cash, Chris, 92
center of gravity, and stability, 25–26, 75, 121, 150, 215–16
Champa, Louis M. (electrician), xvi, 24, 65, 92, 116
Clark, Roosevelt L. “Bootsy” (deckhand), xv
classification societies, 26n, 96, 133, 155, 156
Coast Guard
distress signal received by, 7
drug testing by, 79
Edmund Fitzgerald sinking and, 134n
El Faro debris field and oil sheen spotted by, 12–13, 226–27
El Faro drifting incident and, 62–63
El Faro safety inspections by, 9
El Faro safety issues reported to, 108
El Faro’s sinking determination by, 13
GM margin calculation and, 49n
lifeboat conversion and, 96
risk matrix and target list of, 63
rules and regulations on equipment and personnel from, 78, 79
search-and-rescue operations of, 10, 11–13, 223–26, 227
Tote’s notification about El Faro’s distress to, 6, 7
Columbus, Christopher, 10
containers
daily checks of, 93
hold cargo spaces for, 116
lashing guidelines for, 30, 93
sail effect of wind on, 67, 182, 184
contracts, delay clauses in, 66, 103
Coriolis force and winds, 44–45, 166
Crawford, Sylvester C. Jr. (wiper), xvi
crew of El Faro See also specific members
cabins and accommodations for, 75–76
captain’s relationship with, 68–70
caste system on El Faro and, 79–80
Coast Guard rules and regulations on, 78, 79
commonality of interests of, 56
doubts about trip expressed by members of, 29, 64–65
El Faro as a Southern ship and, 77–78
familiar routine during sailing and, 56–57
fatigue of, as factor in sinking, 29, 159, 161, 171, 232
feelings about El Faro held by, 55–56
free time activities of, 77–79
list of, xv–xvii
maintenance work with rust by, 92
mess for, 35–36, 42–43, 77, 136, 151
Obama’s statement on loss of, 228n
off-watch social activities of, 78, 79
over-the-counter meds used by, 29, 158–59
overtime limits and, 79
Polish riding gang (workers) and, 11, 36, 83–84, 98–99
reasons for working on ships given by, 76–77, 98
safety issues and, 79, 107–108
San Juan route and family life of, 70
sleep amount and fatigue of, 29
tension between officers and, 80–81, 84, 102
Tote’s response to maintenance requests and, 67
Tote’s treatment of, 107
unlicensed members of, 21, 35, 36, 79–80, 91
whistle-blowers and complaints from, 80–81, 107, 139, 231
work assignments for, 91–92, 93
crew families
hearing about El Faro sinking by, 6–7, 10–11
life of, after investigation, 233–34
questions about El Faro sinking from, 13
Tote’s treatment of, 229
Crooked Island Passage, 12, 13, 41, 129, 138, 140, 143, 158, 162
Crowley Maritime, 106, 110, 127, 144
Davidson, Michael C. (captain), xv, 21, 68–71
abandon ship command and ship evacuation and, 209–10
Alaska experience of, 38, 41, 115, 133, 175, 184
awareness of hurricane’s peril by, 160, 175, 182, 184, 190, 202n, 206
Coast Guard’s comments on, 213n
confidence in El Faro by, 143–44, 149, 174
confidence of, 143–44, 164–65, 206
cost and schedule pressures on, 102–3
course changes by, 114, 117, 123, 124, 126, 182, 183
crew’s concerns about hurricane and, 124, 126, 137, 142, 162
crew’s course change suggestions to, 128–29, 142–43, 157–58, 160–61, 162
crew’s feelings about, 68–70, 138–39, 142, 160, 174
delegation of duties by, 37
distress alert (SSAS) to crew and, 198, 201, 230
“doomsday prepper” beliefs of, 144–45
engine loss and, 6, 191, 195, 196–97, 198
engine slowdowns and, 175
feelings about El Faro’s qualities held by, 55
feelings about Tote’s treatment of, 106–7, 129–30, 144
general alarm and, 207–8
hurricane preparations and, 97–98, 151
initial route choice by, 41–42
Joaquin forecasts and course change by, 72–74, 117
job insecurity feelings of, 106, 144
need for Tote’s approval of course changes by, 102, 105–6, 107
notifications to Tote from, 6, 101–2, 117, 199–201, 202
NTSB’s comments on, 202n
personality of, 143–45
rough weather experience of, 183–84
route planning for return northbound trip by, 101–2, 105–6
safety responsibility of, 47, 70, 105, 106, 107, 120, 136–37, 143, 160, 200–201
San Salvador hurricane detour and, 128–29, 136, 149, 157, 158
ship’s list problems and, 175, 176, 182, 185, 186–87, 188, 191, 201
ship’s sinking and, 213–15
“shoot under” strategy of, 47, 101, 144
steering into storm by, 182, 183, 184
Tote’s confidence in, 69–70, 106
Tote’s hurricane warnings to, 8
Tote’s passing over for promotion of, 105
voyage plan and night notes of, 68
water accumulation in holds and, 188, 189, 190, 197–98, 205–6
weather forecast monitoring by, 38–41, 42, 114–15, 127, 136, 139–41, 143, 174
Davidson, Theresa, 231
Davis, Larry “Brookie,” xv, 21, 76, 107, 126
Bruer’s last image of, 5–6, 10, 233
course during hurricane and, 116–17, 169, 173–74, 203
hurricane preparations and, 118, 123–24, 127, 157, 158, 167
Joaquin’s impact and, 161–64
sailing experience of, 152
dead reckoning, 67, 75, 125, 158
delay clauses, in contracts, 66, 103
Dixon, Jeffrey L., 231–32
docking card, 48
Doherty, William, 156
“doomsday prepper” beliefs, 144–45
drug tests and searches, 79, 80
ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System), 67, 128n
Edmund Fitzgerald (ore carrier), 134, 203
El Faro (cargo ship), 2
age and condition of, 82–83
Coast Guard risk matrix and target list on, 63
conversion work on, 99–100
crew’s doubts about trip of, 29, 64–65
crew’s feelings about, 55–56
description of, 19–20
earlier conversion work and renaming of, 22, 96, 108, 133–34, 155
early incident of drifting by, 62–63
fishing boat rescue by, 83
as a machine and world of systems, 14–15
main deck and inboard profile plans of, iv–vi
Puerto Rico’s dependency on regular runs by, 65–66
size of, 9
smell of, 56–57
as a Southern ship, in terms of crew, 77–78
Tote ownership changes and acquisition of, 108, 113
US ownership and registry of, 9
El Faro investigation, 113, 221–34
Coast Guard search-and-rescue operations and, 10, 11–13, 223–26, 227
debris field in, 12–13, 226–27
expeditions to site of wreck in, 229–31
hearings and reports on, 231–33
“last known position” issues and, 223, 224
El Morro (cargo ship), 21, 99, 154
El Yunque (cargo ship)
Coast Guard report on, 155–56, 231–32
El Faro debris spotted by, 226–27, 228
El Faro memorial and, 228
hurricane route changes of, 123, 124–25
San Juan trips of, 65, 78, 105
Emerald Express (coastal freighter), 12, 226n
emergency beacons (EPIRBs), 7, 9, 65n, 142, 225–26
engine room, 31n, 58–63. See also boilers
access to, 58
closed, two-phase cycle of, 61–62
control station of, 59, 130, 131, 132–33
crew assigned to, 59, 60, 130–31, 132
El Faro’s evacuation and, 217
fuel tanks and, 120–21, 172, 219
hurricane preparations in, 118–19
levels of, 59–60
lubrication system in, 59, 62, 131–32
propulsion plant of, 61–62
steam culture of, 60–61
temperature in, 58
EPIRBs (emergency position-indicating radio beacons), 7, 9, 65n, 142, 225–26
Erika (tropical storm), xiii, 41, 42, 74, 143
Ethisphere Institute, 109, 111
fatigue of crew, 29, 159–60, 161, 171, 232
Fisker-Andersen, Jim, 66n, 70, 102, 106, 126, 129, 199n
forecasts. See weather forecasts
foreign-flag vessels, 63, 81n, 134
fuel tanks, 37n, 120–21, 172, 219
Garvey, Michael, 108, 109, 113
George Prince (ferry), 13n
Global Marine Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), 39, 198, 223
GPS navigation, 57, 67, 74, 75, 137, 143
Great Land (cargo ship), 100, 108, 134
Griffin, Keith W. (first engineer), xvi, 106, 122, 179
Gumby survival suits, 142n, 152, 157, 203, 204, 208, 211, 212, 227
Hamm, Frank J. III (able seaman), xv
background of, 83
El Faro’s capsizing and, 213–15
El Faro’s evacuation and, 209
family’s hearing about loss of, 10
Joaquin forecasts and, 126–28, 151
Joaquin’s impact on navigation and, 176, 182–84, 190, 198–99, 206
watches of, 68, 124, 136, 173–74
Hamm, Rochelle, 10
Hargrove, Joe E. (oiler), xvi, 167
Hatch, Carey J. (able seaman), xv, 78, 84, 91, 93, 152, 203
Hearn, Jack, 21, 30, 97, 105n, 107–8, 111, 144, 155
Hill, Schmiora, 10
Holland, Michael L. (third engineer), xvi, 37, 59, 132, 167, 186, 197
Holt, Michael B., 110
Horizon Lines, 110
hull
failures of, 133–34
flaws in, 133
inspections of, 133
metal fatigue and, 134–35
Hurricane Hugo, 139
Hurricane Joaquin
broken anemometer issue and, 137
Coast Guard’s search-and-rescue operations and, 11–12, 224–26, 227
crew’s awareness of peril from, 160
crew’s calculation of intersection with, 157, 158, 162–63, 174
crew’s monitoring of, 71–74, 75, 113–14, 116–18, 123–24, 125, 126–27, 137–42, 157
crew’s mounting concerns about, 127–28, 138–39
Davidson’s preparations for, 97–98
Davidson’s “shoot under” strategy for, 47, 144
difficulty of imagining danger of, 8–9
El Faro’s departure and early path of, 33–34
El Faro’s last position and, 8
El Yunque’s course and, 124, 126
equipment and structural breakdowns during, 152–54
growth to Category 3 storm, 8, 161–62
growth to Category 4 storm, 8, 195–96, 224
lag between data and predictions about, 115
misleading information and inaccuracies about, 86–87, 88, 114–15
other merchant ships avoiding, 65
physics of heat transfer in, 85
possible alternate routes around, 142–43, 140
precautions observed due to, 117
predictive models on growth of, 46
proposed San Salvador detour due to, 128–29, 136
raw power of, 165–67
rhythms of high waves in, 149–51, 163, 164
slowing down and death of, 228–29
Tote’s lack of concern about, 8
Tote’s tracking of El Faro’s route and, 105, 113
transformation into major storm by, 34–35
underestimation of potential strength of, 7–8, 86
weather forecast inaccuracies about strength and course of, 86–87, 88
winds in development of, 34, 44–46, 86–87
hurricanes. See also specific hurricanes
Saffir-Simpson scale for, 8, 9, 114n
watch status of, 124
winds and expansion of, 44–45
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 21, 80
inboard profile plan, iv–vi
Inmarsat system, 7, 11, 39, 57, 101, 113, 117, 127, 174, 223, 224
inspections
Alternate Compliance Program (ACP) for, 154–55, 232, 233
of boilers, 122–23
of cargo lashings, 93
classification societies for, 26n, 133, 155, 156
of cooling systems, 92
crew responsibilities for, 37n
of hull, 133
of lifeboats, 37n, 95, 96, 155
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, 109
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), 138
International Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations, 96, 202
Iron Mike (autopilot), 57, 176
Jackson, Glen, 10, 63, 64–65, 233
Jackson, Jack E. (able seaman), xv, 226n
background of, 63–64
doubts about trip expressed by, 64–65
family’s hearing about loss of, 10, 233
hurricane preparations by, 142, 157, 203, 204, 209
Joaquin monitoring by, 116–17, 137–42, 157
watches of, 63, 65, 67–68, 83, 136, 157
Jackson, Jill, 10
Jacksonville–San Juan run. See Puerto Rico run
Joaquin. See Hurricane Joaquin
Jones, Alex, 144–45
Jones, Jackie R. Jr. (able seaman), xv, 77, 78, 83, 84, 91, 93, 152, 170
Jordan, Lonnie S. (assistant steward), xvii, 35, 77, 136, 151, 203
Kingfish (container ship), 48, 50
Krause, Piotr M. (Polish worker), xvii, 36, 98–99, 233
Kuflik, Mitchell T. (third engineer), xvi, 59, 60, 69, 106, 119–20, 132, 168, 210
lashings
crew’s concerns about, 139, 176, 187
Tote’s guidelines on, 27, 30n, 93, 177
Lawrence, John, 6, 7, 80, 101–2, 105, 112, 199, 200–201, 223
Letang, Joe, 55–56
Lewis, Claire, 127
lifeboats
Coast Guard report on, 202, 232
description of old-style, 20, 95, 146
inspection of, 37n, 95, 96–97, 155
list and launching of, 202–3
modern style of, 95–96
NTSB on, 232
Tote’s approach to updating, 96, 155
tug spotting of, after sinking, 13
life rafts, 9, 67, 96–97, 202, 203
Lightfoot, Roan R. (bosun), xv, 91–92, 203
Lima, Brad, 132n
Lorenz effect, 33
lubrication system. See also sump
Coast Guard review of, 205
gravity-fed tank with, 59, 180, 181, 205
monitoring flow in, 130, 131, 167–68, 178, 180
problems with, 176, 179–81, 182, 186, 187, 189–90, 190, 192, 197, 198, 201
pumps in, 59n, 60, 61, 62–63, 131–32
reserve oil tank in, 59, 132n, 181, 181n, 205
Maersk, 37n
Main Deck
corrosion around vents on, 231–32
description of, 19–20
loading of containers on, 22–24
plan of, iv–vi
Maine Maritime Academy, 9, 28, 29, 37–38, 43, 59, 60, 127, 161
Marine Electric (cargo ship), 78, 134, 156, 233
maritime academies, 9, 28, 82n, 160
Maritime Administration (MARAD), 82
maritime unions, 70, 77, 79, 82, 83, 109
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 9, 99
Mathias, Jeffrey A. (riding gang supervisor), xvi, 69, 132
background and family of, 99, 100
devotion to job by, 60
hurricane and, 118, 168, 179, 183, 184, 188, 204, 206–7
Polish riding gang and, 11, 36, 60, 92, 97, 99, 100
McPhee, John, 37n
Meklin, Dylan O. (third engineer), xvi, 29, 37, 43–44, 58–61, 132, 168
Melville, Herman, 195
merchant marine
all-powerful captain in, 103, 160–61
construction and maintenance regulation loopholes in, 154–56
decline in number of ships in, 81
government policy on, 81–82, 111
Jones Act and, 82–83, 108, 154
life span of ships in, 82–83
public knowledge of work of, 81
merchant marine academies, 9, 28, 82n, 160
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), 82–83, 108, 154
mess, 35–36, 42–43, 77, 136, 151
metal fatigue, 14, 134–35, 153–54
Military Sealift Command, 56
Minouche (coastal freighter), 12, 224, 225, 226n
National Cargo Bureau, 30n
National Hurricane Center (NHC), 8, 9, 38, 45, 46, 86–87, 115
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 7, 9, 38, 84
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Alternate Compliance Program (ACP) judgment of, 156
hearings of, xix, 13, 113, 231, 232
recommendations of, 156
report notes by, 160n, 184, 202n, 232
voyage data recorder and, 72n, 139n, 229, 236
National Weather Service (NWS), 7, 9, 26, 38, 39–40, 114–15, 117, 165
Neeson, Tim (port engineer), 36, 42, 43, 49n, 112
news, El Faro sinking reported on, 10, 13
Nita, Marcin P. (Polish worker), xvii, 36
Northeast Providence Channel, 41, 140
Northern Lights (cargo ship), 108, 133
Northland (US Coast Guard cutter), 12, 227
Northwest Providence Channel, 140, 226
NYK, 110–11
Obama, Barack, 228n
officers of El Faro See also specific officers
fatigue of, as factor in sinking, 29, 159, 161, 171, 232
licensing and training of, 9
tension between crew and, 80–81, 84, 102
Tote’s response to maintenance requests and, 67
offset oil, 190
oil pumps, 59n, 60, 61, 62–63, 130, 131–32, 179, 181, 185, 186, 190 See also lubrication system
Old Bahama Channel, 123, 140, 226
alternate routes using, 73, 74, 105, 158
Davidson’s route for return trip using, 102, 126, 128–29, 138, 143, 184
navigational challenges of, 74–75
Peake, Frank, 110–11
Podgórski, Jan P. (Polish worker), xvii
Polish riding gang (workers), xvii, 4, 6, 11, 204
crew’s relationship with, 83–84, 98–99
work of, 36, 91, 92, 97, 99, 168
Ponce class ships, 99, 108, 144
Porter, James P. (deckhand), xv, 76–77, 84, 91, 93, 152
ports, 2, 31, 153, 170–72, 187
prepper beliefs, 144–45
Puerto Rico
dependency on merchant ship runs by, 65–66, 81
Walmart’s stores on, 66n
Puerto Rico run (Jacksonville–San Juan run)
crew family life and, 70
delay clauses in contracts and, 66, 103
El Faro’s first assignment to, 108
fuel loaded for, 120
Joaquin forecasts and, 142–43
Tote’s LNG/diesel vessels for, 106
Tote’s management style and safety on, 113
Tote’s price-fixing activities on, 110
Tote’s tracking of ships on, 104–5
Pusatere, Richard J. (chief engineer), xvi
captain’s relationship with, 68
cargo loading and, 24
El Faro’s evacuation and, 217
engine room routines and, 59, 60, 61, 99, 100, 130
hurricane conditions and list issues and, 168, 179, 180, 186–87, 190, 205
Tote’s planned promotion of, 106
Quammie, Theodore E. (chief steward), xvii, 36, 136, 151, 203
radar
navigation by, 9, 20, 48, 50, 52, 57, 65n, 74, 104, 137, 161
Randolph, Danielle L. “Dany” (second mate), xv
Captain Davidson and, 68, 159–60, 161
coffee-making habit of, 118, 158, 199
course change suggestions and, 157–58, 160–161
distress messages from, 198, 201, 223, 224, 230
doubts about trip expressed by, 29
evacuation preparations by, 209, 229
family background of, 27–29, 37, 43–44
Joaquin forecasts and, 117, 118, 123–24, 126–27, 157–58
Joaquin’s impact and, 161–64, 167, 169, 173, 189, 190–91, 196, 198–99, 206, 208–9
last message to mother from, 11, 174
new third engineer Meklin and, 43–44
personality of, 69, 78, 80, 107, 118, 127, 158
sleep between watches and, 158–59, 160
watches of, 37n, 67, 85, 115–16, 117, 123–24, 157, 159–60, 161, 173, 189
registries, ship, 9
rest periods, on watches, 159
riding gang. See Polish riding gang
Riehm, Jeremie H. (third mate), xv, 198
background of, 63
course change suggestion from, 157–58, 160–61
Joaquin monitoring by, 114, 116–17, 137–43, 157–58, 174
navigation by, 66, 67, 137, 141
watches of, 29, 37n, 63, 65, 101, 136
risk matrix (Coast Guard), 63
Rivera, Lashawn L. (chief cook), xvii, 10, 170
arrival and boarding by, 19, 20–21, 22
galley and meals and, 35, 36, 77, 203
hurricane preparations and, 97, 151–52
roll-on, roll-off (Ro-Ro) container ships
cargo loading and, 22
Davidson’s experience with, 184
El Faro’s conversion from, 22, 96, 108, 155
Roth-Roffy, Tom, 113
routes (runs). See also Old Bahama Channel; Puerto Rico run; Tacoma–Anchorage run
captain’s authority over, 103–4
cost and schedule pressures in choosing, 66, 102–3, 144
runs. See routes (runs)
rust problems, 30, 32, 92, 93, 156, 186
safety issues
Alternate Compliance Program (ACP) on, 154–55, 232
captain-crew interactions and, 102
captain’s responsibility for, 47, 70, 105, 106, 107, 120, 136–37, 143, 160, 200–201
chief mate’s responsibility for, 37n, 43n
course changes and, 107
crew whistle-blowers and complaints about, 80–81, 107, 139, 231
engine room gates and, 31n
federal regulations on, 81–82
GM margin and, 49n
hurricane precautions for, 8, 42, 47
lifeboat upgrades and, 96, 232
NTSB’s report on, 232
Polish riding gang and, 97
regular equipment inspections and, 9
Tote’s guidelines on, 47, 66, 105, 232
Tote’s management style and, 112–13
Tote’s responses to complaints about, 107–8, 112, 144, 200–201, 231
Saffir-Simpson scale, 8, 9, 114n
sail effect of wind, 67, 182, 184
Saltchuk Resources, 108–9, 110, 111, 113
San Juan–Jacksonville run. See Puerto Rico run
SAT-C
distress messages from, 198, 201
weather forecasts from, 38–39, 40, 71–72, 87, 113–14, 117, 126, 127, 139, 143, 174, 198
Schoenly, Howard J. (second engineer), xvi, 120, 121, 122, 130, 175–76, 178, 179
scuttle hatch gaskets, 93–95
Seafarers International Union (SIU), 77, 79, 82, 233
Sea Star Lines, 6, 108, 110, 111
Sea Star and Tote Services. See Tote
shipping. See also merchant marine
automated vessels in, 104
captain’s authority in, 103–4, 160–61
construction and maintenance regulation loopholes in, 154–56
cost and schedule pressures in, 102–3, 106
federal deregulation of, 81–82
Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), 39, 198, 201, 230
Shultz, Steven W. (chief mate), xv, 28n
captain’s relationship with, 68, 106, 129–30
cargo checks by, 92–93
cargo loading and, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30
El Faro’s evacuation and, 208, 209, 210
feelings about Tote’s treatment of, 107, 129–30
hurricane and course changes and, 158, 173–76, 182
Joaquin forecasts and captain’s course change and, 72–74, 104, 107, 117, 126
list problems and, 176, 182, 185, 187–89, 190, 191, 197, 200, 207
pilots and El Faro’s departure and, 47
proposed course change by, 129–30, 138
responsibilities of, 37n
stability calculations and, 26, 43, 49, 50
watches of, 29, 37n, 68, 124, 136, 173
weather monitoring by, 114, 124–26, 127–29
Solar-Cortes, German A. (oiler), xvi, 83
stability, 14
components affecting, 25
computation of, 25–26, 43, 67, 98, 207n
container load affecting, 24, 67, 155
El Faro’s construction and, 155
fuel tanks and, 120–21
issues affecting, 16, 120–21, 184–85, 207–8
sail effect of wind and, 67, 182, 184
Tote’s guidelines on, 207
sump. See also lubrication system
list and problems with, 180–81, 182, 189–90, 190, 205
oil collection in, 62, 131, 179–80, 181
pump leakage issue and, 132
Sun Shipbuilding (Sunships), 108–9, 113
Tabbutt, Mark, 109
Tacoma–Anchorage run, 11, 56, 99–100, 134, 149
target list (Coast Guard), 63
Texas Enterprise (cargo ship), 5
Thomas, Anthony “Shawn” (oiler), xvi, 82, 122, 133, 179, 185–86, 204
Thresher (submarine), 13n
Tote (Tote, Inc., Sea Star, and Tote Services), 6, 107–13, 189
background of ownership changes and expansion at, 108–9, 113
Coast Guard/NTSB hearings and, 231
Coast Guard risk matrix and target list and, 63
cost and schedule pressures on, 66, 102–3, 144
crew’s treatment by, 107
Davidson’s being passed over for promotion by, 105
Davidson’s feelings about treatment by, 106–7, 129–30, 144
Davidson’s hurricane notifications to, 6, 101–2, 117, 199–201, 202
Davidson’s management style and, 69–70, 106
Davidson’s need for route approval from, 102, 105–6
Davidson’s route planning for return northbound trip and, 101–2, 105
delay clauses in contracts and, 66, 103
El Faro’s structural conversion by, 22, 96, 108, 155
families’ hearing about El Faro’s loss from, 10–11
families’ lawsuits against, 112
families’ treatment by, 112
hurricane recommendations from, 8, 42, 47, 143
Joaquin’s underestimation by, 8
lashing guidelines of, 27, 30n, 93, 177
liability of, 229
lifeboat updating and, 96, 155
LNG/diesel vessels of, 56, 60, 100, 106, 112
maintenance requests to, 66–67, 111
overtime limits by, 79
penalties assessed on, 233
personnel and workload issues at, 112
price-fixing activities of, 110, 113
profit pressures on, 111–13
Puerto Rico’s dependency on regular runs by ships of, 65–66
regular runs and profits of, 65
renovations for Alaska run by, 99–100
response to El Faro’s distress by, 223
rest period violations by, 159
safety coordinator position at, 112
safety guidelines from, 47, 66, 105, 232
safety issues and, 80, 96, 97, 102, 105, 106, 107–8, 112–13, 143, 144, 200–201
safety record of, 80n
salvage tug hired by, 13
stability guidelines from, 207
statement on El Faro’s sinking from, 229
Tacoma–Anchorage route and, 11, 56, 99–100, 134
tracking of El Faro’s route and weather changes by, 104–5, 113
whistle-blowers and complaints to, 80–81, 107, 139, 231
Totem Ocean Trailer Express (TOTE), 108
TOTE Resources, 108
Tropical Analysis and Forecast Branch high seas forecast (TAFB), 38–39, 87
Tropical Storm Erika, xiii, 41, 42, 74, 143
Truszkowski, Andrzej R. (Polish worker), xvii
unions, 70, 77, 79, 82, 83, 109
unlicensed crew members, 21, 35, 36, 79–80, 91
VHF channel emergency calls, 12, 124
voyage data recorder (VDR, or black box), xix, xx, 72n, 115, 139n, 156, 160, 186, 213, 219, 229, 231, 236, 238
Walashek Industrial & Marine, 122, 123
watches, 138
activities during, 137
change routine during, xx, 68, 115–16, 157
El Faro’s flouting of rules on, 159–60
fatigue during, 29, 159–60, 169n
hours worked on, 159–60
hurricane preparations and, 119, 167, 203
Joaquin’s growing strength and, 168, 172, 173, 175, 179, 203, 228
regulations on rest periods with, 159
requirement for, 138
riding gang not part of, 36
shifts during, 50, 57, 58, 63, 67, 68, 70, 83, 91, 122, 124, 127, 130, 132, 136, 165, 167–68, 202
sleep between watches and, 29, 158–59
wave changes noticed during, 101
watch status of hurricanes, 124
Weather Channel, 40
weather forecasts
captain’s authority in route choices and, 104
Captain Davidson’s monitoring of, 38–41, 42, 114–15, 127, 136, 139–41, 143, 174
crew’s monitoring of, 71–74, 75, 113–14, 116–17, 137, 139–41, 157
direction predictions in, 165
inaccuracies about Joaquin’s strength and course in, 86–87, 88, 114–15, 165
Joaquin’s early development on, 71–74, 75
lag between data and prediction in, 115
models used in, 87
predictive models on Joaquin’s growth using, 46
range of sources consulted in, 38–41
Tote’s guidelines on, 47
Tote’s tracking of El Faro’s route and, 104–5
Weather Underground, 137
Westward Venture (cargo ship), 108, 134
wheelhouse. See bridge of El Faro
World Meteorological Organization, 46
“Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald, The” (Lightfoot), 134, 203
Wright, Mariette (deckhand), xv, 27, 76, 79, 84, 91, 93, 203
Zdobych, Rafal A. (Polish worker), xvii