Stoicism and the Art of Happiness: Practical wisdom for everyday life

The principal task in life is this: distinguish matters and weigh them one against another, and say to yourself, ‘Externals are not under my control; volition is under my control. Where am I to look for the good and the evil? Within me, in that which is my own.’ But in that which is another’s never employ the words ‘good’ or ‘evil’, or ‘help’ or ‘harm’, or anything of the sort. (Epictetus, Discourses, 2.5)

For I go around doing nothing but persuading young and old among you not to care for your body or your wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as I say to you: ‘Wealth does not bring about virtue, but virtue makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively.’ (Socrates in Plato’s Apology, 30a-b)

Self-assessment: Stoic attitudes towards Ethics

Before reading this chapter, rate how strongly you agree with the following statements, using the five-point (1–5) scale below, and then re-rate your attitudes once you’ve read and digested the contents.

1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Agree, 5. Strongly agree

1 ‘Practical wisdom consists in knowing what it means for something to be good, bad or ‘indifferent’ when it comes to attaining Happiness and fulfilment.’

2 ‘Whatever is external to my will is ‘indifferent’ with regard to my ultimate Happiness.’

3 ‘Although they’re ultimately unimportant, it’s nevertheless natural and rational to ‘prefer’ some external things over others’.

What’s important about Stoic Ethics?

What is the ultimate source of human Happiness and fulfilment? What do Stoics mean when they say that someone is a good or bad person? What do they mean by saying that external and bodily ‘goods’ are merely indifferent to them? How do they reconcile the need to live in the world, handling property and interacting with other people, with their stringent view that virtue is the only true good? These are the sort of questions addressed in this chapter on ancient Stoic Ethics, which will pave the way for further discussion of Epictetus’ three practical disciplines.

So what did the Stoics actually mean by ‘Ethics’? We’ll need to examine the significance of some Greek words to answer that question. First of all, the word ‘ethics’ (êthikê) carried very different connotations for ancient philosophers. It alludes to the development of one’s character (êthos) and therefore overlaps with modern approaches to self-improvement and psychological therapy. The Stoics saw their Ethics as comparable to athletic or military training and also as resembling a branch of medicine, one treating the mind rather than the body, which they actually called a psychological ‘therapy’ (therapeia).

In this chapter, we’ll focus on the question Epictetus told his students they should ask themselves first: ‘Where is the nature of good and evil to be found?’ (Discourses, 2.2). Indeed, when ancient authors compared Stoicism to other philosophical schools they typically focused on their uniquely uncompromising Ethical doctrines, rather than their Physics or Logic.

Cicero calls this the ‘core’ doctrine of Stoic philosophy: virtue is the only true good. The fundamental goal of mankind was therefore defined by the Stoics as ‘living in accord with virtue’, synonymous with living according to Nature, or living wisely, as a ‘philosopher’ or lover of wisdom.

The Stoics believed that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for living a good life and attaining eudaimonia, regardless of external misfortune or physical hardship. As Cicero wrote:

The belief of the Stoics on this subject is simple. The supreme good, according to them, is to live according to nature, and in harmony with nature. That, they declare is the wise man’s duty; and it is also something that lies within his own capacity to achieve. From this follows the deduction that the man who has the supreme good within his power also possesses the power to live Happily. Consequently, the wise man’s life is Happy. (Tusculan Disputations, 5.28)

We might express the Stoic view by saying that being a good person is all it takes to have a good life, and therefore to be Happy and fulfilled, whatever our external fortune. The life of an enlightened Sage lacks nothing of intrinsic importance, even if he is deprived of health, wealth and reputation. The supposedly opulent and hedonistic life of the Great King of Persia is no better, and in fact is much worse, according to the Stoics, than the life of poverty chosen by their hero Diogenes the Cynic, who slept rough and owned nothing but a cheap cloak and what little food he could fit in his knapsack. Moreover, Diogenes’ life would not ultimately have been made any ‘better’ if fortune had granted him greater wealth and status. Scholars have therefore said that ‘the bastion of Stoic ethics is the thesis that virtue and vice respectively are the sole constituents of happiness and unhappiness’ (Long & Sedley, 1987, p. 357).

However, these radical opinions are worthless unless they transform our lives. Epictetus, in his typically blunt style, warns his students not to be satisfied with learning about the nature of the good as a set of abstract ideas but that we must vigorously apply them to specific situations and train ourselves systematically in doing so, because we have all had years of practice thinking and doing the opposite. We have to digest these ideas and allow them to permeate our lives, which the Stoics compare to sheep eating grass and using the nutrients to grow wool. Otherwise we’re not true philosophers: we’re just commentators on other people’s opinions. Any idiot can give a discourse like this, Epictetus says, in the process giving us a convenient summary of Stoic Ethics:

Of things that are, some are good, and some are bad, and some are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which participate in virtues; and evil things the opposite; and the indifferent things are wealth, health, reputation. (Discourses, 2.9)

However, he adds, suppose that in the middle of this lecture on the good, right now, there’s a sudden and frightening loud noise or some of the audience begin to laugh and ridicule us. We get upset because our philosophy comes from our lips only, and not from the very core of our being. For that reason, the Stoics stress the need for daily training in philosophy as a way of life, using exercises of the kind described throughout this book.

Case study: Jules Evans and modern Stoicism

Jules is an author and researcher involved with the ‘Stoic Week’ project. In an article called ‘How Ancient Philosophy Saved My Life’, published on his blog and in The Times newspaper (8 May 2012), he describes the ‘breakdown’ that led him to seek help from Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and Stoic philosophy. While studying literature at university, Jules experienced worsening panic attacks, depression and anxiety. By attending a CBT-based self-help group, he was able to overcome his panic attacks and to better manage his emotional problems.

Inspired by his success, he travelled to New York, as a trainee journalist, to interview Albert Ellis, the founder of Rational-Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), the main precursor of modern CBT. Jules did the last ever interview with Ellis before he died. Ellis told him about how he’d been directly influenced by ancient Greek philosophy in his pioneering work as a psychotherapist in the 1950s. He’d been particularly taken by the famous quotation from Epictetus’ Handbook: ‘Men are disturbed not by events but by their opinions about them.’ This became the central philosophical inspiration for REBT and most subsequent forms of CBT.

As Jules points out, almost all schools of ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy shared a ‘cognitive’ approach to the emotions. This interprets emotional distress as being largely due to our individual beliefs and patterns of thinking, which are changeable through philosophical reflection and diligent training in related psychological exercises. Ancient philosophy, in other words, was inherently a form of psychological therapy.

Jules concluded that his own emotional problems came, to some extent, from his personal values – putting too much emphasis on winning others’ approval, etc. One of the lessons he took from ancient Socratic philosophy was that ‘we can take back possession of ourselves, by choosing intrinsic values like wisdom rather than extrinsic ones like status or power.’ For the Stoics, the only thing of any ultimate importance in life is virtue, particularly wisdom, and ‘extrinsic’ things are of absolutely secondary value, because they are inherently unimportant when it comes to attaining Happiness and freedom from emotional suffering.

As a blogger and in his book, Philosophy for Life and Other Dangerous Situations (Evans, 2012), Jules has written extensively about the relevance of ancient philosophy for modern living, particularly as a means of improving emotional resilience and personal wellbeing. He sums up three of the lessons he derives from Stoicism and other branches of Hellenistic philosophy as follows:

1 Focus on what you can control, and accept what you can’t.

2 Choose your role models wisely, a lesson he takes from Plutarch’s Parallel Lives.

3 Keep track of your thoughts and behaviour by, for example, monitoring them in a personal therapy journal.

He writes: ‘Socrates showed us that we all have the power to heal ourselves and change our characters, at any stage of our lives; we might not become perfect sages like him, but I believe we can all become a little wiser and happier.’

Key idea: ‘Practical wisdom’ and ‘virtue’

The Stoics believed that humans are inherently rational animals, perhaps uniquely so apart from the god Zeus. So they defined the intrinsic goal of human nature as the perfection of reason, referred to as ‘wisdom’ (sophia), or more specifically phronêsis, which means ‘prudence’, ‘moral wisdom’ or ‘practical wisdom’. The ideal human being, someone both perfectly good and rational, is called the ‘Sage’ or ‘wise man’ (sophos). Those who aspire to become Sages are therefore called ‘philosophers’, lovers of wisdom, as we've seen.

Practical wisdom is the essence of all virtue, according to the Stoics. This consists of knowledge, about the nature of the ‘good’, applied to different aspects of living – so all the virtues are essentially one. As we’ve noted, the Greek term aretê is notoriously tricky to translate. It’s usually rendered as ‘virtue’ but it really refers to excelling in terms of one’s natural function or essential character, in a manner that’s both healthy and praiseworthy. A strong and fast horse has aretê, for example, although we wouldn’t call it ‘virtuous’ in English.

Likewise, the Greek word kakia, translated as ‘vice’, means something more like the ‘badness’ or ‘wretchedness’ of a feeble and sickly horse. As humans are naturally rational and social creatures, our two most important virtues are wisdom and justice, the perfection of reason and of our relationship with others. The remaining cardinal virtues of ‘courage’ and ‘self-discipline’ are necessary to overcome the irrational fears and desires (‘passions’) that would otherwise interfere with living wisely.

Practical wisdom or virtue therefore consists largely in making accurate value judgements. Most importantly, this means judging virtue itself to be ‘good’, and bodily and external things to be ‘indifferent’. Later Stoics also defined prudence as ‘reasoning well in the selection and rejection of things in accordance with nature’. This probably alludes to selecting between ‘indifferent’ things on the basis of their natural value (axia), and knowing which ones to ‘prefer’ over others, a more ‘worldly’ aspect of wisdom.

By contrast, according to legend, Pyrrho of Elis, the founder of Greek Skepticism, was so ‘indifferent’ to external things that he had to be steered away from walking off cliffs or into the path of horse-drawn wagons by his followers. This was probably a caricature but it was not a joke made about the Stoics, who were recognized as more pragmatic philosophers, with an interest in the real world and practical affairs. Indeed, the very detachment of the Stoic from ‘indifferent’ things allows him to make use of them more prudently. According to Seneca, Chrysippus quipped that the wise man needs nothing and yet he can make good use of anything, whereas the fool ‘needs’ countless things but can make good use of none of them.

Remember this: External things are not without value

Although the Cynics appear to have believed that external things are completely ‘indifferent’, the Stoics adopted a position slightly closer to the majority of people, and attributed limited ‘value’ to externals, for the purposes of planning action in the world. External things are completely ‘indifferent’ or irrelevant with regard to living the good life, or being Happy and fulfilled. However, it’s natural for us to seek some in preference to others, as long as we do so with wisdom and virtue. Other people are external to our minds, including our true friends or ‘wise and good’ people, but wishing for mankind to flourish is the essence of Stoic philanthropy. So virtue consists in wishing others well, with the caveat ‘fate permitting’, as we shall see in later chapters.

The nature of the good

Musonius says that Nature has set us the goal of flourishing, becoming ‘good’ men and women, and that ‘being good is the same thing as being a philosopher’, a lover of wisdom (Lectures, 16). Hence, for the Stoics, to be wise and to be good are essentially the same thing. What, then, is the true nature of the ‘good’ that the wise man contemplates and that corresponds with his own state of mind? What do we mean when we say something is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘indifferent’? We’re told Zeno originally gave the following examples, which provide a starting-point for traditional Stoic accounts of Ethics:

• Good things include ‘wisdom, temperance, justice, courage, and all that is virtue or participates in virtue’.

• Bad things include ‘folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, and all that is a vice or participates in vice’.

• Indifferent things include everything else, but most notably: ‘life and death, reputation and ill-repute, pleasure and pain, wealth and poverty, health and sickness’, etc. (Stobaeus, 2.57–58).

The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are just the traditional cardinal virtues of Socratic philosophy and their opposites, the four cardinal vices. These were all considered to be different forms of practical wisdom (phronêsis), the most essentially good thing for man. As we’ll see, the word ‘indifferent’ is slightly misleading as the Stoics, unlike the Cynics, distinguish between some such things as having more ‘value’ than others, and being ‘preferred’ in planning the future.

However, this type of value is totally incommensurate with ‘the good’. Wisdom and the other virtues are valuable beyond comparison with the bodily and external ‘goods’ because possession of them perfects human nature and thereby allows us to fulfil the fundamental goal in life, whereas other so-called ‘goods’ count for nothing in this regard. The ‘indifferent things’ therefore include what the majority of people normally judge as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, often summarized as health, wealth and reputation. The Cynics and Stoics agreed that mankind suffers from a great illusion (tuphos, literally a ‘mist’ or ‘smoke’), the assumption that these superficial things are intrinsically good or bad.

These examples were based on several different Stoic definitions of the ‘good’, in terms of its essential characteristics, which reputedly complement each other and point in the same direction. Perhaps most fundamentally, the Stoics define what is ‘good’ for us as the fulfilment of our potential, or perfection of our nature. The good for all living things, plants and animals alike, is the perfection of their own nature. According to Cicero, the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as ‘what is complete by Nature’, fulfilling its potential, and he portrays Cato as saying: ‘Those who are wise we all consider to be whole and complete’ (De Finibus, 4.37). The early Stoics likewise defined the good as wisdom or ‘that which is perfectly in accord with Nature for a rational being, qua rational’ (Lives, 7.94).

As we’ve seen, the Greek word aretê, usually translated as ‘virtue’, means something more like ‘excelling’ in terms of one’s natural function in life. Humans are inherently both rational and social beings, whose natural goal is therefore to perfect their capacity for wisdom and justice. For Stoics, this is the goal of life handed to us by Nature herself, and the commandment of Zeus, the father of mankind: to bring his unfinished work to perfection.

‘Cato’ therefore also describes the good for man as ‘ripeness’ or ‘timeliness’ (eukairia), a surprising but perhaps revealing Stoic technical term. Virtue, like ripeness, does not increase in value over time, because it is found in our nature having achieved its end, and reached perfection. ‘That is why, for the Stoics, a happy life is no more desirable or worth seeking if long than if short’ (De Finibus, 3.46). To have attained eudaimonia by excelling in accord with our essential nature, perfecting reason and achieving wisdom, is to flourish and ripen naturally like a fruit.

This is an important Stoic doctrine because it means that prolonging one’s life will not necessarily add to virtue, and so death is indifferent with regard to the highest good. In response to those who argue that preserving one’s life is good because it allows wisdom to be exercised for a longer period, Cato is portrayed as objecting quite bluntly but somewhat cryptically: ‘This argument fails to grasp that while the value of good health is judged by its duration, the value of virtue is judged by its ripeness.’ This is another Stoic bombshell; one we’ll return to in the chapter on death.

The early Stoics refer to many additional qualities possessed by the nature of ‘the good’, which Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus both summarized in fairly similar ways. For instance: ‘All good things are beneficial and well-used and advantageous and profitable and virtuous and fitting and honourable; there is an affinity to them’ (Stobaeus, 2.5d). The Stoics appear to have maintained that these characteristics of the good are preconceptions shared, on reflection, by all mankind, which Nature has created in us free from any contradiction.

For which of us does not take it that a good thing is advantageous and worthy of being chosen, and something we should seek and pursue in every circumstance? Which of us does not take it that justice is something honourable and fitting? (Discourses, 1.22)

We likewise share the basic preconception of ‘evil’ that it is something ‘harmful, to be avoided, something to get rid of in every way’ (Discourses, 4.1). Epictetus says that conflict arises between us, nevertheless when we try to apply abstract preconceptions to real situations, such as judging whether specific actions are good and just or whether they are not. However, perhaps the two most important qualities of the good are that it is inherently:

• Beneficial or helpful (ôphelimos, from which the Shakespearean name ‘Ophelia’ derives), rather than harmful or injurious, ‘because [by itself] it is such as to benefit’ us in terms of Happiness (eudaimonia), being inherently good and healthy as a state of mind in its own right – the ‘good’ is its own reward, the only truly beneficial thing for man and its absence, or its opposite, is the only true harm.

• Honourable and beautiful (kalos), because it is intrinsically praiseworthy, perfectly harmonious and consistent with itself, ‘has all the features sought by Nature’, and is sufficient in itself to perfect life and bring it to completion.

When the Stoics speak of virtue as 'honourable', they basically mean that it is admirable and deserves to be unconditionally praised in other people. Therefore wise men also pride themselves in possessing it. By saying that it’s ‘beneficial’ they mean that, crucially, virtue is its own reward. It is itself the very perfection of human nature, and the greatest form of wellbeing we can aspire to, although it also tends to bring many other advantages in life, fate permitting.

Being ‘honourable’ and ‘beneficial’ are undoubtedly two of the most important characteristics of the good as defined by the Stoics. In this way, Stoic Ethics equates the ‘moral’ and ‘therapeutic’ value of practical wisdom and other virtues. What is ‘morally good’, or honourable, is identical with what is ‘good for us’ or healthy. In addition to these qualities above, Epictetus in particular, a former slave himself, refers to wisdom and virtue as ‘freedom’, in the sense of being a free man but also free from irrational fears and desires. So badness or vice is likewise described as being a ‘slave’, in the sense of being enslaved by our passions and by excessive attachment to external things.

Key idea: The Stoic definition of the chief good

Most schools of ancient philosophy agreed that the chief good in life is eudaimonia, which I’ve translated ‘Happiness’ or ‘fulfilment’. This meant living a supremely good life, lacking nothing, and being free from anything bad. However, they disagreed over the precise definition of eudaimonia and the best way to attain it. The Stoics were unique in arguing that being a good person is completely sufficient to live the good life, and attain eudaimonia.

Stoics believe that, on reflection, we all share the natural preconception that what is absolutely ‘good’ in human life must be both ‘beneficial’ for us or healthy and inherently ‘honourable’ or praiseworthy. Most ancient philosophers agreed that what is ‘good’ is beneficial. Yet the Stoics also defined the good as the honourable. Only the good and honourable person is truly beautiful because true beauty resides in our character.

In addition, the Stoics argue that we all naturally assume our supreme good in life is ‘desirable’, and are bound to seek it out when we truly grasp its nature. However, the majority of people mistakenly judge external things to be ‘good’ and therefore experience feelings of desire for things beyond their control, leading to frustration and suffering.

Practical wisdom or virtue, excelling in terms of human nature, is identified as the only truly unconditional ‘good’ and the key to eudaimonia by the Stoics because it meets these criteria of being intrinsically beneficial, honourable, beautiful, desirable, praiseworthy, etc. Virtue in this sense is understood to consist of practical skill and moral wisdom, a quality of our conscious mind (hêgemonikon), or more specifically of our voluntary thoughts and decisions (prohairesis).

Our external actions can also be called ‘good’ insofar as they embody virtue. Other people, although strictly-speaking only Zeus and the ideal Sage, are also called ‘good’ insofar as they possess virtue. Only our own virtue is good for us, and the virtues or vices of other people are technically 'indifferent' regarding our own good – their business not ours. However, the wellbeing and virtue of those we love is naturally to be valued. Indeed, the virtue of ‘justice’ consists in willing others to also flourish and attain good lives, with the caveat: ‘fate permitting’. According to the Stoics, ‘natural affection’ towards others therefore forms an integral part of our own supreme Happiness and fulfilment in life, and our self-interest is synonymous with altruism or a qualified interest in the welfare of others, as we’ll see.

Remember this: Syllogism showing the good is virtue

Cicero describes a common Stoic syllogism, or ‘sorites’ argument, derived from Zeno, which heaped one premise upon another to arrive at the conclusion that the good, for man, is essentially synonymous with virtue. It probably functioned as a brief aide-mémoire, a summary of more complex lines of philosophical reasoning, to be kept ready-to-hand for challenging situations:

1 What’s good is worth choosing (to have).

2 What’s worth choosing is worth seeking (to acquire).

3 What’s worth seeking is praiseworthy.

4 What’s praiseworthy is honourable and virtuous.

5 Therefore what’s good is honour or virtue.

Zeno’s argument may contain the seed of what becomes the dominant theme in Epictetus’ Stoicism: that only what is ‘up to us’ is ultimately good, with regard to our Happiness and fulfilment. If what is good is, by definition, what is worth seeking out, that might be taken to imply that, strictly speaking, only what is under our control can be considered our ‘good’ or our duty. As the philosopher Kant would later put it: ‘Ought implies can.’ This is an important argument both from a philosophical and psychological perspective, as people very often place intrinsic value on things outside of their direct control, and doing so undoubtedly contributes to human suffering in many ways.

The virtues and vices

The concepts of ‘virtue’ (aretê) and ‘vice’ (kakia) are absolutely central to the whole edifice of Stoic philosophy. Although aretê is usually translated as ‘virtue’, ‘excellence’ is perhaps a better translation. It is closer to what we mean by a person’s strengths, their positive characteristics, good qualities, what makes them excel, etc. These terms therefore imply both what is honourable versus shameful, and what shows a healthy strength of character versus inner weakness or even sickness.

The Stoics believed that Nature provided humans with an in-built goal, the good life or Happiness, which we attain by progressing towards virtue. Hence, Cleanthes said that all humans incline naturally towards virtue and are like ‘half lines of iambic verse’, remaining incomplete without it (Stobaeus, 2.5b). Virtue is therefore what ‘completes’ human nature, and without it something of intrinsic value is always lacking within us, leaving our lives empty and unfulfilled. Virtue, as we've seen, can also be understood as harmony or agreement at three levels: with oneself, with reason, with mankind, and with the nature of the universe. By contrast, vice is essentially a state of inconsistency and disharmony, being fundamentally alienated from one’s true self, from the rest of mankind, and from the universe in which we live.

As human nature is essentially rational, it follows that the highest form of excellence, and the key to living harmoniously, is the perfection of reason or wisdom, and the greatest vice is folly or ignorance. The Sage is therefore essentially the same as the good man, and all bad men are fools.

[Wisdom] did not itself generate the human race; it took it over, unfinished, from nature. So it ought to watch nature closely and perfect her work as if it were a statue. What is the character of human beings that nature left incomplete? And what is the task and function of wisdom? What is it that it must polish and perfect? If there is nothing to be perfected except a certain operation of the mind, namely reason, then the ultimate good must be to live in accordance with virtue. Virtue, after all, is the perfection of reason. (Cicero, De Finibus, 4.34)

The Stoics generally accepted that the different forms of virtue, the ways in which humans excel, can be classified under four broad headings. These are the traditional ‘cardinal virtues’ of Socratic philosophy, as we’ve seen, and their opposing vices.

Underneath are the subordinate virtues identified by the early Stoics as these help us to define what they meant.

• Wisdom (sophia) or prudence (phronêsis), which opposes the vice of folly or thoughtlessness (aphrosunê)

• Includes excellent deliberation, good calculation, quick-wittedness, good sense, a healthy sense of purpose and resourcefulness

• Justice, lawfulness, or integrity (dikaiosunê, sometimes ‘righteousness’), which opposes wrongdoing or injustice (adikia)

• Includes piety to the gods, good-heartedness or benevolence, public service, and fair dealing

• Courage or fortitude (andreia, literally ‘manliness’), which opposes cowardice (deilia)

• Includes endurance, confidence, great-heartedness, brave-heartedness, and love of work

• Moderation or temperance (sôphrosunê, sometimes ‘discretion’), which opposes intemperance or excess (akolasia)

• Includes organization, orderliness, modesty, and self-control

Seneca, for example, describes these as the respective virtues of ‘foreseeing what has to be done’, ‘dispensing what has to be given’, ‘curbing fears’ and ‘checking desires’ (Letters, 120). Epictetus also had a famous slogan, ‘endure and renounce’ (anechou kai apechou, alternatively ‘bear and forbear’), which may well correspond with the two closely-related cardinal virtues of courage and self-discipline.

It’s possible that some Stoics thought these were the first two aspects of virtue that had to be mastered by novices during their practical training in Ethics, on the way to attaining the loftier virtues of wisdom and justice. However, Zeno accepted the Socratic notion that all virtues are one: ‘They say that the virtues follow on each other and that he who has one has them all’ (Lives, 7.125–126). Like Socrates, he reputedly also said that the virtues are all forms of knowledge, concerning what is truly good or bad, whereas the vices are forms of moral ignorance.

Try it now: Contemplating the virtues

Strictly speaking, the Stoics believed that only the perfect Sage has attained true virtue. However, we all have reason and therefore the potential for wisdom, ‘the seed of virtue exists in each one of us’ (Musonius, Lectures, 2). So we do find Stoics, especially under the Roman Empire, referring to the contemplation of ‘virtues’ in daily life among those who are making progress towards perfection. Try to consider, therefore, what glimpses of ‘virtue’ there might be in your own life or the lives of others. Take a few moments to contemplate the questions below:

1 What potential virtues or strengths has nature given you and how do they apply to the situations you face, particularly life’s challenges?

2 What personal qualities or character strengths do you find most praiseworthy or admirable in other people?

3 How do the virtues compare to each other? Are some more important? Are they all somehow related or not?

4 What do you think would be the most important virtue for the ideal Sage to possess in order to live a complete and fulfilled life?

5 Take a moment to review the previous day, what strengths or glimpses of ‘virtue’ did you exhibit? What opportunities were there to exhibit others? Overall, then, which aspects of virtue are you making most progress towards and where might you benefit from developing your character further?

Stoic indifference to ‘indifferent’ things

If something is neither good nor bad, in the Stoic sense, it is classed as ‘indifferent’. By this they mean that fundamentally it can neither help nor harm our flourishing as essentially rational beings, it does not constitute a necessary part of the good life. The Stoics said that something ‘indifferent’ contributes neither to Happiness (eudaimonia) nor unhappiness and whatever can be used well and badly is classed as ‘indifferent’. We should learn therefore to be ‘indifferent towards indifferent things’ (Meditations, 11.16). As mentioned earlier, the classic examples of indifferent things given by Zeno were, among others:

• Life and death

• Good and bad reputation

• Pleasure and pain

• Wealth and poverty

• Health and disease

Health, wealth and reputation, by themselves, cannot help a foolish and unjust man attain the good life. Nor can sickness, poverty or persecution harm the virtuous man’s wellbeing. This list includes those things that Stoic developmental theory suggests are naturally valued by human beings from birth. Physical health and survival, in particular, are sought by all animals, above everything else, as ends-in-themselves. However, as Seneca puts it, Stoics come to see that ‘Life is neither good nor bad; it is the space for both good and bad’, meaning that life can be used wisely or foolishly, virtuously or viciously (Letters, 99).

As we’ve seen, what is good for me is also what I naturally find praiseworthy. However, no matter how many external goods an evil man acquires, this does not render him praiseworthy in our eyes. For example, a notorious tyrant like the Emperor Nero might be the wealthiest and most powerful man in the world but none of that, in itself, helps him come any closer to being a good man and, in fact, his wealth and power simply provided him with more opportunities to engage in vice.

Likewise, a wise and good man like Socrates might be reduced to poverty, imprisoned, and ridiculed, but even if he loses everything the majority refer to as ‘good’, including his own life, and every so-called ‘misfortune’ is heaped upon him, that does not make him any less praiseworthy. In fact, maintaining his virtues in adversity arguably just makes him more great-souled and admirable. If the externals can neither add nor take away anything from the good of virtue or evil of vice, then they are not intrinsically good or bad things, at least not in the same sense, and they count as nothing with regard to the good life, and our ultimate wellbeing or eudaimonia.

To borrow Seneca’s analogy, if a horse is weak and ill-tempered then even if it is adorned with the most expensive livery imaginable, we would still not consider it to be a good horse, because these things do not alter its true nature. According to the Stoics, therefore, external ‘goods’ do not relate to our essential nature as rational and social beings and merely confuse foolish people over the true worth of a man’s character.

So this [virtue] is the only good of a man, and if he has it, even if he is bereft of everything else, he deserves praise; but if he does not have it, despite an abundance of everything else, he is condemned and rejected. (Letters, 76)

External ‘goods’ are not merely of less value than virtue but they are totally incommensurate with it: they count for absolutely nothing by comparison. The perfectly good and wise man will therefore willingly expose himself to danger, deprivation, or the hostility of others, where necessary, because these things can never outweigh virtue. For that reason, the Stoics say the good man will ‘at all costs’ pursue virtue and avoid vice.

Cicero illustrates this point with the metaphor of a set of scales, a kind of ‘moral balance’, which he attributed to a Peripatetic philosopher Critolaus of Phaselis. Place virtue on one side of the scales. No matter how many external or bodily ‘goods’ are heaped up on the other side, it will never be enough to shift the balance. Epictetus therefore advises his students literally to rehearse saying in response to bodily and external things: ‘This is nothing to me!’ Of course this level of detachment may sound idealistic. It’s therefore of great importance to the Stoics to be able to point to countless ‘exemplary’ individuals who have demonstrated such practical wisdom, virtue, and aloofness from external things. In particular, Diogenes the Cynic provided a common example of a man who prized virtue above any material possession. However, centuries later, among the Romans, Cato was held up as their own Stoic exemplar:

In his eyes to conquer hunger was a feast, to ward off winter with a roof was a mighty palace, and to draw across his limbs the rough toga in the manner of the Roman citizen of old was a precious robe…(Lucan, The Civil War, 2)

The ability to perceive indifferent things as indifferent, and being satisfied with what little Nature deems necessary, is itself part of wisdom, the supreme virtue. Hence, according to Plutarch, Chrysippus said that to a good man losing his whole estate is merely as though losing one penny, and being sick no more than if he had stumbled.

Key idea: The Stoic concept of the ‘indifferent things’

The Aristotelians introduced a hierarchical distinction between three types of things considered intrinsically ‘good’ in life:

1 Goods of the mind, such as the virtues

2 Goods of the body, primarily physical health

3 External or ‘accidental’ goods, such as wealth and reputation Happiness and fulfilment (eudaimonia) means living a perfectly good life, complete in itself, and lacking nothing, which the Aristotelians, like many people, decided was a combination of these ‘goods’. According to this view, virtue may be important or even essential, but someone cannot be said to have a good life, and to be happy, unless he also has a healthy body and external goods, such as sufficient wealth and good reputation.

Ancient philosophers saw this as close to the attitude adopted by the majority of ordinary people, apart from those who seek pleasure as the most important thing in life. However, whether we have a good and happy life or not is left somewhat in the hands of fate because out of the three categories of ‘good’, only the first is actually under our direct control. Hence, Aristotle’s most influential follower, Theophrastus, apparently wrote: ‘Chance, and not wisdom, rules the life of men’, which Cicero called ‘the most demoralizing utterance that any philosopher has ever made.’ By contrast, even Epicurus wrote: ‘Over a man who is wise, chance has little power.’

However, following the Cynics, the Stoics adopted the radical stance that falling outside of virtue and vice there are only ‘indifferent things’ (ta adiaphora), irrelevant with regard to true fulfilment or eudaimonia. For the Stoic Sage, being a perfectly good person is sufficient to have a perfectly good life. Health, wealth, reputation, etc., literally count for nothing in this regard. Nevertheless, these things do have another sort of value for Stoics. Indeed, some are naturally ‘preferred’ to others – it’s just that this is the wrong type of value by which to assess eudaimonia. Health is generally preferable to illness and wealth to poverty, depending on how they’re used, but neither is of any value whatsoever when it comes to judging whether someone has lived a good life, according to the Stoics.

Try it now: Stoic meditation on virtue

There’s no explicit reference to meditation techniques of this kind in the surviving literature. However, you may find this a helpful adjunct to traditional Stoic practices. Herbert Benson, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School, developed a simplified meditation technique, which has been found effective in a number of research studies as a means of physiological relaxation. This mainly involves repeating a word in your mind each time you exhale. It seems that any word will do, you could just repeat the number ‘one’. However, you may wish to repeat a word that relates to your Stoic practice. The Stoics particularly valued contemplation of the nature of the good, so the English word ‘good’ or perhaps a Greek word like ‘aretê’ (virtue) could become your ‘centring device’, the thing you focus your attention upon, during meditation.

1 Adopt a comfortable position, close your eyes, and take a few minutes to relax, e.g., sit in a chair with both feet flat on the floor and your hands resting on your lap.

2 When you’re ready to begin, focus your attention on your breathing, breathe naturally, and mentally repeat the word ‘good’, or some other word of your choosing, each time you exhale.

3 Repeat this for about 10–20 minutes, or longer if you prefer.

Don’t try to block out distractions. Simply notice when thoughts and feelings intrude or your mind naturally wanders, and gently return your attention to the exercise as if you’re saying ‘So what?’ Benson’s research suggested that this attitude of detached acceptance towards distractions was one of the most important factors. During this exercise contemplate which aspects of conscious experience are under your direct control and which are not. Practise accepting, with Stoic ‘indifference’, any intrusive thoughts or feelings (‘impressions’) that automatically pop into your mind, rather than being swept along by them.

Preferred indifferents and primary value

Although ‘indifferent’ things are not intrinsically ‘good’, Zeno suggested that some are nevertheless more ‘valuable’ than others and ‘preferable’ to them. The Stoics reputedly quipped that the Sage would prefer to have toiletries to clean himself, when appropriate, than not. Yet such things do not make a virtuous life one iota better or more fulfilled. The jargon of Stoicism becomes especially prominent here as ordinary language seems to obscure this distinction. The Stoics say ‘indifferent’ things have ‘selective value’ (axia eklektikê) if they accord with nature and have ‘disvalue’ (apaxia) if they conflict with nature, although some are neutral even in this regard. Positively-valued things are termed ‘preferred’ (proêgmena) whereas disvalued things are ‘dispreferred’ (apoproêgmena). The Stoics therefore make a subtle but crucial distinction between two different types of value:

1 One sort is the value of truly ‘good’ things that directly contribute to living the good life: only the virtues have this absolute value.

2 However, ‘another sort is a certain intermediate potential or usefulness’, the value that health, wealth, and reputation have as potentially useful to the wise man, when used wisely (Lives, 7.105).

For example, we’re told that Zeno classed life and health as examples of ‘preferred indifferents’. In other words, health is better than sickness and it’s natural to seek it, within reason, but not at the cost of wisdom and virtue. The Stoics reputedly said that although the things naturally valued from birth are ‘indifferent’ with regard to achieving Happiness (eudaimonia), and living consistently in accord with practical wisdom, they are emphatically not ‘indifferent’ when it comes to our ‘appropriate actions’ in specific situations, and our survival or natural wellbeing (Stobaeus, 2.7a).

However, pleasure and pain are completely ‘indifferent’, neither preferred nor rejected, because they are mere side-effects rather than things useful with regard to the art of living wisely. Epictetus warns his students against ever using the words ‘good’ and ‘bad’, or even ‘helpful’ and ‘harmful’ to refer to ‘indifferent’ events. However, Chrysippus allegedly conceded that, when speaking loosely, it might be permissible for someone to call ‘preferred and dispreferred’ things ‘good and bad’. Nevertheless, we must be wary not to slip into confusion about their true nature while adapting ourselves in this way to the customary language used by the majority of people. The underlying insight, that practical wisdom is incomparably superior in value to external things, is more important than whatever words we happen to use to express ourselves.

The concept of ‘preferred indifferents’ is also linked to what Zeno called the kathêkonta, a Stoic’s ‘appropriate actions’ or ‘duties’, or what it would be reasonable to do in any given situation. It’s not enough to say that, in general, we should act virtuously, with wisdom, justice, courage, or self-discipline. How do we orient ourselves and know exactly what to do in a practical situation? For example, Epictetus appears to enumerate some of the most popular areas of ‘appropriate action’ discussed by Stoics as follows (Discourses, 3.21):

1 To eat and drink appropriately for a human being.

2 To dress appropriately for a human being.

3 To get married and have children.

4 To lead the life of a citizen in a society.

5 To wisely and virtuously endure insults and foolish behaviour from other human beings, though they may be unwise and vicious.

The Stoic teachers considered it their duty to provide guidance on specific cases. In his Discourses, therefore, we can see Epictetus providing suggestions to people attending his lectures with regard to concrete problems they’re facing in everyday life. However, giving specific advice requires complex judgements of probability, which introduce uncertainty, whereas the core ethical doctrine that virtue is the only good can be grasped with absolute certainty. The Stoics therefore varied considerably in the details of their practical ethical guidance. For example, Cicero tells us the Stoic scholarchs Antipater and Diogenes disagreed as to whether or not it is morally ‘appropriate’ for a man who sells his house to volunteer explanations of all its defects to every potential buyer.

As we’ll see when we come to discuss the Stoic ‘discipline of action’ in more detail, the appropriate actions of a Stoic can be understood as those which are undertaken in accord with the natural ‘value’ something is judged to have for my own wellbeing and that of others, whom I care about. However, any idiot can do the right thing for the wrong reasons. We make progress towards the ‘perfect actions’ (katorthômata) of the Sage only insofar as we begin to select things more consistently in accord with practical wisdom and virtue.

According to Marcus Aurelius this requires training ourselves to undertake all of our actions, not only in accord with their natural value, but also accepting the outcome with equanimity, whether things go as we’d have ‘preferred’ or not, as this is the basis of virtue. Indeed, ‘selective value’ only applies to our future, where there is still opportunity to change things. Once events have already overtaken us, this distinction no longer applies. We have no choice but to accept what it’s too late to change; there’s no point saying you’d ‘prefer’ not to have become ill because you can’t change the past. The Stoics seek to eliminate this sort of meaningless rumination because they class our past as unchangeable and therefore completely ‘indifferent’. Hence, the Sage generally prefers to experience health rather than illness but once he has become ill he willingly accepts the fact it’s happened. The Cynics said that contending with pain is like being chased by wild dogs. If we panic and try to run they'll just pursue us more aggressively, snapping at our heels. However, if we turn and face them calmly, they'll often back away. Ironically, by accepting our suffering we often lessen it.

Try it now: Write a philosophical consolation letter

People often console others who have suffered apparent misfortunes by telling them ‘It’s not the end of the world’ – but why is it not? What philosophical arguments can be mustered to persuade our friends of this? Read some of the consolation letters Seneca wrote to Polybius, Marcia, his mother Helvia, and Lucilius (Letters, 63; 93; 99). Try to list some of the main arguments he employs to reassure, encourage, and console. What do you make of his reasoning and the persuasive force of his remarks?

Epictetus mentions that the Stoic Paconius Agrippinus would write similar letters to himself praising hardships that had befallen him, such as exile or illness, and focusing on them as opportunities to learn strength of character. Try writing a brief letter of consolation to yourself, concerning some challenge or difficulty you face. Make it of a similarly ‘philosophical’ nature by drawing on the material in this chapter and anything else you’ve read or learned about Stoicism. It might be useful for you to review this letter once you’ve finished working through the whole book, to see if you would change anything about it. For now, though, just focus on the Stoic argument that the good life comes from virtue alone, and that one’s external fortunes are irrelevant (‘indifferent’) with regard to living a complete and fulfilled existence. If you find this difficult, just try to imagine how you would paraphrase parts of the consolation letters of Seneca, perhaps adapting them to similar situations in modern life.

Remember this: Stoics disagreed on this subject…

The doctrine of ‘preferred indifferent’ things is one area where Stoics disagreed among themselves, some arguing that certain things are intrinsically preferred, others claiming the value of external things varies depending on circumstances. Some Stoics, such as Aristo of Chios, apparently leaned more towards Cynicism, which viewed all things as totally ‘indifferent’. Others, such as Panaetius and Posidionius, leaned more towards the Aristotelian view that some bodily or external ‘goods’ are important for eudaimonia.

All Stoics firmly rejected Epicureanism, though, viewing bodily pleasure and the avoidance of pain as totally ‘indifferent’ with regard to the good life. Most traditional Stoics agreed that virtue was the only true good and sufficient by itself for the good life, regardless of our health, wealth, or reputation. They would normally accept that it is both natural and rational to ‘prefer’ whatever serves our own physical welfare and that of our friends and loved ones, as long as seeking this is in accord with wisdom and virtue. Philosophers who departed too much from the conventional Stoic view seem to have broken away, occasionally, sometimes becoming followers of another school.

Focus Points

The main points to remember from this chapter are:

✽ The goal of philosophy is Happiness (eudaimonia) but this is achieved primarily through practical wisdom, or virtue, which brings about harmony within oneself, with others, and with Nature as a whole.

✽ Philosophy is essentially the ‘love of wisdom’, or knowledge of what is good, bad, and ‘indifferent’ with regard to living a Happy life.

✽ The chief good for man is this practical wisdom, or virtue, which is good in the sense of being both ‘honourable’ and ‘beneficial’.

✽ Some indifferent things are ‘preferable’ to others but none of them count for anything in terms of attaining Happiness or the good life, according to the Stoics.

Next Step

Having examined the nature of the ‘good’ and ‘indifferent’ things, we should explore more closely what was meant by eudaimonia or ‘Happiness’ and the next step is traditionally to explore the Stoic theory of the ‘passions’, because Happiness was thought to be impossible while experiencing emotional distress. This leads us into the domain of Stoic psychotherapy, or the ‘therapy of the passions’, which was an integral part of ancient Ethics, and the overall ‘promise of philosophy’, the motivation Stoic students had for persevering in their long and challenging pursuit of wisdom.