1. “Is China Being Marginalized on Korean Peninsula?” Global Times, May 28, 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1104531.shtml.
2. Fei Su, “China’s Potential Role as Security Guarantor for North Korea,” 38 North, October 24, 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/10/fsu102418/.
3. Ibid.
4. “Mao Zedong’s Remarks at the Banquet for the North Korean Government Delegation,” November 23, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 203-00003-01, 1–3. Translated by Jeffrey Wang and Charles Kraus. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114167.
5. “180,000 Chinese Soldiers Killed in Korean War,” China Daily, June 28, 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-06/28/content_20365659.htm.
6. “Mao Zedong’s Remarks at the Banquet for the North Korean Government Delegation.”
7. 2017 Bukhan daewaemuyeok donghyang [2017 trends in North Korea’s trade relations], 18-038, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, 2017, 1, https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/globalBbs/kotranews/787/globalBbsDataView.do?setIdx=249&dataIdx=168031&pageViewType=&column=&search=&searchAreaCd=&searchNationCd=&searchTradeCd=&searchStartDate=&searchEndDate=&searchCategoryIdxs=&searchIndustryCateIdx=&searchItemCode=&searchItemName=&page=1&row=10.
8. Ibid., 3.
9. “North Korea in the World: China-DPRK Merchandise Trade Volume 2000-2018,” East-West Center and the National Committee on North Korea, https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/china-dprk/total-trade.
10. Ibid., 12.
11. Midterm Report by Panel of Experts Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) Addressed to the President of the Security Council, September 5, 2017, 4, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/742.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Michael Schuman, “Pyongyang’s China Connection,” U.S. News & World Report, September 19, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-09-19/how-china-keeps-north-koreas-economy-afloat.
15. Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views on South Korea’s Deployment of THAAD,” Chinese Leadership Monitor, February 2, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/02/chinese-views-on-south-korea-s-deployment-of-terminal-high-altitude-area-defense-thaad-pub-67891.
16. Quoted in “China Reacts with Anger, Threats After South Korean Missile Defense Decision,” Reuters, February 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-thaad-china/china-reacts-with-anger-threats-after-south-korean-missile-defense-decision-idUSKBN16709W.
17. David Josef Volodzko, “China Wins Its War Against South Korea’s US THAAD Missile Shield—Without Firing a Shot,” South China Morning Post, November 18, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2120452/china-wins-its-war-against-south-koreas-us-thaad-missile.
18. “社评：中朝关系发展强劲给地区带来正能量” (Sheping: Zhonghan guanxi fazhan qiangin gei diqu dai lai zhengnengliang) [Editorial: development of China–North Korea relations brings positive energy for the region], Huanqiu Shibao, June 19, 2018, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2018-06/12295863.html.
19. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un Keep Meeting—Here’s Why,” National Interest, June 26, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-xi-north-koreas-kim-keep-meeting%E2%80%94heres-why-26415.
20. Ibid.
21. “Power Rankings,” U.S. News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/power-full-list.
22. The Military Balance 2018 (London: IISS, 2018), 233.
23. Ibid.
24. “Russia and the World: 2018 IMEMO Forecast,” New Perspectives 26, no. 3 (2018): 16.
25. Quoted in Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives,” Working Paper No. 8, Wilson Center for International Scholars, November 1993, 11, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB76.pdf.
26. Ibid.
27. Kim Seong-Rae, “Putin jeongbueui daebukjeongchek: gwajaewa jeonmang” [The Putin government’s North Korea policy: issues and prospects], Hanbando Focus 38 (Winter 2016): 63.
28. Ibid., 60.
29. Choe Sang-Hun, “Russia Hints North Korea Is Ready to Do Business,” New York Times, August 21, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/world/europe/22moscow.html.
30. Elizabeth C. Economy, “Russia’s Role on North Korea: More Important than You Might Think,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-role-north-korea-more-important-you-might-think.
31. “Russian, North Korean Diplomats Discuss Denuclearization Talks,” TASS, December 24, 2018, http://tass.com/politics/1032121.
32. “Russia Insists on Guarantees During Denuclearization on Korean Peninsula—Diplomat,” TASS, November 24, 2018, http://tass.com/world/1032333.
33. “North Korea Unlikely to Agree to Unilateral Denuclearization—Expert,” TASS, November 23, 2018, http://tass.com/world/1032100.
34. Economy, “Russia’s Role on North Korea: More Important than You Might Think.”
35. “North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Putin Calls Sanctions Useless,” BBC, September 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41158281.
36. Julian Ryall, “Activists Condemn Russia for Handing Over North Korean Defector,” Telegraph, November 22, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/22/activists-condemn-russia-handing-north-korean-defector.
37. Radina Gigova, “Putin Invites ‘Comrade’ Kim Jong Un to Visit Russia,” CNN, June 14, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/14/world/putin-invites-comrade-kim-jong-un-to-visit-russia/index.html.
38. “Press Review: Putin-Kim Meeting Heavy on Symbolism and Europeans Refuse Russian Oil,” TASS, April 26, 2019, http://tass.com/pressreview/1055881.
39. Amie Ferris-Rotman and Simon Denyer, “Putin: Kim Jong Un Needs International Security Guarantees to Give up Nuclear Arsenal,” Washington Post, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-arrives-in-russian-far-east-ahead-of-first-ever-summit-with-kim-jong-un/2019/04/24/a2d941f8-65c6-11e9-a698-2a8f808c9cfb_story.html?utm_term=.7ffbaf049f0a.
40. Minyoung Lee, “Key Takeaways from DPRK State Media Coverage of Kim-Putin Summit,” NK Pro, April 26, 2019, https://www.nknews.org/pro/key-takeaways-from-dprk-state-media-coverage-of-kim-putin-summit/.
41. Economy, “Russia’s Role on North Korea: More Important than You Might Think.”
42. Brad Glosserman, “Japan-South Korea: So Close, Yet So Far,” The Diplomat, February 28, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/japan-south-korea-so-close-yet-so-far.
43. Ibid.
44. Rachel Blomquist and Daniel Wertz, “An Overview of North Korea–Japan Relations,” NCNK, June 2015, https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/overview-north-korea-japan-relations.
45. Nam Seung-mo, “I daetongryung, jeongyeok dokdo bangmun … yeokdae daetongryeong choecho” [President Lee visits Dokdo all of a sudden … first president to visit island], SBS News, August 20, 2012, https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1001321759.
46. Jason Strother, “Why Japan Is Angry over South Korea’s Visit to an Island,” Christian Science Monitor, August 10, 2012, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2012/0810/Why-Japan-is-angry-over-South-Korea-s-visit-to-an-island.
47. Bryan Harris and Robin Harding, “Japan–South Korea ‘Comfort Women’ Deal Under Threat,” Financial Times, November 21, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/2b50b1f2-ed3a-11e8-89c8-d36339d835c0.
48. Steve Miller, “South Korea Orders 2nd Japan Firm to Pay Forced Laborers,” Voice of America, November 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/world/asia/south-korea-japan-sex-slaves.html.
49. Julian Ryall, “South Korea Orders Japanese Firm to Compensate Forced Laborers as Relations Hit New Low,” Telegraph, November 29, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/29/south-korea-orders-japanese-firm-compensate-forced-laborers.
50. “Regarding the Decision by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea, Confirming the Existing Judgments on the Japanese Company (Statement by Foreign Minister Taro Kono),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002242.html.
51. “Government Statement on the Supreme Court’s Decision on Forced Laborers,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2018, http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us-newyork-ko/brd/m_4237/view.do?seq=1346034.
52. Defense of Japan 2018 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2018), 292.
53. Niall McCarthy, “The World’s Biggest Arms Importers Since 1950 [Infographic],” Forbes, March 12, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/03/12/the-worlds-biggest-post-war-arms-importers-infographic/#c1c2fba8e34c.
54. Martin Armstrong, “The USA’s Biggest Arms Export Partners,” Statista, October 12, 2018, https://www.statista.com/chart/12205/the-usas-biggest-arms-export-partners/.
55. Mike Yeo, “Japan Seeks Drones, Subs, F-35 Jets as Part of $243 Billion Defense-Spending Plan,” DefenseNews, December 19, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/12/19/japan-seeks-drones-subs-f-35-jets-as-part-of-243-billion-defense-spending-plan.
56. Defense of Japan 2018, 73.
57. Ibid.
58. Justin McCurry, “Japan Defence Ministry Sees Record Budget over North Korea Threat,” Guardian, August 31, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/japan-record-defence-budget-north-korea-china-threat.
59. Masayuki Yuda, “Rising Asia Tensions Push Japan’s Defense Budget to Record High,” Nikkei Asian Review, December 22, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Rising-Asia-tensions-push-Japan-s-defense-budget-to-record-high2.
60. Brad Lendon and Yoko Wakatsuki, “Japan to Have First Aircraft Carriers Since World War II,” CNN, December 18, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/18/asia/japan-aircraft-carriers-intl/index.html.
61. “The North Korean Threat Remains,” Japan Times, July 2, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/07/02/editorials/north-korean-threat-remains/#.XCQjE1z7RPY.
62. Ibid.
63. “North Korean Abductions of Japanese Citizens: A Timeline,” Nippon.com, October 18, 2018, https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00310/.
64. Ibid.
65. “North Korean Official in South Demands Japan Compensate for War Crimes,” Channel News Asia, November 16, 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/north-korean-official-in-south-demands-japan-compensate-for-war-crimes-10938252.
66. Jesse Johnson, “North Korea Blasts Japan’s Role in Pushing UN Human Rights Resolution amid Nuclear Talks,” Japan Times, October 23, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/23/national/north-korea-blasts-japans-role-pushing-u-n-human-rights-resolution-amid-nuclear-talks/#.XCQr2lz7RPY.
67. Quoted in Simon Denyer, “Japan’s Abe Finds Himself on Sidelines amid Outreach with North Korea,” Washington Post, September 23, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japans-abe-finds-himself-on-sidelines-amid-outreach-with-north-korea/2018/09/23/5dce8842-bdac-11e8-97f6-0cbdd4d9270e_story.html.
68. Kazuto Suzuki, “Japan’s View of the North Korean Threat,” IAI Commentaries 22 (March 2018): 1, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom1822.pdf.
69. “Peace in North Korea Could Cost $2 Trillion if History Is a Guide,” Fortune, May 10, 2018, http://fortune.com/2018/05/10/cost-of-peace-in-north-korea; Brian Padden, “N. Korea Denuclearization Could Cost $20 Billion,” Voice of America, June 6, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-pricey-denuclearization/4426577.html.
70. “Explainer: What Will It Cost to Denuclearize North Korea?,” Reuters, June 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-cost-explainer/explainer-what-will-it-cost-to-denuclearize-north-korea-idUSKBN1JP1LD.
71. “The Secretary of State to Mr. Min Yeung-Tchan, Special Envoy Without Credentials,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress, December 5, 1905, Document 620, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1905/d620.
72. Ibid.
73. Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia: An Examination of U.S. Policy,” speech delivered at the National Press Club, January 12, 1950, Department of State Bulletin 22, no. 551 (January 23, 1950): 111–118; “Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson’s speech, Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” The World and Japan: Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA), University of Tokyo, http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19500112.S1E.html.
74. “The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Roberts) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio),” January 7, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1959, Korea, vol. VII, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/comp1.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950,” 28.
78. “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” Office of the Press Secretary, White House, June 16, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-and-republic-korea.
79. Nicholas J. Myers, “What Happened During Vostok 2018?,” RealClear Defense, October 5, 2018, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/10/05/what_happened_during_vostok_2018_113870.html.
80. Mathieu Boulegue, “What Russia’s Vostok-2018 Exercises Mean for China and the West,” The Hill, September 29, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/408505-what-russias-vostok-2018-exercises-mean-for-china-and-the-west.