With the issuing of War Directive No. 25, preparations for the invasion of Crete could begin, but it took time to assemble the necessary men and equipment, scattered as they were all across Europe. As a result, D-Day for Operation Merkur was put back until 20 May, enabling the confused defence of Crete to be put into some sort of order. Logistics also dominated the considerations of the targets to attack, as an airborne attack usually relies on surprise, speed and rapid reinforcement. As the first of these factors had already been compromised, the planners looked at the extent to which they could capitalise on the other two. During the early planning process General der Flieger Alexander Löhr (Commander, Luftflotte IV) favoured a single concentrated drop to seize the airfield at Maleme, followed by a build-up of additional infantry and heavy weapons, and then a conventional advance up the island from west to east. Such an approach however, might allow the British time to reinforce the garrison either by sea, or by landing troops at either Heraklion or Rethymnon. This could allow them to sustain a defence of the island. Concerned at this prospect and by the slow build-up that would result from the seizure of a single airfield, Generalmajor Kurt Student (Commander, Fliegerkorps XI) suggested no less than seven separate drops, the most important being around the airfields at Maleme, Rethymnon and Heraklion, with the focus on Heraklion. Student’s plan would enable the Germans to seize all the main strategic points at the outset, so long as resistance on the ground was minimal.
General Wavell stops to talk to an officer while inspecting a 3.7in. anti-aircraft gun position, a number of which were targets for the glider landings on the first day by the Genz and Altmann detachments. Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII only lost some 30 aircraft during the battle so their effectiveness against low-flying targets is open to question. (IWM – E1188)
All the planners (including the Kriegsmarine’s Konteradmiral Karl-Georg Schuster) agreed, however, that Maleme should be one of the main targets. It was closest to the island’s administrative centre, Hania, and Souda Bay, and to the Greek mainland. The latter was important as the 502 operational Ju-52s could not carry all the assault elements in a single drop; the maximum was around 6,000 in one lift. This meant that, even had German intelligence estimates proved correct, the attacking forces would have been at a 1:2 disadvantage. The only answer was to turn the Ju-52s around as quickly as possible to allow a second lift on D-Day. As a back-up the Germans could send a proportion of the assault force by sea, to exploit the foothold gained by the paratroopers. Maleme, being the closest airfield to the mainland, would shorten the time the troopships would be at sea and reduce their vulnerability to interception by the Royal Navy. Finally, Maleme’s close proximity to the mainland would allow even Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters fitted with bomb racks a reasonable amount of flying time over the island, enhancing the potency of available air support.
In the end, Göring imposed a compromise solution between these two different approaches. The drops on D-Day would now be made in two waves: the first in the morning around Hania and the airfield at Maleme, the second in the late afternoon against the airfields at Heraklion and Rethymnon. This would be followed on D+1 by the arrival of the mountain troops of 5th Gebirgs Division under Generalmajor Julius Ringel and the seaborne elements. The assault force on the first day would be split into three groups:
Gruppe West, commanded by Generalmajor Eugen Meindl, consisted of the entire Luftlande Sturmregiment (minus two companies of glider troops that were to be attached to Gruppe Mitte), which would land in the first wave and had the objective of securing Maleme airfield.
Gruppe Mitte, under the divisional commander, Generalleutnant Willhelm Süssmann, the first wave would consist of the divisional headquarters along with the two glider companies from the Luftlande Sturmregiment as well as Oberst Richard Heidrich’s 3rd Fallschirmjäger Regiment, reinforced by engineer and AA units. Their objective would be to land in Prison Valley and attack towards Hania and Souda. The second wave would be commanded by Oberst Alfred Sturm and consist of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 2nd Fallschirmjäger Regiment, with the town of Rethymnon as its objective.
Gruppe Ost, commanded by Oberst Bruno Bräuer and landing in the second wave, consisted of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Regiment, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Fallschirmjäger Regiment (FJR) with Heraklion as its objective.
German intelligence had badly underestimated the Allied strength on the island. The defence of Greece and Crete was one of the many operations General Sir Archibald Wavell (Commander-in-Chief, Commonwealth Forces Middle East) had been forced to undertake with inadequate resources all around his theatre. There were acute shortages of aircraft, heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and even basic supplies that made his job even more problematic, a situation exacerbated by the losses suffered during the evacuation from Greece, including much of the infantry’s organic heavy weapons. In addition many units were now disorganised, and their morale had taken a hard knock. There was no properly functioning radio net and communications proved to be almost non-existent. Nevertheless, the forces on the island numbered some 32,000 Commonwealth troops and 10,000 Greek soldiers, significantly more than the German intelligence estimate of some 10,000 Commonwealth troops and the remnants of ten Greek divisions.
On Crete itself, Freyberg identified five main objectives to defend: the airfields at Maleme, Rethymnon, Heraklion, the administrative centre of Hania and the port at Souda. While his assessments of the nature of the coming assault, its timing and targets was generally good, Freyberg’s options were limited. Due to the security restrictions surrounding the decoded transcripts of German ‘Enigma’ transmissions, it was difficult for him to be confident of the quality of the intelligence he received. The garrison, as well as suffering from poor communications and a lack of heavy weapons, was also handicapped by a chronic shortage of motor transport. There was little prospect of effective air cover and no-one was sure if the Royal Navy could intervene in any meaningful way in the event of a seaborne threat. Freyberg was thus forced to organise his forces into groups of roughly equal strength, split between the objectives, with a strong eye to defending against a seaborne invasion, as well as the threat from the air.
Soldiers Cyril Ericson (holding the map case) and Ernie Avon standing by some discarded German parachutes amongst olive trees near Galatos. Trees and rough ground were always a hazard for parachutists. (Alexander Turnbull Library, DA-00470)
Allied troops in a transit camp, near Souda Bay on the island of Crete, just before the invasion. Transit camps were set up at regular intervals along main transportation routes, to house troops that were moving from one position to another as the shortage of transportation meant that in many instances, a unit would have to move in shifts. (Alexander Turnbull Library, DA-01040)
The New Zealand Division was deployed around the Maleme–Galatos area, under the watchful eye of ‘Creforce’ Headquarters near Hania, and consisted of the 4th Brigade under Brigadier Inglis (18th, 19th and 20th New Zealand Infantry Battalions), the 5th Brigade under Brigadier Hargest (21st, 22nd, 23rd New Zealand and 28th (Maori) Infantry Battalions) and a new 10th Brigade under Colonel Howard Kippenberger (New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Detachment and the Composite Battalion), as Brigadier Falconer’s 6th Brigade had been sent to Egypt.
A life-jacketed Gebirgsjäger looks out over the side of one of the Greek fishing boats in the 1st Motor Sailing Flotilla towards the Italian destroyer, the Lupo. The convoy was intercepted by the Royal Navy on the night of the 21/22 May 1941 and mostly sunk. (Alexander Turnbull Library, DA-01308)
Major General Eric Weston commanded the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation (MNBDO) 1 that was concentrated around Souda and reinforced by two composite Australian battalions, named after their parent organisations (16th and 17th Brigades) and the 2/2 Field Artillery Regiment acting as infantry.
1st Battalion, the Welch Regiment (from 14th Brigade), along with the 1st Ranger Battalion (9th Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps) and Northumberland Hussars formed a reserve near Hania.
Brigadier Vasey’s reinforced 19th Australian Brigade, consisting primarily of 2/1st, 2/7th, 2/8th and 2/11th Infantry Battalions, three batteries from the 2/3rd Field Regiment, some engineers and machine gun troops, was deployed around Rethymnon and Georgioupolis.
Brigadier Chappel’s 14th Brigade defended Heraklion and consisted of: 2nd Battalion, the Leicestershire Regiment; 2nd Battalion, the York and Lancashire Regiment; 2nd Battalion, the Black Watch; 1st Battalion, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (who were still at Tymbaki when the invasion took place) and the Australian 2/4th Infantry Battalion (from 19th Brigade).
Finally, the Greek forces were divided as follows: the 1st, 6th and 8th Regiments in the Maleme–Galatos area; the 2nd Regiment in the Souda–Hania area; the 4th and 5th Regiments along with the Gendarmerie were stationed in the Rethymnon–Georgioupolis area; while the 3rd and 7th Regiments and the Garrison Battalion were deployed around Heraklion. Despite misgivings about their performance from many Allied officers, the Greeks would put up a stubborn fight, helped by the acquisition of weapons from dead paratroopers and the occasional weapons container.
In fact, the British picture of German intentions was far better than the German information on Allied dispositions. From the end of April, a stream of ‘Ultra’ intelligence, decrypted by the code-breaking office at Bletchley Park, indicated that the Germans were very near to launching an all-out airborne invasion of Crete with the emphasis being on the capture of the airfields, and then following that up with air transport of reinforcements, with some coming by sea. Additionally, it was very difficult for Löhr to conceal the build-up of Luftflotte IV in Greece. This information was passed along to Freyberg, but its impact was diluted to protect the secret of the ‘Ultra’ breakthrough. Freyberg was told that the information had come from ‘highly placed spies in Athens’. In fact, ‘Ultra’ proved to be something of a double-edged sword in that the information coming from the German ‘Enigma’ transmissions was, in the main, pretty reliable, but it was not always complete and the analysts at Bletchley Park often made mistakes in trying to fill in the gaps. In this case they believed that 5th Gebirgs Division had been attached to Fliegerkorps XI in addition to the 22nd Luftlande (Air Landing) Division, rather than replacing it, and that the Italian Navy would provide proper support so that the seaborne force would be proportionately larger and the greater threat. As a result it was the seaborne threat, rather than the airborne one, that caused Freyberg the greatest worry.
A group of Junkers Ju-52 transports from KGzbV 1 under Oberst Morzik on Megara airfield, waiting for the invasion of Crete to begin in mid-May 1941. 533 Ju-52s were used in the Crete campaign, a large proportion of the Luftwaffe’s inventory, of which they suffered almost 200 lost in action. (Alexander Turnbull Library, DA-01310)
Members of the 28th (Maori) Battalion on the wharf in Alexandria immediately after their arrival from Crete. They were evacuated from Sphakion on 30 May 1941 after performing well throughout the campaign. (Alexander Turnbull Library, DA-09662)
Further confirmation came when a German Bf 110 crashed in Souda Bay. It was found to contain the map case and operational order for the 3rd Fallschirmjäger Regiment, and a summary of the whole operation. The Greeks made the discovery and, unfortunately, despite the fact that it confirmed their own intelligence, the British command decided it was a ruse. Furthermore, it did not fit in with preconceived British ideas, and thus Freyberg continued to concentrate on the seaborne element of the operation with his units spread along the coast. The Allies failed either to concentrate their defence around the airfields or to put them beyond use; the RAF, convinced it would eventually return in strength, prevented the latter. There was also only a small Allied reserve in the event that the Germans captured an airfield. The scene was set therefore for one of the most daring uses of airborne troops in history, the German attackers with a dreadfully inadequate picture of their target and enemy, the Allies effectively looking in the wrong direction.