IT WAS a curious fact, but true—the man who had made the D-Day decision, and countless others since, the man who had insisted upon keeping control of events in his own hands, in 1956 was unable to decide who his own running mate should be and left the decision in other people’s hands.
Had he wanted Nixon, all he needed to do was say one word at any time in the first half of 1956 and that would have been that. Had he wanted to dump Nixon, all he needed to do was say one word and he would have been rid of the Vice-President. But instead of saying the word on this momentous subject, fraught with significance for the post-Eisenhower Presidency, Eisenhower remained silent, thereby turning the decision over to others. His indecision can only be seen as an indication of his ambiguous and complex attitude toward Nixon.
The adjectives Eisenhower used to describe Nixon in his private diary are generally cold and indifferent; Nixon was “quick,” or “loyal,” or “dependable.” Eisenhower told Arthur Larson that Nixon “isn’t the sort of person you turn to when you want a new idea, but he has an uncanny ability to draw upon others’ ideas and bring out their essence in a cool-headed way.”1
Eisenhower’s most persistent complaints about Nixon were that he was too political and too immature. As to the first charge, it was as much Eisenhower’s fault as Nixon’s. Although obviously Nixon enjoyed blasting the Democrats, and although Eisenhower frequently told him to tone it down, it was nevertheless the case that Eisenhower used Nixon in both presidential campaigns, as well as in the off-year congressional elections, for the hard-hitting partisan speeches, which allowed the President to stay above the battle.
As to the second charge, Eisenhower’s comments to Larson were typical of those he made to many others. When Nixon was forty-five years old, in 1958, Eisenhower told Larson, “You know, Dick has matured.” Six years later, in 1964, Eisenhower repeated, “You know, Dick has matured.” Three years after that, in 1967, Eisenhower reminded Larson, “You know, Dick has really matured.” But in the spring of 1956, when Eisenhower had to make the crucial decision about Nixon’s career, he told Emmet Hughes, “Well, the fact is, of course, I’ve watched Dick a long time, and he just hasn’t grown. So I just haven’t honestly been able to believe that he is presidential timber.”2
That leaves another problem. In 1956, Eisenhower was a sixty-five-year-old heart-attack victim. There was a good chance he would not live through a second term. Eisenhower loved his country and wanted the best for it. If he thought Nixon was not the best, much less unqualified to be President, Eisenhower was the one man in America who could push Nixon out of the Vice-Presidency, in order to get a man whom he trusted to serve as his potential successor. But he either could not find such a man, or, having found him, could not persuade him to take on the job of ousting Nixon.
On April 9 Eisenhower met with Nixon. The President, to Nixon’s consternation, continued to urge him to take a Cabinet post, perhaps HEW or Commerce, in order to build his administrative experience. But, Eisenhower added, “I still insist you must make your decision as to what you want to do. If the answer is yes, I will be happy to have you on the ticket.” He urged Nixon to take his time.3
On April 25, at a press conference, Eisenhower was asked if Nixon had yet charted his own course and reported back to the President. “Well,” Eisenhower replied, “he hasn’t reported back in the terms in which I used the expression . . . no.” The following morning, Nixon asked for an appointment with the President. That afternoon, in the Oval Office, Nixon told Eisenhower, “I would be honored to continue as Vice-President under you.” Eisenhower said he was pleased with Nixon’s decision. The President got Hagerty on the telephone. “Dick has just told me that he’ll stay on the ticket,” Eisenhower said. “Why don’t you take him out right now and let him tell the reporters himself. And,” he added, “you can tell them that I’m delighted by the news.”4
• •
Republican preconvention activity was quiet and dignified. In 1952, Eisenhower and the Republicans had won a campaign in which they took the offensive, leveling various accusations against the Democrats. This time, Eisenhower intended to run on the defensive, pointing to his record of accomplishments instead of to the shortcomings of the opposition. Given the record levels of employment, the general prosperity, and the achievement of peace in the world, pointing to the record was obviously a wise and prudent decision. In addition, Eisenhower had many specific pieces of legislation he could point to with pride; his own favorite was the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, which he signed into law on June 29, 1956.
There were, however, three outstanding problems the Republicans had to face in the weeks before the convention. First was civil rights. Second was the Middle East, where the situation threatened to escalate to a war that would damage Eisenhower’s reputation as a peacemaker. Third was the festering sore in Eastern Europe, recently made worse by Khrushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin and hinting at a liberalization of the Soviet control of the area.
• •
On civil rights, Eisenhower’s chief initiative in the summer of 1956 was Brownell’s civil-rights bill. Republican leaders were cautious about the bill; although they loved putting the Democrats on the defensive by forcing the southern senators to take a stand, they worried about losing their best chance to crack the Solid South. They therefore advised Eisenhower to go slow, and told him Brownell’s bill was too stringent. Eisenhower told the leaders that Brownell had been under terrific pressure “from radicals on his staff” to write an even tougher bill, and that the one Brownell had produced could hardly be “more moderate or less provocative.” He complained that the southerners, who were already denouncing the bill, had not even bothered to read it. But then he turned his attention to the other side, saying that “these civil-rights people” never consider that although the President could “send in the military” he could not “make them operate the school.” He then repeated a little story he had heard from Bobby Jones down at Augusta; one of the field hands was supposed to have said, “If someone doesn’t shut up around here, particularly these Negroes from the North, they’re going to get a lot of us niggers killed!”5
Brownell sent his civil-rights bill to Congress. After prolonged infighting, in July the House passed the two mildest provisions of the bill, one creating a bipartisan commission to investigate racial difficulties, the other establishing a civil-rights division in the Justice Department. Voting rights and federal responsibility for enforcing civil rights were dropped from the compromise package. Nevertheless, the bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee, where the chairman was Senator James Eastland of Mississippi.
• •
A major feature of the 1952 Republican platform had been the call for “liberation” of the East European satellites. Nothing that Eisenhower or his associates had done since had brought liberation any closer; indeed, as noted, Dulles thought that Eisenhower’s going to the Geneva Summit had signaled an American acquiescence in Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. But in the spring of 1956, as a result of action by the Russians, not the Americans, the prospects for liberation suddenly seemed bright again.
In his famous secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev denounced Stalin for his crimes against the Russian people, and seemed to promise that in the future there would be a relaxation of Communist controls both inside Russia and in the satellite countries. The CIA obtained a copy of the speech; with Eisenhower’s permission, Allen Dulles gave it to The New York Times. On June 5, the paper printed the speech in its entirety. Publication caused great excitement throughout Eastern Europe. Perhaps, just perhaps, the long-awaited breakup of the Soviet empire was at hand. Republicans wanted another strong plank on liberation. Eisenhower insisted that they proceed cautiously. He told Jerry Persons “that this particular plank should make it clear that we advocate liberation by all peaceful means, but not to give any indication that we advocate going to the point of war to accomplish this liberation.”6
• •
In the Mideast, Eisenhower had other problems. Insofar as possible, he wanted to stay out—he refused to sell arms to either Israel or the Arabs—but he also wanted to keep the Russians out. Further, he wanted good relations with the Egyptians, and had promised their leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, American financial and technical support for the Aswan Dam. But when Nasser recognized the government of Red China and purchased arms from the Czechs, the Eisenhower Administration withdrew its support. Nasser reacted quickly and boldly: on July 26 he nationalized the Suez Canal and took control of its operations. He said he would use the revenue to pay for the dam. “The fat,” as Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs, “was now really in the fire.”7
Prime Minister Anthony Eden was ready for action. On July 27, he sent a cable to Eisenhower, arguing that the West could not allow Nasser to seize Suez and get away with it. They must act at once, together, or American and British influence throughout the Middle East would be “irretrievably undermined.” He said that the interests of all maritime nations were at stake, because the Egyptians did not have the technical competence to run the canal. Eden said he was preparing military plans and said the West must be ready, as a last resort, to “bring Nasser to his senses” by force.
Eisenhower was drawn in different directions by his various desires and needs. He said that the U.S. “must let the British know how gravely we view this matter, what an error we think their decision is, and how this course of action would antagonize the American people . . .” As to the British claims that Egypt had committed a crime, Eisenhower could only say that “the power of eminent domain within its own territory could scarcely be doubted,” and that “Nasser was within his rights.” As to the British claim that the Egyptians could not run the canal, Eisenhower scoffed at it. The Panama Canal, he said, was a much more complex operation; he had no doubt the Egyptians could run it. But he also said that “thinking of our situation in Panama, we must not let Nasser get away with this action.”8
• •
On August 21 Eisenhower flew off to California to attend the Republican National Convention. It was San Francisco in August, and it could hardly have been better. Everyone had on “I Like Ike” buttons, or “Ike and Dick.” Peace and prosperity were the theme. Ike had Mamie, John, Barbara, Milton, and Edgar with him. All the members of his gang came out.
On August 22, the convention nominated Eisenhower by acclamation, and Nixon as vice-presidential candidate. Ike made an appropriate acceptance speech, then went off for a few days’ vacation on the Monterey Peninsula. The gang was along and they played golf and bridge for four days. On the plane ride back to Washington, Ike had his friends join him. They played nonstop bridge for eight and one-half hours. Ike returned to the White House sun-tanned, buoyant, eager to go to work on his problems.
• •
Politics had provided an interlude in the Suez crisis, but only a brief one. As soon as Eisenhower returned to Washington, the Middie East—not the upcoming campaign—was his central concern, to which he wanted to give his undivided attention.
But of course he could not. The issue of elementary schools, for example, was pressing in on him, because simultaneously with the Suez crisis and the campaign, the 1956–1957 school year began across the nation. At all levels, college, secondary, and elementary, it was the largest opening in the history of the Republic. The classroom and teacher shortage was acute. Eisenhower often said that education was as important, or even more important, than defense, yet the sole significant contact his government had with these millions of children, who everyone agreed were the nation’s greatest asset, was a school-lunch program. The two great needs of the education system, teachers and classrooms, were not addressed in any way by the federal government. The baby-boom children were being shortchanged in their education.
By no means was it entirely Eisenhower’s fault, but at least some of the responsibility for this situation was his. Although he had no proposal to help the teacher crisis, beyond urging the states to raise salaries, he did propose a federal program of loans and grants to the states for school construction. He put conditions on his program, however, that made it—as he had certainly been told that it would—unacceptable to Congress. His principal condition was that the money go to the poor states; rich states like California or New York could solve their own problems. In practice, that meant most of the money appropriated for schools would go to the Deep South. There it would be used to strengthen a segregated school system existing in open defiance of the Supreme Court. Eisenhower refused to widen his proposal to send money to all the states, which would have insured passage. Instead, he did nothing. He hoped the states would solve the problem, or that it might otherwise somehow go away.
It did not, could not, has not. As schools opened, mob violence broke out in Clinton, Tennessee, and in Mansfield, Texas, as school officials attempted to carry out court-ordered desegregation. On September 5, Eisenhower was asked at a press conference whether he thought “there is anything that can be said or done on the national level to help local communities meet this problem without violence.” Eisenhower thought not. It was a local problem. “And let us remember this,” he said, “under the law the federal government cannot . . . move into a state until the state is not able to handle the matter.”9 But he could not get off that easily, because the desegregation crisis was getting closer to the basic point every year. That point was the question, Would the federal government use force to insure court-ordered desegregation? If it would, then integration would prevail, and the South (and the nation) thereby change forever. If it would not, segregation would continue.
Everyone involved in the crisis knew those basic facts. Everyone knew that the ultimate test had to come. Eisenhower admitted to Whitman, “Eventually a district court is going to cite someone for contempt, and then we are going to be up against it,” that is, forced to act.10 As in Suez, Eisenhower wanted to delay as long as possible, to allow people to cool down.
But others wanted the test now. Governor Allan Shivers of Texas, who had supported Eisenhower in 1952, sent Texas Rangers to defy a court order, reassigned the Negro pupils, and then said, “I defy the federal government. Tell the federal courts if they want to come after anyone, to come after me and cite me in this matter.” Edward Morgan of ABC asked the President, “Would you consider that an incident in which the federal government had a responsibility, and, if not, can you give us an idea of what the formula is that would have to be followed for the government to intervene?”
Eisenhower was clear in answering one part of the question, while managing to ignore the other. If a federal court cited someone for contempt, Eisenhower said, of course U.S. marshals would serve the warrants and take the man to jail or force him to pay a fine. But as to using marshals, or any other form of federal force, to put the Negro children back into the school to which the court had assigned them, Eisenhower said not a word. Instead, he deplored violence, then expressed the hope that the states would meet their responsibilities, both to maintain law and order and to enforce the court orders on desegregation.
Eisenhower was asked if he had any advice for young people in the border states who would be attending desegregated schools that fall. Eisenhower’s thoughts immediately turned to the white children, not to the Negro students. He expressed his sympathy for their situation, said he recognized that “it is difficult through law and through force to change a man’s heart.” The South, he said, was “full of people of good will, but they are not the ones we now hear.” Eisenhower then condemned “the people . . . so filled with prejudice that they even resort to violence; and the same way on the other side of the thing, the people who want to have the whole matter settled today.” (Eisenhower’s comparison of civil-rights activists to southern mobs infuriated the NAACP.) Eisenhower also said, “We must all . . . help to bring about a change in spirit so that extremists on both sides do not defeat what we know is a reasonable, logical conclusion to this whole affair, which is recognition of the equality of men.”
That statement led to the next question: Did Eisenhower endorse the Brown decision, or merely accept it, as the Republican platform did? Eisenhower replied, “I think it makes no difference whether or not I endorse it. The Constitution is as the Supreme Court interprets it; and I must conform to that and do my very best to see that it is carried out in this country.”11
It was an attitude he carried with him through the campaign. He refused to discuss the Brown decision or the topic of desegregation, except to point with pride to his ending of Jim Crow in Washington, D.C., and at Army and Navy posts. Since desegregation was not a subject the Democrats could afford to raise, Eisenhower managed to successfully avoid the issue for another year. At what cost to the nation’s children, and especially those who were black and lived in the South, no one can say.
• •
Before the convention, Eisenhower had warned the Republicans that if they nominated him, he would not undertake a strenuous or wide-ranging campaign. Instead, he intended to limit himself to four or five major speeches on national TV. One reason was his health; another was that unlike 1952, he had a record to run on; a third was that, as President, he simply did not have the time to devote to campaigning that he had had when he was only a candidate. One month after the nomination, on September 19, he made his first address. He gave a sober review of the world situation, stressing his Administration’s success in maintaining peace. He dismissed Stevenson’s call for a nuclear test ban as a “theatrical gesture.”12
Eisenhower’s private view of the opposition was scathing. He told Gruenther, “Stevenson and Kefauver, as a combination, are the sorriest and weakest pair that ever aspired to the highest office in the land.” Eisenhower never had any doubts that he and Nixon would prevail, so he felt comfortable in letting Nixon do the vast majority of the campaigning. But, as in 1952, professional Republicans could imagine all sorts of things going wrong. “I notice that as election day approaches,” Eisenhower wrote Gruenther, “everybody gets the jitters. You meet a man and he is practically hysterical with the confidence of overwhelming victory, and sometimes you see that same man that evening and his face is a foot long with fright.”13
Pressed by the RNC to do more talking, Eisenhower convinced himself that it was necessary. He explained to Swede that he not only wanted to win, but to win by a substantial margin. Without a mandate, he said, he would “not want to be elected at all.” He gave two reasons. First, his work in “reforming and revamping the Republican Party” was far from complete, and his influence over the party would depend, in large measure, on the size of his victory. Second, he expected the Democrats to retain the House and Senate. Working with the Democrats, although it often came easier to Eisenhower than working with the Republicans, would also depend on his margin of victory. He therefore decided to “do a bit of traveling in the campaign,” and made campaign speeches in half a dozen cities. He went partly for the fun of it—he always enjoyed traveling—and partly “to prove to the American people that I am a rather healthy individual.”14
Insofar as there was an issue that got him going, it was Stevenson’s call for a test ban. Insofar as there was a reason for his increasing contempt for Stevenson, it was the inept and confused way in which Stevenson raised and used the issue. Stevenson’s campaign was indeed a mishmash; he wanted to end the draft, end testing, but greatly accelerate spending on missiles. Eisenhower thought that testing was far too complex and dangerous a subject to be discussed in a political campaign, and he would have preferred to leave it alone. Stevenson’s advisers also told him that he was foolish to attempt to attack Eisenhower on any question concerning national defense. Stevenson nevertheless insisted on making an end to testing a central theme in his campaign, but he got nowhere with it.
• •
Through September, the British and French continued to put the pressure on Nasser, as Eisenhower continued to urge them to go slowly. Meanwhile, the U-2 spy plane had become operational. Flights over the Middle East revealed an Israeli mobilization and the presence in Israel of some sixty French Mystère jets. Eisenhower was incensed, because under the terms of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were committed to maintaining a status quo in arms and borders in the Middle East. France had earlier asked for, and received, American permission to sell Mystères to Israel, but only twenty-four, not sixty. Thus Eisenhower now knew that the French were arming the Israelis in contravention of the 1950 agreement, and lying to the Americans about it.
Eisenhower did not suspect an Israeli attack on Egypt; his attention was riveted on Jordan. He told Dulles to “make it very clear to the Israelis that they must stop these attacks against the borders of Jordan.” If they continued, the Arabs would turn to the Russians for arms, and “the ultimate effect would be to Sovietize the whole region, including Israel.”
Eisenhower told Dulles he thought “Ben-Gurion’s obviously aggressive attitude” was due to his belief that the political campaign in America would hamstring the Eisenhower Administration. Eisenhower told Dulles to set the Israelis straight: “Ben-Gurion should not make any grave mistake based upon his belief that winning a domestic election is as important to us as preserving and protecting the peace.” Dulles should also tell Ben-Gurion that in the long term, aggression by Israel “cannot fail to bring catastrophe and such friends as he would have left in the world, no matter how powerful, could not do anything about it.” 15
Over the next two weeks, there was a virtual blackout on communication between the United States on the one side and the French and the British on the other. Simultaneously, American interceptors picked up heavy radio traffic between Britain and France. American code breakers were unsuccessful in unraveling the content of the messages; they could only report that the sheer volume of traffic was ominous. Eisenhower’s own expectation was that the Israelis would attack Jordan, supplied by the French with covert British sanction, and that the British and the French would then take advantage of the confusion to occupy the canal. He was, in other words, badly misinformed, and had reached the wrong conclusions. He was about to be as completely surprised as he had been on December 7, 1941, by Pearl Harbor, or on December 16, 1944, by the Ardennes counteroffensive. The difference was that this time it was his friends who were fooling him.
How could it have happened? The United States maintained a huge, complex, and generally efficient intelligence system, of which the CIA was only one part. There were American reporters in London, Paris, and Tel Aviv, all filing daily dispatches about activities in the capitals. The State Department had flourishing embassies in all three capitals, plus a secret line of communication to send word on developments. The U-2s were overflying the eastern Mediterranean and sending back photographs that revealed major military moves. The CIA had spies at various levels scattered through the area. Most of all, Eisenhower had close personal friends in Eden’s Cabinet and in the British military, as well as in the French government and military. But there is no evidence he made any attempt to get in touch, secretly, with his friends (Macmillan, for example, or Mountbatten, both of whom opposed Eden’s adventurism) in order to find out what was going on. As a result, he was surprised.
Part of the reason was, obviously, preoccupation with the campaign, precisely the point the British, the French, and the Israelis relied upon as they did their plotting together. The more important reason for the American intelligence failure was the nature of the act itself. To Eisenhower in 1956, it made no sense—indeed was self-destructive—for the British and the French to attempt to seize and hold the canal, or for the Israelis to act aggressively when they were surrounded by a sea of Arabs, and it especially made no sense to him for Britain and France to attempt to act independently of the United States, much less against the expressed policy of the Eisenhower Administration.
So Eisenhower was badly surprised. He hated to be surprised, but experience had taught him—as he said so many times—that he had to expect to be surprised. The proper response was to remain cool, gather all the information he could, consider the options, and use them to take control of events. That was what he had done in December 1944, in one of his greatest moments as Supreme Commander. It was what he intended to do, and did, in October–November 1956, in one of his greatest moments as President.
While Britain, France, and Israel were completing the preparations for their bizarre plot, great events were occurring in Eastern Europe. Disturbances and riots in Poland, sparked by publication of Khrushchev’s secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, swept the Soviet-dominated government out of power and brought in Wladyslaw Gomulka, a man earlier dismissed by the Soviets as a Titoist. Gomulka announced that “there is more than one road to Socialism,” and warned that the Polish people would “defend themselves with all means; they will not be pushed off the road of democratization.” On October 22, the Poles’ successful defiance of the Soviets set off demonstrations throughout Hungary, where the demand was that Imre Nagy, who had been deposed by the Soviets in 1955, be returned to power.
Although these were spontaneous events, and quite unpredictable, they nevertheless had long been expected by the Eisenhower Administration, where it was an article of faith that sooner or later the satellites would rise up against Russia. But although the United States had anticipated a revolt, and had indeed encouraged it, both through Voice of America and Radio Free Europe broadcasts and through CIA-created underground resistance cells within Eastern Europe, when the revolt actually came, the government had no plans prepared. There was a good reason for this shortcoming—there was nothing the United States could do anyway. As always in grand strategy, geography dictated the options. Hungary was surrounded by Communist states, plus neutral Austria, and had a common border with the Soviet Union. It had no ports. There was almost no trade going on between the United States and the Russians. There was no pressure, in short, save for the amorphous one of world public opinion, that Eisenhower could bring to bear on the Soviets in Hungary. He knew it, had known it all along, which made all the four years of Republican talk about “liberation” so essentially hypocritical.
On October 23, the Hungarian government installed Nagy as Premier; he promised “democratization and improved living standards.” But the riots went on, and the Soviets sent troops to Budapest to restore order. The following day, Hungarian freedom fighters began hurling homemade Molotov cocktails at Russian tanks in Budapest. Eisenhower issued a statement deploring the intervention, but he turned down frantic requests from the CIA that it be allowed to fly over Budapest and air-drop arms and supplies. Liberation was a sham. Eisenhower had always known it. The Hungarians had yet to learn it.
On October 26, Eisenhower presided over a meeting of the NSC. Allen Dulles reported on the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary, the desertion of large numbers of Hungarian Army troops, and the fighting in Budapest. Eisenhower said he wanted to proceed cautiously, that he did not want to give the Soviets any reason to think that the United States might support the Hungarian freedom fighters. Pointing to the dangers involved, he wondered if the Soviets “might not . . . be tempted to resort to extreme measures” to maintain their hold over the satellites, “even to start a world war.”
Foster Dulles then reported on the developments in the Middle East, where Egypt had joined with Jordan and Syria in the Pact of Amman, which provided for military cooperation among them, and an Egyptian commander to take charge of their armed forces in the event of war with Israel. Ben-Gurion said the pact put Israel in “direct and immediate danger,” and Dulles said he expected an Israeli attack on Jordan momentarily.16
On October 28, Eisenhower learned that Israel had ordered a general mobilization of its reserves. In addition, there was heavy radio traffic between Israel and France. Eisenhower decided to evacuate American dependents from the Middle East. He also sent a stern warning to Ben-Gurion “to do nothing which would endanger the peace.” U-2 flights revealed heavy military concentrations by the British and the French on Cyprus. Most disturbing was the increase in the number of troop transports and air forces. It appeared that they had concerted a plan to take advantage of the imminent Israeli attack on Jordan to occupy the canal. Whitman, monitoring a call to Dulles, recorded, “President said he just cannot believe Britain would be dragged into this.” Dulles said he had just talked to the French ambassador and the chargé. “They profess to know nothing about this at all . . . But, he [Dulles] said, their ignorance is almost a sign of a guilty conscience, in his opinion.” 17
Eisenhower and Mamie left the White House for a political trip to Miami, Jacksonville, and Richmond. About midafternoon, while his plane, the Columbine, was en route between Florida and Virginia, the Israelis attacked on a broad front with everything they had. But their target was Egypt, not Jordan. And the Israelis were sweeping the Egyptians before them. Eisenhower got some of the news in Richmond. He went ahead with his speech, then flew up to Washington, arriving at 7 P.M. He met with the Dulles brothers, Hoover, Wilson, Radford, and Goodpaster. Radford thought that it would take the Israeli forces three days to overrun Sinai and get to Suez, which would be the end to the whole affair. Foster Dulles disagreed. “It is far more serious than that,” he said. The canal was likely to be closed, the oil pipelines through the Middle East broken. Then the British and the French would intervene. “They appear to be ready for it,” Dulles said, “and may even have concerted their action with the Israelis.” 18
Finally, the Americans had caught on. Britain, France, and Israel had entered into a cabal, aimed against Egypt, not Jordan. The details of their plot had yet to be revealed, but that they had plotted together there could be no doubt. Dulles speculated that they must have convinced themselves that in the end the United States would have to give its grudging approval, and support.
The moment for decision had come. Eisenhower’s strategy of delay had to give way to action. His British friends, men who had fought beside him in the war, men he admired and loved without stint, had convinced themselves that they had reached a critical moment in their history, and at such a moment they expected the United States to stand beside them. They could not believe their great friend Ike would desert them. The French counted on Eisenhower’s unbreakable commitment to NATO to force him to tilt toward them. The Israelis thought that the election, and the importance of the Jewish vote in it, would force Eisenhower to at least stay neutral, if not support them. But good as their reasoning appeared to them to be, the conspirators were as badly wrong about Eisenhower as he had been about their plans.
Eisenhower’s immediate decision, from which he never retreated one inch, was that the cabal could not be allowed to succeed. The plot reeked of nineteenth-century colonialism of the worst sort; it reeked of bad planning; it reeked of bad faith and perfidy. It also violated the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. Under the circumstances, Eisenhower said (as summarized by Goodpaster): “We cannot be bound by our traditional alliances, but must instead face the question how to make good on our pledge [in the Tripartite Declaration].” As a first step, he wanted to take a cease-fire resolution to the U.N. in the morning. “The President said, in this matter, he does not care in the slightest whether he is re-elected or not . . . He added that he did not really think the American people would throw him out in the midst of a situation like this, but if they did, so be it.” He wanted to tell the British, immediately, that the U.S. would side with Egypt, even though “we recognize that much is on their side in the dispute,” because “nothing justified double-crossing us.” 19
Eisenhower announced that he intended to support the Tripartite Declaration, one part of which pledged the United States to support the victim of an aggression in the Middle East. The only honorable course, he said, was to carry out that pledge. He issued a White House statement to that effect.
Eisenhower began the next day, October 30, by reading a message Goodpaster handed him from Ben-Gurion, saying that Israel had to strike to save itself and rejecting any thought of a cease-fire in Sinai, much less a retreat. Arthur Flemming came in to warn that Western Europe would soon be in critical need of more oil. “The President said he was inclined to think that those who began this operation should be left to work out their own oil problems—to boil in their own oil, so to speak.”20
At 10 A.M., Eisenhower went into a meeting with Dulles, Hoover, Sherman Adams, and Goodpaster. There was a wire-service report that British and French landings in the Suez were “imminent.” Eisenhower said “that in his judgment the French and British do not have an adequate cause for war . . . He wondered if the hand of Churchill might not be behind this—inasmuch as this action is in the mid-Victorian style.” He also wondered what they proposed to do to meet their oil needs. Dulles said they probably figured “we would have no choice but to take extraordinary means to get oil to them.” Eisenhower said that “he did not see much value in an unworthy and unreliable ally and that the necessity to support them might not be as great as they believed.” But that was just agitated talk; he knew Dulles was correct in saying that “the U.S. could not sit by and let them go under economically.”21
At midday, Eisenhower exchanged a series of messages with Eden, arguing about whether the Tripartite Declaration was still valid or not. In New York, the Security Council was considering the U.S. resolution asking all members of the U.N. to refrain from using force in the Middle East. When the vote came that afternoon, Britain and France vetoed it. They also used the veto to defeat a Soviet resolution calling on Israel to pull back to the starting line.
At 2:17 P.M., still October 30, Dulles called to tell the President that Britain and France “gave a twelve-hour ultimatum to Egypt that is about as crude and brutal as anything he has ever seen.” Dulles saw no point to studying it, because “of course by tomorrow they will be in.” But Eisenhower wanted Dulles to read the ultimatum to him, as he had just received a copy and had not had time to read it. The ultimatum revealed, for the first time, the scope of the plot.
Britain and France told Egypt and Israel that unless both sides withdrew ten miles from the canal and permitted Anglo-French occupation of the key points along it, Britain and France would take the canal by force to keep the two sides apart. The Israelis, of course, agreed. If the plot worked, Israel would get to keep Sinai, the British and French would have the canal, Nasser would be toppled. To Eisenhower, such pipe dreams bordered on madness. He sent urgent cables to Eden and Mollet, at 3:30 P.M., pleading with them to withdraw the ultimatum.22
At dawn, October 31, the news included the results of a vote of confidence on Eden in Commons; he had survived, 270 to 218. Israeli forces were still driving westward across Sinai. But Allen Dulles, who gave the morning briefing, had some good news. The Russians had announced they would withdraw their troops from Hungary, had apologized for past behavior toward the satellites, and had pledged “noninterference in one another’s internal affairs.” Eisenhower feared it was too good to be true. Allen Dulles said, “This utterance is one of the most significant to come out of the Soviet Union since the end of World War II.” Eisenhower replied, “Yes, if it is honest.”23
At 9:47 A.M., Senator Knowland telephoned from California to ask if Eisenhower intended to call a special session of Congress. Eisenhower said he did not. Knowland expressed his shock at British actions. Eisenhower said what amazed him was that Eden was going ahead with the thing on the basis of a 270 to 218 vote. “I could not dream of committing this nation on such a vote.” Eisenhower went on to say, “I am about to lose my British citizenship. I have done my best. I think it is the biggest error of our time, outside of losing China.”24
In New York, meanwhile, Lodge had told the General Assembly that the United States intended to introduce a resolution calling upon Israel and Egypt to cease fire, on Israel to withdraw to its original borders, and on all U.N. members to refrain from the use of force, and to participate in an embargo against Israel until it withdrew.
At 11:45 A.M., Lodge phoned Eisenhower to tell him that “never has there been such a tremendous acclaim for the President’s policy. Absolutely spectacular.” The small nations of the world could hardly believe that the United States would support a Third World country, Egypt, in a struggle with colonial powers that were America’s two staunchest allies, or that the United States would support Arabs against Israeli aggression. But it was true, and the small nations were full of admiration and delight.25
The introduction of the American resolution to the U.N. was, indeed, one of the great moments in U.N. history. Eisenhower’s insistence on the primacy of the U.N., of treaty obligations, and of the rights of all nations gave the United States a standing in world opinion it had never before achieved.
Despite this overwhelming demonstration of world public opinion (even the small nations of Europe were privately telling Lodge what a great thing this was), despite the narrow vote in the House of Commons, despite Eisenhower’s warnings, despite a thoroughly botched preparation for an invasion (the British and French forces were in disarray even before they went into action), Eden gave the order to strike. By midday, October 31, Eisenhower learned that British planes were bombing Cairo, Port Said, and other targets. Nasser had resisted, ineffectively, but he had managed to block the canal by sinking a 320-foot ship, previously loaded with cement and rocks; in the next few days, he sent thirty-two ships to the floor of the canal, blaming all the sinkings on the British.
Eisenhower spent most of the afternoon with Hughes, preparing for a national TV broadcast at 7 P.M. Hughes noted that the “press was edgy with expectancy, since no moment since Korea has seemed so charged with war peril. Even technicians around cameras were hushed and anxious.”26
Eisenhower began with Poland and Hungary. He said the U.S. was ready to give economic help to new and independent governments in Eastern Europe without demanding any particular form of society, and reassured the Soviets by saying the United States wanted to be friends with these new governments but did not regard them as potential allies. Turning to the Middle East, Eisenhower said the United States wished to be friends with both Arabs and Jews. He pointed out that he had not been consulted in any way about the assault on Egypt. Britain, France, and Israel had the right to make such decisions, just as the U.S. had the right to dissent. American policy was to support the U.N. in seeking peace, and to support the rule of law.
At 9 A.M. on November 1, Eisenhower presided over an NSC meeting. Allen Dulles began with an intelligence briefing. Egypt had broken diplomatic ties with Britain and France, and Nasser had pulled most of the Egyptian Army out of Sinai to fight the British and the French in defense of the canal. In Hungary, the new Premier, Imre Nagy, told the Russians that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact (created in 1955 as the Soviet answer to NATO), declaring its neutrality, and appealing to the U.N. for help. The developments in Hungary, Dulles said, “are a miracle. They have disproved that a popular revolt can’t occur in the face of modern weapons. Eighty percent of the Hungarian Army has defected. Except in Budapest, even the Soviet troops have shown no stomach for shooting down Hungarians.” Eisenhower thanked Dulles for his presentation, then said that “he did not wish the council to take up the situation in the Soviet satellites.” Instead, he wanted to concentrate on the Middle East.
Foster Dulles took the floor. His pessimism was as deep as his brother’s optimism was high. The Secretary of State declared that “recent events are close to marking the death knell for Great Britain and France.” Like Eisenhower, Dulles was furious with the French, British, and Israelis for plotting behind his back. Adding to the fury was the lost opportunity to exploit Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe. “It is nothing less than tragic,” Dulles said, “that at this very time, when we are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe,” Western colonialism in Egypt was the center of the world’s attention. It was maddening that the British and the French were forcing the U.S. to choose between them and Egypt. Dulles concluded, “Yet this decision must be made in a mere matter of hours—before five o’clock this afternoon.” At that hour, Dulles was scheduled to address the U.N. General Assembly, at which time he had intended to formally introduce the American cease-fire resolution. Eisenhower ordered Dulles to issue a statement about sanctions against Israel, and to go ahead that afternoon in New York with the original American ceasefire resolution.27
Dulles did as he was told. As darkness fell on November 1, the General Assembly began its debate on the American cease-fire resolution. That evening, Eisenhower made his last campaign speech, in Philadelphia. Referring to the Middle East, he declared, “We cannot subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us. There can be only one law—or there shall be no peace.”28 Eisenhower then canceled the rallies he had been scheduled to attend in the last week of the campaign.
The next day, November 2, Eisenhower dictated a letter to Gruenther, beginning, “Life gets more difficult by the minute.” He confessed that “sleep has been a little slower to come than usual. I seem to go to bed later and wake up earlier—which bores me.” But the news that morning was good—the U.N. General Assembly had adopted the U.S. cease-fire resolution by a vote of 64 to 5 (Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel opposing). Lester Pearson of Canada then proposed a U.N. police force to interject itself between the warring parties to insure the effectiveness the cease-fire. By this time, Israeli forces had taken virtually all of Sinai and the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian Air Force had been destroyed; the Israelis had five thousand Egyptian prisoners and large quantities of Soviet-made arms. British and French planes continued to bomb Egypt, and their troops had not yet landed.
Eisenhower was appalled by both British tactics and British strategy. “If one has to fight,” he told Gruenther, “then that is that. But I don’t see the point in getting into a fight to which there can be no satisfactory end, and in which the whole world believes you are playing the part of the bully and you do not even have the firm backing of your entire people.” Eisenhower said he had talked to an old British friend who was “truly bitter” about Eden’s gunboat diplomacy, and who had declared, “This is nothing except Eden trying to be bigger than he is.” Eisenhower said he “did not dismiss it that lightly. I believe that Eden and his associates have become convinced that this is the last straw and Britain simply had to react in the manner of the Victorian period.”29
The news over the weekend was quite disheartening. On Saturday, Dulles had entered Walter Reed for an emergency cancer operation, which took place that day. For the immediate future, Herbert Hoover, Jr., would be the acting Secretary. In the Middle East, the Syrians blew up oil pipelines running through their country from Iraq to the Mediterranean. In Britain, Eden rejected the U.N. call for a cease-fire, unless Egypt and Israel accepted French-British possession of Suez until a U.N. force could arrive. On Sunday morning, at 3:13 A.M., the Security Council met to consider an American resolution calling upon the Russians to withdraw from Hungary. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. That morning the Red Army launched a major assault on Hungary, following an ultimatum that Hungary rejected. Some 200,000 troops accompanied by 4,000 tanks moved on Budapest. Nagy fled to the Yugoslav Embassy, and a new Hungarian government, under Janow Kadar, took office. The Hungarian freedom fighters resisted. Eisenhower sent a message to Bulganin, reminding him of the Soviet declaration of “nonintervention” made only four days earlier, praising him for that statement, and urging him to put it into action.30
Meanwhile, U-2 flights revealed that the British-French armada from Cyprus was finally approaching the Egyptian coast. Eisenhower again asked Eden to turn back. Eden replied that “if we draw back now everything will go up in flames in the Middle East . . . We cannot have a military vacuum while a U.N. force is being constituted.”31
The Hungarians, meanwhile, wanted help. They thought they had been promised it by Radio Free Europe, and by Dulles’ many references over the years to liberation. Eisenhower, however, had no intention of challenging the Russians so close to their borders. American intervention, of any type, would have appeared to the Russians as an attempt to break up the Warsaw Pact, and they would fight before they would allow that to happen. Eisenhower again refused the CIA permission to air-drop arms and supplies to the Hungarians, and he would not consider sending U.S. troops to Hungary, which he characterized as being “as inaccessible to us as Tibet.”32 Eisenhower knew that there were limits to his power, and Hungary was outside those limits.
• •
On Monday morning, November 5, the day before the election, all hell broke loose. British and French paratroopers landed around Port Said on the Suez Canal. Amphibious landings soon followed. Bulganin sent messages to Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion, telling them that the Soviet Union was ready to use force to crush the aggressors and restore the peace. There was a thinly veiled threat to use nuclear missiles against London and Paris if the Franco-British force was not withdrawn from Suez. Bulganin also wrote Eisenhower, proposing that the U.S. and the Soviet Union join forces, march into Egypt, and put an end to the fighting. “If this war is not stopped, it is fraught with danger and can grow into a Third World War,” Bulganin warned.33
At 5 P.M., Eisenhower summoned Hoover, Adams, and Hughes to discuss a reply to Bulganin’s preposterous proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union join hands against Britain and France. To Hughes, Eisenhower seemed “poised and relaxed,” although fatigued. The discussion was somber. The conferees agreed on the word “unthinkable” in dismissing Bulganin’s suggestion. They worried about the Russians, whom they recognized were torn by hope and fear—hope that the Suez crisis would lead to a breakup of NATO, and fear that Hungary would lead to a breakup of the Warsaw Pact.
Eisenhower described their position: “Those boys are both furious and scared. Just as with Hitler, that makes for the most dangerous possible state of mind. And we better be damn sure that every intelligence point and every outpost of our armed forces is absolutely right on their toes.” Under the circumstances, Eisenhower said, “we have to be positive and clear in our every word, every step. And if those fellows start something, we may have to hit ’em—and, if necessary, with everything in the bucket.” Eisenhower directed Hoover to issue a statement that would include clear warnings—if the Russians tried to put troops into the Middle East, the U.S. would resist with force.34
November 6 was election day. At 8:37 A.M., Eisenhower met with Allen Dulles, Hoover, and Goodpaster for the latest intelligence briefing. Dulles reported that the Soviets had told the Egyptians they intended to “do something” in the Middle East. He thought it possible that they would send air forces into Syria. Eisenhower told Dulles to send U-2 flights over Syria and Israel, “avoiding, however, any flights into Russia.” If the Soviets attacked the British and the French, Eisenhower said, “we would be in war, and we would be justified in taking military action even if Congress were not in session.” If reconnaissance “discloses Soviet air forces on Syrian bases,” Eisenhower said, he thought “that there would be reason for the British and French to destroy them.” Goodpaster’s memo on the conference concluded on a chilling note: “The President asked if our forces in the Mediterranean are equipped with atomic antisubmarine weapons.”35
At 9 A.M. Eisenhower and Mamie drove to Gettysburg to vote, then took a helicopter back to Washington, arriving around noon. Goodpaster met him at the airport to report that the U-2 flights had discovered no Soviet planes on Syrian airfields, or any moving into Egypt. World War III was not about to begin. In the White House Cabinet Room, Eisenhower met with Radford. The question was, Should the U.S. mobilize? Eisenhower wanted mobilization put into effect by degrees, “in order to avoid creating a stir.” As a start, he wanted Radford to recall military personnel on leave, an action that could not be concealed and that would give the Russians pause.36
At 12:55 P.M., Eisenhower put through another call to Eden, who had just announced British willingness to accept a cease-fire. (The war had already cost the British nearly $500 million; further, the British and the French now claimed control of the canal.) Eisenhower said, “I can’t tell you how pleased we are.” Eisenhower added that the U.N. peace-keeping force was “getting Canadian troops—lots of troops.” Eden wanted American troops. Would they be a part of the U.N. force? Eisenhower said he wanted none of the great nations in it. “I am afraid the Red boy is going to demand the lion’s share. I would rather make it no troops from the big five.” Eden reluctantly agreed. “If I survive here tonight [he faced a vote of confidence],” Eden concluded, “I will call you tomorrow.” Then he asked how the election was going for Eisenhower. “We have given our whole thought to Hungary and the Middle East,” Eisenhower responded. “I don’t give a damn how the election goes. I guess it will be all right.”37
Eisenhower spent the afternoon resting, to prepare for the excitement of the long night ahead. He canceled his plans to go to Augusta the next day, because of the Suez situation, a decision that he hated to make. “He’s as disappointed as a kid who had counted out all the days to Christmas,” Whitman reported.38 At 10 P.M. he left the White House for the Republican headquarters. As predicted, the early returns showed that he was winning by a landslide, but that the Democrats were going to retain control of Congress.
In the excitement of the contest, Eisenhower shed his supposed indifference to the outcome. He told Hughes, “There’s Michigan and Minnesota still to see. You remember that story of Nelson—dying, he looked around and asked, ‘Are there any of them still left?’ I guess that’s me. When I get in a battle, I just want to win the whole thing . . . six or seven states we can’t help. But I don’t want to lose any more. Don’t want any of them ‘left’—like Nelson. That’s the way I feel.”39
Eisenhower got the mandate he wanted from the American people, who voted 35,581,003 for him, 25,738,765 for Stevenson. That 10,000,000-vote margin was almost double the margin of 1952. Stevenson carried only seven southern states.
• •
Eden too survived his vote of confidence. At 8:53 A.M. on November 7, he called Eisenhower to ask for an immediate—that day or the next—summit conference in Washington between himself, Eisenhower, and Mollet. Eisenhower feared that Eden was trying to back out of British acceptance of a cease-fire and a U.N. force taking control in Suez, but Eden said that what he wanted to discuss was what happened next. Well, Eisenhower replied, “If we are going to talk about the future and about the Bear—okay.”40
Eisenhower next met with Adams and Goodpaster. They both told him the proposed conference was a terrible idea. Goodpaster emphasized that such a meeting would give the appearance “that we were now concerting action in the Middle East independently of the U.N. action.” Hoover joined them. He agreed with Goodpaster and said he had just talked to Dulles, who also opposed the meeting. Hoover also said he had a report from Allen Dulles stating that the Soviets had offered Egypt 250,000 volunteers and that preparations for their departure were under way. Eisenhower asked Goodpaster to check on that report. While he did so, Eisenhower called Eden to inform him that the meeting would have to be postponed. Goodpaster returned to report that there was nothing solid in the intelligence data, but certainly the Soviets did not have 250,000 troops on the move.41
That morning, Ben-Gurion issued a statement saying Israel rejected the U.N. order to withdraw Israeli forces from Sinai and Gaza and to permit U.N. forces to enter. Eisenhower sent him a strong protest. Then the President received a message from Bulganin: “I feel urged to state that the problem of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary . . . comes completely and entirely under the competence of the Hungarian and Soviet governments.”42 The fighting in Budapest, meanwhile, had passed its peak. Hungarian refugees were fleeing to Austria at the rate of three to four thousand a day; there were forty thousand dead freedom fighters.
As had happened so many times before, and would again, the United States found itself unable to influence in any significant way events in Eastern Europe. The Russians violated their pledge of safe-conduct to Nagy, seized him, held a secret trial, and executed him. All that Eisenhower could do was announce that the U.S. was ready to accept 21,000 of the 150,000 Hungarian refugees, and that he would ask for emergency legislation to let more Hungarians enter the United States.
In Egypt, meanwhile, by the end of November, the U.N. force was moving into place, and the British and the French were almost out. Eisenhower lifted the embargo on oil sales to Britain, and the United States soon was shipping 200,000 barrels a day. The Americans loaned money to the British to tide them over. By Christmastime the French and the British troops were gone and the Egyptians had started to clear the canal.
At a meeting with Republican leaders on New Year’s Eve, Eisenhower was asked about British and French attitudes toward the United States “Underneath,” the President replied, “the governments are thankful we did what we did. But publicly, we have to be the whipping boy.” Anyway, “The whole darn thing is straightening out very rapidly.” A recent NATO meeting had gone “very well.” The alliance had survived the crisis.43
• •
After all the nuclear saber rattling that had gone on, relations with the Russians were still tense. Three days after the election, Eisenhower had proposed to Hoover that the United States take advantage of the worldwide fright, a fright that Bulganin presumably shared, to make some progress on disarmament. Eisenhower was willing to make a dramatic offer, such as pulling NATO forces behind the Rhine and withdrawing American ground troops in Germany. Hoover doubted that Dulles would agree. Eisenhower said he just wanted the Secretary to have the thought, because “as long as we are before the world, just calling each other names, being horrified all the time by their brutality, then we get nowhere.”44 But nothing came of the President’s idea.
One reason was Soviet reaction to continued U-2 overflights. During the crisis, Eisenhower had to know what military moves the Soviets were making, and after the election he authorized additional flights. The Soviets protested, privately but strongly. On November 15, Eisenhower met with Hoover, Radford, and Allen Dulles to discuss the flights. Eisenhower thought that they were beginning to “cost more than we gain in form of solid information.” Hoover pointed out that “if we lost a plane at this stage, it would be almost catastrophic.” Eisenhower agreed, and added “Everyone in the world says that in the last six weeks, the U.S. has gained a place it hasn’t held since World War II.” The country had to “preserve a place that is correct and moral.” Still, he worried about those Russians and what they might do with the Red Army, so he approved flights over Eastern Europe, “but not the deep one.” The pilot should “stay as close to the border as possible.”45
The Russians continued to protest. One month later, on December 18, Eisenhower talked to Foster Dulles about the overflights of Eastern Europe. Eisenhower said he was “going to order complete stoppage of the entire business.” As to the Russian protests, Dulles said, “I think we will have to admit this was done and say we are sorry. We cannot deny it.” Eisenhower said he would call Charlie Wilson “and have him stop it.” Dulles reminded the President that “our relations with Russia are pretty tense at the moment.” Eisenhower agreed that this was no time to be provocative.46
The problem of the Hungarian refugees remained. On November 26, Eisenhower gave a warm and heartfelt greeting to the first arrivals, who came to the White House to see the President. He expressed his shock and horror at Russian actions and assured the Hungarians that they were most welcome in the U.S.
On the day after Christmas, Eisenhower held an 11 A.M. meeting with Nixon, who had just returned from a trip to Vienna to get an overview on the refugee situation. Nixon remarked on the high caliber of the refugees. They were mostly young, well educated, leadership types who had to flee because they had participated in the rebellion. Eisenhower recalled a remark that Zhukov had made to him in the summer of 1945: “If you get rid of the leaders of a country, you can do anything you want to.” But the only thing the Americans could do for poor Hungary was accept refugees—yet the law prevented that. Nixon said there were still seventy thousand in Vienna. Eisenhower remarked that the Hungarians were productive people, and that it would be “a tremendous thing” if some of the Middle East countries would take in refugees. The Latin Americans also ought to try to take some—God knew they could “use the skills the Hungarians have.” Meanwhile, he wanted the State Department to continue to process applications, even if the quota had been used up, because if the processing stopped, “the pick of the refugees will go to other countries.”47
The best of Hungary’s young people but not freedom for Hungary—that was what the United States got for four years of agitation about liberation.