The first day of the Battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of countless books and studies because it might have been the best chance Robert E. Lee had to win the war in an afternoon. If a Union defeat had been serious enough to force the Army of the Potomac to retreat to an already identified defensive position along Pipe Creek, the political repercussions of such an event might have been sufficient to force President Lincoln to accept a negotiated peace with the Confederacy. The first day of battle offered the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia its best chance of accomplishing that, as the Union forces arrived piecemeal. Furthermore, the first day would be the only day that the Confederates would have a significant artillery superiority. By the afternoon of July 2, the second day of the battle, the arrival of the Army of the Potomac’s reserve artillery – 114 guns in five brigades – and the later advent of the powerful VI Corps made a decisive Confederate victory problematic at best. On the third day, the grand charge – known forever as Pickett’s Charge – would prove to be as hopeless as it was gallant as it advanced into the converging fire of about a hundred guns.
Pickett’s Charge, by Adam Hook © Osprey Publishing Ltd. Taken from Campaign 52: Gettysburg 1863.
In the late afternoon of June 28, Lieutenant General James Longstreet brought his trusted spy Harrison to General Robert E. Lee’s headquarters to brief Lee on the latest locations of the seven corps of the Army of the Potomac. The news that the Federal Army was relatively close and concentrated around Frederick, Maryland was unexpected, as Lee had assumed that they were still across the Potomac in Virginia. In response, Lee immediately started issuing orders for his army to concentrate. It was not a problem for his I and III Corps, as they were both gathered in the Chambersburg area. However, Lee’s II Corps under Lieutenant General Richard Ewell was much further advanced, with Rodes’ and Johnson’s divisions preparing to move against Harrisburg, while Early’s division was further east at York. Since the bulk of the army was already at Chambersburg, Lee’s initial June 28 order was to have Ewell’s II Corps fall back and join the rest of the army at Chambersburg. With considerable complaining, Ewell started to comply and immediately sent Johnson’s division, II Corps’ reserve artillery and much of the II Corps’ train southwest on the road to Chambersburg.
By the morning of June 29, however, Lee had reconsidered and sent Ewell a new order directing him to concentrate the II Corps at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as “circumstances might dictate.” This further upset General Ewell, who sputtered that Lee needed someone on his staff who could write an intelligible order. In a huff, Ewell ordered Early’s division to move west from York and Rodes’ division to move south from Carlisle so as to converge near Gettysburg. However, no new orders were sent to General Johnson, who continued with his original order to move towards Chambersburg. Eventually, Johnson and the II Corps reserve artillery would turn east at Scotland and then would interpose themselves into the already congested III Corps line of march, creating a monumental traffic jam at Greenwood, just west of the narrow Cashtown Gap. This may have been the critical Confederate administrative mistake of the Gettysburg campaign, since it would not only delay Johnson’s division in re-joining II Corps, but would also delay Anderson’s, Hood’s and McLaw’s divisions by up to five hours in reaching the battlefield. Had this not occurred and had Johnson’s division been ordered to counter-march and simply follow Rodes south to Gettysburg, then both Anderson’s and Johnson’s division could almost certainly have been available for the later stages of the July 1 battle at Gettysburg. If generals Lee, Ewell or their staffs had paid more attention to traffic control, road capacities and lines of march, both Anderson’s division of A. P. Hill’s III Corps and Johnson’s division of II Corps could have joined the first day’s fight. For this reason they are included in the Confederate Orders of Battle for July 1 and in some of the scenarios should the gamer wish to explore that “what if” option.
Late on June 28 Lee ordered his army to concentrate at Chambersburg, but by the morning of June 29, he instructed Ewell’s II Corps to concentrate instead either at Cashtown or Gettysburg. However, no new orders were sent to Johnson’s division, which continued to march westward and eventually created a monumental traffic jam outside Cashtown Gap, delaying Anderson’s division along with Hood’s and McLaw’s divisions of Longstreet’s Corps for about five hours.
Jubal Early faces off against the just-arrived 1st Division of the Union XII Corps. (Patrick LeBeau & Chris Ward)
In any historical battle situation there were inevitable restraints that contributed to the opposing commander’s decisions. When the military historian reviews these battles, he has almost perfect intelligence as to the forces each side had, and when and where those forces would be arriving. We look down on our miniature battlefields, and even if the players are using hidden movement we can almost instantly appreciate where the natural lines of defense and offensive avenues of approach are likely to be. There is no major unknown factor or one nagging intelligence report that may or may not be accurate but, if ignored, could be critical to winning or losing the battle. On the smoke-filled civil war battlefield, commanders from regimental to senior army level were constantly making decisions based on fragmentary or even wrong information. The “fog of war” creates hesitancy and caution, so it is very understandable that these leaders would hold substantial units back as a reserve in case the decision that they just made or are about to make would absolutely be the wrong thing to do. These uncertainties were very real for the two opposing commanders as their armies marched towards Gettysburg. For Robert E. Lee, a decisive defeat deep in northern soil could result in his entire army being destroyed, along with any hope of southern independence. For George Meade, who had only been in command of the Army of the Potomac for five days, the political repercussions of a decisive defeat of the Union’s premier fighting force on its home soil could have been the psychological blow that might have forced President Lincoln to accept an accommodation with the Confederacy.
In each of the July 1 Gettysburg scenarios, the historical restraints – good, bad or indifferent – are pointed out and the gamers can decide to play with them or not, or even let a random roll of the die determine which units do or do not participate. For the Confederates, overshadowing almost of all of the divisional and corps commanders’ decisions that first day was General Lee’s desire, which he had made very clear, that he did not want to bring on a general engagement until his army was concentrated and he had definitive information as to the location of the Union Army. These factors almost certainly weighed on Lee’s decision to keep much of the combat power of the Confederate III Corps then advancing down the Chambersburg Pike held back as a reserve against the unexpected. The III Corps units that were held back on the first day were R. H. Anderson’s entire division (7,000 men, 17 guns), Thomas’ Brigade of W. D. Pender’s division (1,300 men), most of Garnett’s artillery battalion (15 guns) and Pogue’s artillery battalion (16 guns). In addition to holding these forces back, the Confederate attacks against the Union I Corps were hesitant. From 12 p.m. until a little after 2 p.m. there were no significant attacks against the Federals, only artillery exchanges. In addition, the bulk of Pegram’s and McIntosh’s excellent artillery battalions were not brought forward even after their primary target, the Federals on McPherson’s Ridge, had been driven off. Hence the final Confederate assault against the battered but defiant Union I Corps holding tight on Seminary Ridge was done without artillery support. It is, however, unclear if that was by choice or simply an oversight.
The Army of the Potomac’s new commander, Major General George Meade, had his own uncertainty issue that created some confusion among his corps commanders as to his intention. Meade’s overall concept of operation for July 1 was sound enough. The I and XI Corps under General Reynolds would support Buford’s cavalry at Gettysburg, with III Corps supporting Reynolds’ left flank at Emmitsburg and XII Corps his right flank at Two Taverns. However, then Meade clouded the issue with his “Pipe Creek Circular,” which was sent to all his corps commanders (although his most important commander, Major General John Reynolds, did not get it). This appeared to detail Meade’s preferred battle plan: a defensive stand along Pipe Creek southeast of Gettysburg. It was a lengthy document detailing the routes of march and the final positions of each corps. Since most of Meade’s corps commanders now believed that this would eventually be where Meade wanted the battle to be fought, there was an understandable hesitancy to rush everything forward to Gettysburg, since they then would have to retrace their steps back to Pipe Creek. The Pipe Creek option certainly played a role in Major General Henry Slocum’s decision not to move the XII Corps forward to Gettysburg, but to wait for developments for over three hours at Two Taverns, barely five miles from Gettysburg.
There were also conflicting orders. General Meade ordered the army’s III Corps under Major General Daniel Sickles to halt and hold the corps in readiness at Emmitsburg – the western approach to the Pipe Creek position. However, Sickles’ immediate superior General Reynolds, the left wing commander, had ordered Sickles to bring the entire III Corps immediately to Gettysburg just moments before Reynolds was shot dead. Sickles would eventually compromise and bring four of his six brigades to Gettysburg that evening, while leaving two behind at Emmitsburg. However, had Sickles immediately followed his gut instinct to march at that moment to the sound of the guns, his entire corps would have arrived by mid-afternoon to help hold back the Confederate onslaught. As was mentioned, these historical options and restraints are all reflected in these scenarios, but are duly noted so the gamer can explore some alternative and very interesting “what ifs.”
The First Day of Gettysburg Scenario Set is composed of the “Along the Chambersburg Pike” series of three scenarios: “The Devil to Pay”, “McPherson’s Ridge,” and “Seminary Ridge.” These can be played as individual historical snapshot scenarios or one long continuous scenario, “Along the Chambersburg Pike”. The First Day set also includes two other scenarios, “Barlow’s Knoll” and “If Slocum Wasn’t Slow,” which use the middle and eastern boards respectively. Both of those can be played with either a 2 p.m. or 3 p.m. historical start time. Either version of these two scenarios can also be combined with the “McPherson’s Ridge” scenario into one large scenario, “A Long Afternoon,” which combines all three scenarios and covers the critical entire late afternoon fighting of the first day from about 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. to form one large grand convention-sized scenario.
The “A Very Long Day” scenario covers all the serious fighting of the first day from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. and all the historically available units, but without some of the historical hesitations that hampered both sides. For the Confederates, this scenario removes the historical 12 noon to 2 p.m. lull in which there were no attacks, only artillery firing. For the Union, it has some of the III Corps units arriving sooner than they did, as General Reynolds had originally requested just before he was shot.
The “A Very Tough Day” scenario also covers all the serious fighting of the first day from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. without the historical delay and the mid-day lull. In addition, it offers the wargamer the opportunity to explore the probable results of neither side making the administrative missteps that they historically did. For the Confederates, this means that Johnson’s division follows Rodes’ division into the battle and Lee releases Anderson’s division rather than holding it back in reserve. For the Union, it would mean that all of Slocum’s XII Corps and Sickle’s III Corps immediately move to the sound of the guns rather than waiting for specific clarifying orders from General Meade.
Despite their large scope, “A Long Afternoon”, “A Very Long Day” and “A Very Tough Day” scenarios do not require excessive table space. A 6mm or 10mm game will only require a 3-foot by 6-foot space, a 15mm game will fill a 5-foot by 9-foot table, and a 25mm or 28mm game will need a 6-foot by 12-foot table, all of which is very manageable in a club or convention environment. This combined scenario focuses on the entire late afternoon battle north of Gettysburg and can be played as a strictly historical recreation or can include all the units that could have been there had their respective commanders – including both Meade and Lee – not hesitated or better coordinated their army’s approach to the battlefield. For the Confederates, that could have included Johnson’s division of the II Corps and Anderson’s division of the III Corps. For the Union, that would have included the two divisions of Slocum’s XII Corps and almost all of Sickles’ III Corps.
The overlay indicates the area covered by the three wargame tables that are used for the individual first day of Gettysburg scenarios. When all three tables are put together, the combined first day of Gettysburg scenarios take a 5x9-foot table if using the 15mm figure ground scale of one inch equals approximately 80 to 100 yards. The original map was done by Brevet Major General G. K. Warren, Chief of Engineers of the Army of the Potomac in 1868. (US Library of Congress)
For the gamers that like to build specific game boards, all three of the historical scenarios of the “Along the Chambersburg Pike” series use the same board, with each battle providing an exciting two- or three-hour battle, or the situation can be played as one continuing scenario. Almost all of the fighting along the Chambersburg Pike was a fight between the Army of the Potomac’s I Corps under Major General John Reynolds, who was trying to hold off the Army of Northern Virginia’s III Corps under Lieutenant General A. P. Hill. Other units from adjacent commands – such as Daniels’ Brigade from Rodes’ Division – would certainly play a role, but this was basically a stand-up fight between these two opposing infantry corps.
The terrain north of Gettysburg was defined by Oak Hill in the west and by Rock Creek in the east. From both east and west – up until Oak Hill – the terrain slopes gradually downward to Rock Creek with a few undulations, bumps and knolls along the way. Almost all of the wooded patches have been thinned by farmers and grazing animals, so except for a few very rugged areas directly adjacent to Rock Creek all the woods should be considered as light woods. In the west, the singular terrain feature is Oak Hill. It continues to rise north of the Mummasburg Road, eventually reaching an off-board wooded height of 520 feet. The two famous defensive ridges of Gettysburg – McPherson’s Ridge and Seminary Ridge – are both gradually descending ridge-lines of Oak Hill.
Rock Creek was probably the only watercourse in the Gettysburg area that was an impediment to orderly maneuver. Despite having been victorious with his attack, General Gordon later commented that “crossing the creek ... the banks were so abrupt as to prevent a passage except at certain points ... the enemy made a most obstinate resistance.”
Rock Creek is treated as one inch of heavy woods for infantry or cavalry movement and one inch of rough terrain for artillery movement. Infantry in or crossing Rock Creek are in disorder. If an infantry or cavalry unit attempts to fire while in Rock Creek it suffers an extra -4 DRM firing detriment to all its fires. Artillery may not fire while in Rock Creek. If a unit is targeted while in Rock Creek, the firer gets an extra +4 DRM firing benefit. A unit in Rock Creek has its maximum visibility limited to two inches in all directions. However, the small streams and runs only cost one inch extra to cross, or nothing extra if the whole move is made as if in broken terrain. Any wooded area adjacent to Rock Creek is defined as heavy woods within ½ inch of Rock Creek, but beyond ½ inch it is light woods. Any unit in either light or heavy woods is entitled to the -1 MMP cover morale benefit.
On the Gettysburg map is a finished railroad, an unfinished railroad grade and three railroad cuts across the ridges that radiate south from Oak Hill, just west of Gettysburg. The west cut across McPherson’s Ridge was the deepest and the most famous, as that was where 225 Confederates of the 2nd and 42nd Mississippi regiments were trapped and forced to surrender by the 6th Wisconsin and the 95th New York regiments. The rules for the railroads and the railroad cuts are as follows:
The railroad, the unfinished railroad grade, and the railroad cuts are treated as open terrain for column or limbered movement along or through them. There is no extra movement or combat penalty for units moving across the railroad or the unfinished railroad grade. Moving across the railroad cuts, however, is treated as moving across one inch of rough terrain. Infantry units in a railroad cut are either in a column or disorder and artillery can only be limbered. If an infantry or cavalry unit attempts to fire while in a railroad cut, it suffers an extra -4 DRM firing detriment to all its fires. Artillery may only fire one section while in a railroad cut, and that fire is limited to along the railroad cut. If a unit is targeted while in Rock Creek, the firer gets an extra +4 DRM firing bonus for firing at a unit in the railroad cut.
Pender’s Division forms up for its attack against the Union I Corps. (Patrick LeBeau & Chris Ward)
Most of the scenario maps show a designated brigade area where the regiments or battalions of that brigade may set up in within that area in either battle line or extended line, unless the map indicates that they enter in road column. If desired, each brigade of four or fewer regiments may have one regiment advanced two inches forward as skirmishers, and one regiment two inches back as a reserve. If a brigade has five or more regiments, it may advance up to two regiments two inches forward as skirmishers and one regiment two inches back as a reserve. If a regimental rather than a brigade position is indicated, that is where at least one stand of the regiment must be placed and the regiment can be placed in skirmish, extended line or battle line.
As an administrative practice, the Army of the Potomac and Army of Northern Virginia used slightly different official systems of brigade designation. The Union preferred to list their brigades with a numerical designation of brigade number, division number, and then corps number. In that system, Meredith’s “Iron Brigade” would officially be referred to as the First Brigade, First Division, I Corps, or simply as the “1-1-1” brigade. Likewise, the Federals listed their batteries by their official unit declension, such as the 1st Rhode Island, Battery C. The Confederates tended to be more informal and simply referred to the divisions, brigades and batteries by the names of their commander. However, there were exceptions. Some Confederate brigades would often retain the name of an earlier charismatic commander even after he was gone. For instance, Brigadier General Robert Hoke’s original North Carolina brigade was commanded by Colonel Isaac Avery throughout the Gettysburg campaign, but the brigade was still commonly referred to as Hoke’s Brigade. In any case, for the sake of consistency of scenario description and ease of setup, the Confederate system will be used to identify brigades and batteries. Hence, on the scenario setup map, the XI Corps Brigade, “2-3-11,” will simply be shown and identified as “Krzyzanowski’s Brigade.”
In all the first day of Gettysburg scenarios there is no need to have a specific Lee or Meade figure, as their individual figures will play no role in the scenarios. Meade would not arrive until about just after midnight that evening, and though Lee would arrive on Herr Ridge by mid-afternoon, his tactical involvement in the first day’s battle was minimal. Lee at that time was not at his best. He, as we now know, was still recovering from an earlier heart attack and continued to suffer from lingering dysentery. He was also faced with a situation he had not experienced before, an almost total lack of reliable intelligence on the location of his opponent, the Army of the Potomac. That issue, when coupled with his degraded health, resulted in Lee becoming hesitant to commit his forces to a battle before his army was united. In essence, he may have been little more than an interested observer as events unfolded on July 1. Nevertheless, the effect of Lee’s presence on the field is reflected in specific scenario rules, such as to which side is defined as having the initiative or by giving the Confederates the advantage in tied initiative die roll.
The two armies that maneuvered to a collision at Gettysburg were either adjusting to major new command positions or substantial organizational changes. Major General George Meade had only been command of the Army of the Potomac for five days, and he was not the preferred choice of President Lincoln or his general-in-chief, Henry W. Halleck. While Meade had the confidence of his former fellow corps commanders, there was no time for any major army reorganization. Meade would fight the battle with the Army of the Potomac much as he inherited it from his predecessor, Major General Joe Hooker. Lee, on the other hand, owing to the death of “Stonewall” Jackson, had just restructured his two-corps army into a three-corps army. And while Lee could certainly count on the reliability of his well-tested First Corp commander, Lieutenant General James Longstreet, he had some lingering concerns about his new II and III corps commanders, Lieutenant General Richard Ewell and Lieutenant General A. P. Hill respectively. As they came together, the two opposing armies were organized as so:
• A Union corps would consist of two or three divisions, with each division having two or three brigades apiece. The corps would have an artillery brigade of from five to eight batteries in support. If more than one corps was deployed, usually under a designated “wing commander,” then additional artillery units from the Army of the Potomac’s massive reserve artillery train could often be attached at the Army commander’s discretion.
• A Confederate corps would consist of three divisions of from three to five brigades each, with each division having a battalion of about three to five artillery batteries. Each Confederate corps would also have a designated corps artillery reserve of usually two artillery battalions as support.
• The Army of the Potomac marched to Gettysburg with seven corps, while the Army of Northern Virginia invaded Pennsylvania with three corps. Both armies fielded a corps of cavalry, but only the Federals had an army-level artillery reserve. Once the Federal army was together, additional artillery batteries could be quickly dispatched from the artillery reserve as needed to tip the fight against the rebels. However, in the opening stages of a developing battle, until that artillery reserve arrived the Army of the Potomac would probably be fighting with overall artillery inferiority. Following the reserve artillery was a second artillery ammunition train, which gave the Army of Potomac a total of about 98,000 artillery rounds versus the approximately 44,000 carried by the Army of Northern Virginia. Hence the Union gunners never had to worry about artillery ammunition consumption, and consequently each of their engaged guns would fire about 90 rounds per gun, while the Confederates had to be more conservative with their artillery and would only fire about 80 rounds per engaged gun.
As a comparison, here is how the armies roughly stacked up on June 30, 1863, the eve of the Battle of Gettysburg. In the summer of 1863, at least two corps from the Army of the Potomac were usually needed to match one corps from the Army of Northern Virginia. For various reasons, the actual number of troops engaged per corps would usually average about 1,000 to 2,000 fewer than shown below.
| Army of the Potomac | |||
| I Corps | Reynolds | 3 divisions (7 infantry brigades), 1 artillery brigade | 14,300 men, 28 guns |
| II Corps | Hancock | 3 divisions (10 infantry brigades), 1 artillery brigade | 13,500 men, 28 guns |
| III Corps | Sickles | 2 divisions (6 infantry brigades), 1 artillery brigade | 13,000 men, 30 guns |
| V Corps | Sykes | 3 divisions (8 infantry brigades), 1 artillery brigade | 13,200 men, 26 guns |
| VI Corps | Sedgwick | 2 divisions (8 infantry brigades), 1 artillery brigade | 15,700 men, 48 guns |
| XI Corps | Howard | 3 divisions (6 infantry brigades), 1 artillery brigade | 10,800 men, 26 guns |
| XII Corps | Slocum | 2 divisions (6 infantry brigades), 1 artillery brigade | 10,700 men, 20 guns |
| Artillery Reserve | Hunt/Tyler | 5 artillery brigades | 3,000 men, 114 guns |
| Cavalry Corps | Pleasanton | 3 cavalry divisions (8 cavalry brigades), 2 horse artillery brigades | 15,000 men, 52 guns |
| Army of Northern Virginia | |||
| I Corps | Longstreet | 3 divisions (11 infantry brigades), 5 artillery battalions | 22,400 men, 87 guns |
| II Corps | Ewell | 3 divisions (13 infantry brigades), 5 artillery battalions | 21,800 men, 79 guns |
| III Corps | A. P. Hill | 3 divisions (13 infantry brigades), 5 artillery battalions | 23,300 men, 84 guns |
| Cavalry Division | Stuart | 7 cavalry brigades, 2 horse artillery battalions | 12,600 men, 33 guns |
Given the confusion in both armies following the July 1 fighting, the total losses for that one day are harder to document than the total casualties – killed, wounded and missing – for the entire battle. Consequently, the following numbers should be viewed only as a reasonable approximation of the results of the July 1 fighting.
• Union I Corps – Out of about 14,300 men, 12,200 were actually engaged with about 5,500 becoming casualties.
• Union XI Corps – Out of about 10,800 men, 9,400 were actually engaged with about 3,100 becoming casualties.
• Confederate II Corps – Out of about 21,800 men, 13,500 were actually engaged with about 3,200 becoming casualties.
• Confederate III Corps – Out of about 23,300men, 14,000 were actually engaged with about 2,800 becoming casualties.
However, the casualties were not spread evenly across the engaged brigades, as some suffered a lot more than others. For instance, Scales’ Brigade of Pender’s division started its attack against Seminary Ridge with about 1,350 men, and that evening could muster only 500 effective soldiers, after somewhat less than an hour of combat. Meredith’s Union “Iron Brigade” started the day with about 1,800 men and could only muster about 600 when it finally retreated to Culp’s Hill. Individual regimental losses could vary even more. The 26th North Carolina Regiment of Pettigrew’s Brigade suffered over 70 percent casualties in a prolonged point-blank fire fight with the 24th Michigan Regiment of Meredith’s Brigade, which itself also suffered over 70 percent losses in that same engagement.
Following is a list of all Union and Confederate units that were engaged or could have been engaged on the first day of Gettysburg. For the Army of the Potomac, this includes the I, III, XI, and XII Corps plus John Buford’s cavalry division. For the Army of Northern Virginia, this includes all of its II and III Corps. If some individual regiments or brigades were not available due to temporary detached duty, that is also noted. Occasionally a one-time 1D6 die roll is used to determine availability at the beginning of the scenario and is so noted in the specific scenario instructions. In some cases, if it is a question of a variable time of arrival or release from the reserves, the gamer is usually given the option of rolling a 1D6 for that unit’s possible arrival or release.
When units – regiments, brigades and even divisions – are noted as being “optional,” that usually means that a deliberate command or administrative decision had been made that restricted or prevented their participation. However, had a different decision been made then that entire regiment, brigade or division could have been engaged. This was certainly the case of the Confederate divisions of Anderson (III Corps) and Johnson (II Corps), or the two divisions of Slocum’s XII Corps. Divisions and brigades that are noted as optional should only be included with the mutual agreement of the players, as their inclusion could alter the balance of some of the scenarios. Nevertheless, these options give the military historian or interested civil war gamer the opportunity to explore the effect of alternative decisions that could have been made by the historical commanders.
Left Wing Commander – Major General John Reynolds (2 LB)
Major General Oliver Otis Howard (1 LB) after Reynolds’ death.
Major General Abner Doubleday (1 LB) after Reynolds’ death.
I Corps/1st Division – Brigadier General James Wadsworth (1 LB)
1st Brigade – “The Iron Brigade” – Brigadier General Solomon Meredith (1 LB)
• 19th Indiana, 308 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 24th Michigan, 496 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 2nd Wisconsin, 302 men, 6 figures, Mixed Muskets, Elite
• 6th Wisconsin, 344 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 7th Wisconsin, 364 men, 6 figures, Mixed Muskets, Elite
2nd Brigade – Brigadier General Lysander Cutler (1 LB)
• 76th New York, 375 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Musket, Veteran
• 84th New York, “14th Brooklyn”, 318 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Musket, Elite
• 95th New York, 241 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 147th New York, 380 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 56th Philadelphia, 252 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• *7th Indiana, 434 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
*Optional, on detached duty, availability determined by scenario.
I Corps/2nd Division – Brigadier General John Robinson (1 LB)
1st Brigade – Brigadier General Gabriel Paul (No LB)
Arrived near Seminary Ridge at about 12 noon on July 1.
• 13th Massachusetts, 284 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 16th Maine, 298 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 94th New York, 411 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 104th New York, 285 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 107th Philadelphia, 255 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
2nd Brigade – Brigadier General Henry Baxter (1 LB)
Arrived near Seminary Ridge at about 12.30 p.m. on July 1.
• 12th Massachusetts, 261 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 83rd New York, 199 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 97th New York, 236 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 11th Philadelphia, 270 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 88th Philadelphia, 273 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 90th Philadelphia, 208 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
I Corps/3rd Division – Major General Abner Doubleday (1 LB)
Brigadier General Thomas Rowley (No LB) after Reynolds’ death. This was a particularly unfortunate battlefield promotion for the Union, as General Rowley spent most of the day drunk wandering the battlefield and giving incoherent orders. 1st Brigade – Colonel Chapman Biddle (1 LB)
Arrived near Seminary Ridge at about 11.00 a.m. on July 1.
• 80th New York, 287 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 121st Philadelphia, 263 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 142nd Philadelphia, 336 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 151st Philadelphia, 467 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Green
2nd Brigade – “The Second Pennsylvania Bucktails” – Colonel Roy Stone (1 LB)
Arrived near Seminary Ridge at about 10.30 a.m. on July 1.
• 43rd Philadelphia, 465 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 149th Philadelphia, 450 men, 8 figures, Sharpshooter-R/Muskets, Trained
• 150th Philadelphia, 400 men, 8 figures, Sharpshooter-R/Muskets, Trained
3rd Brigade – “The Paper Collar Brigade” – Brigadier General George Stannard (1 LB)
The 13th, 14th, and 16th Vermont would arrive by about 5 p.m., July 1 on Cemetery Ridge.
• 13th Vermont, 636 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 14th Vermont, 647 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 16th Vermont, 661 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• *12th Vermont, 641 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• *15th Vermont, 637 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
*Optional, on detached duty to guard I Corps trains, availability determined by scenario.
I Corps Artillery Brigade – Colonel Charles Wainwright (1 Arty LB)
• Hall’s Battery (Maine Light, 2nd/B), three sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Elite
• Steven’s Battery (Maine Light, 5th/E), three sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• Reynold’s Battery (1st New York Light, L&E), three sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Veteran
• Cooper’s Battery, (1st Philadelphia Light, B), two sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Veteran
• Stewart’s Battery (4th US Regulars, B), three sections of Napoleons, Elite
III Corps was a victim of conflicting orders. Around noon, General Sickles had received General Reynolds’ last message saying that “he had better come up.” However, the army commander General Meade had previously ordered III Corps to stay put at Emmitsburg. General Sickles continued to dither until about 3 p.m. when he received General Howard’s message that “General Reynolds is dead, for God’s sake come up.” At that point, General Sickles decided to respond, and after leaving two brigades and two batteries at Emmitsburg, he began moving the rest of III Corps up to Gettysburg. Ironically, that night Meade approved of Sickles’ decision and then had him bring up the remaining two brigades and two batteries that had been left behind at Emmitsburg.
III Corps/1st Division, Major General David Birney (1 LB)
1st Brigade, Brigadier General Charles Graham (1 LB)
Historically, this unit would arrive at Cemetery Hill in the evening of July 1, 1863.
• 57th Philadelphia, 207 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 63rd Philadelphia, 246 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 68th Philadelphia, 320 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 105th Philadelphia, 274 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 114th Philadelphia, 259 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 141st Philadelphia, 209 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
2nd Brigade, Brigadier General Hobart Ward (1 LB)
Historically, this unit would arrive at Cemetery Hill in the evening of July 1, 1863.
• 20th Indiana, 400 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 3rd Maine, 210 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 4th Maine, 287 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 86th New York, 287 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 124th New York, 238 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 99th Philadelphia, 277 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
United States Sharpshooters Brigade, Colonel Hiram Berdan (1 LB)
Administratively attached to Ward’s Brigade but often operated as a divisional asset.
• *1st USS Sharpshooters, 240 men, 4 figures, Sharps B/L Rifles, Elite
• *2nd USS Sharpshooters, 240 men, 4 figures, Sharps B/L Rifles, Elite
*See ADF Sharpshooter Rules
3rd Brigade, Colonel Philippe Regis de Trobriand (1 LB)
Historically, 3rd Brigade spent July 1 at Emmitsburg and would arrive in the vicinity of Cemetery Ridge on the morning of July 2, 1863.
• 17th Maine, 350 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 3rd Michigan, 238 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 5th Michigan, 216 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• *40th New York, 583 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
*Includes 152 men of the 110th Philadelphia Regiment
III Corps/2nd Division, Brigadier General Andrew Humphreys (1 LB)
1st Brigade, Brigadier General Joseph Carr (1 LB)
Historically, 1st Brigade would arrive near Little Round Top on the evening of July 1, 1863.
• 1st Massachusetts, 321 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 11th Massachusetts, 286 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 16th Massachusetts, 245 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 12th New Hampshire, 224 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 11th New Jersey, 275 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 26th Philadelphia, 365 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
2nd Brigade – “The Excelsior Brigade” – Colonel William Brewster (1 LB)
Historically, 2nd Brigade would arrive near Little Round Top on the evening of July 1.
• 70th New York, 288 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 71st New York, 243 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 72nd New York, 305 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 73rd New York, 349 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 74th New York, 266 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 120th New York, 383 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
3rd Brigade, Colonel George Burling (1 LB)
Historically, 3rd Brigade would spend July 1 at Emmitsburg and would re-join III Corps on the morning of July 2.
• 2nd New Hampshire, 354 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 5th New Jersey, 206 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 6th New Jersey, 207 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 7th New Jersey, 275 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• *8th New Jersey, 321 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
*Includes 150 men from 115th Philadelphia
III Corps Artillery Brigade – Captain George Randolph (1 LB)
Judson’s, Bucklyn’s and Seely’s batteries had arrived by the evening of July 1.
• Clark’s Battery (1st New Jersey Light, 2nd/B), three sections of 10 pounder Parrott Rifles, Veteran
• Bucklyn’s Battery (1st Rhode Island/E), three sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• Seely’s Battery (4th US Regulars/K), three sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• * Winslow’s Battery (1st New York/B), three sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• * Smith’s Battery (4th NY Light), three sections of 10 pounder Parrott Rifles, Veteran
* Historically, would spend July 1 at Emmitsburg and would re-join III Corps on the morning of July 2.
XI Corps/1st Division, Brigadier General Francis Barlow (1 LB)
1st Brigade – Colonel Leopold Von Gilsa (1 LB)
• 41st New York, 220 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 68th New York, 230 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 153rd Philadelphia, 500 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 54th New York, 190 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
2nd Brigade – Brigadier General Adelbert Ames (1 LB)
• 17th Connecticut, 390 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 25th Ohio, 220 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 75th Ohio, 270 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 107th Ohio, 460 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
XI Corps/2nd Division, Brigadier General Adolph Von Steinwehr (1 LB)
1st Brigade – Colonel Charles Coster (1 LB)
• 134th New York, 400 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 154th New York, 240 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 27th Philadelphia, 280 men, 4 figures, Mixed Muskets, Veteran
• 73rd Philadelphia, 290 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
2nd Brigade – Colonel Orlando Smith (1 LB)
Not committed, held in reserve on Cemetery Hill.
• 33rd Massachusetts, 490 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 136th New York, 480 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 55th Ohio, 330 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 73rd Ohio, 340 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
XI Corps/3rd Division, Major General Carl Schurz (1 LB)
1st Brigade – Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelfennig (1 LB)
• 82nd Illinois, 320 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 45th New York, 370 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veterans
• 157th New York, 410 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 61st Ohio, 250 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 74th Philadelphia, 330 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
2nd Brigade – Colonel Waldimir Krzyzanowski (1 LB)
• 58th New York, 190 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 119th New York, 260 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 82nd Ohio, 310 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 75th Philadelphia, 210 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 26th Wisconsin, 450 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
XI Corps Artillery Brigade – Major Thomas Osborne (1 LB)
• Wheeler’s Battery (New York Light/13th Bat), two sections of 3” rifles, Veteran
• Dilger’s Battery (1st Ohio Light/I), three sections of Napoleons, Elite
• Heckman’s Battery (1st Ohio Light/K), two sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• Wilkeson’s Battery (4th US/G), three sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• *Weidrich’s Battery (1st New York Light/I), three sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Veteran
*Not committed, was held in reserve on Cemetery Hill.
Despite pleas from General Howard at Gettysburg, General Slocum had decided to wait most of the afternoon at Two Taverns, just five miles away, before moving forward to Gettysburg, as he expected the army to retire to the Pipe Creek position. However, had he responded immediately and marched to the sound of the guns, his first division could have begun arriving as early as 2 p.m. or 3 p.m., though elements of his second division probably would still have been held in reserve or sent to guard the Round Tops as they actually were. This option is the basis for the two eastern board scenarios, “Slocum Arrives” and “If Slocum Wasn’t Slow,” which start at 2 or 3 p.m. respectively.
XII Corps/1st Division, Brigadier General Alpheus Williams (1 LB)
Historically Williams’ division had just deployed to attack Wolf’s Hill south of the Hanover Road by 6 p.m., but was recalled before the attack had started and re-joined Federal forces on the Baltimore Pike by about 7.30 p.m. By dark it was in reserve on Cemetery Hill.
1st Brigade, Colonel Archibald McDougall (1 LB)
• 5th Connecticut, 318 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 20th Connecticut, 380 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 3rd Massachusetts, 242 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 123rd New York, 472 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 145th New York, 264 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 46th Philadelphia, 296 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
2nd Brigade, Brigadier General Harry Lockwood (1 LB)
• 1st Maryland, Eastern Shore, 583 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 1/1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade, 370 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 2/1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade, 370 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 1/150th New York, 323 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 2/150th New York, 323 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
3rd Brigade, Brigadier General Thomas Ruger (1 LB)
• 27th Indiana, 339 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 2nd Massachusetts, 397 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 13th New Jersey, 360 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 107th New York, 346 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 3rd Wisconsin, 285 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
XII Corps/2nd Division, Brigadier General John Geary (1 LB)
Historically, upon arriving at about 6 p.m. the whole division was sent to secure the Round Tops.
1st Brigade, Colonel Charles Candy (1 LB)
• 5th Ohio, 299 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 7th Ohio, 282 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 29th Ohio, 315 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 66th Ohio, 299 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 28th Philadelphia, 303 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 147th Philadelphia, 298 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
2nd Brigade, Brigadier General Thomas Kane (1 LB)
• 29th Philadelphia, 357 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• *111th Philadelphia, 340 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
*Includes 149 men from the 109th Philadelphia
3rd Brigade, Brigadier General George Greene (2 LB)
• 60th New York, 273 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 78th New York, 198 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 102 New York, 230 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 137 New York, 423 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 149th New York, 297 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
XII Corps Artillery Brigade – Lt Edward D. Muhlenberg (1 LB)
• Winegar’s Battery (1st New York Light/B), two sections of 10 pounder Parrott Rifles, Veteran
• Atwell’s Battery (Philadelphia Light/E), three sections of 10 pounder Parrott Rifles, Veteran
• Rugg’s Battery (4th US Regulars/F), three sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• Kinzie’s Battery (5th US Regulars/K), two sections of Napoleons, Veteran
Cavalry in ADF is modeled as one figure equals 30 men to reflect the larger space that cavalry would occupy. The cavalry of both sides, when used as a screening force, would usually deploy as battalions of two or more troops or companies each, and consequently the cavalry regiments in ADF are usually portrayed as two or three battalions per regiment, with each battalion usually functioning as an individual maneuver element when desired.
1st Cavalry Division – Brigadier General John Buford (2 LB)
From 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery – Assigned to 1st Cavalry Division
• Calef’s Battery (2nd US Horse Artillery/A), three sections, 3 inch rifles, Elite
1st Cavalry Brigade – Colonel William Gamble (1 LB)
• 1/8th Illinois, 235 men, 8 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 2/8th Illinois, 235 men, 8 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 1/3rd Indiana, 156 men, 6 figures, BL Carbines, Elite
• 2/3rd Indiana, 156 men, 6 figures, BL Carbines, Elite
• 1/12th Illinois, 116 men, 4 figures, BL Carbines, Elite
• 1/12th Illinois, 116 men, 4 figures, BL Carbines, Elite
• 1/8th New York, 193 men, 6 figures, Veteran, Sharps BL Carbines, Elite
• 2/8th New York, 193 men, 6 figures, Veteran, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 3/8th New York, 193 men, 6 figures, Veteran, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
2nd Cavalry Brigade – Colonel Thomas Devin (1 LB)
• 1/9th New York, 183 men, 6 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 2/9th New York, 183 men, 6 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 1/17th Philadelphia, 232 men, 8 figures, BL Carbines, Veteran
• 2/17th Philadelphia Regiment, 232 men, 8 figures, BL Carbines, Veteran
• 1/6th New York, 135 men, 4 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Elite
• *2/6th New York, 135 men, 4 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Elite
*Includes 63 men of the 3rd West Virginia
3rd Cavalry Brigade – Brigadier General Wesley Merritt (1 LB)
Merritt was held back to guard supply trains at Mechanicsburg, Maryland and then served as Cavalry Corps HQ Reserve. He would not see action until July 3, 1863.
• 1/6th Philadelphia, 121 men, 4 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 2/6th Philadelphia, 121 men, 4 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 1/1st US, 181 men, 6 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Elite
• 2/1st US, 181 men, 6 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Elite
• 1/2nd US, 203 men, 6 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Elite
• 2/2nd US, 203 men, 6 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Elite
• 1/5th US, 153 men, 4 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 2/5th US, 153 men, 4 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 1/6th US, 235 men, 6 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
• 2/6th US, 235 men, 6 figures, Sharps BL Carbines, Veteran
Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill (1 LB)
III Corps/Heth’s Division – Major General Henry Heth (1 LB)
Archer’s Brigade – Brigadier General James Archer (1 LB)
• 1st Tennessee, 281 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 7th Tennessee, 249 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 14th Tennessee, 220 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• *13th Alabama, 443 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
*Includes 135 men of the 5th Alabama Battalion
Davis’ Brigade – Brigadier General Joseph Davis (No LB)
• 2nd Mississippi, 492 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 42nd Mississippi, 575 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Musket, Trained
• 55th North Carolina, 640 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Musket, Trained
• *11th Mississippi, 592 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Musket, Trained
* Detached duty guarding supply trains. Roll 1D6 for availability: a result of 1 or 2 means they are available.
Pettigrew’s Brigade – Brigadier General James Pettigrew (1 LB)
• 11th North Carolina, 617 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 1/26th North Carolina, 418 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 2/26th North Carolina, 418 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 47th North Carolina, 567 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Green
• 52nd North Carolina, 553 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Green
Brockenbrough’s Brigade – Colonel John Brockenbrough (1 LB)
• 40th Virginia, 254 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 47th Virginia, 209 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 55th Virginia, 268 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 22nd Virginia, 237 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Heth’s Divisional Artillery, Garnett’s Battalion – Lieutenant Colonel John Garnett (No LB)
For reasons that remain unclear, on the morning of July 1 Garnett was relieved of duty by Lee’s chief of artillery, Brigadier General William Pendleton, and consequently his battalion was never committed during the fighting as an entire battalion – on the first day only Maurin’s battery saw serious action. However, at about 5 p.m. all of Garnett’s batteries were released and were finally brought forward eventually to set up on Seminary Ridge.
• Grandy’s Battery (Norfolk Light), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Lewis’ Battery (Pittsylvania Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Maurin’s Battery (Donaldsonville Artillery), two sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Veteran
• Moore’s Battery (Virginia Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
III Corps/Pender’s Division – Major General William Dorsey Pender (1 LB)
Perrin’s Brigade – Colonel Abner Perrin (1 LB)
• 1st South Carolina, 328 men, 6 figures, Smoothbore Muskets, Elite
• 12th South Carolina, 366 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 13th South Carolina, 390 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 14th South Carolina, 428 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• *1st South Carolina Rifles, 366 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
* Detached duty guarding supply trains. Roll 1D6 for availability: a result of or 2 means they are available.
Lane’s Brigade – Brigadier General James Lane (1 LB)
• 7th North Carolina, 291 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 18th North Carolina, 346 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 28th North Carolina, 346 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 33rd North Carolina, 368 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 37th North Carolina, 379 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Scales’ Brigade – Brigadier General Alfred Scales (1 LB)
• 13th North Carolina, 232 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 16th North Carolina, 321 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 2nd North Carolina, 267 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 34th North Carolina, 311 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 38th North Carolina, 216 men, 4 figures, Smoothbore Muskets, Veteran
Thomas’ Brigade – Brigadier General Edward Thomas (1 LB)
Upon arriving on Herr Ridge, the III Corps commander, Lieutenant General A. P. Hill, decided to hold Thomas’ brigade in reserve as support for the Confederate guns on Herr Ridge, and hence it saw no action that day. However, it was there and available, and depending on the scenario could be released for action.
• 14th Georgia, 305 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 35th Georgia, 305 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 45th Georgia, 305 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 49th Georgia, 329 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Pender’s Divisional Artillery Battalion – Major William Pogue (1 LB)
Historically, although Pender’s Division was ultimately committed to the attack, its divisional artillery was kept in reserve and saw no relevant action on July 1. However, towards the end of the battle at about 4.30 p.m. they were brought forward and eventually took up a position on Seminary Ridge facing Cemetery Hill.
• Wyatt’s Battery (Albemarle Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Graham’s Battery (Charlotte Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Ward’s Battery (Madison Light Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Brooke’s Battery (Warrington Battery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
III Corps/Anderson’s Division – Major General Richard Anderson (1 LB) Optional Unit
On July 1, Anderson’s Division had been delayed by the huge traffic jam on the Chambersburg Pike caused by Johnson’s division interposing in front of it, and consequently the head of his column did not reach Herr Ridge until about 7 p.m. At that point, General Lee ordered Anderson to go into bivouac and serve as a reserve. However, had Johnson’s division been ordered to proceed to Gettysburg down the Carlisle Pike – with the rest of its corps – rather than on to the Chambersburg Pike, then Anderson’s Division could have started arriving at about 3 p.m. along the Chambersburg Pike and been deployed by about 4 p.m. behind Pender’s Division. However, General Lee would probably still have held back at least one or two brigades and possibly Lane’s Artillery Battalion as a reserve against the unexpected. This would have still have allowed most of Anderson’s brigades to begin entering in battle formation at about 3.30 p.m. on the west edge of the battle space.
Wilcox’s Brigade – Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox (2 LB)
• 8th Alabama, 477 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 9th Alabama, 306 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 10th Alabama, 311 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 11th Alabama, 311 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 14th Alabama, 316 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Mahone’s Brigade – Brigadier General William Mahone (1 LB)
• 6th Virginia, 288 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 12th Virginia, 348 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 16th Virginia, 270 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 41st Virginia, 276 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 61st Virginia, 356 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Lang’s Brigade – Colonel David Lang (1 LB)
• 2nd Florida, 244 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 5th Florida, 248 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 8th Florida, 248 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Wright’s Brigade – Brigadier General Ambrose Wright (1 LB)
• 3rd Georgia, 441 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 22nd Georgia, 400 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• *48th Georgia, 568 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
*Includes 173 men of the 2nd Georgia Battalion
Posey’s Brigade – Brigadier General Carnot Posey (1 LB)
• 12th Mississippi, 305 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 16th Mississippi, 385 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 19th Mississippi, 372 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 48th Mississippi, 256 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Anderson’s Divisional Artillery Battalion – Major John Lane (1 LB)
• Ross’ Battery (Company A/Sumter Artillery), three sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Patterson’s Battery (Company B/Sumter Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Wingfield’s Battery (Company C/Sumter Artillery), three sections of mixed guns, Veteran
III Corps Artillery Reserve – Colonel Lindsay Walker (1 LB)
The III Corps Reserve Artillery, with Pegram in the lead, arrived early on Herr Ridge and provided valuable support for the fight for McPherson’s Ridge. However, historically neither Pegram’s nor McIntosh’s battalions were brought forward for the attack on Seminary Ridge. Once Seminary Ridge was secured, both gun battalions were then brought forward to fire on Cemetery Hill.
Pegram’s Artillery Battalion – Major William Pegram (1 Artillery LB)
• Johnson’s Battery (Crenshaw Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Marye’s Battery (Fredericksburg Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Bander’s Battery (Letcher Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Zimmerman’s Battery (Pee Dee Artillery), two sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Veteran
• McGraw (Purcell Artillery), two sections of Napoleons, Veteran
McIntosh’s Artillery Battalion – Major D. G. McIntosh (1 LB)
• Rice’s Battery (Danville Artillery), two sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• Hurt’s Battery (Hardaway Artillery), one section of 3” rifles, one section of Whitworth Rifles, Veteran
• Wallace’s Battery (2nd Rockbridge Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Johnson’s Battery (Richmond Battery), two sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Veteran
Lieutenant General Richard Ewell (1 LB)
II Corps – Optional Attached Cavalry – Brigadier General Albert G. Jenkins (1 LB)
Jenkins’ cavalry brigade was not well regarded in the Army of Northern Virginia. It was a loosely disciplined and erratically equipped group of irregular horsemen without any formal cavalry training. They were excellent marksmen, however, and when dismounted they fight as Veterans, but if mounted they fight as Green and any mounted charge is done in disorder. Due to administrative oversights, only the 17th Virginia would see action that first day, as dismounted support for General Jubal Early’s divisional artillery battalion.
• 14th Virginia Cavalry, 265 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran/Green
• 16th Virginia Cavalry, 260 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran/Green
• 17th Virginia Cavalry, 241 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran/Green
• 34th Virginia Cavalry, 172 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran/Green
• 36th Virginia Cavalry, 107 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran/Green
• Jackson’s Battery (Charlottesville Artillery) 2 sections of mixed guns, Veteran
II Corps/Rodes’ Division, Major General Robert Rodes (1 LB)
• Blackford’s Sharpshooters, 160-240 men, 4 figures, Sharpshooters R/M – Elite
Blackford’s unit was administratively part of the 5th Alabama of O’Neal’s Brigade, but Robert Rodes used them as a divisional asset to augment individual brigades depending on the mission. On the division’s march down from Carlisle, they were with Iverson’s Brigade as the division’s advance guard. However, once the battle began they fought with Doles’ Brigade against Barlow’s Division.
Doles’ Brigade – Brigadier General George Doles (2 LB)
• 4th Georgia, 340 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 12th Georgia, 330 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 44th Georgia, 360 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 21st Georgia, 287 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
Daniel’s Brigade – Brigadier General Junius Daniel (1 LB)
Optional deployment per specific scenario.
• 32nd North Carolina, 450 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 43rd North Carolina, 570 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 45th North Carolina, 460 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 53rd North Carolina, 320 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 2nd North Carolina Battalion, 250 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Iverson’s Brigade – Brigadier General Alfred Iverson (No LB)
• 5th North Carolina, 470 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 12th North Carolina, 220 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 20th North Carolina, 370 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 23rd North Carolina, 210 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
O’Neal’s Brigade – Colonel Edward O’Neal (1 LB)
• 3rd Alabama, 350 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 5th Alabama, 330 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 6th Alabama, 380 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 12th Alabama, 320 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 26th Alabama, 320 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Ramseur’s Brigade – Brigadier General Stephen Ramseur (1 LB)
• 2nd North Carolina, 240 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 4th North Carolina, 200 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 14th North Carolina, 300 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 30th North Carolina, 280 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Rodes’ Divisional Artillery Battalion – Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Carter (1 LB)
• Reese’s Battery (Jeff Davis Artillery), 2 sections of 3” rifles, Veteran
• Carter’s Battery (King Williams Artillery), 2 sections of mixed guns, Elite
• Page’s Battery (Morris Virginia Artillery), 2 sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• Fry’s Battery (Orange Virginia Artillery), 2 sections of 10 pounder Parrott Rifles, Veteran
II Corps/Early’s Division, Major General Jubal Early (1 LB)
Gordon’s Brigade – Brigadier General John Gordon (2 LB)
• 13th Georgia, 330 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Musket, Elite
• 31st Georgia, 269 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Musket, Elite
• 38th Georgia, 343 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Musket, Elite
• 60th Georgia, 318 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Musket, Veteran
• 61st Georgia, 307 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Musket, Veteran
• *26th Georgia, 333 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Musket, Elite
*Historically, the 26th GA was detailed to support Jones’ artillery battalion. To reflect this, the 26th GA must stay adjacent to one of the artillery batteries until released. Roll 1D6 at the beginning of each Confederate turn for release, which takes a 1 or 2. In the actual battle the 26th GA was not released until the battle was almost over and the Union in full retreat.
Hays’ Brigade – “The Louisiana Tigers” – Brigadier General Harry Hays (1 LB)
• 5th Louisiana, 209 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 6th Louisiana, 232 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 7th Louisiana, 248 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 8th Louisiana, 314 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 9th Louisiana, 366 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Hoke’s or Avery’s Brigade – Colonel Isaac Avery (1 LB)
• 6th North Carolina, 533 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 21st North Carolina, 454 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 57th North Carolina, 316 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• *54th North Carolina, 434 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• *1st North Carolina Sharpshooters, 160 men, 4 figures, Sharpshooter Rifle/Muskets, Elite
*Unlikely availability, roll 1D6 for each at start: a result of 1 or 2 means they are available.
Smith’s Brigade – Brigadier General William Smith (No LB)
General “Extra Billy” Smith was a well-intentioned but easily confused commander. Sometime after 5 p.m. General Smith became convinced that a large Federal force was hovering off the Confederate right flank. He was so insistent that eventually General Early agreed to let his and Gordon’s brigade redeploy off to the east to counter this threat. There was no Federal threat, but it did result in these two brigades being taken away from the battlefield at about 6 p.m.
• 1st Virginia, 280 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 49th Virginia, 280 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 52nd Virginia, 271 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Early’s Divisional Artillery Battalion – Lieutenant Colonel Hillary P. Jones (1 Artillery LB)
• Carrington’s Battery (Charlottesville Artillery) – two sections of Napoleons, Elite
• Tanner’s Battery (Courtney Virginia Artillery) – two sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Veteran
• Green’s Battery (Louisiana Guard Artillery) – two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Garber’s Battery (Staunton Virginia Artillery) – two sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• 17th Virginia Cavalry, 241 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran if dismounted/Green if mounted
II Corps/Johnson’s Division, Major General Edward Johnson (1 LB)
Johnson’s Division arrived sometime between 6 and 7 p.m. on the Chambersburg Pike and would proceed to march across the north of Gettysburg to reach the rest of II Corps, then northeast of Gettysburg. However, with better route planning it could have followed Rodes’ Division down from Carlisle and arrived on the “North Edge” in battle formation as early as 4 p.m.
Steuart’s Brigade – Brigadier General George Steuart (1 LB)
• 1st Maryland, 400 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 1st North Carolina, 377men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 3rd North Carolina, 548 men, 10 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Trained
• 10th Virginia, 276 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 23rd Virginia, 251 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 37th Virginia, 264 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Walker’s Brigade – “The Stonewall Brigade” – Brigadier General James Walker (1 LB)
• 2nd Virginia, 333 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 4th Virginia, 257 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 5th Virginia, 345 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• *33rd Virginia, 384 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
*Includes 148 men from the 27th Virginia.
Williams’ Brigade – “Nicholls’ Louisiana Brigade” – Colonel Jesse Williams (1 LB)
• 10th Louisiana, 226 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• *2nd Louisiana, 408 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• **14th Louisiana, 461 men, 8 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
*Includes 172 men from the 1st Louisiana.
**Includes 186 men from the 15th Louisiana.
Jones’ Brigade – Brigadier General John M. Jones (1 LB)
• 21st Virginia, 183 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 25th Virginia, 280 men, 6 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Elite
• 42nd Virginia, 252 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 44th Virginia, 227 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 48th Virginia, 252 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
• 50th Virginia, 252 men, 4 figures, Rifle/Muskets, Veteran
Johnson’s Divisional Artillery Battalion – Major Joseph Latimer (1 Artillery LB)
• Dement’s Battery (1st Maryland Battery), two sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• Carpenter’s Battery (Alleghany Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Brown’s Battery (Chesapeake Artillery), two sections of Napoleons, Veteran
• *1/Raine’s Battery (1/Lee Virginia Artillery), one section of 10 pounder Parrott Rifles, Veteran
• *2/Raine’s Battery (2/Lee Virginia Artillery), one section of 20 pounder Parrott Rifles, Veteran
* Treat as two sections of 20 pounder Parrott Rifles for game purposes.
II Corps Artillery Reserve – Colonel J. Thompson Brown (1 LB)
The II Corps reserve artillery had also been sent along with Johnson’s Division to re-join the Army advancing along the Chambersburg Pike, so Dance’s and Nelson’s artillery battalions would also contribute to the huge traffic jam at the Cashtown Gap.
Dance’s Virginia Artillery Battalion – Captain Willis J. Dance (1 LB)
• Watson’s Battery (2nd Richmond Howitzers), two sections of 10 pounder Parrott Rifles, Veteran
• Smith’s Battery (3rd Richmond Howitzers), two sections of 3”ordnance rifles, Veteran
• Cunningham’s Battery (Powhatan Artillery), two sections of 3” ordnance rifles, Veteran
• Graham’s Battery (Rockbridge Artillery), two sections of 20 pounder Parrott Rifles, Elite
• Griffen’s Battery (Salem Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
The Rebels swarm over Seminary Hill (Patrick LeBeau)
Nelsen’s Artillery Battalion – Lieutenant Colonel William Nelsen (1 LB)
• Kirkpatrick’s Battery (Amherst Virginia Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Massies’ Battery (Fluvanna Virginia Artillery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
• Milledge’s Battery (The Georgia Battery), two sections of mixed guns, Veteran
For those gamers that prefer to create a balanced collision of forces while still reflecting the nature of the two armies of Gettysburg, the ADF Muster Point (MP) values of each brigade, division and corps are presented for the first day of Gettysburg as part of the Army Lists for this scenario set. It is recommended, however, that the gamers preserve the actual historical regiments within the brigades and then freely structure their “Summer of 1863” using the various brigades, divisions or corps with the overall organizational guidelines as previously discussed. Do note that cavalry brigades have a much higher point value than infantry brigades. This has been done to reflect the historically higher expense and longer time it takes to raise, train and maintain a cavalry unit as opposed to an infantry unit.
Even if a leader has no LBs he still costs the same Muster Points (MPs) as a 1 LB brigade or division commander since he does occupy the position. That said, even a no LB leader has an equivalent value of 1 for determining command and control distances.
With that in mind, a fairly balanced “Gettysburg Summer” battle could be had using a 650 to 750 point Army of Northern Virginia corps against two Army of the Potomac Union corps of about 250 to 350 points each. However, start the battle with the entire Confederate Corps deployed against just one of the Union Corps. Then have the second Union Corps coming on to the board just as the game starts or slightly later based on a die roll. At any time, an additional Union corps or a battalion or two of artillery from the Army of the Potomac’s massive artillery reserve could certainly arrive. For further details on the use of how the ADF muster point system can be used to create scenarios, consult the original rules.
| The I Corps with Major General John Reynolds (321 MPs) | |
| I Corps – 1st Division with Brigadier General James Wadsworth (101 MPs) | Meredith’s Brigade (43 MPs) Cutler’s Brigade (50 MPs) |
| I Corps – 2nd Division with Brigadier General John Robinson (81 MPs) | Paul’s Brigade (33 MPs) Baxter’s Brigade (40 MPs) |
| I Corps – 3rd Division with Major General Abner Doubleday (123 MPs) | Biddle’s Brigade (29 MPs) Stone’s Brigade (30 MPs) Stannard’s Brigade (56 MPs) |
| I Corps – Artillery Brigade with five batteries (55 MPs) | |
| The III Corps with Major General Daniel Sickles (342 MPs) | |
| III Corps – 1st Division with Major General David Birney (152 MPs) | Graham’s Brigade (36 MPs) Ward’s Brigade (39 MPs) Berdan’s USS Brigade (32 MPs) Regis de Trobriand’s Brigade (37 MPs) |
| III Corps – 2nd Division with Brigadier General Andrew Humphreys (131 MPs) | Carr’s Brigade (42 MPs) Brewster’s Brigade (46 MPs) Burling’s Brigade (35 MPs) |
| III Corps – Artillery Brigade with five batteries (51 MPs) | |
| The XI Corps with Major General Oliver Otis Howard (287 MPs) | |
| XI Corps – 1st Division with Brigadier General Francis Barlow (69 MPs) | Leopold von Gilsa’s Brigade (30 MPs) Ames’ Brigade (31 MPs) |
| XI Corps – 2nd Division with Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr (70 MPs) | Coster’s Brigade (24 MPs) Smith’s Brigade (38 MPs) |
| XI Corps – 3rd Division with Major General Carl Schurz (90 MP) | Schimmelfenning’s Brigade (43 MPs) Krzyzanowski’s Brigade (39s) |
| XI Corps – Artillery Brigade with five batteries (50 MPs) | |
| The XII Corps with Major General Henry Slocum (295 MPs) | |
| XII Corps – 1st Division with Brigadier General Alpheus Williams (139 MPs) | McDougall’s Brigade (48 MPs) Lockwood’s Brigade (40 MPs) Ruger’s Brigade (43s) |
| XII Corps – 2nd Division with Brigadier General John Geary (110 MPs) | Candy’s Brigade (39 MPs) Kane’s Brigade (20 MPs) Greene’s Brigade (43 MPs) |
| XII Corps – Artillery Brigade with four batteries (38 MPs) | |
| 1st Cavalry Division with Brigadier General John Buford (404 MPs) | Gamble’s Brigade (138 MPs) Devin’s Brigade (92 MPs) Merritt’s Brigade (146 MPs) Calef’s Horse Artillery Battery (12 MPs) |
| III Corps with Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill (648 MPs) | |
| III Corps – Heth’s Division with Major General Henry Heth (168 MPs) | Archer’s Brigade (32 MPs) Davis’ Brigade (39 MPs) Pettigrew’s Brigade (46 MPs) Brockenbrough’s Brigade (26 MPs) Garnett’s Divisional Artillery Battalion with four batteries (25 MPs) |
| III Corps – Pender’s Division with Major General William Dorsey Pender (189 MPs) | Perrin’s Brigade (46 MPs) Lane’s Brigade (35 MPs) Scales’ Brigade (36 MPs) Thomas’ Brigade (34 MPs) Pogue’s Divisional Artillery Battalion with four batteries (30 MPs) |
| III Corps – Anderson’s Division with Major General Richard Anderson (213 MPs) | Wilcox’s Brigade (51 MPs) Mahone’s Brigade (37 MPs) Lang’s Brigade (23 MPs) Wright’s Brigade (34 MPs) Posey’s Brigade (32 MPs) Lane’s Divisional Artillery Battalion with three batteries (28 MPs) |
| III Corps – Reserve Artillery Brigade with Colonel L. Walker (70 MPs) | Pegram’s Artillery Battalion with five batteries (38 MPs) McIntosh’s Artillery Battalion with four batteries (26 MPs) |
| II Corps with Lieutenant General Richard Ewell (781 MPs) | |
| II Corps – Jenkins’ Cavalry Brigade (60 MPs) | |
| II Corps – Rodes’ Division with Major General Robert Rodes (242 MPs) | Blackford’s Sharpshooters (11 MPs) Doles’ Brigade (44 MPs) Daniel’s Brigade (44 MPs) Iverson’s Brigade (26 MPs) O’Neal’s Brigade (41 MPs) Ramseur’s Brigade (32 MPs) Carter’s Divisional Artillery Battalion with four batteries (36 MPs) |
| II Corps – Early’s Division with Major General Jubal Early (192 MPs) | Gordon’s Brigade (60 MPs) Hay’s Brigade (41 MPs) Hokes’ or Avery’s Brigade (38 MPs) Smith’s Brigade (23 MPs) Jones’ Divisional Artillery Battalion with four batteries (30 MPs) |
| II Corps – Johnson’s Divisions with Major General Edward Johnson (204 MPs) | Steuart’s Brigade (51 MPs) Walker’s Brigade (38 MPs) Williams’ Brigade (29 MPs) Jones’ Brigade (42 MPs) Latimer’s Divisional Artillery Battalion with four batteries (39 MPs) |
| II Corps – Reserve Artillery Battalion with Colonel J. Thompson Brown (75 MPs) | Dance’s Artillery Battalion with five batteries (45 MPs) Nelsen’s Artillery Battalion with three batteries (24 MPs) |
REGIMENTS AND FRONTAGES
American Civil War enthusiasts have been debating frontages for many decades, and the answer that would be correct most of the time would be “whatever space they need to occupy for the mission at hand.” By dropping companies into reserve a regiment could compress, or by going into a single line the regiment could extend. However, how long would a “text book” double-rank battle line actually be? In a post-war experiment, Cadet Captain B. Allison Colona of the Virginia Military Institute, using the VMI cadets, formed up regulation battle lines from 10 men to 1,000 men, measured how long each was and recorded those distances along with his detailed survey of the New Market battlefield. His actual notes are reproduced here. Being a senior engineering student, Cadet Captain Colona noted how long these lines would be in a precise map scale of 4 inches to one mile. However, once the command of “fire at will” was given, all those neat double lines would almost always disintegrate into a ragged scramble of men simply trying to load and fire as fast as they could.
