“The Rebs won’t gobble us this time!” – Major General Franz Sigel
Lieutenant General U. S Grant’s grand plan to win the war in the Eastern Theater called for a spring offensive by four armies. Major General George Meade’s massive Army of the Potomac would seek out and destroy Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia somewhere in the hinterlands along the Rappahannock River. Simultaneously, Major General Benjamin Butler’s Army of the James would land at Bermuda Hundred and advance along the James River and threaten Richmond from the south. To support these major offensives, Major General Franz Sigel, commander of the Department of West Virginia, was instructed to organize two smaller armies for offensive operations against Lee’s strategic left flank in the vital Shenandoah Valley and south-western Virginia.
One Army was the 9,000-man Army of the Kanawha to be led by Brigadier General George Crook, which would operate out of Charleston, West Virginia. The other would be the 9,000-man Army of the Shenandoah, which Sigel would command himself. Sigel’s army would march south from Martinsburg with the primary mission of capturing the Confederate supply base at Staunton. The opening moves of the armies commanded by Meade, Butler and Crook clearly indicate that they fully understood Grant’s expectation that the campaign proceed with indomitable offensive spirit. But that sense of aggressive urgency appears to have escaped General Franz Sigel.
Sigel’s army marched from Martinsburg on April 29 and ambled south at a slug’s pace, which included time off for a “mock battle.” It took 16 days for the head of his column, under Colonel Augustus Moor, to reach the outskirts of New Market. Unfortunately for Colonel Moor, numerous detachments to guard against Rebel raiders and frivolous delays had reduced that column to just over 6,000 men. During the afternoon of May 14, just north of New Market, a lively skirmish ensued that continued into the evening and ended with the town still in Confederate hands. Moor took up a defensive position on a ridge just north of the town, knowing that he now faced a sizable Confederate force that appeared ready and eager for battle. As the sun came up and with a battle imminent, Colonel Moor was uneasy and anxiously wondered when the rest of Sigel’s scattered army would arrive.
“We can attack and whip them here ... and I’ll do it!” – Major General John C. Breckinridge
After learning that the Union Army had once again entered the valley in force, the veteran Confederate leader Major General John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky pulled together all available forces to repulse this latest Federal threat. It would take time for Breckinridge to gather enough units to cobble together a credible defensive force, but Sigel’s leisurely advance of fits and start would give him that time. By early May, Breckinridge had assembled a force of approximately 4,000 muskets and 18 guns. The core of his little army was two experienced infantry brigades under brigadier generals John C. Echols and Gabriel C. Wharton, along with a cavalry brigade under the wily Brigadier General John D. Imboden. Filling out his command was a number of smaller battalions, including the untested but eager and well-led 247-man cadet corps of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI).
Breckinridge originally concentrated his force at Staunton, while Imboden and other Confederate cavalry elements harassed Sigel’s advance. On May 13, Breckinridge decided to move north and confront Sigel before the Unionist reached Staunton. Breckinridge pushed his advance elements and cavalry to just beyond New Market, while holding his main body in readiness at Lacy Springs. Following the initial May 14 clash with elements of Colonel Moor’s “ad hoc” brigade, Breckenridge gave the order for his entire force to move out at 1 a.m. with the hope of surprising and defeating Sigel while much of his army was still straggling southward along the Valley Turnpike. By early morning, Breckinridge had his army massed and ready on high ground just south of New Market.
The scenario starts with the 11.30 a.m. turn and ends at the conclusion of the 3 p.m. turn for a total game length of seven turns. For the entire scenario the Confederates have the initiative. For the Confederates to win, there must be no more than two Union units on the bottom four squares of the game board, and any Union units east of Swift Creek do not count against the Confederate victory conditions. For the Union to win, they must prevent the Confederate victory condition.
All the woods are light woods and the hills are gentle slopes. Since it had been raining, the slopes are somewhat slippery, so if a unit is moving up two or more elevations in one movement action the whole move is done at one movement rate worse. Crossing one or more fences only costs one additional inch of movement, or the whole movement can be made as if it was broken terrain. Normally there would be no extra movement cost to cross the little streams, but since it had been raining it costs one extra inch to cross one or more of them. They have no effect on combat. The escarpment along the Shenandoah River is impassable, as is Smith’s Creek, with the possible exception of the one ford. The field designated as “Mud Field” was excessively muddy, and movement through it is done at the light woods rate. When the VMI cadets charged across this field, the mud was so sticky that it sucked many of their shoes off and from then on it has been known as the “field of lost shoes.”
Despite the heavy rains, the ford across Smith’s Creek may be usable. When the first unit comes up to it, roll 1D6, and if a 1 or 2 is rolled, the ford is usable. This one roll determines the status of the ford for the entire scenario. It takes one whole movement action for a unit to use the ford and to cross the creek – from one side to the other – with the movement ending in disorder. Historically, this ford was probably used by Colonel William Boyd of the 1st New York Lincoln Cavalry to retreat after being soundly thrashed on May 13 by Imboden’s cavalry.
Imboden’s cavalry brigade (18th and 23rd Virginia) and up to one other unit can exit off the east edge of the game board via the Luray Road. Beginning on the next Confederate active turn after these units have left, the Confederate player rolls 1D6 for re-entry and Imboden’s command can re-enter on the east edge of the game board where indicated with the roll of a 1 or 2. If a 3, 4, or 5 is rolled, Imboden is still in transit, but the Confederate player can roll again on his next active turn. However, if a 6 is rolled, the heavy rains have washed out the bridge that Imboden historically used to cross swollen Smith’s Creek, and all his units return via the Luray Road on the next Confederate active turn.
“We began to learn, much to our regret, that fighting was not as pleasant as we had anticipated.” – VMI Cadet John J. Coleman
There was strong reluctance by General Breckinridge to actually use the “boys,” hence they must be kept in reserve and cannot deliberately be put on the front line until the start of the 1.30 p.m. turn. Though the cadets had not seen combat, many of their adult officers and non-commissioned officers had previous combat experience, and the morale and excitement of the Cadet Corps was high; hence they are rated as Trained troops. Historically, at about 2 p.m. a large gap opened in the Confederate lines, and the VMI Cadets were the last viable reserves. Breckinridge was at first reluctant to commit them. Then Major Charles Sample said “they are of the best Virginia blood, they will stand.” Breckinridge nodded, and with tears in his eyes ordered, “Put the boys in and may God forgive me for the order.”
Breckinridge began his steady northward advance about 11 a.m. and would begin his main attack against Moor’s Brigade a little before noon. Despite tough resistance, Moor’s Brigade was gradually pushed back towards the rest of Sigel’s army, which was trying to form a defensive line on the high ground of the Bushong Farm. About 1.30 p.m., the Confederates reformed to renew their attack on this new line, but massed Union defensive fire forced the Rebel center to give way and created a gap in their line. It was at that point that Breckenridge reluctantly committed the VMI cadets. At nearly the same time, Sigel launched a series of regimental counterattacks, which regained some ground but were eventually checked. Finally, almost in desperation, Stahel attempted a mounted charge with his cavalry, which was severely punished by the Confederate artillery. At this point, Breckinridge ordered a general advance and the Union line began to unravel; soon entire units were breaking towards the rear. As the retreat became a rout, five guns were eventually abandoned to the advancing Confederates, one of which was captured by the VMI cadets.
Breckinridge’s victory was sweet, but soon soured because the day after the battle the general made a decision that negated much of the positive effect of his victory. The Kentuckian believed that the Army of the Shenandoah was beaten and demoralized and could make no major offensive moves in the valley for a long time to come. However, Breckinridge also realized that the strength of his army was insufficient to pursue the enemy and clear the valley of enemy troops. Therefore, he concluded that the war in the valley had resulted in stalemate, and that his veteran infantry could safely move to reinforce Lee’s hard-pressed army at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. Lee agreed. Therefore, on the day following the battle, the grizzled victors of New Market – including the VMI cadets – marched to Staunton, where they jumped on flatcars and rode the Virginia Central Railroad to join Lee’s forces outside of Richmond. Brigadier General John Imboden’s cavalry brigade and the Valley District reserves were all that remained to garrison the valley. Almost as importantly, General Grant did not suffer a foolish general gladly and would unceremoniously sack Sigel immediately after the battle. Then on May 19, Grant raised Major General David “Black Dave” Hunter to command of the department, a man who had no interest in leisurely advances and mock battles.
RM: Rifle muskets, RC/P: Repeating carbines and pistols, MM/P: Mixed muskets and pistols, MM: Mixed muskets, SBLC/P: Sharps breech-loading carbines and pistols.
General Sigel was not present at the start of the battle. He arrives at the start of the Union 12.30 p.m. turn.
Infantry Division – Brigadier General Jeremiah Sullivan (1 LB)
Sullivan does not arrive unit the Union 2 p.m. Active Turn (see reinforcements below) Moor’s “Ad Hoc” Brigade – Colonel Augustus Moor (1 LB)
This was more of an ad hoc brigade than a formalized structure, as it fought at New Market with two regiments from Moor’s own brigade and two from Colonel Thoburn’s Brigade.
• 18th Connecticut Infantry – 599 men – 9 figures – RM – Trained
• 1st West Virginia Infantry – 360 men – 6 figures – RM – Veteran
• 34th Massachusetts Infantry – 500 men – 9 figures – RM – Veteran
• 123rd Ohio Infantry – 616 men – 10 figures – RM – Trained
• Snow’s Battery (B/1st Maryland Light) – 3 sections – Mixed Guns – Veteran
• Von Kleiser’s Battery (30th New York Battery) – three sections of Napoleons – Veteran
2nd Brigade (Minus) – Colonel Joseph Thoburn (1 LB)
• 54th Philadelphia Infantry – 566 men – 10 figures – RM – Veteran
• 1/12th West Virginia Infantry – 470 men – 8 figures – RM – Green
• 2/12th West Virginia Infantry – 459 men – 8 figures – RM – Green
• Carlin’s Battery (D/1st West Virginia Light Artillery) – three sections of 3”Rifles – Veteran
Infantry Division Reinforcements
Arrives in this order at the Union 2 p.m. active turn
• DuPont’s Battery (B/5th US Light Artillery) – three sections of 3” Rifles – Elite
• Brigadier General Jeremiah Sullivan (1 LB)
• 28th Ohio Infantry- 574 men – 9 figures – RM – Trained
• 116th Ohio Infantry – 766 men – 12 figures – RM – Green
Cavalry Division – Brigadier General Julius Stahel (1 LB)
All Union cavalry units start mounted. If they dismount they must stay dismounted for the entire scenario, unless they remount for the sole reason of retiring from the field and then must immediately retreat off the gameboard.
1st Cavalry Brigade (Minus) – Colonel William Tibbits (2 LB)
• 1st Maryland, Potomac Home Guard Cavalry – 360 men – 12 figures – BLC/P – Trained
• 1st New York Lincoln Cavalry – 270 men – 9 figures – RC/P – Trained
• 1st New York Veteran Cavalry – 270 men – 9 figures – RC/P – Veteran
• 14th Philadelphia Cavalry – 120 men – 4 figures – SBLC/P – Veteran
• 21st New York Cavalry – 120men – 4 figures – SBLC/P – Trained
• Ewing’s Battery (G/1st West Virginia Light) – three sections – 3” Rifles – Veteran
2nd Cavalry Brigade – Colonel John Wynkoop (1 LB)
• 20th Philadelphia Cavalry – 120 men – 4 figures – SBLC/P – Veteran
• 22nd Philadelphia Cavalry – 120 men – 4 figures – RC/P – Veteran
• 15th New York Cavalry – 120 men – 4 figures – SBLC/P – Veteran
Major General John C. Breckenridge (2 LB)
Echols’ Brigade – Colonel George S. Patton (1 LB)
Although Brigadier John Echols was this brigade’s nominal commander, his worsening illness made Colonel Patton its de facto leader for most of the battle, and one week after the battle this arrangement was made official. Patton’s performance at New Market would earn him a brigadier’s commission, but he would be killed at the Battle of Winchester before it could be officially confirmed.
Although officially part of Echol’s Brigade, the 26th VA would spend most of the battle fighting as part of Wharton’s Brigade.
• 22nd Virginia Infantry – 540 men – 9 figures – RM – Elite (also known as the Kanawha Regiment)
• 23rd Virginia Infantry – 480 men – 8 figures – RM – Veteran
• 26th Virginia Infantry – 480 men – 8 figures – RM – Veteran
Wharton’s Brigade – Brigadier General Gabriel Wharton (1 LB)
The 62nd VA was detached from the Valley Cavalry and fought as any other infantry. Its own 500 troopers were augmented by additional dismounted cavalry companies from the 18th Virginia, the 23th Virginia and the 1st Missouri Cavalry.
• 30th Virginia Infantry – 360 men – 6 figures – RM – Elite
• 51st Virginia Infantry – 630 men – 10 figures – RM – Veteran
• 62nd Virginia Infantry – 720 men – 12 figures – RM – Veteran
• VMI Cadet Battalion – 240 men – 4 figures – RM – Trained
• Jackson’s Virginia Battery – 2 sections – Mixed Guns – Veteran
Cavalry Brigade – Brigadier General John Imboden (2 LB)
• 1/18th Virginia Cavalry – 240 men – 8 figures – SBLC/P – Veteran
• 2/18th Virginia Cavalry – 240 men – 8 figures – SBLC/P – Veteran
• 23rd Virginia Cavalry – 240 men – 8 figures – MM/P – Veteran
• McClanahan’s Virginia Battery – two sections of mixed guns – Veteran (also known as the Staunton Horse Artillery)
Artillery Battalion – Major William McLaughlin (1 Arty LB)
Berkeley’s section detached from McClanahan’s Battery
• Chapman’s Virginia Battery – three sections – mixed guns – Veteran
• Berkeley’s Section – one section of 3” Rifles – Elite
• Captain Minge’s VMI Section – one section of 3” Rifles – Veteran
Valley Reserves – Colonel William Harman (no LB)
Since they were almost raw recruits, Breckinridge did not commit them to battle. However, after a few weeks more of training, some of the same elements of the Valley Reserves would do well enough at the Battle of Piedmont. They enter at 1 p.m. and go into reserve in New Market. Beginning with the 1 p.m. turn, roll 1D6 at the start of each Confederate active turn for release; it takes 1 or 2 for their release. If released, they can be used freely.
• Augusta-Rockingham Reserves – 480 men – 8 figures – MM – Green