capacitas nolendi / capacitas volendi: ability or capacity to refuse or to not will / ability or capacity to will. See facultas aversandi gratiam; gratia resistibilis.
capacitas passiva: passive capacity; as, e.g., the human capacity for grace according to Lutheran and Reformed monergism. The individual, before grace, cannot seek grace actively but can only receive grace passively. See conversio; gratia.
capax Dei: capable of God, receptive of God or of God’s gifts. Human beings in their fallen state do not have an active capacity to receive God, only a passive capacity, or capacitas passiva (q.v.), and even in an unfallen state would not have a capacity to receive God in a manner proportionate to God’s being and power. See Finitum non capax infiniti.
caput ecclesiae: head of the church; viz., Christ.
caput electorum: head of the elect; in Reformed theology, a term applied to Christ as Mediator and second Adam, related to the concept of Christ’s federal headship. See foedus gratiae; pactum salutis; primus electorum.
carentia: lack, deprivation, privation; a term used in Augustinian theology to describe sin. See privatio; privatio boni.
caritas: love; with faith (fides) and hope (spes), one of the three theological virtues; cf. 1 Corinthians 13:13; particularly love as affection or esteem; self-giving love, synonymous with benevolentia (q.v.); as distinct from amor (q.v.) and dilectio (q.v.); also the virtue associated with agenda, things to be done, one of the three spiritual categories of biblical teaching according to the medieval fourfold interpretation, or quadriga (q.v.). See fides; spes.
castigationes paternae: paternal castigations; i.e., limited, temporal punishments, inflicted on believers by God as Father, which have the effect of drawing them away from sin and saving them from the fate of eternal punishment. These punishments are also referred to as paideia (παιδεία). See tentatio.
categoria: a category; in logic, a class of praedicamenta (q.v.), or predicates. In traditional Peripatetic philosophy, the categories, or praedicamenta, can be considered either metaphysically or logically (and are therefore discussed in manuals both of metaphysics and of logic). Considered metaphysically, the categories are the real modes of finite being; considered logically, they are a classification of genera and species. The list of categories and its order will be the same in metaphysics and logic, given the assumption that logical or rational being (ens rationis) reflects real being (ens realis) and does so inasmuch as truth is the adequation (adaequatio, q.v.) of the mind to the thing. There are three divisions of the categories: the category that identifies the essence of the thing or subject, categories that inhere intrinsically in the subject, and categories that inhere in the subject as dependent on or in relation to something extrinsic to it. The first category, identifying the essence of a subject, is substance (substantia, q.v.) and refers to the thing itself as the subject in which the other categories or predicates inhere. The remaining categories are the incidental properties of the subject, the accidentia. The first grouping of three categories consists in accidentia intrinsic to the subject: quantity (quantitas), quality (qualitas), and relation (relatio). The second grouping of six categories consists in accidentia that are dependent on something extrinsic to the subject: action (actio, q.v.), passion (passio), place (ubi), posture (situs), time (quando), and habit (habitus).
catena: a chain; specifically, a chain of texts excerpted from the fathers for use in exegetical or theological explanation; also a chain of readings from Scripture. Collections of this kind, also called florilegia (gatherings of flowers), were common in the Middle Ages. Thus Thomas Aquinas’s Catena aurea is an extended gloss on the text of the Gospels. The term catena aurea is also used as a reference to Romans 8:28–30. See armilla aurea.
causa: cause; that which brings about motion or mutation. Following Aristotle, the medieval scholastics, the Reformers, and the Protestant scholastics held a basic fourfold schema of causality: (1) the causa efficiens, the efficient cause, or productive and effective cause, which is the agent productive of the motion or mutation in any sequence of causes and effects; (2) the causa materialis, or material cause, which is the physical or substantial basis of the motion or mutation, the materia on which the causa efficiens operates; (3) the causa formalis, or formal cause, which is the essentia (q.v.) or quidditas (q.v.) of the thing, and which is determinative of what the thing caused is to be; (4) the causa finalis, or final cause, which is the ultimate purpose for which a thing is made or an act is performed. In the creation of the world, e.g., God is the efficient cause; materia prima (q.v.) is the material cause; the forma substantialis (see forma), or substantial form, which determines the kind of substance drawn out of materia prima, is the formal cause; and the glory of God is the final cause. Similarly, the Reformed will apply the fourfold causality to the election of believers to salvation, varying occasionally the material and formal causes. Here the causa efficiens is the beneplacitum (q.v.), or good pleasure of God; the causa materia is Christ; the causa formalis is the preaching of the gospel; and the causa finalis is the praise and glory of God. In the logic of causality, or ordination of a causal sequence, the final cause takes precedence over the material and formal causes; i.e., the ordination of the end (finis, or telos) must precede the selection of means requisite to the achievement of that end. This logic of causality was used by the supralapsarians among the Reformed to argue for the correctness of their teaching over the infralapsarian position; i.e., election and reprobation, considered as ends manifesting the final glory of God, stand prior in the order of the decrees (ordo rerum decretarum, q.v.) to the establishment of creation and fall as means to those ends. The logic of causality also dictates that proximate or closely related causes produce only proximate or closely related effects. Ultimate ends can be appointed only by the first cause. This means that the realm of finite agents can produce only finite results or effects, whereas an infinite agent or cause, viz., God, is needed for the ordination of ends or goals beyond the finite order. In other words, no effect can be greater than its cause, and there must be a certain proportionality between all causes and their effects. This logic is neatly summed up in the maxim Quod non habet, dare non potest (What it does not have, it cannot impart). See infra lapsum; supra lapsum.
causa causans: the causing cause; i.e., the cause ultimately responsible for bringing about the thing caused; note the maxims Causa causae est causa causati: The cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused [i.e., the effect]; and Causa causantis causa est causati: The cause of the thing causing is the cause of the things caused [i.e., of the effect]. See causatum.
causa deficiens: deficient cause; a term used with reference to the origin of sin in the Augustinian system held by both Lutheran and Reformed. Since God created all things good, there can be no evil thing that exists as the efficient cause (causa efficiens) of sin. Sin must therefore arise, not out of the efficiency of some evil existent agent, but rather out of a deficiency in the willing of something by an otherwise good agent. Thus the causa peccati, the cause of sin, is a deficient cause and not an efficient cause, a deficient willing rather than an efficient willing, i.e., a willing of something not as it ought to be willed. Neither the will itself, as created, nor the object of its willing is evil. See causa; malum; peccatum; privatio; privatio boni.
causa efficiens: efficient cause. See causa.
causa electionis princeps: the principal cause of election, which is the Triune God himself. See electio; intuitu fidei; praedestinatio.
causa equivoca/causa univoca: equivocal cause/univocal cause; a standard scholastic distinction concerning the relation of causes and effects. When whatever is in the effect was also, in the same manner, in the cause, and the effect is precisely of the same kind as its cause, the cause is univocal. When whatever is in the effect was also, in a different manner, in the cause, and the effect is of a different kind than the cause, the cause is equivocal. Thus the effect is in a univocal cause in the sense that the univocal cause contains the precise similitude of the form that is in the effect (e.g., when an animal generates another animal, the parent stands as a univocal cause). By contrast, the effect is in the equivocal cause as the similitude of its more excellent form (e.g., when the sun generates something by the power of its light and heat, the effect not being another sun, the sun stands as an equivocal cause).
causa exemplaris: exemplary cause; namely, the idea or form of a thing, understood as the exemplar or pattern on the basis of which the existing thing is made. The divine ideas serve as the exemplars or exemplary causes of created things, analogous to the ideas in the minds of artisans that serve as exemplars of the things they produce. See causa; forma exemplaris; ideae divinae; universalia.
causa finalis: final cause; the ultimate purpose of an act or thing. See causa.
causa formalis: formal cause. See causa.
causa formaliter causans: the formally causing cause; i.e., the formal cause, or causa formalis. See causa.
causa impulsiva: impulsive or impelling cause; i.e., a cause external to the traditional Aristotelian model of first or efficient, material, formal, and final causes (see causa); it moves or provides opportunity for the efficient cause, though not in an absolute or necessary sense, not as a prior efficient cause. Thus man’s misery can be called the causa impulsiva or, sometimes more precisely, the causa impulsiva externa, the external impelling cause, of the divine mercy. As a synonym for causa impulsiva externa, the Protestant scholastics also use the term causa prokatarktikē, a cause that precedes and prepares.
causa instrumentalis: instrumental cause; in the realm of causae secundae (q.v.), the means, or medium, used to bring about a desired effect, distinct from the material and formal causes (see causa), as a tool is distinct from both the material upon which it is used and from the form that determines what the material is or will be. See articuli antecedentes/constituentes/consequentes.
causa libera: free cause; viz., a cause that operates not out of necessity or compulsion, but freely; specifically, God as the cause of human salvation insofar as God is in no way constrained to be gracious to his fallen creatures and is not under any external necessity in his ordination of the economy (dispensatio, q.v.) of salvation.
causa mali: cause of evil. See causa deficiens.
causa materialis: material cause. See causa.
causa meritoria: meritorious cause; i.e., an intermediate or instrumental cause that contributes to a desired effect by rendering the effect worthy of taking place. Thus Christ’s death is the causa meritoria of human salvation. The Protestant scholastics, in polemic with Rome, deny that human actions are in any way a causa meritoria of the gracious favor of God; salvation is a freely given gift that rests on God’s grace alone in Christ. Thus the idea of the human merits of congruity (meritum de congruo, q.v.), to which God graciously responds. See cooperatio; gratia; meritum de condigno.
causa mortis: cause of death.
causa peccati: cause of sin. See causa deficiens.
causa prima: first cause. See prima causa; primum movens.
causa proēgoumenē (προηγουμένη): a cause that precedes or goes before, in the sense of preparing or manifesting the way.
causa prokatarktikē (προκαταρκτική) / causa proēgoumenē (προηγουμένη): external impulsive cause / internal impulsive cause.
causa propinqua: a nearby or closely related cause; as opposed to causa remota (q.v.).
causa proxima: a proximate or closely related cause; as opposed to causa remota (q.v.).
causa remota: remote cause; viz., a cause not proximate or closely related to an effect; the remoteness may be in time, in space, or in a chain of causality. See causa.
causa sine qua non: the cause without which not; i.e., the cause apart from which the effect would not occur.
causa sui: the cause of oneself or because of oneself. See ens causa sui.
causa virtualiter causans: the virtually or effectively causing cause; i.e., the efficient cause, or causa efficiens. See causa.
causae secundae: second causes; secondary, as distinct from and subordinate to primary, causality, viz., the order of finite causality. It is a truism of scholastic theology that God does not act immediately, but mediately, through secondary or instrumental causes. The world does not experience sudden divine interventions but rather the effecting of the divine will in and through the finite order of the universe. Nor does this mean that every finite cause and effect implies a distinct and separate act of God in order to its occurrence, preceding and causing the finite cause and effect. There is no actio Dei praevia, no preceding action of God, but a concursus (q.v.) of divine primary and creaturely secondary causality or, as the Lutheran orthodox term it, a continuus Dei in creaturas influxus, a continuous inflowing, or influence, of God upon creatures.
causatum: that which has been caused; i.e., an effect. A thing caused depends for its essence upon its cause: causatum est quod, quoad essentiam, a causa pendet. See causa.
Caveat: Let one beware; thus also Caveat actor: Let the doer beware; and Caveat viator: Let the traveler beware.
certa persuasio de remissione peccatorum: the certain persuasion of the remission of sins; i.e., justifying faith considered subjectively.
certitudo: certainty, certitude, surety; specifically, the certainty of knowledge (certitudo cognitionis), also termed the certainty of assent or adhesion (certitudo adhaesionis). Human knowing is characterized by several distinct kinds of certainty: (1) Certitudo demonstrativa, or demonstrative certainty, which is an absolute certainty resting on logical demonstration or proof. This certainty can also be termed certitudo mathematica, mathematical certainty, or certitudo scientiae, the certainty of rational knowledge. (2) Certitudo moralis is a nondemonstrative certainty found in ethical decision and resting on probable arguments. Moral certainty is therefore also termed certitudo probabilis, probable certainty. (3) Certitudo principiorum is the certitude of principles, i.e., the certainty of basic principles known in and through themselves. This certitude is the foundation of both logical demonstration and moral probability. (4) Certitudo theologica, theological certainty, is also termed certitudo fidei, the certainty of faith. This certainty is not demonstrative, nor does it derive from self-evident principles. Nevertheless, theological certainty is not simply a probable certainty but a certitudo absoluta et infallibilis, an absolute and infallible certainty, resting on divine revelation by faith.
certitudo et gratiae praesentis et salutis aeternae: the certainty both of present grace and of eternal salvation; i.e., the assurance of salvation that derives from justifying faith. It is characteristic of the early Reformation doctrine of assurance, or certainty of salvation, among both Lutheran and Reformed, that Christ himself—joined to us by grace in the unio mystica (q.v.), or mystical union, which results from justification—is the ground of assurance. Luther polemicized against the monster of uncertainty (monstrum incertitudinis), and Calvin firmly grounded assurance in faith in Christ, calling Christ the mirror of election (speculum electionis). The Reformed orthodox, however, out of a desire to clarify the structure and pattern of assurance, moved away from the simple assertion of union with Christ as the ground of certainty toward the establishment of an inward logic of assurance based on the work of the Holy Spirit. This logic could manifest itself as a simple syllogism arguing the relationship of the believer to the Spirit (see syllogismus practicus) or as a detailed moral casuistry. The latter pattern is typical of English Puritanism and, via the impact of William Perkins on continental writers like Gisbertus Voetius, of Reformed covenant theology in general. The moral casuistry provided the form for personal regulation of obedience under the covenant of grace. Indeed, neither the moral casuistry nor the basic syllogismus practicus could have any application to life outside of the covenant of grace. The problem of assurance arises out of the Christian warfare with sin, death, and the devil, conducted in and through the aid of grace. It is therefore an error to view either the syllogismus practicus or the casuistry as evidences of legalism associated with the concept of a covenant of works (foedus operum, q.v.); instead, both arise out of the Reformed emphasis upon the third use of the law (see usus legis) under the covenant of grace (foedus gratiae, q.v.).
certitudo gratiae et salutis: certainty of grace and salvation. See certitudo et gratiae praesentis et salutis aeternae.
certitudo salutis: certitude or assurance of salvation; a certitude that rests on faith in Christ, not on reason or proof. See syllogismus practicus.
cessatio voluntatis: cessation of will. In distinguishing human from divine permissio (q.v.), the scholastics note that human beings can, in a sense, cease to will and thereby permit something to occur that would be contrary to our willing; yet since in God there is no cessatio voluntatis, the divine permission is always a willing and efficax permission.
character: character; an indelible mark on or quality of the soul; e.g., the mark or impression made on a soul by sacramental grace, termed character sacramentalis, character ordinis or character ordinis sacerdotalis, character baptismalis. In medieval scholastic and Roman Catholic theology, an indelible impression on the soul by baptism and ordination; the doctrinal basis for the unrepeatability of baptism and the indefectibility of ordination; denied by the Protestant scholastics, not only of ordination (to which they deny sacramental status), but also of baptism on the ground that indelible character (character indelibilis) rests on the ex opere operato conception of sacramental grace. See ex opere operato; gratia; sacramentum.
character hypostaticus sive personalis: hypostatic or personal character; specifically, the incommunicable or personal properties (proprietates personales) and the personal relations (relationes personales) of the persons of the Trinity as they serve to define and differentiate the individual persons. In other words, the hypostatic character of each person is identified or determined by the various personal characteristics, or notiones personales (q.v.), that describe each of the persons. Thus the hypostatic character of the Father, paternitas (q.v.), or paternity, is defined by the Father’s unbegottenness, together with his generation of the Son and his procession of the Spirit. The hypostatic character of the Son, filiatio (q.v.), or filiation, is defined by his generation from the Father and his procession of the Spirit. The hypostatic character of the Spirit, processio (q.v.), or procession, is his emanation or procession from the Father and the Son or, strictly speaking, his being proceeded or emanated. See notiones personales; proprietas; relatio personalis; Trinitas.
charis (χάρις): grace. See gratia.
cheirothesia (χειροθεσία): the laying on of hands, particularly in baptism and ordination.
chiliasmus: chiliasm, millennialism; viz., the hope in a future thousand-year reign of the saints, based on a more or less literalistic exegesis of Revelation 20. Some of the orthodox did distinguish between chiliasmus crassus, as taught by the fanatics, and chiliasmus subtilis (and sometimes chiliasmus subtilissimus), as found among pietists like Philipp Spener and Friedrich Lampe. The chiliasmus crassus expects a visible, earthly kingdom of Christ that will last for a literal millennium and accepts the doctrine of one or more resurrections before the final judgment. Chiliasmus subtilis or subtilissimus is so called because it moves subtly, and sometimes most subtly, away from enthusiastic notions of a thousand-year reign: thus while it does not hold the establishment of an earthly kingdom of saints in Jerusalem, it can argue for a conversion of the Jews and the defeat of antichrist (antichristus, q.v.), two eschatological returns of Christ, and sometimes two resurrections. Millennial teachings of this sort were held by many of the Protestant orthodox. Chiliasmus subtilissimus omits all literal detail and looks only toward the hope of better times, the spes meliorum temporum, in a new age of the kingdom’s expansion through the power of grace. This latter view is now sometimes called postmillennialism because it identifies the final coming as taking place after the millennium, but it is not to be confused with the late nineteenth-century notion of a gradually dawning era of peace under the gospel. Orthodox writers sometimes, more polemically, refer to these three grades of chiliasm as chiliasmus crassissimus, grossest chiliasm; chiliasmus crassus, gross chiliasm; and chiliasmus subtilis, subtle chiliasm. See adventus Christi; dies novissimus; ecclesia; millennium; spes meliorum temporum.
cholera: choler; the yellow bile, associated with the choleric disposition, one of the four primary bodily fluids in the older physiology and medicine. See humor.
chrēsis (χρῆσις): use, function. See ktēsis.
chrēstotēs (χρηστότης): goodness or kindness; especially the goodness or kindness of God. See bonitas.
Christiani sunt in ecclesia: Christians are in the church. See Extra ecclesiam non sit salus.
Christotokos (χριστότοκος): bearer of Christ; viz., the Virgin Mary. The term Christotokos is not subject to the same objections as the term Theotokos (q.v.), bearer of God, since the former can be construed as referring to Christ’s humanity.
Christus: Christ; literally, anointed one; the Latinized form of Χριστός (Christos), which in turn is the Greek term for “Messiah.” The Protestant scholastics universally recognize Christus to be the nomen officii (q.v.), or official name, of the one anointed to the office of Mediator (q.v.). See persona Christi; unio personalis.
Christus quidem fuit legis doctor, sed non legislator: Christ was indeed the teacher of the law, but not the legislator. Against the Council of Trent, the Arminians, and the Socinians, both Reformed and Lutheran orthodox argue for the perpetuity of the lex Mosaica (q.v.) or lex moralis (q.v.), the Mosaic law or moral law. They also argue for the fulfillment of that law by Christ in such a way that he corrected abuses and perversions of the law and enjoined the fulfilled law upon his church. Christ does not bring a more perfect law. The form of the maxim given above is from the system of the Lutheran scholastic Jerome Kromayer, as cited in Baier-Walther, Compendium theologiae positivae (3:57).
circulus vitiosus: a vicious circle; i.e., arguing in such a way as to rest one’s premises on the proposed conclusion or solution; similar to petitio principii (q.v.).
circumincessio: circumincession, or coinherence; used as a synonym of the Greek περιχώρησις (perichōrēsis) or emperichōrēsis (q.v.). Circumincessio refers primarily to the coinherence of the persons of the Trinity in the divine essence and in each other, in such a way that each person is fully possessed of the entire divine essence. Circumincessio is sometimes used synonymously with terms indicating “in-existence” (inexistentia), inhabitation (inhabitatio), and intercommunion (intercommunio). It can also indicate the coinherence of Christ’s divine and human natures in their communion or personal union. In neither case is the interrelationship a spatial one or such as could describe the interrelationship of physical beings. See communio naturarum; unio personalis.
circumscriptivus: circumscriptive; capable of being described or judged by physical circumscription. See praesentia.
cives: citizens; sg., civis; Christians are cives of the commonwealth of the church and ultimately of the kingdom of God.
civitas: commonwealth, body politic; specifically, the body of citizens (cives, q.v.) making up the body politic, as distinct from the collection of buildings making up the city (urbs). The term must be correctly understood in relation to the famous usage of Augustine, who wrote, not of the urbs Dei, but of the civitas Dei, the Christian commonwealth, which sojourns here on earth.
clementia: clemency, mildness; specifically, clementia Dei: the mildness or clemency of God; viz., that affection of the divine will, related to mercy (misericordia, q.v.) and long-suffering (longanimitas, q.v.), according to which God is gentle and forbearing toward his creatures.
coelum beatorum: heaven or paradise of the blessed (beati, q.v.).
coelum Dei maiestaticum: the heaven, or height, of divine majesty; in Lutheran orthodoxy, the heaven to which Christ ascends, or terminus ad quem of the ascension, synonymous with the right hand of God. Thus the ascension is not ascension to a place but the coming of Christ into the fullness of divine glory. This conception of the ascension corresponds to the christological doctrine of the genus maiestaticum in the Lutheran teaching concerning the communicatio idiomatum (q.v.), or communication of proper qualities. In the exaltation of Christ (see status exaltationis), of which the ascension is a stage, the divine majesty and omnipresence possessed by Christ (see ktēsis), but not used during the state of humiliation (status humiliationis, q.v.), are exercised in and through the human nature. Ascension to the coelum maiestaticum, therefore, indicates the majesty and omnipresence of the risen divine-human person of Christ.
coena Domini: the Lord’s Supper. See coena sacra.
coena sacra: the holy supper; i.e., the Lord’s Supper, also referred to as coena Domini and coena dominica. The sacra coena is the holy rite or action instituted by Christ in which the consecrated bread and wine mediate the body and blood of the Lord both in commemoration of his death and in the sealing of the forgiveness of sins and the impartation of grace by which faith is confirmed to life eternal. Lutherans and Reformed agree that the coena sacra is, with baptism, a means of grace and a Verbum visibile Dei, a visible Word of God, but they differ over the christological foundation of sacramental theory in the communicatio idiomatum (q.v.), over the question of the manducatio indignorum (q.v.), the eating by the unworthy, and over the definition of the presence of Christ to believers. See communicare Christo; consubstantiatio; impanatio; praesentia illocalis sive definitiva; praesentia localis; praesentia realis; praesentia spiritualis sive virtualis; sacramentum; transubstantiatio.
coessentialitas: coessentiality. See homoousios.
coetus electorum: the assembly of the elect; i.e., the church, specifically, the invisible church. See ecclesia.
coetus fidelium: the assembly of the faithful; a term applied to the church considered as community. See communio sanctorum; ecclesia.
coetus vocatorum: assembly of the called; i.e., the church. See ecclesia; vocatio.
cognitio: knowledge in the most general sense of the word; a term indicating knowledge both of concrete objects and of abstractions, knowledge gained by sense perception, and knowledge of universals, together with knowledge of the objects of the will and the affections. The scholastics can distinguish between cognitio actualis, actual knowledge, or knowledge that is presently actualized, and cognitio habitualis, habitual or latent knowledge, knowledge that lies inactive as a disposition or capacity of the knower. Further distinctions can be made among the terms cognitio innata, cognitio intuitiva, cognitio infusa, cognitio insita, cognitio affectiva, and cognitio abstractiva, inborn or innate knowledge, a knowledge of immediate apprehension, infused knowledge, implanted knowledge, affective knowledge, and abstractive knowledge. Neither the Reformers nor the Protestant scholastics argue for the existence of innate ideas in the Platonic sense; instead they argue for the presence in the mind of certain ideas that arise out of the initial encounter of mind and sense with externals. Cognitio Dei insita, implanted knowledge of God, and sometimes even the term cognitio Dei innata, innate or inborn knowledge of God, indicate neither an unmediated act of God by which knowledge is implanted nor an inward illumination (illuminatio, q.v.), but rather that fundamental sense of the divine mediated by the created order and known by the mind’s apprehension of externals, rather than by the process of logical deduction. To these categories of intellectual knowledge, the scholastics also add cognitio affectiva, affective knowledge, or knowledge arising out of the affections of the will, principally out of love. The concept of a cognitio affectiva as distinct from both rational or intellectual knowledge (cognitio intellectualis or cognitio intellectus sive rationis) and sense knowledge (cognitio sensibilis or cognitio sensus) is of paramount importance to the scholastic definition of faith as cognitio. The definition does not imply a purely intellectual knowing but includes also the operation of the will and its affective knowing. See cognitio abstractiva; cognitio innata; cognitio insita; cognitio intuitiva; fides; notiones communes.
cognitio abstractiva: abstract or abstractive knowledge. See cognitio intuitiva.
cognitio acquisita or cognitio adquisita: acquired knowledge; i.e., knowledge that is not innate or implanted but gained through the use of the faculties.
cognitio certa: certain knowledge or cognition; consisting in knowledge itself (notitia, q.v.) and assent (assensus, q.v.). See fides.
cognitio Dei abstractiva: abstract or abstractive knowledge of God; viz., the knowledge of God that fallen humanity has through both natural and supernatural revelation. In this life, God is apprehended not directly but indirectly through means, so that the knowledge we have of God belongs to the abstractive effort or operation of the intellect as it encounters the forms of revelation. See cognitio Dei intuitiva; cognitio intuitiva.
cognitio Dei intuitiva: intuitive knowledge of God; viz., the direct apprehension of God that is impossible in this life but available to the blessed (beati, q.v.) in the vision of God (visio Dei, q.v.) in the next life.
cognitio Dei naturalis: natural knowledge of God. See theologia naturalis.
cognitio innata: innate knowledge; a term indicating the presence of knowledge in the human mind prior to or at birth, apart from perception of any external objects. Innate, as distinct from implanted knowledge, is a characteristically Platonic notion, opposed to the assumption that the mind at birth is tabula rasa (q.v.). See cognitio; cognitio insita.
cognitio insita: ingrafted or implanted knowledge; especially cognitio Dei insita, ingrafted or implanted knowledge of God. Although they sometimes use the terms insita and innata interchangeably, the Protestant scholastics generally prefer the term cognitio insita to the Platonizing language of cognitio innata, innate or inborn knowledge. Strictly understood, the concept of inborn knowledge indicates an inward knowledge of eternal truths or universals (universalia, q.v.) natural to the human mind and present from birth apart from any perception of externals. But the concept of ingrafted or implanted knowledge, like the idea of a seed of religion (semen religionis, q.v.), assumes the beginning of knowledge to be in the intellect’s most rudimentary apprehension of God’s work in creation and providence or, conversely, in the rudimentary knowledge of God implanted in the intellect by God’s active presence upholding the created order. Some of the later scholastics speak of the ability of the mind to grasp intuitively or immediately through a potentia propinqua, a closely related power of the mind, such revelation of God in nature. See cognitio intuitiva; dianoētikos; discursus; theologia naturalis.
cognitio intuitiva: intuitive knowledge; i.e., knowledge that rests on the immediate apprehension of a thing, as distinct from knowledge based on a mediate apprehension by way of demonstration or discourse. In other words, demonstrative knowledge moves from premises to conclusions in a rigorous fashion, and discursive knowledge attains a similar result by less logically rigorous patterns, with the result that the conclusion is not immediately but mediately known; in contrast, intuitive knowledge moves through no logical development but grasps its object without mediation of argument. Cognitio intuitiva, by extension, is a direct knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of things and their qualities; the basis of immediate apprehension is and must be an existent thing or an existent quality in a thing. Such knowledge can be distinguished from abstractive knowledge, or cognitio abstractiva (q.v.), which does not involve the immediate apprehension of existents but rather is a knowledge of the essence or quiddity of things, apart from questions of their individual, concrete existence. Cognitio abstractiva can therefore know whether a given thing, granted its existence, is contingent or not, but it cannot know of the actual existence or nonexistence of contingents. Thus cognitio intuitiva knows human beings and their qualities and knows also of the present existence or nonexistence of particular human beings, whereas cognitio abstractiva knows about humanity, not individual existent human beings. See abstractum; concretum.
cognoscendum: thing known, object of knowing. See cognitio.
collatio locorum: a gathering or collation of places or loci; a method of interpreting texts, especially of Scripture, used either to clarify the meaning of an obscure or difficult text by drawing on other texts of related topics, or for the sake of drawing conclusions from a series of gathered texts. See analogia Scripturae; loci communes; locus; locus classicus.
collegium pietatis: a pious gathering; pl., collegia pietatis; specifically, a gathering for the study of Scripture, as often found among the pietist groups of the mid to late seventeenth century. See ecclesiola.
communicare Christo: to have communion with or join with Christ; a phrase used synonymously with and in explanation of libare sanguinem Christi, to partake of the blood of Christ, and manducare corpus Christi, to eat the body of Christ.
communicatio actionum inter se: communication of activity between themselves; viz., the common or joint activity of the two natures of Christ in the accomplishment of the work of salvation. See apotelesma; communicatio idiomatum; communicatio operationum.
communicatio apotelesmatum: the communication of apotelesmata or mediatorial operations. See apotelesma; communicatio operationum.
communicatio corporis: the communication of the body; i.e., the corpus Christi, or body of Christ. See communio corporis.
communicatio gratiarum: communication of graces; the impartation of grace by the Word to the human nature it assumed in the incarnation, consisting in the gratia unionis (q.v.), the grace of union, also termed gratia eminentiae, or grace of eminence, which elevates Jesus’s humanity above all other creatures; and the gratiae habituales, the habitual graces or gracious dispositions conferred by the Holy Spirit on the human nature of Christ. Those latter graces are gifts of true knowledge of God, soundness and perseverance of will, and great power of action, beyond the natural capacity of human beings. Because the communicatio gratiarum is a communication of spiritual gifts, it is also sometimes called the communicatio charismatum. See apotelesma; dona extraordinaria finita.
communicatio idiomatum / communicatio proprietatum: communication of proper qualities; a term used in Christology to describe the way in which the properties, or idiomata (q.v.), of each nature are communicated to or interchanged in the unity of the person. The communicatio can be characterized as either in concreto or in abstracto (q.v.). The former qualification, in concreto, refers to the concretion of Christ’s person in the incarnation and personal union; the two natures are here considered as joined in the person, and the interchange of attributes is understood as taking place at the level of the person and not between the natures. This view was typical of the Antiochene Christology and of the Reformed Christology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The latter qualification, in abstracto, refers to the abstractive consideration of the relation of the two natures to each other distinct from their union in the person and to the exchange of properties between the natures, specifically, a communication of divine properties to the human nature. This view was typical of Alexandrian and Cappadocian Christology in the early church. Both views raise doctrinal problems: the Antiochene position, taken to an extreme by Nestorius, threatens the unity of Christ’s person; the Alexandrian doctrine, taken to an extreme by Eutyches, threatens the integrity of the natures. In addition, the logic of predication argues that the use of abstractions as predicates is not legitimate. When the Reformed scholastics accuse the Lutheran orthodox of teaching communicatio idiomatum in abstracto—of using abstracta, or abstractions, as predicates—they warn not only of a Eutychian tendency but also of a logical error in the Lutheran view.
The Lutherans, however, attempt to move beyond the dichotomy between Antioch and Alexandria and, on the supposition that the unity of the two natures in Christ’s person demands a real communication or sharing of attributes, formulate a doctrine of the communication of divine attributes to the human nature, not against, but as part of, the communicatio idiomatum in concreto. The Lutherans never predicate the abstractum, divinity as such, of the abstractum humanity, but instead they rest a series of predications on the fact that the concretum of the Word is both the divine nature and the person of Christ. The Lutheran orthodox describe three genera of communicatio: the genus idiomaticum, the genus maiestaticum, and the genus apotelesmaticum. (1) The genus idiomaticum, or idiomatic genus, indicates the predication of the qualities or attributes of both natures of the person of the Mediator, so that the God-man can be said, as one person, to suffer and die but also to govern and sustain the whole creation. The qualities of each nature (idiomata) belong to the person of Christ, but each nature retains its own idiomata, so that the qualities of one nature do not, according to the genus idiomaticum, become the qualities of the other. (2) The genus maiestaticum, or majestatic genus, indicates the hypostatic relationship of the human nature within the union; since the human nature does not have an independent subsistence, but subsists enhypostatically in the divine person who assumed it, it participates in the divine attributes, specifically in the gloria and maiestas Dei (hence, maiestaticum). This, according to the Lutheran scholastics, does not represent a communicatio idiomatum in abstracto between the natures or a transfer of properties from one nature to another. Thus it is not a denial of the genus idiomaticum, but instead a recognition of the inseparability of person and nature and of the intimate communion between the divine person and his human nature. The human nature, then, partakes of the divine attributes without either losing its own idiomata or conferring human, finite idiomata upon the divine nature. The genus maiestaticum thus accounts for the ubiquity (ubiquitas, q.v.), or omnipresence (omnipraesentia, q.v.), of Christ’s human nature and provides the dogmatic underpinning in Lutheran orthodoxy for the real presence of Christ’s body and blood in the Lord’s Supper (see Logos non extra carnem; multivolipraesentia; praesentia). This is the crucial point of contention between Lutherans and Reformed. (3) The genus apotelesmaticum, or apotelesmatic genus, refers to the cooperation of the two natures in the union of the person and to the completion of the Mediator’s work; nothing is accomplished by either of the natures that is done without the communion and cooperation of the other, including the acts that are peculiar to the natures considered in and of themselves. Thus the divine nature, although it cannot suffer, remains in communion with the human nature through the sufferings of Christ and supports and sustains the humanity through its trials.
The greatest difference between the Lutherans and the Reformed appears in the genus maiestaticum, which the Reformed utterly reject. The Reformed view of the communicatio, which tends to be restricted to the genus idiomaticum, approaches the communication more as a praedicatio verbalis, or verbal predication, of idiomata from both natures of the person; but the Lutheran view insists that the person actually bears the idiomata of both natures. The Reformed, in addition, do not view the apotelesmata, or shared operations, of the natures as a genus of the communicatio idiomatum but as a separate communicatio apotelesmatum, according to which the distinct operations of both natures are brought to completion in the one work of Christ. Thus the Lutheran teaching is a real communicatio, while the Reformed, remaining at the level of a communicatio in concreto only, is quite accurately called antidosis onomatōn (ἀντίδοσις ὀνομάτων), a mutual interchange or reciprocation of names, rather than a transfer or communication of properties; or a koinōnia idiōmatōn kata synekdochēn (κοινωνία ἰδιωμάτων κατὰ συνεκδοχήν), a communion of proper qualities by synecdoche. Since synecdoche is a figure by which the name of a part stands for the whole or the whole for a part, this communio is not merely a human invention but a praedicatio vera, a true predication of attributes, but of the person only and not between the natures. See abstractum; alius/aliud; communio naturarum; concretum; genus tapeinotikon; ktēsis; totus/totum; unio personalis.
communicatio operationum: communication of operations; also communicatio apotelesmatum: the communication of mediatorial operations in and for the sake of the work of salvation; terms used by the Reformed to indicate the common work of the two natures of Christ, each doing what is proper to it according to its own attributes. The Lutherans view this apotelesma, or divine-human work, as resulting directly from the communicatio idiomatum (q.v.) and argue for a genus apotelesmaticum of the communicatio idiomatum rather than a separate communicatio apotelesmatum.
communio: communion or community; the Latin equivalent of koinōnia (q.v.). See communio sanctorum.
communio bonorum: communion of goods.
communio corporis: communion of the body; i.e., of Christ; the broken bread of the Lord’s Supper, which is the communion of the body of Christ, just as the cup of blessing is the communio sanguinis Christi, the communion of the blood of Christ. Thus in the partaking of and participation in the sacrament, believers have communion or fellowship with Christ (see koinōnia). The communio corporis Christi and the communio sanguinis Christi point toward the communicatio corporis et sanguinis Christi, the communication of the body and blood of Christ, to those who participate in the sacrament. The Reformed confine this communicatio to believers, while the Lutherans argue that all who participate receive the body and blood of Christ, since Christ is objectively given. See coena sacra; manducatio.
communio fidelium: communion of the faithful; synonymous with communio sanctorum (q.v.).
communio naturarum: communion of natures; the intimate and unitive relationship of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ. The term appears in the systems of the Lutheran orthodox as a representation of the circumincessio (q.v.), the περιχώρησις (perichōrēsis), or coinherence of the natures of Christ, by which each nature exists or dwells in the other. Specifically, the divine actively indwells the human, and the human passively exists in the divine.
communio sanctorum: communion of saints; i.e., the Christian community, the church, viewed as the body of believers; also congregatio sanctorum: congregation of the saints. The members of the church are holy (sanctus) and can be called the communio sanctorum, (1) because of the righteousness of Christ (see iustitia fidei), which is imputed to them on account of faith; (2) because of the righteousness of life (iustitia vitae) or spiritual righteousness (iustitia spiritualis, q.v.) of believers, which arises in them because of faith and through the continuing grace of the Spirit (gratia cooperans or gratia inhabitans; see gratia); and (3) because of the renovation (renovatio, q.v.) and sanctification (sanctificatio, q.v.) that occur in believers through the cooperation of the regenerate intellect and will with the grace of the Spirit in Word and sacrament. Among the Reformed the saints are often identified as the elect, and the communio sanctorum as the invisible body of the elect, or ecclesia invisibilis (see ecclesia). The Lutheran orthodox, too, can identify the church as the body of the elect (corpus electorum), but their emphasis lies more on the actuality of faith and the work of grace than on the eternal decree.
communio sanguinis: communion of the blood; i.e., of Christ. See communio corporis.
communis opinio: common opinion. See opinio.
complacentia rationalis: rational complacency; i.e., the condition of fallen humanity, pleased with themselves and their activities.
conceptio miraculosa: miraculous conception; viz., the conception of Christ by the power of the Spirit in the Virgin Mary.
concretum: a concretion; i.e., a concrete existent as opposed to an abstraction (abstractum, q.v.); a subject in which form and substance or essence and existence are conjoined. See in abstracto; in concreto.
concupiscentia: concupiscence; profound desire; from the verb concupisco, to desire, to be very desirous of, to long for. In general usage, concupiscentia can have a neutral meaning, in relation to the concupiscible (concupiscibilis, q.v.), namely, appetites, or passions. In Augustinian theology, however, concupiscentia is the wrongful desire that is present in the parents during the act of intercourse, which then passes on to the children and which, as an inborn stain, becomes the fomes peccati (q.v.), or source of sin, in the succeeding generation. Concupiscence is thus both the privatio iustitiae originalis, the privation of original righteousness, and a positive cause of sin.
concupiscibilis: concupiscible; as an adjective, worthy of desire or, used as a noun, a passion or motion of the sensitive appetite that desires what is pleasurable; also appetitus concupiscibilis, concupiscible appetite; and concupiscibilitas, concupiscibility; also vis concupiscenci, the power of desiring. As distinct from the Augustinian understanding of concupiscence (concupiscentia, q.v.), the concupiscible or concupiscible power is understood in a neutral sense in the Aristotelian faculty psychology (Greek ἐπιθυμητικόν, epithymētikon). It is not the task of the sensitive appetite to discern either theoretical good or the universal but instead, as concupiscible, simply to desire something in the sense of being pleasurable or to avoid something evil in the sense of being unpleasurable or harmful. There are six concupiscible passions, set forth as pairs of opposites: love and hate, joy and sadness, desire and aversion. See appetitus; irascibilis.
concursus or concursus generalis: concurrence or general concurrence; also concursus divinus, divine concurrence; a corollary of the doctrines of God as primum movens (q.v.) and of providence as creatio continuata (q.v.) that defines the continuing divine support of the operation of all secondary causes (whether free, contingent, or necessary). For any contingent being to act in a free, a contingent, or a necessary manner, the divine will, which supports all contingent being, must concur in its act. This concursus is therefore generalis, or general, i.e., it belongs to the order of creation and providence rather than to the order of grace, and it enables all acts of contingent being to occur, whether good or evil. Hence the concursus generalis can be distinguished into a governance (gubernatio) kat’ eudokian (q.v.) and secundum beneplacitum, by good pleasure, according to which God works his opus proprium (q.v.) in and through the good, and a gubernatio that is kata synchōrēsin (q.v.), or secundum permissionem, by permission, according to which God works his opus alienum (q.v.), or alien work, bringing about his ends in and through the evil of creatures.
The concursus rests on the omnipraesentia (q.v.) and omnipotentia (q.v.) of God and can be defined in terms both of God’s being or subsistence and of God’s effective power or operation. Thus the scholastics speak of an immediatio suppositi, an immediacy of the self-subsistent being of God, filling and supporting the being of all things; and of an immediatio virtutis, an immediacy of the effective and operative power of God in and through all things, undergirding, supporting, and sustaining the liberty and contingency of second causes (causae secundae, q.v.). See praemotio physica.
condescensio. See accommodatio.
conditio humana: the human condition.
conditio sine qua non: the condition without which not; viz., the necessary condition for something.
conditionaliter: conditionally. See ex hypothesi; necessitas consequentiae.
confessio: confession; the admission or self-accusation of sin. In medieval and Roman Catholic theology, it is a rite done in private before a priest. In Protestant theology it is usually a corporate act of the congregation in worship, although the Lutherans do not exclude private confession. Confessio is followed by absolution (absolutio, q.v.). In the Roman Catholic sacrament of penance (poenitentia, q.v.), contrition (contritio, q.v.) precedes confessio, and confession is followed both by the priest’s absolution and by his imposition of a work of penance, a satisfaction (satisfactio, q.v.) to be made for temporal sins in the place of temporal punishment. See attritio.
confirmatio: confirmation; a rite of the church viewed by the medieval doctors and by the Roman Catholic Church as a sacrament, but denied sacramental status by the Reformers and the Protestant scholastics on the ground that it does not rest on a command of God (see sacramentum). Nevertheless, both the Lutheran and Reformed orthodox view confirmatio, rightly conceived and performed, as a useful and edifying support of piety. Children baptized in infancy should receive formal instruction in the faith when they have reached an age of discretion. After this instruction they may come publicly before the bishop or pastor in order to make a profession of faith and receive the support of the church’s prayers and of the nonsuperstitious laying on of hands. Such a rite coincides with the teaching of Scripture and the ancient custom of the church. Since, moreover, it is an act of piety and edification and not a sacrament or means of grace, the Protestant scholastics note that it is in no way a completion of baptism.
confirmatio foederis: confirmation of the covenant; specifically, the sealing of the covenant of grace to believers through the sacramental signs. See foedus gratiae; promulgatio foederis; sanctio foederis.
conformitas voluntatis: conformity of will; i.e., the conforming of the human will to the divine.
confusio naturarum: confusion of natures; i.e., the Eutychian heresy, which confuses divinity and humanity in Christ by the infusion of divine attributes into the human nature. See atreptōs kai asynchytōs; communicatio idiomatum.
congregatio sanctorum: congregation of the saints. See communio sanctorum.
conscientia: conscience; the application in action of the innate habit of the mind that knows the moral law (see synderesis). The medieval debate over the identification of conscientia as a faculty (facultas, q.v.), a habit or disposition (habitus, q.v.), or an act (actus, q.v.) continued into the Reformation and post-Reformation eras, with some Reformed writers arguing that conscience is a faculty or power belonging to the intellect or understanding (e.g., Perkins) and others taking the more Thomistic view that it is an act of the understanding (e.g., Ames). In Ames’s extended definition, conscience is more than a “bare apprehension” of truth or a habit or an inclination to act or a power or faculty: it is a judgment of the understanding, specifically an act of the practical intellect that “proceeds” from a habit or disposition (Cases of Conscience 1.1.1, 6).
Both Protestants and Roman Catholic thinkers developed distinctive literature of conscience in which problems concerning the essentially spontaneous application of the innate knowledge of morality were elaborated in a highly casuistic fashion. Among Protestants, the English Puritans produced the most elaborate literature of “cases of conscience.” The Protestant orthodox do not allow, however, that conscientia was untouched by the fall but hold that it, together with the understanding and its capacities, has fallen into error; human beings are plagued by conscientia erronea, erring conscience, which misidentifies the good.
consecratio: consecration; the act of setting aside the sacramental elements from a common or secular use to a sacred use through the statement of the words of institution (verba institutionis). Without this first part of the sacramental action (actio sacramentalis, q.v.), there can be no sacrament. The Protestant orthodox are careful to point out that the consecration is one and the same as the pronouncement of the words of institution and is, in effect, a prayer of blessing and an announcement of the celebration of the sacrament. Consecration is in no way a magical act that makes Christ’s body and blood be present; both the sacrament and Christ’s presence are received in the eating and drinking of the consecrated elements. See Nihil habet rationem sacramenti extra usum a Christo institutum; sacramentum; verbum institutionis.
consensu gentium: the consent of all nations. See e consensu gentium.
consensus ecclesiae catholicae: consensus of the church catholic; among Protestant theologians, usually a reference to the agreement of the fathers of the early church (consensus patrum) on particular points of doctrine, such as the doctrines of Christ and of the Trinity. Against irenicists like Calixtus, the orthodox, both Lutheran and Reformed, denied the existence of any absolute doctrinal consensus external to and independent from Scripture, and therefore they denied a normative status to the tradition of the church, even in the more restricted sense of the tradition of the patristic period. See traditio.
consensus mutuus: mutual consent.
consensus patrum: consensus of the fathers. See consensus ecclesiae catholicae; traditio.
consensus quinquesaecularis: consensus of the first five centuries; a term used by the irenicists of the era, perhaps most notably by the Lutheran Georg Calixtus, to indicate the fundamental or “constituent” truths of Christianity on which all Christians might agree. See articuli antecedentes/constituentes/consequentes; articuli fundamentales; consensus ecclesiae catholicae; traditio.
consequentia: consequence, effect, conclusion, both in physical causality and in logic. The art of logic was devoted to the drawing of a valid or good conclusion (bona consequentia, q.v.) or, as also stated, a good and necessary conclusion (bona et necessaria consequentia). The orthodox writers could also indicate, as a general hermeneutical principle, that true doctrine was either found directly stated in Scripture or could be elicited from Scripture by way of good and necessary consequence, thus allowing for the ancillary use of logic in determining doctrine. See ancilla theologiae; necessitas consequentiae; necessitas consequentis; usus philosophiae.
conservatio: conservation, preservation; specifically, the preserving or protecting of the created order by its Creator; also conservatio mundi, conservation of the world. See providentia.
consilia evangelica: evangelical counsels; viz., the advice or counsel of the church on various moral issues, defined by the medieval scholastics as a higher obedience not commanded in the law. The church counsels, but does not command, vows of poverty and chastity. Those who follow the counsels perform acts of merit and are given a greater certainty of salvation than those who merely follow the commands of the law. The theory of consilia evangelica is tied directly to the medieval reverence for the monastic life. On the ground of justification by grace alone, through faith alone, Protestantism, both Reformed and Lutheran, rejects the medieval theory of merit and therefore rejects also the idea of consilia evangelica. See Christus quidem fuit legis doctor, sed non legislator.
consilium Dei: counsel of God; in effect, the decision of God; also consilium voluntatis Dei: the counsel of the will of God, the decision of the divine will; viz., the opus Dei essentialis ad intra, according to which God actively, immediately, and eternally wills all things. Considered as essential work, the consilium is the act of all three persons; considered as a work ad intra, it is the one, undivided, immanent (inhaerens) work of the Godhead. Consilium in this sense is virtually synonymous with εὐδοκία (eudokia), beneplacitum, decretum, and voluntas, and it is one with the essentia (q.v.) of eternal God. As such, it does not imply decision in the human sense of a choice resting on options or on acquired knowledge; the consilium, therefore, is absolute, definite, and inalterable. Some Reformed theologians set the concept of a divine counsel prior to the decree in order to emphasize the foundation of the decree in the divine understanding as coordinate with divine willing. In the federal theology of the seventeenth century, the consilium Dei can also refer to the eternal counsel or counsel of peace (consilium pacis, q.v.) between the Father and the Son concerning the salvation of humanity. See aeternitas; beneplacitum; decretum; potentia absoluta; propositum Dei; voluntas Dei.
consilium pacis: the counsel of peace; a term used by Reformed theology in the seventeenth century, particularly the Cocceians, for the mutual agreement made in eternity between the Father and the Son, usually termed the pactum salutis (q.v.). Since the term consilium pacis comes directly from Zechariah 6:13 (Vulgate), the Cocceians felt they had there found the ideal exegetical basis for their doctrine. Others, including some of the Reformed, felt that this counsel between the Lord and the “Branch” referred, instead, to the uniting of the priestly and kingly offices in the person of the Messiah and could not be used as an exegetical basis for the pactum salutis.
consolatio fratrum: consolation of the brethren; a reference to Matthew 18:20, “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.” Christians gathered as siblings have the consolation and support of Christ’s presence.
consubstantialitas: consubstantiality. See homoousios.
consubstantiatio: consubstantiation; viz., a doctrine of Christ’s sacramental presence in the Eucharist developed in the Middle Ages as an alternative to theories of substantial alteration of the elements either by annihilation or transformation of the substance of the bread and wine. According to the theory of consubstantiation, the body and blood of Christ become substantially present together with the substance of the bread and wine when the elements are consecrated. The theory is frequently confused with the Lutheran doctrine of real presence. Consubstantiatio indicates the presence of Christ’s body according to a unique sacramental mode of presence that is proper to Christ’s body as such, and it is therefore a local presence (praesentia localis, q.v.); the Lutheran view, however, argues for a real but illocal presence of Christ’s body and blood that is grounded in the omnipresence of Christ’s person, and therefore a supernatural and sacramental, rather than a local, union with the visible elements of the sacrament. A concept related to consubstantiatio is that of impanatio (q.v.), or impanation, indicating the presence of Christ’s body in the bread (in pane). Here too the bread remains and Christ’s body becomes present with it, but as propounded by its medieval proponent Guitmund of Aversa, impanatio implies a hypostatic or personal union of Christ with the bread. With reference to the wine this theory is called invinatio (q.v.), invination. Consubstantiatio implies only a presence with and not a union of Christ and the sacramental elements; it was taught as a possibility by Duns Scotus, John of Jandun, and William of Occam. See praesentia illocalis sive definitiva; praesentia realis; transubstantiatio; ubiquitas; unio personalis; unio sacramentalis.
consummatio mundi: the consummation or end of the world. See consummatio saeculi; interitus mundi.
consummatio saeculi: consummation of the age; the Latin equivalent of συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος (synteleia tou aiōnos); i.e., the end of the world, consisting in the destruction of the sinful old order by fire and the creation or re-creation of the world in the new age, thus often, consummatio huius saeculi, consummation of this age, indicating the beginning of the next age, or saeculum. See adventus Christi; dies novissimus; interitus mundi.
contemplativus, -a, -um (adj.): contemplative; synonymous with speculativus (q.v.).
contingens: contingent. See contingentia.
contingentia: contingency, contingent things; a thing or condition that exists but can also not be (quod potest non esse) and can be otherwise (quod potest aliter se habere), as distinguished from pure possibility, in which a thing or condition is not but can be (quod potest esse); impossibility, in which a thing or condition cannot be (quod non potest esse); and necessity, in which a thing or condition cannot not be (quod non potest non esse) and cannot be otherwise (quod non potest aliter se habere). Contingency, then, is an absence of necessity, not to be equated with chance but rather to be understood as the result of the free operation of secondary causes (causae secundae, q.v.). In a contingent circumstance, an effect results from clearly definable causes, though the effect could be different, given an entirely possible and different interrelation of causes. In short, a contingent event or thing is a nonnecessary event or thing that either might not exist or could be other than it is. See impossibilia; necessaria; possibile; possibilia.
continuus Dei in creaturas influxus: a continuous inflowing or influence of God on creatures. See causae secundae; concursus; creatio continuata.
contra legem: against the law.
contra ordinem: against the order; specifically, an act contrary to the revealed order of things.
contradictio in adiecto: contradiction in the adjective; i.e., a contradiction involving the improper pairing of a noun and an adjective; e.g., a square circle, a temporal eternity.
contradictoria: contradictories; mutually exclusive things or ideas; things or ideas that are not possible together, incompossibles. A contradiction is an absolute or eternal disjunction or opposition, such as at the same time to affirm and deny, to be true and false, to be and not be. A contradictory is, therefore, a nonentity. In logic, when there are two contradictory propositions, one must be true and the other false—as distinct from two contrary propositions, where one excludes the other but both may be false. Thus “It is necessary that A exists” and “It is possible that A does not exist” are contradictory: one is true and the other is false. See contraria; incompossibilia.
contradictoriae Dei voluntates: contradictory wills of God; a term used to indicate either the seeming contradiction between the revealed will of God (voluntas revelata Dei, q.v.) and the hidden will of God (voluntas abscondita) insofar as the former includes the universal offer of salvation, and the latter the salvation of only the elect; or the actual contradiction between an antecedent will (voluntas antecedens, q.v.) to save all people and a consequent will (voluntas consequens, q.v.) to save some. Reformed theologians typically deny actually contradictory wills, identify this as characteristic of Arminianism, and debate the issue as a perceived problem among the hypothetical universalists. See universalismus hypotheticus.
contraria: contraries; things that are diametrically opposed or different. In logic, contrary propositions cannot both be true, but as distinct from contradictory propositions, both may be false. Thus “It is necessary that A exists” and “It is impossible that A exists” are contrary: if one is true, the other is false, but both may be false, since A could be a not-as-yet existent possible or a soon-to-be nonexistent contingent. See contradictoria.
contrarietas: contrariety; i.e., a condition of mutual exclusion or incompatibility between things, propositions, or terms. See opposita.
contrarium: a contrary; viz., a thing, a proposition, or a term that is opposite to and logically exclusive of another thing, proposition, or term. See opposita.
contritio: contrition; a genuine repentance (resipiscentia, q.v.) arising out of filial fear (timor filialis, q.v.) and love for God (amor Dei, q.v.); sometimes distinguished into contritio activa and contritio passiva, active and passive contrition. The former indicates the active turning of the heart, and even the outward acts of repentance, and it is therefore rejected by the Protestant orthodox as works-righteousness. The Lutherans, in particular, stress contritio passiva, the inward contrition according to which the heart is broken open by grace and subjected to the terrores conscientiae, or terrors of conscience, and thus readied for the positive call of the gospel. Contritio passiva is not an inward human work but an initial work of the Spirit effected through the second use of the law and therefore not a contradiction of justification by grace alone. See attritio; lex Dei; ordo salutis; poenitentia; usus legis.
conversio: conversion; viz., the work of the Holy Spirit according to which the intellect and the will of the sinner are turned toward God in contrition and faith. Conversion can be distinguished into two kinds: (1) conversio passiva sive habitualis, passive or habitual conversion, commonly called regeneration (regeneratio), in which the will, passively, without any motion of its own, receives by grace alone the habit or disposition (habitus, q.v.) toward repentance and new life in Christ. Because the work of the conversio passiva begins in God and passes to the human subject, it is also called conversio transitiva, transitive conversion, a conversion that passes over from one being to another. (2) Conversio activa sive actualis, active or actual conversion, commonly called conversion (conversio) without modifier, in which the regenerated will itself actually and actively turns toward God; i.e., the human side of conversion, the actual repentance, or metanoia.
Because the conversio activa is confined to the human subject, it is sometimes called conversio intransitiva, intransitive conversion, or conversion that does not pass over from one being to another. Conversio activa is sometimes also called regeneratio secunda, a second or further regeneration, belonging to the renovation (renovatio, q.v.) of the individual.
The scholastics also define conversion in relation to its termini, or limits. The terminus a quo, or beginning (see terminus), of conversion in a formal sense is sin itself, sin as such, while in an objective sense it is the specific objects of or reasons for sinning peculiar to the individual sinner. The terminus ad quem, or goal, of conversion, formally considered, is faith in Christ; objectively considered, God, to whom the repentant return in and through Christ. The orthodox deny the concept of a homo renascens (q.v.), or a human being in the process of being reborn in conversion, and therefore reject any notion of a middle condition (status medius) between the two termini of conversion. In other words, conversion is not a process. Thus conversio transitiva is immediately effective as conversio intransitiva; conversio habitualis is immediately resultant in conversio actualis. The divine work and the turning of the human heart are inseparable and are distinguished only in terms of the subject of the operation. See conversio continuata; illuminatio; ordo salutis; resipiscentia.
conversio continuata: continued conversion. As distinct from the moment of conversio (q.v.) properly so called, continued conversion is the human activity of daily turning from sin in repentance. In this conversio secunda, or second conversion, human beings cooperate with God by means of a renewed intellect and will; it is therefore also termed illuminatio continuata and regeneratio continuata. Temporally, conversio continuata corresponds with sanctificatio (q.v.).
conversio reiterata: reiterated or repeated conversion. Over against the Reformed doctrine of perseverance (perseverantia, q.v.), which denies that the elect can finally fall from grace, the Lutheran orthodox argue that believers can fall away from grace as indicated by the loss of the exercise of faith (exercitium fidei), but that all such fallen remain subject to the power of grace and may experience a conversio reiterata.
cooperatio: cooperation; the term usually employed by the Protestant scholastics with reference to the doctrine of human cooperation with divine grace before regeneration, a view also termed synergism (synergismus, q.v.).
cor: heart; often in the older theology understood as the will (voluntas, q.v.) in distinction from the understanding (intellectus, q.v.).
cor incurvatus ad se: the heart curved in upon itself; a description of the sinful tendency of human beings to seek their own good in themselves rather than in God. Luther used the phrase to describe concupiscence (concupiscentia, q.v.) or original sin (peccatum originale, q.v.) as a positive problem in human beings rather than simply as a lack of original righteousness.
coram Deo: before God; as distinct from coram hominibus (q.v.), before men.
coram hominibus: before men; as distinct from coram Deo (q.v.), before God.
corporaliter: bodily, corporally. See praesentia illocalis sive definitiva; praesentia localis.
corpus Christi: the body of Christ; by extension, the church, which is the corpus Christi mysticum. See coena sacra; ecclesia; unio mystica.
corpus doctrinae: body of doctrine; specifically, the body of doctrine held by the church as true throughout its history and developed systematically during the various ages of the church; it is therefore also a theological system. See corpus theologiae; loci communes; medulla; syntagma; systema.
corpus electorum: the body of the elect; i.e., the church as the communion of saints (communio sanctorum, q.v.).
corpus iuris canonici: the body of canon law; specifically, the complete collection of ecclesiastical canons or rules that defined the governance of the medieval church and continue to define the governance of the Roman Catholic Church. See forum ecclesiasticum; regimen ecclesiasticum.
corpus theologiae: a body of theology; i.e., a theological system, or loci communes (q.v.); also called corpus doctrinae (q.v.), a body of doctrine. See medulla; systema.
correptio: accusation or rebuke; viz., an ecclesiastical discipline before excommunicatio (q.v.).
corruptio haereditaria: hereditary corruption, inherited sin; not an actual sin (peccatum actuale, q.v.), but the inherited condition of humanity. The Protestant scholastics view corruptio haereditaria as sin quoad habitum, sin in the sense of a habitus (q.v.), or disposition, as distinct from sin quoad actum, sin in the sense of an act, but distinct also from a mere potentia (q.v.) or posse peccare. See libertas naturae; peccatum originale; propagatio peccati.
cosmus (from Greek κόσμος, kosmos): the universe, viz., the entire system of spheres from the outermost first moveable sphere (primum mobile, q.v.) to the inmost sphere, the earth or world (mundus). See elementum.
creatio: creation; distinguished into (1) creatio activa, active creation, or the divine creative act in creating the world ex nihilo; and (2) creatio passiva, passive creation, or the coming to be of the world as created order. The significance of the distinction is the reinforcement of the ex nihilo (q.v.) by denying any active role in creation to the materials from which the world is made.
Creatio can also be distinguished into two stages: (1) creatio prima, the first creation, corresponding to Genesis 1:1–2, during which God drew out of nothing the materia prima, or materia inhabilis, the primary or unformed matter; and (2) creatio secunda, according to which God produced individual beings by imparting form and life to the materia prima. In Lutheran orthodoxy, the creatio prima and creatio secunda are sometimes termed creatio immediata and creatio mediata, since in the creatio secunda God arranged previously created materia, and the creation was in a sense mediated by the materia prima. This arranging of the materia consists in the ordo creationis, or order of creation, of the hexaemeron (q.v.). The Lutherans and the Reformed agree in calling the entire work of creation a free act of God resting solely on the goodness of the divine will. That God created is therefore neither an absolute necessity (necessitas absoluta, q.v.) resting on an antecedent cause nor a necessity of nature (necessitas naturae, q.v.), since God was not bound by his nature to create the world but could have existed without the creation. The Reformed add that creation is a necessity of the consequence (necessitas consequentiae, q.v.), since the divine act of creation does result from the eternal and immutable decree of God, or consilium Dei (q.v.). See creatio continuata; operationes Dei externae.
creatio continuata: continued creation; sometimes also creatio continua, continuous or ongoing creation. The act by which God brought the universe into being provides also for the preservation of the created order in its temporality. Understood sub specie aeternitatis (q.v.), there is but one act of God, who eternally wills the existence of the created order. From the perspective of time, however, a distinction can be made between the creatio primitiva, or original creation, and the creatio continuata, the continued creation or the conservation of creation. Providentia (q.v.) may therefore be viewed as the continuation of the creative act, distinct from creation only from the perspective of time, viz., from the point of view of the creature; a further distinction beyond that between creatio primitiva and creatio continuata can be made between God’s eternal decree of providence and actual providence, the temporal preservation of the world order. This concept, it needs be noted, is entirely opposed to the view of philosophical occasionalists, who assume that creation is re-created from moment to moment, and of pantheists, who hold to an ongoing self-diversification of Deus sive natura (q.v.). See causae secundae; concursus.
creatio primitiva: original creation; namely, the original act of creation ex nihilo. See creatio continuata.
Crede, ut intelligas: Believe in order that you may understand; Augustine’s dictum concerning the relationship of belief and authority to reason, from his Sermon 43.7, 9.
credenda; sg., credendum: literally, things to be believed; thus, beliefs, objects of belief, Christian doctrine. See agenda; quadriga; speranda.
credere / credere in: to believe / to believe in. Scholastic theology distinguishes three types of believing: (1) Credere Deo: to believe God; i.e., to accept as true the revelation or scriptural Word of God. This is not a saving faith but merely fides historica, held by good and bad alike. (2) Credere Deum: to believe in (the existence of) God; again, not a saving faith, since it implies no loving relationship with God. (3) Credere in Deum: to believe in God, in the sense of a close personal love and trust in God and in his mercy; this is fides salvifica, or in the terms of medieval scholasticism, fides formata (q.v.). See fides.
Credo, ut intelligam: I believe in order that I might understand; Anselm’s statement (Proslogion 1) of his premise concerning the relationship of faith and reason, which was a conscious echo of Augustine’s Crede, ut intelligas (q.v.).
Crimen trahit personam: crime draws the person along with it.
crux: cross.
crux theologorum: the cross of theologians; i.e., the doctrinal question most troublesome to theologians, which cannot be solved in this life, viz., the question concerning the reason for the salvation of some people and not others; a term used by Lutherans to pose the problem of universal and particular grace and to point to the problem inherent both in Calvinism, which must qualify universal grace, and in Arminianism, which must deny salvation by (particular) grace alone.
culpa: guilt, fault, or crime; as distinct from poena (q.v.), punishment.
cultus: an honoring, a reverencing, a veneration of the divine; a word derived from the verb colo, colere, which indicates a caring for, a cultivation of, or an honoring of something. Thus religion (religio, q.v.) is described as cultus or as recta Deum colendi ratio, a right way of honoring God. Cultus may be distinguished into cultus internus, or inward devotion, consisting in the Christian virtues of faith (fides, q.v.), hope (spes, q.v.), and love (caritas, q.v.); and cultus externus, external devotion, consisting in outward worship and Christian service.
cultus vere divinus: true divine worship; i.e., worship that is accorded only to God (see latria). Because of their view of the communicatio idiomatum (q.v.), or communication of proper qualities, the Lutheran scholastics argued for a cultus vere divinus of Christ according to his human nature. The Reformed, by way of contrast, held a cultus mediatorius, or mediatorial worship, due to Christ’s humanity in its union with the divine nature. See religio.
cupiditas: cupidity, passionate desire, lust, wrongful appetite; in the Augustinian vocabulary, wrongfully and pridefully directed love. See amor; caritas; concupiscentia; dilectio.