macula: stain or blemish; specifically, spiritual pollution (pollutio spiritualis) and deformity of nature (deformitas naturae), i.e., the defilement of the soul that results from sin. See reatus.
Magis et minus non variant speciem: Greater and lesser do not vary according to species, or kind; an important philosophical axiom based on the fact that greater and lesser, albeit intrinsic, are quantitative and not essential or substantial characteristics. A tall tree is no more a tree than a shorter tree; their essence or substance is the same. See categoria.
magister: master; in the university, the title of one who has been awarded the first of the teaching degrees above the baccalaureus.
Magister dixit: The master said it; a reference to a saying by an authoritative teacher.
magisterium: teaching authority; i.e., the authority of the magister (q.v.); most frequently, the teaching authority of the church, the ecclesia docens (q.v.), according to Roman Catholic doctrine.
magnalia Dei: the mighty works of God. See opera Dei.
magnitudo: greatness, magnitude; as an attribute of God, the magnitudo Dei, the greatness of God in all his attributes, the greatness or magnitude of the divine essence itself. Specifically, magnitudo is used as a synonym for infinitude (infinitas, q.v.), both in terms of the divine immensity (immensitas, q.v.), or transcendence of space, and the divine eternity (aeternitas, q.v.), or transcendence of time. See attributa divina.
maiestas: majesty; i.e., the maiestas Dei, or majesty of God, the supreme eminence of the divine essence and attributes, usually paired with gloria (q.v.), the glory of God.
male velle: evil willing; the act of willing in an evil manner for the sake of doing evil. See velle malum.
malignitas: malignancy, maliciousness, spitefulness.
malitia: malice, wickedness, vice. See malum.
malum (n.) and malus, -a, -um (adj.): evil; the contrary or opposite of good; negation of the good. As defined by Augustine and argued by the scholastics, evil is not a thing or a substance. Since all things, as all the substances from which things are formed, are made by God, and since God created all things good, evil must be defined as having nonsubstantial existence, or as existing in the form of a defect (vitium, q.v.) or a privation (privatio, q.v.) in an otherwise good thing. Evil therefore cannot be an ultimate opposed eternally to the ultimate good; for its very existence evil depends on the existence of good. Nor can evil become absolute, since evil is a defect or a privation in and of the good; its increase toward the absolute results in the absolute privation of the good, i.e., in nonbeing or nothingness. Evil can also be defined, therefore, as the privation of being or as the result of a will moving away from being toward nonbeing.
Evil can be variously distinguished. Evil can be considered as either absolute (malum absolutum, malitia absoluta), as an imperfection or defect considered in itself; or relative (malum relativum), as the privation of a perfection in a thing. Note that, given the Augustinian understanding of evil, the malum absolutum cannot be a thing or a being in itself, which would imply a substantial or fundamental dualism, i.e., a Manichaean dualism. Alternatively, evil can be distinguished into malum entiativum, entiative or existent evil, when an act or quality is evil in itself, as sin (peccatum, q.v.) or vice (vitium); malum subiectivum, subjective evil, when something is the subject of evil or wickedness, as the sinful will; and malum formale, formal evil, when something is evil in a formal, constitutive, or apparent sense as wickedness (malitia). Again, the malum entiativum references not the being of a thing as if an existent thing, being, or substance (res, ens, substantia, q.v.) can be substantially or essentially evil, but the intrinsic evil of an act or quality considered in itself, such as murder or theft.
The connection traditionally made between the “tree of knowledge of good and evil” (Gen. 2:9)—the arbor scientiae boni et mali—and the “apple” reputedly eaten by the first pair rests, not on an ignorance of the text, as sometimes assumed, but on a bit of philological humor: the adjective “evil” (malus, mala, malum) is identical in its masculine and neuter forms, respectively, with the Latin words for “apple tree” (malus) and “apple” (malum).
mandatum: command, mandate.
mandatum scribendi: mandate or command to write; also impulsum scribendi, the impulse to write; an assumption of the doctrine of verbal inspiration, viz., that the Spirit initiated the writing of Scripture and provided a mandatum, or an impulsum, to write (2 Pet. 1:21).
manducare corpus Christi: to eat the body of Christ. See coena sacra; communicare Christo; manducatio.
manducatio: eating; specifically, in sacramental theology, the eating, partaking, and enjoyment of the Lord’s Supper (coena sacra, q.v.). This manducatio is variously distinguished by the scholastics. The Reformed argue for a twofold distinction between (1) a manducatio sacramentalis or symbolica, a sacramental or symbolic eating, which is given to believers and unbelievers and which involves only the eating of the signum (q.v.), or sign, the bread; and (2) a manducatio spiritualis, or spiritual eating, which is possible only for believers, who receive the body of Christ through faith by the agency of the Spirit.
The Reformed further speak of a manducatio indigna, an unworthy eating, of the sacramental elements by unbelievers, but they deny a manducatio indignorum, eating by the unworthy, which implies that unbelievers actually receive the body of Christ. In opposition to this view, which appeared to them to be a denial of the real presence of Christ in the supper (praesentia realis, q.v.), the Lutherans argue for (1) a manducatio oralis, or oral eating, not in the sense of a natural or physical eating, but rather a sacramental eating in the sense of a manducatio hyperphysica sive supernaturalis, a hyperphysical or supernatural eating, Christ’s body being received through the mouth, but not being digested as bread is digested; and (2) a manducatio sacramentalis or spiritualis, sacramental or spiritual eating, i.e., appropriating to oneself the merits and blessings of Christ by faith. Furthermore, this emphasis on praesentia realis and manducatio oralis hyperphysica led the Lutherans to deny a distinction between manducatio indigna and manducatio indignorum and to argue, on the basis of 1 Corinthians 11:27–29, that unbelievers receive the body of Christ to their judgment or damnation. Lutheran theologians typically point to the manducatio indignorum as the key to understanding the difference between Lutheran affirmation of praesentia realis and Reformed use of the term. Note further that the language of manducatio spiritualis, sacramentalis, etc. applies equally to the spiritual and sacramental drinking of Christ’s blood: thus bibitio spiritualis, bibitio sacramentalis, and the like.
manifestatio: manifestation. See patefactio; revelatio.
manutenentia: maintenance, preservation; synonymous with conservatio, conservation; one aspect of providentia (q.v.).
massa perditionis: mass or lump of perdition; i.e., the universally fallen humanity out of which God elects some to salvation; an Augustinian term associated particularly with the infralapsarian form of the doctrine of predestination. The usage arises from the Latin of Romans 9:21–22, “Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump [massa] . . . vessels of wrath [and] vessels of mercy.” See infra lapsum; praedestinatio.
mater fidelium: mother of the faithful; a designation of the church considered as institution. See ecclesia.
materia: matter; i.e., the corporeal substratum of things, understood to have been created by God out of nothing (ex nihilo, q.v.), first as the undifferentiated or confused and chaotic primary matter (materia prima) and subsequently as the underlying, now differentiated stuff of knowable or identifiable things (materia secunda). Substance (substantia, q.v.) is the union of materia and form (forma, q.v.). See essentia; hylē amorphos; materia prima; materia secunda; natura.
materia coelestis: heavenly material or heavenly element; i.e., the res coelestis, or heavenly element, in the Lord’s Supper. Rather than use language of sign and thing signified (signum and res signata) and imply a sacramental theology of mere representation or spiritual presence, the Lutheran orthodox speak of the visible, corporeal, or sensible element and the invisible or intelligible element of the sacrament, or to the earthly material (materia terrestris) and heavenly material (materia coelestis) of the sacrament. Thus, in the Lord’s Supper there is a sacramental union (unio sacramentalis, q.v.) of earthly material, bread and wine, with heavenly material, the body and blood of Christ. Whereas the materia or res (q.v.) of the Lord’s Supper is easily identified as the person of Christ, the materia or res of baptism was the subject of some discussion among the Lutheran scholastics. Some identified it as the Holy Spirit, others as Christ or the blood of Christ, but most argued for the Trinity, as indicated by the baptismal formula. Nevertheless, it is Christ and his blood that make the sacrament possible and provide the objective ground of the salvation therein offered (see res sacramenti), so that Christ remains the res signata, or thing signified, by the sacrament from one point of view, while the Father, Son, and Spirit, who as one God dwell in the hearts of believers, are clearly the ultimate ground and the source of baptismal grace and therefore, from another view, are equally well called the materia or res coelestis. Later orthodox Lutherans thought it better to refrain from final decision on the point at issue. See baptismus; coena sacra; sacramentum.
materia inhabilis: literally, undisposed matter; the chaos or formless mass of the first act of creation, also called materia prima (q.v.). Not only is materia inhabilis undisposed or unformed, but it is also incapable of forming or giving disposition to itself. See creatio.
materia prima: prime matter or first material; also termed materia inhabilis (q.v.), undisposed or formless matter, the fundamental materiality, or ὕλη ἄμορφος (hylē amorphos, q.v.), in Aristotelian philosophy; in theology, the chaotic, formless earth of the first act of creation, which God informs (gives material form to) in the second act of creation in order to bring forth the individual species of the created order; in scholastic philosophy, the underlying unformed material substratum of all things, identified by Aristotle as the basis of continuity and change beneath the transitory substances of temporal things. In the theology and Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages and early modern era, there are two understandings of prime matter. (1) Materia prima is understood as the absolutely generalized basis of all subsequent individuation; it is utterly potential, absolutely formless in the sense of lacking any and all substantial form (forma substantialis; see forma), and devoid of all attributes or qualities. Given that such utter absence of form would, arguably, preclude any existence at all, materia prima in this sense is claimed by some to be purely hypothetical, yielding (2) the alternative understanding of materia prima as a fundamental elemental matter subsisting in a rude, chaotic mass, the tōhû wābōhû of Genesis 1:1–2. Various writers indicate that the rude original mass consisted in earth, water, air, and fire, namely, the four elements. This mass would nonetheless not have in it a power of self-motion, would be incapable of informing itself, and would not consist in individual things; i.e., materia with an elemental but not a substantial form and not yet separated out into a coherent world order. This second view was that of Aquinas and appears to have been the majority view of both Reformed and Lutheran scholastics, although a few, following Scotus, did hold to the former definition.
Individuation rests, first, on the informing of prime matter with the forma substantialis, or substantial form, that distinguishes the substance of one species of thing from the substance of another species. This union of materia prima with forma substantialis results in materia secunda, second matter, the basis of all material existence. The way in which this materia secunda is further differentiated into individuals of a species was a matter of dispute among the scholastics. The Thomists argued that the principle of individuation is not the form, or universal, in things but the matter itself of things insofar as matter is that out of which quantity arises. Scotus argued that prime matter itself cannot be the principle of individuation, since matter apart from form is entirely undetermined and undifferentiated. Scotus identifies the principle of individuation as a formally distinct (see distinctio) individual entity of a thing, i.e., as a principle that is really the thing as a composite of form and matter but that is formally distinguishable in the thing as an individuating principle neither purely material nor purely of the universal. Scotus refers to it as the haecceitas (q.v.), or “thisness,” of the thing.
materia secunda: second matter; viz., substance at the basis of existent things, the combination of materia prima (q.v.) and forma substantialis, or substantial form.
materia terrena: earthly material or substance; i.e., the bread and wine of the sacrament as distinct from the materia coelestis (q.v.), or heavenly material, with which they are united; also called materia terrestris. See coena Domini; unio sacramentalis.
mē on (μὴ ὄν): nonbeing; specifically, in Platonic philosophy, a plasticity of space or an indeterminacy upon which the ideas or forms (ἰδέαι or εἴδη, ideai or eidē) are impressed. This nonbeing accounts for the imperfection and transience of all embodiments of the eternal forms. Over against this theory, Aristotle argued that space, nothingness, or nonbeing in this absolute sense cannot be the foundation of the corporeal order. In other words, Aristotle argued against an absolute dualism of form and matter, being and nonbeing. In his Metaphysics (5.4.1015a.7)—as interpreted by the scholastics—Aristotle argued for an eternal material substratum, a not-quite-nothingness of pure potency (potentia, q.v.) or unformed matter (πρώτη ὕλη, prōtē hylē). In addition, he assumed the union of form and matter, denying the incorporeal existence of ideas or universals (universalia, q.v.). Form is the principle of self-realization (entelecheia, q.v.) in all things. Thus formless matter or pure potency does not exist as such; rather potency always exists in relation to some actuality (actus, q.v.; see in actu). The scholastics adapt the Aristotelian model insofar as it is more susceptible of a Christian construction. The μὴ ὄν is therefore non-ens, nonbeing, in an absolute sense, a nihil negativum materiam excludens, a negative nothingness excluding matter, pure space not susceptible of form. Formless matter or pure potency is a nihil positivum, a positive nothingness, or material nothing, usually identified as materia prima (q.v.), primary matter, the void or chaotic earth of the first day of creation. See ens; forma; nihil.
media: means; sg., medium; the instrumentality through which an end, or goal, is accomplished, sometimes termed instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis, q.v.), or second cause (causae secundae, q.v.). It is characteristic of means that they are passive in the order of causes and are utilized by the efficient cause. The value, positive or negative, of means therefore derives from the end achieved, the means in themselves being neutral. When, however, means are used in such a way as to have value in themselves and, in effect, attain the status of a proximate end, they not only cease to be neutral but also affect the achievement of the final end. A related problem concerning the particular status of churchly rites and practices considered as means led to the use of media as a synonym for adiaphora (q.v.) in the discussions of so-called things indifferent.
media communicationis remissionis peccatorum: means of the communication of the remission of sins; i.e., the Word and the sacraments viewed causally or ex parte Dei, on the part of God, as means of offering or bestowing (media oblativa sive dativa) grace, or as instruments (instrumenta) of grace that are operative and effective (operativa et effectiva). See organa gratiae et salutis.
media dotika (δοτικά): given or received means; in the justification of the sinner, the means of grace given by God, Word and sacrament, as distinct from faith, the medium lēptikon (q.v.), or receiving means.
media gratiae: means of grace; i.e., Word and sacraments as the means by which the grace of God is operative in the church. The term is used by both Lutheran and Reformed orthodox, although the Lutherans often substitute a stronger term, organa gratiae et salutis (q.v.), instruments of grace and salvation. The identification of Word and sacraments as media gratiae does not intend to exclude a general or common operation of grace but rather seeks to indicate the function of both Word and sacraments in the regeneration (regeneratio, q.v.) and sanctification (sanctificatio, q.v.) of human beings as the instruments or objective channels of special or saving grace (gratia specialis). Word and sacraments are thus instrumental both in the inception of salvation and in the continuance of the work of grace in the Christian life. In addition, Word and sacraments are the sole officially ordained or instituted instruments or means of grace. God has promised the presence of his grace to faithful hearers of the Word and faithful participants in the sacraments. Thus the right preaching of the Word and the right administration of the sacraments are the marks or identifying features of the true church (notae ecclesiae, q.v.). The Lutherans differ from the Reformed in rooting saving grace more totally in Word and sacrament. Without denying the efficacy of grace in Word and sacrament, the Reformed argue for the nonreception of that grace and also the ineffectual calling of the external Word (Verbum externum, q.v.) in the case of the nonelect or reprobate.
media iustificationis: the means of justification; i.e., Word and sacrament, the media dotika (q.v.), or given means; and faith, the medium lēptikon (q.v.), or receiving means. See fides; iustificatio; organa gratiae et salutis.
media remissionis peccatorum: means of the remission of sins; i.e., the means of grace, or Word and sacrament. See organa gratiae et salutis.
Mediator: Mediator, Reconciler; viz., Christ in the exercise of his threefold office (munus triplex, q.v.). Christ, as the God-man, is the person who fulfills the conditions requisite to the reconciliation of God and sinful humanity. His human nature is capable of performing a redemptive act representative of and in the place of sinful human beings, and the divine nature is capable both of sustaining the human nature throughout the ordeal of its saving work and of rendering the work performed through the instrumentality of the human nature of infinite value by reason of the infinite worth and power of his divinity. Following Augustine’s reading of 1 Timothy 2:5 (Confessions 10.43), the medieval doctors argued that Christ was Mediator according to his humanity, in which and through which the work of mediation was performed and without which the divine nature could not have been a mediator. The Reformers, and after them the Protestant scholastics, argue that neither nature (divine or human) by itself could mediate between God and man and that both natures together perform the one opus theandricum (q.v.), or divine-human work; therefore, Christ is Mediator according to both natures. See medius; unio personalis.
meditatio: meditation.
medium: means. See media.
medium cognoscendi: means of knowing; in theology the media cognoscendi are reason (ratio, q.v.) in the case of natural theology and Scripture (not, of course, without the use of our rational faculties) in revealed theology. See principia theologiae; theologia naturalis.
medium iustificationis: means of justification. See medium lēptikon.
medium lēptikon (ληπτικόν): the accepting or receiving medium or means; viz., faith, the medium iustificationis (q.v.), characterized as a passive means, disposed to accept God’s grace, rather than actively or synergistically searching out the grace of God. The adjective ληπτικός (lēptikos) is not biblical but rather was drawn by the Lutheran scholastics from Aristotelian philosophy; in the present usage, it has the effect of describing faith as a habitus (q.v.), or disposition. Faith is therefore not the cause of justification, but it is the condition for receiving justification, graciously instilled in human beings apart from works. The Protestant scholastics use the term medium receptivum, or receptive means, as a synonym of medium lēptikon. See iustificatio; media dotika.
medius: between, in between; a term applied to Christ: as one person in whom the divine and human natures are joined, Christ stands directly between God and man. In the medieval scholastic vocabulary, Christ is medius, or in between God and man, according to both natures, and because of his middle position, he is capable of being Mediator (q.v.) according to his human nature. The Reformers and Protestant scholastics argue that Christ is medius and also Mediator according to both natures, though they continue to distinguish between (1) medius as a neutral term indicating the position of Christ as God-man between God and humanity and (2) Mediator as an official term pointing toward Christ’s work of reconciliation.
medulla: marrow, central core; thus the primary or central issues in a body of knowledge, e.g., medulla theologiae, the marrow of theology—the title of a brief, tightly organized theological system, such as the Medulla theologiae of William Ames. See corpus theologiae; erōtēma; loci communes; syntagma; systema; theologia acroamatica.
melancholia: melancholy; the black bile associated with the melancholic disposition, one of the four primary bodily humors, or fluids, in the older physiology and medicine. See humor.
membra ecclesiae militantis: members of the church militant; viz., the members of the earthly and struggling church who, in death, will become membra ecclesiae triumphantis, members of the church triumphant. See ecclesia.
mens: mind, intellect. See intellectus.
mensura: measure. See immensitas.
merita supererogationis: merits of supererogation. See opera supererogationis.
meritum: merit; viz., the value or worth of a good or obedient act or the act itself; by extension, the just desert of the person performing the act. According to the medieval scholastic doctrine of salvation, human beings, with the aid of grace (gratia, q.v.), are required to live a life of active obedience and thereby be worthy of salvation. Considered in themselves as human acts, acts of obedience are half-merits that in an ultimate sense do not earn the gift of eternal salvation (meritum de congruo, q.v.). Considered, however, as works of the Spirit in us, these acts are fully meritorious (meritum de condigno). The Christian sinner, moreover, is required to perform acts of penance (poenitentia); because penance is a sacrament and a means of grace, these acts both convey grace to the sinner through the performance of the sacrament (ex opere operato, q.v.) and, insofar as the sinner willingly performs the act and receives further grace (ex opere operantis, q.v.), are themselves meritorious acts or merits. Over against this view, the Protestant scholastics, both Lutheran and Reformed, hold that no human acts, whether before or after grace, have merit. In standing before God, a person justified by grace through faith alone is counted as both righteous and personally sinful (simul iustus et peccator, q.v.).
The good acts that flow from grace are divine acts in the individual and contribute nothing at all to one’s salvation. Since, in this view, only perfect righteousness can be meritorious, only Christ merits life in and of himself, not for himself but vicariously for us. This merit of Christ (meritum Christi, q.v.), the value or worth of Christ’s righteousness or obedience, is the superabundant ground of salvation and is the sole true merit allowed in the Protestant orthodox system. Nonetheless, there are good works that spring from faith and the work of the Holy Spirit that can be identified as merits. In this sense, as found among the church fathers, the term is accepted among Protestant orthodox writers. See poenitentia.
meritum Christi: the merit of Christ; a term understood in two ways: the medieval scholastics, in accord with their view of the obedience of Christ (obedientia Christi, q.v.), divided the merit of Christ into (1) the merit acquired by Christ for himself through his perfect obedience, as a result of which he was worthy of life and could accept death voluntarily (i.e., not as the wages of sin), and (2) the merit of Christ’s passive obedience to death, which can be graciously applied via the sacraments to believers. The Protestant scholastics, on the basis of the unity of the obedientia Christi and the application of the entirety of Christ’s work to believers, argue that Christ merited nothing for himself. Equally important to the concept of the meritum Christi is the question of the source and the extent or value of Christ’s merit. The argument most often found among the Protestant scholastics, both Lutheran and Reformed, received its clearest medieval formulation in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The source of the meritum Christi is the persona Christi, who performs the work of satisfaction (satisfactio vicaria, q.v.). Since the person is the divine Word, the infinite Second Person of the Trinity, the work performed by that person, even though accomplished through the instrumentality of his human nature, must be infinite. Against this view, Duns Scotus argued that Christ’s work was in and of itself of finite value, since the source of the value or worth of the work must be the human nature of Christ in and by which the work was accomplished. The infinite sufficiency of Christ’s merit arose, according to Scotus, from the divine acceptation (acceptatio, q.v.) of the finite meritum Christi as payment in full for sin. This counterargument became significant for Protestant orthodoxy in the seventeenth century when it was adopted by Hugo Grotius and ultimately became the normative view in Arminianism—the so-called moral government theory of atonement (see acceptilatio). A third view was stated by Calvin, most probably as an intensification of the Scotist view. The value of Christ’s merit rests upon the divine decree (Institutes 2.17.l). Unlike the Scotist view, Calvin’s doctrine argues for the infinite merit, or all-sufficiency, of Christ’s satisfaction, but on the same basis as the Scotist acceptation: the absolute will of God. Despite the general accord between Calvin’s view of the communicatio idiomatum (q.v.), or communication of proper qualities in the person of Christ, and that of later Reformed thinkers, the orthodox Reformed tend not to follow Calvin on the specific issue of the infinite value of Christ’s merit, but rather to agree with the Lutheran scholastics on the more generally Thomistic solution to the problem, viz., grounding the infinite worthiness of Christ’s satisfaction in the divinity of Christ’s person (cf. Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae 14.12.7). See sufficientia.
meritum de condigno: merit of condignity or condign merit; also called full merit as opposed to a half-merit or meritum de congruo (q.v.).
meritum de congruo: merit of congruity; a so-called half-merit, or proportionate merit. In late medieval scholastic theology a distinction was made between (1) a meritum de condigno, a merit of condignity or full merit, deserving of grace, and (2) a meritum de congruo, a half-merit or act not truly deserving of grace, but nevertheless receiving grace on the basis of the divine generosity. Aquinas had argued that meritorious acts of the regenerate could be considered either in terms of the merit of the Holy Spirit’s work in the individual or in terms of the merit of the individual’s own effort. In the former case, the act could be viewed as a meritum de condigno, a full merit, inasmuch as the work of the Spirit is absolutely good and is the ground of a truly and justly deserved salvation. In the latter case, the act is only a meritum de congruo, a half-merit, inasmuch as no human act can justly deserve the reward of salvation. Nevertheless, the half-merit can be viewed as receiving a proportionate reward in the gift of salvation. In response to a finite act in which individuals do what they are able, God who is infinite responds by doing as much as he is able—which, of course, is infinitely greater. The gift is not equivalent in an absolute sense, as in the case of meritum de condigno, but it is proportionately just. Whereas Aquinas allowed no merit, either de congruo or de condigno, before the work of grace in human beings, late medieval theology, following Scotus, argued for a meritum de congruo, before saving or operative grace (see gratia), in the purely natural condition (status purorum naturalium, q.v.). According to Scotus, the fall had merely resulted in the loss of a superadded gift (donum superadditum, q.v.) of grace that Adam had earned by doing a meritorious work on the basis of his natural ability. After the fall, Scotus argued, this grace could be once again earned; people could merit grace by doing what was in them, i.e., by performing a half-merit, thereby earning a proportionate reward. In other words, a person need not be capable of earning salvation by a fully meritorious act, which of course is impossible for fallen human beings. The concept of a meritum de congruo, or proportionate merit, allowed late medieval scholastics to argue that a minimal act might be performed and, because of it, one could merit an initial gift of grace. See facere quod in se est.
mesitēs (μεσίτης): mediator. See Mediator.
metabainonta (μεταβαίνοντα): things that have passed over from one condition or one subject to another.
metameleia (μεταμέλεια): feeling of regret. See metanoia.
metanoia (μετάνοια): repentance, change of mind; e.g., Luke 15:7. The Protestant scholastics frequently conjoin metanoia, defined as a change of mind, with metameleia (μεταμέλεια), defined as the feeling of regret or anguish over sin, in their definitions of repentance (resipiscentia, q.v.; see poenitentia) and conversion (conversio activa sive actualis, q.v.).
metaphysica: metaphysic or, in common English usage, metaphysics; literally, beyond the physics; a term arising from the placement of Aristotle’s treatise on first philosophy, or first principles, in the ancient collection of Andronicus—after the treatises on physics. Aristotle himself did not use the term metaphysica. Metaphysics, or as it is also called, first philosophy, is by definition the philosophical knowledge (see epistēmē; scientia) concerned with the understanding of “being” in the most general sense; thus it is the science of being simply as being, or the science of all beings considered as beings. It includes the discussion of first causes, universals, or essences as the ground of the existence of particulars. As such, it represents an area of interest in philosophy that overlaps the domain of theology (see articuli puri/mixti; usus philosophiae). In Aristotle’s own designation of the subject, it is actually to be identified as theologia, linking what came to be called metaphysica to the discipline of natural theology (theologia naturalis, q.v.).
Metaphysics can deal with God as being and as first mover (primum movens, q.v.), with primary efficient causality (see causa), and with the relationship of form (forma, q.v.) and matter (see materia prima; mē on) and therefore with questions relating to the origin of the world. A distinction must be made between metaphysics and theology on this issue, in that metaphysics can address God as being in the absolute sense and as first cause, whereas theology addresses God as God, not only as first cause but also as related to the created order in a series of intellectual, volitional, and moral attributes. Various Reformed writers of the early modern era excluded discussion of God from metaphysics on the ground that metaphysics is the science of being in general and God is not only a particular being but also the infinite creator of finite being, whose being, therefore, cannot be conceptually univocal with the beginning of creatures. See creatio; essentia; ex nihilo; principium; universalia; univocatio.
metaphysicus, -a, -um (adj.): metaphysical; beyond the physical. See metaphysica.
methodus: method; from the Greek μετά + ὁδός, meta + hodos (a way through); specifically, method understood as a suitable way through a series of topics or difficulties. See locus.
microcosmos (from the Greek μικρόκοσμος, mikrokosmos): microcosm or miniature world, tiny universe; a term applied to the human being as the pinnacle and sum of creation, in whom the entirety of the created order is mirrored. The scholastics refer to the human being as a chart, or compendium, of creation that in small compass recapitulates the creation.
millennium: a thousand years; viz., the thousand-year reign of the saints. The Protestant orthodox, both Lutheran and Reformed, opposed what they held to be crass or fanatical forms of millennialism, identified as problematic in the Augsburg Confession, the Forty-Two Articles of Edward VI, and the Second Helvetic Confession. Still, neither the Reformers nor the orthodox simply reduced the notion of the millennium to the reign of grace of indeterminate length between the first and the second visible comings of Christ, the age of the ecclesia militans. The issue of the time of the millennium was posed for the writers of the Reformation and the era of orthodoxy by their recognition, in common with various theologians of the later Middle Ages, that the Augustinian assumption of a churchly millennium extending from some time in the history of the early church for a thousand years, would lead to the conclusion that the millennium had ended. Thus the tendency of the Reformers and of the early orthodox writers was to view the millennium as past, extending either from the destruction of the temple in AD 70 to Gregory VII and the investiture controversy, when the papacy made war on empire, or from the time of Constantine in the early fourth century to the Babylonian Captivity of the church in the fourteenth century. A significant shift in understanding occurred in the seventeenth century, when theologians like Alsted and Comenius argued for an imminent future millennium. This understanding become common in the high and late orthodox eras. See chiliasmus.
ministerium: the body of ministers or pastors charged with the work of maintaining pure worship and true doctrine; also the work of service in which the ministri engage. See regimen ecclesiasticum.
ministrantes inter Christianos: ministers or servants among Christians; i.e., the clergy. The Reformers and the Protestant orthodox are adamant in their argument against Rome that a minister or pastor is not a priest (sacerdos) but rather an official of the church distinguished from laity only by office or work and having no special powers.
ministri ministrantes: ministering or serving ministers; among the Reformed a term used to designate the presbyters and deacons who support the work of the clergy. As the ecclesia repraesentativa (q.v.), the presbyters join with the pastor in governing the church. See ecclesia.
mirabile dictu: wonderful to say.
mirabilia; also mira: wonders, wondrous things; amazing and even seemingly inexplicable occurrences that are not, however, in the category of miracula (q.v.). Angels and devils have the power to perform mirabilia but not miracula.
miracula: miracles, strange or marvelous things or occurrences brought about by the divine omnipotence; as distinct from mirabilia (q.v.), miracles can be done only by God. Specifically, God is the first or primary cause of all miracles, although some miracles occur through the activity of instrumental causes and not by direct divine intervention. In addition, a miracle is not an extramundane intrusion or a violation of the laws of nature (leges naturae, q.v.) but a divine work accomplished in the world in a manner beyond or superior to the regular order of things. Miracles are possible because of the absolute power (potentia absoluta, q.v.) of God as the free and first efficient cause of all things, including the laws of the natural order. God is the Creator of all things and of all laws. As the Lord of his creation, he can use the created order in ways not possible for the order in and of itself (see omnipotentia).
misericordia: mercy, compassion; specifically, the misericordia Dei, or mercy of God, according to which God has compassion on his fallen creatures in their inability to return to him; one of the affections of the divine will. See bonitas Dei; voluntas Dei.
missa: Mass; i.e., Holy Communion (communio, q.v.), the celebration of the Lord’s Supper (coena Domini; see coena sacra) in Roman Catholic worship. Use of the term missa with reference to the Eucharist therefore implies the doctrine of transubstantiation (transubstantiatio, q.v.).
missio: a sending forth or mission; specifically, the missio Spiritus Sancti, the sending forth of the Holy Spirit, distinct from, and not to be confused with, the processio (q.v.). The missio of the Spirit is the activity of the Spirit, according to the modus agendi (q.v.) of the persons in the opera Dei essentialia (q.v.), by which and through which the Father and the Son act in the world, both in general and in the special economy of salvation.
mixtio: mixture; also commixtio: mixture or commixture; a term used to describe the Eutychian heresy. See atreptōs kai asynchytōs.
modus: mode, method, pattern; used as a synonym for ratio in its sense of method or rationale.
modus agendi: mode or manner of working. See opera Dei essentialia.
modus essendi: mode or manner of being. See modus operandi.
modus loquendi: manner of speaking.
modus operandi: mode or way of operation or working. It is a fundamental maxim of traditional physics and metaphysics that Modus operandi sequitur modum essendi, the mode or manner of operation follows the mode of being or existing: the being or essence of a thing is the foundation or principium (q.v.) of its activity or operation, and all things operate in a manner proper or proportionate to what they are.
modus ponens: mode or method of establishing; in logic, the basic rule of inference that, “if A, then B” is true, and if there is A, then B must follow. See modus tollens.
modus procedendi: mode or manner of proceeding.
modus subsistendi: mode of subsistence; used in trinitarian language as a synonym for subsistentia (q.v.) and as a Latin equivalent for hypostasis; modus subsistendi is more technical and precise than persona (q.v.). The Reformed in particular prefer to say that the persons of the Trinity are distinguished not merely rationaliter or formaliter but also modaliter, according to their distinct modes of subsistence. The term can be used generally to indicate the mode or manner of the individual existence of anything and, in this general sense, plays a role in Lutheran and Reformed christological debate over the manner of Christ’s presence in the Lord’s Supper and the mode or modes of the subsistence of Christ’s body in its union with the divine person of the Word. See distinctio; localis subsistendi modus; praesentia; praesentia illocalis sive definitiva.
modus tollens: mode or method of abolishing or of removing; in logic, the basic rule of inference that “if A, then B” is true, and if there is no A, then B must not follow.
momentum: moment, short interval; also movement, motion, or impulse. In late scholastic and seventeenth-century theology and philosophy, momentum was often used as the term for a structural, nontemporal element in the logical sequence of divine knowing or willing, also identified as an instant (instans, instantia). Thus God can be said to have a necessary or simple knowledge of all possibility and a voluntary or visionary knowledge of those possibilities he wills to actualize; these two kinds of knowledge are understood as nontemporal momenta and therefore as a purely logical or structural sequence, neither disruptive of the divine simplicity nor implying a discursive or deliberative knowing on the part of God. See instantes naturae; scientia Dei; simplicitas.
monopleuron (μονόπλευρον): one-sided. See foedus monopleuron.
monstrum incertitudinis: the monster of uncertainty. See certitudo et gratiae praesentis et salutis aeternae.
mors: death; defined by the Protestant scholastics as threefold: mors temporalis sive corporalis (q.v.), mors spiritualis (q.v.), and mors aeterna (q.v.).
mors aeterna: eternal death; the punishment (poena, q.v.) that follows mors temporalis (q.v.) at the final judgment in the cases of those whose guilt (culpa, q.v.) has not been covered by the satisfactio Christi (q.v.). Both Lutherans and the Reformed deny the doctrine that mors aeterna is an annihilation, defining it rather as an eternal punishment and an eternal separation from fellowship with God—in short, an endless torment for the damned. See satisfactio vicaria.
mors Christi: the death of Christ. See obedientia Christi; passio; satisfactio vicaria.
mors spiritualis: spiritual death; the condition of the unregenerate in this life.
mors temporalis sive corporalis: temporal or bodily death; i.e., physical death as the result of sin. The scholastics argue that God is not the cause of death except in the sense that he is the righteous judge who pronounces judgment on sin. Death itself is the deprivatio, or privation, of the natural life of a human being (privatio vitae hominum naturalis) by the dissolution of the union of body and soul. As such, it derives directly from the fall, which is the impelling cause, or causa impulsiva (q.v.), of death. Since all have fallen in Adam, death occurs in all human beings as part of the reatus (q.v.), or liability to punishment, inherited by all of Adam’s progeny. The work of salvation accomplished in Christ, however, has altered the meaning of death for Christians; it is now the transition to life eternal. The church thus bestows pleasant names on death, the mortis dulcia nomina (q.v.).
mortificatio: mortification; also mortificatio carnis: mortification of the flesh; viz., the putting off of the old nature, the dying to the world and the flesh, which marks the beginning of true repentance. See poenitentia; sanctificatio.
mortis dulcia nomina: agreeable or pleasant names of death; e.g., the passage from death to life, being with Christ, and the like. Christians can, in faith, apply these dulcia nomina to death, since they know from the promises of the gospel that death has no sting and that life eternal (vita aeterna) follows death. See mors.
motio: motion or movement. See motus.
motivum credibilitatis: a motivation toward belief; in particular, the authority of the church that testifies to the authority of Scripture. The Reformers and the orthodox allow this authority to the church but insist on the priority of Word over church and on the derivative authority of the church. See potestas ecclesiae; Verbum Dei.
motus: motion, movement, change; either in the sense of an actual movement, an activity, or an operation or in the sense of a process or development from potency to actuality. Varied specifications of the term relate to the categories of predication (see categoria; praedicamenta). Thus there is generation, or generative motion (motus generationis) productive of substance; motion of accretion (motus accretionis), or movement by addition of quantity; motion of decrease (motus decretionis), or movement or change by removal of quantity; motion by alteration (motus alterationis), or motion as the mutation or change of quality; and local motion (motus localis or motus lationis), movement from place to place. (It needs to be noted that the new rationalistic and mechanical philosophies of the seventeenth century radically altered the concept of motion. Beginning in the 1640s, in the thought of Descartes, Gassendi, and the mechanical philosophies, motion was reduced to physical or local motion and no longer regarded as an ontological movement from potency to actuality. Late seventeenth-century transitional theologies and late orthodox theologies of the eighteenth century do not follow the Aristotelian definition.)
In Aristotelian metaphysics, the primary sense of motus is the process or development (kinēsis or motus) from potency to actuality. In the Aristotelian schema adopted by most of the medieval scholastics and by the Protestant orthodox, the potential dualism of form (forma, q.v.) and matter (materia, q.v.) is avoided by the assumption of a union of matter and form in all things (see universalia). The material substratum of the thing is a potency, or potential, for form or, more precisely, for the actualization of form—while the form is an inner principle of self-realization (entelecheia, q.v.), an inner goal toward which the process or development, the motus, of the thing is directed. Motus, therefore, is the principle of development that unites form and matter in a thing. Since Aristotelian physics assumes rest unless motion is introduced, the motus or kinēsis in finite things always requires a prior efficient cause (causa, q.v.), or a mover, for its existence. Ultimately, since all finite movers both move and are moved—indeed, are moved from potency to act prior to their own self-movements—the chain of causality demands a first mover (primum movens, q.v.) who moves without himself being moved, i.e., God, the self-existent, necessary, fully actualized being. (It is therefore a significant misinterpretation of the traditional language of God as unmoved mover to claim that the term implies immobility or inaction.)
Motus can also refer to an immanent action or operation (actio immanens) in a rational being. Thus the activity or operation of the soul (motus animae) in its faculties of intellect (intellectus, q.v.) and will (voluntas, q.v.) or in its desire or appetite (appetitus, q.v.): the motus intellectualis sive cogitationis; the motus voluntatis; and the motus appetitus. In each of these motions, the basic capacity or faculty of intellect, will, or desire moves from its existence as such, or primary actuality (in actu primo), to its fulfillment or realization in operation, or secondary actuality (in actu secundo). See actus purus; Deus; ens; in actu; Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.
motus praeparatorii: preparatory motions or movements; e.g., the terrors of conscience (terrores conscientiae, q.v.) before conversion. See homo renascens.
multivolipraesentia: multivolipresence; presence in many (multi-) places according to the will (voli-) of God; specifically, the presence of Christ’s humanity in the Lord’s Supper according to scholastic Lutheranism. See omnipraesentia generalis; ubivolipraesentia.
mundus: world; specifically the earth as the central sphere of the cosmus or universe according to the Ptolemaic, or geocentric, system. See creatio; elementum.
munus Christi: office of Christ. See munus triplex.
munus triplex: threefold office; a christological term referring to the threefold work of Christ as prophet, priest, and king. The doctrine of a munus triplex, as opposed to a munus duplex (priest and king), was taught by Calvin and became standard among the Reformed in the sixteenth century. Following Johann Gerhard, the Lutherans of the seventeenth century also tended to adopt the munus triplex. The doctrine assumes that in his work Christ fulfilled all the anointed offices of the old covenant. Although the scholastics will speak of a munus propheticum, munus sacerdotale, and munus regium—a prophetic office, priestly office, and kingly office—there is but one office (munus), just as there is but one work, duty, or obligation (officium, q.v.) of Christ. The office is a single threefold function of the Mediator. It is also an eternal office that belongs to the preexistent Word in his mediatorial work during the Old Testament dispensation and to the Word incarnate during both his earthly work and his eternal reign from the resurrection to the eschaton (q.v.) and beyond. Thus the munus regium, or kingly office, does not begin at the resurrection or ascension, but has always belonged to Christ as Logos, and even to the incarnate Word according to his human nature, which exercised the munus regium, albeit in a hidden form, even during the status humiliationis (q.v.). Similar statements can be made of the prophetic and priestly offices. The orthodox also recognize that an office is not something that belongs to a person by nature but is something conferred upon a person. Thus the baptism of Christ can be viewed as the temporal designation of Christ to his office and as the beginning of his official ministry. The Reformed go further than the Lutherans in elaborating this point and, early on in the era of orthodoxy, speak of the designation or self-designation of the Word to the office of Mediator, a concept that leads ultimately to the doctrine of the pactum salutis (q.v.). Finally it should be noted that munus and officium are not always strictly distinguished and that, as the munus triplex became more and more a central structural feature of the doctrine of the work of Christ, the orthodox would also refer to an officium triplex. See prophetia; regnum Christi; sacerdotium.
mutabilitas: mutability, changeability, the ability to change or alter in form; ultimately, the capability in all finite things of ceasing to be through defect or corruption; a specifically theological problem is the instance of the mutation of will that is peccatum originale (q.v.). See immutabilitas.
mutari posse: the ability to change. See mutabilitas.
mutatis mutandis: the necessary changes being made.
mysteria fidei: mysteries of the faith; i.e., the doctrines known by revelation that transcend the grasp of reason.