natura: nature; literally, something that is natus, or generated; a term having three primary meanings in scholastic theology and in Protestant orthodox usage: (1) essence, (2) a particular kind or species of essence in its actual existence, (3) the entire physical universe and its phenomena. Given its etymology, in the strictest application of the term, natura cannot be applied to God. The term natura Dei, nature of God, takes the most general usage of nature and references the divine essence, or essentia Dei, and its perfections or attributes.
In the first sense, natura simply means the character or quiddity (quidditas, q.v.) of a thing as defined by its primary qualities. Like essentia (q.v.), natura in this sense can be separate from the actual existence (esse, q.v.) of a thing. It indicates the genus, e.g., the humanitas, or humanity, of human beings, human nature in the most general sense. In the second sense, natura identifies the concrete substance (substantia, q.v.) of a species both in essence (essentia) and in existence (esse): e.g., not merely humanitas or natura humana as the quiddity of human beings, but natura humana as the substance of a particular human being, such as that nature assumed by the person of Christ (see persona; persona Christi). In the third sense, natura simply refers to the order of nature and is used in such terms as lex naturalis (q.v.), natural law, or theologia naturalis (q.v.), natural theology—the law implicit in the order of the phenomenal world and the knowledge of God obtainable from examination of the physical universe. See ex rerum natura; in puris naturalibus; in rerum natura; status purorum naturalium.
natura creatrix: creative nature, namely, God. See natura naturans / natura naturata.
natura Dei: the nature of God, specifically indicating the divine essence and attributes. See Deus; natura.
Natura determinatur ad unum: Nature is determined to one effect; an axiom indicating that natural causes, as distinct from rational and therefore free causes, act to produce one effect or, more precisely, one kind of effect only. Lightning strikes, it cannot not strike; fire burns, it cannot not burn. Free agents, by contrast, have potency to contradictories and contraries. See contingentia; liberum arbitrium; necessitas.
natura integra: uncorrupted nature; i.e., human nature before the fall. See in puris naturalibus; status integritatis; status purorum naturalium.
natura naturans / natura naturata: nature generating / nature generated; an old distinction associated in the late seventeenth century with Spinoza’s pantheistic identification of God with all substance: Deus sive natura (q.v.), God as nature. The traditional usage understood natura naturans as equivalent to natura creatrix, creative nature or nature the creator, and therefore as distinct from natura naturata, the generated or created nature including all things in the finite order brought into existence by God ex nihilo. The Spinozistic use of the terms indicates a distinction between God as such, the ultimate substance understood as generating multiplicity out of itself, and God as the generated multiplicity of being. Note that the Spinozistic usage explicitly clashes not only with traditional theism but also with the strict use of the term natura (q.v.), specifically by abolishing the strict distinction between generated nature and God as the fons naturae (q.v.), or source of nature, and arguing against creation ex nihilo (q.v.).
Natura nunquam errat: Nature never errs; a maxim referencing the consistency of natural causation. Specifically, when natural agents act or operate, they have a potency to one and one only effect insofar as natural causes operate necessarily: as, e.g., a pebble dislodged from a cliff will fall; water will run downhill. When a natural agent acts or operates, the effect of the action is therefore a necessity and the consequent. See necessitas absoluta; necessitas consequentis; necessitas naturae.
natura prior: naturally prior, prior by nature. See in ordine naturae; prioritas naturae.
ne plus ultra: nothing more beyond or nothing higher; namely, the best or highest thing, example, or goal.
necessaria: the necessary or necessary things; viz., that which is and which cannot not be (quod non potest non esse) or cannot be otherwise than it is (quod non potest aliter se habere). In the traditional language of logic and metaphysics, the necessary is understood in relation to the impossible, the possible, and the contingent: that which cannot not exist is necessary; that which cannot exist (quod non potest esse) is impossible; that which is not but can exist (quod potest esse) is possible; and that which is but is able not to exist (quod potest non esse) or can be other than what it is (quod potest aliter se habere) is contingent.
necessitas: necessity. Scholastic philosophy and theology distinguish different kinds and levels of necessity; see the following definitions.
necessitas absoluta: absolute necessity; viz., simple necessity, or necessity simply and properly so called. Necessitas absoluta indicates something that is necessary in such a way that its opposite is contradictory. God’s existence is thus an absolute necessity, since the nonexistence of the self-existent, necessary being is a contradiction. See necessitas coactionis; necessitas consequentis.
necessitas coactionis: necessity of coaction or compulsion; a necessity imposed on a thing, an agent, or an event by an external cause not in accord with the will of the thing or agent on which it is imposed. Necessitas coactionis, of course, applies only to created beings and not to God. When God is bound to his promises, he is so bound by his own freely willed decree. See necessitas absoluta; necessitas consequentiae.
necessitas conditionata: conditioned necessity; i.e., a necessity of the consequence. See necessitas consequentiae.
necessitas consequentiae: necessity of the consequence; i.e., not an absolute necessity (necessitas absoluta, q.v.) or necessitas consequentis (q.v.), but a necessity brought about or conditioned by a previous condition or by a preceding contingent act or event so that the necessity itself arises out of the logic of the contingent circumstance necessarily being what it is when it is; therefore the maxim Omne quod est, ex suppositione quod sit, necesse est esse, Everything that is, on the supposition that it is, is necessary that it is. Or more simply, Unumquodque necessario est, quando est, A thing necessarily is when it is (which, of course, does not mean that when a thing is, it is necessary). Thus a necessitas consequentiae is a conditional or hypothetical necessity, best described as a logical necessity standing in ordine cognoscendi et dicendi, i.e., in the order of knowing and speaking, or more simply, de dicto. Necessitas consequentiae is also called necessitas ex suppositione, necessity on account of supposition, or necessitas ex hypothesi, necessity on account of hypothesis, or hypothetical necessity, and sometimes necessitas ex hypothesi dispositionis, or necessity on account of a hypothesis of disposition. Each of these latter terms indicates a necessity that arises out of a set of circumstances or out of a disposition or capacity hypothetically rather than absolutely or necessarily conceived; i.e., the conditions that create the necessity are themselves a matter of contingency and are therefore only hypothetically or suppositionally the ground or reason for a necessity. Thus, if a person is running, it is a necessity of the consequence (and a contingency) that the person is in motion, and it is possible in a divided sense (in sensu diviso) that the person stand still, while in a composite sense (in sensu composito) it is impossible that the person run and stand still at the same time. The necessitas consequentiae occurs continually in the finite order notably as a result of free choice and, unlike necessitas absoluta, is applicable to God in terms of his potentia ordinata (q.v.), or ordained power. There is no necessity that God decree what he decrees; but granting the divine decree, God is bound to his own plan and promises. Therefore the fulfillment of the divine plan and the divine promises is necessary, but by a necessitas consequentiae. See sensus compositus; sensus divisus.
necessitas consequentis: necessity of the consequent or necessity of the consequent (thing); i.e., the necessity of something that cannot be other than what it is, which is to say, a simple or absolute necessity, a natural necessity in ordine essendi, in the order of being, or a necessity de re (q.v.; of the thing), as opposed to a necessity de dicto (q.v.; of a statement). A necessity of the consequent thing arises out of the connection of necessary causes with the effects that must follow from them and is sometimes also referred to as a necessitas consequentis vel causata, in distinction from a necessitas consequentiae (q.v.), which is a purely logical necessity and accordingly, when referencing things, a contingency. The necessity of the consequent thing is associated with the natural order inasmuch as natural or nonrational causes have potency to one effect only. See Natura determinatur ad unum; Natura nunquam errat; necessitas absoluta; necessitas coactionis; necessitas naturae.
necessitas de dicto: See necessitas consequentiae.
necessitas de re: See necessitas consequentis.
necessitas dependentiae: necessity of dependence, the ontological necessity that creatures, as finite and contingent, depend for their existence and movement on God, who alone has the freedom of independence (libertas independentiae, q.v.). Not only is the concept of a necessity of dependency crucial to an understanding of the nature of creaturely being, but it is also crucial to an understanding of the approach of many early modern Reformed writers to human freedom, which must operate in accordance with the nature of human beings as dependent on God. See liberum arbitrium.
necessitas ex hypothesi or necessitas ex hypothesi dispositionis: hypothetical necessity or hypothetical necessity of disposition; synonymous with necessitas consequentiae (q.v.).
necessitas infallibilitatis: necessity of infallibility; sometimes, necessitas infallibilitatis ad tempus, a necessity of infallibility concerning the time. This term refers to a cognitive necessity, not a causal necessity, and specifically to the necessity of knowing certainly or infallibly that something will occur, including contingent events or effects. Thus God can know a future contingent according to a necessity of infallibility.
necessitas naturae: necessity of nature; viz., the limit of thought and action, not imposed from without, but belonging to the nature of the thing or being itself. No being, not even omnipotent God, can act against its own nature. This necessity, since it is not a necessity imposed from without or a necessity that arises out of previous external circumstance, in no way conflicts with the libertas naturae (q.v.) of a being. See necessitas absoluta; necessitas coactionis; necessitas consequentis.
necessitas per accidens: incidental necessity; a term often used to describe the necessity of past events that occurred contingently or by free choice but that, given that they are past, cannot be changed. They are, in other words, necessary incidentally, or per accidens, through something being added to them, namely, irreversibility.
necessitas servitutis: necessity of servitude or slavery; i.e., the necessity that fallen human beings are enslaved to sin and subject to misery. See libertas a servitute.
nekrōsis (νέκρωσις): mortification; e.g., 2 Corinthians 4:10. See mortificatio.
neotericus (νεωτερικός, neōterikos): innovator, modern writer; usually a polemical usage.
Neque caro extra Λόγον neque Λόγος extra carnem: Neither is the flesh beyond the Logos nor the Logos beyond the flesh; a more elaborate form of the Lutheran christological maxim Logos non extra carnem (q.v.).
nihil: nothing; nothingness; also nihilum; the form nihil is indeclinable; nihilum is a regular second-declension noun. Theologically and philosophically, nihil is sometimes distinguished into the nihil positivum, or positive nothingness, i.e., pure potency or potential (potentia, q.v.); and the nihil negativum, negative or absolute nothingness, a total absence of both potency and act. See ex nihilo; in actu; mē on.
Nihil habet rationem sacramenti extra usum a Christo institutum: Nothing has the nature of a sacrament outside of the exercise instituted by Christ; i.e., There is no sacrament apart from the rite. A maxim from the Formula of Concord (Solid Declaration 7.85) used frequently by the Lutheran orthodox (Baier, Compendium theologiae positivae, 3:504–5). The full statement reads, Nihil habet rationem sacramenti extra usum a Christo institutum seu extra actionem divinitus institutam (adding the phrase, “or outside of the divinely instituted action”). A variant form is given by Baier (504): Nihil habeat rationem sacramenti extra usum, qui institutus est a Deo. The Lutheran orthodox here express a rule for the Protestant interpretation of the sacrament in opposition to the medieval scholastic and continuing Roman Catholic veneration of the host. The Roman Catholic view, based upon the doctrine of transubstantiation (transubstantiatio, q.v.), was that the converted elements remained body and blood after the celebration of the sacrament. Consecrated bread, in particular, was reserved and venerated beyond the rite (extra usum). The Lutheran orthodox insist on the real illocal presence of Christ’s body and blood only for the duration of the sacramental action (actio sacramentalis). The real presence is indicated though not controlled by the words of institution, “This do” and “As often as you do this,” so that the cessation of the mandated action is also the cessation of the sacramental union. Thus the aphorism Unio sacramentalis fit, quando fit manducatio et bibitio, “The sacramental union occurs when the eating and drinking occur.” More precisely, the unio sacramentalis is not caused by human act or speech; the words of institution only set apart the visible means for sacramental use. These words do not bring about the real presence or mark a point in time at which the real presence occurs or begins. Nonetheless the words “This do in remembrance of me” indicate the rite (usus, q.v.) and the action (actio, q.v.) of the sacrament and therefore indicate the presence of Christ in the consecration (consecratio, q.v.), distribution (distributio, q.v.), eating (manducatio, q.v.), and drinking (bibitio). By the same token, there is no real presence during the last part of the rite, after the last person has communed. Thus an eating and drinking that takes place without the consecration or words of institution is not a sacrament, nor is there any real presence; but equally so, a consecration not followed by sacramental eating and drinking is an empty act, and a piece of consecrated bread or a drop of consecrated wine fallen on the floor does not indicate a desecration of the real presence. The same argument obtains in the definition of baptism. If the water is not consecrated, there is no baptism, and if consecrated water is put to any use other than the baptism instituted by Christ, there is no sacrament. See verbum institutionis.
Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu: Nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in the senses; an epistemological maxim drawn from the Peripatetic tradition. See intellectus; phantasma.
Nihil movet se: Nothing moves itself. See motus; Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.
Nihil obstat: Nothing prevents it; often the decision of a censor permitting a book to be published.
nihilum: nothing. See nihil.
nomen officii: official title; i.e., a name deriving from one’s work or office rather than from one’s nature (nomen naturae); e.g., angeloi (q.v.), Christus (q.v.).
nomina Dei: names of God; a term reserved by the Protestant scholastics for the specifically biblical appellations of God, such as Jehovah, Elohim, El, El Shaddai, El Elyon. The Protestant scholastics often distinguish between the nomina Dei and the divine attributes (attributa divina, q.v.) and develop a separate locus, or separate section, of a general locus de Deo on the subject of the biblical names as an issue to be considered prior to the attributes in the identification of God and his ways.
nomos (νόμος): law. See lex Dei.
nomothesia (νομοθεσία): legislation, promulgation of law; e.g., Romans 9:4. See foedus.
Non liquet: It is not clear or evident; i.e., not proved; a judicial opinion allowed by Roman law in cases in which the judges recognize a lack of clarity or evidence and therefore refrain from pronouncing a verdict. The language carries over into theology, notably in instances of dispute falling within confessional boundaries in which a synod or other church body refrains from deciding a doctrinal issue for lack of clear grounds.
non posse non peccare: not able not to sin; viz., the condition of fallen humanity according to the Augustinian perspective, also described as impotentia bene agendi, the inability to do good. This condition does not imply an absence of moral responsibility since it arises not from a loss of the libertas naturae (q.v.) but from loss of the potentia bene agendi. The human nature, as such, remains free to act according to the limit of its abilities, apart from any external coaction or coercion, and has lost only the ability to make a choice (arbitrium, q.v.) for the good. In addition, since the loss of that ability is the result of the original sin of Adam and not of any act of the divine Lawgiver, humanity’s responsibility before the moral law and the divine promise of fellowship in return for perfect obedience remains unblemished, despite human inability.
non posse peccare: not able to sin; the condition of humanity in the final state of glory. See beati; in patria; libertas naturae.
non-ens: nonbeing, nothing. See ens; ex nihilo; mē on; nihil.
non-impeditio peccati: the nonprevention of sin; i.e., the divine permissio peccati, or permission of sin. The language of non-impeditio is used by the scholastics to indicate that God’s active or willing permissio (q.v.) of sin in no way entails even a momentary moral approval of the sinful act. God merely does not act to remove the conditions of free will or free choice (liberum arbitrium, q.v.) and of the operation of secondary causes (causae secundae, q.v.) in general, according to which sin is physically possible. This permissio, however, does not indicate that the punishment (poena, q.v.) of such sins is removed, since they occur by the effective will of the sinner. Indeed, the non-impeditio implies a withholding of grace and illumination and a giving over of sinners to their own sinful willing and ultimately to eternal damnation.
norma: norm or standard; variously distinguished as (1) norma absoluta, absolute norm, applicable only to Scripture as principium theologiae; (2) norma causativa, causative norm, again applicable only to Scripture; (3) norma normata, a standardized norm, applied to churchly confessions, particularly by the orthodox Lutherans, insofar as they set forth the truths of Scripture; and (4) norma normans, the standardizing norm, applied to Scripture as the norm standing behind the standardized confessions, or norma normata. The law (lex, q.v.), particularly in the sense of human law (lex humana, q.v.), can also be identified as the norm governing what is to be done and what is to be avoided (norma faciendorum et fugiendorum). See ecclesia repraesentativa; potestas ecclesiae; testes veritatis.
notae ecclesiae: marks of the church; sometimes notae verae ecclesiae: marks of the true church; the distinguishing features by which the church can be identified: (1) the preaching of the Word (praedicatio Verbi) or profession of true doctrine; (2) the valid administration of the true sacraments (see administratio sacramentorum); and (3) disciplined Christian life in obedience to Word and sacrament. The Reformers and the Lutheran orthodox generally argue for the first two notae, Word and sacrament, and assume the third as a by-product or effect. The Reformed scholastics generally argue for Word, sacrament, and discipline as the notae. See attributa ecclesiae; ecclesia; sacramentum; Verbum Dei.
notae personales: personal marks or characteristics; see character hypostaticus sive personalis.
notio personalis: personal notion or conception; see relatio personalis.
notiones communes: common notions, common conceptions; the Latin equivalent of κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι (koinai ennoiai) or, in some Stoic usages, προλήψεις (prolēpseis, q.v.); specifically, basic ideas engraved or implanted in the human mind that belong by nature to all people, a theory rooted in ancient Stoic philosophy. These common notions were assumed to be universally true in the traditional philosophy, whether Aristotelian or Platonic, of the Middle Ages and early modern era and, together with the assumed reliability of sense perception, provided a solid foundation for learning and argumentation. The assumption of common notions consisting in the principles (principia, q.v.) and rudimentary conclusions of natural law (lex naturalis, q.v.) accounted for universal moral norms, as indicated theologically in the exegesis of Romans 2:14–15 and taught by the Reformers and the Protestant scholastics. The denial of notiones communes and of the validity of sense perception by the new philosophies of the seventeenth century, notably Cartesianism and the Lockian philosophy, as well as by the later Remonstrant theologians, called into question the entire structure and language of the tradition, whether philosophical or theological. See cognitio; cognitio insita.
notiones personales: personal characteristics or “notions”; specifically, the personal characteristics of the three persons of the Trinity that determine the hypostatic or personal character (character hypostaticus sive personalis, q.v.) of each of the persons. The notiones personales are identical with the personal relations plus the unbegottenness (innascibilitas or agennēsia) of the Father; i.e., the notiones are the personal relations (relationes personales) and the personal properties (proprietates personates) of the Trinity. See proprietas; relatio personalis; Trinitas.
notitia: knowledge; synonymous with cognitio (q.v.). See fides; scientia.
notitia Dei acquisita: acquired knowledge of God.
notitia Dei insita: implanted or ingrafted knowledge of God. See cognitio; notiones communes.
notitia historica: historical knowledge; especially in theology, the knowledge of the events and the substance of the biblical history; while it pertains to the knowledge content of faith, it does not itself constitute faith or belong to the essence of faith. See fides.
Novum Testamentum: New Testament. See foedus gratiae; Scriptura Sacra; testamentum.
nulla proportio: no proportion. See Finitum non capax infiniti.
numen: a divine spirit, a presiding deity; a term from Roman religion used to indicate the divine presence.