Pp

pactum: pact or covenant; also pactio. See foedus; pactum salutis.

pactum amicitiae: pact or covenant of friendship; used to refer to the antelapsarian covenant with Adam. See foedus naturae; foedus operum.

pactum reconciliationis: pact or covenant of reconciliation; used synonymously with covenant of grace. See foedus gratiae.

pactum salutis: covenant of salvation; alternatively called the foedus redemptionis, covenant of redemption; or consilium pacis (q.v.), counsel of peace. In Reformed federalism, the pretemporal, intratrinitarian agreement of the Father and the Son concerning the covenant of grace and its ratification in and through the work of the Son incarnate. In the unity of the Godhead, the Son covenants with the Father to be the temporal sponsor of the Father’s testamentum (q.v.) in and through the work of the Mediator. In that work, the Son fulfills his sponsio (q.v.) or fideiussio (q.v.), i.e., his guarantee of payment of the debt of sin in ratification of the Father’s testamentum. The roots of this idea of an eternal intratrinitarian pactum are clearly present in sixteenth-century Reformed thought, but the terminology came to prominence and became fixed only in the third and fourth decades of the seventeenth century in the work of such thinkers as Edward Fisher, Peter Bulkeley, John Owen, David Dickson, Johannes Cloppenburg, and Johannes Cocceius. The term pactum salutis is more characteristic of the continental Reformed; “covenant of redemption,” or foedus redemptionis, of the British writers; consilium pacis or its equivalent, raad des vredes, of the Dutch Reformed. The intention of the pactum salutis is to emphasize the eternal, inviolable, and trinitarian foundation of the temporal foedus gratiae (q.v.), much in the way that the eternal decree underlies and guarantees the ordo salutis (q.v.). The biblical foundations of the doctrine vary among its exponents, yet arguably the central texts are the Pauline Adam-Christ parallels in relation to the understanding of legal and evangelical covenants, together with various messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. The doctrine offers an example of the older hermeneutic of drawing a good and necessary consequence (bona et necessaria consequentia), or valid conclusion, from a collation of texts. Reformed writers in the second half of the seventeenth century debated the question of whether the pactum salutis ought to be identified with or distinguished from the foedus gratiae: in the former case, Christ is the sole party in covenant with God, and believers belong to the covenant in their union with him; in the latter case, Christ is party with God in the pactum salutis, and on grounds of the pactum, believers are parties with God in the foedus gratiae as made possible by the work of Christ and union with him. See aphesis; caput electorum; consequentia; expromissio; opera Dei ad intra; unio mystica.

paedagogus ad Christum: guide to Christ; i.e., the law. See usus legis.

paenitentia: See poenitentia.

paideia (παιδεία): teaching, instruction, discipline, or correction, especially of children. See castigationes paternae.

panarmonios (παναρμόνιος): complex; embracing a vast array of things.

par: equal.

parabasis (παράβασις): sin considered as a transgression against the law or violation of the law.

paradeigma (παράδειγμα): paradigm, idea, concept. See archetypos; idea.

paradisio: paradise; viz., the dwelling place of the souls of the blessed between the death of the body (mors temporalis, q.v.) and the final resurrection (see resurrectio). Paradisio is not to be confused with eternal life (vita aeterna, q.v.). See Hades; iudicium particulare et occultum; status animarum a corpore separatarum.

paradosis (παράδοσις): tradition; although there was debate over the kinds of traditions and the status of tradition in theological formulation, the Reformers and the orthodox recognized the importance of divinely given tradition and did so on the basis of Scripture, namely, 1 Corinthians 11:2. See traditio.

parangelia (παραγγελία): a command or advisement; e.g., 1 Thessalonians 4:2. See foedus.

paraphysica (παραφυσικά): beside (or beyond) the physical; the term does not appear in standard classical, New Testament, or patristic lexica. The usual term is hyperphysica (q.v.).

paraptōma (παράπτωμα): transgression; specifically, a transgression against God; e.g., Romans 4:25.

paresis (πάρεσις): a passing over or remission, in the case of sin, letting it go unpunished without absolute cancellation of guilt, as in Romans 3:25; a term used by Cocceius to indicate the justification of believers prior to the work of Christ. See aphesis.

parousia (παρουσία): parousia, advent; especially the second visible coming of Christ as Judge; e.g., Matthew 24:3. See adventus Christi; dies novissimus; iudicium extremum.

pars: part; also pars pro toto: a part (taken) for the whole.

pars providentiae: a part of providence; viz., predestination considered as decretum Dei speciale under the larger category of providence, the decretum Dei generale. Similarly, the favor Dei in providence and the gratia universalis by which God works for good in all things stand as larger categories behind the gratia specialis of salvation. See decretum; praedestinatio; providentia.

partes animae: parts of the soul; not a preferred term, since the soul, as spiritual, cannot be divided in a physical sense. See anima; facultates animae.

particulae distinctivae: distinctive particles or units of speech; especially phrases or attributions made possible by the union of natures in the person of Christ. See propositiones personales.

particulae exclusivae: exclusive particles; i.e., units of speech indicating mutually exclusive categories. The term is used in orthodox Lutheranism of words indicating the radical exclusion of works from salvation by grace and the radical exclusion of merit by the gracious application of Christ’s merit to believers; e.g., grace without works.

partim: partly; often in comparisons as partim . . . partim, e.g., partim bonum, partim malum: partly good, partly evil. The partim . . . partim construction was used in the initial formula of the Council of Trent to indicate that revealed truth was contained partly in Scripture and partly in unwritten traditions—a crucial difference between the theologies of the Reformation and those of the early modern Roman Catholic Church. It can be seen, moreover, that the removal of the partim . . . partim construction does not alter the meaning of the final text of the Canons of Trent, that tradition and Scripture are coequal norms of doctrine.

Parum cavet natura: Nature takes little precaution.

Parum differunt quae re concordant: Things that agree in substance differ little.

passio: passion or suffering; as distinct from passiones (q.v.) or emotions in the faculty psychology. Understood broadly in the logical sense of the categories of predication, passion is opposed to action (actio, q.v.): whereas action brings about an effect in a subject, passion involves being acted upon or suffering an effect. See categoria; praedicamenta.

Theologically, passio is the experience of suffering, especially the passio Christi, the passion or suffering of Christ. Broadly conceived, the passio Christi extends to the entire status humiliationis (q.v.), or state of humiliation, i.e., from Christ’s birth to his death, during which he suffered all the common infirmities (infirmitates communes, q.v.) of the human race. More strictly, the passio Christi is the passio magna, or great suffering, of the final trials and crucifixion. See obedientia Christi.

passiones: passions, emotions; in the faculty psychology, specifically those negative emotions or alterations of emotional condition caused by something external; roughly synonymous with the Greek παθήματα, pathēmata. Whereas an affection (affectio, q.v.) is a positive relation that begins in a subject and extends to an object, a passion is the result of a negative relation that is caused by the impact of an object on the subject. See impassibilitas.

patefactio: disclosure, manifestation, a making known. In general, the Protestant scholastics use patefactio to indicate the self-disclosure of God in Christ, as well as revelatio, which implies an uncovering for someone or an impartation of knowledge to someone, to indicate the scriptural or verbal revelation of God. Thus patefactio serves more generally as a synonym for epiphaneia (ἐπιφάνεια), and revelatio as the equivalent of apocalypsis (ἀποκάλυψις). See revelatio.

pater: father; specifically, Deus Pater, God the Father, the First Person of the Trinity. See Trinitas.

paternitas: paternity; specifically, the paternity of the First Person of the Trinity, the Father in his relation to the Son and Spirit. See relatio personalis.

pathēmata (παθήματα): See passiones.

pathētikōs (παθητικῶς): subject to passions or suffering, passible; thus, subject to change.

patientia: patience; in God, patientia is synonymous with long-suffering (longanimitas, q.v.).

pax: peace; also pax Dei: the peace of God; pax Christi: the peace of Christ; pax ecclesiae: the peace of the church.

Pax vobiscum: Peace be with you.

peccata clamantia: sins that cry out; i.e., unprotested sins that nonetheless cry out for vengeance to Almighty God: e.g., the murder of Abel (Gen. 4:10), whose blood, as representing life, cries out from the ground; by extension, the oppression of widows, orphans, strangers, and others who cannot defend themselves and can only cry out to God for help. See peccatum.

peccata enormia: unusually great sins.

peccata mortalia: mortal sins; viz., sins that result in damnation and eternal death because their commission so denies faith and the work of the Spirit that salvation becomes impossible, as distinguished from peccata venialia, venial sins, which are merely weaknesses. Against the medieval scholastics, both the Lutherans and the Reformed deny the distinction, at least in the sense that venial sins must also be recognized as damnable and as worthy of eternal punishment if the sinner perseveres in them to the point of impoenitentia finalis (q.v.). Medieval scholastic theology distinguished seven deadly or mortal sins: superbia, avaritia, luxuria, ira, gula, invidia, acedia: pride, greed, luxury, anger, gluttony, envy, sloth. The Protestant scholastics more frequently speak of peccata cordis, oris, operis, sins of heart, mouth, and action, or as often rendered, sins of thought, word, and deed. See Omne peccatum in Deum committitur; peccatum; septem peccata mortalia.

peccata venialia: venial sins. See peccata mortalia.

peccatum: sin; pl., peccata. Once actual sin (peccatum actuale, q.v.) is distinguished from original sin (peccatum originale, q.v.), it must be further defined according to the kinds of actual sin that are committed. A basic distinction can be made between (1) peccata voluntaria, voluntary sins, which are the result of positive human willing; and (2) peccata involuntaria, involuntary sins, which do not arise out of malice but out of ignorance, fear, and the like.

The Protestant scholastics, following the Reformers, reject the medieval and Roman Catholic distinction between peccata mortalia (q.v.) and peccata venialia. In place of these, they distinguish sins further into peccata commissionis and peccata omissionis, sins of commission and of omission, and peccata cordis, oris, et operis, sins of heart, mouth, and action (i.e., thought, word, and deed). See homo; reatus.

peccatum actuale: actual sin; viz., an actual transgression of the law, as opposed to peccatum originale (q.v.), which is inherent in fallen human nature. Peccatum originale is a corruption present in every human being at birth; peccatum actuale is the sinful activity that, in the absence of any external coercion, springs from the sinful nature. See arbitrium; peccatum; voluntas.

peccatum habituale acquisitum: an acquired sinful disposition or an acquired disposition to sin; a term used to designate patterns of human sinfulness that are created by the repetition of sinful acts. Against both Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy, seventeenth-century Arminianism denied peccatum originale (q.v.) and explained all resident human sinfulness as peccatum habituale acquisitum. The orthodox accept the concept of peccatum habituale acquisitum, but only as a secondary or derivative cause of sin itself resting upon both original sin and the continual commission of actual sins.

peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum: sin against the Holy Spirit; the so-called unforgivable sin committed against the work of the Spirit (cf. Matt. 12:31–32; Mark 3:28–29; Luke 12:10), usually defined as blasphemy against the truth of salvation conveyed to the heart and mind by the Spirit. Both Lutherans and Reformed distinguish between the peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum and mere impoenitentia finalis, or final impenitence, arguing that the former is not simply impenitence but rather the ultimate apostasy from and conscious rejection of the obvious truth of the gospel, despite the work of the Spirit, by one who remains convinced of that truth and cannot deny it but still maliciously assaults it and rejects it, as indicated in Hebrews 6:4–6; 10:28–29. Since the work of the Spirit is the one path toward remission of sin, ultimate rejection of the Spirit in this blasphemous manner is the sole peccatum irremissibile, or unforgivable sin.

peccatum inhaerens: inherent sin; viz., the sinfulness that inheres or resides in the heart and mind of fallen human beings.

peccatum originale: original sin; not a substance or a positive attribute but a defect in human nature caused by the fall and consisting in the virtual loss of the imago Dei (q.v.) and consequent absence of original righteousness, iustitia originalis (q.v.). In Adam’s fall itself, the original sin can be distinguished into peccatum originans, the sin originating, and peccatum originata, the sin originated, i.e., Adam’s sinful act originating the sin and the resulting sin or sinfulness that originated in Adam. As resident in all human beings, this peccatum originale consists in (1) the culpa haereditaria, or hereditary guilt, which is imputed to all humanity because of the sin and guilt of Adam—in Reformed theology this imputation rests on the federal headship of Adam. It is also (2) the corruptio haereditaria (q.v.), or hereditary corruption, which, because of the guilt and corruption of Adam and Eve, is transmitted to all their descendants by generation. See culpa; imputatio; macula; propagatio peccati; reatus.

per accidens: by or by reason of something added. See per se / per accidens.

per aequipollens or per equipollens: by an equivalent.

per consequentiam or per consequens: by consequence. See necessitas consequentiae.

per contra: on the contrary.

per definitionem: by definition.

per eundem: by the same.

per fas et nefas: by right or wrong.

per omnes: by all.

per se: by or through itself; thus also per se nota: known by or through itself, known immediately. A thing or concept is per se nota when it is known directly or immediately through the senses apart from any means or agency, including demonstration. Physical objects and true principia (q.v.) are known through themselves. Yet in the view of Aquinas and the more Thomistic theologians among the Protestant orthodox, God is not per se nota but is known mediately, namely, through means and can be demonstrated to exist. See in se; per se / per accidens.

per se / per accidens: by or through itself / by or through something added or incidental. Something understood per se is identified as what it is according to its essence or inward essential principle; something understood per accidens is identified according to an incidental property. Thus a horse per se is an animal; per accidens it is brown or spotted. Per se is equivalent to propter se et directe, according to itself and directly understood; per accidens equals propter aliud et indirecte, according to another and indirectly understood. In this sense, theologia per se is concerned with God; per accidens, with God’s works. See accidens.

per universitatem: as a whole.

per vivam vocem: by the living voice. See viva vox.

perfectio: perfection; viz., the highest or most complete condition of any thing or attribute; thus the fullness or complete actuality of a thing or attribute. Perfection indicates both a transcendence of mutation and a fulfillment of all potential or potency (potentia, q.v.). The perfectio Dei, or perfection of God, is the absolute, unchanging excellence of God in his being and in all his attributes. See in actu; in potentia.

perfectio essentialis: essential perfection; an attribute of Scripture. See perfectio integralis.

perfectio integralis: integral perfection; entire perfection in the sense of a fullness or completeness that lacks nothing; a term applied to Scripture as a whole. Whereas perfectio essentialis applies to the content of the text, to what the text says, perfectio integralis refers to the completeness of Scripture: it needs no addition. The former term is definitive, the latter is circumscriptive.

perichōrēsis (περιχώρησις): See circumincessio; emperichōrēsis.

periculum: danger, hazard; thus, Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere: It is dangerous to introduce new and uncustomary or untried things.

permissio: permission; specifically, permission as distinct from active or effective willing. The concept of a divine permissio was denied by Calvin but accepted by virtually all later Reformed theologians, including Beza and Zanchi, as a means of explaining the origin of sin and the continuing instances of sin in the course of human history. God does not will positively that sins occur but permits creatures to exercise their will in a sinful way. The concept appears also in the Lutheran scholastic systems, though Lutheran opposition to the doctrine of a decretum absolutum, or absolute decree, of predestination rendered the origin of sin and the continuing presence of sin less of a problem for Lutheran than for Reformed orthodoxy. See decretum; permissio efficax; praedestinatio.

permissio efficax: effective permission or willing permission; especially the providential concursus (q.v.) underlying evil acts of human beings; a concept typical of Reformed theology, which will not allow a bare or ineffectual permission on the part of God and which will acknowledge no realm of activity outside of the will of God. God is therefore viewed as positively willing to permit the free agency of human beings and as supporting their acts with his providential concursus, even when those acts go against his revealed will. See non-impeditio peccati.

perseverantia: perseverance; also perseverantia sanctorum: perseverance of the saints; a term used by the Reformed to indicate the final indefectibility of the elect, who, although they continue after justification to experience temptation and sin, will ultimately never fall beyond the power of God’s grace. Even if the exercise of faith (exercitium fidei) ceases, the cessation will be only temporary. The Lutherans do not deny the necessity of perseverantia, but they hold the possibility of apostasy and sinful loss of faith after the effectual hearing of God’s Word. When believers do persevere, they do so by means of God’s grace; when they fall away, they do so by their own fault. The difference between Lutheran and Reformed here arises in part out of Lutheran insistence on the efficacy of the Word and consequent refusal to allow the typical Reformed distinction between effectual and ineffectual calling (see vocatio). See conversio reiterata; incrementa fidei; ordo salutis; sanctificatio.

persona: person; the equivalent in Latin patristic theology of the Greek term prosōpon (q.v.). In its basic meaning, a person is, as Boethius defined the term, an individual substance of a rational nature, as distinct from a supposit, or suppositum (q.v.), i.e., any individual or primary substance.

In trinitarian theology, the term persona received its first major use in Tertullian’s refutation of the Sabellian heresy. Like prosōpon, persona had the connotation of a dramatic role or, more precisely, a mask worn by an actor in playing a role. From that basic meaning it had, by Tertullian’s time, developed two further implications. In the first place, it had come to indicate the individual character in the play and thereby to have a certain objective significance. In the second place, crucial for Tertullian, it had come to indicate in Roman law an objective individual capable of having property or substance (substantia, q.v.). Tertullian found the terms persona and substantia ideal for identifying an objective threeness and an objective oneness, respectively, in God. In addition, the definition of three personae sharing one substantia made sense by using legal analogies. It is clear from Tertullian’s works, however, that he pressed beyond the limitations of the dramatic and legal metaphors toward a metaphysical equation of substantia with the indivisible divinity of God and viewed persona as a term capable of indicating distinction within the divine substance without separation or division of substance. This usage prevailed in the Latin West and settled the trinitarian question there until the time of the Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, and Chalcedon, at which point the ability to translate the Western language into terms of prosōpon and ousia, and finally into terms of hypostasis and ousia, contributed greatly to the establishment of a standard orthodox terminology in both East and West. Nevertheless, the Western theologians of the fourth and fifth centuries, particularly Hilary of Poitiers, Marius Victorinus, Jerome, and Augustine, noted problems in the terminology. Jerome was suspicious of the term hypostasis, viewing it as virtually synonymous with ousia and therefore as a cause of Arian tendencies in trinitarian thinking. The others recognized the orthodox character of Cappadocian usage (see hypostasis) but noted the difficulty of rendering the Greek terminology into Latin. Ousia had been rendered substantia; hypostasis ought to indicate, therefore, persona, but it too had been translated, prior to its redefinition by the Cappadocians, as substantia. In addition, the Latin term persona, like the Greek prosōpon, was imprecise in its application to theology. Both Hilary and Victorinus, in order to provide a more precise term, used the word subsistentia, subsistence, to indicate the individual instances of the divine substantia, the persons of the Trinity. Despite these problems, echoed at length by Augustine in The Trinity, the term persona remained standard in Western orthodox definition and was given ecumenical creedal status at the Council of Chalcedon in the council’s acceptance of Leo I’s “Tome” (a doctrinal letter) as an expression of orthodox Christology.

In the early sixth century, persona was finally given metaphysical and philosophical definition by Boethius. In this classic definition, a person is “an individual substance of a rational nature” (rationalis naturae individua substantia). Boethius and his contemporary Cassiodorus were also responsible for the determination of subsistentia as the proper translation of hypostasis. Whereas this latter point of definition would ultimately clarify trinitarian usage, the definition of persona retains, now at a metaphysical level, the original problem of the Western reaction to the theological use of hypostasis. The latter term had caused discussion because of its original translation as substantia; and here persona, which Latin usage had juxtaposed with substantia, is defined as an individual substantia rather than as the Cappadocians had defined hypostasis, an individual instance of a substance or essence. This definition, with its internal problems, was inherited by the medieval doctors as the normative philosophical meaning of persona.

The depth of the problem is clearly seen in the medieval scholastic attempts to cope with both Boethius’s definition and the Greek trinitarian language. Anselm, e.g., generally used substantia as an equivalent for essentia (q.v.) but was led by the problem of the definition and the problem of orthodox Greek trinitarian language to speak of one essentia and three personae sive substantiae. A person, in Anselm’s approximation of the Boethian definition, is an individual rational nature (individua rationalis natura), while “substance” is used with reference to individuals, particularly to those who subsist in plurality. Thus person and substance may be used interchangeably. Nonetheless, continues Anselm, since individuals are called substance because they substand (subjacent) accidents, the term substantia is applied only with difficulty to God insofar as there are no accidents in God. In the case of God, substantia must indicate essentia (substantia ponatur pro essentia). The problem is insoluble; the language is adopted of necessity (Monologium 78).

Among the medieval doctors, Richard of Saint Victor and Alexander of Hales sought modification of the definition. Because no “person” of the Trinity is an individual substance separate from the substantia of the other persons, and because the rational nature of God is the divine substance that belongs inseparably to all the persons, Boethius’s definition applies equally well to either the Godhead or the three hypostases, though not perfectly in either case. A similar problem arises when the definition is used christologically. Christ is one persona but not one substantia, not, at least, in the traditional Latin christological language! Richard proposed that in trinitarian and christological usage, persona be defined as divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia, the incommunicable existence of a divine nature. For general philosophical usage, he proposed: Persona est existens per se solum juxta singularem quemdam rationalis existentiae modum, “A person is a thing existing by itself alone according to a certain singular mode of rational existence.” Alexander proposed a similar modification of Boethius: Persona est existentia incommunicabilis intellectualis naturae vel existens per se solum secundum quemdam modum existendi, “A person is the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature, or a thing existing by itself alone according to a certain mode of existing.” In both of these definitions, the term “mode of existing,” modus existendi, points toward the idea of a subsistence defined by its way or manner of being what it is, an approach in both cases to the patristic concept of hypostasis.

Thomas Aquinas followed the more cautious path of accepting Boethius’s definition while recognizing that the language of three substantiae in God could be construed as tritheistic heresy: the term substantia in the basic definition of persona must not be understood as indicating a separate essentia but rather a suppositum (q.v.), a distinct individual. Thus qualified, the definition serves also as a definition of hypostasis. Aquinas proposes also his own explanation of the term “person”: Persona significat in divinis relationem, ut rem subsistentem in natura divina, “Person signifies a relation in the divine, as a thing subsisting in the divine nature.” These relationes or res subsistentes can be defined as really distinct from one another (see distinctio) but as only rationally distinct from the divine essentia (Summa Theologiae I, qq. 29–30). In effect, Aquinas salvaged the Boethian definition by removing the underlying problematic of the early translation of hypostasis as substantia: persona, hypostasis, and in this particular instance substantia all refer to subsistent individuals, to real subsistent relations. This solution to the problem, with its use of the term suppositum, or as frequently given, suppositum intelligens, an intelligent individual, becomes typical of medieval discussion of persona.

In the Reformation, although there was little debate over the terms of trinitarian theology, Calvin in particular saw the limits of the term persona and, though he certainly knew Boethius’s definition, did not follow it specifically. A person, he wrote, is a subsistence in the essence of God, subsistentia in Dei essentia (Institutes 1.13.6). The term is a direct reflection of patristic usage, particularly that of Augustine and Hilary. The Protestant scholastics tend to refer to Boethius’s definition but also to recognize its limitation and to offer alternatives such as suppositum intelligens or suppositum intellectuale, a self-subsistent intelligence; quod proprie subsistit, that which properly or of itself subsists; and modus subsistendi, a mode of subsisting. This last term reflects the Protestant scholastic interest in patristic theology, specifically in the trinitarian vocabulary of Hilary, Victorinus, and Augustine, all of whom had used the verb subsistere to indicate the threeness of the divine essentia or substantia, and who had tended toward a modal language of person and personal distinctions in the Trinity. Thus Francis Turretin can define persona and hypostasis as suppositum intellectuale and subsistentia and argue that the three personae are distinct from the divine essentia or substantia, not really (realiter) or essentially (essentialiter) as one thing is distinct from another (ut res et res), but rather modally (modaliter) as a mode of being is distinct but nonetheless in a thing (ut modus a re; see Institutio theologiae elencticae 3.23.6–7; 3.27.3). The Lutheran orthodox have reservations concerning the use of modal language to describe even the immanent Trinity and therefore argue that the three divine subsistentiae or supposita can be distinct only rationally (rationaliter) from the divine essence (Baier, Compendium, 2:62–63). There is agreement, however, that the personae are distinct realiter from one another (see distinctio). Both the Lutheran and the Reformed discussions manifest careful reading of the medieval systems, with the Reformed drawing more broadly on medieval reformulations and the Lutherans following the more conservative path marked out by Thomas Aquinas.

In none of these usages does the term persona have the connotation of emotional individuality or unique consciousness that clearly belongs to the term in contemporary usage. It is quite certain that the trinitarian use of persona does not point to three wills, three emotionally unique beings, or as several eighteenth-century authors influenced by Cartesianism argued, three centers of consciousness; such implication would be tritheistic. It is equally certain that contemporary theological statements to the effect that the God of the Bible is a “personal” God point not to the Trinity but to the oneness of the divine will in loving relation to creatures. In other words, despite the variety of usages and implications we have noted, the patristic, medieval, Reformation, and Protestant scholastic definitions of the term persona are united in their distinction from colloquial modern usage. In brief, the term has traditionally indicated an objective and distinct mode or manner of being, a subsistence or subsistent individual, not necessarily substantially separate from other like personae. Thus, in trinitarian usage, three personae subsist in the divine substantia or essentia (q.v.) without division, and in christological usage, one persona has two distinct naturae, the divine and the human. This can be said while nonetheless arguing one will in God and two in Christ—since will belongs properly to the essence of God and to the natures in Christ, and in neither case to persona as such. Thus, in the language of the scholastics, persona indicates primarily an individuum (q.v.), an individual thing, or a suppositum (q.v.), a self-subsistent thing, and more specifically still, an intelligent self-subsistent thing (suppositum intelligens, q.v.). See modus subsistendi; natura; persona Christi; persona Deitatis; subsistentia.

persona Christi: the person of Christ. General agreement exists among Protestant scholastics, Lutheran and Reformed, on the basic principles of Chalcedonian orthodoxy: (1) Christ is the true God (verus Deus), homoousios (q.v.), or consubstantial with God the Father; (2) Christ is true man (verus homo), consubstantial with us in his humanity; (3) these two natures (naturae) are united in one person, the human nature being assumed by the person of the Son or Word.

Thus Christ can be called one person in two natures (una persona in duabus naturis), or considered as having a unity of person (unitas personae) and a duality of natures (dualitas naturarum). The two natures are therefore distinct as one thing from another thing, each having its own attributes or proper qualities, but they are not distinct as one person from another person (see alius/aliud). Since Christ is one person in two natures and that person or subsistence (see subsistentia) is the divine person, Christ’s humanity is viewed as impersonal (see anhypostasis), or as subsistent in and through another (see enhypostasis). See incarnatio; Mediator; natura; unio personalis; unitas.

persona composita: composite person; also persona synthetos (σύνθετος); the term used with reference to the person of Christ by John of Damascus (De fide orthodoxa 3.3) and debated by the Protestant orthodox, many of whom viewed it as too easily capable of a Nestorian interpretation; i.e., the person of Christ as constituted by the union of the two natures. Such an interpretation was uniformly rejected. See anhypostasis; unio personalis.

persona Deitatis or persona divina: person of the Deity or divine person; i.e., one of the three persons, or hypostases, of the Godhead, each of whom has by nature the whole, indivisible divine essence and who are distinguished from each other by the incommunicable personal attributes unbegottenness, begottenness, and procession. See persona.

persona publica: public or representative person; in Reformed covenant theology, a term applied to Adam as the federal head of humanity. In entering the covenant, Adam acted not only for himself but also for the entire human race, which was then, as it were, in his loins and represented by him before God. In short, when Adam and Eve fell, the whole of human nature, which was summed up in them, fell. See foedus operum.

personalis unio. See unio personalis.

personaliter: personally or hypostatically; as opposed to essentialiter (q.v.).

perspicuitas: perspicuity, clarity of thought, lucidity; one of the traditional attributes of Scripture. The attribution of perspicuitas to Scripture does not imply that all passages are clear; rather, the point is that all things necessary to salvation are clearly stated and the obscurities in the text are to be elucidated through comparison to and collation with clear passages in accordance with the analogy of Scripture (analogia Scripturae, q.v.) and the analogy of faith (analogia fidei, q.v.).

petitio principii: begging the question; a fallacy in logic involving the assertion of an unwarranted premise or an unproved conclusion as if it were a datum of argument; similar to a vicious circle (circulus vitiosus, q.v.).

phantasia (φαντασία): imagination, a making visible, the power of presenting an image; specifically, the imaging work of the active intellect (intellectus agens, q.v.). The active intellect abstracts from the sensory image, or phantasma (q.v.), the kind (species, q.v.) or universal of the thing, and by the ongoing operation of receiving such images, the intellect refines its understanding of the external objects by way of an increasingly clearer knowledge of the universal. The result of this operation of the intellect is the increasing adequation (adaequatio, q.v.) of the mind to the thing perceived and the increasingly adequated understanding of its species and genus. See genus; intellectus possibilis; species impressa; universalia; veritas.

phantasma (φάντασμα): an appearance or image; in the faculty psychology, specifically the image of an external object made available to the intellect by the exercise of the senses. The intellect cannot think apart from the presence of this image or phantasm, inasmuch as, from the Aristotelian or Thomistic perspective assumed by most Protestant orthodox prior to the impact of Cartesian philosophy, there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses (nihil in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu). See intellectus agens; intellectus possibilis.

philosophia naturalis: natural philosophy or physics. See physica.

Philosophus: the Philosopher; the honorific title given to Aristotle in the Middle Ages and still used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the eighteenth century, various Cartesian philosophers and theologians transferred it to Descartes.

physica (n.): physics, viz., natural philosophy; adj.: physical; viz., natural or according to nature. Thus physics is the teaching (doctrina, q.v.) or science (scientia, q.v.) concerning finite natures and the qualities of natural things. More specifically, physica is the philosophy that consists in knowledge of natural or corporeal things, including their principia (q.v.), causes, effects, motion, functions, parts, and incidental properties. Its proper object is natural bodies endowed with motion, specifically, corporeal substances composed of primary matter and substantial form. See natura; physica Christiana; physica Mosaica.

physica Christiana: Christian physics; a term for attempts to write a specifically Christian physics in distinction from the pagan or secular Physica of Aristotle, the tradition of commentators on Aristotle, and the received argumentation of other ancient philosophers. Typically, early modern Christian physics accepted most of the philosophical argumentation concerning matter (materia, q.v.), form (forma, q.v.), and substance (substantia, q.v.) but rejected Aristotelian conceptions of the eternity of the world and adjusted understandings of prime matter (materia prima) to the biblical view of a primal chaos. See creatio; ex nihilo; hexaemeron; natura; physica; physica Mosaica.

physica Mosaica: Mosaic physics. Numerous works either titled Physica Mosaica or focused on producing a Mosaic or suitably biblical physics were written in the early modern era, although their diversity precludes identifying a particular school of thought. The common thread uniting most of such works, however, is their attempt to coordinate a view of the origins of the world order gleaned from Genesis 1 with currents in the natural philosophy or physics of the era, albeit with little consistency of philosophical approach. If there is a distinction to be made between Christian physics (physica Christiana, q.v.) and the various works claiming a Mosaic physics, it is the tendency of the former to offer a fairly traditional modified or Christianized Aristotelianism and the tendency of the latter to draw on contemporary philosophical and theosophical theories, including early modern Hermeticism. See creatio; ex nihilo; hexaemeron; natura; physica; physica Christiana.

physikē (φυσική): natural, physical, according to nature. See natura; physica.

physis (φύσις). See natura; physica.

piaculum: an expiation or expiatory sacrifice; i.e., a sacrifice that satisfies or atones for an offense; thus the death of Christ. See expiatio; satisfactio vicaria.

pietas: piety; the personal confidence in, reverence for, and fear of God that conduces to true worship of and devotion to God. Thus piety together with devotion (cultus, q.v.) constitutes true religion (religio, q.v.).

pignus: pledge or assurance; a term used with reference to the sacraments. See sacramentum; signum.

pituita: phlegm; associated with the phlegmatic disposition, one of the four primary bodily fluids in the older physiology and medicine. See humor.

plena possessio: full possession; as distinguished from plenarius usus, full use. See ktēsis.

pleonektēma (πλεονέκτημα): an excess, a covetous act.

pneuma (πνεῦμα): spirit. See spiritus.

pneumata leitourgika (πνεύματα λειτουργικά): ministering spirits; i.e., angels. By definition angels are immaterial; of spiritual substance; endowed with intellect, reason, and will; and created by God for his service as ministers or messengers. Angels are not eternal but are created ex nihilo. Before the fall of Adam, some fell away from God of their own free will; the others, who persevered in righteousness, are now held by grace in their communion with God.

Since they are finite, angels do not have the attribute of omnipresence; yet as spirit, they are not, strictly speaking, in a place. They are limited, not by physical space, but by power of operation upon things. Thus they are localized definitively but not circumscriptively. See alicubitas; praesentia; spiritus.

poena: penalty or punishment; the original Latin sense of the word indicated primarily or basically a penalty, namely, a compensation or indemnification due after the commission of a wrong or a crime, and therefore also a punishment. It is certainly in the primary sense of penalty that Adam and his descendants receive the poena for sin and that Christ is able to bear it in the place of sinners for the sake of satisfying the divine justice or wrath. The medieval scholastics could accordingly distinguish between poena placationis, a placating or compensatory punishment or penalty such as Christ suffered, and a poena ultionis, an avenging punishment rightly born by unrepentant sinners.

As a concept in medieval scholastic theology, peccatum originale (q.v.), original sin, entailed both culpa, fault or guilt, and poena, punishment. Through the sacrificial work of Christ, remission of culpa was made possible for participants in the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist. In the sacrament of penance, the eternal poena due to sin was transformed into temporal acts of satisfaction, which could be performed in this life. The Protestant scholastics, because of their view of the obedientia Christi (q.v.), would argue that Christ’s work removed both culpa and poena. They further distinguish eternal punishment into (1) poena damni, the punishment of the damned, which is the pain of eternal separation from God; and (2) poena sensus, the punishment of sense, which is the actual torment in body and soul suffered by those who are denied the fellowship of God in eternity. In the poena sensus, the scholastics distinguish various gradus poenarum infernalium, degrees of punishment in hell, meted out according to the quality and measure of sins committed. Thus the unbaptized children of heathens will suffer less than heathen parents, who had a lifetime of sin, and less also than sinful hypocrites in the bosom of the church.

poena ultionis / poena placationis: avenging punishment / placating or appeasing punishment. The former, as avenging, correlates with the vindicatory justice of God (iustitia vindicativa), which directly punishes sin and is justly directed toward wrongdoers; the latter, as placative, compensatory, or indemnifying, can indicate the nature of the punishment directed toward Christ, who, as sinless, received the punishment due to others as an act of satisfaction, thereby appeasing or placating the divine wrath or justice. See iustitia; poena.

poenitentia: penitence, penance, repentance, or contrition; specifically, in medieval and Roman Catholic theology, the sacrament of penance (sacramentum poenitentiae) consisting of (1) acts of the penitent: sorrow for sin (contritio, q.v.), confession of sin (confessio, q.v.), and desire for atonement or satisfaction (satisfactio, q.v.); and (2) the acts of the priest: absolution (absolutio, q.v.) and the imposition of works of penance (which are, technically, extrasacramental).

Preparation for penance may begin in attritio (q.v.), an imperfect contrition preceding true contrition. The medieval scholastics argue that the sacrament of penance itself is effective ex opere operato (q.v.), while the extrasacramental works of penance are effective ex opere operantis (q.v.). The sacrament of penance was overthrown by the Reformers as a denial of salvation by grace alone and justification by faith. In addition, the biblical command metanoeite was recognized by the Reformers as demanding repentance, not penance. The Vulgate translation, poenitentiam agite, could not stand, at least in the technical, sacramental sense given to the term poenitentia—rather, the command was translated resipiscite (see resipiscentia), “Repent.” Protestant theology retains the term poenitentia, but only in its root meaning of penitence leading to, or consisting in, repentance or contrition. The Protestant orthodox tend to view poenitentia as a broad category descriptive of the putting off of the old nature and the putting on of the new nature (Col. 3:9–10), which begins in contritio passiva and moves to contritio activa (see contritio), to fides (q.v.), and to nova obedientia, or new obedience. Similarly, poenitentia can be described as the mortificatio, or νέκρωσις (nekrōsis), of the old nature and the vivificatio, or ζωοποίησις (zōopoiēsis), of the new nature. This latter usage of mortification and vivification was favored particularly by the English Reformed or Calvinistic Puritans. See conversio; regeneratio; renovatio.

poenitentia stantium: repentance of those who stand or remain standing; as distinguished from the poenitentia lapsorum, the repentance of those who have fallen away from faith.

politeuma (πολίτευμα): commonwealth or nation; hence, the kingdom of God as the commonwealth or heavenly country of Christians; e.g., Philippians 3:20.

pollutio spiritualis: spiritual pollution or corruption; a result of sin. See macula.

posse non peccare: able not to sin; i.e., the condition of Adam before the fall. See libertas naturae; non posse non peccare; non posse peccare.

possibile: possible, that which can be. The word takes on two distinct meanings in early modern theology and philosophy: it can mean either that which is not but can be, or that which presently is but does not have to be; in the latter sense, it is synonymous with contingent. See contingentia; necessaria; possibilia.

possibilia: possibles or possible existents; viz., things that do not have to be but that are not impossible; specifically, things that can exist (quod potest esse), thus either presently existing contingent things or, more commonly and in distinction from contingents, things that do not exist but that can exist. Following the latter definition, the scholastics further distinguish between the possible and the actual, the latter representing the contingent order of existent things. The possible, as quod potest esse, can moreover be defined either logically or ontically: in the logical sense, the possible is something that does not involve a contradiction; in the ontic sense, a possible is something that falls within the potency of an agent. Thus some logical possibles are not possible for human beings, given that human beings lack the capability or potency to accomplish them; they are, however, possible for God.

Thus, further, these distinctions are significant to scholastic discussions of and distinctions in the scientia Dei (q.v.). A distinction can also be made concerning possible things according to the theological distinction between the divine potentia absoluta (q.v.), or absolute power, and the divine potentia ordinata (q.v.), or ordained power. Under the potentia absoluta anything is possible that does not involve a contradiction; God’s absolute power comprehends the broadest category of possibility, including those possibilia that God could actualize but does not will to actualize. All possibles belong to the mind of God as ideas resident in and intrinsic to the divine essence and serve as the exemplars or patterns for finite existences. But under the potentia ordinata only those things are possible that do not conflict with the divinely established order of nature. See causa exemplaris; contingentia; ideae divinae; necessaria; necessitas.

possibilitas servitutis: the possibility of servitude or subjection; i.e., the possibility of change or mutation of the will toward bondage in sin. This possibility, latent in human nature as originally created, was capable of being actualized by the wrongful exercise of free choice (liberum arbitrium, q.v.). See mutabilitas; peccatum.

post rem: after the thing. See universalia.

potentia: power, potential, potency, efficacy. A distinction must be made between active or operative potency (potentia operativa), namely, the capacity to effect something or of exercising and efficacy or efficiency in action; or passive potency (potentia passiva), in the sense of being capable of existing or of being acted upon (see in potentia). In Aristotelian philosophy, a potentia or dynamis (δύναμις) is, specifically, potential being (μή πω ὄν, mē pō on), the capacity or power to accomplish change, to come into being. See actus; in actu; mē on; potentia absoluta; potentia activa; potentia credendi; potentia extraordinaria; potentia simultatis; virtus; vis.

potentia absoluta: absolute power; the omnipotence of God limited only by the law of noncontradiction. According to his potentia absoluta, God can effect all possibility, constrained only by his own nature. Things that by nature are evil and either impossible or noncompossible things (like square circles) fall outside of the realm of God’s power. The term emphasizes the transcendence and omnipotence of God by setting God even above and beyond the laws he has ordained for the operation of his universe. In a more restricted sense, therefore, the potentia absoluta can be appealed to as the basis of the miraculous and is sometimes therefore associated with the extraordinary power of God (potentia extraordinaria), in contrast with the ordinary or usual exercise of divine power (potentia ordinaria). More precisely, however, the potentia absoluta is paired with the potentia ordinata in parallel with the distinction between the divine scientia necessaria and scientia voluntaria, namely, the divine knowledge of all possibility and the divine knowledge of all actuality as willed by God. The potentia absoluta, in this technical sense, is the divine power to actualize any of the infinite possibilities known to God and, as such, is not a power that operates, is not an arbitrary power that intervenes, but rather represents the possible range of divine power prior to its passage into actual exercise as the potentia ordinata. See miracula; omnipotentia; potentia ordinata.

potentia activa / potentia passiva: active potency or power / passive potency or power; active potency is the inward foundation or basis of action upon another (principium agendi in aliud); passive potency is the inward foundation or basis of being acted upon by another (principium patiendi ab alio). The divine power or potentia, usually identified as omnipotentia (q.v.), is therefore an active potency only. There is no passive potency in God.

potentia credendi: the potential for or power of believing. See actus; in actu; in potentia; potentia.

potentia extraordinaria: extraordinary power, namely, the divine power to work miracles, inasmuch as the miraculous stands outside of what is usually identified as the ordinary or ordained work of God. See potentia absoluta; potentia ordinata.

potentia ordinata: ordained power; the power by which God creates and sustains the world according to his pactum (q.v.) with himself and creation. In other words, a limited and bounded power that guarantees the stability and consistency of the orders of nature and of grace; distinct from the potentia absoluta (q.v.), according to which God can exercise the entirety of his power and effect all possibility. When contrasted with the miraculous, as accomplished by the divine potentia extraordinaria, the ordained power of God is also termed potentia ordinaria, ordinary or usual power.

potentia passiva: passive potency. See potentia activa / potentia passiva.

potentia simultatis: a power or potency of simultaneity. See potentia; simultas potentiae.

potestas: authority, rule; power in the sense of rule or dominion, particularly in relation to law or legal jurisdiction. Potestas must be distinguished from the power or potency (potentia, q.v.) to become something or to effect something, from strength understood as value or worth (virtus, q.v.), and from power in the sense of force (vis, q.v.). The potestas Dei, the dominion of God, and the potestas Christi, the rule of Christ, exercised according to his munus regium, or kingly office, are references to just and rightful governance and not, generally, to creative power (i.e., potentia). The Protestant scholastics therefore refer to churchly powers not as potentia but as potestas, derived from the dominion of God in Christ. See potestas ecclesiae; potestas interpretandi sive iudicandi.

potestas ecclesiae: the power of the church; specifically, the power of the church’s ministry and work, distinguished by the Lutheran scholastics into potestas ordinis, the power of order, according to which the church teaches the Word and administers the sacraments, and the potestas clavium, or power of the keys, also called potestas jurisdictionis, power of jurisdiction, according to which the church forgives sin through absolution or refuses forgiveness through excommunication. The Reformed, in accordance with their greater emphasis on polity, follow a threefold division of church power into (1) potestas dogmatica sive docendi, the dogmatic or teaching power, according to which the church preaches the Word, administers the sacraments, and declares true doctrine in its confessions; (2) potestas gubernandi, the power of governing, which is both a power of ordering or ordaining (potestas ordinandi) and a power of adjudication (potestas iudicandi), according to which the laws of the church are established and enforced and church discipline is maintained; and (3) the potestas misericordiae or potestas ministerium, the power of mercy or power of the ministry, by virtue of which the clergy engage in the Christian work of forgiveness and benevolence. The Reformed also tend to view the pronouncement of forgiveness (an aspect of the potestas clavium) as part of the teaching ministry, while they speak of the refusal of forgiveness and excommunication as a potestas disciplinae or potestas correptionis, a power of discipline.

All potestas ecclesiae or potestas ecclesiastica (ecclesiastical power) subserves and derives from Christ’s potestas dominica, dominical or lordly power, which he exercises as the sole Lord and head of the church. Thus the potestas dogmatica sive docendi, the dogmatic or teaching authority of the church, rests on the authority of Christ, its Lord and head, and on the scriptural revelation of God in Christ. Although both Lutherans and Reformed recognize the derivative and dependent nature of this authority to declare and teach dogma (dogma, q.v.), the Reformed are more willing than the Lutherans to allow the church meeting in council to declare doctrine, even at the level of the local congregation. Lutheranism specifically disavows the claim of congregations and synods to pronounce what must be believed, except in churchly, standardized norms (normae normatae). See ecclesia repraesentativa; norma.

potestas interpretandi sive iudicandi: the power of interpretation or judgment; specifically, the power or right to interpret Scripture, distinguished by the Protestant scholastics into (1) potestas privata, the power of private judgment, according to which all believers have the power and the right to interpret Scripture for personal edification and to build up faith, and (2) the potestas publica, the power of public interpretation, which is not given to all Christians but accompanies a special calling to public ministry and is supported by special gifts. The potestas interpretandi, either privata or publica, is always subject to Scripture and to the testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti (q.v.). See authoritas Scripturae.

practicus, -a, -um (adj.): practical; leading or tending toward a goal. A discipline or body of knowledge is identified as practical when it leads to a goal beyond itself. Various of the scholastics, medieval and early modern, identify theology as scientia practica or as a praxis inasmuch as it leads toward God. See scientia; speculativus; theologia.

praeambula: preambles, from the verb ambulare, to walk, indicating a “walking before,” or preparation for something. Thus praeambula fidei, indicating preambles of or to faith; i.e., knowledge that is preliminary or preparatory to faith. In scholastic thought, the praeambula fidei consist in the basic knowledge accessible naturally that is necessary for understanding the language of faith or Christian doctrine.

praecepta caritatis: precepts or commands of love; viz., the rules of Christian obedience and therefore the substance of Christian ethics, as distinguished from the articuli fidei (q.v.), or articles of faith. Praecepta caritatis is a broader term than praecepta Decalogi, insofar as it comprehends the Decalogue, the two great commandments, and the Sermon on the Mount. It also emphasizes love (caritas), springing from grace and faith, as the ground of true obedience. When the literal sensus of Scripture contradicts both the articles of faith and the commands of love, then and only then must it be given up for an allegorical reading. See evangelium; lex; quadriga.

praecepta Decalogi: the precepts of the Decalogue, the Ten Commandments; viz., the moral law. See lex; lex moralis; lex Mosaica; praecepta caritatis.

praecognita: things to be considered beforehand, preliminaries, from the verb praecogito; used as a term for the issues to be addressed in the prolegomena.

praecognitio: foreknowledge or precognition, from the verb praecognosco. See praescientia.

praedestinatio: predestination, foreordination; viz., the prior appointment of a thing to a specific end. Thus the eternal foreordination of God by which all rational creatures, angelic and human, have been appointed to their ends, either to eternal life or to eternal death; or the eternal and immutable decree of God to manifest his mercy and justice in the salvation of some and the damnation of other of his creatures. Praedestinatio, moreover, implies not only the praefinitio, or appointment to a fixed end or finis, but also ordinatio, the ordination or appointment of means to that end; i.e., creatures are predestined both ad media and ad finem. The Reformed, as opposed to both the Lutherans and the Arminians, define the praefinitio as absolute; which is to say, praedestinatio is a decretum absolutum, or absolute decree, in its underlying intention and in its determination of ends. Nevertheless, the Reformed allow that predestination considered as ordinatio ad media is not absolute but respective (respectivum), i.e., having regard for or giving consideration to the variety of means in the order of free and contingent causae secundae (q.v.). In contrast to this, the Lutheran orthodox define predestination, not as a decretum absolutum, but as a decretum conditionatum, a conditioned decree, ordained by God intuitu fidei (q.v.), in view of faith. This definition is not intended to make faith the effective or impelling cause of God’s decree, and in fact it denies that view explicitly; it intends only to preserve the gratia universalis (q.v.) of the gospel, which Calvinism appears to restrict. At the same time, the Lutheran view preserves the sola gratia (q.v.) of the divine promise by firmly resting faith on grace. In sum, the scholastic Lutheran view argues for a coordination of predestination and faith, on the ground of the atemporal nature of the decree in order to allow that all who come to faith will be among the elect.

The Arminian view of predestination departs from both the Reformed and the Lutheran views in that it adopts a fully synergistic perspective, with the human will preceding God’s actual decision to elect any individual. The Arminians divide the decree into parts, corresponding with God’s voluntas antecedens (q.v.), or antecedent will, and voluntas consequens (q.v.), or consequent will. In exercising his antecedent will, God ordains the means of salvation for all human beings; in exercising his consequent will, God decrees to save or elect all those who choose to have faith in Christ. Unlike the Lutheran decretum conditionatum, the Arminian concept of voluntas consequens makes the freely willed faith of individuals the effective cause of divine election; election is grounded on a foreknowledge of faith. In preserving and emphasizing gratia universalis, the Arminian view sets aside the sola gratia of the Reformers. On one hand, the Lutherans could accuse the Reformed of teaching an arbitrary predestination; on the other hand, they could accuse the Arminians of a lapse into semi-Pelagianism.

There are also two patterns of definition, one defining predestination as a positive divine act and therefore either as synonymous with election or as the divine willing of salvation for the elect, and in the latter sense a divine willing or foredetermination that follows on the divine choice or election. This first pattern of definition yields what is sometimes called “single predestination,” but it does not deny that there is a decree of reprobation; it only places reprobation apart from the divine predestining properly so called. The second pattern of definition holds predestination to be the divine determination of all destinies, whether of the elect or of the reprobate. In the former pattern, reprobation is set apart from predestination but is nonetheless understood as a divine decree; in the latter pattern of argument, the decree of predestination is further distinguished into electio (q.v.) and reprobatio (q.v.), yielding what is frequently called “double predestination.” In either case, reprobation is often distinguished into a prior negative act of willing not to bestow grace (praeteritio, q.v.) and a logically subsequent positive act of setting aside.

Both the Lutherans and those among the Reformed who adopted the infralapsarian (from infra lapsum, q.v.) perspective define electio as the positive decree of God by which he eternally chooses in Christ, out of the mass of humanity considered as fallen, those who will be his eternally; the Reformed can define reprobatio either as a coordinate decree with electio or as a passing over of the rest of the human race, leaving them in their sins to their ultimate damnatio (q.v.). The infralapsarian definition can therefore argue for either a double decree of election and reprobation or a single decree of election only, in the latter case with reprobation being understood not so much positively as negatively, namely, as a passing over of some human beings. Those among the Reformed who adopted the supralapsarian (from supra lapsum, q.v.) perspective define electio and reprobatio as coordinate decrees of God by which God eternally chooses out of the mass of humanity considered as unfallen both the elect who will be ultimately saved and the reprobate who will ultimately be damned on account of their sins—in other words, a fully double predestination, or praedestinatio gemina.

Finally, as a special and foundational category of predestination, the scholastics argue for a praedestinatio Christi, or predestination of Christ, resting on texts like 1 Peter 1:20 and upon the definition of election as occurring in Christ (e.g., Eph. 1:4–5). Technically, such a predestination must refer to the human nature of Christ only or to the man, Jesus of Nazareth, since the divine nature of Christ is the God who elects. Thus Christ is said to be predestinate according to his humanity for the sake of the salvation of the elect who are predestinate in him. The Reformed scholastics also argue that the divine nature of Christ, the eternal Son, if not predestined in the strict sense of the term, was nonetheless designated or self-designated to incarnation and to the mediatorial office. This view ultimately led to the development of the concept of an eternal pactum salutis (q.v.) between the Father and the Son. In Scotist theology, this predestination of Christ is an absolute predestination and is prior to the creation and fall of man. The Protestant orthodox, both Reformed and Lutheran, disavow any speculation concerning incarnation and the praedestinatio Christi and therefore deny the Scotist conclusion that the incarnation would have occurred had Adam not fallen. In this the Protestant scholastics agree with the majority of the medieval doctors. See fundamentum electionis; obiectum electionis; Si homo non periisset, Filius hominis non venisset; voluntas Dei.

praedestinatio ad salutem: predestination to salvation; viz., election. See electio; praedestinatio.

praedestinatio Christi: the predestination of Christ. See fundamentum electionis; praedestinatio.

praedestinatio gemina: double predestination. See praedestinatio.

praedicamenta: predicaments; i.e., the categories (categoria, q.v.) or general concepts governing the operation of predication or attribution. In the Aristotelian logic followed by the scholastics, there are ten categories of predication: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passivity, place, time, posture or situation, and habit or state. The latter nine of the categories are accidents (see accidens) and are distinguished from substance (substantia, q.v.) according to the third of the antepraedicamenta (q.v.), namely, the distinction between substance and accidents, between singulars and universals, or prerequisites to predication.

Quantitas, or quantity, is the accident or property of extension and enumeration. Quantitas continua, or continuous quantity, is the property of size, length, and depth; quantitas discreta, or discrete quantity, is the property of number, i.e., of extension into parts that can be enumerated. Qualitas is an accident that modifies substance in itself. Quantitas is extension without substantial modification and is therefore distinct from qualitas, which is concerned with intrinsic disposition and alteration in terms of the fundamental and inalienable dispositions or habits of a thing, its intrinsic potency or capability of operation, and its passibility or capacity for change. (Considered extrinsically, habit, operation, and passibility, or passivity, are distinct praedicamenta.) Relatio is the attribution of order and arrangement to things either transcendentally, really, or rationally. Transcendental relation is a relation that belongs to the very essence of a thing and is therefore more than an incidental property or accident, such as the relation of soul to body (see spiritus incompletus). Real relation is an accident in a thing that refers or relates the thing to another thing. Rational relation is neither of the essence of a thing nor an accident in a thing but is a mental description of the arrangement of essentially unrelated things. Actio, or action, indicates an operation, or operative power, considered either immanently, as the faculty or disposition of an agent (e.g., intellect or will in itself in its inward actuality), or transitively, as an action directed externally toward a desired effect. Passio, passion or passivity, identifies an agent or a thing as the mere recipient of an action, apart from any action of its own. Ubi, or locus, place, is the simple accident of location. It is distinguished from posture or situation, situs or dispositio, which represents an added qualification or the relation or ordering of the parts of a thing within its place. Quando is the attribute “when,” i.e., the time (tempus) of a thing. Finally habitus, or habit, is the accident of an added disposition or capacity, such as the accident of a body being clothed. This meaning of habitus is distinct from the meaning of the term in faculty psychology (see actio; habitus).

praedicatio: predication; by extension, preaching; in its basic sense, the activity or operation by means of which something is affirmed of or attributed to a subject. Aristotle distinguished three kinds of predication: univocal, equivocal, and denominative. To these, Aquinas added a fourth, analogical. Since the distinction of these four kinds of predication is the necessary prerequisite for beginning to divide things into their proper categories and classifications (praedicamenta, q.v.), they are referred to, together with other logical prerequisites of proper predication, as antepraedicamenta (q.v.). Preaching is a praedicatio, or predication, because it affirms something of God and of God’s promises.

praedicatio evangelii: the preaching of the gospel.

praedicatio identica: identical predication; a term used by Lutheran orthodoxy to indicate the identity of bread with body and wine with blood in the Lord’s Supper. The bread and the wine are visible to believers; but through and in these elements, Christ’s body and blood are manifest in the predications “This is my body” and “This is my blood.” See locutio exhibitiva.

praedicatio verbalis: verbal predication; used to distinguish between a predication that is merely verbal, i.e., a figure of speech, and a real predication. See praedicatio.

Praedicatio Verbi Dei Verbum Dei est: The preaching of the Word of God is the Word of God; a marginal heading from Bullinger’s Confessio Helvetica Posterior that points to the importance of strictly scriptural preaching in the Reformed Church. Some modern readings of the phrase take it to imply an existential moment of encounter, but its meaning in context is simply to affirm that the Word must be preached and that doing so requires the direct recourse to and interpretation of Scripture in the pulpit.

praedicationes inusitatae: unique predications; specifically, the predications that occur because of the unio personalis (q.v.), or personal union, of the divine and human in Christ. See propositiones personales.

praefinitio: the prescription, ordination, or prior appointment of things to their end. See praedestinatio.

praemia: rewards, prizes; sg., praemium; a term used in medieval theology to indicate various rewards for merit, adopted by some of the Protestant orthodox in their discussions of gradus gloriae (q.v.), degrees of heavenly glory, but without the connotation of a merit system or of any human ability to earn divine favor.

praemotio moralis: moral premotion; a term indicating that the divine concurrence in the acts of will of rational creatures involves an impetus toward a specific moral goal. Insofar as this kind of premotion would undermine freedom of choice in matters of morality, it is typically denied by the Reformed in their arguments concerning the necessity of divine concurrence (concursus, q.v.) or of a physical premotion (praemotio physica, q.v.) underlying all creaturely acts or movements.

praemotio physica: physical premotion; a term given currency by early modern Dominican theologians in their debate with Molinists, but reflective of the traditional assumption that God as first mover (primum movens, q.v.) is the ultimate source of all motion in the universe. All creaturely movements, including the volitional acts of rational creatures, are ontologically dependent on God: in order for any creaturely motion to take place, God must will that motion concurrently with the creature. This concurrent willing respects the nature and the will of the creature. Praemotio physica is also to be distinguished from a praemotio moralis: whereas God is understood as necessarily concurring in the physical movements of creatures, given that he does not alter either their natures or their willing by his concurrence, the physical premotion does not imply divine interference with human moral choices. This concept and the language of praemotio physica was adapted by many of the Reformed writers of the seventeenth century, who saw themselves as in fundamental agreement with the Dominican opposition to Molinism. See concursus.

praeparatio ad conversionem: preparation for conversion; a term used in Reformed dogmatics, particularly by the English, to indicate the terror of heart, the deep remorse, and the fear of hell brought on by the elenctical use of the law (see usus legis) that precede conversion and can be viewed as a preparatory work of the Spirit, subduing pride and opening the will for grace. The Reformed are anxious to preserve their doctrine from synergism and argue that the praeparatio is itself a work of grace, an actus praeparatorius, or preparatory work, an actus praecedaneus, or work preceding, that involves the inward life of sinners but does not constitute a human merit. Among the Lutherans this praeparatio is referred to under the term terrores conscientiae (q.v.).

praeparatio evangelica: preparation for the gospel; specifically, the work of the Logos in and through providential revelation, human reason, and even pagan philosophy that instilled in the pagan mind belief in the oneness of God and the desire for both pure worship and higher morality in the centuries prior to the coming of Christ and the apostolic mission. The apologetic tradition of the early church used the concept of a praeparatio evangelica to explain the presence of truths in paganism and the relationship of those truths to the Christian revelation. Some of the fathers, like Eusebius of Caesarea in his Praeparatio evangelica, parallel the Old Testament revelation to the Jews with the truths known to pagan philosophy and religion; they argue that both of these preparations for Christianity belong to the old covenant. The Old Testament contains revelation given by the Logos asarkos (q.v.), or Logos incarnandus, the Word to be incarnated (see incarnandus/incarnatus), while the gift of divine knowledge to the pagans, technically general revelation (revelatio generalis, q.v.), was defined by the apologists of the early church as the work of the logos spermatikos, the spermatic or seed-logos, present in the human mind (see semen religionis; sensus divinitatis). By extension, praeparatio evangelica can indicate the truths concerning God known to any nation or in any religion prior to the coming of the gospel.

Protestant orthodox apologetics reflects this notion of a praeparatio evangelica in its assumption that there are truths concerning God common to all human beings and that these common principles provide a basis for debate with other religions. Thus, whereas Christians and Jews will not be able to debate theological points by starting with the New Testament, they have as a common principle the Old Testament. Similarly, neither Christians nor Jews will have much success debating with pagans if they use the Old Testament as a basis for debate—but they can assume the common principles known to philosophy in general, such as the existence and goodness of God. There is also a line of argument in seventeenth-century Reformed apologetic works that begins with consideration of humanity in general, argues for the truth and necessity of religion, presents arguments to show the universality of religion, argues for the failure of natural religion to provide salvation, and then presents a historical view of the necessity of revelation beginning with the truths present in Judaism and concluding with the truth of Christianity.

praescientia: foreknowledge; i.e., the knowing of a thing or an event before its occurrence. Praescientia is predicated of God, who knows our words before they are on our tongues (Ps. 139:4). The scholastics recognize, however, that the praescientia Dei is a function or aspect of the divine omniscience (omniscientia, q.v.) and is not to be understood in a temporal sense as meaning that God would know in time something that is going to occur at a subsequent time. “Foreknowledge is thus not claimed with respect to God, but with respect to things,” Praescientia dicitur non respectu Dei, sed respectu rerum (J. A. Osiander in Baier, Compendium, 2:30). God eternally knows all things that are in time, so that the things that are in our future and that are said to be foreknown with respect to us are known by God simultaneously with our past and our present. The scholastics also note that praescientia defined in this manner does not compromise the contingency of events or the freedom of the will. God’s eternal knowledge of things and events is not itself the cause of those things and events but is rather a knowledge both of things and events and of their causes. (This conclusion, however, in no way contradicts the ultimate causality of God undergirding all things or the eternal decree of God that does ordain some things as necessary.) Foreknowledge of contingent things and events indicates a certainty on the part of the knower just as immediate, direct knowledge of an event by a finite being indicates certainty—in both instances, without a causal connection.

The scholastics recognize, further, that there is a certain kind of necessity resident within the contingent event or thing. But this is no absolute necessity (necessitas absoluta, q.v.) or necessity of the consequent (necessitas consequentis, q.v.) arising out of the relation of a necessary cause to its effects; rather, it is a conditioned or relative necessity, or a necessity of the consequences (necessitas consequentiae, q.v.), arising a posteriori in view of a previous series of contingent events or causes—therefore, a contingency. Since praescientia indicates a knowledge not only of events but also of their causes and thus of the entire operation of the contingent order, it indicates a certain knowledge of this a posteriori necessity resident in events and things, but again without necessary causal relation between the knower and the thing known. See contingentia.

praesciti: the foreseen. See reprobi.

praesentia: presence; nearness or closeness, whether physical and spatial, temporal, or spiritual and nonspatial; proximity. The scholastics distinguish a series of ways of being present or modes of presence: (1) Praesentia localis sive corporalis, local or bodily presence, is also termed praesentia circumscriptiva, circumscriptive presence. These terms all denote the mode of presence of physical, finite things. They are present locally, i.e., in a finite place; they are present bodily, i.e., in a finite physical shape within physical boundaries; and therefore they are present in a circumscribed way, i.e., they can be described or demarked by circumscription, which is to say, by drawing a line around them. A human body, e.g., is present locally, corporally, and circumscriptively. (2) Praesentia spiritualis sive virtualis, spiritual or virtual presence, is a term applying to any spiritual being that, since it is immaterial, does not occupy space but rather manifests its presence by a power (virtus, q.v.) of operation. The term is vague because it can be applied to souls, to angels, to the body of Christ in the Lord’s Supper, and even to God. Therefore a distinction must be made between the presence of finite spirits and the presence of an infinite spirit: thus (3) praesentia illocalis sive definitiva (q.v.), illocal or definitive presence, and (4) praesentia repletiva, repletive presence. Illocal or definitive presence is the presence of a finite spiritual being, which cannot be circumscribed or assigned to a spatially defined locus because of the immaterial or nonphysical nature of the being, yet which is limited or defined (definitiva) by the finitude of the being in its power and operation. Souls and angels are present illocally and definitively, as are, according to most of the orthodox, the bodies of the blessed (beati, q.v.). Repletive presence, however, is the presence of a spiritual being that fills a place without being contained or defined in any way by that place. Ultimately God alone, who is unlimited in his power and operation, has repletive presence. Finally, there is (5) praesentia temporalis, temporal presence. This term can be applied to all created beings since their presence, local or illocal, circumscriptive or definitive, has duration.

To this set of terms, which is governed by philosophical and ontological considerations, the Protestant scholastics add a set of primarily theological terms related to the problem of the eucharistic presence of Christ. The most general of these terms is praesentia sacramentalis, or sacramental presence. It is used by Reformed and Lutherans alike to indicate a mode of presence unique to the person of Christ in the sacrament. Both Lutherans and Reformed argue that this sacramental presence results in a communication of the substance of Christ’s body and blood (see manducatio indignorum) and is therefore a praesentia substantialis, a substantial presence. Nevertheless, both deny a praesentia corporalis or localis et circumscriptiva such as indicated in the Roman Catholic doctrines of transubstantiation (transubstantiatio, q.v.) and consubstantiation (consubstantiatio, q.v.) on the assumption that Christ’s sacramental presence is not the physical mode of presence or local mode of subsistence (localis subsistendi modus, q.v.) typical of physical objects or bodies. Christ’s eucharistic presence therefore falls into the category of a praesentia spiritualis sive virtualis (q.v.). This term is favored by the Reformed, who argue for a presence made possible by the power (virtus) of the Holy Spirit. Although this activity of the Spirit is claimed to communicate the substance of Christ, the Reformed refuse to attribute any mode of subsistence other than the localis subsistendi modus to Christ’s body and therefore argue that Christ’s body, as such, remains entirely in heaven.

Lutheran orthodoxy, true to the position of Luther in his debate with Zwingli, could view this Reformed teaching only as a denial of praesentia realis, or real presence. The term praesentia realis, as used in orthodox Lutheranism, indicates the real but supernatural and illocal presence of the true body and blood of Christ in the Lord’s Supper over against the virtualism of the Reformed. Specifically, it indicates the illocal mode of subsistence (illocalis subsistendi modus) of the body of Christ that is distinct from the omnipresence (omnipraesentia, q.v.) of Christ’s divine person and from the ubiquity (ubiquitas, q.v.) of Christ’s human nature resulting from the communication of proper qualities (communicatio idiomatum, q.v.) inasmuch as it is an illocal or definitive presence (praesentia illocalis sive definitiva) in, with, and under the visible elements of the sacrament. This praesentia sacramentalis is real, resting on the promise of Christ (Matt. 26:26–28) that the bread is his body and the wine is his blood and on the personal union (unio personalis, q.v.), the communion of natures (communio naturarum, q.v.) in the union, and the communication of proper qualities. Nevertheless, it is a hyperphysical (hyperphysica, q.v.), not a physical, corporeal, or local presence such as occurs naturally and is described in terms of bodily, physical attributes of extension. In addition, since the real presence finds its dogmatic explanation in the power given to Christ in the exaltation of his human nature to the right hand of God (Augustine, Confessions 3), and therefore in the full exercise (chrēsis; see ktēsis) of the attribute of omnipresence that belongs to the human nature by virtue of the majestatic genus of the communicatio idiomatum (as distinct from the idiomatic genus), it cannot be viewed as a denial of natural attributes or qualities to Christ’s human nature. Thus the Lutheran orthodox insist that the body of Christ has not lost the attribute of place: it was present circumscriptively on the cross and is now present definitively in a heavenly somewhere, i.e., it has an ubi, a “where” or whereness (ubietas). This praesentia definitiva is proper to a glorified body and may also be termed a glorious presence, praesentia gloriosa. It is, like the real presence, illocal and definitive, but it is nonetheless distinct since it is not sacramental. See immensitas; multivolipraesentia; omnipraesentia intima sive partialis; praesentia extima sive totalis.

Praesentia bonorum operum ad iustificationem necessaria est: The presence of good works is necessary to salvation; a Majorist maxim reflecting the early Lutheran controversies and, specifically, Georg Maior’s insistence, against antinomian tendencies, that salvation cannot fail to be accompanied by good works. Orthodox Lutheranism steadfastly refuses to prejudice the sola gratia (q.v.) and sola fide (q.v.) by any statement of necessary relation between justification and works. The Reformed agree that the presence of good works is in no way requisite to justification, but they add that works must follow justification. The difference arises out of a stronger emphasis among the Reformed on the third use of the law. Both affirm the need for sanctification as evidenced by good works. See iustificatio; usus legis.

praesentia corporalis: corporal or bodily presence. See praesentia.

praesentia extima sive totalis: outward or total presence; a term used by the Lutheran scholastics to describe the manifest omnipresence of Christ’s human nature during the status exaltationis (q.v.), or state of exaltation. It is praesentia totalis, since Christ in his human nature both possesses and uses his omnipresence. Praesentia extima sive totalis is also termed omnipraesentia extima. See ktēsis; omnipraesentia intima sive partialis.

praesentia illocalis sive definitiva: illocal or definitive presence; viz., the mode of presence characteristic of an immaterial but finite being, which by its nature is not confined dimensionally to a given locus, or place, but which in its power and operation is nevertheless delimited or defined. The term is used by the Lutheran orthodox as an alternative to the praesentia spiritualis sive virtualis (q.v.), spiritual or virtual presence, and used by the Reformed in describing Christ’s eucharistic presence. A distinction must therefore be made between the communicated omnipraesentia (q.v.) of Christ’s human nature and the illocal and supernatural presence of Christ’s body and blood in the Lord’s Supper. Whereas the sacramental presence can be grounded dogmatically on and understood in terms of the communicatio idiomatum, the primary intention of the Lutheran orthodox in arguing the illocal and supernatural presence of the body and blood in, under, and with the bread and the wine is to explain the words of institution and thereby indicate a presence of Christ peculiar to and appropriate to the sacrament. The omnipresence, or ubiquity (ubiquitas, q.v.), of Christ’s human nature is a repletive presence (praesentia repletiva); Christ’s humanity, because of its union with the Logos, is present in, through, and to all creatures, filling all things just as the Logos fills all things (see Logos non extra carnem). The illocal presence of Christ’s body and blood in the sacrament, however, is a definitive presence (praesentia definitiva), not because of any limitation of finitude, but because it is a presence specific to the sacrament. That presence is bound to a particular promise of God given in the words of institution. Thus Christ is present, repletively, in every place and at every meal, but present definitively and sacramentally only in the consecrated elements of the Lord’s Supper. See coena sacra; praedicatio identica; praesentia; unio sacramentalis.

praesentia intima sive personalis: intimate (secret) or personal presence. See omnipraesentia intima sive partialis.

praesentia localis: local presence; also praesentia circumscriptiva: circumscriptive presence. See praesentia.

praesentia realis: real presence; a term used in particular by the orthodox Lutherans to indicate the real, illocal presence of Christ’s true body and blood in the Lord’s Supper. Realis here is not to be rendered “genuine” or “true” but specifically indicates the substantial or substantive presence of the res sacramenti, namely, the body of Christ, with the signs, or signa. See coena sacra; praesentia; res; unio sacramentalis.

praesentia sacramentalis: sacramental presence. See coena sacra; consubstantiatio; praesentia; transubstantiatio; unio sacramentalis.

praesentia spiritualis sive virtualis: spiritual or virtual presence; in general, the effective or effectual mode of presence that is characteristic of a spiritual or immaterial being (e.g., an angel or a soul) as opposed to praesentia corporalis or praesentia physica, corporal or physical presence. More specifically, the mode of presence of Christ’s body in the Lord’s Supper as taught by the Reformed. According to the Reformed doctrine, the body of the ascended Christ, which remains locally or physically present in heaven, is substantially given in the Lord’s Supper to those who receive the elements in faith. This communication of the substance of Christ’s body and blood occurs by the power of the Holy Spirit to join together two physically separate things. Since believers are thus joined with Christ by the Spirit, the presence is spiritualis, or spiritual; since the union occurs by the power (virtus) of the Spirit, the presence is virtualis, or virtual. The Reformed orthodox tend to describe this spiritual presence and union in terms of the liturgical phrase Sursum corda, “Lift up your hearts”: the glorious body of Christ is not returned from heaven to earth, but rather the hearts and souls of believers through faith and by the Spirit are raised to union with Christ where he dwells, in heaven. See praesentia.

praesentia substantialis: substantial presence; i.e., a real or true presence. Depending on the substance and its attributes, praesentia substantialis can be either circumscriptive (local, physical) or definitive (spiritual) or repletive (illocal). See omnipraesentia; praesentia.

praesentia virtualis: virtual or effective presence. See praesentia spiritualis sive virtualis.

praestantia: superiority or excellence; specifically, the superiority or excellence of human nature in its original created state, viz., the untarnished imago Dei (q.v.).

praeteritio: preterition; a passing over or passing by; a term used by both the supralapsarian and the infralapsarian Reformed to indicate the nonelection of those left by God in the condemned mass of humanity. In a supralapsarian definition, praeteritio is the logically prior negative act of reprobation, a willing not to bestow grace on some. The infralapsarians identify the divine praeteritio as a negative willing as contrasted with the positive willing of electio (q.v.), or election, and it is intended to rest all the efficient causes of damnation (damnatio, q.v.) in human beings. Orthodox Lutheranism rejects the concept of praeteritio inasmuch as it denies the efficacy of the universal call (gratia universalis, q.v.) and grace of the Word. Damnation must ultimately rest on the sinner’s final and impenitent resistance to grace, and reprobation must rest on the eternal divine foreknowledge of final impenitence in the face of the gracious calling of the Word. See infra lapsum; intuitu fidei; intuitu incredulitatis finalis; praedestinatio; reprobatio; supra lapsum.

praeveniens: coming before. See gratia praeveniens.

praevisa fides: foreknown faith; in Arminian theology, the ground and impelling cause (causa impulsiva) of election; in scholastic Lutheranism, not the impelling cause, but the occasion or reason (ratio) for election inasmuch as the apprehension of Christ’s merit is eternally foreknown by God. See intuitu fidei; praedestinatio; synergismus.

praevisio Dei: the foresight or prevision of God. See praescientia.

praxis: praxis, practice; since theology is a discipline taught and studied with an end in view, viz., the salvation of believers, it can be called a praxis, i.e., a practical discipline. Protestant scholastics, like their medieval predecessors, raised the question in their theological prolegomena whether theology is purely practical, purely speculative, or some combination of the two. All the Lutheran and Reformed orthodox assumed that theology is, at least in part, a praxis. See practicus; speculativus.

pretium: price or ransom; a term used to describe the death of Christ. See lytron; satisfactio vicaria.

prima causa: the first cause; viz., God as the cause of all things, i.e., the uncaused cause or noncontingent, necessary being whose causal activity sets in motion all contingent causes and their effects. See causa; ens; essentia Dei; primum movens.

primitas: primacy; also principitas: being of the highest order of importance. The primitas Dei, or principitas Dei, arises as a corollary of the absolute life (vita Dei, q.v.) and necessary self-existence (aseitas, q.v.) of God. Since God alone exists of himself and is the sole ground of all nonnecessary or contingent things (contingentia, q.v.), God is also first or ultimate, the foundation of all things, the being of the highest order, the primum ens, or first being, and the ens perfectissimum, the perfect being.

primo loco: in the first place.

primum cognitum: first known; the perennial question between Platonist and Aristotelian philosophies arises over the object of knowing, namely, whether the mind first knows the form or universal or whether it first knows the individual thing, from which it abstracts the form or universal. See ens; substantia; universalia.

primum ens: first being or first existent; viz., God. See Deus; ens; primitas.

primum mobile: the first movable sphere; i.e., the tenth and outermost of the series of concentric spheres of the Ptolemaic universe. The primum mobile is set in motion by God, and its motion is conveyed to the lower spheres. The fixed stars are situated on the primum mobile, and its motion accounts for their daily revolution.

primum movens: the first or supreme mover; viz., God as both the first efficient cause and the final cause of all things. This identification of God as first efficient cause, like the identification of God as infinite and of the world as created out of nothing, marks a significant modification of the original Aristotelian understanding of the primum movens, according to which the first mover is not the efficient but the final cause of all things. In Aristotle’s view, the world is eternal, not created, and the movement engendered by the first mover is not understood temporally but as an ontological movement from potency to actuality, which can be brought about only by an already actualized cause. The Christian adaptation that identifies the primum movens as the first efficient cause rests on the Christian assumption of a transcendent God who creates ex nihilo (q.v.).

The Christian Aristotelian metaphysics underlying scholastic thought, both medieval and Protestant, assumes the basic inertia of matter (materia, q.v.) and the state of rest as the basic condition of all things. Thus for any event to occur or any individual thing to come into existence, it must be moved from potency (potentia, q.v.) to actuality (actus, q.v.). In other words, for natural processes of development or motion (motus, q.v.) to occur, there must be a cause, a mover, external to the process that sets it in motion. It is also clear that no purely potential thing can be a mover. For a thing to act as a mover of another thing, as the efficient cause of a particular effect, it must exist in actuality. A mover, therefore, must itself have been moved from potentia to actus, from potential to actual existence. But there cannot be an infinite regress of finite movers: motion must begin somewhere. Therefore, just as the Aristotelian metaphysics requires the pure potency of a material substratum (materia prima, q.v.) from which all finite things are moved toward actual existence, so does it also require a pure actuality (actus purus, q.v.), a fully actualized being in which there is no potency. This being is capable of exerting potency, or power (potentia), toward externals (ad extra, q.v.). In other words, the motus of the finite order requires a first mover who brings about all finite motions but who is not himself moved. It is worth noting that this concept of an “unmoved mover” does not at all imply immobility or unrelatedness, as is sometimes alleged against it. Indeed, in the scholastic view, God as unmoved primum movens is causally related to all things and to all movements, not merely in the sense of the beginning of motion but also in the sense of the continued and continuing ontological support of all things and movements (concursus, q.v.). See causa; creatio.

primus electorum: first of the elect; in Reformed theology, a term applied to Christ according to his human nature, indicating his designation to the office of Mediator. See caput electorum; fundamentum electionis; praedestinatio Christi.

principia theologiae: fundamental principles or foundations of theology. According to the Protestant scholastics, theology has two principia, Scripture and God, i.e., the revelation and the one who reveals himself. The scholastic systems frequently begin with a definition of theology followed by a statement of its principia, viz., a locus on Scripture and a locus on God. Thus (1) the principium cognoscendi, the principle of knowing or cognitive foundation, is a term applied to Scripture as the noetic or epistemological principium theologiae, without which there could be no true knowledge of God and therefore no theological system; it is sometimes further distinguished into the principium cognoscendi externum, the external written Word, and the principium cognoscendi internum, the internal principle of faith, which knows the external Word and answers its call, i.e., faith resting on the testimony of the Spirit. Identification of Scripture by the Reformed scholastics as the principium cognoscendi theologiae relates to the self-authenticating and self-interpreting character of Scripture in the orthodox theology inasmuch as a principium, properly understood, is both self-evidencing or self-evidently true and indemonstrable. (2) The principium essendi, the principle of being or essential foundation, is a term applied to God considered as the objective ground of theology, without whom there could be neither divine revelation nor theology. This usage is less proper than the identification of Scripture as principium cognoscendi, given that God is not, strictly speaking, self-evidencing (per se nota, q.v.) and, according to some theologians, can be demonstrated to exist. See principium essendi / principium cognoscendi; testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti.

principiatum: literally, that which has been principiated, something brought about by or proceeding from a foundation, a source (fons, q.v.), a principium; something that has been caused. Thus, in the Trinity, the Father is the principium and the Son is principiatus. See principium.

principium: principle, fundamental or foundational principle; namely, that from which anything proceeds in whatever manner. The term has two main applications. (1) In logic, a principium is, by definition, both self-evidently true and indemonstrable, as in plane geometry, the principle that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points. If a proposition is demonstrable, it is the conclusion, not the foundation of an argument; if it is indemonstrable but not self-evidently true, it also fails as the foundation of an argument. Only if it is both self-evident and indemonstrable can it be a true principium, namely, the starting point or terminus a quo of an argument. Thus comes the maxim Perspicua vera non sunt probanda, Evident truths are not to be proved. Thus also the term principia per se nota, principles or foundational truths known through themselves, often rendered as self-evident or self-evidencing principles. Principia are the foundations of demonstrative knowledge (scientia, q.v.). In a more general sense, a principium can also be understood as the beginning or foundation (fundamentum, q.v.) of an argument. Note also the scholastic maxim Contra negantes principia non est disputandum, There is (or can be) no disputation (or argument) against those who deny foundational truths.

(2) In metaphysics and physics, the principia of all finite things are matter (materia, q.v.), privation (privatio, q.v.), and form (forma, q.v.). Inasmuch as matter is not self-moved, materia is identified as the principium passivum, the passive principle, or principium quod, the foundation that is acted upon; forma is called the principium activum, the active principle, or principium quo, the principle by which the thing arises. In order for materia to receive form, it must have what is identified as the third of the principia, a privation; in other words, it must be lacking and therefore be receptive; the form requires the matter to sustain it, and the matter is that in which the form resides. A thing itself, understood as an actualized being, is the foundation or principium of all its actions or operations.

A further distinction can therefore be made between the principium quod, the “principle which,” and the principium quo, the “principle by which.” The principium quod is the concrete, operative person or thing, the suppositum (q.v.), or subject, to whom or which the action or operation is attributed. The principium quo is the potency or power of the subject, the virtus suppositi from which the action or operation originates. Thus in the case of an action on the part of a human being, the person is the principium quod; the person’s will is the principium quo. See modus operandi; per se nota; principium essendi / principium cognoscendi; terminus.

principium agendi: principle of motion or action; effective principle. The principium agendi is the source or ground of an action, motion, or operation. See principium.

principium essendi / principium cognoscendi: principle or foundation of being / principle or foundation of knowing. The principium essendi is the ground or basis through which something is (id ex quo aliud est), also principium rei, the foundation or ground of the thing; the principium cognoscendi is the ground or basis on which something is known. See principium.

principium individuationis: principle of individuation; namely, that by which a thing is itself, as distinct both from its universal and from other things. It is variously identified as the individuality (individualitas, q.v.), numerical differentiation (differentia numerica), singularity (singularitas), or thisness (haecceitas, q.v.) of a thing. Typically, in the case of physical being, matter or materiality is understood to be the principle of individuation, given that the form, taken by itself, is not a real being (ens realis) but a rational being (ens rationis) existing intra mentem and generalized to all things of a particular species. The form, then, is individuated by the matter. In the case of purely spiritual beings, the principle of individuation is the form itself, from which it must be concluded that spiritual beings are one of a kind. See ens; forma; substantia.

principium quo: the basis by or from which; as distinct from the principium quod: the basis which. The former term implies an active principle or causative principle, while the latter term indicates the individual or subject in whom or in which the active principle subsists. See principium.

principium tertii exclusi: the principle of the excluded third [or middle]; also, tertium non datur, a third [possibility] is not given. In modern sources, this logical rule is called the principle or law of the excluded middle; it is related to the law of noncontradiction and the principle of bivalence. The logical point can be stated in several ways: first, there cannot be any third possibility between two contradictory propositions; second, when there are two contradictory propositions, one must be true and the other must be false; third, when identified as the law of noncontradiction, two contradictory propositions cannot be true simultaneously, or in the concrete, a thing cannot be A and not-A at the same time, in the same place, and in the same way; and fourth, when used as the principle of bivalence, every proposition is either true or false.

principium unicum: sole or only principle; a term applied to Scripture as the sole source of theology. The term principium cognoscendi, principle of knowing, is better inasmuch as God himself is also a principle or foundation of theology. See principia theologiae.

prioritas naturae: priority of nature; also in the form natura prior, prior or first by nature; as distinct from simultas naturae (q.v.), simultaneity of nature. Priority of nature is typically identified causally in the natural order, inasmuch as the cause must be prior to its effect, albeit not necessarily temporally prior. Thus the sun is naturally prior to its light. A simultaneity of nature belongs to two things or effects occurring at the same time, as, e.g., light and heat are the simultaneous effects of the sun. See in ordine naturae; in signo rationis; prioritas temporis.

prioritas temporis: priority in time; also in the form tempore prior, first in time; indicating that the duration of one thing or person preceded the duration of another, as Moses is temporally prior to Christ. Prioritas temporas is opposed to simultas temporis (q.v.), simultaneity in time or existing at the same time, such as Peter and James. Temporal priority is also to be distinguished from being first by nature (natura prior) or prior of nature (prioritas naturae, q.v.) or to being logically prior. See in signo rationis.

privatio: in philosophy, privation, the absence of form or of a positive attribute or characteristic; in theology, deprivation, the loss of a positive attribute or characteristic. In the basic, philosophical sense, privation, together with matter and form, can be understood as one of three principia, or foundations, of nature (natura, q.v.). In this sense, privation is the contrary of form and is the basis, in matter, for the reception of form, defined as the negatio formae in subiecto apto ad habendum talem formam, the negation of form in a subject capable of having (or receiving) some form. In Aristotelian philosophy, privation is therefore characteristic of unformed materia prima (q.v.), or matter.

In the theological sense, derived from Augustine, privation refers to the loss of original righteousness (iustitia originalis, q.v.) in the first sinful willing of Adam. The consequent absence or deprivation of that righteousness is not, however, mere privation (mere privatio) but, as sin, is an active opposition to God and to the good, termed by the scholastics actuosa privatio, an actualized or active privation, a vitiositas, an active corruption or viciousness. A further distinction can be made between privatio pura, pure or complete privation, and privatio non pura, incomplete privation. The former is a privation of existence (esse, q.v.), i.e., an absolute privation; the latter is a partial privation, or partial loss, a damage caused to the subject. Sin must fall into the latter category since it is only a partial privation of the good; it does not abolish the human will but consists in defective willing. See privatio boni.

privatio boni: privation of the good; the theological assumption that God created all things good, together with the philosophical principle that the actuality (actus, q.v.) of a thing is better than its potential existence (potentia, q.v.), leads directly to the question of the origin and nature of evil (malum, q.v.). Since God did not create evil and since evil is not an actuality but a falling short of actuality, it cannot be a substance (substantia, q.v.) or a thing (res, q.v.) but, if it exists in any sense, must be in a substance or thing. In other words, evil is not a created thing or an actual substance but rather wrongness or distortion in a thing or substance. Furthermore, if evil is neither a thing nor a substance, it cannot be an efficient cause (causa efficiens; see causa) but must be termed a deficiency or a deficient cause (causa deficiens, q.v.). Evil occurs when an otherwise good thing turns or is turned from a higher to a lower good. Thus the fall (see lapsus; peccatum originale) was not a turning from God to some intrinsically evil thing, but rather from God, the highest good (summum bonum, q.v.), toward self wrongfully considered as the highest good. The will toward self rather than toward God is deficient rather than efficient and represents a wrongful and incomplete actualization of will. The result of deficient willing is the loss of full actualization of will and, thus, a privation (privatio, q.v.), or deprivation, of the actualization of will (actus voluntatis). Since the actuality of will and the actuality of the human being of whom the will is a faculty (see voluntas) are goods intended by God the Creator, the evil that arises as a result of sinful or deficient willing is a privation of the good, a privatio boni.

This argument was first fully developed by Augustine in his Enchiridion and is definitive for virtually all subsequent theology: medieval, Reformation, and post-Reformation. Finally, we note that Augustine’s argument concerning evil as the privatio boni is an example of the impact of Aristotelian thought on the classic mind. Plato (Republic 476a; Theaetetus 176e) seems to argue for the real extramental existence of bad and injustice, as well as of good and justice. Plotinus’s development of this Platonic view led to the identification of matter as the utterly dark end of the process of emanation out of the One and as the principle of evil. Against this direction in Platonism, on the basis of his conceptions of actuality and potency, Aristotle had argued that bad things are in fact perverted actualities, things that are in fact lower than their own potency; the bad is not a thing, therefore, but must exist in a thing (Metaphysics 9.9.1051a.4–22), and it is this nondualist or even antidualist Aristotelian view—characteristic of eclectic Neoplatonism like that of Iamblichus—that lies in the background of Augustine’s definitions and also of later Christian understandings. See bonitas Dei; bonum.

pro se: for oneself.

pro tanto: for so much; often indicating acceptance of a statement or a claim without demonstration.

pro tempore: for the time or for the time being.

proairesis (προαίρεσις): the capacity for or faculty of free choice; synonymous with arbitrium and used to denote free choice in general, moral choice, and the responsibility for sinful acts. See liberum arbitrium.

processio: procession; the personal property and relation (see relatio personalis) of the Spirit to the Father and the Son, synonymous with spiratio (q.v.). See Trinitas.

processio intellectualis: intellectual or intellective procession; viz., the internal activity or operation of the Godhead by means of which the Father produces the Verbum internum, the internal Word or Son, the Second Person of the Trinity; most frequently termed generatio (q.v.). Scholastic theology frequently speaks of two emanations, or processions, in the Godhead, the one of intellect or of nature (processio naturalis) and the other of the will (processio per voluntatem), the former being the generation of the Son and the latter being the procession of the Spirit. Thus the generation or procession of the Son is described as an actio intellectus, an action or activity of the divine intellect, on the analogy of the intellective production of a word in the mind. The procession of the Spirit is described as an actio voluntatis, or activity of the will, on the analogy of the will inclining toward an object willed or loved. The former analogy is in keeping with the designation of the Second Person of the Trinity as Word, the latter with the Augustinian view of the Spirit as the bond of love between Father and Son.

processus in infinitum: See progressus in infinitum.

proemium: that which comes first; viz., a preface to a book; also a reward or gift. The meaning reward or gift applies in medieval scholastic theology; also spelled praemium; pl., praemia (q.v.).

prognōsis (πρόγνωσις): foreknowledge or predestination; e.g., Acts 2:23; 1 Peter 1:2. See praedestinatio; praescientia.

progressus in infinitum: progress or advance to infinity; alternatively, processus in infinitum; the alternative to the postulation of an uncaused first cause in the proofs of God’s existence; a logical impossibility on the assumption of the mutually contingent existence of all finite causes. Also termed progressio causarum in infinitum, a progress or advance of causes to infinity.

prolegomenon (προλεγόμενον): prolegomenon, introductory remarks; pl., prolegomena (προλεγόμενα): prolegomena; i.e., the introductory section of a treatise or system of thought in which basic principles and premises are enunciated. One of the most important contributions of Protestant scholasticism to the theology of Lutheranism and Calvinism was the development of theological prolegomena in which the fundamental principles of doctrine (principia theologiae, q.v.) were enunciated. In most of the orthodox systems, therefore, the reader encounters a prolegomenon before either the locus (q.v.) on Scripture or the locus on God. The prolegomena are also where the discipline of theology (see theologia) itself is defined.

prolēpseis (προλήψεις): something taken or known beforehand; anticipations; in Stoic philosophical language, synonymous with κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι (koinai ennoiai), universal or common notions. See notiones communes.

promissio: promise; pl., promissiones; specifically, the promissiones Dei, or promises of God, given in Scripture concerning salvation. The Protestant scholastics distinguish between (1) the promissiones conditionales, or conditional promises, of the law and (2) the promissiones gratuitae, or gratuitous, i.e., unconditional promises, of the gospel.

promulgatio: promulgation; specifically, the promulgation or declaration (declaratio) of the divine promises. See promulgatio foederis.

promulgatio foederis: promulgation of the covenant; in Reformed federalism, the divine declaration of the covenant of grace, beginning with the protevangelium (q.v.) and confirmed in the promise to Noah and the promise to Abraham. See confirmatio foederis; foedus gratiae; sanctio foederis.

pronoia (πρόνοια): providence, foresight, provision; e.g., Romans 13:14. See providentia.

proorismos (προορισμός): foreordination, predestination (Rom. 8:29–30; Eph. 1:11–12). See praedestinatio.

propagatio peccati: the propagation of sin; distinct from the imputatio peccati (q.v.), which is a divine act only. The propagation of sin arises both from the divine act of imputation and from the human act of generation. By imputation, Adam’s progeny receive his transgression; as a matter of heredity, they also receive the privation of righteousness caused by the fall. Sin is thus transmitted by the descent from Adam in the general sense of imputation and, through conception of children, in the specific sense of heredity. Both the Lutherans and the Reformed tend to emphasize the latter and speak of the impure seed, or semen impurum (q.v.), as the source of individual corruption. The Lutherans, for the most part traducian in their theory of the origin of the soul, can more easily explain the propagatio as occurring by transmission (per traducem); the Reformed, for the most part creationist, must claim the immediate corrupting of the soul in its contact with a body produced by the semen impurum. See anima.

propheta omnibus excellentior: a prophet more excellent than all others; also propheta kat’ exochēn (κατ’ ἐξοχήν): the preeminent prophet; terms applied to Christ in his munus propheticum, or prophetic office. See munus triplex; prophetia.

prophetia (from the Greek προφητεία, prophēteia): prophecy; specifically, the prophetic office or prophetic work of Christ, distinguished into prophetia legalis and prophetia evangelica, legal and evangelical prophecy. The Reformed in particular insist on the prophetia legalis in view of the inclusion of the law within the foedus gratiae (q.v.). Christ, as Logos incarnandus (q.v.), reveals the Word of the law as his “legal prophecy,” just as he reveals the Word of the gospel as his “evangelical prophecy” both in the Old Testament and, after the incarnation, in the New. See munus triplex.

prophorikon: transeunt, brought forth, engendered. See Logos endiathetos / Logos prophorikos; Logos ensarkos.

proportio: proportion; sometimes used synonymously with analogy, as in the term proportio fidei, proportion or analogy of faith. See analogia; analogia fidei.

propositio: proposition; specifically, a formal statement consisting in a subject, a verb (most frequently the verb “to be”), and a predicate that either expresses a truth or denies a falsehood about the subject. See praedicatio.

propositiones idiomaticae: idiomatic propositions; i.e., the propositions concerning the person of Christ that arise from the properties, or idiomata (q.v.), belonging to the person by reason of the communio naturarum (q.v.), or communion of natures. See propositiones personales.

propositiones personales: personal propositions; a term used by the Lutheran scholastics to indicate the unique propositions or predications (propositiones sive praedicationes inusitatae) that are made possible by and are descriptions of the unio personalis (q.v.), or personal union, of Christ: e.g., God is man; man is God. Reformed and Lutheran orthodoxy agree in these predications, since a concretum (q.v.), or concrete existent, is predicated of another concretum. Both deny the predication of one abstractum (q.v.) of another—as, e.g., divinity is humanity, or humanity is divinity. There is profound disagreement, however, between Lutherans and Reformed concerning the actual communication of proper qualities (communicatio idiomatum, q.v.).

propositum Dei: the design, plan, purpose, or intention of God; a term used in connection with language concerning the eternal decree, specifically with reference to the underlying or fundamental intention of God in willing his decree. See aeternitas; beneplacitum; consilium Dei; consilium pacis; decretum; potentia absoluta; voluntas Dei.

proprie: properly, strictly, in contrast to improprie, improperly or loosely. Thus a proper predication is strictly (strictè, q.v.) conceived and specific; an improper predication is more loosely (latè) or generally conceived. Note that improprie virtually never means improper in the colloquial sense of inappropriate, incorrect, or unseemly.

proprietas: property; specifically, an intimate, incommunicable property; thus the incommunicable attributes of God and the personal properties (proprietates personales) of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, paternitas (paternity), filiatio (filiation), and processio (procession), which belong to the persons of the Trinity individually. Considered as descriptions of the relations between the persons, these personal properties are termed personal relations (see relatio personalis). See attributa divina; attributum; notiones personales; Trinitas.

proprietates entis: properties of being; also proprietates transcendentales entis, transcendental properties of being; and sometimes also affectiones entis, affections, dispositions, or conditions of being. In traditional metaphysics, being (ens, q.v.), whether in its most general or in the specific sense of an individual being, has a series of irreducible or inseparable and therefore transcendental properties that are convertible with being itself. In the most basic definition, these properties are unity (unitas), goodness (bonitas), and truth (veritas); some sources add to these three the properties of existence (existentia) and duration (duratio); others add res, indicating a thing or existent, and something (aliquid) or other (aliud). In short, being exists and therefore has duration; it is something that stands over against what is other; it has unity or is one in its juxtaposition with the other and in being what it is and not comprising another reality; it is good in the sense that it is the actualization of what it is; and it is true in that it can only be what it is. See bonitas; unitas; veritas.

proprium: intimate property or essential attribute; that which is proper to or properly predicated of an individual. A distinction can be made between a proprium strictè and a proprium latè acceptum, a property accepted either strictly or loosely; or similarly between a proprium simpliciter and a proprium alicui, a property absolutely understood and a property in some respect. Thus rationality and volition are propria of humanity simpliciter or strictly; musicality, as a property of some human beings, is a proprium loosely understood or in some respect. See opus proprium.

propter: because of, on account of; propter quod: on account of which.

proskynēsis (προσκύνησις): worship, obeisance.

proslēmma (πρόσλημμα): an addition or acquisition; used by the fathers with reference to the human nature assumed by the Word.

prosōpon (πρόσωπον): person; a less technical term than hypostasis or subsistentia used to refer to the persons of the Trinity or the person of Christ. By the time the Greek fathers appropriated the word for use in trinitarian theology, prosōpon had taken on, in addition to its original meaning “face” or “expression,” the connotation of “role,” as in a play, and of the individual person indicated by the role. In its theological usage it points toward an individual existence or subsistence but without any philosophical or metaphysical overtones. Like its Latin equivalent, persona (q.v.), it suffers from a certain imprecision and in the company of terms like ousia (q.v.) or “essence,” which do have metaphysical import, would ultimately need clarification through use of the term hypostasis as defined by the Cappadocian fathers. See subsistentia.

protevangelium: literally, the protogospel; the first announcement of the redemption to be effected in and through Christ, given figuratively to Adam and Eve in the words of God to the serpent, “I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and hers; he will strike your head, and you will strike his heel” (Gen. 3:15 NRSV); in Reformed federalism, the inception of the covenant of grace.

prothesis (πρόθεσις): purpose or plan; the divine purpose; e.g., Romans 8:28; 9:11.

prothymia (προθυμία): willingness or goodwill; e.g., 2 Corinthians 8:12.

prōton pseudos (πρῶτον ψεῦδος): first falsehood, false fundamental; i.e., a doctrinal position held as basic by an errorist. An expression originating from Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.18.66a.17.

providentia: providence; the continuing act of divine power, subsequent to the act of creation, by means of which God preserves all things in being, supports their actions, governs them according to his established order, and directs them toward their ordained ends. Since God is eternal, this distinction between creation and providence results primarily from our temporal view of God’s work. In terms of the eternal decretum (q.v.) and the voluntas Dei (q.v.), creation and providence are one act. The scholastics therefore often refer to providence as creatio continuata (q.v.). Providence is further defined as the decretum Dei generale, or general decree of God, comprehending all things, as distinct from the decretum Dei speciale or praedestinatio (q.v.). The identification of providence as the general decree of God also leads to a distinction parallel to that between the eternal decree and its execution in time that is characteristic of the Reformed doctrine of predestination—namely, a distinction between providentia eternalis and providentia actualis, eternal and actual (or actualized) providence. Some of the Reformed orthodox offer a twofold exposition of the doctrine, discussing eternal providence under the topic of the general decree of God and actual providence in a distinct locus following the doctrine of creation. Often, however, providentia actualis is simply identified as providentia, and the entire exposition of the doctrine developed following the locus de creatione. Actual providence is also typically distinguished into conservatio, concursus (q.v.), and gubernatio. Conservatio (conservation or sustenance) refers to the maintenance of the esse (q.v.), or being, of contingent things; concursus (concurrence) to the support of the operationes, or activities and actions, of contingent beings; gubernatio (governance) to the ordinance of God that governs or directs all things. These three aspects of providence, though distinct, are not at all separate but occur simultaneously in, for, and through all things.

Because of the immediacy of the divine providential activity, providence is known from revelatio generalis (q.v.), or theologia naturalis (q.v.), and not only from revelatio specialis, or theologia supernaturalis. The later Protestant scholastics sometimes argued for a personal and general experience of providence as a proof of God’s conservatio, concursus, and gubernatio of the world, the so-called duplex providentiae schola (q.v.). A further distinction can be made between (1) providentia ordinaria, ordinary or general providence, by means of which God conserves, supports, and governs all things through the instrumentality of secondary causes in accord with the laws of nature; and (2) providentia extraordinaria, extraordinary or special providence, according to which God in his wisdom performs special acts or miracles (miracula, q.v.) that lie beyond the normal possibilities inherent in secondary causality and that can therefore be termed either supra causas, beyond or above causes, or contra causas, against or over against causes. Providentia ordinaria corresponds with God’s ordained power (potentia ordinata, q.v.), and providentia extraordinaria indicates God’s extraordinary power (potentia extraordinaria), which in some writers is related to the absolute power of God (potentia absoluta, q.v.). See lex naturalis; praemotio physica.

proximus, -a, -um (adj.): proximate, very near, immediately related or following; the superlative form of the adjective propinquus, -a, -um, “near.” The term is frequently used in connection with causal language indicating an immediately related cause, or causa proxima, as distinct from a distant cause, or causa remota. See causa.

prudentia: prudence; viz., the form of knowledge (see cognitio; notitia) that guides practical judgment by means of universal principles of conduct and action; thus, more generally, the form of knowledge according to which actions are regulated. Along with intelligentia (q.v.), sapientia (q.v.), scientia (q.v.), and ars (q.v.), it is one of the natural virtues and, with iustitia (q.v), fortitudo, and temperantia, one of the four cardinal virtues (virtutes cardinales). As a practical disposition, prudentia is associated with a proper method or rationale (recta ratio, q.v.) of conduct. See virtus.

psychē (ψυχή): soul. See anima.

psychopannychia: the sleep of the soul; viz., the teaching that the soul lapses into a state of unconsciousness or semiconsciousness between the death of the body (see mors temporalis) and the resurrection (resurrectio, q.v.) to judgment. The defenders of this doctrine are called Psychopannychitae. Psychopannychia is denied by both Lutheran and Reformed orthodox. See status animarum a corpore separatarum.

puncta vocalia: vowel points; i.e., the signs indicating vocalization of words in the Masoretic Text of the Old Testament. In the seventeenth century, Protestant scholastics debated the issue of the date when the text was pointed, on the assumption that a postcanonical dating might add a human, uninspired element of interpretation and thereby jeopardize the doctrine of the authority of Scripture. Mosaic origin, or at least origin in the time of Ezra, was claimed by most of the orthodox Lutheran and Reformed, with the definitive confessional statement being made by the Reformed in the Formula Consensus Helvetica (1675), viz., that if the actual points are not coeval with the consonants, then at least the indicated sounds are so. See authoritas Scripturae.

purgatorium: purgatory, cleansing fire; according to the later fathers, the medieval doctors, and Roman Catholic doctrine, a place and condition of temporal, purgative punishment reserved for those Christians who die with the stain of venial sin still on them or who die without having completed temporal satisfaction or penance for their sins. What occurs in purgatory is a final contrition and penance performed with the aid of grace. The doctrine of purgatory conforms to the structure of the medieval sacramental system and the related views of the obedience of Christ (obedientia Christi, q.v.) and of the necessity of human merit (see meritum de condigno; meritum de congruo). The Reformers and the Protestant scholastics reject the idea of purgatory, regarding it as having no scriptural foundation and as unnecessary in view of justification by grace through faith alone and in view of their conception of the obedience of Christ. The primary biblical ground for the doctrine of purgatorium is 2 Maccabees 12:42–45 (42–46 in Vulgate), which is deuterocanonical, or apocryphal, and therefore rejected by Protestants.