Because the telephone line risked being tapped, Captain Meyer used a mutually agreed code⁹⁷ to speak with Eggen. In plain language, his message read:

After Guisan’s meetings with Schellenberg in Biglen and Arosa, which served to restore the situation in Switzerland’s favor, informants among Germany’s leadership have told us that Berlin is not interested in keeping Switzerland independent—which means that Switzerland is in danger. Do you know what the German leadership thinks about that? And if the reports are true, do you think that there is any means to prevent that decision from being made? Colonel-Brigadier Masson would like to know what you think about that. What do you think about a meeting between Masson and Schellenberg in Berlin? What does Schellenberg say about his efforts in favor of Switzerland? Please get back to me soon so I can reassure Swiss Army headquarters.

Eggen reassured Meyer, replying, “I have heard only good things so far, there are no reservations whatsoever nor is there any reason to worry. Here everything is merry. Regards to everyone.”⁹⁸ Meyer-Schwertenbach immediately informed Masson about his conversation with Eggen.

In the morning of Monday, March 22, 1943, Weidenmann called Meyer at Wolfsberg castle to ask him to call Berlin in the afternoon. At 3 p.m., two hours before Rigi reported that the alert was over, Meyer once again spoke with Eggen over the telephone. The German explained that everything was normal and that he was scheduled to arrive in Basel the following day. Meyer again informed Interlaken about that. At 11 p.m., Masson called Meyer at the Schweizerhof hotel in Zürich, asking him to urgently call him back the following morning from a public telephone.⁹⁹ The following morning, Masson told Meyer about Viking sounding the all-clear, stating, “The decision has been made, but not against us—I suppose¹⁰⁰ that this is due to Dr. Berg’s intervention. Could you verify that with E[ggen] in order to allow me to report that information to my chief [General Guisan].”¹⁰¹

With that order in mind, Meyer drove to Basel to pick up Eggen at the train station. He noted in his diary that during a casual conversation he told his guest from Berlin, “We were informed about the [planned] incursion into Switzerland;… yesterday it was decided [to call it off].—[Eggen] is visibly dismayed about our being informed; late that evening he admits that [the operation] was scheduled to be carried out on March 25, 1943.”¹⁰² That is what the owner of Wolfsberg Castle reported about Eggen’s reaction. However, there is reason to wonder whether in this instance Meyer-Schwertenbach’s account should be taken at face value. Because it is known today that at that time Germany had no plans for an invasion of Switzerland, there is every reason to argue that Meyer misinterpreted Eggen’s reaction.

When he told Eggen about Swiss Intelligence being informed about Germany’s intention to attack Switzerland, Meyer probably did see a reaction in Eggen’s face, but instead of being dismayed the German was astonished. Eggen had not expected such a revelation, and he tried to think how he should react to it. As it turned out, that revelation unexpectedly made it easier for him to accomplish the mission that had brought him to Switzerland. He probably hesitated because he tried to see how far he could venture forward, but Meyer misinterpreted that moment of hesitation. In an effort to present his superior Masson with the requested confirmation to General Guisan’s attention, Meyer unintentionally supplied the SS major with the information that he needed to convincingly play the role that the Swiss had intended for him. Meyer, who had turned rash as a result of the called-off alert, told Eggen that a connection of Swiss Intelligence had warned them about the upcoming invasion but had been able to say only that the operation would take place no later than April 6. Eggen consequently had enough information available to “admit” to Meyer, who was all ears, that the attack had been scheduled for March 25, 1943.

Then Eggen started spinning yarns. He claimed that Switzerland’s fate had been hanging by a single thread, but luckily Schellenberg arrived at the Führers headquarters in time to defend Switzerland’s interests. Eggen reported that Schellenberg initially had a tough time, and after Hitler’s return he called Eggen to tell him that he believed that everything was lost. It was only due to Himmler’s and Ribbentrop’s support that he was able to reverse the decision to invade Switzerland.

Captain Meyer was deeply impressed by Eggen’s account and immediately called Masson at army headquarters to tell him about it. The Chief of Intelligence wanted to personally consult Eggen on the matter. Meyer and Eggen traveled to Zürich, where Zürich’s Police Inspector Wiesendanger was expecting them. At 9 p.m., Meyer left the German in Wiesendanger’s company and went to pick up Masson at the train station. He gave his superior a detailed account of what Eggen had told him. Meyer’s notes indicate that he and Masson were both in high spirits because they considered that “their connection” had obviously saved Switzerland from an invasion. He wrote:

I congratulate [Masson] on what he [has] done for Switzerland, telling him that the country could never be thankful enough to him. He slaps me on the shoulder and proudly says, “I am not the only one to whom the credit goes for this, Meyer. I know who else is owed the same amount of credit.” I tell him that in the last few decades no other Swiss has done as much for his home country as he has. I tell him that Dr. Wiesendanger considers that Masson should receive an honorary doctorate for that—and Peter [i.e. Eggen] and Schelli should be made honorary citizens of Switzerland.¹⁰³

Meyer informed Masson that Eggen had mentioned in passing that Schellenberg would appreciate Masson’s sending him a short thank-you note,¹⁰⁴ adding that at the same time he should accept Schellenberg’s invitation to travel to Berlin within the next two weeks, where Masson was said to be scheduled to meet Reichsführer of the SS Himmler.¹⁰⁵ Meyer said that the purpose of Masson’s visit was “to feel Switzerland out concerning the sacrifices that it might be willing to make if the Führer publicly acknowledged its neutrality because now [they had] to continue [their] efforts in order to get things straightened out between the two states, both on a political and economic level.”¹⁰⁶ Masson commented to Meyer that now they were facing the most difficult part of their task, thereby indicating that he was perfectly willing to go on a mission to Berlin.

When Meyer and Masson arrived at Wiesendanger’s office, Eggen repeated to the Assistant Chief of Staff what he had told Meyer. Masson thanked the German for his efforts, then called General Guisan to tell him that he had received confirmation of the information about the called-off invasion, explaining, “The disaster would have hit us the day after tomorrow.”¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Captain Meyer the writer had drafted Masson’s letter to Schellenberg.¹⁰⁸ The Chief of Intelligence agreed with the draft and typed the letter from dictation. By that time Eggen and Wiesendanger had left for the Schweizerhof hotel. Later that night the four of them celebrated the connection’s successful intervention¹⁰⁹ before discussing the steps that should be taken ahead of Masson’s visit with the Reichsführer SS. They deliberated whether it was better to inform the Federal Council or the Commander-in-Chief. Meyer recounted, “We decide in favor of the second option because if the Federal Council does not authorize Masson to travel, the Führer risks becoming furious; Eggen confirms that indeed that is what will happen, adding that that shows that in a democracy it is impossible to negotiate anything in a legally binding manner with one single individual.”¹¹⁰

The three Swiss among the party did not realize that their German guest was celebrating a different kind of success. To Eggen, the festive mood of the three Swiss confederates proved that Schellenberg had a reliable secret channel available to Switzerland’s army command. While Masson and Meyer interpreted the outcome of the alert of March 1943 as convincing evidence of the value of their connection to the Reich Security Central Office, German reference material shows that Berlin viewed the line with Masson and Meyer so positively—probably too positively—that it believed that there was no need for any other line. A letter that SS Lieutenant General Gottlob Berger,¹¹¹ the head of the SS Central Office, wrote a few weeks later to Himmler is an interesting piece of evidence for that fact. Shortly after Viking had sounded the all-clear, a retired high-ranking Swiss officer took a private trip to Germany to visit relatives. Franz Riedweg,¹¹² who dealt with issues pertaining to Switzerland at the SS Central Office, suggested that the officer “use the opportunity to tell some people the truth about the perspective of a neutral and well-inclined country.”¹¹³ For that purpose, he organized a luncheon at his office at Grunewald¹¹⁴ to which he also invited his chief Berger and Permanent Secretary Stuckart. Berger reported to his superior Himmler about that meeting:

In my opinion, [the retired Swiss officer] is no longer a candidate for a leading political position because he will never make the break from a Swiss Confederate to a National Socialist, no matter how small the break is. This is what I told SS Major Dr. Riedweg in a matter-of-fact and clear manner, and I gave him strict orders to maintain the contact on a personal and friendly level, if possible in an even more cordial manner, but without talking about any political issues. Dr. Riedweg does not know that we have another promising connection to Switzerland. I will keep an even closer eye on how Switzerland is dealt with.¹¹⁵

Reactions among Swiss Intelligence

Masson and Meyer were absolutely convinced that due to their secret channel to Berlin they had saved Switzerland from a German invasion.¹¹⁶ However, it did not take long for their enthusiasm to be dampened by everyday reality. On April 8, 1943, when Captain Meyer told his superior, “Peter has informed us that he will arrive next Tuesday [April 13] to transmit the invitation to Berlin,”¹¹⁷ Masson explained to his intermediary, “This is where the most difficult phase begins of our efforts to build up relations.”¹¹⁸ He said that Kobelt had informed the Federal Council about the meeting in Biglen and reprimanded the Commander-in-Chief. Meyer added, “Moreover, he explains that some officers of his service have threatened to resign if he does not give up the friendly relations with the SS people Eggen and Schellenberg.”¹¹⁹ Masson argued that these circumstances would make it more difficult for him to travel to Berlin, and he would imperatively have to inform the federal government about the trip. Captain Meyer suggested to him:

If that is the case, next week [you] will have to go and see the Cabinet in the Commander-in-Chief’s company to explain the situation, showing them the invitation. That will allow [you] to counter every accusation and refuse to accept any responsibility [for] the consequences that the country will suffer if the invitation is not accepted. I envy [you] for being able to defend yourself before the entire Cabinet because [you] have a clear conscience and on 25 March you saved the country through our relations. [You are] no Quisling because [you] consider Germany’s situation as hopeless; everything is just a matter of gaining time.¹²⁰

Masson did not tell his staff member that by making some thoughtless remarks at army headquarters a week earlier Meyer-Schwertenbach had contributed in large part to making the connection to the Reich Security Central Office highly contested. In addition to the Federal Council, the opponents of the connection now also included Chief of Security Werner Müller, the head of N.S.1, Major Waibel, and the head of the Axis Section, Major Ernst.

On March 30, 1943, Captain Meyer had gone to see Colonel Werner Müller at army headquarters in Interlaken. In a letter to Masson, the Chief of Security explained:

[Meyer] was dressed in civilian clothes, paying me a visit from old loyalty, as he put it. Among other things, he told me about his intervention in Berlin in connection with the “Viking” message that you know about.… I had an interest in letting the man talk even though I was about to lose my mind. Several things have become clear to me.… In connection with the “Viking” matter I have the definite impression that Captain Meyer more or less thinks of himself as the savior of our country, and that he very deliberately plays the role of someone who is supposedly in a position to check if our Intelligence Service works properly and to evaluate its performance.¹²¹

The Deputy Chief of Intelligence made an absolutely correct assessment of Meyer’s state of mind. That same evening, Meyer told other officers at army headquarters that he had no intention of letting anyone transfer him to the Uto sub-office; instead, he said that after the successful intervention by “his” connection he definitely expected to be acceptable again in Interlaken.¹²²

The day before, when running into Waibel at army headquarters, it was the same enthusiastic state of mind that had caused Meyer-Schwertenbach to tell the head of N.S.1 in Lucerne about the latest accomplishment of the Masson-Schellenberg connection. Waibel later recalled that Meyer had approached him to “congratulate [him] on [his] good intelligence service because the reports by ‘Viking’ had been correct, as he had been able to verify himself in Berlin.” Waibel commented:

First I did not trust my ears, then I thought that Meyer’s explanation about his mission to Berlin was a bad joke. When I realized what had happened, I addressed a serious written warning and complaint to Deputy Chief of Intelligence [Werner Müller]. I pointed out that there was no further need to prove that Schellenberg was not sincere toward Switzerland and consequently not toward Masson either because Schellenberg had not sent us any warning. It was not until after the fact, upon Meyer’s inquiry, that he claimed that due to his intervention with Himmler the plan to occupy Switzerland had been dropped. Of course anyone could say that.¹²³

Masson rejected the criticism that Schellenberg had been insincere toward him by failing to warn the Swiss; he argued that that had not been the purpose of the connection, stating:

At no point in time did I expect Schellenberg to supply me with military information, and I most certainly did not expect him to inform me ahead of time if there was a threat to Switzerland. On the contrary, we had discussed with Schellenberg about the possible strategic need for Germany to attack Switzerland. For that event, I basically kept telling Schellenberg, “You will face 500,000 men who are very determined to defend themselves to the last.” I tried to make us look even stronger than we were.¹²⁴

He said that Schellenberg for his part had made him clearly understand that

… if those among Hitler’s entourage who were in favor of “liquidating” Switzerland gained the upper hand, he would be reduced to carrying out official orders, so I should not expect him to inform me ahead of time of that attack. In March 1943, I was therefore not at all surprised to have been informed by my “Viking” connection rather than Schellenberg about the meeting at the Führer’s and the threat that was materializing against us. The goal of the connection with Schellenberg was to have someone high up who should prevent the Führer from “playing the madman” to our detriment by giving in to his impulses.¹²⁵

What should one think of these arguments? Schellenberg could hardly be accused (the way he was by Waibel) of playing Masson false by failing to warn him in March 1943; there had been no meeting at the Führer’s headquarters concerning Case Switzerland, as has been shown. However, Waibel did not know that Schellenberg was indeed insincere toward Masson and Switzerland by taking credit for saving Switzerland at a meeting at the Führer’s headquarters that did not take place. This shows that the circumstances were more complex than the involved persons realized at the time. Waibel and Masson were both partly wrong with their assessments. However, Waibel reached the right conclusion even though the information that he used to support his case was inaccurate,¹²⁶ whereas Masson, who was right not to expect any warning from Schellenberg, showed gratitude toward Schellenberg that was unwarranted. All the same, even this last statement should be put in perspective because after his meetings with General Guisan in Biglen and Arosa, Schellenberg did indeed write a report to Ribbentrop’s attention that was favorable toward Switzerland.¹²⁷ Hence, to a certain extent Schellenberg was justified in taking credit for standing up for Switzerland’s interests as an independent state—even if he did not do so in the way that he tried to make Masson believe.

In a broad sense, due to his secret channel to the Reich Security Central Office, Masson did have “someone high up who should prevent the Führer from ‘playing the madman’ to our detriment by giving in to his impulses.” However, Switzerland’s Chief of Intelligence obviously failed to realize that he had to pay a very high price for having that channel available. Was the price actually too high? Waibel definitely thought so, arguing:

Himmler might very well be capable of having a personal direct line to Switzerland’s army command in order to properly pull the wool over its eyes practically with his own hands, and unfortunately he has done so successfully, [adding] based on the issues raised by Switzerland’s army command that Eggen and Schellenberg transmit to him, Himmler draws conclusions about the things that Swiss Intelligence knows, the same way that we are able to draw conclusions about Germany’s information and intentions from the issues that double agents report to us.¹²⁸

Waibel considered that by asking Meyer to verify with Eggen whether the reports by Viking were true, Masson had made an inexcusable mistake with far-reaching consequences. He explained:

We have obediently told the Reichsführer SS in person that we have been informed about the talks in the immediate entourage of the Führer’s headquarters. Now the Reichsführer will do whatever is necessary to prevent our informa[nt] of the “Viking” connection from doing that again. If the informa[nt] is discovered, the lives of several of our close collaborators are lost—through our own fault. That is something for which I cannot take responsibility. What is more, we have uncovered our best alarm bell, once again through our own fault.¹²⁹

Waibel noticed that several of his informants had turned suspicious, fearing that the Masson-Schellenberg connection would be their doom. He stated: “One of our informants who works at the German security service recently expressed serious reservations about SS General Schellenberg’s strange trip and the fact that this dangerous man could travel around Switzerland as he pleased and was even received by top officers.¹³⁰ This means that German circles also know about Schellenberg’s mission.”¹³¹

As it turned out, Waibel’s warnings and reservations were absolutely justified. Shortly after Captain Meyer had called Eggen¹³² to verify Viking’s information, one of the key individuals in the connection was arrested on suspicion of high treason and was interrogated for five weeks. Waibel commented, “The only reason why the ‘Viking’ connection escaped the clutches of Himmler/Schellenberg was the fact that the ‘Viking’ connection was one of our best-kept secrets. Only two other people in Switzerland besides me knew the names of our brave and spirited ‘Viking’ people.”¹³³ Moreover, it was extremely important for German Intelligence to know what Swiss Intelligence had been able to find out about Germany. The enraged Waibel consequently described the fact that such information had been given away to an SS leader—the Chief of Foreign Intelligence at the Reich Security Central Office, of all people—as an act of high treason by negligence.¹³⁴ However, objectively speaking, one must add that there is no evidence that there was a causal relationship between Masson verifying Viking’s information and the Viking agent being arrested; the two events may simply have coincided. Once the suspect was released, the Viking line successfully resumed its activities in favor of Swiss Intelligence. The fact that the suspect was set free could actually be an indication that Germany did not think that he had any ties with Swiss Intelligence; otherwise, it would be hard to understand why the Germans spared him from the gruesome torturing techniques that the Gestapo used to apply with a degree of unscrupulousness typical of totalitarian systems trying to extort information from individuals. Nevertheless, this reservation does not change anything about the fact that Masson took a great risk by showing such unbelievably excessive trustfulness toward his German partners. It was not until much later that it must have dawned upon Switzerland’s Chief of Intelligence what a faux pas he had made. Twenty years after the fact, he asked Meyer-Schwertenbach, “What exactly did you tell Eggen or Sch[ellenberg] during the famous telephone conversation that is held against us? I refuse to believe that we asked Schellenberg ‘if the situation was serious’ and if Switzerland was in danger. After all, we are not that stupid.”¹³⁵

Max Waibel considered Masson’s action unacceptable, prompting him to threaten to resign from Army Intelligence if the direct connection to the Reich Security Central Office was not immediately interrupted. He remarked, “I believe that it is a threat to our country. I may not be able to avert this threat; however, I do not want to trivialize it either by remaining on the staff of Group Id, nor do I want to terribly disappoint those who work with me because they trust me and therefore also trust the intelligence service.”¹³⁶ The only reason that made Waibel stay with Army Intelligence was the fact that no one else could have stepped in to continue the important job of procuring intelligence from the Axis countries.¹³⁷

For his part, Alfred Ernst, the head of the German Bureau, could not be made to take back his letter of resignation. Two days after the supposed day on which the “disaster” was to hit the country, on March 27, 1943, he wrote to the Chief of Intelligence:

I am deeply concerned about your telling me that you checked with your German informants whether Switzerland was in danger. I am convinced that people like SS Leader Schellenberg and Eggen have no honest intentions toward us but are playing a dangerous game with you that is bound to have fateful consequences.… I am ready to resign if the SS leaders, who I think are capable of doing only bad things, continue to exercise any influence on Switzerland’s Intelligence Service. I feel obligated to tell you frankly that I will do my utmost to fight against this influence that is fateful to our country, and I am ready to bear the consequences of my conviction.¹³⁸

Masson threatened to sue Ernst before the Military Attorney General if he did not take back his insinuation that Masson had opened up Swiss Intelligence to SS influence. Also, he shrugged off Ernst’s serious reservations by remarking, “Your judgment of Schellenberg and Eggen… is primarily the result of your negative reaction to everything that comes from Germany.”¹³⁹ Masson argued that, after seven years of heading Army Intelligence, he knew “all the difficulties that its operations entail[ed].”¹⁴⁰ Moreover, he said that he had not checked with his German informants whether Switzerland was in danger, as Ernst claimed. He stated:

It is not true that after receiving “Viking’s” warning my first reaction was to ask Berlin “whether Switzerland was in danger.”¹⁴¹ I am not so naïve as to believe that at the last moment even loyal informants would commit such a harmful act to their country. In reality I notified Capt[ain] Meyer that he should be receiving news from the north these days, and I basically informed him about what we had been told through another special channel. I do not know what exactly this officer said. Besides, he corresponded with a comrade¹⁴² whom he knows well.¹⁴³

When Alfred Ernst realized that the Chief of Intelligence would not change his mind, he asked the Chief of the General Staff for a transfer from Group Id to the Section of Operations, arguing that his “views on fundamental issues differ[ed]”¹⁴⁴ from Masson’s. Lieutenant General Huber granted his request.¹⁴⁵ Hausamann and the commander of the Pfalz sub-office, Emil Häberli, also considered resigning because of Masson’s secret channel to the Reich Security Central Office.¹⁴⁶ However, like Waibel they ended up staying on their posts because they believed that by quitting the damage would be even greater.

Result

Based on the strategic situation of winter 1942–1943 it appeared plausible for German circles to talk about Switzerland and its possible reaction to an Allied invasion. Swiss Intelligence had perfectly good reason not to make light of the warnings that had been leaked to it in March 1943. However, based on the reference material that is available today, it is safe to conclude that the “March alarm” of 1943 was a product of Swiss Military Intelligence’s imagination and that in an effort to consolidate the connection with Masson and strengthen the confidence that Switzerland’s Chief of Intelligence had in the channel, after the fact Schellenberg and Eggen skillfully managed to take credit for saving Switzerland by making Meyer and Masson believe that they had used their influence among the German leadership to avert the threat of an invasion by the Wehrmacht.

After the war, the two SS officers actually admitted, although indirectly, to pulling the wool over the Swiss’ eyes. In addition to the fact that in March 1943 the agenda at the Führer’s headquarters was dictated by the events of the war in Africa, the Mediterranean, and at the front in the East, making the topic of Switzerland simply irrelevant, Schellenberg would not have had the opportunity to defend Switzerland’s interests in what he described as a dramatic meeting at the Führer’s headquarters. In spring 1945, Schellenberg told Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte, “Of course I have not seen Hitler for two or three years.”¹⁴⁷ In fact Schellenberg had not seen the Führer since 1942.¹⁴⁸ Eggen made a statement that was just as revealing. In 1948¹⁴⁹ he told the U.S. investigating magistrate in Nuremberg, “Acting on Canaris’ instructions, Gisevius was the first person¹⁵⁰ who informed Switzerland’s General Staff that an attack on Switzerland might be planned. That was after the famous meeting at Wilhelmstrasse [at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]¹⁵¹ during which the idea of an invasion of Switzerland had been carefully considered. I was the second person who arrived in Switzerland; Schellenberg had asked me to tell the Swiss, ‘It was Schellenberg who was able to avert things from you at the last moment.’“¹⁵² Masson and Meyer-Schwertenbach unintentionally facilitated Eggen’s task by virtually urging Schellenberg’s intermediary to admit something of which he was supposed to convince the Swiss.

One could argue that Swiss Intelligence’s erroneous reports of March 1943 about Switzerland being in great danger had no very serious consequences because they resulted in Switzerland being even more alert and increasing its defensive precautions; hence, the alert of March 1943 contributed, although unintentionally and for no objective reason, to rendering the national defense even more effective. From that point of view, a false alarm was certainly better than a missed alarm. However, for Swiss Intelligence the false alert of March 1943 did have serious consequences, acting as a catalyst of the conflicts that had been smoldering for a long time.

When the staff members of Group Id heard through the grapevine that Masson had used his secret channel to Schellenberg in a highly rash manner, the malaise within Army Intelligence deepened, resulting in an éclat at the Axis Section in the short run and creating a lasting rift among the Intelligence and Security Service in the long run. Instead of showing the necessary mutual understanding and working together, staff members began eyeing each other with mistrust and suspicion. A staff member of the Pfalz sub-office recalls, “In 1943-1944 the Schellenberg affair served as an example of the fact that the German leaders could not be trusted and that our procurement lines had to be sealed off also from Chief Masson.”¹⁵³ From that moment on, the staff at Army Intelligence were split into two irreconcilable camps, resulting in rivalries, intrigues, and lawsuits that dragged on for several decades after the end of wartime duty. From that point of view, the Masson-Schellenberg connection had disastrous, disintegrative consequences.¹⁵⁴