THE HISTORY OF THE controversial connection between Masson and Schellenberg goes back to the fall of 1941. The connection essentially became possible because Captain Paul Meyer was friends with Lieutenant Colonel Henry Guisan, the Commander-in-Chief’s son. Guisan Jr. was a member of the Army Staff.1 Based on his notes, the circumstances under which Meyer met Schellenberg’s aide and courier Eggen were different from the ones described by historian Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, who used the reference material that was available to him at the time.2 Following is a short account of what happened.
Henry Guisan Jr. was a shareholder and member of the board of directors at a company that did business with the Warenvertriebs G.m.b.H. in Berlin, which was owned by Hans Wilhelm Eggen. Because Meyer was not only Guisan’s friend but also his legal advisor, the Commander-in-Chief’s son introduced him to Eggen. These are the facts that are established on the basis of the available reference material. However, once an attempt is undertaken to look into the circumstances under which the connection was set up, matters become complex and confusing. Fuhrer rightfully states, “The early history in itself is already very contradictory.”3 Indeed, in many instances the written evidence tells two conflicting stories. Some parts of the history of the connection resemble pieces of a puzzle that do not perfectly fit together; some pieces may be missing, but it is not always clear which ones. As a result, this author asserts that his attempt at reconstructing the facts offers only a plausible overview of the connection as he has been able to reconstruct from the written records.
At the end of October 1940,4 Eggen arrived in Switzerland to purchase a large quantity5 of submachine guns on behalf of the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs.6 This event, in connection with which Eggen was mentioned for the first time, is interesting not only because of its consequences, but also because it already shows that due to his winsome manner, the German managed to circumvent bureaucratic procedures in an elegant fashion. After the fact the involved Swiss authorities felt cheated, yet it remained unclear whether Eggen had intentionally pulled the wool over their eyes.
In February 1940, the Government of Finland had indicated that it was interested in purchasing the Swiss submachine guns in question. Even though Switzerland’s Army Command approved the sale, it did not go through, apparently because of the political situation at the time.7 The Swiss Army for its part was interested in purchasing about 275 submachine guns of the same type. They would have needed 200,000 pieces of ammunition for the guns. The problem was that the ammunition was neither being manufactured in Switzerland, nor was it available in Germany in early 1940. It was not until August 1940 that the Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabrik A. G. had that quantity in stock for sale to Switzerland. On November 6, 1940, despite the fact that Chief of the General Staff Huber consequently requested funds from the Commander-in-Chief to purchase the submachine guns from the manufacturer in Neuhausen, canton of Schaffhausen, and the ammunition from Germany, the purchase did not materialize. The following day, the head of service for Ammunitions at the Ordnance Section called the head of the Ordnance Section, Col. Alfred Muntwyler, to tell him that a representative of the German Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs named Eggen and a representative of the Luchsinger company in Zürich had come to see him. Chief of the General Staff Huber explained: “They declared that for some reason or other they were interested in the submachine guns in question. The two men supposedly made a good impression, and the Ordnance Section considers that it is advisable to allow the submachine guns to be sold, not least because the required ammunition, which we have to purchase in Germany, would not be released for sale if we created difficulties.”8
Apparently Eggen was in a great hurry to conclude the deal. Immediately after seeing the head of service at Ammunitions, he succeeded in arranging a meeting with Colonel Muntwyler at the train station in Thun.9 At that meeting, acting as the representative of the German Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, Eggen confirmed that Germany set great store on purchasing the guns. In exchange, he presented a document promising that Germany would supply Switzerland with gasoline.10 Colonel Muntwyler explained to Eggen that in order to wrap up the deal the military attaché at the German Legation in Bern had to officially confirm that Germany was in need of the material, and that “in any event, the Swiss Army wanted to keep 25 of these arms for test purposes.”11 Eggen and his business partner from Zürich accepted these conditions and traveled to Bern to see Military Attaché von Ilsemann. Meanwhile, Muntwyler asked the Intelligence Section “whether currently there was any interest in doing the German Government or the German Military Attaché a favor. The Intelligence Section gave an affirmative answer.”12
As early as the same afternoon, Ilsemann called the head of the Ordnance Section to supply the requested confirmation.13 The head of Materials and Technology at the Ordnance Section informed Chief of the General Staff Huber about Ilsemann’s telephone call, and Huber approved the arms sale, later explaining to Minister Jean Hotz, “I did so mainly because the guns were useless to us without the ammunition and it was highly questionable whether the ammunition could be imported.”14 On that same day, November 7, 1940, Ilsemann was informed over the telephone about Huber’s approval. The following morning, the Army Command confirmed in writing that it approved the sale of 250 submachine guns, whereupon the deal was concluded,15 and it was agreed that in return Germany would supply 200,000 liters of gasoline. Until the present day the exact circumstances of the transaction have been contested16 because it is one person’s word against another’s.17 In the context of this study, only the consequences of the deal, which ended up falling through, are significant; because the gasoline in question was not delivered,18 “[Switzerland’s] Department of Economic Affairs supposedly asked the Department of Foreign Affairs to prevent E[ggen] from entering Switzerland in the future.”19
It is not possible to establish when exactly Meyer-Schwertenbach found out about this matter. In the note for the file dated November 14, 1941 concerning his first contact with Eggen, Meyer was vague, stating that “weeks ago”20 his friend Henry Guisan had told him about Eggen and the trouble he had entering Switzerland, adding that “Eggen supposedly had good connections with Himmler and was certainly interesting for our intelligence service.”21 Meyer consulted with his superiors, Colonel Werner Müller and Colonel22 Masson. With their approval, he established contact with Eggen.23 However, that was not very easy because apparently the Swiss authorities had serious reservations about this particular German re-entering Switzerland. Meyer made inquiries with several governing bodies, explaining:
I had that24 verified and was informed by Berlin that E. would like to come to Switzerland to justify himself [because] it was not his fault that the deal in question25 had fallen through. It was Switzerland that had refused to accept leaded gasoline. He was also said to be able to provide Switzerland with orders that would create jobs. Through an informant, I tried in vain to make the Department of Economic Affairs26 change its mind. I subsequently noticed that the German Legation backed [Major] von Steiger [of the Ordnance Section],27 as Ilsemann28 and E[ggen] are opponents because [Eggen] is a member of the SS.29
With Masson’s approval, the head of the Special Service subsequently called on the Swiss Federal Police Section30 about Eggen “and asked them to authorize him to enter the country as there was an interest in his being available31 in Switzerland.”32 Meyer managed to get a three-day single-entry visa for Eggen. The trip must have meant a lot to Eggen as well. Meyer remarked, “He arrived right away by plane, and one of my informants received him in Dübendorf. “33
On October 30, 1941, at the Schweizerhof hotel in Bern, Meyer-Schwertenbach and Eggen met for the first time; the Swiss introduced himself as Dr. Ritzburg.34 Guisan Jr. introduced Eggen to him by remarking that he was “a capable man for the connection with well-known personalities in Berlin.”35 It will be shown below in this chapter that, by making that statement, Guisan not only had intelligence matters in mind but also had high hopes as a businessman. Eggen soon talked about business as well. Meyer noted: “[Eggen] thanked me because he had heard that he owed it to me that he was allowed to travel to Switzerland. He told me that the [German] Army needed wooden barracks and that he had flown to Switzerland to purchase them because his ministry was responsible for the troops’ well-being and safety.”36 According to Meyer: “[The first] meeting was friendly and lasted about 45 minutes. I accompanied him to the train station, and he asked me to see to it that he could come back one more time. He said that he wanted to go to see the Department of Economic Affairs with me in order to set the record37 straight.”38
The wooden barracks deal that Eggen brought up and that Meyer had probably already heard about through Guisan Jr. played a key role in Meyer’s meeting with Eggen, and therefore also in establishing the Masson-Schellenberg connection. The barracks deal had several aspects; it was a private business transaction that had implications for the Swiss economy as a whole, as well as for the intelligence services of two countries. In the framework of this study, the intelligence aspect is obviously particularly interesting. In the next section it will be demonstrated that the influence of Swiss Intelligence actually facilitated the establishment of business relations in which Guisan Jr. was interested as a private individual.39 However, since Guisan’s German partner Eggen was indeed a promising contact for Swiss Intelligence, it is questionable whether this instance should be considered as a case of abuse of the intelligence service for personal purposes; the contact with Eggen was business that could be profitable to both sides.
Opponents of the connection with Schellenberg later accused Meyer of misusing his position as an army official for his own business purposes. In early 1943, Colonel Werner Müller used Meyer-Schwertenbach’s business relations with Eggen as a pretext to remove him from the Security Service. Müller explained to the Chief of Intelligence: “[The fact] that Captain Meyer is the lawyer of a foreign national who occupies an important position should be taken into special consideration in connection with the Intelligence and Security Service. I know that Captain Meyer received substantial payments for his services and that—regardless whether this is done intentionally or not—to a certain extent civilian and military activities have been combined.”40 He acknowledged that Meyer had the right to work as a lawyer because “an officer with his social status [could] not live from a soldier’s pay.”41 Nevertheless, the head of the Security Service feared that Meyer’s business relations could result in “extremely delicate concomitants,” arguing:
Even if these relations are absolutely honorable—I have no reason to believe that they are not—as a matter of principle contacts with an officer holding a major position are not allowed. For domestic political reasons such contacts are dangerous merely because they exist. I insist on pointing out these circumstances because it is of importance to me to prevent a scandal from being created one day that would have serious consequences for the army.42
Hence, the head of the Security Service suggested to Masson that “for special official reasons” he indefinitely put Meyer-Schwertenbach on stand-by.
In fact, the owner of Wolfsberg Castle benefited from his contact with Eggen as a private individual. However, considering the identity of the Germans who were involved in the connection, it could be argued that Meyer had realized that contact with them could only be established and consolidated through interesting business proposals.43 Meyer’s relatively small income from the connection and his rather substantial expenses incurred through his involvement in it44 speak in favor of this argument.
At the end of 1940, in response to Swiss offers, the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) attempted to purchase wooden barracks in Switzerland.45 When negotiations with the Swiss Wood Syndicate (SHS)46 broke down in 1941, the Waffen-SS took over.47 As a member of the SS procurement office,48 Hans Wilhelm Eggen, a major in both the regular SS and the Waffen (armed) SS,49 was put in charge of the transaction. He did business through the Warenvertriebs G.m.b.H. in Berlin, a firm that had apparently been created by the SS.50 According to Eggen, the company’s “main activity was to carry out international compensation deals, especially with Denmark, Switzerland, Slovakia, Sweden, [and] Spain.”51 Eggen was the company’s manager. In order to make progress with the purchase of the barracks, his deputy, Max Baumann, “initiated contact with [Hermann] Weidenmann, a German living in Zürich who had a bad reputation,”52 who in turn contacted Rudolf Haenger and his son Rudolf Walter Haenger, two businessmen whom he knew in Basel.53 Haenger and his son subsequently founded a shareholding company in Lausanne called Extroc S.A. They were both named to the new company’s board of directors, along with an industrialist from Lausanne54 and a “higher-ranking officer,”55 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Guisan, the son of the Swiss Army’s Commander-in-Chief.
The available reference documents reveal a lot of details about Guisan Jr.’s relations with the Extroc S.A.56 The company, which was incorporated on August 29, 1941, purchased, sold, imported, and exchanged a large variety of goods.57 It primarily arranged for the delivery of goods that did not go through Switzerland at all. According to a report by the Basel-Stadt police department, in terms of exports the company arranged the sale of Swiss-made wooden barracks to Germany and Italy as well as the sale of paintings.58 The report also stated: “In reality the company is directed by Mr. Haenger and his son. The company’s entire business transactions are carried out by these two gentlemen.”59 Lieutenant Colonel Guisan, whom the two businessmen had first contacted in June 1941, initially hesitated to join Extroc’s board of directors.60 However, after making some inquiries and informing his friend Meyer-Schwertenbach,61 Guisan agreed to do business with Haenger and his son under the condition that Director Ernest-Otto Knecht was also named to the board.62 The two businessmen from Basel agreed, so on August 27, 1941, Extroc S.A. was founded.63 Was Lieutenant Colonel Guisan supposed to have served as a bulwark against potential claims by the tax authorities looking into excess profits from war-related sales?64 After the war, Director Knecht made no secret of the role that had been assigned to Guisan, stating, “ Through his father’s position, he had access everywhere. Even though we considered him mostly as a ‘piece of ornament,’65 a few times we actually had to use his services.”66 Furthermore, Knecht commented: “Fortunately Guisan Sr. was commander-inchief, not his son. The son has a bad reputation. We had no good experience with him.67 Nevertheless, at certain times he rendered us some good services.68 Some deals became possible through his father.”69 During the same conversation, Knecht described Guisan Jr.’s two business partners from Basel as “dangerous black marketeers with innocent manners.”70
Soon after the company had been founded, it became known that everything had been arranged for the barracks deal. In retrospect, the Commander-in-Chief’s son admitted, “From that moment on, I was in a delicate situation.”71 In addition, it turned out that Haenger and his son were not in a position to hold the negotiations for the barracks transaction, so Guisan Jr. “personally intervened in order to get the Swiss Wood Syndicate to act as a substitute for Extroc S.A.”72 Guisan henceforth took an active part as a mediator on the Swiss side and enlisted the head of the Special Service as his legal advisor.73 As a legal advisor, Meyer-Schwertenbach had to advise and represent the group of Swiss brokers. He saw to it that “Eggen could directly address the official Swiss authorities.”74 The relations that Meyer arranged75 worked out; at the end of November 1941, the Swiss Wood Syndicate and Eggen, the representative of the Warenvertriebs G.m.b.H., held first talks in Bern. In January 1942, with the approval of the Commerce Section of the Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs, the SHS management traveled to Berlin, where the negotiations continued under the direction of the Swiss legation.76 On January 22, 1942, they ended with an agreement77 on the delivery of 2,000 barracks buildings.78 A first partial delivery79 of 500 wooden barracks80 was made in early spring 1942.81 In supplementary agreements dated April 15 and August 6, 1942, the two parties agreed on the delivery of another 500 barracks, which were shipped in fall 1942.82 According to the SHS President, “At the end of 1942, new negotiations were held that resulted in an agreement on 1,000 barracks,83 but it was not executed because several compensations and services had not been rendered in return.”84 However, in fall 1943, new talks were successful, culminating on October 7, 1943 in an agreement85 on the delivery of 70 wooden apartment buildings,86 which were shipped in January-February 1944.87 Later several rounds of new negotiations were held, but they did not result in any agreement.